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IN REPLY REFER TO AGAM-P (M) (7 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 683062 10 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I FFORCENV, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OF UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During May, June and July 1968 United States and Free World Military Forces (PMF) with 37 maneuver battalions (19 US and 18 ROK) supported by 24 artillery battalions and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with 20 maneuver battalions supported by six artillery battalions conducted operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ). Operations were conducted in the west along the Cambodian/Lao/Republic of Vietnam (HVN) border in Talar, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Ninh Thuan Provinces. As the quarter started military operations were offensive in nature and oriented toward the location and destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast, cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolutionary development were emphasized. By early June the enemy forces, which had suffered several military defeats during May, chose to avoid decisive contact throughout the zone. Increased reconnaissance operations geared to locating the enemy forces were partially successful; however, where possible, the enemy continued his evasive tactics and refused to become engaged.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 1377 KIA and 3898 WIA. Enemy losses were 5023 KIA, 534 captured and 1671 individual and 137 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, 11 CTZ accounted for 403 Hoi Chansa.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) General: The I FFORCIV Intensified Reconnaissance Program initiated during the first quarter of the year was continued during the past quarter. Minor modifications and refinement of the program have been made during the period. Evaluations have been made to measure the effectiveness of the program, and means of improvement are continuously being sought.

(2) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(a) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.

(b) G2 Air:

1. The Intensified Reconnaissance and Surveillance (IRS) Program
which was started on 10 March 1968 requires that areas be selected for Intensified Reconnaissance and Surveillance. The areas selected on a weekly basis include known or suspected base areas, infiltration routes and other areas of intelligence interest. During the first week of May 1968 this program was evaluated. The evaluation revealed a need for minor modifications in the program to include the reduction in the size of R&S areas and closer coordination with tactical units.

2. In an effort to provide increased responsiveness to the requests of tactical units for aerial reconnaissance and to bring about an increase in the number of reconnaissance objectives completed, I FF0hCV G2 1IR and DASC ALPHA Reconnaissance have implemented new procedures for the daily selection of USAF recon targets. These new targeting methods have been coordinated with MACV TASE and will be conducted on a trial/evaluation basis. The following benefits should be realized:

1. Reconnaissance objectives will be targeted according to the desires of tactical commanders, providing timely intelligence information in the areas of their primary interest.

2. More detailed analysis of the weather conditions in each area, prior to targeting, will greatly reduce the number of targets normally lost due to bad weather. The overall objective is to provide a dynamic tactical aerial reconnaissance program which is responsive to the commanders' requirements.

1. During the period 555 photo targets, 1400 IR targets and 180 SLAR target areas were planned and completed. Readout information from the reconnaissance missions was furnished to all commanders concerned.

(c) 55th MI Detachment (Corps):

1. For the period 01 May through 29 July 1968, the 55th MI Detachment received 606 missions and processed 499. In addition, 20 Dorsal Fin missions and 21 Yankee Team missions were received and processed. Forty-four Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted which included 20 area studies, two trafficability studies, 17 area studies in southeastern Laos, one coastal study and four border studies. Twenty Supplementary Photo Interpretation Reports were also submitted covering the Dorsal Fin. In addition to reports submitted, four area studies were completed, 18 were made, SLAR plots were maintained and numerous overlays were furnished to requesting units. The 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) was furnished with updated master plates covering the entire II Corps Tactical Zone.

2. During the period 01 May through 31 July 1968, 66 individual weapons, 32 crew-served weapons and 200 pounds of miscellaneous quartermaster and medical items of equipment were evacuated to MACV. Effective 1 June 1968, CMSC Team #2 ceased picking up these items as this is now a C3 function. During the period, IFW teams screened and classified 221 detainees and, as a result of these interrogations, a total of 158 PIRs and 18Rs were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 91.6 feet of documents were forwarded to CUBE for further exploitation. IFW teams translated 58 Korean language documents, 18 courtesy translations, and 64 Vietnamese language translations for a total of 159 Allied translations.

(d) Detachment D, 1st MI Bn (ARS):

1. During the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, Detachment D flew 167 sorties in support of units of the II CTZ, transporting 11,554 pounds of cargo. The detachment also interpreted 952 targets; processed 292,093 prints of which 269,360 were interpreted; prepared 1075 II reports including 1280 items.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters 1 FORGE for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. Hand-held photographic missions continue to receive increasing emphasis within the detachment's overall operations. It flew 60 hand-held missions resulting in 3510 developed prints.

(e) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company:

1. Training: Cycle one of the ARVN LRP training program initiated during the last quarter has progressed to completion. Of the 121 students in Training Cycle One who were tested during the period 22-28 July 1968, 22 will be qualified as ARVN LRP's. The LRP qualification test is administered by the ARVN Ranger Training Center at DUC MY. This test is an ARVN imposed requirement on all ARVN LRP trainees and is the basis for determining which personnel will be awarded the ARVN LRP badge and LRP incentive pay. The high attrition rate is attributed to the stringent standards observed by the Ranger Training Center. Alternative utilization or retraining is being considered for the 99 LRP personnel who have completed training but were not qualified. Ranger testing procedures are also being studied more closely, to ascertain which areas may require greater training emphasis for future students. Training Cycle Two of the program began on 29 July 1968. If required, modifications of the FOI will be implemented as soon as possible. Mobile Training Teams are now provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) for 22d ARVN Division, Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (Airborne) for 23d ARVN Division and 4th Infantry Division for 24th STL (ARVN).

2. Operations: During the reporting period, Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry inserted 153 LRP's which resulted in 125 enemy sightings and 45 enemy KIA (BC). Friendly losses were three LRP members KIA and 12 wounded. Integration of ARVN and US LRP personnel continues to effect excellent results. There have been some outstanding examples of ARVN LRP contributions with no derogatory reports received. To date 33 ARVN LRP's have completed integration with US units and 29 ARVN Rangers are now integrated into two platoons of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry for LRP operations. Integration periods are normally 60 days in duration. Approximately 50 additional ARVN LRP's are scheduled to begin integrated operations with US units on 5 August 1968.

(f) The 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain): The detachment, updated, and after printing, distributed 62,900 copies of tactical data overprinted maps covering seventy 1:50,000 scale map sheets; 1900 of the terrain analysis overprinted maps covering 1:50,000 scale map sheets were distributed. One study on enemy infiltration was completed and distributed. Three special studies covering trafficability, stream crossings, and a terrain study of local areas were prepared.

(3) Deviation from current intelligence doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

(4) Significant changes from previous reports: None.

(5) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:
1. Units accepted:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>325C NVA Div</td>
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<td>4925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; Spt Units/325C</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th AA Bn/325C</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th Engr Bn/325C</td>
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<td>17th Trans Bn/325C</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<td>18th Signal Bn/325C</td>
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<td>19th Med Bn/325C</td>
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<td>101D NVA Regt/325C</td>
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<td>HQ &amp; Spt Units/101D</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn/101D</td>
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<td>4th Bn/95C</td>
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<td>5th Bn/95C</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn/95C</td>
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<td>K-61 Signal Bn/NT 5</td>
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<td>240th Bn/WK 6</td>
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<td>450</td>
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<td>13th Hvy Wpns Bn/NT 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th AA Bn/NT 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>K39 Bn/33d NVA Regt</td>
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<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>400th Sapper Bn/NT 3</td>
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<td>125</td>
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2. Units removed:

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<td>32d NVA Regt/32d Ft</td>
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<td>HQ &amp; Spt Units/32d</td>
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<tr>
<td>334th Bn/32d</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>635th Bn/32d</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>300</td>
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TOUS USFOR-63 (R1) (U)

19th Trans Bn/NV 1 Disbanded
H-13 AA Bn/NT 1 Confirmed, redesignated 41th AF Bn.
2d Br/J3d NVA Regt Confirmed 250, disbanded in 1966
40th Mortar Bn/NT 3 Confirmed, 100, disbanded
70th Field Hosp/NT 3 Confirmed 90, disbanded

2. Changes in subordination: 96th Bn from the 32d NVA regt to the B3 Ft.

4. Other changes: 209th NVA Regt now carried as the 320th NVA Regt (aka 209), 1st NVA Division; H-15 Engr Bn now designated the 15th Engr Bn, 1st NVA Division.

(c) Enemy losses during the period: (KIA is 35% of KIA based on MIA/V criteria)

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<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>KIA-CHUNK</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>CHAW-Servefl</th>
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<td>May</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RF/FP</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>2777</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Jun   | US   | 353 | 48  | 187| 13       | 15|
|       | ROK  | 424 | 35  | 199| 6        | 15|
|       | ARVN | 143 | 11  | 32 | 1        | 10|
|       | CIDG | 154 | 18  | 91 | 5        | 5|
|       | RF/FP| 163 | 44  | 75 | 5        | 5|
| TOTALS|      | 1237| 432 | 156| 92       | 584|

| Jul   | US   | 167 | 11  | 35 | 5        | 5|
|       | ROK  | 441 | 13  | 175| 11       | 11|
|       | ARVN | 129 | 25  | 20 | 1        | 1|
|       | CIDG | 122 | 3   | 68 | 9        | 5|
|       | RF/FP| 150 | 110 | 39 | 0        | 0|
| TOTALS|      | 1009| 353 | 165| 126      | 337|

*All figures reflect the period 01-29 July 1968.
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15 August 1968

(d) Total Enemy Strength in III CTZ as of 30 July 1968:

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<tr>
<td>VC MF/LF Units</td>
<td>8,755</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>4,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>19,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>74,165</td>
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(e) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy Capabilities:

1. In Kontum Province the enemy has the capability to:

   a. Conduct ground attacks against US/allied bases of Dak Pek, Dak Suang and Ben Het in up to multi-battalion strength supported by RA, mortar, rocket and artillery fire.

   b. Conduct standoff attacks against Allied forces and installations using mortars of up to 120mm, 75mm RA and rockets of up to 140mm as well as 105mm/115mm artillery with or without a coordinated ground attack.

   c. Employ multi-battalion NVA/VC forces to interdict QL 14N, Highway 512 and other major friendly LOCs.

   d. Restrict friendly air activity with fire from 5A, 82mm, 14.5mm and 37mm AA artillery.

2. In Pleiku Province the enemy has the capability to:


   b. Attack Pleiku City utilizing 82mm mortar, 75mm RA and 122mm rocket fire as well as sapper units.

   c. Employ multi-company NVA/VC forces against friendly convoys and installations along QL 19E and QL 14N, supported by 75mm RA and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack LOCs 509, TL 62, 437, TL7C and TL7B with company sized VC elements using AT grenades, RA and mortar fires.

   d. Conduct standoff attacks against other Allied installations.

3. In Daklac Province the enemy has the capability to:

   a. Attack Ban Me Thuot City with multi-regimental forces employing 75mm RA, 60mm/82mm/120mm mortars and 122mm rocket fire in support.
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Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

b. Attack Lac Thien, Buon Ho and Phuoc An District Headquarters with
75mm RBU, 60mm/82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire in either a stand-off role
or in coordination with up to two battalion size force ground attack.

4. In Phu Bon Province, the enemy is capable of harassing Cheo Reo and
district headquarters.

5. In Binh Dinh Province attack the population centers, US/GVN install-
lations and units in multi-company strength. Employ multi-company forces
against friendly convoys along QL 19E. The enemy is capable of employing
stand-off attacks by direct and/or indirect fire weapons against Allied
outposts and fire support bases supported by sapper units. Conduct ter-
rorist and harassing activities along the coast near QL 1.

6. In Phu Yen Province attack urban areas in Tuy hoa and Tuy An Districts
in reinforced battalion strength, when supported by LF and HF units. Infil-
trate Tuy Hoa with up to platoon size unit and conduct sapper and terrorist
activities.

7. In Khanh Hoa Province conduct stand-off attacks employing direct
and/or indirect fire weapons against Allied installations in the Nha Trang
and Cam Ranh Bay areas, and conduct company size attacks against lightly
populated areas.

8. In Binh Thuan and Tuyen Duc Provinces attack local villages and
Allied outposts in up to two battalion strength when augmented by LF com-
panies and continue interdiction of QL 14 and 20.

9. In Lam Dong and Ninh Thuan Provinces attack small Allied outposts
and villages in up to battalion strength. Interdict QL 11.

10. Continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort.

11. Employ any combination of the above capabilities.

12. Withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for replacements,
resupply and retraining.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1. Enemy LOCs are extended and insecure with the exception of those
traversing neutral countries or international waters, which afford some
degree of security.

2. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treat-
ment facilities.

3. The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for
extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior Allied firepower in any
large scale offensive.

4. The ease of detection by friendly forces using aerial observation of
trail movement, base areas, and fortification, limits the enemy's mobility
and activity.
5 Recruited and impressed VC personnel are relatively untrained and inexperienced. NVA units are short experienced leaders; additionally, NVA replacements have received minimal training and are unfamiliar with the terrain.

6 The rainy season in the Central highlands will slow down or even intercept the movement of NVA supplies and men. In addition, the enemy's capability to move armor, mechanized artillery, and trucks is severely handicapped.

7 As a result of harassment and terrorist activities and the Tet offensive, the populace fears the enemy and will probably provide the enemy support only under duress.

8 Low morale, in many units is caused by one or more factors, e.g., Allied firepower, sickness, lack of food and lack of significant victories.

9 Replacement of VC personnel by NVA members in main force units is a source of friction.

10 The replacement of VC LF personnel in MF units has created a morale problem for LF personnel. Too, the competence of MF units is reduced because of the inexperience of the LF replacements.

11 Due to the generally low morale, the enemy is highly susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

7) Weather:

(a) Interior: The month of May marked the transition between the Northeast and the Southwest Monsoon over Southeast Asia. Wind flow was highly variable during the month with direction varying from northeast to southeast to southwest and back to northeast throughout May. Prevailing weather conditions were patchy morning low clouds and fog which dissipated between 0900H and 1000H. Skies then became fair to partly cloudy with isolated afternoon and evening rainfall and thunderstorms. Skies were generally clear during the late night and early morning hours. The Southwest Monsoon moved into the II Corps area by 3 June. This resulted in increased cloudiness and precipitation during the months of June and July. However, the Southwest Monsoon has not been as strong as in previous years and total precipitation amounts averaged well below the monthly normals. Extensive low cloudiness and poor visibilities in fog and intermittent rain and drizzle were a common occurrence during the morning hours with conditions beginning to improve during the late morning. Skies were generally partly cloudy to cloudy during the late afternoon and evening as few scattered rainshowers and thunderstorms occurred. Thunderstorm activity was occasionally severe and a few funnel clouds were observed but no damage has been reported. Skies cleared somewhat during the late night and early morning hours.

(b) Coastal: Very little day to day change in weather occurred along the coastal sections of II Corps during this period. Skies were mostly fair to partly cloudy with isolated to few rainshowers and thunderstorms over the coastal mountains during the afternoon and evening hours. Isolated shower activity occasionally occurred along the immediate coast during the afternoon and early evening. Heaviest shower activity along the coast usually occurred south of Cam Rán Bay during the late afternoon hours.
Extensive cloudiness and rain occurred along the coast on 3 and 4 June as the Intertropical Convergence Zone moved through the II Corps area. Patchy fog formed on some mornings in the river valleys near sunrise but dissipated by 0900H. Occasional strong southwest surges would bring cloudy skies to coastal areas along with an increase in precipitation, but these outbreaks were infrequent and generally lasted only two to four days. Tropical Storm Olive developed as a tropical depression on 23 July at 1700 North 1140 East. The storm intensified slowly and as it moved slowly northward, was declared a tropical storm on 25 July with winds in excess of 35 knots. On 27 July the storm weakened once again and dissipated as the entire system moved slowly northward. Weather resulting from the storm was in the form of a strong wind belt with moist equatorial air which covered the entire Republic of Vietnam. The worst weather occurred on the western slopes of the mountains. Three days of ceilings less than 500 feet and visibilities of one to three miles occurred in the interior II Corps. Cam Ly Airfield experienced ceilings of less than 300 feet and visibilities of less than two miles during the 48 hour period 24/0800 - 26/0800H. Cam Ly Airfield and Tuy Hoa both reported winds in excess of 30 knots.

(c) Effects of Operations: There were a total of 199 TAC sorties cancelled due to weather. Helicopter airborne operations were occasionally delayed due to weather during the early morning hours and for approximatly 48 hours during the period 24-26 July 1968.

(d) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting I FFORCEV and USAVY tactical units in II CTZ, Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV), Americal Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Support is being provided in the following manner:

1. I FFORCEV:
   a. Staff Weather Officer (SWO)
   b. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ
   c. Climatological Support
   d. Mobile Observation Teams

2. 4th Infantry Division
   a. SWO and Forecaster support at base camp
   b. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs.
   c. Observations at base camp
   d. Climatological Support

3. Dalat (Cam Ly Airfield)
   a. Observations
   b. Forecasts on as required basis

4. An Khe
   a. Observations
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1. Forecasts on as required basis
2. LZ English
3. Observations
4. Forecasts on as required basis
5. Phan Thiet
6. Observations
7. Forecasts on as required basis
8. Americal Division
9. SWO and Forecaster support at Chu Lai
10. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs
11. Climatological Support
12. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
13. SWO and Forecaster support at base camp
14. SWO and Forecaster support at Division Forward when operational
15. Observations at Brigade CPs and Division Forward CP when operational
16. Climatological support
17. Provisional Corps Vietnam
18. SWO Support
19. Forecast support center for I CTZ
20. Climatological support
21. Task Force South
22. Observations
23. Forecasts on as requested basis

24. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

(1) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence and overall strategy, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published 2 operation orders, 4 contingency plans and 4 fragmentary orders during the reporting period. One combined LOI was written as well as LOI to the three headquarters (4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and TF South) operating under I FFORCEV. The semi-annual revision of the I CTZ Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) occurred during this period, with a quarterly summary of progress toward attainment of CCP goals being submitted and the oral review being held. The monthly senior commanders' conference and weekly special operations briefing were continued.
as well as instituting a monthly measurement of progress briefing on the CCP goals. A major study was conducted on the Five Southern Provinces and portions have already been instituted. Two new concepts developed were the "Pair Off" and "Lock On." The "Pair Off" concept teams US battalions with ARVN Regiments in close coordination with the same AO. The "Pair Off" allows the commanders at all levels to plan and execute combined operations through a full exchange of ideas, intelligence and tactical plans. In addition, at all levels, commanders stress coordination and cooperation with district and province officials to enhance the RF and PF capabilities, install offensive motivation in the RF/PF leadership, and insure coordinated support planning. As an adjunct to the concept, the AOs were renamed to include both the Vietnamese and US names. The "Lock On" envisions a friendly unit targeting on an enemy force. The friendly unit will "Lock On" to VC/NVA adversaries, focusing their full time and attention on his destruction. With the concept, friendly units will come to know their adversaries habits, base areas, personalities, weapons and doctrine and through this knowledge will be able to eliminate him.

(a) Operations Orders: OPORD 200-68, Change 14, (OP MCLAIN) was published on 21 July. This major revision of the original OPORD extends AO MCLAIN and provides for TF South headquarters as recommended in the Southern Province Study.

(b) Contingency Plans:

1. OPLAN 103-68 (LUCAS GREEN/SILVER) was published on 2 May 1968. The OPLAN provided for 3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div to be deployed on 48 hour notice into the Ban Me Thuot (LUCAS SILVER) or Kontum/Pleiku (LUCAS GREEN) areas to relieve or reinforce US/RVNAF forces. OPLAN 103-68 (OP LUCAS GREEN) was redesignated OPORD 103-68 as of 23 May for execution. The OPORD further specified the deployment to Dak To of 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div to reinforce 4th Inf Div.

2. OPLAN ROKNE GOLD: Though never published, this plan was instituted by Frag Order on 10 May.

3. OPLAN 2-68 (OP BANJO ROYCE) was published on 4 June 1968. This OPLAN provided for the I FFORCEV in coordination with I Corps to locate and destroy VC/NVA operating SW of Dalat.

4. OPLAN 104-68 (OP JAY SILVER) was published on 19 July 1968. The sensitivity of this particular plan exceeds the classification of this document and precludes further discussion.

(c) Frag Orders: The following frag orders show a continued reliance on special type operations in II CTZ. The Long Range Patrols and Mobile Strike Force continue to provide accurate "find and fix" data on enemy forces. The frag orders issued are as follows:

1. Frag 0 17-68 was published 10 May 68 employing elements of 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in the Southern Province area.

2. Frag 0 18-68 directed Co B, 5th SFCA to conduct a two company NSF operation North of Pleiku, vic CL 19A. The mission assigned was RF. Artillery support was provided by the 52d Artillery Group with Avn support being provided by the 19th Aviation Group. The operations commenced 27 May for 10 days.
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3. Frag O 22-68 directs Co B, 5th SFGA to conduct a LRP/MSF TF IIF operation with three companies in the Song Ba Valley NW of An Khe. The operation commenced 12 July 1968 for 15 days and was supported by the 52d Arty Go and the 17th Avn Gp. A back-up reserve/reaction force was initially provided by the 4th Inf Div and the responsibility later assumed by the 173d Abn Bde (SBP).

4. Frag O 23-68 deployed a three company MSF TF to Ninh Thuan Province for operations with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) for a period of 30 days. ORCON was assumed by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) on 15 July 1968.

(d) Letters of Instruction:

1. Combined Letter of Instruction Number One concerning the Defense of Urban Areas was written, coordinated and signed by the combined commanders of II CTZ. This LOI outlines in detail the duties and responsibilities for defense of urban areas and relief of Regional and Popular Force units and other GVN activities in rural areas in danger of being overrun by superior VC/NVA forces.

2. LOI to CG, 4th Inf Div; CG, 173d Abn Bde (Sep); and CG, TF South describes in detail their responsibilities in the conduct of combined operations with regular ARVN and territorial forces.

(e) II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan (CCP)

1. The Campaign Plan was revised to present the second half, CY 68 goals for II CTZ. The document was coordinated with ARVN II Corps and signed by both CG, II Corps and CG, I FFORCEV. Submitted on 21 June to MACV.

2. The Quarterly Summary of 2d Quarter for II CTZ was prepared and submitted on 20 July. The report covers the progress made during the quarter toward the 25 CCP goals. In addition, all major efforts of the Corps are provided in the report.

3. The Quarterly Review of progress toward the II CTZ CCP goals was presented to COMSHACV and Chief, JGS at Pleiku on 30 July. The oral report covers the progress toward the 25 CCP goals and any problem areas encountered.

4. A new monthly Measurement of Progress briefing was initiated whereby on a monthly basis the CG, I FFORCEV and all staff elements are briefed on the progress toward the goals of the CCP.

(f) Southern Province Study. The comprehensive study of the five Southern Provinces of II CTZ was conducted. The study determined the threat to the area required additional friendly forces. The additional force was provided by moving 3d BN, 303d Abn Inf, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to Bao Loc initially and placing TF South, a command and control group, at Dalat, to control the 3d BN, 506th Abn Inf, 101st Abn Div and the 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf. In addition, this headquarters will coordinate combined operations with 23d ARVN Div and 2d ARVN Ranger Gp.

2. Operational Activities. During the quarter operations throughout II CTZ were characterized by reconnaissance in force and security missions by combined operations of US, ARVN, and ROK forces and stand-off attacks by the enemy. VC/NVA forces avoided decisive contact throughout the zone where possible. Many of the VC/NVA units were reported withdrawing to their training areas in and out of country.
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(a) Western Highlands May Operations: In the western highland provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac, Operation TAN-MAI-ACHTRUK was characterized by occupation of fire support bases and key terrain vicinity Dak To - Ben Het and Polei Klang in anticipation of large scale enemy attacks (see Incl 2). Reconnaissance elements operated out of the fire support bases to maintain surveillance of and contact with the enemy forces. Significant actions occurred as follows:

1. US Operations: On 10 May, C and D Co., 3d Bn 8th Inf located vicinity TB 886291 were attacked by an estimated VC/NVA battalion. Artillery and Spooky supported and contact broke after four hours resulting in three US KIA, 12 US WIA, enemy - 47 KIA, six FN's, five SA and two CSW captured. On 16 May, Fire Base Brillo Pad received a standoff attack of mortar, recoilless rifle and B-40 rocket fire resulting in five US KIA, 29 US WIA and two 105mm howitzers damaged. On 25 May a mine sweep team supported by one platoon of C Trp 2d Sqdn 1st Arm Cav operating on Highway 512 made contact with a reinforced company astride the road. Troop C 2d Sqdn 1st Arm Cav reinforced and artillery, TAG Air and gunships from B Trp 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav supported. Results of this action were: Friendly - two KIA, 11 WIA; Enemy - 5 KIA. On 25 May the 3d Bn 101st Abn Div reinforced the 4th Inf Div as it was deployed from I CTZ to the highlands vicinity Polei Klang. On 29 May at FSB A-29, A and C Co 1st Bn 8th Inf were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. After the enemy initially penetrated the perimeter and occupied six bunkers, the US forces counterattacked and regained the bunkers. Enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire continued throughout the day with losses to the US forces of 14 KIA, 56 WIA and two MIA. Enemy losses were 129 KIA, two PW's and 52 SA captured. Also on 25 May, FSB Brillo Pad, occupied by 1st Bn 12th Inf received over 250 rounds of 60, 75, 82 and 120mm fire with friendly losses of four KIA, 34 WIA and one MIA. On 30 May, the action for the month was completed by a ground attack on D Co 3d Bn 12th Inf. After reinforcement by Spooky and artillery, the enemy withdrew but continued harassing direct and indirect fire throughout the day. Results were seven US KIA, 10 US WIA with enemy losses of 43 KIA, one PW and 39 SA captured.

2. ARVN Operations: On 5 May, a 4th Inf Div convoy was ambushed on Highway 14, 26 km north of Pleiku City. US gunships supported and the 3d Armd Cav Sqdn deployed as a reaction force. Results were 16 US and one ARVN KIA, 26 US and eight ARVN WIA, nine ARVN MIA, five helicopters damaged, three V-100 scout cars damaged and two M-41 tanks damaged. Enemy losses were 121 KIA, two PW's, 26 SA, 16 CSW, 38 rds 60mm mortar, 12 rounds B-40 ammo, one rd 82mm mortar, three antitank grenades and miscellaneous field equipment captured. On 7 May, elements of 1st Bn 4th Arty (US) contacted an unknown size enemy force five km south of Ban Mein Thuet. TAG Air and artillery supported and contact broke. Results were LI ARVN WIA, with the enemy losses at 24 KIA, one PW, and four SA captured. On 21 May a company of 1st Bn 115th Arty (US) on 4th Inf Div convoy 16 km north of Pleiku City. The 3d Armd Cav Sqdn reacted, supported by artillery and gunships. Results for the action were one US KIA, two US WIA, three ARVN MIA, one 5 ton truck destroyed, three trucks damaged while the enemy sustained 15 KIA and one PW.

3. CIDG Operations: CIDG forces had one major action when a company from Ben Het was overrun in a defensive position west of the camp resulting in one US KIA and one US MIA, one VNSF WIA, nine CIDG KIA, 29 CIDG WIA and 28 CIDG MIA. Enemy losses were 16 KIA.

4. RF/PF Operations: During May the RF/PF forces in the II CTZ were engaged in some of the more significant operations conducted during the quarter. On 15 May the K6 Bn 24th NVA Regt attacked the Kon Sum Luh outpost located 11 km SE of Kontum on Highway 5-B. The 105th and 438th RF Companies defending Kon Sum Luh and C Btry 6th Bn 14th Arty (US) firing in support killed 152 VC/NVA while having only three RF WIA.
(b) Western Highlands June Operations: The tempo of ground action diminished throughout the highlands during the month. In contrast to May, the heavy standoff mortar and rocket attacks were at a minimum. The enemy tended to avoid contact throughout the entire I CFR, almost appearing as if he had completely withdrawn his main forces. For the most part, action that took place was friendly initiated.

1. US Operations: The 4th Inf Div in conjunction with CIDG, ARVN and RF/PF forces expanded their reconnaissance in force operations during the month. This increase in operational momentum was necessary to seek out and find the enemy who chose to virtually disengage from combat for nearly two-thirds of the month. Offensive operations were expanded northeast of Kontum City, the Dak Payau Valley, and into both the Se San and 1a Drang River Valleys in the Pleiku Province. Elements of the 3d Bde 101st Abn Div which had replaced 1st Bde 4th Inf Div in the Dak Pek area returned to the III CTZ as the enemy threat in the highlands decreased. Contact during the early portion of June was moderate with enemy ground and standoff mortar and rocket attacks diminishing by the second week. Significant contact in the western highlands eased toward the end of the month with enemy activity centered primarily in limited interdiction of Highways 14, 14, and 19. The decline of attacks by fire as well as ground attacks may be attributed in part to the fact that the forces of the 133 Front were under constant artillery shelling, B52 and tactical air strikes. Significant actions are as follows:

2. US/CIDG/ARVN Operations: On 1 June a CSF platoon from the Plei Me CIDO Camp made contact with an estimated VC/NVA Co vicinity ZV 1697. The contact was reinforced by elements of the 1st Sqdn 10th Armd Cav. Results were three friendly KIA and 32 WIA. Enemy losses were 26 KIA and five SA captured. On 2 June, B Co 3d Bn 505th Abn Inf made contact with an estimated enemy company vicinity YB 8830 resulting in 11 US WIA and 10 enemy KIA. On 3 June, vicinity BY 8027, B and C Companies 1st Bn 35th Inf received 30-35 rounds of 82mm mortar followed by small arms fire from an estimated two enemy companies. Three US were KIA and 23 WIA while two enemy were KIA and six SA captured. On 4 June vicinity YB 7927, B Co 3d Bn 12th Inf engaged an estimated two VC/NVA companies. Four US were WIA and one enemy was KIA. A sweep of the area located 21 weapons and assorted military equipment. Two ambushes were conducted against a 4th Inf Div convoy on 4 June. Results of both contacts were two US KIA, two ARVN and eight US WIA while enemy losses were 33 KIA and five SA captured. While conducting operations on 24 June in the Dak Payau Valley vicinity BR 048. Trp A 1st Sqdn 10th Armd Cav found 90 rounds of 82mm mortar, 80 rounds of 60mm mortar, 800 fuzes, 40 cases of 7.62mm ammunition and 50 PRG - 2 rounds. On 9 June, the Ban Me Thuot airfield received 70-80 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 11 aircraft damaged. On 10 June, vicinity Dak Pek CIDO Camp, elements of the 1st Bn 22d Inf received mortars and a ground attack by an estimated VC/NVA battalion. One US was KIA and 22 CIDG WIA as 16 enemy were KIA and three SA captured.

2. On 19 June a CSF company engaged an estimated reinforced enemy platoon vicinity ZV 1897 resulting in 10 VC/NVA KIA and six SA captured. On 23 June vicinity ZV 1272, a CIDG element from Ban Me Thuot discovered an ammunition cache containing 375 mixed 82mm mortar and FRG - 2 rounds. In addition, 11 rounds 122mm rocket, along with 150 PRG - 12 boosters, 150 82mm mortar fuzes and 50 containers of shotshells were uncovered.
Western Highlands July Operations: Activities in the Western Highlands were limited, mainly by the enemy's continued reluctance to become decisively engaged. Because the enemy was known to have the capability to mount an attack from his Laotian/Cambodian sanctuaries, Allied Forces in the northwestern highlands maintained a posture which would be capable of effectively countering and engaging any large scale infiltration against Dak Pek or the cities of Kontum or Pleiku. For the entire month, US forces concentrated heavily on patrolling activities from widely distributed company firebases in close coordination with CIDG operations along the northwestern border. Operations already in progress were reinforced in the Dak Payou Valley by combined US/MSF units. In the later part of the month, an increasing enemy threat against Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province became evident and the 4th Inf Div was directed to expand Operation BINH TAY-MACARTHUR to include a brigade AO centered around Ban Me Thuot. This was accomplished by 22 Jul and while there were increasing indications of a large scale enemy buildup in the Ban Me Thuot area, no decisive contact was established. Significant actions occurred as follows:

1. US Operations: On 8 July, the last US unit moved from the Dak Payou Valley back to the Kontum-Pleiku City region. Only NSF units remained in that region and they were unable to establish any decisive contact. The 4th Div was deployed generally along the northwestern Corps boundary in a series of small fire bases from which they conducted extensive local patrolling. This tactic was designed to give early warning to the target areas of Pleiku and Kontum Cities and to force the enemy to commit himself prematurely thus becoming vulnerable to superior US fire support. Only light contacts were made in the two northern provinces and by mid-month it became apparent that enemy units were shifting south towards Ban Me Thuot. CG, 4th Div deployed the 2d Bde with all the necessary combat support and combat service support elements to Ban Me Thuot to conduct extended operations in that area. The 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div moved from the Dak Payou Valley to the Kontum-Pleiku area. On 22 July, the 2d Bde moved to 10th Cav, 17th Air Cav, 2d Bn 35th Inf, 2d Bn 12th Inf and one troop at Sqn 10th Cav. As the units arrived, they deployed north of the city in an expanding reconnaissance in force semi-circle towards suspected VC/NVA sanctuaries and likely jump-off points for a large scale effort against Ban Me Thuot. By the end of the month, US forces had established several light contacts, but none decisive and none with anything larger than a platoon sized force. These small enemy units were felt to be quartering and reconnaissance parties for a larger force which had not yet arrived in the area. In Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, the 1st and 3rd Brigades 4th Inf Div realigned their forces to fill the gap created by the 2d Bde's departure, and continued operations previously described.

2. ARVN Operations: In Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, the 24th STZ's operations were limited mostly to local security missions. Early in the month, the 24th ARVN Regt conducted bomb damage assessment of an ARC Light target. Scattered light contacts were made, but none were significant.

In Ban Me Thuot, the 45th ARVN Regiment made several contacts south of the city. On 17 July, 17 km SW of Ban Me Thuot the Rcn Co 45th ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated VC/NVA company killing seven. Again on 23 July, 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt contacted an estimated VC/NVA company while following-up an ARC Light, killing 22 enemy who were identified as members of the D-237 Infiltration Group normally associated with the 17th NVA Regt. On 27 July, elements of the 2d Bn 45th ARVN Regt engaged an estimated VC/NVA Co killing 17. Again on 30 July, the 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt made a light contact south of Ban Me Thuot in a semicircle similar to the 2d Bde 4th Inf Div's semicircle to the north of town.
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CIDG Operations: CIDG elements continued operations along the Laos/Cambodian border in all three highland provinces, supported by MSF companies operating in both the Dak Payou Valley and anothersuspected base area west of Kontum City. Camp Strike Force elements, from Trang Phu to Plei Meeng, made scattered contacts with enemy units up to company size, but the enemy repeatedly refused to become decisively engaged and eluded allied attempts at encirclement.

RF/PF Operations: RF and PF units continued their local reconnaissance and security missions without establishing significant contact. The various units were subject to an increased number of enemy initiated contacts, but appeared to have demonstrated an increased effectiveness in the face of increased activity directed towards them.

(d) Binh Dinh Province May Operations: Combined operations of ARVN, ROK, CIDG and US forces increased throughout the month though few major actions were reported. Significant actions occurred as follows:

1 US Operations: The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) continued operation DAN SINH-COCHISE in Binh Dinh Province (See Inc 2). On 3 May, eight km north of Cai Lay, a platoon of A Co Ist Bn 50th Inf (Mech) was surrounded and suffered moderate casualties, 1st Bn 50th Inf (Mech), 1st Bn 69th Armor and 2d Bn 50th Arty Inf reinforced. During the contact three gunships were shot down. Twenty-four tactical air sorties were flown and artillery supported. On 6 May, the action continued with 3d Bn 50th Arty Inf moving into the contact area to find, fix and prevent withdrawal of the enemy. A total of 39 enemy bodies and 13 weapons were located during sweep operations. Other minor actions in the area through 7 May by the 2d Bn 50th Inf and 3d Bn 50th Arty Inf produced overall casualties for the period 4-7 May of 23 US KIA, 124 WIA. The enemy losses were placed at 145 KIA, two PW's, one rafier and 16 SA captured. On 11 May B and C Co Ist Bn 50th Inf (Mech) were attacked by an estimated two VC/NVA battalions six km southwest of LZ Uplift. The VC/NVA force fired over 150 rounds of 82mm and 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Results of the attack were: Enemy - 104 KIA; Friendly three KIA and 33 WIA. On 15 May, gunships from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) observed 60-75 enemy five km east of Ha Tay CIDG Camp. Artillery and 3d Bn 50th Arty Inf reacted to the sighting. While sweeping the area, a regimental size base camp, containing 100 bunkers and miscellaneous material, was discovered. On 22 May, B and C Co Ist Bn 50th Inf (Mech) made contact with an enemy battalion six km southwest of LZ Uplift. Results of the action were two US KIA, 16 WIA while the enemy lost 38 KIA and one PW.

2 ARVN Operations: While the 405th ARVN Scout Co was investigating a cave system six km east of Tay Phuoc on 9 May, they received small arms, automatic weapon and B-40 fire from the cave. The 401st ARVN Scout Co and TAC Air reinforced the contact. Results of the contact were: ARVN - one KIA, two ARVN WIA, 10 SA, one FRC 1G, and 54 protective masks lost to the enemy. Known enemy losses were three KIA.

3 CIDG Operations: CIDG elements continued a major operation on 10 May eight km southwest of Ha Tay CIDG Camp. Action continued through the 12th with three CSF Co and one MSF Co employed. Results of the contact were: US KIA, 26 CIDG KIA, four US and 102 CIDG WIA, enemy losses were 130 KIA, 20 SA, 300 uniforms, two tons of rice and assorted ammunition captured.

ARVN Operations: ARVN forces continued to exploit successes gained from Operation MAENG NO 11 to counter a continued threat to the Co Boi Plain area, through Operation BI NO 12. One tank platoon from 1st Bn 69th Armor was placed OPCON to the Senior Liaison Officer to Capital ARVN Inf Div (CSF) in support of the operation. Focused in an area seven km northwest of Qui Nhon, the operation resulted in 39 enemy KIA, 30 PW's, 31 SA, two CSW and 28 hand grenades captured with only two ARVN WIA.

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5. RF/PF Operations: On 5 May vicinity BR 6690 the 17th and 30th PF platoons engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 15 VC/NVA KIA and one PF KIA and two WIA. Contact continued on 5 May when LZ Salem, vicinity BR 9379 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar followed by an attack on the 3d Bn 17th ARVN Regt and 943d RF Company's positions. Results for the operation were nine RF KIA, 16 RF WIA, three ARVN KIA, five RF MIA and 18 VC/NVA KIA. On 18 May the 114th RF Co engaged an unknown size enemy unit NW of Qui Nhon, vicinity OR 0826. The contact was reinforced by two additional RF companies. The fighting continued until the evening of the 19th when the enemy broke contact. Results of the contact were:

Friendly - eight RF KIA, three WIA, one US Adv WIA; Enemy - 43 KIA and seven SA captured.

(e) Binh Dinh Province June Operations: During June elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the An Lao Valley, the Phu My Plains and the Nieu Mui Mountains in conjunction with the 40th and the 41st ARVN Inf Regt. The 3d Bn 503d Abn Inf was deployed from the DAN SINH-COCRISE AO on 18 June to Bao Loc. The 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf continued Operation WALKER by conducting reconnaissance in force operations west of An Khe complementing security operations along Highway QL 1. On 22 June, two companies of the 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf deployed to Bao Loc. In southern Binh Dinh Province elements of the CIDG continued their attacks on the 18th NVA Regt and commenced Operation MAENG HO 12 in the Phu Cat Mountains/Go Boi Plains area north of Qui Nhon. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: On 18 June, Camp Radcliff at An Khe vic BR 4648, received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in 12 US WIA. No significant contacts were made by US forces in June.

2. CIDG Operations: On 15 June, vic BR 6654 a CSF platoon from the Vinh Than CIDG Camp engaged an unknown size enemy force. Three enemy were killed without friendly losses and a sweep of the area uncovered 40 rounds of 82mm mortar, nine SA, 1000 rounds of M-79 ammunition, 800 hand grenades and one ton of AK-47 ammunition.

3. RF/PF Operations: At 1710 hours on 17 June, a PF platoon located vic CR0172 was attacked by an estimated enemy squad as it entered the hamlet. Results of the contact were five PF KIA and nine WIA. In addition, one civilian was killed and 33 wounded.

(f) Binh Dinh Province July Operations:

1. US Operations: The northern boundary of the DAN SINH-COCRISE AO was changed to follow the I Corps/II Corps boundary on 2 July 1968. At 1210 hours 2 July C Co 1st Bn 50th Inf (Mech) was released of its bridge security mission for bridges 87-94 along QL 1 vic BS9217, and returned to LZ Uplift. The Americal Division assumed the mission of bridge defense. On 4 July, 1st Bn 50th Inf commenced a combined operation with the 3rd ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of Suoi Ca Valley. On 11 July, Company C 1st Bn 69th Armor reinforced the CAP ROK Inf Div on Operation MAENG HO 12, in the Go Boi Plains. On 15 July, A Co 2d Bn 503d Inf on a search operation with national police elements located one ton of rice vic BR 901983. An enemy ambush of elements of the 19th Bn in the vicinity of BS 8906 on 22 July resulted in 14 US KIA, nine US WIA, three
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ARVN KIA, eight ARVN WIA and four RP/PF WIA. On 31 July, B Co 1st Bn 50th Inf (Mech) while on a search operation found a cave complex containing $150,000 (US) in $50 bills and 935,000 piasters vicinity of BR 7464.

2. ARVN Operations: The month of July was one which held light contact for the Army of Vietnam and for the Popular and Regular Forces. On 6 July, the 1st Bn of the 41st ARVN Regt was air-lifted from the Suoi Ca Valley to Phu My. On 10 July, three PF platoons, while participating in a search and clear operation five km northeast of Bong Son (BR 8997), made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged, resulting in one friendly KIA while 15 enemy were KIA and 21 SA captured. On the 27th of July, northwest of Vinh at 0925 hours the 114th RF Co made contact with an estimated VC platoon (CR 8897). US artillery supported the contact which broke at 1600 hours, resulting in 15 enemy KIA and two PW's captured without friendly loss.

3. ROK Operations: ROK contacts in the CRID AO by elements of the Cavalry Regiment on 5 July in the vicinity of BR 660149, BR 671348 and CR 880146 resulted in 12 enemy KIA, four SA, two CSW, several hand grenades, small arms ammunition and a small amount of rice captured. The Cav Regt also located a small cache consisting of 49 B40 rockets and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 8 July, during Operation MAEX HD 12 ROK forces, vicinity the Phu Cat Mountains/Go Boi Plains, had several scattered contacts resulting in 17 enemy KIA, one PW and 12 SA captured with the ROK having four KIA. A 13 company cordon, vicinity BR 9941, was completed on 8 July by the CRID's 1st Bde and Cav Regt encircling what was believed to be a battalion size enemy unit. On 11 July, Company C (-) from 1st Bn 69th Armor deployed to the CRID contact area on the Go Boi Plains. Heavy contact erupted as the cordon tightened and the enemy attempted to break out. After several hours of intense combat, 30 enemy were KIA, two PW's, 14 SA and three B-40 rocket launchers and a light machine gun were captured. Friendly losses were four KIA. On the following day the ROK's continued to tighten the cordon making numerous contacts throughout the day. Results for 13 July were enemy 46 KIA, 17 SA and two CSW captured. Friendly losses were one KIA and five WIA. On 15 July scattered contact on the Go Boi Plains resulted in 20 enemy KIA and seven SA captured without friendly losses. Operation MAEX HD 12 terminated on 19 July with the following results: Enemy - 335 KIA, 38 PW's, 77 ralliers, 165 SA and 14 CSW captured. Friendly losses were 29 KIA and 54 WIA.

(g) Central Provinces May Operations: In Phu Bon, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces, US forces reported numerous small actions in the DAN HOA-BOLLING AD including extensive Bushmaster operations conducted by 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: On 2 May B Co 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf conducted an ambush which accounted for eight enemy KIA, seven SA and six packs captured in the vicinity of CR 006496. On 20 May, D Co 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf located 300 pounds of CS gas vicinity of BR 994526. As the area was highly contaminated, the gas was left in place.

2. ROK Operations: The 9th ROK Div continued to concentrate on extensive patrolling and preparation for Operation DOK SURI BAEX MA 6, to take place 20 km west of Nha Trang. On 11 May, a LRP platoon surprised and killed 25 VC/NVA west of the Hon Ba Pass. Six SA, one Tokarev pistol and one hand grenade were captured. As the operation continued, small engagements occurred throughout the area. Results for Phase I and II of Operation DAK MA 6 were: Enemy - 243 KIA, four PW's, 87 SA and seven CSW captured. Friendly losses were five KIA and 12 WIA.

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(h) Central Provinces June Operations: In the central provinces contact remained at relatively low level during June. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf continued Operation BAK BOLLING in conjunction with the 47th ARVN Regt targeting on the 95th NVA Regt in the Ky Lo Valley. There was a significant increase in both mining and booby-trap incidents in Phu Yen Province. This coupled with LOC and POL pipeline interdiction, indicated that although enemy units had refused decisive ground contact with Allied Forces, he planned to continue his harassing actions in Phu Yen Province.

2. ROK Operations: In Khanh Hoa Province, the 9th ROK Div terminated Operation BAK MA 6 20 km northwest of Nha Trang, on 7 June. Results of this highly successful operation were: 305 enemy KIA, five FW's and 135 weapons captured. On 6 June, the Yung Ro Port facility was attacked by a sapper unit resulting in eight US KIA and 22 WIA. On the same day, 13 sections of pipeline north of Yung Ro Bay were destroyed resulting in 50-75,000 gallons of JP-4 and diesel fuel lost. In Operation MAENG HO 12 on 23 June, elements of the CIDG vic CR 0953 killed 53 enemy while capturing seven FW's and 26 SA. Friendly casualties were one KIA and two WIA.

3. ARVN Operations: On 26 June, vic CR 0573, elements of the 4th Bn 41st ARVN Regt were attacked by an unknown number of enemy. Twelve enemy were KIA and three FW's captured without friendly casualties.

4. CIDG Operations: On 6 June, vic BQ 8974, a CSF company from the Dong Tre CIDG Camp engaged an estimated VC/NVA platoon resulting in 10 VC/NVA KIA, five SA captured, and six CSF KIA and two WIA. On 23 June, vic BP 9553, a CSF element from the Trung Dung CIDG Camp engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 12 enemy KIA, one PW and one SA captured without friendly casualties.

(i) Central Provinces July Operations: During the month of July the military activity within the central provinces was generally characterized by small unit contacts resulting from sweep operations and ambushes. Two significant engagements were those of the 29th ROK Regt during Operation BAK JEE 17 west of Nha Trang and the 33d and 89th PP Platoons operations NE of Song Cau. Forces operating in the three provinces include the 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf; the 26th, 29th and 30th ROK Regiments and the 47th ARVN Regiment (-). On 30 July, a combined operation commenced in the Ky Lo Valley (BQ 8377) with the 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf, the 3d Bn 47th ARVN Regt and the 26th ROK Regt participating. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: The 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf was the only unit operating within the three provinces. The battalion conducted search and clear operations in AC BLACK (BQ 3040) from 16-27 July. There were no significant US contacts during the month of July.

2. ROK Operations: ROK Operation BAK JEE 517 was conducted in the Hon Oi Mountains (vicinity BQ 6761) from 7-19 July by the 29th ROK Regt. Numerous contacts were made by the nine companies of this regiment resulting in 129 enemy KIA, two FW's, 35 SA, and one CSW captured. Friendly casualties were two KIA and two WIA. Other ROK contacts were made mostly by ambush which resulted in numerous enemy KIA while sustaining almost negligible friendly casualties.
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2. ARVN/RF/PF Operations: Approximately eight km NE of Song Cau (vic Q1 137925) the 33rd and 89th RF Platoons were attacked by an estimated VC/NVA company on 27 July. The 726th and 946th RF Companies reinforced the contact at 1925 hours by combat assaults into blocking positions. Coastal Group 23 (RF) also reinforced the contact with five junks and two swift boats which later sank two enemy sampans. The 297th and 112th RF Companies were also inserted into the area by combat assault on the morning of 28 July. Contact broke at 0900 hours on 28 July. Results of the action were 16 RF/PF KIA, one VN sailor KIA, six KIA, two WIA, 26 SA and one radio lost. Enemy losses were 29 KIA, three FN's with 13 SA, two OSN and 6000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured.

4. CIDO Operations: The defined area of the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command (IDC) had only a few small unit contacts resulting from combat sweep operations. During the assault of a base camp area (vic BP 987647) by CSF and NSP companies, an extensive cave complex with multiple entrances was discovered. Some caves were 25-30 feet deep with 10-12 feet of solid rock overhang. There is sufficient running water and pools to supply a battalion sized force. Currently this complex is not clear of enemy personnel; however, combat operations are continuing, specifically oriented toward the destruction of the remaining elements of the 18B NVA Regt currently operating in the vicinity of Nha Trang.

(j) Southern Provinces May Operations: During May US tactical operations were limited to Operation DAN THANG-MCLAIN in Binh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces. Minor scattered actions involving US units were limited. Significant actions in this area were as follows:

1. RF Operations: On 5 May, six km north of Phan Thiet, five RF companies reinforced by the 2d Plat C Co lst Bn 69th Armor and 3d Bn 44th ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results of the contact were six RF KIA and 32 RF MIA. Enemy losses were 50 KIA, 16 SA and three OSN captured. On 6 May, three RF companies were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion vicinity BN 256412. The engagement resulted in 20 RF KIA and 214 RF WIA. Enemy losses were 41 KIA and two SA captured. On 25 May, three km north of Phan Thiet, 3d Bn 44th ARVN Inf and a US tank plat encountered an estimated two enemy companies, resulting in six ARVN KIA and 22 ARVN WIA. Three enemy were KIA and three SA were captured.

2. ARVN Operations: On 9 May 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt was ambushed, 15 km SSW of Nha Loc by an estimated company size VC/NVA force. Contact broke after six air strikes. Results were 35 ARVN KIA, 37 ARVN WIA, 44 SA, one FK-10 radio lost with four enemy KIA. On 12 May, the 22d ARVN Ranger Bn on a search and clear operation contacted an estimated VC/NVA battalion, 28 km SW of Dalat. ARVN artillery and Spooky supported. The 22d ARVN Ranger Bn regrouped and swept the area the following day. Friendly losses were 39 KIA, 33 WIA, 25 SA lost. Enemy casualties were unknown; however, an examination of the battle area revealed numerous blood trails and troops in contact estimated 50 VC/NVA KIA.

(k) Southern Provinces June Operations: During early June, enemy initiated activity increased in Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong and the southern portion of Ninh Thuan Province. This activity necessitated a movement of US, ARVN and CIDO elements to the southern portion of 11
CTZ to contain this threat. The 3d Bn 506th Inf 1st Bde 101st ACD moved from the Phan Thiet area to conduct Operation BANJO ROYCE southwest of Dalat, then shifted southeast of Bao Loc in conjunction with the 3d Bn 503d Abn Inf 173d Abn Bde (Sop) which had been deployed from the DAN SING-COCHESE AO in Binh Dinh Province. In response to increased activity vicinity Phan Thiet, the 3d Bn 506th Inf airlifted back into Binh Thuan Province to commence operations against the 482d Local Force Bn. Operation HARMON GREEN was initiated on 18 June southwest of Bao Loc to locate and destroy the enemy. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Forces/RF Forces: On 1 June, a combined task force comprising elements of 3d Bn 506th Inf, engineers, a MEDCAP Team, a civil affairs team, an RF Co, one tank plat, and elements from the national police force made contact with an enemy platoon vicinity AN 8414 resulting in 17 enemy KIA, eight SA and one PW captured. Two US and five RF were WIA. Also on 17 June, southwest of Bao Loc vicinity ZT 1672, C Co 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. Seven US were KIA and 33 WIA, while enemy losses were 15 KIA. A weapons cache was uncovered in the immediate area yielding 63 SA, two radios, approximately 1000 pounds of small arms ammunition, and medical supplies.

2. ARVN Forces, RF/PF Forces: On 1 June, an unknown size enemy force made contact with the 11th Ranger Bn four km west of Dalat. Spooky supported and results were 20 ARVN KIA, 32 WIA while the enemy sustained five KIA and two SA were captured. On 3 June, vicinity ZT 2376, the 512d RF Co was attacked by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 50 RF KIA, six civilians killed and 43 SA lost. On 5 June, a village BN 35386, north of Phan Rang was occupied by an enemy company. Four RF companies were dispatched to the village and engaged the enemy force.

Results of the contact were 13 RF KIA and 18 RF WIA, seven SA and three radios lost. Enemy losses were unknown. On the night of 6 June, Tu Tam Hamlet BN 7874, six km SW of Phan Rang, was entered by an estimated enemy battalion. On 7 June, three companies from the 1st Bn 44th ARVN Regt and three RF companies reinforced the RD units in the hamlet. The contact continued until 8 June resulting in five RF KIA, two US and 11 RF WIA. Enemy losses were 11 KIA, four FW's and three SA captured. On 18 June, vic AN 8412, the 15th RD team made contact with an estimated two VC/NVA companies, a tank plat and the 3d Bn 44th ARVN Regt reinforced; contact broke on 19 June with 53 enemy KIA and 30 SA captured. Friendly losses were 22 KIA and 31 WIA.

On 20 June vic BN 8144, elements of the 44th Bn 44th ARVN Regt were attacked by two enemy companies. Results were 36 ARVN KIA and 12 WIA while 31 SA were lost.

2. On 17 June, a VC/NVA Co was reported to have occupied the village Binh Nghia vicinity BN 8987. Two companies combat assaulted into the area while elements of the 1st Bn 44th ARVN Regt cordoned the area. Sixteen enemy were KIA and eight SA captured while three RF were KIA and three WIA. In Quang Duc Province on 18 June, vic YU 4632 a CSP Co from the Bu Prang CIDG Camp discovered 40 rounds of RPG-2, 300 82mm mortar rounds and 300 hand grenades.

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1. Southern Provinces July Operations: There was only scattered contact with enemy forces in the Southern Provinces during the month of July. The enemy chose to avoid contact and on the rare occasions when located managed to break contact as rapidly as possible. Friendly forces have continued to operate in the Southern Provinces on a reconnaissance-in-force mission directed against MR6 and its elements. On 1 July 1968, the LAN THANG-MCLAUS AO was extended to include all the Area of Operation NAMON GRE13. Forces operating in the area included Task Force South with 3d Bn 503d Abn Inf, 3d Bn 506th Inf, A and C Companies 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf, a two battalion ARVN Ranger Task Force and a three company MSF TF. Weather throughout the month was characterized by low ceilings and scattered rain showers that frequently interfered with air operations. Significant actions in the area are as follows:

1. US Forces: On 4 July 1968, Operation LAN THANG-MCLAUS, the combined US/ARVN/CILG operation, directed against MR6 began when US and ARVN elements conducted combat assaults into landing zones vicinity AN 833354 (FSB Adams), AN 834389 (FSB Washington) and AN 831520 (FSB Jefferson). Effective 15 July, the area of operation was expanded to include all of Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc and Binh Thuan Provinces and that portion of Binh Thuan Province not included in the 9th ROK Inf Div area of operation (see Inci 2). There were only two significant US contacts during the month of July, in which the 3d Bn 506th Inf reinforced an ARVN contact NE of Phan Thiet on 17 July and a RF contact on 21 July. The results of these contacts are discussed in the ARVN and RF portions.

2. ARVN Operations: On 8 July 1968, approximately two kilometers SSW of Duc Lap (vic Tu 883521) elements from the 3d Bn 45th ARVN Regt were ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing claymores. Results were nine ARVN KIA, five ARVN WIA. Enemy losses were unknown. At 0845 hrs on 17 July, the 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt engaged an estimated VC/NVA battalion dug in vicinity AN 934180. Gunships reacted at 1000 hours and friendly forces pulled back to employ tactical air, artillery and naval gunfire. The initial contact broke at 1330 hours and TF South began combat assaulting the 3d Bn 506th Inf into blocking positions to the north and northeast vicinity AN 948195 and AN 93521. The battalion closed at 7125 hours. At approximately 1700 hours vicinity AN 9321, elements from the 3d Bn 506th Inf began receiving mortar and small arms fire and at 1820 hours vicinity AN 9420 other elements from the 3d Bn 506th Inf began to receive small arms fire. Artillery, gunships and Spooky supported and 3d Bn 506th Inf continued to receive sporadic mortar and small arms fire during the night. Additionally, the 3d Bn 44th ARVN Regt moved from Phan Thiet to the contact area and reinforced 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt. A sweep of the area on 18 July revealed numerous bunkers and blood trails; however, no enemy bodies were found. Results of this contact were 11 ARVN KIA, 46 ARVN WIA, 11 SA lost, two US KIA and 30 US WIA. Enemy losses are unknown; however, an agent reported that 68 enemy had been killed. On 26 July vicinity AP 817007 elements from the 22d Ranger Bn made contact with an estimated enemy company. Artillery supported and contact broke at 1000 hours when the enemy exfiltrated in small groups out of the area. One ARVN was KIA, and 17 WIA. Enemy losses are unknown.

2. ROK Operations: On 6 July, the 30th ROK Regt initiated Operation KUN MA #7 northwest of Phan Rang vicinity BP 7303. On 10 July 1968, during this operation, 38 enemy were killed and 10 SA captured without friendly losses. Operation KUN MA #7 terminated on 12 July. Results for the operation were 44 enemy KIA and 11 SA captured. There were no friendly casualties.

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4. RF and PF Operations: Two platoons from the 119th RF Company were ambushed by an estimated enemy company on 6 July 1968, vicinity BM94373. The Song Hao district advisor, Major Allen Pasco, while en-route to the contact with his interpreter was ambushed and killed. His interpreter escaped. The contact was supported by gunships, artillery and tactical air and broke at 1110 hours. At 1200 hours, three RF companies were moving into the area using TF South aviation assets. Night defensive positions were established in the area but no further contact was established. Results of the contact were one US KIA, nine RF WIA, 18 SA and one radio lost.

5. CIDG Operations: On 2 July vicinity YU947671 a Camp Strike Force element from Duc Lap CIDG Camp made contact with estimated enemy battalion. Gunships and tactical air supported the contact which broke at 1230 hours. Two additional Camp Strike Force companies were lifted into the area and combat commenced. The enemy was in prepared positions and employed 8m.1, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle fire and B40 rockets. Gunships, tactical air and artillery supported friendly forces and the 2d Bn, 44th AEVN Regt began combat assaulting into blocking positions at 1317 hours. The 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Regt also began combat assaulting into blocking positions at 1430 hours with the bulk of both battalions and the 4th Trp, 8th ARVN Arm Cav moving into cordon positions. Additionally, three companies from 3d En, 50th Inf closed into the cordon positions at 1735 hours. The enemy made several attempts to break out of the cordon, but when these efforts were met with resistance the enemy force apparently fragmented into small groups of personnel and exfiltrated with the bulk of their weapons. A sweep through the contact area the following day met no resistance. Results for the contact were six RF KIA, 13 RF WIA, eight ARVN KIA, 21 ARVN WIA, two US WIA, six SA lost. Enemy losses were four RF, four FN and four SA captured.

(m) Results for II CTZ for the Period 1 May 68 to 31 July 68.

1. Friendly:

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<th></th>
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<th>ROK</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>RF/PF</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>555</td>
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<td>1374</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>825</td>
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2. See page 6 and 7: Enemy casualty figures.

(n) Results for US operations for the Period 1 May 68 to 31 Jul 68.

FRIENDLY

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AiPA-O2-OT

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SWBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DAN SINH

DAN THANG

DAN HOA

Binh Tay

WALKER

COCHLISK

MCCLAIN

ROLLING

MACARTHUR

KIA

416

157

45

1189

FW

27

13

3

91

SA

65

42

18

267

CS

10

7

0

2

(o) Cumulative results for US Operations.

KIA

23

97

34

60

752

WIA

157

543

331

249

3580

KIA

0

2

0

0

3

ENEMY

KIA

160

493

709

670

5041

FW

8

37

17

88

228

SA

41

102

133

220

1115

CS

1

11

17

19

153

(3) Organizational and Training Activities.

(a) All units that are assigned, attached or under operational control of this headquarters as of 31 July 1968 are listed at incl 3.

(b) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and PAVN units within I CTZ is at incl 4.

(c) The following units were assigned, attached or became OPCON to I FFORCEV during the period.

1. 2534th, 254th and 255th FA Detachments (Radar), assigned by USARV GO 2511, 27 May 68.

2. 256th FA Detachment (Radar), assigned by USARV GO 2532, 20 Jun 68.

3. 1st Civil Affairs Co, assigned by USARV GO 3434, 17 Jul 68.

(d) The following units were reassigned from I FFORCEV during the period.

1. 1st Bn (155mm)(T) 30th Arty, assigned to 1st Air Cav Div by USARV GO 2522, 27 May 68.

2. Btry C, 6th Bn (155mm)(T) 16th Arty, assigned to Provisional Corps Vietnam by USARV GO 2522, 27 May 68.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS 1 FFORCEV FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1968

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28 May 68.

3. 43d APU, assigned to 1st Logistical Command by USARV GO 2542, 28 May 68.

(e) Headquarters, Task Force South (Provisional) was organized by I FFORCEV GO 60L, 24 Jul 68. The headquarters consists of 12 officers and 18 enlisted men with the mission to coordinate unilateral and combined operations in the expanded AO MCLAIN, employing OPCON units to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, and to establish and maintain closest cooperation and coordination with RVNAF units, Province chiefs and their advisors within the AO. Collocated with HQ TF South in Dalat is the 23d Inf Div, Light C.P. Both US/ARVN Commanding Officers work side by side with their staffs working in a combined TOC. The staff produces bilingual briefings, Sitreps, Intsums and operation orders.

(f) Manpower Authorizations:

1. HHC, I FFORCEV, was reorganized under MTOE 52-1T USARPAC 2/68 effective 1 June 1968. USARPAC GO 264, 20 May 68, as amended by USARPAC GO 292, 14 Jun 68 implemented MTOE which authorized 166 officers, 4 warrant officers and 261 enlisted men. The MTOE had been submitted during July 1967.

2. Medium (155mm) and heavy (175mm/8 in) artillery battalions were reorganized under standardised MTOE effective 15 June and 1 July respectively. These MTOE were recommended during USARV Phase I Standardization Conference in Aug 67 and submitted to D.

(g) Research and Development (R&D) Activities:

1. Requests for information on W-I items from USARV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. No SURFUSE requests were received from OPCON units. One SURFUSE request was submitted to USARV from HQ 1 FFORCEV. It was a request for high-power wide angle telescopes to use in II CTZ for long range visual surveillance from high terrain features.

2. Testing of a series of sensors to detect enemy movement was conducted in II CTZ. These are seismic and acoustic types of sensors. They are emplaced either by hand or by air and information from them is monitored at a location apart from the sensors. Test results are inconclusive at this stage but more intensive testing is programmed.

(h) Training:

1. Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, are inspected semi-annually. One unit was inspected during the last quarter and it was rated satisfactory.

2. During the period 22-24 July 1968 a six man CONARC Liaison Team visited HQ 1 FFORCEV and OPCON units. The purpose of the visit was to confer with commanders and staffs at all levels to discuss areas affecting individual and unit training. HQ CONARC, USAAMS, USAVNS, USAIS, USAASCS and USAARMS were represented on the team. Observations made during the visit should contribute recent combat concepts for inclusion in individual and unit training programs in CONUS.

3. I FFORCEV initiated the publication "Tactical Notes" to provide valuable lessons learned to as wide an audience as possible. Lessons Learned are submitted to HQ 1 FFORCEV from staff sections and units in
the II CTZ. After receipt the lessons learned are evaluated by a board of officers (Tactical Analysis Board) which includes experienced commanders and advisors. The first issue was in May 1968. The notes are intended to address primarily the tactical as opposed to the administrative area. The notes are published on or about the twenty-fifth of each month. The overall objective of I FFORCEV Tactical Notes is to provide a recurring publication in which new ideas and lessons learned regarding operations and intelligence matters may be exchanged with a view to improving operations.

a. Tactical Notes for May, Incl 5.


(4) Chemical:

(a) Herbicide operations during this reporting period have included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout the II CTZ have resulted in the cancellation of 319 sorties of 561 sorties scheduled.

1. The results of US Air Force, C-123 herbicide missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NO OF SORTIES</th>
<th>HECTARES DEPOLIATED</th>
<th>M/T CROPS DESTROYED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>37</td>
<td>3180</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>21,844</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Units OPCON to I FFORCEV are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck based apparatuses to spray small areas not conducive to attack by C-123 aircraft.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCi-V for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFCR-65 (Rl) (U)

A. The 4th Inf Div flew one CH-47 helicopter and sixteen UH-I helicopter sorties to defoliate roads and fire base perimeters and to destroy crops. Approximately 130 metric tons of rice have been destroyed through hulborne spray operations in the Dak Kayau Valley. Twenty-three ground based spray missions were completed, using a truck mounted spray apparatus to defoliate the perimeter of the division base camp.

B. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) flew nine UH-I helicopter sorties, two CH-47 helicopter sorties, and two ground based spray missions to defoliate LZs, ambush sites, perimeters and to destroy crops.

c. DSA, II Corps flew 27 UH-1 helicopter defoliation missions requested by ARVN.

b) Riot Control Agents (RCA) were employed in both offensive and defensive operations. Cartridges, 40mm, CS XM651 and 4.2 inch tactical CS, XM630 continue in short supply. Operational quantities are not expected until Dec 68 and 1st Quarter CY 69 respectively.

1. The 4th Inf Div dropped thirty-four XM15 (E-58 Tactical US Canister Clusters) from UH-1s on enemy bunker complexes to restrict their use. A demonstration of one XM15 drop was conducted for 4th Div CBR Officers and NCOs. Bulk CS (2060 lbs) was employed against enemy rocket sites, vicinity YA 7832, from which ground fire had been received. Two largest bulk CS drum drops ever attempted in South Vietnam were successfully conducted against the VC/NVA road network in northwestern Kontum Province. On 28 May, 256 CS drums (20,480 lbs) were dropped by C-130 aircraft on the Alpha Road, vicinity YB 9085, following TAC air strikes, to restrict enemy movement along the VC/NVA road network. Aerial photographs and aerial recon indicated the road was not used by vehicular traffic for approximately nine days. On 2 June, 192 CS drums (15,360 lbs) were dropped by C-130 aircraft on QL-14, vicinity YB 9484, restricting the use of this road for approximately 14 days. Four E-8 CS Launchers were used in demonstrations and in testing the E-8 CS Launcher mounted on the V-100 armored car and the 2½ ton truck. The tests revealed that the E-8 CS launcher could be successfully employed from these vehicles.

2. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) employed six XM15 clusters against fortified positions vicinity BR 9076 to force the enemy into the open prior to an artillery assault. Bulk CS (2,812 lbs) was employed to flush tunnels, restrict the use of possible ambush sites and bunkers and to contaminate routes of access and escape. One E-8 mounted on a truck vehicle was successfully tested for effectiveness as a counter-ambush weapon.

3. The 3d Bn, 506th Inf 101st Air Cav Div employed 1920 lbs of bulk CS to restrict the use of terrain within a known enemy base area vicinity AN '795. On 30 May, five VC/NVA were driven from bunkers by the CS released from an E-8 CS Launcher and killed by the 2d Plt, C Co. 1st Bn, 69th Armor attached to the 3d Bn, 506th Inf.

(c) Personnel detectors (APD and MFD) operating within the I Corps are providing a continual source of reliable information concerning enemy locations. In most instances, gunships, TAC Air, or H&I fires were employed against the locations of the heavy readings. All readings were submitted to the appropriate GS/S2 for evaluation.

1. The 4th Inf Div, operating in the BINH TAY - MACARTHUR AO, flew 71 APD missions. On two occasions APD readings revealed probable enemy
locations in the same vicinity where agent reports had placed two VC/NVA company size units.

2. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep), operating in DAN NOA - IOLING, WALKH, and DAN 5DLN - COCHISE AO's, flew 62 APD and 111 MPD missions. In addition the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) conducted two MPD missions for the ROKs and one mission for ARVN. On 15 May, the sensor aircraft received fire from 20-50 NVA/VC after the MPD reported heavy readings. On 19 May, another sensor aircraft was hit by ground fire, resulting in one US injured.

3. The 3d Bn, 506th Inf operating in DAM HANG - MCLEAN AO flew 21 APD and 17 MPD missions. Seven APD missions were flown in support of MACV Advisory Team 3y (Lam Dong Province).

4. The personnel detector program was expanded to include detector support to ARVN and ROK Forces by US Advisory and liaison personnel trained as operators. One hundred MPD missions were conducted in support of the ROK Divisions by US Liaison personnel. Ten MPD missions were conducted for the 23rd ARVN Div by US Advisory personnel.

(a) The enemy continued to use flame weapons and Agent Control Agents (ACA) on a small scale during offensive operations. On 9 May, vic AR 7953, an unknown size enemy force employed a slightly persistent agent "believed to be a CS like substance" against the 11 CTZ Montagnard Training Center. An estimated 20-25 82mm mortar rounds containing CS were also used in the attack. On 16 May, vicinity YA 9285, an OP was attacked by an unknown number of enemy employing flamethrowers together with conventional fires.

(b) In June reports of a major withdrawal of NVA units from 11 CTZ led to an intensification of PSYOP aimed at both friendly and enemy targets audiences in 11 CTZ from 1 May to 31 Jul 68. In 11 CTZ operations 342 million leaflets were disseminated of which 12 million were printed locally by the 8th PSYOP Bn. In addition, 1,373 hours of aerial loudspeaker time were directed against enemy target audiences.

2. In June reports of a major withdrawal of NVA units from 11 CTZ led to an intensification of PSYOP aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities of main and local force troops left behind by the withdrawal. Appeals stressed that these units had been abandoned and left to their own desires. Rewards for disclosure of thinly guarded caches were also emphasized. The hardships caused by monsoon conditions were stressed in media directed at Highland NVA and VC. PSYOP feedback remained limited. However, NVA Corporal Tuy who rallied in Darlac Province on 8 Jul after movement of his unit from Kontum to Darlac stated that he had seen many leaflets and heard many loudspeaker broadcasts, both of which influenced his decision to return.

(b) Support:

1. The major PSYOP Support agencies in 11 CTZ were the 8th PSYOP Bn, the 9th Air Commando Sqdn (ACS), the 2d Coastal Zone "Junk and Swift Boat" fleet, the ROKFY CA/PSYOP Co, the 20th ARVN POLWAR Bn and the 114th VNAF Liaison Sqdn.
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2. For samples of leaflets printed by the 8th PSYOP bn during the period see:
   b. Incl 10: A Leaflet supporting the Volunteer Informant Program.
   c. Incl 11: A leaflet designed to cause dissention in enemy ranks.

3. On 1 June 1968 a PSYOP Support Coordination Center (PSCC) for the Coastal Provinces opened in Nha Trang. This joint SVN, H&K, US agency is charged with the responsibility of coordinating requests for PSYOP aircraft support. Its opening stimulated a marked increase in the number of aerial PSYOP targets requested by SVN sources. For example, their requests increased from 442 targets during May to more than 800 during June.

4. During June a Regional Armed Propaganda Unit from Binh Dinh was deployed to support TF 3/506th inf in Operation BANJO ROTOR. This unit was part of a complete PSYOP packet incorporated into the organisational structure of the Task Force. Other elements included a PSYOP staff element and field team from the 8th PSYOP bn (see Commander's Observations for further discussion). The APT conducted operations in isolated villages in conjunction with MIDCAPS and PSYOP film presentations. In one case, the PSYOP field team was able to persuade theuyen buc Province Chief to visit a Montagnard village that had not previously been visited by important GVN Officials. This experience demonstrates that a PSYOP field team can be instrumental in promoting "show-the-flag" operations in the countryside thus strengthening GVN-Montagnard relationships.

6. G3 Air Operations:
   (a) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 22 to 163 with a mean of 87 per day for this period. The most frequent missions were:
      1. Direct support of friendly forces in contact.
      2. Preparation fires on landing zones and objectives areas.
      3. Harassment and interdiction of enemy base and assembly areas and infiltration routes.
      4. Landing zone construction.
   (b) Approximately 13.7% of the missions flown for I FORGEY and 508 Forces were combat skyspot while 18.8% of sorties flown were immediate missions.
   (c) There were 7977 tactical sorties flown in support of operations as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>DA1</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
   | BINKI TAX | 2834          | 31  | 74 KBA, 106 secondary explo-
   | MACARTHUR |               |     | sions, 45 secondary fires, 29 |
   |           |               |     | military structures destroyed,
   |           |               |     | 16 military structures damaged,
   |           |               |     | 268 bunkers destroyed, 126 bunkers |

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damaged, 7 automatic weapon positions destroyed, 6 automatic weapon positions damaged, 8 AAA positions destroyed, 3 AAA positions damaged, 3 gun emplacements damaged, 1 RR position destroyed, 10 mortar positions destroyed, 3 mortar positions damaged, 8 bridges destroyed, 4 bridges damaged, 76 roads cut, 3 rafts destroyed, 1 truck damaged, 8 residual fires, 1 trailer destroyed, 1 mortar tube destroyed.

DAN THANG 883 10
4 KBM, 17 secondary explosions, 17 secondary fires, 10 military structures destroyed, 7 military structures damaged, 67 bunkers destroyed, 5 bunkers damaged, 1 automatic weapon position destroyed, 1 mortar position damaged, 1 sampan destroyed, 3 trucks destroyed, 9 B-40 launchers destroyed.

DAN SINGH 1188 13
69 KBM, 15 secondary explosions, 53 secondary fires, 188 military structures destroyed, 18 military structures damaged, 113 bunkers destroyed, 12 bunkers damaged, 12 bunkers uncovered, 3 automatic weapon positions destroyed, 2 gun emplacements destroyed, 4 mortar positions destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 10 barrels of fuel destroyed.

9th ROK 1658 18
11 KBM, 38 secondary explosions, 71 secondary fires, 90 military structures destroyed, 38 military structures damaged, 79 bunkers destroyed, 1 automatic weapon position damaged, 1 bridge destroyed, 1 bridge damaged, 5 sampans destroyed, 81 caves destroyed.

CAP ROK 1185 13
6 KBM, 16 secondary explosions, 126 secondary fires, 198 military structures destroyed, 111 military structures damaged, 33 bunkers destroyed, 35 bunkers damaged, 1 bridge destroyed, 8 sampans destroyed, 12 pack animals killed, 1 ton of rice destroyed, 200 acres of corn destroyed.
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OPERATION TOTAL SORTIES SORTIES REMARKS

HARMON GREEN 66 2 3 secondary fires, 3 bunkers destroyed.

DANIEL BOONE 42 1 1 KRA, 3 secondary fires, 6 military structures destroyed, 4A bunkers destroyed.

BANJO ROYCE 60 2 1 secondary explosion.

TF SOUTH 68 2 1 cave destroyed.

(d) B-52 Support: There were 1346 B-52 sorties flown in support of ground operations as indicated at Inclosure 8. Last quarter there were 672 sorties.

(7) Army Aviation Operations:

(a) The major objectives in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFORCEV are:

1. Provide airlift to combat elements of Free World Forces in II CTZ.

2. Provide aviation support to the Province Senior Advisors and CORDS personnel in II CTZ for command and control and for resupply.

3. Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance program.

(b) Resources available from the 17th Cbt Av Gp:

1. Assault Helicopter Assets:

   COMPANY BN CAB SUPPORT MISSION

   92d AHC 10th CAB GS Southern Coastal, GS
   155th AHC 10th CAB Southern Highlands and
   192d AHC 10th CAB Task Force South, Recondo
   10th AHC 10th CAB Special Forces, ARVN & WMD
   281st AHC 10th CAB
   57th AHC 52d CAB GS Northern Highlands,
   119th AHC 52d CAB Prairie Fire and Omega
   170th AHC 52d CAB 4th Inf Div, ARVN
   189th AHC 52d CAB
   61st AHC 268th CAB GS Northern Coastal, 173d
   129th AHC 268th CAB Abn Bde, CRID, ARVN

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134th AH (--) 268th CAB
335th AH 268th CAB

2. Assault Support Helicopter Assets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BN</th>
<th>CAB SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>DS 4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d ASHC</td>
<td>10th CAB</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Central Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Heavy Helicopter Assets (Crane):

335th HHC 52d CAB GS II CTZ

4. Armed Helicopter Company:

361st ACM 52d CAB GS II CTZ

5. Air Cavalry Squadron:

7/17th (-) NCS II CTZ

6. The 183d, 185th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the VR Program and provide GS throughout II CTZ.

7. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.

8. The 18th Utility Airplane Company provides GS logistical resupply and radio relay throughout the II CTZ and for the Provisional Corps operating in the II CTZ.

(c) Major Accomplishments:

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BANJO ROYCE</td>
<td>3d Bn 506th Abn Inf 2d Ranger Gp (ARVN)</td>
<td>8 Jun - 18 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON GREEN</td>
<td>3d Bn 506th Abn Inf 3d Bn 509d Abn Inf</td>
<td>17 Jun - 2 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUCAS GREEN</td>
<td>3d Bde 101st Abn Div 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>24 May - 12 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALKER</td>
<td>1st Bn 503d Abn Inf</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN HOA/BOLLING</td>
<td>4th Bn 503d Abn Inf 17th ARVN Regt</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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OPERATION SUPPORT UNIT DURATION

DAN SINH/COCHISE 173d Abn Bde (-) 1 May - 31 Jul
40th & 41st ARVN Regts
Binh Tay/NAGARTHUR 4th Inf Div/24th ARVN STZ 1 May - 31 Jul
DAN THANG/MLAIN TF South/23d ARVN Div 18 Jun - 31 Jul

2. The daily ROKA support was provided by the 48th and 129th AHGs and the 150th and 196th ASHCs. Additional support was provided on a mission basis for the following major ROKA operations:

OPERATION SUPPORT UNIT DURATION

DO KAE BAE 9th ROK Inf Div 1 - 7 May
BAK MA 6 (Phase 1) 9th ROK Inf Div 5 - 25 May 68
(Phase II) 9th ROK Inf Div 26 May - 7 Jun
BLE HO 12 1st ROK Inf Div 12 - 22 May
MAENG HO 12 1st ROK Inf Div 9 Jun - 19 Jul
KU MA 7 9th ROK Inf Div 6 - 14 Jul
BAK JLE 9th ROK Inf Div 7 - 19 Jul
MAE SUN JUL 3 26th ROK Regt 30 - 31 Jul
4th Bn 503d Abn Inf
3d Bn 47th ARVN Regt

3. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a recurring basis:

ARVN GSA, 11 COHRS
HIGHWAY COORDINATOR CORPS-PSA
I FFORCEN ARMY 4th INF DIV
HA 5TH SFGA 173D ABN BDE
PHUOC CAMP CO B, 5TH SFGA
18TH ENG CR BDE

4. Airmobile assets were provided to the following special operations directed by MACV:

a. DELTA
b. OMEGA
c. PRAIRIE FIRE
d. PROVISIONAL CORPS (I CTZ)

5. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support, mission basis status:

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1. I FFORCEN Staff
   E Co, 20th Inf (LAR)
   21st Sig Bty
   18th Engr Bde
   MACV Adv Team #39
   CAM R and H Q CITY HQ
   Cui Khoan Spt Command
   83rd Air Div (USAF)

II. Airmobile assets were provided the following units on a tactical emergency basis (TAC E):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>FOB2</td>
<td>14 Slicks/4 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>4 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>3 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>CO B, 5th SFGA</td>
<td>1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>2 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>114 RF/PF</td>
<td>2 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jun</td>
<td>3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf</td>
<td>4 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jun</td>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>2 Gunships/1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jun</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>2 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jun</td>
<td>9th ROK Inf Div</td>
<td>2 Gunships/2 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>SA SONG MAG RF/PF</td>
<td>7 Slicks/2 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul</td>
<td>9th ROK Inf Div</td>
<td>6 Slicks/1 CH-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>Escort Dust Off Ship</td>
<td>2 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>4 Slicks/5 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>2 CH-47s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. On 30 May 68, the 361st Aviation Company (AW) became operational. It is attached to the 52d CAB and provides general support direct fire support throughout the II CTZ on a mission basis.

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On 15 Jul, the rear detachment of the 355th Heavy Helicopter Company closed in the RVN. One platoon is located at Phu liep and the company (-) at Pleiku.

(c) Logistical Activities:

(1) The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to Operations Binh Tay - MacArthur, Dan Sinh - Cochise, Dan Hua - Boling, Dan Thang - McLain, Walker and Banjo Royce.

(2) ACOS, G4 continued to monitor the material and supply posture of units assigned, attached and under the operational control (OPCON) to this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following forward support activities (FSA) were monitored daily:

(a) FSA English - In support of Operation Dan Sinh - Cochise.

(b) FSA Dak To and Ban Me Thuot - In support of Binh Tay - MacArthur.

(c) FSA Phan Thiet and Bao Loc - In support of Dan Thang - McLain.

In addition, logistical support to TF 3/506th during operation Banjo Royce in the vicinity of Dalat was monitored to insure prompt and adequate resupply.

(3) It was recognized early in May 1968 that there was an urgent need for a clearer understanding by logistical staff officers of the magnitude and complexity of the logistical systems that support Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMF) in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). In view of this, a Logistical Seminar was conducted at Headquarters, I FFORCIV on 6 June 1968 for the purpose of identifying potential problem areas, clarifying procedures and relationships and exploring methods by which problems could be solved. Logistical Staff Officers, Advisors, and Liaison Officers within II CTZ as well as representatives of the Support Command of Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon attended. The seminar was so successful that additional ones will be conducted on a periodic basis which will include ARVN and ROK counterparts.

(4) In keeping with the Combined Campaign goal 21 which is to develop within RVNAF a balanced logistical system capable of responsive support to all the requirements of extended combat operations, significant increase in intensity of logistical assistance has been provided in ARVN, RF/PF and CORDS areas. Certain problem areas have been identified and remedial action has been initiated to improve the logistical support system. Examples of these actions include:

(a) The highway system in II CTZ has improved over its condition of one year ago. This has enabled II and V Area Logistic Commands (ALC) to move a tremendous amount of cargo overland.

(b) Staff visits to the Administrative and Direct Support Logistical Companies (A&DSL) have provided a means for isolating and working out specific problems.

(c) Mobile Assistance Logistical Teams have done much to assist the ALC and A&DSL Companies to solve technical logistical problems.

(d) A program to get maintenance and supply contact assistance teams
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at various levels to visit all RF/PF and ARVN units to improve their logistical posture has been established.

(e) A program to aid the RVNAF Commissary System has been initiated. Fifty-three retail outlets have been established and seven additional outlets are planned for future opening.

(f) A program to equip ARVN with CH-47 and CH-54 helicopter slings to permit emergency and routine resupply of items has been initiated. This program should improve the ARVN emergency resupply system and is scheduled for completion prior to the end of CY 68.

(5) The issue of M2 Carbines to RF/PF units was completed. Six thousand sixty-four M-1 Carbines were converted to M-2 Carbines during the modernization program. The conversion of Carbines and issue of weapons were accomplished by II and V ALC.

(6) Status of M-16 rifle issues to ARVN is as listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZE</th>
<th>ISSUED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21,613</td>
<td>20,977</td>
<td>436*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two hundred M-16 rifles are at V ALC awaiting shipment.

(7) Supply: The overall supply to troops requirements continues to be adequate. There are no existing shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of this command. Theater wide shortages of water trailers, tactical generators, AN/PRC-25 radios and water purification sets cause concern however, these shortages should be alleviated in the near future.

(a) Emphasis placed on turn-in of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment resulted in the reporting of 230 line items (156 more than last quarter) and supply action on 189 separate items (68 less than last quarter) ranging from tool sets to vehicles.

(b) Presently there are 12 items under ASR control. A total of 16 items have been deleted since last quarter. Items under ASR control are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODIC</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B534</td>
<td>40mm, MF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B568</td>
<td>40mm, HE (M79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C251</td>
<td>Ctg, 81mm, Illum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>Ctg, 81mm, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C445</td>
<td>Ctg, 105mm, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C704</td>
<td>4.2&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D544</td>
<td>155mm, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>175mm, HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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D680 Proj, 8th HC
G945 Gren, Sak, Yel
K143 Mine, APERS, M18 (ALL)
M023 Chg, Demo, C4

(8) Services: Nothing significant to report.

(9) Transportation:

(a) The tempo of daily airlift operations throughout II Corps tactical zone has remained constant in tonnage while increasing slightly in passengers as compared to the previous quarter. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 compared with daily averages of the previous quarter as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUARTER</th>
<th>SHORT TONS</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 68</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Highway QL-21 was opened during May, June, and July for the re-supply of the Ban Me Thuot area. A total of 10,877 short tons (2,738 S/T more than last quarter) of mixed classes of supplies were moved during the period by US convoys from CRHSC and ARVN convoys from V ALC in Nha Trang.

(c) Increased use of highway QL 1 south from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet continued during the quarter. Five convoys carrying 2,595 short tons (918 S/T more than last quarter) of supplies were moved over this land LOC.

e. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) General: The MACCORDS reporting system continued to operate throughout the period to provide the necessary data needed for the evaluation and management of CORDS advisory and assistance activities. Extensive effort was expanded at all advisory levels, district through province and CORDS/I FFORCEV, to provide MACCORDS and Washington agencies with detailed assessments on the status of pacification and recovery in II CT2. These additional requirements included a six month assessment of pacification in II CTZ for the period January through 30 June 1968, as well as submissions of weekly recovery and situation reports.

(2) New Life Development (NLD):

(a) Agriculture: During the month of May 1968, agriculture programs made steady progress. The inland fisheries program was a highlight of the month. There were 22 ponds built and 52 others improved. At least one province reported upgrading fisheries training and stocking of fish ponds continued to increase. Phu Yen Province has a most active fisheries program. Difficulties in securing fertilizer were eased considerably in early June, after some frantic efforts on the part of the CORDS/NLD Agriculture Branch to obtain release of fertilizer from the GVN Agriculture Development Bank. The IR-8 rice program (miracle rice) is proceeding very well except for the somewhat late distribution of fertilizer.
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It is now expected that over 2,800 hectares of land will be planted in first plantings. Seed kits of IR-8 and IR-5, together with training material, are being distributed throughout II Corps. Temporary repairs were completed on the south main canal of the irrigation system in Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen Province, and water was flowing throughout the system by the end of the month in sufficient time for the second planting in that area. Farmer training and demonstrations continued with 2,792 farmers reported in attendance. At the end of June, 89,362 hectares of rice were planted. Of this total, 2,508 hectares were reported to be IR-8 rice.

The number of farmers planting rice was reported as 117,323 with 2,928 planting IR-8 rice. The IR-8 rice farmers were using fertilizer at an average application of 263 kilos of ammonium and 156 kilos of urea per hectare. As June is the season between harvestings, only 502 metric tons of paddy were harvested at an average yield of 1.9 metric tons per hectare. The reported outbreak of hog cholera in Ban Me Thuot, Gia Lai Province, was brought under control with the assistance of military veterinarians and coordinated action with GVN authorities.

(b) Education: The education program is considered to be satisfactory. One hundred and eighty-three hamlets schools are under construction and 84 were completed as of the end of June. The program goal of 618 classrooms appears, at this time, difficult to achieve, but 85 percent of those programmed should be completed by the end of 1968. The hamlet school teacher training program is in full swing now, but only 44 teachers were graduated as of the end of June. Activity workshops have been conducted in several provinces. A total enrollment of 4,744 is reported in adult literacy training. The draft continues to have a significant impact on the availability of teachers and administrative personnel. The use of young women, trained in the hamlet school training program is making a noteworthy contribution to the teaching staffs, both in quality and quantity. The CORDS elementary education advisor assisted in three training courses and a special in-service session on the use of textbooks at Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province, Nha Trang in Khanh Hoa Province, Ban Me Thuot in Gia Lai Province and Dalat in Tuyen Duc Province. An average of 100 teachers attended each of the two-day sessions.

(c) Youth Affairs: The youth affairs program, despite considerable activity by civic action and private youth groups, continues to be marginal due to the fact that the budgets for 1968 have not been released by the GVN Ministry of Youth Affairs. New youth service chiefs have been appointed in Pleiku, Kontum, Quang Duc, Dalat and Tuyen Duc Provinces. Youth activities have been significant in Ninh Thuan Province due to an active youth service chief and US advisory efforts. CORDS assistance in kind (AIK), pacification funds were expended on a trip to Saigon for Tuy An Hamlet, Phu Yen Province, youth groups. The trip from 23-26 July 1968 was a heartwarming success in bringing rural and urban children together and showing hamlet youth the seat of their central government.

(d) Self-Help: The self-help program made steady progress in May 1968 with 90 projects completed. CORDS commodities, in the amount of 6,265 bags of cement, 1,754 sheets of roofing and 5,300 kilograms of rebar were issued in support of these completed projects and the 320 in process. Equally significant were the informal training activities conducted for hamlet and lay leaders on self-help techniques and procedures. These training activities, conducted by CORDS community development officers, aimed at organizing people into action groups to pursue self-help activities, benefitted some 550 lay leader participants during May 1968. In June, 113 funded and 42 unfunded self-help projects were
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completed. In addition, 584 projects, 416 funded and 168 unfunded, were in progress. These projects were supported with CORDS commodities including cement, roofing and reinforcing bars valued at VN $5,380,000. Training activities, involving some 1,500 lay leaders, were conducted by CORDS community development officers in coordination with GVN officials and civil affairs teams throughout I Corps. Training of self-help local leaders is progressing in Darlac, Pleiku, Kontum and Binh Thuan Provinces. Training materials, including 2,500 flip charts, have been made available to help explain the 10 steps of project generation and implementation.

(3) Public Safety (PSD):

(a) During May, the new National Police (NP) command appointments made by Directory General National Police (DGNP) Saigon for the Provinces of Darlac, Ninh Thuan and Phu Yen were not well received at the provincial level due to personality conflicts, charges of corruption and favoritism. Improvement in resources control through the period continued to receive priority attention. NP recruitment seems to be a dead issue now and for the immediate future attention will focus on a better utilization of manpower. The GVN has demonstrated only moderate interest in solving the long range problem of detention facilities. This bears directly on the program of eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) because the frequency of operations must be correlated to the capacity of the provinces and districts to incarcerate infrastructure members or suspects. The two programs require more intensive monitoring at Corps and particularly National level where the primary impetus must originate.

(b) National Police Field Force (NPFF) operations targeted against the VCI have not yet achieved optimum results, largely because of the excessive reaction time necessary for the NPFF and the province and staff coordination necessary for NPFF to operate in a given tactical area. The development of more DIOCC's should be a step in solving this central problem. As in all other operations in Vietnam, leadership must be developed at a level below the Saigon-appointed company commanders who generally are lacking in talent or inclination for combat duty.

(4) Psychological Operations: POD activities fall into two general areas of operation: PSYOP support of CORDS programs and VIS activity.

(a) PSYOP support:

1. Public Safety: In Phu Yen and Kontum Provinces extensive poster and loudspeaker support of safe driving and cleanup campaigns was produced. In Tuyen Duc and Binh Dinh Provinces, VC "wanted" posters have been produced in cooperation with the police special branch.

2. RD Cadre: Several leaflets and posters have been produced to supplement RD cadre face-to-face PSYOP in their villages. Binh Dinh Province has produced a RD newspaper to supplement the national and I Corps RD newsletters.

3. New Life Development and Public Health: Extensive poster, leaflet, and pamphlet production has supported the IR-8 program corps-wide, an anti-plague campaign in Tuyen Duc Province, a leadership training program in Kontum Province, and other NLD programs. A JUSFAO team was in Binh Thuan Province in June recording progress in the IR-8 program, animal husbandry, RD Cadre, rebuilding of two hamlets, inoculation teams, mid-wife training, and high school students helping to rebuild homes destroyed during Tet. In Phu Yen Province a movie team filmed a joint ARVN-CONFIDENTIAL

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Free World Forces project to rebuild three hamlets destroyed by action against the NVA.

(b) VIS: VIS operations are showing a general improvement throughout II Corps, especially in Kontum, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Daklak and Quang Duc Provinces. Two significant events have been the return of the airborne TV transmitter over Binh Dinh Province and the return of the Pleiku radio station to the air.

(5) Refugees:
(a) Tet Refugees: Of the 173,000 refugees generated by the Tet offensive, approximately 14,000 remain to be resettled.
(b) Other Refugees: There has been an average of about 4,000 refugees per month during this quarter. The largest numbers were in Dalat, in May, where a deterioration of security led to Montagnard movements to more secure areas.
(c) Refugees: The virtual completion of the Tet recovery operation is now allowing commodities to begin to flow through normal channels and an increase in building activity is expected throughout the Corps area.
(d) The situation at Dien Bien Phu is discussed in the Lessons Learned portion of this report.

(6) Civic Action:
(a) Civic action projects throughout II CTZ continue to emphasize self-help, with the involved military unit supplying technical assistance coordination, and some labor and materials.
(b) Two methods of achieving effective planning and coordination have been developed in Pleiku and Binh Thuan Provinces respectively.
1. In Pleiku, proposed civic action projects are submitted to the GVN Revolutionary Development Council. In this manner, civic action becomes more complimentary to the RD program, duplication of effort is eliminated and a better sense of direction is acquired by the civic action program.
2. In Ninh Thuan, a civic action permanent bureau has been established which plans, coordinates and supports all civic action projects within the province. The bureau is GVN-sponsored and is intended to eliminate coordination problems between the GVN civil government and RVNAF elements.

(7) Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF): During the month of May, the overall effectiveness of the RF/PF program continued to show improvement. A new aggressive spirit, which manifested itself in the ranks of the forces, contributed to the successful defense of Kon Som Luh, Kon Mony and Dak Brong I and II in Kontum Province. Other accomplishments made by RF/PF forces during the period were the spirited defense of the Dalat War College, Phan Ri village in Binh Thuan Province and the Phu Moi Hamlet in Phu Yen Province. The intensive May recruiting program resulted in six RF companies and 12 PF platoons added to the II Corps troop list. Units in direct support of RF increased over the month of April from 105 to 120 RF companies and from 446 to 455 PF platoons. There were a total of six ARVN battalions assigned to the direct support of RD. Due to leaders having shown an increased awareness of the necessity of
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Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters I Field Corps for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS OSPOR-65 (R1) (4)

In-place training, eight Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS) were deployed bringing the II Corps total to 28 in May and increased to 48 in July of a planned total of 96 at end of CY 68.

(8) Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDG):

(a) The greatest task of the RD teams during the reporting period was to prevent regression in pacified hamlets. Lack of security is the main hindrance. It causes a disproportionate amount of time to be spent on local security by groups rather than the other tasks of RD.

(b) The losses in RDPG caused by the GVN mobilization have been offset by the training and arming of civil servants and urban dwellers. Although this new program is not RDPG, it performs a function similar to RDPG under the title of arming of civilians.

(c) Through the reporting period, the enforcement of GVN directives towards improving discipline was of major interest. The GVN Ministry of Revolutionary Development (HODU) issued Memorandum 1177 on 13 June, setting down policy prohibiting the hiring of RD cadre who desert or are dismissed from the program for disciplinary reasons. Names of deserters were disseminated to the appropriate GVN agencies with word not to hire them. It has also become the custom to draft these people into the army.

(d) Many new ways are being improvised in the absence of any GVN directives to increase RD benefits. Steps are being taken to improve morale and prestige of the cadre, thereby gaining a stronger commitment by them to the program. These steps include the retraining or refreshing of RD cadre groups regularly by Mobile instructor teams.

(9) Phoenix (Phung Hoang):

(a) The overall objective of the Phoenix program; i.e., the attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI), is to neutralize as many VCI as possible. Neutralization of the Viet Cong infrastructure is one of the most important objectives of the Vietnam War.

(b) During this reporting period, 897 VCI were neutralized (killed, captured and rallied) in May, 570 in June and 354 in July. The total of 1,821 neutralized VCI is 100 percent above the goal of 900 for the period. A total of 3,674 VCI operations were conducted during the quarter. The downward trend indicated above in neutralizations is due to the probability of increased cover for remaining VCI. Total estimated VCI in II CTZ was 31,000 as of June 1968.

(c) Some progress was made in the processing and exploitation of VC detainees, ralliers and PW's through liaison with US and ROK tactical units to screen PW's for VCI information and the use of police interrogation and instructions. The significant results obtained were brought about by increased emphasis on the attack on the VCI throughout II CTZ. Phoenix advisory personnel, whose numbers increased from 34 to 84, during the first half of 1968, were primarily responsible for the establishment of 18 additional District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIIOC) for a total of 37, which was the goal for the end of June 1968. Seven additional province centers (PICC) were also established for a total of 11, exceeding our semi-annual goal of eight, and attaining the goal of 11, set for the end of the 3rd quarter.

(d) Considerable progress in the attack on the VCI has been obtained

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through training, orientation, and coordination. The efforts of the Regional Police Director, the G2 and Chief of Vietnamese Military Intelligence of the II Corps area, have done much to focus attention and bring about the required organization and coordination. A regional police training center has been established and two courses for Police Special Branch personnel have been completed. This course is designed to train personnel in Intelligence collection and the fundamentals of DIIOCC operations. Upon the recommendation of the students the length of the course will be increased from seven to 10 days, to provide practical work in DIIOCC operations. RD cadre is now represented in 22 DIIOCC's and Static Census Grievance is represented in 25 DIIOCC's. Increased emphasis and training, concerning VCI, has materially aided the overall effectiveness of the DIIOCC.

10. Public Health (PHD):

(a) The reporting period was characterized by an intensification of the reorganization of the province medical effort. Past experience has proved that all aspects of the health program, whether MEDCAP, Refugee, Chieu Hoi, HEC or MOH, must be coordinated through the medical assistance team assigned to the province and under the control of the CORDS Public Health Division.

(b) In spite of reduced personnel caused by the military mobilization program, the patient load, both in patient and outpatient, increased during the month and put a terrific work load on all health personnel. Inpatient load increased by 7.4% and outpatient by 10.2%.

(c) Province hospitals treated a total of 491 civilian war casualties and 156 military casualties.

(d) Emphasis is being placed on preventive medicine, with particular effort toward environmental health. Sanitation programs are being initiated in all provinces which involve garbage and refugee control, in addition to general health improvement.

f. Personnel:

(1) Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEV Key person nel is at Incl 12.

(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 13.

(3) Military Personnel Management:

(a) During the reporting period HQ I FFORCEV assumed direct responsibility for managing the infusion program within its assigned and attached units. As a major command, I Field Force Vietnam is within accepted rotational limits and shows no rotational hump. However, some units subordinate to this headquarters do exceed the acceptable limit and require infusion. All units except the 4th Bn, 60th Arty, which is an air defense unit, can be infused from within the resources of the command. MOS's within that battalion are not compatible with those in other units of this command; therefore, infusion assistance has been requested from USARV.

(b) Personnel strengths of assigned and attached units have been generally satisfactory throughout the period. A problem exists in obtaining 05B20 (Radio Operator) and 05C20 (Radio Teletype Operator) qualified replacement personnel. USARV is aware of the shortages and is filling
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

them as rapidly as possible from the replacement stream. The problem of qualified radar personnel for the 8th Bn, 26th Army has been alleviated. Enlisted MOS imbalances still exist in MOS’s 112 and 141; however, they are less pronounced than during the previous three months and should be brought into balance before the close of the next reporting period.

(c) Lack of timely receipt of reassignment instructions for rotating personnel continues to be a problem. It has improved during this reporting period but it is still prevalent enough to have a detrimental effect on morale and create personal hardships for individuals involved.

(4) Civilian Personnel Management:

(a) During the period local national direct hire spaces were increased from 189 to 217 spaces. I FFORCEV Regs 37-16, Control of Overtime, 616-2, Manpower Management of Direct Hire Local Nationals and 616-3, Authorization for Employment of Daily Hire Local Nationals, were published. Emphasis was placed on coordination between all levels of command and the servicing area CFO's in order to achieve improved administration and management of local national hires.

(b) The 2d quarter CY 68 allocation of AIR funds (2,144,000 $VN) was expended to within approximately 300,000 $VN of the total allocation. An allocation of 2,545,700 $VN has been received for 3d qtr CY 68. This represents approximately 80% of the total amount requested by this headquarters.

(5) During this quarter, Headquarters I FFORCEV Arty was delegated authority to approve awards up to and including the Bronze Star. Also, the I FFORCEV awards and decorations board was given authority to approve recommendations for awards pertaining to MACV advisory personnel in II Corps Tactical Zone. During this same period a change in procedure in the processing of Air medals was initiated, by which recommendations for this award are submitted for review by the Aviation and Command Sections only. Additionally, during this period there was a tremendous increase in the volume of recommendations for the Legion of Merit (34), a fact which may be attributed to the summer "rotational hump" of many of the senior Field Grade Officers of this command. The AZ section processed an average total of 220 awards per month during the past quarter. Resume of awards is at Incl 14.

(6) During the past quarter the number of R&R allocations received by this headquarters decreased. The chief reason for this decrease was the poor utilization rate of R&R quotas received by this command during the previous quarter. However, this headquarters has advised all assigned and attached units that all R&R quotas received by units of this command will be utilized, and that Headquarters, I FFORCEV intends to monitor each unit's utilization rate. Consequently, it is anticipated that during the next quarter the number of R&R quotas allocated to this command will increase. Additionally, during this quarter USAV requested that all major subordinate commands strictly enforce the provision of USAV Reg 28-5 which limits an individual to one authorized R&R during a normal tour of duty in Vietnam. All units of this command were directed to establish appropriate controls to insure that no individual takes more than one R&R during his normal tour. Resume of R&R allocations is at Incl 15.

(7) Resume of promotions for I FFORCEV is at Incl 16.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters 1 FFORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 R.S. CSFOR-65 (R1, (U)

(a) Chaplain Activities:

(a) An entire new chaplain staff has arrived in the headquarters since previous report.

(b) II CTZ has 122 US Military Chaplains: 112 US Army (85 Protestant, 21 Catholic, 1 Jewish) and 10 US Air Force (5 Protestant, 5 Catholic).

(c) Religious Services:

1. Protestant services in OPCON units and in combat and service support units are adequate. Services for advisory teams on a regular basis are difficult in sections of the II CTZ, while in other sections chaplains adjacent to advisory teams provide regular weekly chaplain coverage and religious worship services. Religious services and chaplain coverage were also provided Special Forces Teams by Advisory Team Chaplains and unit chaplains in the vicinity of team locations as well as by Special Forces Chaplains. Attendance was satisfactory during this period.

2. Catholic services were augmented by the use of civilian clergy who satisfy minimal religious obligation requirements for Catholic personnel. There was an increase in the use of civilian clergy in the latter part of the reporting period due to rotation of assigned Catholic Chaplains with no immediate replacements.

3. Jewish services are adequate. Services are conducted by the I FFORCEN Jewish Chaplain in nine locations in the II CTZ on a monthly basis, and in Nha Trang weekly. Lay leaders conducted weekly Jewish Lay services in nine locations during period. Coordination presents no major problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters has responsibility for all II CTZ.

4. In Nha Trang the following services are scheduled:

a. Sunday: 20 Protestant, 13 Catholic, 1 Lutheran, 2 Episcopal, 1 Christian Science, and 1 Latter Day Saints.

b. Friday Evening: Jewish Sabbath Service.

c. Daily: 2 Catholic services.

d. Services were conducted at the following locations:

- 8th Field Hospital
- Beach Chapel
- 5th Special Forces Gp
- US Air Force Base
- Harbor Defense Site

5. Military Police:

(a) Discipline, law and order:

(a) Serious Incident Report Statistics:

a. Fatal Traffic Accidents: During the reporting period 64 fatal traffic accidents occurred in the II CTZ, an increase of nine fatalities.
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Operational Report of headquarters I FFORVN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 R&S CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

over the last quarterly report. Most of the accidents resulted from 2 1/2 or 5-TON trucks colliding with Vietnamese on motorcycles or motor scooters. A majority of the deaths were caused by carelessness of the Vietnamese people while operating a vehicle. Many of the fatalities resulted from head injuries and might have been prevented if helmets had been worn.

b. Self-Inflicted Wounds: During the reporting period 33 accidental self-inflicted injuries resulted from gunshot wounds; two were fatal; in addition, there were four suicides. A majority of these injuries were attributable to carelessness or gross neglect on the part of the individual soldier, e.g., a round in the chamber, failure to clear a weapon when entering a secure area or horseplay with a firearm.

2. The Khanh Hoa Province Police Officers' Meeting hosted by various police agencies on a rotating basis, was held in June and July. Representatives of the USAF Security Police, Vietnamese National Police, ARVN, ROK and US Military Police, Vietnamese Customs, CSFOR-65 Security Police and Province Advisor were in attendance. Topics at these meetings included blackmarketing, traffic enforcement and safety. These meetings have proven beneficial in maintaining rapport and liaison with all police agencies and have resulted in improved effectiveness of operations for all forces through formation of combined patrols and adjusting police resources.

(b) Prisoners of War:

1. Reorganization of the Phu Tai PW Camp: During the reporting period the Phu Tai PW Camp became a permanent female PW facility. From 14-27 May 1968, the Phu Tai PW Camp was completely closed to male PW, creating a hardship on divisions/brigades operating in the western portion of II CTZ (particularly the two ROK Divisions) because it was necessary to evacuate PW to Phu Quoc PW Camp. Coordination by members of the PM Section, MACU-15 and USA, II Corps G3 and PM Advisors persuaded the JCS to reopen the facility to male PW on a transient basis. The camp is now accepting all PW on a transient basis only pending evacuation to Phu Quoc. Formal evacuation procedures continue. The camp has a population of 597 females and 201 males for a total of 798 PW.

PW Relocation: To reduce the II CTZ PW Camp population to an acceptable level, 468 PW were transferred to Phu Quoc PW Camp (261 from Phu Hai and 207 from Pleiku). The Quoc population has increased from 6,363 PW in the previous quarter to 11,437 PW.

3. Training Film: A five man team from the US Army Pictorial Center filmed a realistic training film of the field processing of detained/secure personnel. The logistical support furnished by USA II CTZ. 1st Div was collected at the site for the film. The team also visited the 2d Bde and 1st Div detention collecting rations at the brigade level were filmed.

(c) Provost Marshal representative is a member of the 1st Provost Marshal inspection team that conducts quarterly inspections of major US installations in II CTZ. During the practice test exercises the PM representative observes the notification procedures and checks the reaction plan of the local military police. During the security inspection the PM representative inspects physical security safeguards such as protective lighting, perimeter barriers, guard force and control of local nationals. Ten such inspections were conducted during the reporting period.

(d) VIP Security and Special Events:

1. Personal security was provided for six distinguished persons (4-star general of flag rank civilian official of equal or higher rank):
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SUBJCT: Operational report of headquarters 1 FFORCERV for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1968 KCS CSFOR-65 (KU) (U)

visiting Headquarters 1 FFORCERV and the Nha Trang area that included the Honorable Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army. Coordination was made with the Senior Province Advisor, Khanh Thuan Province, when the Honorable Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, visited the Phan Rang area in Lik etc.

2. Security and traffic control continue to be provided by the 1 FFORCERV military police for conferences and special events such as the opening day ceremonies of the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command Tactical Operations Center. Coordination was made by members of the Provost Marshal section with the Vietnamese, NOK and other US agencies to assure the security of the attendees.

(I) Safety and Accident Prevention (1 FFORCERV assigned and attached units only):

(a) Both the motor vehicle accident rate and military injury rate were below previous quarter rates. The motor vehicle accident rate was .02 above the established expectancy ceiling, and the injury rate .48 below the ceiling. Statistical data, by unit, are shown at inclosure 17.

(b) More than 50% of the reported accidents resulted from the operation of Army motor vehicles. Fifty percent of the motor vehicle accidents involved 2 1/2 ton or larger sized vehicles. The primary cause factor of motor vehicle accidents continued to be driving too fast for existing conditions of the roadway, pedestrian traffic or weather.

(c) The number of injuries sustained from the accidental discharge of small arms decreased during the period. Five were injured when .45 caliber pistols accidentally discharged. Improper clearing procedures and cleaning of weapons with rounds chambered were identified as primary cause.

(ii) Medical:

(a) Disease trends in civilian population are on a down trend; plague is showing its seasonal downturn. Most of the preventive medicine programs have gone quite well, and major projects have been completed.

(b) Malaria continues to be a major problem in the Highlands, especially in the area north of Cui Nhon. Control efforts have been very strong in this area; however, the type of operations of the units in this area seem to prevent a decrease in the malaria rate.

(c) There are impressive shortages in medical personnel for both the 173d Abn Bde and the 4th Inf Div. However, the USAV Surgeon assures the 1 FFORCERV Surgeon that these two units will be given priority and that all units should approach full authorized strength by the end of September 1968.

(d) All Dust Off aircraft have been equipped with the L-19 engine, which has solved the lift capability problem which had previously existed. The concept of field standby Dust Off support has proven invaluable and has been enthusiastically accepted by the tactical unit commanders and the Air Force personnel.

(C) Artillery:

In the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, 1 FFORCERV Artillery continued to support US, FNSL, AECM, EF/FP and GICO forces in Lik Unit.

(ii) 1 FFORCERV Artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, 11 battalions, three separate batteries, and ten detachment supported all

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major operations in the II CTZ to include OPERATIONS BINH TAY - MACARTHUR, DIK SINH - LOC CHIESE, DAN HOA - BOLING, LAN THANG - NULAH, and WALKER. 3F and CIDG forces operating in AO's Blue, Red, and Black were supported as were ARVN operations conducted by units of the 22d and 23d ARVN Div, 24th STW, and provincial defense forces. 10K forces in the 9th and CBLD areas of operation were supported during OPERATIONS NAUONG HO 12 and BAHK MA 6.

(3) Selected Munitions; 1 FFG/s Arty evaluation of selected munitions was completed on 30 Jun 68 using data compiled on all artillery missions fired with these munitions in II CTZ during the period 1 Feb through 15 Jun 68. There was a total of 120 missions fired, expending 1818 rounds of all calibers, resulting in 436 confirmed KIA, 49 KIA estimated by intelligence, and 30 confirmed WIA. This indicates an expenditure of only 3.5 rounds per casualty although surveillance of only 21 missions, or 17.5 percent of the total, was obtained.

(a) Mobile Artillery Task Force. The Mobile Artillery Task Force, of which 6th Bn, 8th Arty forms the nucleus, continued its support of major operations in II CTZ. As of the end of the reporting period, it has participated in operations conducted in every AO in the II CTZ, to include LOCUS GREEN in the western highlands, VELVET HAMMER on the northern coast, NAUONG MC 11 and 12 in the CAF 400X Div AO, BAHK MA 6 in 9th ROX Div AO, and TF South in DAN THANG-KOALIN AO.

(5) Arrival of Countermortar Radars. On 29 May 68, three countermortar radar (AN/AIP-4A) detachments arrived in country followed by a fourth detachment on 28 Jun 68. All detachments arrived at the post of Qui Nhon and convoyed to HHB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB), Camp Townes, west of Qui Nhon for an orientation, processing, and check out of equipment, with the exception of the fourth detachment. Orientation, processing, and check out of equipment was accomplished at Camp Radcliffe, An Khe, due to relocation of HHB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB) on 20 Jun 68. The first three detachments are presently located in BINH TAY-MACARTHUR AO and the fourth in the vicinity of the Lang Giang Pass (WALKER AO).

(6) Artillery Support for RF/PP.

(a) A formal program was established in June to insure that all RF/PP elements are capable of using the artillery support available to them. Each US artillery unit in II CTZ has been assigned an area of responsibility based upon political boundaries in which they are to execute the program through the district and province advisors.

(b) Under the concept of the program, each US unit is making a survey of the RF/PP elements in their area of responsibility to determine the number of elements in their locations, fire support requirements and communications available. After completion of the survey, contact teams are being dispatched with the purpose of visiting all RF/PP elements. Their mission is to assist in fire planning, fire in defensive concentrations, insure that responsive fire request channels exist, and provide training in forward observer procedures.

(c) The goals of the program are to provide 100% coverage of RF/PP elements and to react to a request for fire with artillery of any allied unit within three minutes. A number of RF/PP personnel have already been trained in forward observer procedures at the FO school at An Khe. Training has also been conducted in other locations in conjunction with ARVN artillery units.
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(7) Artillery Seminar. An artillery seminar was held at An Khe on 21 June. Artillery commanders of US, ROK and ARVN forces at the corps, division and group level participated. A demonstration of selected munitions was presented after which a conference was held to discuss several topics of mutual interest. The discussions covered such areas as combined support for RF/PF elements, improvement of artillery effectiveness through the analysis of ammunition expenditures, methods to increase the number of forward observers operating with Vietnamese maneuver units, and the means of preventing artillery accidents. This second meeting in a planned series of meetings has resulted in strengthening of ties between allied units with the outcome of more effective and responsive artillery support for maneuver units of all allied nations.

(8) Calibration Program. The USARV calibration team calibrated US artillery in the 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde (Sep) A/P's during the period 10-17 June 68. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Unit</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEN Arty</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn 199th Arty</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Meteorological Quality Control Team. The Metro Control Team continued analysis of data provided to firing units by the nine electronic metro sections in II CTZ. A reduction of errors to 1.5% of all metro data provided to artillery units during the period was noted. This record low percentage of error has contributed significantly to the accuracy of artillery fires and reduced the probability of firing incidents by artillery units in the II CTZ.

(10) Intelligence Seminar. The second I FFORCEN Arty Intelligence Seminar was hosted by the 52d Arty Gp on 11 Jul 68. Attendees included representatives from US, ARVN and ROK Arty units. The purpose of the seminar was to provide an opportunity for discussion of intelligence operations at various staff levels and to facilitate exchange of information between all groups represented. Briefings were presented by representatives of CORDS I FFORCEN, II Corps, I FFORCEN Arty, 9th ROK Div Arty and 173d Abn Bde (Sep). The seminar was found to be beneficial and presented an excellent opportunity for exchange of information among US, ROK and ARVN intelligence officers. It was determined that significant advances in integrated intelligence operations and subsequent increased effectiveness of artillery fire support can be realized from conferences of this type.

(11) Counterbattery Intelligence Operations.

(a) In May 68 the counterbattery intelligence section published the first monthly analysis of the enemy artillery threat in II CTZ. For purposes of the analysis enemy artillery was defined as recoilless rifles, mortars, rockets and cannons. The objectives were as follows:

1. To determine from data collected and evaluated, what enemy artillery capabilities were used in II CTZ during the period.

2. To determine the effectiveness of active and passive counter measures employed at installations in II CTZ.

3. To determine actions required to increase effectiveness of active and passive defense of installations against enemy artillery.

(b) Subsequent analysis refined the first publication emphasizing effectiveness of active and passive defense measures. They assisted radar officers in measuring proficiency of countermortar radar detachments.
and determining if proper sectors of scan had been assigned or if additional sectors of scan were required. The analysis provided indications of where the various types of enemy artillery are located and against what targets the artillery is used. The ultimate objective of the analysis is to increase the effectiveness of target acquisition agencies in order to reduce enemy artillery effectiveness.

(12) Ammunition Expenditures Analysis. The analysis of ammunition expenditures has been expedited through the development of computer programs which performs the numerical calculations of the weekly and monthly expenditure data. A Burroughs 263 computer, located at the Base Data Automation Section, 14th Cbt Spt Gp Ha Trang Air Force Base, is used, and a series of programs was developed by a programmer assigned to the section. The sophisticated program incorporating numerous double check features and variable time interval flexibility, provides output parameters of rounds, missions percentage of rounds and missions against to: 1) casemates, and rounds per mission for each target category by caliber, area of operation, and battalion. Weekly and monthly copies of the computerized expenditure analysis are provided to all major artillery commands in 1 FFORC-EV to utilize as a means of analyzing their subordinate units’ expenditures. As a result of the 1 FFORC-EV ammunition management system, a significant shift has been noticed in expenditures from the interdiction category to the more profitable target categories, such as confirmed and acquired.

(13) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) During this period, increased emphasis was placed on naval gunfire support. Coordination meetings were conducted by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) with representatives of the USS Craig and the USS Carronade. The meetings enabled a better understanding of the principles of naval gunfire. An average of three ships were on station each day in the contiguous waters of the II CTZ. Naval gunfire was used extensively in AO’s DAN SM-COCHISE and DAN THAN-MCLAIN.

(b) Target processing increased greatly during the month of May when over 3,000 targets were developed and passed to firing units. During the period May to 31 July, an average of over 2,400 targets were processed each month. An increased specialization in target processing was developed in conjunction with certain targeting information furnished by 02. As a result of this information, two types of targets, immediate reaction and hangfire, were developed. Immediate reaction targets are those developed from usually reliable intelligence sources and passed to the firing unit for immediate firing. Hangfire targets are those developed from very recent, reliable intelligence sources and passed to the firing units for immediate firing. Areas of increased enemy activity are given special emphasis in immediate reaction and Hangfire targeting. Procedures have been established through liaison and advisory channels to obtain rapid firing response by ROK and ARVN firing units and to obtain clearance to fire outside US AO’s on these targets. During the period, 367 Hangfire and 7,305 immediate reaction targets were developed and passed to the firing units by the FSCE.

(c) In coordination with the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command (IDC), the FSCE developed and passed targets to supporting artillery commands with a specific schedule of fires which allowed IDC to conduct its operation with more efficiency. The NGLO in the FSCE also coordinated closely with IDC for scheduled NGF in support of IDC operations.
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SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters I FFORCEN for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS USFOR-65 (RL) (U)

(a) Targeting coordination meetings were conducted during the period
with the 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and the 41st Arty Gp. A represent-
tive from the FSCE has been at TF South since 26 June serving as a fire
support LO. This resulted in increased targeting efficiency and provided
a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCE) for TF South.

(b) Several ARC Light coordination visits were conducted during the
period. The most notable were with the Capital ROK Div and the Combined
Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV). As a result of the visits, more
complete ground follow-ups were conducted and requests for ARC Light
targets from ARVN and ROK commands increased. A total of 263 ARC Light
targets were processed, 136 of which were fired.

(c) On 15 July, members of the MACV Combat Operation Center (COC 8)
and MACV J2 presented an ARC Light briefing at I FFORCEN. Personnel from
subordinate commands and Headquarters, I FFORCEN who are involved in the
daily processing of ARC Light missions attended. The purpose of the meet-
ing was to discuss the new ARC Light regulation: MACV Directive 95-14,
subject: ARC Light Operations, dated 3 Jul 68.

(d) Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training.

(a) The backlog of artillery lieutenants who had not attended the For-
ward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses, conducted res-
pectively by the 41st Arty Gp at An Khe and the 54th Arty Gp at Pleiku, has
been reduced to a point where quotas to attend the schools may be exten-
ted to personnel other than artillery lieutenants. Recent graduates of the
schools include ARVN, CIDG and RF/PF personnel. In addition, newly assign-
ed captains and majors with no field artillery experience are being sent
to both schools.

(b) A total of 104 students have graduated from the Fire Direction
Officer Training Course during the reporting period for an overall total
of 212 graduates since the schools began in Jan 68. The Forward Observer
Training Course trained 154 students during the period and have trained
311 students overall.

(c) Since Jan 68, the Forward Observer Training Course has trained
38 ARVN, 117 RF/PF, and 32 CIDG/SF personnel.

(15) Artillery: The following table reflects artillery
tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN, and RF/PF Artillery units in 11 CTZ
at the end of the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tube Size</th>
<th>US Divisional</th>
<th>ROK Divisional</th>
<th>US Force Artillery</th>
<th>ARVN Artillery</th>
<th>Special Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(16) Ammunition Statistics for US Artillery in 11 CTZ for the
reporting quarter:

(a) Expenditures by Target Category:
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### TARGET CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAY ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
<th>JUNE ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
<th>JULY ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>49,063/1,612</td>
<td>25,471/777</td>
<td>19,355/590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>71,354/8,680</td>
<td>44,473/8,494</td>
<td>30,794/3,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>14,417/1,897</td>
<td>4,015/146</td>
<td>2,129/3,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>28,808/1,729</td>
<td>22,955/1,110</td>
<td>17,152/677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>79,572/28,897</td>
<td>59,721/25,807</td>
<td>20,820/12,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>32,510/4,508</td>
<td>29,707/4,234</td>
<td>2,697/4,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4,267/552</td>
<td>4,380/521</td>
<td>4,799/554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>279,995/46,549</td>
<td>190,622/41,119</td>
<td>114,704/22,284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**(b) Expenditure by Caliber:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>RDS EXPENDED</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/321/167/RDS/MAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>177,479</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>67,068</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>21,879</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>33,269</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>279,995</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>124,995</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>39,064</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>15,686</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>11,289</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>190,622</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>73,364</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>20,765</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>12,820</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>7,725</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>114,704</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>58,321</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Prorated Average

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(17) Artillery with I FFORCEV at the end of the 3QL quarter were:

(a) Non-divisional.

**I FFORCEV ARTILLERY**

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5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AWSF)
Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)
Battery K, 41st Artillery (MG)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
240th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
245th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

11th Artillery Group
7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm/155mm T Prov)
6th Battalion, 64th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm Sp)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

(b) Divisional.

4th Infantry Division Artillery
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)
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1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

h. (6) Signal Operations. The mission of providing Command and Control communications from Headquarters I FFORCEV to subordinate commands and the support of tactical communications requirements beyond the capacity of those commands continued to constitute the main activities of the Signal Section during the reporting period.

1. The 54th Signal Battalion provided communications support for OPLANS BINH TAY-MACARTHUR and DAN THAN-MCLAIN. In addition to support of these I FFORCEV operations, the 54th provided support for several ROK operations. Additional equipment was committed in support of road convoy movements which were experiencing difficulties with FM communications.

2. In support of TF South, elements of Company E, 43d Signal Battalion, 21st Signal Group, which are permanently assigned in Dalat, augmented by a small detachment from the 54th Sig Bn, were employed to provide the tactical circuit terminations at TF South Headquarters, eliminating the need for a large signal contingent to be deployed with the TF staff.

3. Efforts were continued to improve and upgrade communications capabilities within II CTZ. Emphasis has been placed on the improvement of CORDS Command and Control communications to allow more direct contact and operational control down through the province structure. Studies were conducted and recommendations submitted to USARV to provide a secure record traffic capability for CORDS. The addition of six trunk circuits has provided CORDS telephone access through the Typhoon switchboard to all Province Senior Advisors.

4. An I FFORCEV regulation was issued implementing the use of Address Indicator Groups, significantly reducing the transmission time on recurring messages.

5. Conferences have been conducted with representatives of USARV and all major tactical units within II CTZ concerned with secure tactical voice communications. Planning for the installation of AUTOVIN and AUTOSEVOCOM continued. Training in the message format and procedures to be used in AUTOVIN has been intensified.

6. The occasional requirement for 4-channel VHF to battalion CP's was the subject of critical review and found to be valid. Battalion Commanders, while operating away from their base areas, often retain security and training responsibilities in their base areas, and in an increasing way share this responsibility with ARVN forces in the base areas. Their combat operations in forward areas are more frequently on a shared-responsibility basis with ARVN counterparts, heightening the need for liaison and communications both laterally and back to base areas for contact with Sector and Subsector Advisors. The liaison-type communications are typically lengthy because they deal more with abstract matters than purely administrative and logistical matters, and thus tend to monopolize net time. These additional requirements, added to the usual operational, administrative and logistical demands on FM nets, has the effect of overloading those nets to the detriment of effective command control.
1. **Engineer**:

   (1) The major effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, coordinating and supervising 18th Engr Bde units in combat support on I FFORC, 5th SOS, HOKV and ARVN operations. Organic engineer units under OPCON of 1 FFORC, 4th Engr Bn (C) and the 173rd Engr Co (Abn), were fully committed in support of their parent organizations throughout the period. Their activities were monitored by the engineer section. Tactical operations supported during the period were NAM HOA-BOLLING, DAN THANG-MCLAIN, DAN SING-OCCHISL and BINH TAY-MACARIHER. Specific engineer combat support effort expended by units of the 18th Engr Bde and divisional and brigade engineer units in support of tactical operations is outlined below.

   (2) Support of Tactical Operations.

   (a) OPERATION DAN HOA-BOLLING: 35th Engr Gp is in general support of operation. Major effort was directed towards upgrading and maintaining LOC'S. Additional support included minesweeps along LTL 7B, helipad construction, dust suppression, assistance in constructing fortifications and upgrading 116 km of LTL 7B (west from Tuy Hoa) to limited all weather capability by repair or constructing bridges, culverts and fords and improvement of route drainage. Continuous maintenance of airfields was accomplished as required.

   (b) OPERATION DAN THANG-MCLAIN: The 35th Engr Gp is in general support. The majority of engineer effort was placed on constructing aircraft revetments, helipads, FAC Ammo Storage Complex, POW Compound and enlarging perimeter at L. Betty. Maintenance operations along QL 1 vic Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province to the north continued. During a one week period thirty-six roadblocks were removed between AN 959312 to AN 980332 and from Phan Thiet to AN L23364.

   (c) OPERATION DAN SING-OCCHISL: The 35th Engr Gp is in general support. Support included upgrading and maintenance of roads and airfields, application of dust pallatives and construction of artillery gun pads as well as accomplishment of additional engineer support requirements as requested.

   (d) OPERATION LAM HOYCE: The 87th Engr Bn (Const), 35th Engr Gp, furnished engineer operational support for build-up of the Dalat Cam Ly Staging Area. Support included construction of five L-shape and fifteen U-shape berm aircraft revetments, five FAC prefabricated revetments, three ASP berm storage areas and other engineer operational support tasks.

   (e) OPERATION BINH TAY-MACARIHER: The 937th Engr Gp is in general support. The majority of engineer effort for period of report was concentrated on maintenance and upgrading of major LOC's in the highlands AOR, maintenance and repair of airfields and construction of artillery firebases.

   (3) Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair:

   (a) Ban Don (ZV 032268): The 1st Plato, B Co, 20th Engr Bn (C) commenced upgrading on 4 Apr 68 and completed repairs on 9 May 68. A 150' x 150' parking apron with a 245' x 40' taxiway was constructed. Runway markers were built and placed and the drainage system was improved. A total of 5,652 US man hours and 940 equipment hours were expended.
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(b) Bao Loc (GT 06/792). MACV Advisor personnel have supervised ARVN Engineers in minor repair and welding of NM1. However, recent indications point to the probable need for major repairs in the near future. A message was sent from this Hq to 18th Engr Bde on 18 Jul requesting an engineer evaluation and work estimate. Repair work is expected to start in late Aug or Sep 68.

(c) Ban Me Thuot East (AQ 88/020). The Vietnamese Ministry of Public Works has commenced to repair and extend the east end of runway approximately 1000'. This work is part of a GVN long-range development program that has progressed slowly but steadily during the reporting period without interfering with C-130 operations.

(d) Dak Pek (TB 95283). One officer and ten (10) EH were assigned to Dak Pek for a two week period in Jun 68 to repair damage to runway caused by a C7A accident, to improve the road from the main camp hill to the drop point and to upgrade the connecting road to an artillery position approximately 300m north of the main SF camp.

(e) Dak Seang (YB 89/406). The airfield was closed on 5 Jul by USAF due to erosion across the runway. Repair was beyond capabilities of SF camp personnel. One plat, 299th Engr Bn (C), commenced work on 15 Jul. Repair involves leveling, shifting and compacting the runway lift and applying seal-coat. Completion of repairs will ensure that the field remains operational for the duration of current monsoon season. EDC is 15 Aug 68.

(f) Dong Ba Thin (CP 03/295). The airfield was closed in Apr 68 due to deterioration of PSP surface and failure of subgrade. Approval to construct a light-traffic capable field was obtained from M4, USAMV, on 3 May 68. Repair design plans have been completed and construction is expected to start within the next quarter as assets become available from higher priority projects now in progress.

(g) Dalat/Cam Ly (BF 18/220). The 87th Engr Bn (Const) completed constructing the new 1470' x 60' E/ST, Type II C-130 runway. During recent tactical operations via Dalat the new runway sustained approximately 100 C-130 sorties. Several soft spots developed in isolated areas of the runway and are presently being repaired.

(h) Dong Ba Thin (CP 03/295). The airfield was closed in Apr 68 due to deterioration of PSP surface and failure of subgrade. Approval to construct a light-traffic capable field was obtained from M4, USAMV, on 3 May 68. Repair design plans have been completed and construction is expected to start within the next quarter as assets become available from higher priority projects now in progress.

(i) Duc Lap (TU 90/792). The airfield has a T-17 membrane surface that SF camp personnel have continued to maintain and repair in a commendable manner. The airfield has sustained more traffic than its originally designed capability. Recent engineering evaluation reveals that repair to isolated portions of the subgrade and base course are required. Construction is scheduled to start in Oct or Nov 68, immediately after the present monsoon.

(j) Duc Khe (AP 88/67). The airfield was closed to C7A traffic in Jul 68 due to subgrade failure causing numerous flat and soft spots with subsequent rupture of matting. One plat, C Co, 70th Engr Bn (C), closed on site with airmobile equipment on 18 Jul 68. Repair of subgrade and replacement of matting is underway. EDC is 4 Aug 68.

(k) Pocai Keng (ZA 03/92). Pocai Keng was downgraded to Type II C-123, on 6 Jul 68 by I FFORCEN Hq due to mortar damage of NM1 and damage caused by a jettisoned load from a CH-47 on the west end of the runway.

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MeAl matting on the east end of the strip had many ruptured seams. These deficiencies were corrected by elements of the 70th Engr Bn (C), 11-15 Jul 68.

(i) English AAF (HD 879.05). Approval for upgrading with asphalatic concrete surface has been received from USAV. Construction has been assigned to the 19th Engr Bn (C). Starting date is 04 5 Aug 68 with EDC 31 Oct 68.

(a) Phu Tue (BG 506359). This facility was closed to AAF aircraft in Jun 68 due to multiple rips of T-17 membrane surface and consequent subgrade deterioration caused by moisture. The 20th Engr Bn (C) arrived on site with equipment 18 Jul 68 and are removing the T17 and repairing subgrade. The airstrip will be resurfaced with DBST or seal-coat. EDC is 15 Aug 68.

(m) Plei Duong (TA 859487). On 18 Jun 68 a helicopter crashed on the runway damaging approximately 26 MX-19 panels. The field was closed temporarily while elements of the 35th Engr Gp repaired damage. Repairs were completed on 21 Jun 68.

(L) Land Clearing Operations. The 35th Land Clearing Plt continued in direct support of IFOR-11 during the past three months 8,637 acres were cleared. These areas were:

(a) Ban Me Thuot. Area northwest of Ban Me Thuot (City) Airfield via NK 790005 - 800500 - 803400 - 790800.

(b) QL 19E. From vic BR 222521 to vic Suol Du, 250 m each side of road.

(c) QL 21. From Ban Me Thuot to Darlac - Khanh Hoa Province border. 100 m each side of road. Cleared 10 m wide, 200 m long, NS fire lanes at 200 m intervals on south side of cleared areas along QL 21 from NK 320174 to NK 387163.

(d) QL 21. Cleared 50 m wide strip around sides and back of plantations located at NK 350127 - 354129; NK 183127 - 191132 and NK 193140 - 195148.

(e) Camp Enari. Access roads were cleared.

(f) Area vic AQ 803 G45 was cleared.

(g) Pleiku Logistical Depot. Area vic of installation was cleared.

(h) On 15 Jul all land clearing operations in the Highlands terminated and equipment returned to vic Pleiku for maintenance.

(i) On 26 Jul one section and a half closed DAN SINH - COCHINE AO for operations therein.

(j) On 30 Jul one section and a half closed DAN SINH - COCHINE AO for continued operations under control of the 35th Engr Gp.

(K) Route Upgrading In II CTZ.

(a) During the reporting period approximately 68.9 km of LOC were paved to MACV standard.

(b) Within the 35th Engr Gp AOR the following route upgrading tasks were achieved:
1. Route 7B: Elements of the 577th Engr Bn (Cont) upgraded 116 km of road west from Tuy Hoa in May and Jun 68 to class 18 limited all weather.

2. QL-14 (Fleiku-Dak To): Elements of 20th Engr Bn (C), 70th Engr Bn (C) and 299th Engr Bn (C) upgraded this 82 km portion of QL-14 by placing and patching macadam between Fleiku and Kontum, laying a single lane asphalt pavement for 7 km south from Dak To and constructing a 28" road mix surface for the remaining 32 km south of Kontum. This phase of construction was completed during the first week of Jul 68.

3. QL-19W: The 20th Engr Bn (C) placed a 35 km DEST class 31 surface on this road from the EJ of QL-14 to Edap Enang. The remaining 13 km to Duc Co have been shaped, compacted and drained to achieve a class 31 limited all weather road.

4. QL-21: This 149 km stretch of road between Ninh Hoa and Ban Me Thuot receives periodic expedient road repair on an as-needed basis in order to allow convoys to pass every six weeks. Upon initiation of tactical operations by elements of 4th Div in Ban Me Thuot, D Co, 70th Engr Bn (C) and elements of 864th Engr Bn (Cont) were committed to maintain and repair this route to Class 31 all weather.

5. Miscellaneous Projects.

(a) Phu Yen Aquaduct. During the period repairs were completed on the aquaduct via CQ 007355. The 577th Engr Bn (Cont) assisted irrigation personnel in repairing the aquaduct by providing blast rock, equipment and technical assistance.

(b) Heavy Artillery Fire Bases. Construction of heavy artillery fire bases commenced in Apr 68 by units of the 937th Engr Group. Percentages of completion as of 31 Jul 68 follow:

Dak To: 76%
Oasis: 98%
LZ Mary lou: 95%
Ban Me Thuot: 96%
Saol Doi: Completed Jul 68.
Phu Dien: Completed 29 Apr 68.

(c) Defense of Vung Ro Bay. The 35th Engr Co (Cont) committed an Engr Co (-) to upgrading the passive defensive posture of this critical installation. Land clearing out to fifty meters beyond the perimeter and construction of personnel and command bunkers were completed by 31 Jul 68.

(d) Kontum FAC Facilities. The 299th Engr Bn (C) is progressing well. Project is 98% complete with using unit accepting beneficial occupancy as facilities become available.

(e) Ban Me Thuot East FSA. A tactical operation involving one brigade of the 4th Inf Div commenced on 19 Juy 1968 in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot. Artillery positions, ASP, a TOC and internal road net are under construction by C Co, 70th Engr Bn (C). Construction requirements include 15 helicopter revetments. The TOC has been completed. EDC for the ASP is
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7 Aug 68. The EDC for the by-pass road, connecting the internal road net with the perimeter road, is 5 Aug 68. EDC for revetments is 3 Aug 68.

(1) Dak To (2B 044224). Early in May 68 the 299th Engr Bn (C) initiated repair of the FSA at Dak To which included minor repairs to the POL area and improvement of the access road to the Class I storage area. Scope includes improving drainage and raising and shaping the existing road. The battalion continues to maintain and perform minor repairs, as needed, on the airfield. Work was accelerated during Jul 68, as additional equipment became available from the completion of upgrading QL-14 between Tan Caanh and Kontum.

(2) Ben Het Special Forces Camp (YB 072252). Upon request of CO, B Co, 5th SFZ, elements of 299th Engr Bn (C) moved to the site with equipment on 8 Jul 68 to assist SF personnel in constructing limited all weather roads between the three main hills of the camp complex, improving drainage within the main camp and constructing concrete mortar pads and an ammunition storage area. The engineers are providing equipment and technical assistance while SF camp personnel were tasked to provide manual labor. EDC for project is 8 Aug 68.

(3) Information Office.

1. Representative of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

(a) Dedication ceremony for the opening of the Nha Trang Installation Defense Center (IDC), 2 Jun 68.

(b) Farewell ceremony for MG Choe Dae Myung, CG, RKFY-FC, 25 Jun 68.

(c) Farewell visit to 1 PFORGEV of General William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, 7 Jun 68.

(d) Promotion of MG William R. Peers to the rank of LTG by General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, 27 Jun 68. (See Inclosure 18)

2. Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(a) Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, CINCUS, 18 May 68.

(b) General Dwight E. Beach, COMUSARPA, 4 Jul 68.

(c) LTG Frank T. Kirkman, Dep CG, USAV, 11 Jul 68.

(d) MG Bak Hyeun Sik, CG, 9th MDL, 15 Jul 68.

(e) The Honorable Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, 30 Jul 68.

3. The following media representatives were granted an interview with the CG and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(a) Mr. Kevin Buckley, Newsweek Magazine, 18 Jun 68.
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(b) Mr. Peter Arrnett, AP, 21 June 68.

(c) Mr. Dick Oliver, UPI, 28 Jun 68.

(d) Mr. Ben Price, U.S. News and World Report, 29, 30 Jun 68.


(4) Command Information Initial Orientation Briefings for personnel newly assigned to 1st FOBOLV were conducted twice monthly.

(5) On 29 May LTC Paul A. Teehan reported for duty with 1st FOBOLV and assumed the duties of Information Officer, replacing LTC William J. McNelly Jr., who departed for CONUS on 31 May. Major Douglas S. Harris arrived on 5 July, replacing Major Edward L. Fitzpatrick, assistant IO, who departed for CONUS on 4 July. CPT Paul F. Amedick, assistant IO, departed for CONUS on 20 July.

(6) The 5th Public Information Detachment (PID) under the supervision of the IO, 1st FOBOLV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the May, June and July issues of the 1st FOBOLV magazine, "Typhoon". Also during this period the 5th PID inaugurated the publication of the "Wrap Up", a bi-weekly summation of news in the 21 CID, and the "Feature Page", a 15 minute weekly radio program. CPT James L. Turner, assistant IO, departed for CONUS on 21 July. CPT Randolph Brock and 1LT John F. Gray joined the unit on 30 and 31 July respectively. CPT Brock assumed the duties of assistant IO, and 1LT Gray was assigned as Radio/TV officer.

(7) The 11th PID continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 638 personnel during the period covered. The Qui Nhon Press Camp was closed on 26 July due to insufficient usage by correspondents. Post, Camp and Station property in excess of needs was turned in, and other property, purchased with club/gess funds, was transferred to the press camps at Pleiku and Nha Trang. Arrangements were made with the Qui Nhon Sub Area Command to accommodate news media representatives who are visiting that area.

k. (U) Inspector General Activities:

(1) A total of 46 complaints and 22 requests for assistance were received during the period. Of the 46 complaints, 18 were considered to be justified and 22 were unjustified. There was no indication of conditions which were detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) 1st FOBOLV Regulation 20-1, Command Inspections was revised on 19 July 68 to broaden the scope of inspections and to establish a report format more nearly consistent with AR 20-1.

(3) 1st FOBOLV Regulation 20-2, Complaints was published on 12 June 68 to formalize the appointment of acting inspectors general and to establish command policy in the handling of complaints.

(4) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on dates indicated; all were rated satisfactory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37th Co, 1st FOBOLV</td>
<td>3 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237th Trans Co</td>
<td>10 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 92d Arty</td>
<td>13 May 68</td>
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</table>

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AVFA-GC-OT
15 August 1968


7th Bn 15th Arty 27 May 68
5th Bn 22d Arty 10 Jun 68
3d Bn 6th Arty 1 Jul 68
Ninh Thuan Province 6-7 Jul 68
6th Bn 11th Arty 15 Jul 68
Binh Thuan Province 20-21 Jul 68
6th Bn 84th Arty 29 Jul 68

(5) The inspection of province advisory teams in Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan noted above was the beginning of a new program designed to permit CORDS/I FFORCIV greater influence on the advisory effort within the II CTZ.

(6) The USARV Annual General Inspection of the headquarters was conducted during the period 27-30 May 68. The inspection was satisfactory and the final report of corrective action was indorsed back to USARV on 16 Jul 68.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

(1) In the field of military justice, one general court-martial case was tried during the quarter. Subordinate units under the general court-martial jurisdiction of CG I FFORCIV, held 68 trials by special court-martial and 43 trials by summary court-martial. Pursuant to the authority of paragraph 94, HDM, 1951, and Article 65 (c), UCJM, the records of special and summary court-martial were reviewed in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency.

(2) During the quarter 910 persons were punished under the provisions of Article 15.

(3) US personnel presented 67 claims against the government for loss or damage to personal property. Ajudication of 18 of these claims was made by the Staff Judge Advocate, I FFORCIV, and a total of $5,588.05 was paid to claimants.

4. During the quarter legal assistance was given to 740 personnel.

2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The majority of lessons learned by HQ I FFORCIV during the quarter were submitted monthly by staff sections to a Tactical Analysis Board which, after evaluation, developed them into lessons learned directed specifically to units in the II CTZ. These lessons learned along with ones submitted by units are published monthly as "Tactical Notes" (Incl 5, 6 and 7) and are widely disseminated throughout II CTZ. The majority of these lessons learned, although oriented toward operations in the II CTZ, would be applicable to operations throughout Vietnam. For additional information concerning "Tactical Notes" see paragraph 1c(3)(h) page 25 of Section I.

a. (U) PERSONNEL:

(i) Religious Coverage:

(a) OBSERVATION: On occasions chaplains have not been used to provide maximum religious coverage.

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(b) EVALUATION: Some commanders appear to be unaware of the US Army policy of area coverage for religious activities. In some cases commanders direct that all of their units, regardless of location, be served by the unit chaplain, even though the chaplain from another unit may be able to provide better service due to location. The majority of US Army service schools make little or no mention of area religious coverage in their instruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the program of instruction in service schools include instruction on the use of area coverage for religious activities.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) PSYOP Support Unit (PSU):

(a) OBSERVATION: OPERATION BANJO BICE conducted by TF 3d Pr, 506th Inf during the period 8-18 June was supported by a complete PSYOP capability consisting of the following elements:

1. PSYOP Staff Element: One Officer, MOS 9305; one artist, MOS 81E; one intelligence analyst, MOS 96B; one ARVN interpreter.

2. PSYOP Field Team: HE (Audio Visual Team) One Officer, MOS 9305; one TO, MOS 76L; one interpreter, MOS 71R.

3. PSYOP Field Team: HB (Loudspeaker Team) One NCO, MOS 96B; one ARVN interpreter.

4. Regional Armed Propaganda Platoon: Furnished by the GVN Ministry of Civil Mili and consisted of 20 Armed Propaganda Cadre.

(b) EVALUATION: The PSU concept provides a complete PSYOP capability to maneuver elements which are smaller than a brigade. Such units normally do not have sufficient PSYOP staff or field assets within their own resources. The PSU employed in BANJO BICE conducted two successful "show the flag" operations in remote villages during the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the PSU concept be considered when planning for task force operations smaller than brigade size.

(2) Target Processing:

(a) OBSERVATION: An efficient means of processing targeting information is a very effective and valuable aid to the commander and staff in planning and conducting operations and selecting special targets.

(b) EVALUATION: The vast amount of information available to an artillery command is of little value unless an efficient means for processing and storing is utilized. Incoming targeting information should be plotted on a 1:50,000 map and then posted on 5x8 inch index cards with coordinates and nature of target. Also, include on the card the date of the sightings, method of target determination, and accuracy of the information if obtained from an intelligence report. Cards are filed by grid zone designation and target type. The target analyst can check the targeting map in the area of a pending operation and obtain the exact locations and target types from the card file.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this means of processing and storing targeting information be considered by all PSCE.

(3) Map Enang Montagnard Resettlement Center.

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(a) OBSERVATION: The Edap Enang Resettlement Center in Pleiku Province was created to care for the relocation of a large Montagnard refugee population. These Jarai people lived in isolated parts of Pleiku Province where they were easily exploited by VC/NVA units and could not be protected by GVN or US forces. Dwellings were erected by Vietnamese for the refugees but the people could not seem to relate existence in this artificial setting to the life they had known in their hamlets. They departed Edap Enang in large groups, only to be returned by force in some cases. Over a period of months significant commitments were made to the program such as better roads, increased security, and ethnic leadership. Through long months of difficulties and frustrating work the Edap Enang resettlement Center is beginning to show definite signs of success. The refugees have planted crops on the land provided, the center's administration has won the support and trust of the inhabitants and people are returning to the camp on their own.

(b) EVALUATION: Thorough planning must be completed prior to the start of any refugee resettlement project. Large undertakings in refugee resettlement require a significant amount of time and effort before success if realized.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That thorough planning be completed prior to refugee resettlement and all persons associated with the project must be made to realize that long periods of frustration will be experienced before success becomes apparent.

c. (U) TRAINING: None.
d. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None.
e. (C) LOGISTICS:

(1) Maintenance Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: In order to accomplish the I FFORCE mission it has been necessary to divide units below that which their organic maintenance is designed to support. In such cases, it becomes difficult to adequately provide a unit slice of organizational maintenance and especially direct support maintenance. Utilization of 1st Logistical Command units to fill the gaps is not always the most effective method of providing support. These units are overloaded with their normal support responsibilities and to require them to provide personnel for maintenance support further reduces their efficiency. In addition, many of the maintenance units must go through a relearning process to support an unfamiliar piece of equipment only to have it removed from their area as they begin to achieve proficiency on that end item.

(b) EVALUATION: A better solution would appear to be the expansion of the organic organizational and direct support maintenance units. This would provide sufficient organic maintenance to allow an adequate support slice to accompany a unit operating away from its parent unit. The organic personnel will be familiar with the equipment they are supporting, thus eliminating the retraining process to meet a temporary support requirement. In addition, when units are intact the additional personnel can be used to better support assigned equipment and thereby reduce backup requirements from the 1st Logistical Command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the appropriate agency study the present organic maintenance organizations of the tactical units primarily armor and artillery.
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AVFA-OC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I PPORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R4) (U)

f. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.
g. (U) OTHER: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James L. Kalergis
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

*D18 incl

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*Incls 2, 8 thru 14 w/o HQ, DA

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AUTHOR: PST (15 Aug 1968) 1st Ind (C)  MAJ Klingman/aja/LBN 4/33
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCENV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 ICS OSPIN-65 (K1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 31 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATT: OSPIN-LT, APO 96358

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning PSYOP support unit (PSU), page 61, paragraph 2b(1): Concur. Similar units are in existence on a semi-permanent basis in I, III, and IV CTZ.

   b. Reference item concerning target processing, page 61, paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Target lists, logs of targets by area of operation, and pictomap displays are all acceptable devices which can be used depending upon the desires of the commander.

   c. Reference item concerning maintenance support, page 62, paragraph 2e(1): This headquarters will take action to determine the maintenance support requirements of I Field Force Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNITZ
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy start:
HQ I FFV

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I FFORCEV for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[C. L. SHORTT]
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG
# Headquarters I FFORCEV Task Organization

## As of 31 July 1966

### Assigned Units

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<th>Status</th>
<th>Authority</th>
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<td><strong>NMC, I FFORCEV</strong></td>
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<td>1 FFORCEV GO 391, 9 May 67</td>
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<td><strong>NMC, I FFORCEV Arty</strong></td>
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<td>1 FFORCEV GO 391, 9 May 67</td>
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<td>3rd Arty Group</td>
<td>USARV GO 57, 5 Jan 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Bn (105mm) 6th Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn (175mm) 11th Arty</td>
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<td>5th Bn (175mm) 22d Arty</td>
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<td>Attached List Arty Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th Bn (155mm) 92d Arty</td>
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<td>NMC, 8th Bn (TA) 26th Arty</td>
<td>USARV GO 361, 25 Jan 67</td>
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(Air Cav Trp D)
1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf
B Co, 20th Inf (1AP)
54th Inf Det (Radar)
66th Inf Det (Radar)
5th PI Det
11th PI Det
13th Hil Hist Det
41st CA Co (-)
54th Sig Bn (Corps)
55th MI Det
64th Engr Det (Terrain)
167th Sig Co (RR)
209th Sig Det (RA)
274th HP Co (Corps)
297th Trans Co (CA)
HQ, Task Force South (Prov)

Attached 4th Inf Div
Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Attached 4th Inf Div
Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Attached 52d CAB

ATTACHED UNITS
313th RR Bn
509th RR Op GO 9, 8 Jun 66

AUTHORITY

STATUS

AUTHORITY

LOC

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**AVIATION SUPPORT**

THE FOLLOWING AVIATION UNITS (ON ORDER UNLESS CONTROL OF THE 17TH AVIATION GROUP) SUPPLY
HEADQUARTERS 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

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<td>183d EAC</td>
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These notes are printed for the purpose of informing commanders on matters of tactical importance.

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</table>

1. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Rapid Reporting of Intelligience/Information: Accuracy and timeliness in reporting and disseminating intelligence/information is vital to the planning and execution of combat operations. This is especially true if we are to maintain pressure on the enemy throughout the II CTZ. It is of the utmost importance that every item of significant information obtained on enemy actions/activities be forwarded as rapidly as possible so that proper action may be taken. While initial reports have, for the most part, been promptly forwarded, follow up or supplemental reports have been lacking or have been incomplete. Frequently it has been necessary to contact reporting units for supplementary information. This has been especially true of isolated small unit contacts and reports of captured Fis and documents. In several instances, attacks on small friendly units have not been reported until 48 to 72 hours following the incident and some reports have failed to identify and/or cite the location of the friendly element(s) involved. Commanders are urged to insure that all significant information obtained on enemy actions is reported as rapidly and thoroughly as possible.
b. Communications Security: Some telephone users share the mistaken belief that a telephone is secure because personal contact is established directly between the sender and the recipient. This is obviously not true. In many telephone circuits within this command radio links are used between the wire circuits at each end of the telephone link. As a result of this radio link the telephone is highly susceptible to exploitation by enemy forces. In addition telephones within RVN pass through many switchboards employing uncleared indigenous personnel as switchboard operators who can easily overhear any conversations conducted. There have also been indications that VC/NVA forces employ wire tapping in addition to their excellent radio intercept program in order to gain exploitable information from US forces. Commanders must indoctrinate all personnel on the vulnerability of telephone conversations to interception and exploitation.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Reporting: Timely and accurate reporting is fundamental to the successful conduct of military operations for it is upon these reports that the commander bases his decisions. This is true for the platoon leader as well as the Commander in Chief. If our TOC reporting system breaks down at any point between these levels of command we are denying him the complete picture of the tactical situation. The following reports are two of the most important in providing up-to-date information on the tactical situation.

(1) Situation Reports: These reports must arrive at this headquarters NLT 0600 hours daily and reflect the complete picture of the unit's activity. Specific areas to be improved are the reports of the disposition of friendly wounded and the accuracy of enemy kill figures. Reports of friendly wounded must be annotated to reflect the number who required MEDEVAC. Enemy killed must be reported in the statistical portion of the report only if verified actual body count by US personnel. Where possible, the report should indicate the number killed by tactical air, artillery, gunships, naval gunships and ground fire.

(2) Spot Reports: Description of contacts will contain all details available to include support means employed, e.g., tactical air and artillery. If complete details of an action are unknown, followup and corrective reports should be submitted as additional information is obtained.

b. Exploitation of Personnel Detector Missions: Personnel detectors can be extremely valuable reconnaissance means for all units. The Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) and the Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD) provide an instant readout of probable enemy locations. The advantage of the personnel detector lies in its instant readout capability but this advantage must be fully exploited. Early morning "Red Haze" followed by
a sniffer mission should provide reliable information concerning the location of enemy troops and the dimensions of the areas occupied. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols can be inserted in the area of the "Sniffer" readings or observed artillery and air strikes can be called for destruction of the enemy in-place. The key is rapid reaction to personnel detector readings. A "Sniffer" mission with the sensor aircraft flying at treetop level accompanied by two gunships and a chase ship is probably well known to VC/NVA troops and must be rapidly exploited to maintain the element of surprise. A delay of one day gives the ever-moving enemy a chance to react to his detection and possibly even to set up ambushes.

c. Use of E-8 Tactical CS Launcher: The E-8 tactical CS launcher consists of sixteen tubes, each containing four CS cartridges. The E-8 can be fired manually or electrically. It produces an incapacitating concentration of CS over an area of from 75 meters X 40 meters to 250 meters X 40 meters at ranges up to 150 meters depending on the elevation of the launcher. A dense cloud of CS will cover the target area in approximately 10 seconds. The E-8 can be used either as an offensive or defensive weapon. As an offensive weapon, it is best utilized against enemy fortified positions or villages from which fire is being received. As a defensive weapon, it is best utilized as an emplaced munition around perimeters or mounted on convoy vehicles. The rapid employment of CS in this manner against an attacking or ambush force will permit friendly forces to gain the element of surprise and take the offensive.

d. Mine Warfare: The continuation of accidents involving friendly personnel in old minefields and an upturn in the number of US mines being employed by the enemy is a matter of serious concern. A revised mine warfare policy is being published as a portion of the I FFORCEN SOP. All commanders must thoroughly review and comply with the letter and the spirit of this SOP. It is imperative that we do not allow the enemy access to our mines, and that we disseminate broadly the location of known fields. The abandonment of a minefield to the enemy is a defeat in itself since he will surely employ the mines against us at a later time.

e. Proper Utilization of Fire Support: The importance of continuous fire support for troops in contact cannot be overemphasized. It has been noted that upon occasion fire support has been denied because artillery was check-fired while awaiting the arrival of airstrikes or gunships. In most cases it is not necessary to check artillery fire until immediately before the aircraft begin their pass. Close coordination and a workable system of signals between the FAC and other fire support elements can eliminate unnecessary periods of denying maneuver units fire support. Fires can be shifted to other targets just prior to the airstrike. Knowledge of the gun-target line and of the location and time of the last rounds in the primary target area can facilitate safety and timeliness. This close coordination will enable air, mortar and artillery to attack targets in the same general area simultaneously. Additionally, concentrated artillery fires just prior to airstrikes can neutralize the effectiveness of anti-aircraft weapons by denying them the chance to position themselves for effective fire or by
forcing the crews to take cover. These comments apply to gunship support as well. Close liaison between the ground commander and the gunship commander is essential. Proper coordination of all elements has proven most effective on the battlefield and has shown that there is seldom cause for a complete shutdown of any one means of fire support. Emphasis on a more thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of all fire support means will develop the confidence of the users. Commanders at all echelons are urged to give their personal attention to the continuous utilization of fire support on the battlefield and to develop increased expertise in obtaining the maximum benefits from all air, mortar gunship and artillery support.

f. RF/PF Reinforcement: During the past thirty days this headquarters has continued to emphasize the need to seize the initiative, taking advantage of the weakened VC/NVA posture. In a recent message COMUSMACV has stated that our objective is to make a major breakthrough toward military victory in South Vietnam. Toward that end it is envisioned that every commander will be constantly on the alert to exploit all contacts and that the combined forces in II Corps will strive for the common goal of defeating the enemy. In accomplishing this objective it is essential that every integral force in II CTZ be fully oriented on and utilized for offensive operations. In this regard it has been encouraging to note the fine job the Regional and Popular forces have been doing. Commanders should continuously take cognizance of what the RF/PF units are doing and assist in integrating these units into the offensive thrusts. Particular attention must be given to the reinforcement of RF/PF units which engage enemy forces beyond their capability. A combined letter of instruction is under preparation by ARVN, ROK and US commands which will assign specific responsibilities concerning such reinforcement.

g. Combined Campaign Plan: The overall goals and objectives of the CCP must not be overlooked in the day to day conduct of the battle. The II CTZ CCP furnishes the commander with a blueprint that encompasses the semi-annual assessment and outlook by the combined commanders. The plan covering the period 1 July - 31 December 1968 is currently under preparation and is scheduled for publication on 15 June 1968.

h. Bushmaster Program: One of the most effective means of exploiting enemy vulnerabilities is the Bushmaster Program. There is currently an increased tempo in enemy movement within II CTZ. The enemy has habitually traveled along TAOR boundaries in small groups to avoid contact. Night ambushes along these boundaries and outside of established AOIs keep an unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The totality of the offensive effort demands 24 hour a day operations with particular emphasis on those measures which will interdict enemy movement and resupply.
2. (U) **Logistics:** When operational planning is conducted at any level, it is imperative that the appropriate logistical support activity be included in the coordination. Failure to do so will result in an unanticipated drawdown of heavily used items and may jeopardize the intended mission. The various stockage objectives and stockage levels that are established at supply points are based on current supply demands and altered as required to meet anticipated changes. The appropriate logistical support activity must be kept informed of these anticipated changes in order to furnish effective support. An example of lack of supply coordination that recently occurred was a planned concentrated air activity in the vicinity of an FSA that required aircraft refueling at the FSA rather than from their normal logistical support installations. This resulted in an unusually heavy demand of JP-4 at the FSA. The support command became aware of this operational change only after the JP-4 level at the FSA became dangerously low. This lack of communication between tactical and logistical operations could have produced dire consequences. Future operational plans must include coordination with the appropriate support activity.

/s/ W. R. Peers
/t/ W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
C
D (less staff)
E (less staff)
F (less staff)
AVFA-GC-OT 25 June 1968

SUBJECT: I FFORCEV Tactical Notes

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded are I FFORCEV Tactical Notes #2.

2. Some items submitted by units arrived too late for inclusion in this publication but will be included in the next issue of the I FFORCEV Tactical Notes. It was noted that some units and advisory groups made no contribution. Since the success of this endeavor depends on input from a broad base, it is requested that all addressees forward items for inclusion in the next issue by 15 July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. BUSBEE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

INCL 6
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ARTILLERY

1. (U) Secondary Explosions. Secondary explosions provide an important source of intelligence information. All personnel should be constantly alert for them during artillery firing, air strikes and gunship employment. Observers should carefully note and report the color of the fireball and the height and shape of the cloud column. In addition, the maneuver unit commander must be promptly notified so that he can take tactical advantage of the information. Fire support should be immediately increased to exploit the discovery before the enemy can effectively react. A secondary explosion confirms an enemy location and should be followed by additional fire in the target area. (Arty)

2. (U) M12A7 Sight, 105mm Howitzer. The white paint in the etched micrometer graduation on the M12A7 sight for the 105mm howitzer wears rapidly, making the setting extremely difficult to read during night firing. The problem can be solved by the use of white "grease pencil" (china marker type) rubbed lightly over the micrometer graduations. The pencil material will rub into the small grooves, and will remain after buffing with a soft cloth has removed any excess material from the knob. These restored markings have been found to be far more durable than the original paint and more easily read. (4th Inf Div)

AVIATION

3. (C) Combat Emergency Frequency. An emergency FM frequency, 38.90 MHz has been designated for use by all ground and aviation units in II CTZ. The frequency will net with the new and old families of tactical FM radios. The concept of employment is for the aviator observing signals or unusual activity by a ground unit to tune immediately to the emergency FM frequency and attempt to establish contact. The ground commander, depending on the situation, either gives the aircraft his tactical call sign and frequency or uses the common frequency. This contact makes available to the ground commander the entire communications capability of the aircraft in a radio relay role. Ground and aviation unit SOI/SSIs should be amended to explain fully the use of this frequency. (Avn)

CHEMICAL

4. (C) Bulk CS Drop. As an adjunct to ground operations, Allied Forces drop bulk CS powder in 55 gallon drums, plastic containers or plastic bags which are set to detonate or burst on or near the surface to disperse the agent. Each drop should be followed by VR to insure that all containers have ruptured. Duds should be identified and destroyed by gunfire or WP rockets in order to prevent the CS from being captured intact and used by VC/NVA forces. (Chem)

CORDS

5. (U) Hoi Chanh Processing. Within 48 hours after a Hoi Chanh rallies to a US unit, his name, rank, unit and rally date will be furnished to the
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respective Province Chieu Hoi Service or Chieu Hoi Advisor. A Preliminary Interrogation Report will be processed and a copy forwarded to the sector 52 Advisor. If the Hoi Chanh is to be retained by the receiving unit for exploitation, an estimated date of turnover to the Chieu Hoi Service will be included with the above information. Deviations from the above procedure cannot be tolerated as they seriously affect the credibility of the entire PSYOP effort (See IFFORCEV Reg 380-7). Remember every rallier treated properly is a potential salesman for the program. The life he subsequently saves may be one of your men. (C0RDS)

INTELLIGENCE

6. (C) Early Warning Against Enemy Activity. Recent occurrences in the II CTZ have shown a need for strengthening early warning around major installations and population centers to assure that timely defensive measures can be taken. The enemy has shown on several occasions that he can position himself undetected and inflict serious casualties unless defensive forces receive sufficient warning. Some effort has been made to counter this threat through the use of several early warning systems. Hamlet/villages warning radio nets are in various stages of completion in the II CTZ. It is intended that the eventual system will include an extensive warning net through coordinated use of civilian and military facilities around most major population centers. As an adjunct to these communication systems, agent and informant nets are used widely within the corps zone to provide early detection of the enemy. Use of the Volunteer Informant Program (IFFORCEV Reg 381-2) to reward civilians for information about the enemy is another asset for use in an early warning program. In order for these systems to be most effective, they should be integrated by a coordinating element such as a Province Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center (PIOCC), District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center (DIIOCC) or Installation Defense Coordinator. This centralized effort will insure that warnings are disseminated rapidly and that adequate defensive measures are taken. A desirable radius around major installations and population centers in which early warning systems should be employed is 10 kilometers in order to insure that standoff as well as ground attacks can be detected. The benefits of early warning were vividly demonstrated near TUY HOA in May of this year. Reports by civilians in surrounding villages enabled allied forces to take offensive action and by a decisive victory, thwart a multi-battalion attack on the city itself. Commanders and senior advisory personnel are urged to insure that adequate early warning systems are developed and that they represent a coordinated effort by all local agencies. (G2)

7. (U) Importance of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war have proven to be one of the most important sources of intelligence available to Allied Forces in Vietnam. It is from the prisoner that we can learn those all-important facts we have a continuing need for: The who, what, where, when, where and how concerning the enemy. Offensive action, necessary to defeat an enemy, must be based on sound intelligence, the type of intelligence available from a POW. The capture and subsequent interrogation of PVT PHAN VAN MANH from the 5th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment by CIDG from
Camp TIEU ATAR substantiated previous unconfirmed reports that the 32d Regiment had relocated from KONTUM Province to DARLAC Province and that two battalions would attack BAN M THUOT City. The capture of LT NGO QUANG TAO from the 325th NVA Division provided the first intelligence that a new enemy division had relocated from KHE SAINH to the Western Highlands. Further interrogation yielded invaluable information concerning the new enemy threat. These prisoners are but two of many who revealed highly valuable and immediately exploitable intelligence. With these examples in mind, commanders should take every opportunity to encourage the capture of prisoners. Appropriate awards for the capture of POW should be considered.

8. (U) Increased Intelligence Through Aerial Surveillance. Units often request aerial surveillance coverage of broad areas rather than more precisely defined targets. This practice is costly and often results in less than satisfactory imagery for the requestor. Emphasis should be placed on the selection of the smallest aerial surveillance target possible that will satisfy the EEI requirements. Specific requests will permit a better scale of photography and allows more detailed interpretation thus providing more intelligence. In addition, multiple targets can often be incorporated into a single mission, which will allow reconnaissance aircraft to be more responsive to other aerial reconnaissance requests. (G2)

9. (U) Intelligence for the Small Unit Commander. We have available to us a limitless reservoir of combat intelligence, which, if disseminated, updated, learned and applied, would go far toward enriching the American soldier’s knowledge of his enemy. To supplement unit studies and publications, a list of selected intelligence and operational studies is provided at Appendix I for reference by company and platoon level unit commanders. For assistance in obtaining copies of these publications, major units should contact this headquarters, ATTN: ACoS, G2. (G2)

10. (C) Programmed Use of Reconnaissance Assets. In order to get maximum coverage of the extremely large division area of operations (8,000 - 10,000 square miles), reconnaissance assets must be employed most judiciously. The fragmenting of reconnaissance assets, in an attempt to get some coverage over the entire area of operations at all times, dissipates the overall potential of these assets, thereby greatly reducing the chances of finding the enemy. Reconnaissance assets should be programmed into selected target areas in a progression commensurate with the developing intelligence picture. Suspect areas are determined from agent reports, POW interrogations, captured documents and general trends in enemy activity. Initial reconnaissance, consisting of Red Haze, Snoopy, aerial photography and SLAR, is concentrated in the suspected areas. Once these suspect areas have been further narrowed down, long range patrols and air and ground cavalry forces are inserted into the reduced area. At the same time, Snoopy, aerial photography, SLAR, concentrated VR and other means continue to be employed. After this phase has been completed and the enemy has been fixed in what is now a relatively small area, maximum destruction is caused by air and artillery while ground forces further fix the enemy. It has been found that this is the most efficient and productive way to
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utilize reconnaissance resources to find and destroy enemy forces in a large area of operations. (4th Inf Div)

OPERATIONS

11. (U) Ambushes. Ambushes can make more tactical "money" for the commander than any other type of combat action. Their use should be extensive and continuous. An analysis of recent ambush results indicates that some units are more successful than others in ambushing. Since all units have equal opportunities to put out ambushes and to get kills, enemy casualties become a good indicator of relative ambush efficiency. Basically there are two types of ambush: the large-force, or classic ambush and the small hasty ambush. The large-force ambush, which is extensively covered in field manuals, is not well suited to the day-to-day situation we face in II CTZ. It is complicated and difficult to establish. The small hasty 5-10 man ambush is simple to establish and execute. The overriding consideration, however, for the successful ambush is surprise. This is achieved not by digging-in, as the ambush is not a defensive position, nor by using the same sites over and over, but by moving with stealth into well chosen, concealed positions preferably during the hours of darkness. The actual movement into position is critical, for a single footprint on the trail will warn the enemy, thus giving away the ambush site and permitting an enemy counterambush. In order to get extensive area coverage, which makes contact more probable, a platoon can move out 2000-3000 meters from a minimally secured company base and then further break down into squad and/or fire team size elements. Sites are chosen along trails and other likely avenues of approach in places which provide concealment to the ambush but which will not place fire on other ambushes. Likely enemy mortar positions should be considered. Thorough training and guidance will be required to enable elements to rapidly occupy adequate positions. Because ambushes often receive little prior warning of the enemy's approach, all personnel must remain awake to enhance the probability of timely action. Commanders, therefore, must make provisions for night ambushers to sleep during the day. If properly planned and executed, an ambush should be able to destroy all the enemy within the predesigned killing zone, thus annihilating small groups and scaring off most large ones. Fires must be carefully planned and well distributed to cover completely the killing zone. There has often been a notable absence of small element leaders in field ambushes. Because of the tendency to "let the subordinate do it" the experienced leader's knowledge of ambush techniques is wasted. In addition, many unit commanders do not really know what is happening on their ambushes. They must make arrangements to find out. If necessary, commanders should accompany small ambushes to learn first hand. As the enemy's knowledge of the terrain diminishes with his increased use of troops from the north, our ability to ambush these less-well trained soldiers should proportionately grow. Remember the two bywords of the ambush, SURPRISE and SIMPLICITY and you will "get the jump on the enemy" permanently. (G3)

12. (U) Tactical Emergency. IFFORCEV Regulation 55-2, dated 4 June 1968 defines tactical emergency (TAC "E") in part, as a situation in which "the unit is engaged with the enemy or contact is imminent." There have been
indications in the past that commanders and advisors have declared tactical emergencies to obtain additional support for their units when this criterion does not exist. Such a practice is extremely dangerous because IFFORCEV assets are limited and must be conserved to support all Allied Forces. The fulfillment of a TAC "E" request for one unit in II CTZ normally requires a drawdown of assets allocated to other users. Such drawdowns frequently disrupt other important but lesser priority missions. Commanders must insure that the above criterion is met before declaring a TAC "E". (G3)

13. (U) Use of LRP's in Conjunction with Airmobile Operations. There are many ways in which LRP's can assist airmobile operations. One effective technique often overlooked, is the use of LRP's to recon a planned landing zone. Insertion of a LRP team prior to the assault can determine if the enemy is on or near the LZ. If the enemy is not present, the combat assault can be made without "prepping" the LZ. If the enemy is present, the LRP team can adjust the LZ preparatory fires or assist in selection of alternate LZ's. (G2)

PERSONNEL

14. (U) Recovery of Deceased Personnel. It is a proud unit which "takes care of its own", whether in garrison or on the battlefield. No better example of this proud spirit of competence exists than that evidenced by units of high morale and esprit de corps in the care and attention they give to the recovery, protection and evacuation of comrades who have been killed in action. There is a definite detrimental effect on the morale of a unit when bodies of deceased members of that unit are left unrecovered on the field. Additionally, the sorrow, worry and uncertainty visited upon families back home adds to what is already a heavy burden of sadness for them. Every effort must be made to recover and evacuate as soon as possible the bodies of personnel killed in action. Commanding Officers at all levels will insure maximum effort is made to recover remains of personnel killed and missing in action. (G1)

CG, IFFORCEV'S MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

15. (U) Offensive Operations. These consist of finding the enemy, fixing him, exploiting the contact and maintaining contact and pursuing him to ultimate destruction. The most difficult of all of these is finding him, particularly the enemy we have here in SVN. Hence, whenever we do find him, the automatic thought action should be "to immediately employ an exploitation force and build on it." This is applicable at all levels of command.

16. (U) Tactical Security. There are too many instances wherein security elements are non-existent or so close in that they are non-effective.

a. Offensive - The point, advance party and advance guard must be sufficiently far ahead of the main body to provide ample warning time of the presence of the enemy and to provide ample maneuver room. Normally, in comparatively open terrain the lead security elements should be 500 -
1000 meters ahead of the main body. In thick jungle or restricted terrain the distances are reduced to 100-300 meters.

b. Defensive - Numerous OP's and ambush positions well out from the defensive position are absolutely essential to provide early warning of impending enemy attacks and to prevent the enemy from reconnoitering the position and gaining initial surprise.

17. (U) Ambushes. The following are rather typical ambush reports.

a. X ambushed 5 enemy - results 5 VC/NVA KIA, 5 weapons CIA - (obviously this was a well planned and well executed ambush).

b. Y ambushed 3 VC - results 1 VC KIA, the other two picked up the weapon and ran - (premature engagement, trigger happy and perhaps scared, did not wait for the enemy to enter the predetermined kill zone).

c. Z ambush was attacked by VC squad - results 2 KIA, 1 weapon lost, enemy unknown (who ambushed whom - no friendly ambush existed).

18. (U) Friendly Unit Ambushed by the Enemy when Returning from Night Ambush Site. This has happened more than a few times and with heavy losses. It was caused in almost all instances by the friendly unit using the same ambush position, night after night, setting up a pattern as to the time and route of return to the base location, and becoming careless. Avoiding such instances requires frequent, almost daily changes in the location of the ambush site, moving into the position by stealth or under cover of darkness, careful development of the ambush site and the use of a proper tactical formation while returning to the base.

19. (U) LRP Contacts. Too many LRP's and Hawkeyes are being extracted immediately after an enemy sighting or contact. If the LRP is operating properly the enemy should not suspect its presence so there is no need for extraction. Similarly, should a Hawkeye or LRP establish contact, the object is to immediately reinforce to pin down the enemy and ultimately destroy him. LRP's and Hawkeyes are not an end in themselves, their greatest value comes from rapid exploitation of their sightings or contacts.

20. (U) Reaction Forces. Every battalion size and larger unit must have a readily available reaction force to exploit contacts. Such a force need not be held in a static position in the base camp. It may be composed of elements defending the fire base, a unit performing S&C operations with nearby LZ's, and so on. Aircraft to move the reaction force and gunships to protect the movement must also be readily available. It will probably be unusual to have sufficient aircraft to keep them on standby; therefore, it is imperative that someone continually monitor the use of aircraft so that when the employment of a reaction force is necessary, he will be prepared to make an immediate recommendation as to where the aircraft should come from. It does little good for the reaction force to arrive after the contact is broken. Moreover, if
the reaction force is delayed too long, the enemy will surely police the battlefield.

21. (U) Feelling of Urgency. In counterinsurgency operations, as in any war, it is essential not only to have the weapons cocked and primed, so to speak, and the smaller units prepared for instant contact, but it is also necessary that commanders at all echelons be mentally geared to the situation. The commander owes it to his men to be able to provide additional protection or to exploit their contacts. It requires fast reaction but it must be an intelligent decision, well thought out and executed as a matter of SOP. Invariably the better commanders are those having the greater feeling of concern for their men and units.

22. (U) Sunday Holidays. It comes as a great surprise to learn that some combat units and some advisory elements consider Sundays as a day of stand-down and a large percentage of the personnel in the units are given leave and passes. The VC/NVA are communists; they are anti-God; and they regard Sunday as another day for combat. Accordingly, it is expected that all units assigned or under the operational control of IFFORCEV including all advisor elements, will be manned and fully capable of performing their assigned responsibilities on Sundays as well as any other day. This does not preclude a slightly later starting time on Sundays, nor does it preclude personnel taking time off to attend religious service. Moreover, personnel and advisory elements should encourage their counterpart organization to be fully capable of accomplishing assigned duties.

23. (C) Checking Arc-Lights. We have been requested repeatedly by COMUSMAV to thoroughly check out all Arc-Lights, preferably by ground reconnaissance. The fact of the matter is, however, that the response has not been commensurate with the eagerness of the request for the Arc-Lights. The same is generally true for air strikes (FAC or Combat Sky Spot directed), Cook-Outs, areas of secondary explosions and others. We have received outstanding support from our higher headquarters and the 7th Air Force but we have not been overly enthusiastic in obtaining the data required to continue justification of such support. For US units, all Arc-Lights, Cook-Outs and multiple air strikes (three or more) will be reconnoitered by a ground element within 72 hours or a complete explanation will be provided to IFFORCEV. (Strikes within 2 KM of the Laos-Cambodian border are excluded but every effort should be made to check them out with LRP, Omega or Air Cav ground elements.) Advisors and IFFORCEV ROK Special Liaison Group personnel are requested to effect comparable arrangements with their counterparts.
25 July 1968

SUBJECT: I FFORCEV Tactical Notes

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded are I FFORCEV Tactical Notes # 3.

2. Addressees were reminded in June's issue of the I FFORCEV Tactical Notes to forward items for inclusion in the notes by the 15th of the month. Since some input was received late, it is again requested that all addressees forward items for inclusion in the notes by the 15th of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. BUSBEY JR.
Colonel, ADC
Adjutant General

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# INDEX

**IFOR GLV TACTICAL NOTES**

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ARTILLERY

1. (U) Joint ARVN/US Artillery Support. Recently a US artillery battery provided artillery support for two ARVN operations in conjunction with an ARVN artillery platoon. US forward observers and a liaison officer accompanied the maneuver units. As a result of these operations, the following recommendations for the joint employment of US and ARVN artillery were made:

a. The US LO can provide valuable assistance to the ARVN maneuver commander. He should be aggressive in insuring that preplanned targets are available along all routes of march and that defensive targets are planned and fired in for all defensive positions.

b. A fire coordination line should be established by the ARVN headquarters to allow firing of both artillery units into the contact area and allow the continuance of artillery fire while gunships and air strikes are employed. If ARVN personnel do not establish the fire coordination line, the US LO should recommend it.

c. US artillery units should be furnished an overlay showing villages and no fire zones by the ARVN headquarters. (I FFORCEV Arty)

2. (U) Danger Zone for Shell Illumination.

a. The large danger zone created by the empty canister and base plate of illuminating rounds restricts employment of shell, illuminating in populated areas. The selection of an alternate burst point to move the danger zone outside safety areas introduces delay in responsiveness and the possibility of insufficient illumination.

b. Test firing of illumination shells at Fort Sill revealed that debris from a 105mm shell fell into an area on the ground 300 meters on either side of the azimuth of fire and from 400 meters short of the point of ejection to the projected point of impact. Danger zone for 155mm shell was found to be an area on the ground 300 meters on either side of the azimuth of fire and from the point of ejection to the projected point of impact.

c. The FDC exercising technical fire control should determine the danger zone and insure it is cleared. In populated areas a solution enabling the FDC to determine at a glance the areas over which illumination can be fired is the preparation of an "illumination dead space" overlay. (I FFORCEV Arty)

CHEMICAL

3. (C) Evaluation of Personnel Detector Missions. Personnel detectors are an invaluable adjunct to the reconnaissance and surveillance program.
Although in many instances "hot readings" are followed by air, artillery or gunship strikes, follow-up action must be accomplished and reported in order to properly evaluate the intelligence information obtained by the detectors. Saturation of an area by fire following a "hot reading" without follow-up makes evaluation of detector effectiveness meaningless. Detectors can be profitably used in road opening or clearing operations. The employment of detectors immediately preceding and during the convoy passage will provide additional valuable intelligence information concerning possible enemy locations or ambush sites. Based on successes achieved by personnel detectors in UH-1 aircraft throughout II CTZ, consideration is being given to utilization of the OI aircraft in a similar role. Employment of the personnel detector in the OI aircraft would provide an additional asset for acquisition of targets and would be especially useful in detecting targets concealed by thick jungle growth. An additional benefit derived from employment of the personnel detector in this role would be the capability of the accompanying aerial observer to bring immediate responsive fire on detected targets. When the OI aircraft is utilized in this role, it must be provided security.

**CORDS**

4. (C) **Revolutionary Development Operations.** Revolutionary Development (RD) is an integrated military and civil program to restore, consolidate and expand government control, so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military and civic actions necessary to liberate the people from VC control, restore public security, initiate political and economic development, extend effective GVN authority, and win the willing support of the people toward these ends. The focal point of RD is the people in the hamlets. The RD program aims at transforming VC-controlled hamlets in order that new life will be developed for the people within a secure environment and with improved political, economic and social standards of living for all. An intermediate goal of the RD program is the establishment of a secure hamlet. The following points provide criteria for determining the security status of a hamlet:

a. A census of residents has to be completed, the VC infrastructure has to be identified and destroyed, or neutralized, and an intelligence net has to be established to deter its recurrence.

b. An adequate popular force and/or paramilitary force has to be recruited, trained, armed and qualified for operations.

c. Hamlet security must be effected with an integrated defensive system to include methods of requesting reinforcements.

d. Hamlet inhabitants are questioned and permitted to express their grievances and aspirations. With this information, some economic and social development projects have to be initiated to satisfy people's desires.
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5. Hamlet inhabitants should be organized for self-defense and development tasks.

6. Hamlet chiefs should be appointed and trained. Chiefs should be supported by a majority of the people in the hamlet. (EMO)

INTELLIGENCE

5. (G) Intelligence on V2 Infrastructure and Local Force Units: The most current intelligence information on V2 infrastructure and local force units within a district is located at the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). Timely intelligence of this nature is not always available to US units operating unilaterally within a particular area. To insure access to this valuable intelligence, US operation's plans should include provisions for requesting from the District Chief Information concerning the current local enemy situation, and for combined operations with I units. (EMO)

OPERATIONS

6. (G) Reporting: Reporting the major source of information on the tactical situation has been and will continue to be through the "Boot Report System." The subject of reporting procedures was addressed in I PGMN Tactical Notes #1, dated 31 May 1966. At the present time, the importance of accurate, timely and complete information cannot be over emphasized enough by all commanders. While serving in an economy of force role, allied forces none the less have maintained an offensive posture. This has been possible by the prudent and aggressive allocation of our limited assets to exploit contacts and maintain pressure on an enemy presently attempting to avoid decisive combat. Reports of contacts several hours late are of little value to immediate reaction. Initial reports have generally been appropriate and informative; however, a serious gap in follow-up reports currently exists. Additional information on contacts, casualties, deployments or correction of previous errors must be reported to this headquarters immediately. This will permit reaction and planning in a positive and tactically sound manner. Commanders at all echelons are expected to review their reporting procedures and exercise continuous scrutiny to ensure the best means available are being utilized to maintain an effective reporting system. (G3)

7. (G) Fire Support Bunkers: When planning for construction of anti-tank fire support bunkers on the downward slopes of hill or perimeter, care must be taken to insure that the artillery pieces can fire close range direct fire. This is especially critical when planning include the firing of "Rice Hive" ammunition during enemy attempts to penetrate the defensive perimeter. (EMO)

8. (G) Avoiding Stereotyped Mobile Operations: Every effort must be made to avoid stereotyped helicopter operations. Although LRRP preparations normally include artillery and fighter strikes, this pattern should

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be changed occasionally by using a short and intensive strike by armed helicopters immediately before the first assault element touches down. With the large number of airmobile assaults that have been conducted in Vietnam, emphasis must be placed on effective variations, so that a predictable pattern is not set. Other possibilities, in addition to those mentioned above, are the use of naval gunfire support when available, assaults in conjunction with preplanned B-52 strikes, night airmobile operations, and surprise assaults with no preparation fired. If the greatest flexibility and imagination are not employed, the risk of enemy ambush on the LZ will be increased. In all cases any preparation should be equated to the enemy threat and the amount of munitions expended should be so tailored. (USACDC ORLL May 1968)

9. (U) Convoy Procedures. As with any successful combat operation, conduct of a successful convoy is the result of the planning and coordination which has taken place prior to the move. A convoy should be conducted as a tactical operation. It should not be considered as an administrative move even though convoys have followed the same route before and were unmolested. Guidance for convoy procedures is given in an I FORGEV SOP, subj: Hwy 19 SOP for Logistical and Security Elements, dated 17 July 1968. (G3)

10. (U) ARVN/CIDG/ROKA/US Combined Operations. US and FWNF operations involving the utilization of Camp Strike Force (CSF) and Mobile Strike Force (MSF) units must be effectively coordinated between the US conventional unit and Special Forces personnel. Concerning the employment of CIDG forces, it is absolutely essential that conventional units exercising OPCON over CIDG forces fully understand the limitations and capabilities of the CIDG. CIDG personnel are civilian paramilitary forces, and as such, have certain limitations which dictate their method of employment. USASF advisory personnel fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the CIDG and can advise OPCON units of these capabilities and limitations. (5th SFSA)

11. (C) A Successful RF Company Tactical Formation. The most successful tactical formation employed by RF companies is an adaptation of a "T" formation. In this formation, the unit commander deploys a squad on line 30-500 meters in advance of the main body. The main body is deployed in two columns, 50 meters apart, with flank security deployed on the flanks 50-500 meters out. This formation affords the unit a capability of rapid movement, security and the ability to maneuver quickly in response to an enemy threat. It also allows the unit to search a much larger area while moving. See sketch of "T" formation as shown on next page. (DSA, II CTZ)
12. (C) NVA Movement Techniques and Habits. When assaulting a friendly position such as a Fire Support Base (FSB), the NVA move in close to the objective (250-300 meters away) so that they will not be hit by artillery and air strikes. One Hoi Chanh recommended that friendly units, when being attacked in a defensive position, fire artillery on all sides of the position at a range of 250-300 meters. Two other Hoi Chanhs who participated in the 26 March attack on 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB in Kontum Province stated that they remained in the vicinity of the FSB for over two weeks after the unsuccessful attack on the FSB. This was done in order to avoid air strikes being conducted further away from the FSB. Upon withdrawal from the area of an attack, it is a NVA practice to guide on stream junctions as rally points. Whenever possible, they withdraw down ravines in order to reduce the effects of friendly air strikes and artillery. NVA units generally bivouac in ravines or on the sides of hills in order to mitigate the effects of friendly air strikes and artillery while positioning only a small element on the hilltop or ridgeline for observation and security purposes. Several PWS and Hoi Chanhs have reported witnessing US air strikes and artillery fired into the hilltop while they bivouacked safely down the slope. (4th Inf Div)

13. (C) Utilization of Kit Carson Scouts. Utilization of the first increment of Kit Carson Scouts indicates that the program has great potential value, and commanders indicate a desire for assignment of more KC Scouts. On one occasion, a Scout, through observation of trail markers, was able to warn his unit commander of a minefield ahead. In another case, a Scout exposed booby traps in a reoccupied area.

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The Scouts have adapted well to their units. One commander encountered a problem when he attempted to transfer a Scout to another element for an operation. The Scout objected to leaving his friends in the squad. The problem was solved by attaching the entire squad for the duration of the operation.

14. (U) 12/17 Police and Improvements. Police of helicopter landing sites remain a continuing problem in Fire Support Bases. Turbine engine ingestion of loose objects and debris (i.e., plastic ammunition covers, sandbags, packing material, steel wire, ponchos, etc.) which litter helicopter FS3 and LOC pads have proven costly and resulted in unsafe operations. Most important, is the resultant decrease in aircraft availability for future operations. Positive implementation of assets incorporates the following: "Each unit which builds and/or utilizes a landing pad in an LZ or other area designates an officer or senior NCO as the aircraft landing site safety officer. He is responsible for the removal of trees, brush, loose objects and other items which present a hazard to safe helicopter operation." Police and continual improvement of helicopter landing sites are required to preclude further incidents which may cause aircraft damage and a resultant degradation in combat effectiveness. (4th Inf Div)

15. (C) 90mm and 106mm Recoilless Rifles as Defensive Weapons. In firebase defense, there have been many instances in which direct fire is needed, and artillery is not able to provide it because of proximity to friendly troops or conflicting missions. The 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles are an accurate and effective substitute for direct fire artillery. It can be integrated in the defense of the perimeter to control avenues of approach, and be used as a counter-mortar weapon against close-in positions. It can also assist short range patrols operating out of the fire base. The 90mm recoilless rifle can be utilized where it is not feasible to employ the 106mm recoilless rifle. Similarly, in the defense of urban areas, recoilless rifles are extremely effective in destroying a specific house or bunker without destroying other structures near the target. (4th Inf Div)

16. (C) White Phosphorous Grenade Used as Immediate Action in Contact. The point man of a patrol or any other tactical element can use the WP grenade as a means of gaining initiative. The grenade will momentarily distract an enemy and provide some concealment for the point man's movement. Point men can be trained to employ the WP grenade as an immediate action upon making contact. (4th Inf Div)

17. (C) NVA Use of Saddle Positions. A generalized NVA tactic, i.e., used by more than one NVA regiment, has been identified in conjunction with the use of saddle positions. The tactic is believed developed from an NVA analysis which apparently assumes that:

a. US units habitually move down the ridge or saddle which connects two pieces of high ground, rather than approaching by contour across draws and up fingers.
b. When NVA are believed to be defending in the area, US units will hold on one hill and prepare the next with an intensive air or artillery preparation directed primarily against the objective hill mass, with secondary emphasis on the ridge or saddle connecting the high ground. Based on this analysis of US characteristics, the NVA do not place their position on the objective hill mass, but locate it so as to control the most likely avenue of approach, as well as limited (200-300 meters) flanking attempts. The majority of the fighting positions are not located on the ridge or saddle (the probable US line of march), but rather on the sides. The position is sited so that it can be fought as either a perimeter or an ambush; in either case, good withdrawal routes and delay positions are available. Further, the siting of the individual positions permits the NVA to deliver heavy fire towards the center of their own positions without masking each other's fires. Finally, protective bunkers located some distance away in well-protected draws on each flank provide protection during air and artillery preparation as well as a covered attack position for reinforcing units. Sketch of NVA Saddle Position is provided at Appendix I. (4th Inf Div)

SIGNAL

18. (C) Radio Communications. The enemy's capability to monitor and derive useful intelligence from tactical voice radio nets continues to improve, as does his ability to enter nets and attempt "imitative deception." To offset this growing capability it is increasingly important for tactical commanders to insure that strict net discipline and appropriate transmission security procedures are enforced on all nets for which they are responsible. The procedures include the periodic change of frequencies and call words, habitual use of authentication and low level operations and numeral codes. Compliance with USARV Regulation 380-13 is required. (Signal)

19. (C) Dispersal of Tactical Signal Equipment. Staff visits to subordinate elements throughout II CTZ have revealed that in many cases communications equipment is not adequately protected or dispersed. Numerous sites have been found to have all radio and tele-type equipment located in a single building, room or bunker so that a single large caliber round, or even a well placed satchel charge would completely disrupt that unit's communications. It is recognized that in many cases quantities of communications equipment must, for valid operational reasons, be located in a single room such as a TOC. However, prudence would dictate that a least some elements of the communications resources, (i.e., a radio team) be located in another bunker or shelter. (Signal)

CG, I FFORCE MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

20. (C) Success Through Diversified Tactics. The VC and NVA forces have been credited many times with being masters of deception and ambush techniques. However, with ingenuity and imagination, they can be beaten at their own game. Commanders at all levels should always be
searching for new and different tactics to engage and destroy the enemy. In this regard, it is important to avoid establishing set patterns of operation. Captured enemy documents have repeatedly pointed out that the VC/NVA are well aware of our standard operating techniques. For example, it is known that US forces consistently operate within an artillery fan. If the enemy desires to avoid contact, all he need do is remain outside of US supporting artillery range. Concealed movement of artillery or mortars to extend the fan will often catch VC/NVA unprepared when ground troops are deployed into the extended fan area. Varying daily the simple routine of getting up and getting started can also catch the enemy off guard. For example, instead of eating breakfast and then starting out, move out at first light and eat an hour or two later. You may catch the enemy eating his breakfast. All successful tactics should be passed on to replacements and also published in lessons learned or commander's notes with actual examples from after action reports. Some examples of techniques which have already been found effective are as follows:

a. The "claymore ambush" can be extremely effective when properly employed. The ambushing unit places numerous claymores along a trail or road at the ambush site. Both sides of the trail can be utilized, as well as the additional use of claymores along possible routes of escape. The objective is to inflict maximum casualties in minimum time not utilizing small arms unless it becomes necessary. By detonating the mines along the trail simultaneously, maximum surprise and effectiveness are attained. The escape route claymores are detonated as the enemy left alive try to flee. In this way maximum casualties are inflicted without giving away friendly locations or exposing friendly personnel to enemy fire.

b. One of the highly successful tactics available to the small unit commander is the stay behind ambush. It can be used effectively in two basic circumstances:

(1) When a unit is leaving a company base area that has been occupied for a short period of time or a FSB occupied for a longer period of time, a stay behind ambush of squad size is many times an effective tactic. The VC and NVA make a habit of searching known US positions for anything that may have been left behind which could be of use, i.e., ammo, C ration cans, commo wire or web equipment. Normally a 5 to 10 man element will search the abandoned area. A stay behind ambush should not be left each time a unit moves, but doing so periodically will reap positive results. However, you must insure that you can reinforce the stay behind troops if it becomes necessary.

(2) After a meeting engagement, where VC/NVA bodies are left on the battlefield, a stay behind ambush will normally prove worthwhile. The VC/NVA will always retrieve as many bodies as possible as well as police the battlefield. A well placed ambush in an area of contact will normally have good results. If helicopters and troops are available, the enemy can be made to think that the US force is leaving the area. Bring in the helicopters, loaded with troops, but with doors
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closed. Upon landing, open doors, let the troops hang their legs out and the helicopter takes off full, but with the original troops still left in the area. If helicopters are not utilised, the entire unit leaves the area, but an ambush element is dropped off after moving a few hundred meters and circles back to the contact area.

c. A successful tactic to "sucker" the VC/NVA into an attack advantageous to friendly forces is the infiltration of units to a new location. This can be applied at company or battalion level. If it is felt that the enemy is closely observing unit movements waiting for an opening to attack, fragment the unit to appear that only small perimeters will be occupied. For example, a company moving along which encounters sporadic sniper fire or scout type elements following the unit movement can employ this tactic. First, a lucrative target must be flaunted such as a company command group with mortars. Establish a relatively obvious position which is marginally defended. At dusk, have the remainder of the company close into the position. If the unit has been watched, the VC/NVA will attack based on the thin defenses originally established in hopes of overrunning the position. Attacking the now well defended position can prove disastrous for the VC/NVA.

d. The reverse of the above is also very effective. A company can establish a perimeter and give the appearance of "digging in" for the night. However, at dusk the entire unit moves to a new location a short distance away. Booby trapped grenades, if authorized, can be left in the old perimeter. If possible, the new position should be able to observe the old and place effective fire upon it. Naturally, artillery fires are planned on the old position. If the VC/NVA attack, they find nothing but intensive incoming fire.

e. The establishment of ambushes along a unit's route of movement can be employed to discourage trail watchers and snipers. If a unit is moving along a fairly obvious route or one that is easily followed, dropping off an ambush element will surprise any enemy who are attempting to follow the unit. This technique is habitually successful as the VC/NVA make a practice of assigning personnel to follow US units.
Three separate NVA company sized positions similar to the above were encountered by the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division during contacts west of Kontum during the period 20 March through 3 April 1968.
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**Abstract**

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned details the experiences of the unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations from 1 May to 31 July 1968. It highlights the lessons learned during this period, which includes operational strategies, tactical approaches, and insights gained from the engagement. The report is essential for future strategies and planning to enhance counterinsurgency efforts.
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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