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AVII-GCT 20 August 1948

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1968. RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

Commanding General
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. SECTION 1 - Operations: Significant Activities
   A. Command......................................................... 1
   B. Intelligence and Counterintelligence......................... 1
   C. Plans, Operations and Training.................................. 3
   D. Personnel and Administration.................................. 7
   E. Logistics...................................................... 8
   F. Inspector General............................................. 10
   G. Information.................................................... 10
   H. Command History............................................... 11
   I. Aviation....................................................... 11
   J. Signal......................................................... 12
   K. Engineer....................................................... 16
   L. PSOPS, Civil Affairs.......................................... 17

II. SECTION 2 - Lessons Learned.................................. 20

III. SECTION 3 - Inclosures
   1. Roster of Key Personnel
   2. Troop List of PCV Units

INCL 1
SECTION 1

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
A. COMMAND

(U) Lieutenant General William B. Rosson commanded Provisional Corps Vietnam from its activation until 30 June 1968. On 30 June 1968, a Command Farewell was given Lieutenant General Rosson, and Major General Richard G. Stilwell assumed command.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Intelligence Planning: In late April, planning was begun for the Rice Denial (4 May to 30 June 1968). Information available on the enemy, rice routes, collection points, and caches was collated, analyzed, and developed into intelligence. The Rice Denial Operation was a success. In Quang Tri Province 97% (16,795 tons) was harvested, 78% (13,077 tons) was secured, and less than 1% was denied the enemy by destruction. In Thua Thien Province 92% (13,523 tons) was harvested, 81% (11,537 tons) was secured, and 7% was denied the enemy by destruction. In June, planning started for Operation Thor (1 to 7 July). The objective of this operation was the destruction of artillery and antiaircraft weapons in the vicinity of the eastern half of the DMZ. Targets were acquired through aerial photography readout before and during the operation. Targets were engaged by B52 bomb strikes, TAC air, and artillery with the following results:
   - Antiaircraft weapons: 63 destroyed, 0 damaged;
   - SAM launchers and sites: 9 destroyed, 6 damaged; artillery: 20 destroyed, 6 damaged.

2. (C) B52 Bombing Program: During the month of May, a massive bombing effort took place in and near the A Shau Valley in support of Operation Delaware. Post-strike bomb damage assessment (BDA) revealed this bombing was successful in destroying several enemy base camps and supply areas. During Operation Thor, strikes were coordinated and integrated into the overall fireplan. These strikes were successful in destroying enemy supply areas and neutralizing areas of heavy enemy antiaircraft fire.

3. (C) Phoenix Program: On 29 May 1968, a conference was held at Provisional Corps Vietnam to familiarize the PCV Staff with the Phoenix Program and the organization of the District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Center (DOICC). Formerly known as ICX, Phoenix has the mission of coordinating efforts aimed at the elimination of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). During the meeting, PCV personnel were acquainted with the mission, organization, and requirements of the Phoenix Program, and Phoenix personnel were informed of the PCV resources available to support this program. This meeting resulted in the directing of captured VCI through Phoenix channels, prompt and regular exchange of VCI information to include:
   - Provision of detailed hamlet studies to PCV units, upon request;
   - Coordination of PCV operations through Phoenix agencies to increase pressure upon the VCI;
   - Maximum integration of GVN military, para-military, and civil
agencies in PCV area of operations to take advantage of their specialized skills, and increase GVN presence in the countryside.

4. (c) Counterintelligence Technical Surveys: During June and July 1968, counterintelligence technical surveys were conducted at HQ, PCV, to determine the possible presence of enemy monitoring devices and to identify security hazards. Several conditions which could encourage covert monitoring were detected and corrected.

5. (c) Enemy Situation:

a. The enemy's posture changed considerably during this reporting period. The early phase was characterized by enemy-initiated activities north/northwest of Dong Ha. Regimental-sized infiltration occurred in the DMZ area as the enemy began the initial phase of the "Second Offensive." Although planned as a country-wide coordinated offensive, rapid reaction by friendly forces minimized the enemy's military, political and propaganda gains. Even though the enemy replaced battalion-sized units, which had suffered heavy casualties, with battalion-sized infiltration groups, the NVA/VC were unable to sustain attacks in this area or successfully complete planned operations. Marine and ARVN forces repelled attacks in the Dong Ha area, eventually forcing elements of the 320th Division to withdraw north of the DMZ.

b. During the same period, allied forces successfully executed numerous cordon operations. These cordon operations were mounted on several occasions when the enemy massed troops to participate in the country-wide offensive. Several cordons resulted in destruction of 50 to 75 percent of entire battalions. Prisoner of war interrogations reported that cordon operations in late May southeast of Hue had preempted offensive attacks directed against that city. These and other allied operations forced the enemy to withdraw from the coastal plains to base areas in the highlands.

c. Operation Delaware (19 April to 15 May) was concluded with very little contact. Numerous caches were discovered both in the A Shau Valley and along Route 547A. These caches contained weapons systems and components that indicated plans for large-scale military operations. They contained 85mm field guns (D-44), 23mm AAA guns (ZU-23) and 122mm artillery ammunition for the 122mm field gun (D-74). A large volume of documents was also captured and provided a substantial amount of intelligence concerning enemy operations in the area.

d. At the conclusion of Operation Delaware, friendly forces concentrated on enemy activities in the coastal plains and in the highlands. Numerous bunker complexes were discovered in Base Areas 101 and 114. Intelligence gained from these operations provided insight into enemy shortcomings during Tet and recent offensives. Captured documents discussed the following deficiencies of NVA/VC forces:

(1) Weapons and equipment are not properly maintained.
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(2) Soldiers are lax in their use of camouflage and other means to avoid detection. Specifically, security during movement is poor. NVA/VC soldiers are no longer traversing tree lines or heavily covered terrain, but rather are moving over the easiest terrain without due regard for cover.

(3) In offensive operations, both communications and coordination between units are lacking.

(4) Overall document and communication security is weak.

e. During most of June and July the enemy avoided contact. Agents reported that the enemy would launch offensive attacks during the latter part of July. However, the attacks did not materialize. Agents, PW's and documents indicate the "Autumn-Winter" offensive will begin during August.

f. Even though the NVA/VC have suffered defeats from cordon operations and large amounts of supplies and materials have been captured, the enemy still possesses a strong force. The recent extended period of minimum contact has allowed the enemy to regroup, retrain and reorganize. Attacks on major cities and military installations will be made when so directed by Hanoi High Command. Personnel infiltration has continued at about 5 or 6000 per month. Therefore, those units which have not been in recent contact should be considered combat effective. Attacks by fire and probing actions will probably be major activities in future assaults. At the end of the reporting period enemy forces in the vicinity of the DMZ pose the greatest threat to PAVN. These forces have had ample time to reorganize and train. There are indications that these forces are beginning to move south and may be preparing to launch an offensive in this area. The threat in the A Shau Valley is difficult to assess. It is doubtful the NVA/VC would try to stage attacks from this area, but would attempt to assemble his forces closer to planned target areas and position supplies as far forward as possible. Due to friendly operations in NVA/VC base areas, the enemy has not been able to group and assemble forces.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) This reporting period commenced following successful completion of Operation Pegasus, relief of Khe Sanh (4 to 15 April), and Operation Delaware, assault into the A Shau Valley (19 April to 15 May), both conducted by PCV using the 1st Air Cavalry Division (ACD) with elements of the 101st Air Cavalry Division (ACD) and 3d Marine Division supporting. Pegasus results were reported last quarter. Operation Delaware results are listed below:

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C同意, "IT R. Wi .A J, KXR. 2'. NPPS, 101,it ACD 241 5 34/25 25.22 -0 130 2 60/34** TOTALS 168 928 30 669 8 2563/73 * Includes 12 - 37mm t. guns ** Includes 1 - 85mm gun

EQUIPMENT CAPTURED:
2618 Mines/Grenades 31 Flame Throwers
151,623 Small Arms Amm. (Rds) 36 Mine Detectors
84,739 Large Cal Rds 73 Trucks
300 lbs Medical Supplies

2. (O) Also concluded during the reporting period, were operations Carentan II (1 April to 15 May) and an unnamed operation in the vicinity of Dong Ha (28 April to 14 May). Carentan II, conducted by the 101st ACD, resulted in 1.6 friendly KIA, 717 WIA and 9 MIA. The enemy lost 2100 KIA, 157 POW, 488 individual weapons and 93 crew-served weapons. The unnamed operation in the vicinity of Dong Ha was conducted by the 3d Mar Div (2d Bde, 1st ACD, along with elements of 196th LIB and 3d Sqn, 5th Cav, were OPCON to 3d Mar Div for this operation), with the following results:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2167</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>453/139</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68/23</td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2642</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>521/142</td>
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3. (O) The following continuing operations remain in progress:

a. Scotland II. Task Force Click, later designated Task Force Hotel, conducted combat operations in and around Khe Sanh, in western Quang Tri Province. As of 31 July, Scotland II attained the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. The Khe Sanh Combat Base was deactivated during the reporting period. On 12 June 1968, CCR, III MAF, approved 3d Mar Div plan for the deactivation of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. By 6 July, all general cargo, vehicles and air field equipment had been removed; bunkers, trenches, defensive positions, unserviceable ammunition and buildings were destroyed and the combat base rendered ineffective for further use. HQ, TF Hotel was

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relocated to LZ Stud and continued to control operations in the Scotland II AO.

b. Lancaster II. Elements of the 4th Mar Regt conducted combat operations in north/central Quang Tri Province from 1 May through 31 July with the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. Light and sporadic contact continues throughout the AO.

c. Kentucky. The 9th Mar Regt conducted combat operations in the piedmont area of northern Quang Tri Province through 31 July, with the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. Other than the unnamed operation before mentioned, light and sporadic contact continues throughout the AO.

d. Napoleon/Saline. Elements of the 1st and 3d Mar Regts conducted combat operations along the Cua Viet River in northeastern Quang Tri Province through 31 July, with the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. The Cua Viet River was closed temporarily during the quarter due to enemy mining and sapper activities (see paragraph 3, belo). Light and sporadic contact continues.

4. (C) The 1st ACD continued its conduct of combat operations in southern Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province by commencing Jeb Stuart III on 17 May 1968. Following Operation Pegasus, and still in progress, Jeb Stuart III has accumulated the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. Aggressive patrolling, ambush and reconnaissance activities continued throughout the AO.

5. (C) The 101st ACD, so designated on 1 July 1968, commenced operation Nevada Eagle on 17 May 1968, following completion of Operation Delaware. Still in progress, Nevada Eagle has attained the results indicated in paragraph 7, below. On 1 and 2 May, the 2d Bde, 101st ACD, conducted a cordon of Phouc Yen Village, six km NW of Hue, resulting in 141 enemy killed and 107 prisoners taken. The enemy made two attempts to break out of the cordon and was repulsed. Thereafter, artillery continued to bombard the area while loudspeakers encouraged the enemy to surrender. TAC air strikes and CS gas were employed resulting in increasing numbers of the enemy surrendering. The 107 prisoners taken is believed to be the largest number captured during any single battle in Vietnam.

6. (C) On 1 May 1968, HQ PCV commenced Rice Denial Operations with elements of the 3d Mar Div, 1st and 101st ACDs, in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Div. A four-phased operation was conducted throughout the rice producing area of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The operation was designed to provide security for civilian rice collection efforts, deny enemy access to rice, seek out and destroy his rice gathering forces and return to government control rice collected by the enemy. The operation terminated on or about 30 June 1968, although, rice caches are still being found and reported. Rice denial efforts resulted in the capture of 752.5 tons of rice and destruction of an additional 29 tons, of this total ARVN forces accounted for approximately 200 tons.
Operations summary: During the reporting period, PAVN efforts were confined, for the most part, to small combat operations, with one major corps operation being initiated. Concurrently, there was a lack of significant enemy initiated action. NVA/VC attacks by fire in the 3d Mar Div AO have diminished considerably. Attacks on Camp Evans and Camp Eagle, 19 and 20 May respectively, represented the major extent of enemy effort.

The 1st and 101st ACDs have continually reported the capture of large enemy caches located outside the established base area boundaries, indicating that the base area boundaries are larger than currently depicted, particularly Base Area 1/4. The location of major road nets originating in Laos and terminating in RVN, indicates an increased reliance upon faster and more efficient resupply means. The enemy has expended considerable effort to maintain and improve these lines of communication and the effect thereof is attested to by the capture of significant amounts of equipment mentioned earlier. The effectiveness of small unit combat actions becomes apparent. The enemy has been sought out and destroyed on a small, but effective scale. The enemy can no longer claim sanctuary in defined base areas and has avoided major combat actions. The effectiveness of the Rice Denial Operations should be apparent during the next reporting period as evidenced by NVA/VC efforts to obtain food, as the current stockpile of rice is depleted. The effectiveness of the ARVN improved steadily. Participating in all major operations and conducting operations on their own, ARVN forces contributed immeasurably to the successful accomplishments of US Forces throughout Northern I Corps Tactical Zone. The reporting period can best be described as day and night search and clear operations conducted against the enemy by US and ARVN company and smaller sized units denying the enemy the opportunity to regroup for a coordinated attack.

**Statistical Data**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA (KIA)</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>LCD/CREW-SVD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>1962 (1078)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2512</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANCASTER</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>121 (837)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENTUCKY</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>2420 (1836)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2882</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPOLEON/SALINE</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>2041 (1602)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1375</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEB STUART</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>914 (826)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVADA EAGLE</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>827 (561)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>9375 (7397)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12208</td>
<td>3652</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE:* Enemy casualty figures as of 30 Jun 68.
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RICE CAPTURED:

JEB STUART - 210.2 tons
NEVADA EAGLE - 346.0 tons
TOTAL - 556.2 tons

8. (C) Task Force Clearwater.

a. TF Clearwater is a US Navy command OPCON to PCV. This command contains two river divisions equipped with river patrol boats (PBR) and a coastal division equipped with pneumatic air cushion vehicles (PACV). The task force mission is to coordinate logistics movements and provide security for logistical water craft on the Cua Viet River between Cua Viet and Dong Ha, and on the Perfume River between Tan My and Hue. The task force also provides forces for Market Time activities.

b. During the reporting period TF Clearwater detected 68,430 vessels (Perfume River - 58,668; Cua Viet River - 9742) on the inland waterways within the PCV AO. They boarded and searched 16,734 vessels for unmanifested cargo, weapons, improper ID cards and draft dodgers. 30 individuals were detained for the following violations: unmanifested cargo 48, curfew violators 119, improper ID cards 51, inside restricted areas 33, on VC list 22, and 35 others for minor violations. The effectiveness of the above program is indicated by the reduced infiltration on these inland waterways, the uninterrupted flow of US logistic craft on the LOCs (the two LOCs were closed only 1/3 days throughout the reporting period) and the enemy's inability to use the waterways.

c. On 25 June 1968, Coastal Div 17, which has three PACVs, was assigned to TF Clearwater. The appearance of the PACV on the Cau Hai Bay has in 30 days reduced the number of curfew violators from over 100 per night to about five per night. The PACV has also been used to support combat operations in the vicinity of Cau Hai Bay by providing blocking/screening forces.

d. TF Clearwater, in conjunction with RVN 11th, 12th and 13th Junk Fleets, and the 32d River Assault Group (RAG), has successfully harassed and interdicted the NVA/VC waterborne infiltration movement within NICTZ.

D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, DISCIPLINE AND MEDICAL

1. (U) Personnel Administration.

a. Military Personnel Management. During the reporting period there was an increase in personnel administrative activities to include processing of personnel actions, promotion board actions, maintenance of personnel records, replacement processing, etc., with the assignment of C Btry, 6/16th Arty and 1st Bn, 83d Arty. This additional workload was accomplished without the assignment of additional administrative personnel. The 108th Artillery Group was also assigned, but no additional workload was created.
as administrative and personnel functions were retained by the Group.

b. Civilian Personnel Management. The command obtained an authorization for one DAC Safety Officer and an increase in the total number of direct hire Vietnamese Nationals from 30 to 34. Also authority for daily hire of approximately 40 Vietnamese Nationals per day for the first quarter FY 69 was granted.

c. Religious Activities. During the period a continuous effort was maintained by the Chaplain Section to provide religious coverage in the PCV AO. Chaplain unit personnel rosters were monitored to facilitate timely fill of vacancies, and units without chaplains were assisted by "friendly neighbor" Army, Navy or Marine unit chaplains. Through these methods, complete coverage of religious services was accomplished throughout the PCV AO.

2. (U) Discipline, Law and Order. Provost Marshal Activities. During the reporting period, this office engaged in the FM functions outlined in FM 101-5 and Corps directives. Divisional military police companies assigned to the 1st and 101st ACDs and the 3d Mar Div continued to provide tactical military police support to their respective divisions. The 14th MP Group task force provided non-tactical area military police support as outlined in paragraph 4a, USA RV Regulation 190-1. This support included convoy escorts, traffic enforcement and accident investigation on main supply routes, evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points to the III MAF collecting point at Da Nang, discipline, law and order in the cities of Quang Tri and Hue, and investigation of criminal offenses involving non-divisional troops.

3. (U) Medical. During the period, excellent medical support was continually provided units in the PCV AO. This capability was increased with the movement into the area of the 775th Medical Detachment (Vet Svc, large) which established teams at area base camps to provide complete veterinary support for scout/sentry dog units and food inspection facilities for Class I subsistence. The capability to provide specialized out-patient support was also increased with the arrival of the 616th Medical Company (Clearing) in the area. Although not completely operational, the unit was able to provide support through the utilization of assigned personnel at other medical facilities located in the area.

E. LOGISTICS

i. (C) General.

a. During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, continued improvement was made with regards to the logistics posture of NICTZ. Improvement to IOCs and combat service support was realized due to the joint efforts of the US Army Engineers, US Navy Seabees, US Army Support Command (USASUPCOM) Da Nang, US Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang, and the Force Logistics Command (FLC) Da Nang.

b. The responsiveness and flexibility of the NICTZ logistical support
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system were aptly demonstrated during Operations Delaware and Thor.

(1) Finalization of logistical planning associated with Operation Delaware took place concurrently with logistical support of Operation Pegasus. The USASUPCOM, Da Nang, expeditiously and successfully realigned its logistical emphasis from Operation Pegasus to support Operation Delaware, moving personnel, equipment, and supplies in support thereof, in a timely manner. Particularly significant was the fact that the 1st AD was supported exclusively by air LOC. Air drops were the primary means of resupply during the initial stages of Delaware; however, with the completion of Alcan Airfield on 1 May 1966, air landed resupply commenced. The professionalism displayed by the 322d Air Div contributed materially to the successful resupply of Operation Delaware.

(2) During Operation Thor, the initial movement of approximately 100 5/tons of ammunition into the PCV AO was coordinated by FC7 through FC5, Da Nang and the USASUPCOM, Da Nang. Normal shipping time for such a large quantity of ammunition is approximately 21 days; however, during Operation Thor the initial stockage objective was met in ten days. This accomplishment takes on added significance when it is recalled that the Jungs ASR was interdicted during the latter part of June, just prior to the commencement of Operation Thor. Prior to, and during Operation Thor, ammunition was phased into the PCV AO in order to achieve efficient utilization of transportation assets and positive control over ammunition 'location.

c. During the reporting period logistical planning and coordination was effected with higher and lower headquarters and combat service support agencies in order to provide for the orderly reception and stationing of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in the PCV AO. Arrival of unit equipment continues at the close of the reporting period.

2. (C) Transportation.

a. During the reporting period the PCV Convoy Control Center increased its convoy clearance operations over the preceding quarter from coordination of 1% of convoys, to the issuance of 35% convoy clearances, in a total of over 3600 vehicles. Coordination of convoys between PCV AO and that of Task Force X-Ray was increased in order to prevent the unauthorized movement of unescorted vehicles within the TF X-Ray AO.

b. During the extraction phase of Operation Delaware, provision of 130 2½-ton truck equivalents for the transport of personnel was coordinated by the PCV Convoy Control Center. Aircraft brought personnel to division landing zones, bussed vehicles to their base camps, and air travel time and distance shortened by this means, the extraction of forces from the AO was facilitated. In addition, the PCV Convoy Control Center participated in the coordination and planning of highway and water movement of units and equipment in support of Operation Thor.

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c. Elements of the 1/5th Mech began arriving at the Wunder Beach facility on 15 July 1968. The Transportation Division, PCV, acted as the coordinating and reporting agency for the water movement of 1/5th Mech vehicles and cargo. Self-sustaining vessels were brought directly to Wunder Beach. These vessels were unloaded on to lighterage. Cargo aboard non-self-sustaining vessels was off loaded at Da Nang and Qui Nhon and subsequently moved to Wunder Beach by landing craft. During the reporting period 100% of the personnel of 1/5th Mech, and 75% of the Pde equipment arrived in Vietnam.

3. (C) Maintenance.

a. Improvements have been made in the aircraft maintenance and supply operations of PCV units during the reporting period. Aircraft availability has increased 10 to 20 percent over the previous period. Improved coordination between supporting direct support units and the Aircraft Maintenance Management Center has been made during the period. Utilization of available transportation, coupled with command emphasis on supply, has helped PCV organizations maintain a relatively low non-operational ready supply rate during this period.

b. Coordination with 1/5th Mech and the 34th General Support Group has been made to establish support requirements for 1/5th Mech aircraft. The 1/5th Mech is programmed to receive four OH-6A helicopters in Aug 68.

4. (C) Supply.

a. Close liaison with USASUPCOM, Da Nang, and the PNC, Da Nang, has improved the supply responsiveness of Corps logistical resources. During the reporting period a Marine Corps liaison officer was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. His knowledge of Marine Corps supply requirements and procedures proved invaluable with respect to coordination between PCV and the PNC, Da Nang.

b. Timely reporting and close coordination of PCV ammunition and POL resources insured uninterrupted support of these items during the reporting period.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) None.

G. INFORMATION

1. (U) General. At the request of this headquarters, USARV directed the establishment of a photolab at Phu Bai. As a result, Photographic Assignment Team E, of the 221st Signal Company, attached during the previous quarter, was redesignated as Detachment E; one lab technician was added, and lab equipment was furnished. The lab became operational on 6 July 1968.

2. (U) Command Information. The following was accomplished in support
CONFIDENTIAL

of the Command Information Program:

a. An orientation brochure was published to provide guidance to newly assigned personnel.

b. Upon completion of Operation Delaware, a large map showing significant caches uncovered together with a photo display board was exhibited in the main hallway of the headquarters building.

c. Official photo coverage was given to numerous VIP visits to the headquarters, including the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Clark Clifford.

3. (U) Public Information. During the quarter:

a. A total of 99 hometown news releases were processed.

b. A total of one news story and six feature stories were released.

c. A total of 475 news correspondents were provided with billeting, mess and transportation services.

d. The Commanding General conducted two press briefings (7 and 17 May) on Operation Delaware.

e. The Commanding General on 12 July participated in a one-half hour panel discussion show prepared for Vietnamese television. Program was aired on 24 July.

H. COMMAND HISTORY

1. (U) Historical Study 3-68 (Operation Pegasus) was completed during the reporting period and submitted to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

2. (U) A letter of appreciation was transmitted to the 31st Military History Detachment from the Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, for Historical Study 1-68 (PCV Organization and Activation) submitted during the previous quarter.

3. (U) Historical Studies in progress at the end of the reporting period were:

a. PCV Historical Study 2-68 (Opn City of Hue).

b. PCV Historical Study 4-68 (Opn Delaware).

I. AVIATION

1. (C) Two separate incidents during the month of May caused considerable loss in aviation assets within the Corps. The first was Operation
Delaware In which a total of 30 aircraft were destroyed; 21 in the operational area (A Shau Valley) and nine outside the area, but still taking part in the operation. The second incident was the mortar attack on Camp Evans, 1st ACD base camp. The mortar attack which hit an ammunition storage area caused subsequent explosions that were responsible for five aircraft destroyed, 46 heavily damaged, 33 moderately damaged and 40 lightly damaged. A total of 124 aircraft suffered damage with 40 of them being declared flyable within a 24 hour period.

2. (C) One problem area during the period was low availability rate of CH-47s. Causal factors were high flying time due to large scale operations, aircraft losses due to the incidents mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and an increase in the intensity and accuracy of enemy ground fire. Improvement during June showed the 101st ACD CH-47s availability rate up from a low of 20% to a high of 70%, and the 1st ACD from 40% to 75%.

3. (C) Redesignation of the 101st Airborne Division to the 101st ACD occurred 1 July 1968. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was redesignated the 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion (ASHB). The 160th Aviation Group was formed, consisting of the 163d General Support Company (GS), the 101st Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHH), less the gun company, and the 159th ASHB. In addition, the division has the aero medical evacuation platoon of the 322d Medical Battalion. The division lacks the following aviation units: an air cav sqdn, an aerial rocket artillery bn (ARA), and additional ASHB, D Company (gun company) of the 101st AHB, an ASIC, and the heavy helicopter company (CH-54).

4. (U) During the last quarter the Corps Aviation Company (Provisional) was assigned two OH-6A aircraft to better enable the company to support the air transportation requirements of the Corps Staff.

5. (U) On 30 July 1968, an MTOE for Corps Avn Co (Prov) was forwarded to HQ, USARV. The MTOE requested additional helicopter assets (two UH-1s and ten OH-6As) and personnel.

J. SIGNAL

1. (C) Termination of Operation Delaware. The opening of this reporting period coincided with the termination of Operation Delaware. Retrieval and evacuation of the communication equipment from Hill 1487 (TD 407035) was closely coordinated with the 1st ACD to insure use of the equipment until all troops were withdrawn from the A Shau Valley. The 1st ACD heli-lifted the equipment from the hill and returned it to Camp Evans upon termination of the operation.

2. (C) Fast Reaction Procedures for Controlling Southeast Asia Operations.

a. In April 1968, the JCS directed that procedures be established to expedite transmission of key instructions from high national authority to Southeast Asia operating forces. In order to test the procedures, messages...
b. At the outset of the exercise, the Corps received each of these "Red Rocket Exercise" messages up to nine times. This caused confusion and retarded rather than insured speed of delivery of the exercise messages. PCV analysis of this situation assisted in establishment by MACV of revised routing procedures which provided minimum redundancy, yet alleviate the multiple receipt problem. Messages are now being received only twice.

3. (C) Contingency Plan 9-68. Lessons learned from Operation Pegasus and Delaware pointed up the need for a contingency package of signal equipment and personnel for future Corps operations. A communications contingency plan OPLAN 9-68, was therefore published. The plan had the concurrence of ACofS GE, USARV, and CO, 1st Signal Brigade. It designates certain equipments for Corps contingency purposes. In general, this contingency package consists of two 12 channel HF systems and one 24 channel tropo system.

4. (U) Support of Rice Denial Operations.

a. Corps rice denial operations went into effect on 15 May and terminated on 30 June. These operations did not require any major shifts in signal support configurations in MCTZ.

b. During this period, there were several requirements for short term, short distance, low capacity, multichannel communications to support the divisions. Notably, the 101st ACP required several of these systems. Four AN/GRC-163 radio terminal teams, which were residual USARV assets made available to PCV for Pegasus and Delaware, were used to satisfy these requirements. These teams were committed in a four-channel ground mode of operation generally connecting major elements of the division to temporary advance fire bases. The AN/GRC-163 systems were found to be an ideal solution to these communications requirements because of the radio's simplicity, compactness and reliability.

5. (U) Motor and Air Courier System. During the post-Delaware period, PCV motor and air courier systems were perfected. The relatively small AO made courier services particularly desirable. Close coordination between Corps Aviation, AG, Signal and the division signal elements resulted in successful courier schedules and operations.

6. (C) Deactivation of Khe Sari Combat Base (KSCB).

a. A decision was made in early June 1968 to deactivate KSCB and to shift command of forces on the Khe Sanh Plateau to the 3d AD - LZ Stud area. This required a new configuration of the former Khe Sanh - Hue tropo system.

b. An AN/TRC-129 system was engineered between Phu Bai and LZ Stud to support the move of TF Hotel. The path profile indicated that the planned
system would be of marginal quality. However, 3d Mar Div installed an AN/TRC-97 tropo system for test purposes. The results of the test indicated the system would work. The AN/TRC-129 system between Phu Bai and LZ Stud was installed on 29 June 1968; the system was of such poor quality, however, that it could not support teletype circuits. The Phu Bai terminal was relocated to Hue, with a resultant improvement in system quality. The system was activated and channelized as a Corps command and control system (AACS) by 1 July.

7. (C) Communications Support for Operation Thor.

a. Operation Thor was an air/artillery/ naval gunfire operation in the eastern half of the DMZ. As such, the operation was planned and controlled by CG, PCV Artillery. His command and control plan included use of the existing command post, 108th Arty Gp, Dong Ha, for a PCV Forward CP.

b. Basic communications planning took cognizance of requirements for coordination between PCV and PCV Forward, PCV Forward and 3d Mar Div, and air/ground communications with US Air Force control elements. CG, PCV Artillery planned to use existing 108th Arty Gp communications to control subordinate artillery units, and 3d Mar Div communications for coordination of naval gunfire support.

c. Communications from Phu Bai to Dong Ha presented no special problem since the route constitutes the main axis of communications in the Corps Zone. Lack of local cable paths in Dong Ha, however, posed a potential problem in that local termination of new circuits or installation of additional telephones between 108th Arty Gp and 3d Mar Div would be virtually impossible. The problem was solved by establishment of a temporary multi-channel radio relay system in the Dong Ha area.

d. Time from initial planning to installation of systems and circuits was one week. As the PCV Signal Staff used the Corps Artillery Communications Officer as the single point of contact for developing initial communications requirements, the communications officer, 108th Arty Gp, was brought into the planning as soon as it was known that his communications facilities would be used to the utmost for termination of special circuits. CG, 63d Signal Battalion, who would provide most of the personnel and equipment for communications support was kept abreast of plans as they crystallized.

e. Circuit requirements for Operation Thor were provided by the Corps Signal Section on 26 June 1968 and encompassed eight sole user voice circuits between PCV Forward and elements of the 3d Mar Div, PCV and the MACV TASS at Tan Son Nhut. A dedicated TTY circuit from the III MAF Photo Interpretation Center, Da Nang, to PCV Forward was also required. In addition there was a need for continuous radio contact with the USAF APCCC from 1 July to the termination of the operation.

f. With the exception of the dedicated TTY circuit from the III MAF Photo Interpretation Section, all communications for the operation were installed and operational by 30JUL 68. Installation was facilitated
CONFIDENTIAL

by engineering a 12 channel VHF system between 3d Mar Div and VC7 Forward. This system was required because of lack of existing cable pairs between the 106th Arty Gp and 3d Mar Div, and between the 106th Arty Gp and the radio relay site at Dong Ha.

g. Termination of circuits at Da Nang was accomplished with personnel and equipment of the 37th Signal Battalion as coordinated by CO, 63d Sig Bn, Phu Bai. The AN/GRC-26 link between Da Nang and Dong Ha operated with an exceptionally high degree of reliability throughout the operation. The primary teletype circuit between the photo interpretation center at Da Nang and the headquarters at Dong Ha was somewhat less reliable at the beginning of the operation. There was, however, no loss of communications between the two points because of the available RATT backup.

h. US 7th AF was requested to assume responsibility for terminal equipment and operators to satisfy the requirement for communications with the ABCCC (Airborne Command Control Center). The Air Force provided one AN/ARC-108 ground terminal operating on VHF and UHF. The system worked well with only occasional loss of contact caused by electrical power failures.

i. Communications support provided for Operation Thor proved successful. However, the volume of high precedence teletype traffic between 7th AF and PCV Forward was grossly underestimated. Also, the 106th Arty Gp's communications center proved inadequate to handle the increased volume of all types of teletype traffic generated by the operation. This experience leads to the conclusion that mobile teletype central augmentation be committed in future operations of this type. These deficiencies were minor and did not materially detract from the overall value of the signal communications support provided.

6. (U) AN/TRC-66 Outages. Several prolonged outages have occurred on the AN/TRC-66's that form several of the links in the Southeast Asia Wide Band System/Integrated Wide Band Communications System (SEAWBS/IWCS) in NICTZ. These outages reflected the need for alternate routing on parallel tactical systems. The AACS backbone system in the PCV AO was used to provide some alternate routing and helped alleviate some of the more serious outage problems.

9. (C) 160th Aviation Group. During the last month of the reporting period the 101st Abn Div was redesignated the 101st ACD. Currently, the division is being tailored for an air cavalry role. Concomitantly, the 160th Avn Gp was organized as a major subordinate unit of the 101st ACD, and located at Gia Le. The 101st ACD requested Corps communications support for the 160th Avn Gp as the division was unable to provide common user telephone service from the Camp Eagle AN/HIC-1 switchboard. This switchboard is filled to capacity. The support required consisted of providing the 160th Avn Gp access to the Army Area Switchboard at Gia Le. A four channel AN/MRC-112 radio relay system was installed between the 160th Avn Gp and the Gia Le switchboard. This system will remain operational until a 25 pair cable can be constructed and extended to the 160th Avn Gp.
K. ENGINEER

1. (C) Command Relationships. No changes have occurred during the reporting period. The two US Army engineer battalions in general support of the 1st and 101st ACDs are part of the 45th Engineer Group and are tasked by III MAF. Five mobile construction battalions (Seabees) are assigned to the 32d Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) and are tasked through III MAF. One Fleet Marine Force (FMF) engineer battalion is in general support of the 3d Mar Div and is tasked by III MAF. The CC, PCV, has no direct tasking authority of general support engineer units within the PCV AO.

2. (C) Operations.

   a. Support of Tactical Operations.

   (1) Operation Delaware. A denial plan was executed during the closing phase of Operation Delaware. Denial was afforded by employment of nuisance mining using antitank and antipersonnel mines, and employed the maximum use of antilift and booby trap devices. Selected areas were contaminated with CS gas. Denial was directed toward possible assembly areas, artillery positions, bivouac areas, truck parks, access and egress routes. Mines were augmented with electronic sensors and aerial delivered gravel and micro gravel (sensor activation). Ringtrops were also used to inhibit labor forces in road repairs and to damage vehicle tires.

   (2) Operation Thor. Operation Thor required the construction of 4 hasty gun pads to include personnel and ammunition bunkers. Construction was performed in 40 man days at sites A-2, A-3, A-4 and in the vicinity of Dong Ha by the 11th Engineer Battalion (FMF).

   b. LOCs and Logistical Support Facilities.

   (1) Two bridges on the Perfume River at Hue were destroyed during Tet. The railroad bridge (converted to highway) was repaired by Eiffel Co and passed one way traffic (Class 40) on 5 July 1968. The highway bridge was repaired by the Eiffel Company and passed one way traffic (Class 15) on 28 July.

   (2) The Asmi Bridge at Nam Hoa on Route 547 was opened to two way traffic on 15 July. The M-4/CL60 float bridge was removed and shipped to Da Nang on or about 25 July.

   (3) Work started on rehabilitation of the Hue - Da Nang railroad. Repair of the Truc Bridge was begun on 22 July 1968 by MCB 62, and clearing of tunnels through the Hai Van Pass was begun on 22 July by the 35th Engr Bn, 45th Engr Op. Repair and replacement of track is being performed by the Vietnamese National Railroad.

   c. (C) QL1. Upgrading QL1 as a two way all-weather road from Da Nang to Dong Ha continues. Primary responsibility rests with the 32d NCR with the exception of the portion from Name Bridge to Phu Loc, where the 35th Engr Bn has the upgrading mission. Work is scheduled to be completed in
the Hai Van Pass area before the onset of the NW monsoon. The scope of work includes laying asphaltic concrete pavement north to Lang Co.

4. (C) Rock Quarry Operations. Due to the critical shortage of crushed rock in NICTZ, three rock quarries, operated by the Seabees, are in operation 24 hours per day. It is estimated that the two shift crusher operation will result in an additional 70 to 80,000 tons of crushed rock being available by 15 September 1968.

5. (C) ARVN Engineer Support. Coordination was continued with ARVN engineers through the advisors to the 1st ARVN Div at Hué. ARVN engineers have supported joint tactical operations with men and equipment to assist in building fire support bases.

6. (C) Airfields. The airfields at Camp Evans are being upgraded to a type II, C-130, all-weather airfield and is scheduled for completion by 30 September 1968.

7. (C) ASP Construction. Permanent ASP complexes are being constructed at Quang Tri and Camp Evans.

8. (C) Monsoon Posture. The positioning and relocation of units within the AO has generated a considerable requirement for engineer effort. The Khe Sanh Combat Base was closed after all salvageable engineer material had been retrieved. LZ Stud is being upgraded to include the construction of bunkers, and ASP and artillery firing positions. MER construction at Quang Tri is required for the 1/5th Mech which recently arrived in-country. LZs Nancy and Sally each require MER for a brigade.

L. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) Civic Action.


(1) During the three month reporting period, Civic Action showed a definite increase over the previous reporting period. The plans formed in March and April were vigorously executed during the months of May through July. During this time, the units OPCON to PCV spent over 72,000 man-days (ten hour days) in civic action work, including over 32,000 patients treated in the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). In addition to a substantial increase in the amount of commodity support (the corps units supplied an average of seven to ten tons of commodities of all kinds each week in their civic action programs), there was a noticeable rise in the number of major civic action programs undertaken. These included such projects in the field of construction/reconstruction as the creation of a hospital from a former dispensary in Dong Ha, the building of a new school in Quang Tri City, the building of new market places in Hue. Other projects varied from scholarship work (the General Walt Scholarship Fund and American Universities and Colleges Scholarship Assistance), to refugee evacuation, the spending of Tet Aggression Relief Project (TARP) funds on victims of the Tet Offensive.
and from the reinstitution of the Dental Civic Action Program (DFNTCAP),
to the direct support by monies, technical advice and assistance, and com-
modities to over 80 public institutions or projects.

(2) During the reporting period the PCV G5 Section coordinated a num-
ber of activities. The following are representative of these activities.
During the month of May the G5 coordinated the initial conference on the
Rice Denial Operation. Also the section coordinated the assets of the vari-
ous division G5 sections for support of the plan and acted as a liaison
agency with province personnel towards achieving a smoother operation. The
PCV G5, as principal action office, was also the source through which mili-
tary assistance was initially channelled; specifically, vehicle and heli-
copter support was provided to the GVN for movement of rice to secure areas.
As a direct result of these activities over 70 truck days (ten hour days)
and over 80 hours of helicopter support were given and nearly 400 tons of
rice moved. During the months of May and June the PCV G5, together with
the Corps Engineer, coordinated the employment of USAFR assets towards
the completion of the Cam Lo Refugee Center Reservoir which now provides
critically needed water to some 20,000 refugees. The section also directly
supported the Hue ARVN Armed Forces Celebration during 17 - 19 June. The
section supplied almost two tons of toys and other gifts to the 1st ARVN
Div G5 Advisor for distribution at the celebration. During July, the sec-
tion, in concert with province personnel, coordinated and monitored the
movement of 8000 refugees, primarily Bru Montagnards, from the Cam Lo Refu-
gee Center to new resettlement sites in the Cua Valley. In July the PCV G5
chaired a coordination conference attended by military, province and Corps
personnel in which general plans were formulated for Joint Pacification
Operations (combining Phoenix, County Fair, and normal cordon and search
activities).

b. Civic Action Effectiveness. The following trends were noted in
civic action reports received by this headquarters:

(1) There has been an increase in the desire shown by the people to
improve their personal health situation, their sanitation and their general
welfare.

(2) As a direct result of civic action work, the image of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam has been enhanced at the grassroots level.

(3) The people are gaining a greater degree of confidence in the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam's abilities and desire to protect and assist them.

(4) Increasing amounts of low level intelligence are being gained
from areas which have received civic action assistance and, in some instan-
ces, members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure have been identified and/or
turned in during civic action activities.

(5) MEDCAPS continue to be the most effective high impact civic action
program available by virtue of the large number of persons reached and the
immediacy of the results of the assistance provided. Greater emphasis is
being placed on getting more assistance in this area from GVN health personnel as the effectiveness of this program would be particularly useful in helping the people identify with the government.

(6) Community organization and discipline has improved displaying a willingness on the part of the people to improve their situation, something which can be described best as "civic pride."

2. (U) PSYOP Activities.

a. The PCV G5 monitored all PSYOP conducted in PCV AO and coordinated with adjacent and higher headquarters.

b. During the reporting period the PSYOP Division developed and published five PSYOP Annexes to Corps OPLANS. Special leaflets and tapes were designed and requested for all plans.

c. PCV G5, PSYOP Division, continued to receive and screen requests from the divisions and submit the requests to III MAF PSYOP Support Center on a daily basis. During the reporting period the PSYOP Division processed an average of 632 requests weekly and in response to these requests, a weekly average of 18,000,000 leaflets were disseminated and 50 hours of aerial tape broadcasts were flown.
SECTION 2

LESSONS LEARNED
CONFIDENTIAL

A. COMMAND

(U) None.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Item: Merging of the Target Information Center and the G2 Arc Light Section.

a. OBSERVATION: Duplication of effort in the Target Information Center and Arc Light Section.

b. EVALUATION: Two similar targeting agencies operated in HQ, PCV—the Target Information Center operated by PCV Artillery and the Arc Light targeting section operated by G2. A study of the flow of intelligence information into both sections indicated duplication of effort in many respects and further, that each was receiving information from at least one source not being exploited by the other. Information was obtained, posted and stored in similar manners by both facilities.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the targeting activities in the same headquarters be centralized in order to avoid duplication of effort, permit maximum use of manpower and assure input from all available sources and agencies.

2. (C) Item: Speeding up of Initial Prisoner of War (PW) Interrogation Reports.

a. OBSERVATION: During the quarter, the requirement for forwarding Initial Prisoner Interrogation Reports (IPIR) to arrive at MACV within 12 hours was rarely satisfied.

b. EVALUATION: Often, during company-sized operations, there are no linguists or interpreters present in the field to interrogate PWs. The initial interrogation, therefore, is not conducted until the PW can be brought back to a prisoner collection point, usually at brigade level. This situation results in delays of filing IPIRs for 24 hours or longer depending on the tactical situation. The 12 hour deadline has been met when Kit Carson Scouts, or an interpreter, were present to conduct initial interrogation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That interpreters, qualified linguists, or Kit Carson Scouts be utilized on all company-sized operations.

3. (C) Item: Delay of Electrically Transmitted Intelligence Messages.

a. OBSERVATION: Much intelligence traffic is delayed when transmitted electrically due to message center backlog, mechanical breakdown, garbled transmission, etc.

b. EVALUATION: The value of the intelligence collection program is
often diminished by loss of timeliness in dissemination of information to users and reporting of raw intelligence to processors. Requesting retransmission of garbled messages is time-consuming to the point of loss of value on spoilable intelligence. Administrative or technical delays in transmitting intelligence has the same effect. In many cases the problem has been reduced by utilizing the helicopter courier service between PCV and its subordinate commands as well as to higher headquarters.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That all intelligence traffic of an immediate or spoilable nature be backed up by a hard copy sent through the helicopter courier service.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(u) None.

D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, DISCIPLINE AND MEDICAL

(u) None.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (C) Item: Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Support Plans.

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Deployment of a unit into NICTZ necessitated a change of support units. Subsequent realignment of maintenance support plans within PCV caused another change in the supporting organization for the subject unit. During both of these changes, supply requests from the using organization placed on the supporting direct support unit were not transferred to the gaining direct support unit.

   b. **EVALUATION:** Causative factors associated with this problem area can be traced to a lack of interest and communication by both the direct support units and the operational unit. As a result, several days were lost in excess supply action time which led to unnecessary aircraft downtime.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That command emphasis be placed on timely updating and transferring of outstanding requests upon a change in maintenance and supply support plans. Commanders must insure that weekly reconciliations are conducted with direct support units.

2. (C) Item: Transportation of Aircraft, Equipment Deadlined for Parts (EDP), Items.

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Frequent delay in receipt of aircraft repair parts indicates that appropriate transportation assets, specifically, dedicated air transport, are not being utilized to the maximum extent.

   b. **EVALUATION:** The problem of delayed transport of repair parts resulted from a lack of unit emphasis on the use of available transportation
assets. Though existing flight routes and schedules would require no changes in order to deliver repair parts expeditiously, full advantage was not being taken of this facility. When utilized, dedicated air transport reduced shipping times from three to five days.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That commanders continually evaluate the status and availability of all transportation assets in order to reduce shipping delays.

3. (C) Item: Requisitioning of Supplies.

a. OBSERVATION: PCV units continue to receive status reports from depots as "Unknown" or "Requisition Not Received" for requisitions which were assumed valid. This situation contributes to significant delays in obtaining needed supplies.

b. EVALUATION: The problem lies both in depot inability to maintain adequate manual records of requisitions and in unit failure to take prompt followup action.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Timely requisitioning and aggressive followup action by using units, pending depot transition to automation, is essential to minimize effects of manual stock control system.

4. (C) Item: POL Test Lab Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Portable lab equipment located with each forward support area (FSA) in the PCV AO would greatly enhance the responsiveness of Corps Class III supply facilities.

b. EVALUATION: POL Test equipment is not presently available in FSAs located in the PCV AO. POL moved into the PCV AO normally is passed through three or more facilities before arrival at using units. Frequent handling tends to increase the possibility of product contamination. Presently, samples of suspect product, discovered at the Class III facility in Camp Eagle, Camp Evans, Quang Tri or Dong Ha must be sent to Da Nang for testing. As a result, considerable time is lost in awaiting transportation and test results. The placement of POL testing equipment and personnel at POL storage sites within the PCV AO would greatly enhance the flexibility associated with POL functions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: This headquarters will initiate action requesting FSAs in the PCV AO be provided with adequate personnel and equipment to conduct on site POL analysis.
I. AVIATION
(U) None.

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) Item: Backlog of Relay Traffic.
   a. OBSERVATION: During the early part of this reporting period, the Army Area/Corps Communication Center at Phu Bai was experiencing excessive backlogs of relay traffic to the 1st and 101st ACDs. These backlogs were caused primarily by the high volume of uni-service administrative traffic from the division rears, USARV and 1st Logistical Command.
   b. EVALUATION: It was recognized that the volume of this uni-service administrative traffic would increase rather than decrease. A one position, multipoint, "send only" circuit to the two divisions was established to augment the regular teletype service.
   c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

2. (C) Item: Radio Terminal Set AN/GRC-163.
   a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period the 101st ACD had the opportunity to employ the AN/GRC-163 sets in several field tests under adverse weather and terrain conditions. In all cases, the equipment was installed to provide single point to point systems without relays. In many cases the radio path between terminals was not line of sight, and the triple canopy jungle was not cleared in the vicinity of the terminal areas.
   b. EVALUATIONS:
      (1) The AN/GRC-163 is equipped with only one 1.5 kw generator. Thus, when dismounted from the vehicle, continuous use of the AN/GRC-163 is almost impossible without an additional power unit.
      (2) Overall, the equipment met or exceeded expectations, and is vastly superior to the four channel AN/GRC-10 (AN/MRC-68 or AN/MRC-112) in equipment size, frequency range, simplicity of operation, reliability and circuit quality.
      (3) The chief advantage of the system is its small size. When the AN/GRC-163 is dismounted, it can be moved by a UH-1 helicopter with two generators and a three man team. In comparison, the AN/MRC-68 or AN/MRC-112 requires lift by a CH-47 helicopter or equivalent.
   c. RECOMMENDATIONS:
      (1) That a second 1.5 kw generator be issued with the AN/GRC-163.
      (2) That the AN/GRC-163 be considered as a replacement for the AN/MRC-112 currently authorized in the Air Cavalry Division Table of Organization and Equipment.
3. (C) Item: Corps Communications Contingency Package.
   a. OBSERVATION: The lack of an organic corps signal battalion and experiences since March have pointed up the need for a quick reaction capability with low capacity multichannel equipment. Under the provisions of PCV OPLAN 9-68 (Communications Contingency Plan 1), 21 May 1968, a contingency package consisting of two complete 12 channel VHF systems with intermediate relays, or one 24 channel tropospheric scatter radio relay system are available for commitment by the Corps Commander on short notice without prior USARV approval. Also, PCV has available four radio terminals, AN/GRC-153 and four radio terminals AN/MRC-112. By agreement with ACofS CE, USARV, these equipments may be employed in like fashion.
   b. EVALUATION: Frequently, the Corps Commander needs to commit lower capacity systems than the 12 or 24 channel equipments as specified in OPLAN 9-68. The AN/GRC-163s and AN/MRC-112s are ideally suited to meet quick reaction, short term communications requirements.
   c. RECOMMENDATIONS:
      (1) That in a situation where a corps relies solely on non-organic signal support, the corps be provided the arrangement stated above.
      (2) That the contingency plan, OPLAN 9-68, remain in effect and consideration be given to expanding the plan to include all of the resources stated in paragraph 3a above.

4. (C) Item: Hue/Phu Bai - LZ Stud AN/TRC-129 System.
   a. OBSERVATION: A new configuration of the Khe Sanh (KSH) - Hue tropo system was required to support a displacement of forces on the KSH Plateau. An Army AN/TRC-129 system was engineered between Phu Bai and LZ Stud to support this displacement. A path profile and reliability study indicated that the system would be of marginal quality. However, 3d Mar Div conducted a short test using AN/TRC-97 tropo equipment. The results of this test indicated the system would work. The AN/TRC-129 was subsequently installed between Phu Bai and LZ Stud. The system was of such poor quality, however, that it could not support teletype. This resulted in a relocation of the Phu Bai terminal to Hue with a marked improvement in system quality.
   b. EVALUATION: Scientifically conducted path profile studies will give an accurate prediction of system reliability.
   c. RECOMMENDATION: That path profile studies, rather than hasty experimentation with substitute equipment, be used to predict reliability of AN/TRC-129 tropo systems.

   a. OBSERVATION: During the past three months, several prolonged
outages have occurred on the USAF AN/TRC-66 systems. These AN/TRC-66s provide several of the major communications links in the SEAMES/IMCS systems in the NICTZ. These systems also provide the paths for critically essential Corps command/control circuits.

b. EVALUATION: The US Air Force presently has technicians working on these AN/TRC-66 equipments in order to repair, realign and stabilize the systems. It has been necessary to install an Army AN/TRC-129 tropospheric scatter radio system between Dong Ha and Phu Bai to provide an all-route capability for critical command/control circuitry.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the AN/TRC-129 system remain in place until such time that the AN/TRC-66 systems are sufficiently stabilized to insure reliable communications.

6. (C) Item: Communications Support for Operation Thor.

a. OBSERVATION: Operation Thor was a joint Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps action. Communications support for this operation proved successful. However, the volume of high precedence teletype traffic between 7th AF and PCV Forward was underestimated. Also, the 106th Arty Op communications center proved inadequate to handle the increased volume of all types of teletype traffic generated by the operation.

b. EVALUATIONS:

(1) In joint operations of this type, more coordination between the operating staffs of the various services involved is needed to determine the estimated volume and type of teletype traffic. Such information is required for the Signal Staff to engineer sufficient circuit capability.

(2) A mobile teletype central augmentation can be employed effectively when existing communications centers are inadequate.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That in future operations of this type, close coordination be effected to determine estimated volume and type of teletype traffic between major service command headquarters.

(2) That existing communications centers be surveyed prior to operations to determine capabilities to handle increased teletype traffic loads.

7. (C) Item: Communications Support for 160th Aviation Group.

a. OBSERVATION: In the early part of July 1968, the 101st ACD requested communications support for the 160th Avn Gp. The 101st ACD was unable to provide common user telephone service to the Group because the 101st ACD AN/MTC-1 switchboard was filled to capacity. In addition, there was inadequate cable distribution in the 160th Avn Gp's area at Gia Lai. This cable is presently being installed by the 63d Signal Battalion.
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b. EVALUATIONS:

(1) The switchboard facilities of the 101st ACD are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the division. This problem can be alleviated by installing an Army Area switchboard at Camp Eagle and relieving some of the load on the division switchboard.

(2) The cable distribution system at Cia Le is not sufficient to meet the anticipated increase in Army units.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That an Army Area switchboard be installed at Camp Eagle to relieve congestion on the 101st ACD switchboard.

(2) That the cable plant at Cia Le be surveyed in light of planned and existing unit densities, and that action be taken to install an outside plant as required.

K. ENGINEER

1. (U) Item: Technical Data on New Products.

a. OBSERVATION: During the planning stage of Operation Delaware, COMUSMACV suggested the use of "Commando Lava" in the denial plan.

b. EVALUATION: Very few members of the PCV Staff were aware of the existence of this material and no literature was available within HQ, PCV on the subject. Consequently, the MACV Science Advisor was requested to visit HQ, PCV and brief interested members of the staff.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That MACV periodically distribute technical bulletins or papers on new products.

2. (U) Item: Engineer Equipment - Chain Saws.

a. OBSERVATION: Chain saws in engineer units organic to the divisions are proving to be unsuitable for heavy duty work involved in clearing fire support bases.

b. EVALUATION: The life span of the standard chain saws (Remington) is greatly reduced because of the increased load encountered by cutting hardwood timber. The steel-tipped blades require frequent sharpening and experience considerable difficulty in cutting hardwood.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the procurement of heavy duty chain saws with carbide-tipped blades requested by USARV in its message to DA of 12 July be expedited.

L. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

30

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1. (U) Item: Increase in Number of Hoi Chanh

   a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period a total of 539 NVA/VC became Hoi Chanh in PCV AO; this can be further divided into 139 for Quang Tri Province and 400 for Thua Thien Province, an increase from a total of 202 for the previous quarter. Further, the largest portion of the Hoi Chanh came from the portions of Thua Thien Province in which the 101st ACD has tactical responsibility.

   b. EVALUATION: The 101st ACD, by the employment of intensive firepower and tactical mobility, integrated with an aggressive PSYOP program, has caused an increase in the enemy's discontent and disillusionment with his situation. The Division then exploited this posture to gain an increase in the number of ralliers (Hoi Chanh). This PSYOP program included careful selection of targets and themes as well as an intensive analysis of the tactical situation.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

2. (U) Item: Military Police Rewards Program

   a. OBSERVATION: The 16th MP Group Task Force operating in the Hue-Phu Bai area has recently instituted a rewards program. The major differences between this program and other rewards programs under the Voluntary Informants Program are:

      (1) Immediate payment of rewards, on the spot, by individual MPs.

      (2) Reduced possibility of the enemy determining who has turned in weapons, thereby reducing the possibility of retaliation.

      (3) Elimination of the necessity of long trips to a military installation to collect the reward.

   b. EVALUATION: Although it is too early to make a final determination as to the effectiveness at this time, the program has met with considerable initial success. A detailed evaluation of this program will be included in the following quarter's ORP.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

3. (C) Item: Operation Thor

   a. OBSERVATION: The PSYOP effort in Operation Thor consisted of aerial delivery of leaflets into an area with a high concentration of antiaircraft defense. The delivery was further complicated by rapidly rising terrain, and was accomplished through a combination of wind drift and explosive opening of containers.

   b. EVALUATION: Weather data was obtained from Corps Artillery Meteorological Section, giving the wind direction and speed at 1000 foot intervals. Due to the wind, terrain and enemy antiaircraft capabilities, normal leaflet
delivery techniques were not practical. In order to release the leaflets at the optimum location/altitude, leaflet containers were equipped with explosive devices to open the containers after a free fall. This method proved very effective in that the greatest majority of leaflets landed in the target area.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.


a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, due to the substantial increase in civic action activity and coupled with the building needs of individual units in the AO, a substantial shortage of building materials occurred. This nonavailability of material hampered many construction/reconstruction projects.

b. EVALUATION: The 101st ACD and the 3d Mar Div report they have somewhat alleviated this shortage. A program has been instituted to recover all available scrap lumber and deliver it to the various projects. Additionally, the 101st ACD has supplemented their scrap lumber by utilizing logs from its various fire support bases. As fields of fire are cleared, the logs are hauled to a Hue sawmill where they are cut into usable lumber for division civic action projects. Over 500 logs were cut during the first six weeks of the program.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.
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SUbject: Operational Report of Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam for Period ending 31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (HI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Contents follow:

a. Reference item concerning requisitioning of supplies, page 22, paragraph 23: Concur. Da Nang Depot began mechanized accounting operations with the installation of its new UNIVAC 1005 system in July. This conversion should result in improved supply response to XXIV Corps units.

b. Reference item concerning radio terminal set AN/GRC-163, page 23, paragraph J2. This headquarters has taken action to request authorization of an additional 1.5 kw engine generator for each AN/GRC-163. Upon approval of this request, the unit will be directed to add the engine generator as an additional line item to the MTOE.

c. Reference item concerning Corps Communications Contingency Package, page 24, paragraph J3. USARV OPLAN 82-68 (C-L Augmentation to PCV) (U), dated 17 June 1968, is being revised to include four AN/GRC-163 and four AN/GRC-112 equipments, with operating personnel, as part of the Corps Communications Contingency Package to meet short term communications requirements.

d. Reference item concerning the Hue/Phu Bai-LZ Stud AN/TRC-129 system, page 24, paragraph J4. As stated in the observation, a path profile and reliability study was conducted for the Phu Bai-LZ Stud path. Although the results of this study indicated the path to be of marginal quality, Phu Bai was the only terminal site then available and the AN/TRC-129 the only Army tropo equipment available at the time of installation. Twenty-six AN/TRC-973 terminals are presently programmed for Army units in VN for use on paths which are beyond the capability of the AN/TRC-129 to provide reliable communications.
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AVHC-C-DST (20 Aug 68) lst lnd (c)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam
for Period Ending 31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (I)

   e. Reference item concerning AN/TRC-66 system outages, page 24, paragraph J5. MACV tasked this headquarters on 24 June 1968 to establish an AN/TRC-129 system between Dong Ha and Phu Bai or Da Nang to provide additional DCS and AACS access to Dong Ha. The system between Phu Bai and Dong Ha was installed on 29 June 1968. This system will remain in place until such time as upgrading of the IWCS in I CTZ is completed.

   f. Reference item concerning communications support for the 160th Aviation Group, page 25, paragraph J7. This headquarters is taking action to improve telephone communications in the Camp Eagle-Gia Le area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:
HQ XXIV Corps
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GPOP-DT (20 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Prov Corps Vietnam for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
endorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed, with exception as
noted in paragraph 2b below.

2. (C) Reference 2b, lst Indorsement:

a. This headquarters has recommended DA approval of the request in
response to ACSFOR message 885990.

b. Reference (page 23) paragraph J2(c)(2): Nonconcur. The
AN/GRC-163 has been authorized to replace wire between brigades and
battalions. Four hundred and nine sets are programmed for USARV. The
AN/MRC-112 is scheduled to be replaced by the AN/TRC-145, AN/MRC-126 and
the AN/MRC-127 in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC

 Cy furn:
CG USARV

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**1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION**

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**101ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION**

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**INCLUSION #1**

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37

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Provisional Corps Vietnam

HHC (Prov)
Avn Co (Prov)
574th APU
172d Engr Det (Util)
559th Engr Det (Terrain)
PI Det (Prov)
Signal Photo Team
33d Cal Det
1st Plat, Co A, 504th MP Bn
Prov Trans Co (Car)
MI Det (Prov)
31st Mil Hist Det
Special Security Det

1st Air Cavalry Division

HHC

1st Sqdn, 9th Cav
62d Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)

8th Engr Bn
13th Sig Bn
545th MP Co
Co E, 52d Inf (IRFP)
191st MI Det
583d MI Det
184th Cal Plat
26th Cal Det
14th Mil Hist Det
42d PI Det
371st Radio Research Co
Special Security Det
Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (USAF)

1st Brigade

HHC
1st Bn, 8th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav
25th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
41st PI Det

2d Brigade

HHC

INCLUSION #2

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1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 8th Cav
2d Bn, 12th Cav

3d Brigade

IC
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
5th Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav
34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

3d Sqdn, 5th Cav (OPCON)

Division Artillery

HHD
1st Bn, 21st Arty (105mm)
1st Bn, 77th Arty (105mm)
2d Bn, 19th Arty (105mm)
2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA)
1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm)
C Btry (-), 4th Bn, 60th Arty (40mm)
D Btry (-), 1st Bn, 44th Arty (40mm)
A Btry, 6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm)
B Btry, 6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm)
E Btry, 41st Arty (.50 Cal)
G Btry (-), 1st Bn, 44th Arty (.50 Cal)
Plat (-), A Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight)
Plat (-), G Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

11th Aviation Group

HHC
11th GS Avn Co
227th Aalt Hel Bn
228th Aalt Spt Hel Bn
478th Hvy Hel Bn
382d Trans Acft Maint Det
229th Aalt Hel Bn

Division Support Command

HHC & Band
15th Admin Co
15th S&S Bn
15th Med Bn
15th Trans Acft Maint Bn
27th Maint Bn

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101st Air Cavalry Division

HHC

1st Brigade

HHC
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 502d Inf

2d Brigade

HHC
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf

Division Artillery

HHB
2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm)
1st Bn, 321st Arty (105mm)
2d Bn, 11th Arty (155mm)
C Btry, 6th Bn, 16th Arty (155mm)
C Btry, 6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm)

Division Troops

160th Avn Grp

101st Aalt Hel Bn
159th Aalt Spt Hel Bn
163d Avn Co (GS)

2d Sqdn, 17th Cav
326th Engr Bn
501st Sig Bn
Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (Atch from 1st ACD)
Co F, 58th Inf (LRP)
101st Admin Co
101st MP Co
265th Radio Research Co
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
58th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
557th Inf Plt (Combat Trackers)
10th Cal Plt
20th Cal Det
36th Cal Det
22d Mil Hist Det
25th FI Det

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24th PI Det
45th PI Det
101st MI Det
181st MI Det

Division Support Command

HHC & Band
15th TAM Bn
326th Med Bn
50th Med Det
426th S&S Bn.
101st QM Co
501st Supply Co
801st Maint Bn

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

HHC
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm)
1st Det, 5th MI Det
Co A, 7th Engr Bn
1st Bn, 11th Inf
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

75th S&S Bn

HHC
Co A (Admin)
Co B (Med)
Co C (S&T)
Co D (Maint)

1/77th Armor (Tank)
86th Cal Det
532d Sig Det
552d ASA Det

3/82d Light Infantry Brigade

HHC
1st Bn, 505th Inf
2d Bn, 505th Inf
1st Bn, 508th Inf
2d Bn, 321st Arty (105mm)
Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 17th Cav
Co C, 307th Engr
3d Plat, 82d MP Co
3d FASCP, 82d Sig
Plat (+), 358th Radio Research Co
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82d MI Det
782d Maint Det
582d Supply Co
Co D, 307th Med Bn
82d Avn Plat

Provisional Corps Artillery:

HHB
1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8"")
PPT, 108th Arty Co
1st Bn, 44th Arty (175mm gun)
(Dtry B, OPCON 1st Mar Div)
6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm)
Dtry C, attch 101st ACD
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105mm)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)
Dtry G, 65th Arty (.50 Cal MG) (Atch 1/44th Arty)
Dtry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight) (Atch 1/44th Arty; OPCON III MAF)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (8" How - 175mm gun)
Dtry G, 2d Bn, 26th Arty (Trgt Acq)
235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
236th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
246th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
Dtry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty (155mm How) (Atch 101st ACD)
1st 8" How Btry (8" How) (Fleet Marine Force, USMC, OPCON II PAV Arty)
5th 155 gun Btry (155mm gun - 8" How) (Fleet Marine Force, USMC, OPCON II PAV Arty)

3d Marine Division

HQ Bn (-)(Rein)
Dtry Bn (-)
Dtry Co (-)
Dtry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty (155mm How) (Atch 101st ACD)

TF Hotel

HQ TF Hotel

3d Mar Regt (Rein)

HQ Co
1st Bn, 3d Mar
2d Bn, 3d Mar
3d Bn, 3d Mar

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4th Mar Regt (Rein)

HQ Co
A&B Cmd Gp 1/4th Mar
A Cmd Gp BLT 2/4th Mar
B Cmd Gp BLT 2/4th Mar
3d Bn, 4th Mar
1st Bn, 9th Mar

9th Mar Regt (-)(Rein)

HQ Co
3d Bn, 9th Mar

1st Mar Regt (-)(Rein)

HQ Co
1st Bn, 1st Mar
2d Bn, 1st Mar
2d Bn, 9th Mar
1st AMTRAC Bn
TF Mike
2d Bn, 26th Mar

12th Mar Regt (-)(Rein)

HQ Btry (Rein)
1st Ssl Btry
1st 8" How Btry (OPCON PCV Arty)
5th 155 gun Btry (OPCON PCV Arty)
1st Bn, 12th Mar (105mm)
2d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm)
3d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm)
4th Bn, 12th Mar (155mm)
1st Bn, 11th Mar (105mm)
Btry K, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (155mm)
1st Arm Amph (105mm-LVT)

3d Tank Bn (Rein)
3d Recon Bn (Rein)
3d Shore Party Bn
9th MT Bn
3d MT Bn (Rein)
3d Med Bn (-)(Rein)
3d Dental Co

3d Engr Bn (Rein)

H&S Co

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Engt Spc Co (Rein)
  Co A (Rein)
  Co B (Rein)
  Co C (Rein)

Task Force Clearwater

River Div 5:3
River Div 521
Coastal Div 17
**Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CC, Provisional Corps Vietnam

| Report Date       | Pages | Rept No.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 August 1968</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

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**ABSTRACT**

N/A
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD #</th>
<th>PAGE #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ITEM 5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

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