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**AUTHORITY**

GDS [Group-4], per document markings.; DA Office of the Adjutant General ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (United States Army), Ending 31 July 1968 (O)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFor OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 30 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING MIRAGES"

AVGD-CC

10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, REG 525-25 (A-1) (U)

See Distribution

Section I. Operations (Significant Activities)

1. (C) Command: This report covers the period 1 May 1968 through 31
July 1968, and is submitted in compliance with USDAG REG 525-15, dated
22 March 1968 and USDAG REG 525-25, dated 13 April 1968.

a. Mission: The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is to
command all assigned and attached units and provide aviation support as
directed by the 17th Combat Aviation Group to US, Republic of Vietnam,
and other Free World Military Assistance Forces. Priorities are to the
4th Infantry Division, 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ-ARVN), 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) and other units under Operation Control, Head-
quarters, First Field Force Vietnam, located in the Second Corps Tactical
Zone. In addition, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion commands or controls
all activities and functions of Camp Holloway and Holloway Army Airfield.

b. Organizational Structure: The Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation
Battalion is located at Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN and is commanded by
LTC William C. Chamberlain. Elements subordinate to the 52d Combat
Aviation Battalion are: (See inclosure 1 for detailed organizational
listing of organic and assigned units, attached units, and units under
the operational control of this battalion).

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.

(2) 57th Assault Helicopter Company, Kontum RVN. Equipped with UH-1H
and UH-1C(L) helicopters.

(3) 119th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.
Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(L) helicopters.

(4) 170th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.
Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(L) helicopters.
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AVGD-CC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (D-1) (U)

(5) 189th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1G(A) helicopters.

(6) 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT), Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with UH-1G(A) and AH-1G helicopters.

(7) 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with CH-47A helicopters.

(8) 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) (-) located at Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN and 2nd Platoon at Phu Hiep RVN. Equipped with CH-54 helicopters.

(9) During this reporting period there were two significant changes in organizational structure. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Corycil, Ban Me Thuot was reassigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and secondly, the 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT) was assigned to 52d Combat Aviation Battalion from 12th Combat Aviation Group and relocated to Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.

2. (0) Personnel

a. Awards and Decorations: During the reporting period 1,853 awards were processed and 1,573 were awarded. This battalion received 26 Vietnamese awards for valor or service. A decrease in elapse time from submission to final approval of all decorations was noted.

b. The increased number of assigned aviators during the reporting period has reduced the previous reported aviator shortage to an acceptable level. The known 45 day losses of experienced personnel in critical MOS (Maintenance field), are of particular concern to this command. Infusion is required to preclude further shortages caused by DEROS during the month of October and January.

c. Command and Staff Changes

(1) The following command and staff changes were made dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>New Commander</th>
<th>Old Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52d HQ Det</td>
<td>LT Daniel A Berry</td>
<td>LT Robert L Litton</td>
<td>16 June 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, 52d CAB</td>
<td>CPT Charles R Rayl</td>
<td>Maj Leon D Jackson</td>
<td>10 June 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>LTC William G Chamberlain</td>
<td>LTC Raymond G Lehman Jr</td>
<td>25 July 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th Avn Co</td>
<td>Maj Carl P Jones</td>
<td>Maj Robert W Cook</td>
<td>17 June 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*361st Avn Co</td>
<td>Maj Larry B McKee</td>
<td>*Indicates newly assigned unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*665th TC Det</td>
<td>CPT George Michol</td>
<td>LTC Robert D Craig</td>
<td>25 July 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCC, 52d CAB</td>
<td>LTC Thomas L Williamson</td>
<td>LTC Thomas L Williamson</td>
<td>25 July 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC, 52d CAB</td>
<td>LTC James Burton</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVGD-CC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-45 (E-1) (U)

(2) Following gains and losses occurred during the period May through July 1968:

(a) Gains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Officers Auth/CH</th>
<th>WO Auth/CH</th>
<th>EM Auth/CH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>5/4</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Officers Auth/CH</th>
<th>WO Auth/CH</th>
<th>EM Auth/CH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>4/0</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The battalion is 68 enlisted men and 52 officers and warrant officers below TOE strength as of 31 July 1968. Unit authorized and present for duty strengths are:

(a) Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Officers Auth/CH</th>
<th>WO Auth/CH</th>
<th>EM Auth/CH</th>
<th>Total Auth/CH</th>
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<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td>15/16</td>
<td>52/44</td>
<td>152/150</td>
<td>219/210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>615th TC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>70/62</td>
<td>74/64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>822nd Sig</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>8/9</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AHC</td>
<td>15/17</td>
<td>52/41</td>
<td>152/148</td>
<td>219/206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545th TC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>70/61</td>
<td>72/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Sig</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>10/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td>15/16</td>
<td>52/41</td>
<td>152/140</td>
<td>219/197</td>
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<tr>
<td>405th TC</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>70/59</td>
<td>72/61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443rd Sig</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>7/8</td>
<td>9/8</td>
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<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>13/9</td>
<td>25/20</td>
<td>132/129</td>
<td>170/158</td>
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<tr>
<td>402nd TC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>80/71</td>
<td>82/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td>15/13</td>
<td>52/42</td>
<td>152/150</td>
<td>219/205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604th TC</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>70/57</td>
<td>72/58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Sig</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>9/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355th Avn Co</td>
<td>16/6</td>
<td>16/11</td>
<td>97/84</td>
<td>129/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>662nd TC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>57/50</td>
<td>59/52</td>
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<tr>
<td>361st Avn Co</td>
<td>16/16</td>
<td>13/12</td>
<td>80/77</td>
<td>109/105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>655th TC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>57/54</td>
<td>59/56</td>
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<tr>
<td>621st Sig</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>6/7</td>
<td>6/7</td>
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<td>22/25</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>87/136</td>
<td>111/167</td>
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<tr>
<td>52d Security</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>151/130</td>
<td>152/132</td>
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<tr>
<td>68th Radar</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>19/16</td>
<td>19/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Mod</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>8/12</td>
<td>9/13</td>
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<td>755th Med</td>
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<td>8/10</td>
<td>9/11</td>
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<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>138/130</td>
<td>274/227</td>
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<td>2115/1993</td>
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AVGD-CC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, RUS CAB OR-65 (R-1) (U)

(b)

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<tr>
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<th>DAC Auth/OH</th>
<th>VN Auth/OH</th>
<th>3rd Natl Auth/OH</th>
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<td>HHD, 52d CAB</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>14/14</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>11/9</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>11/9</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>11/10</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355th Avn Co</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>361st Avn Co</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Intelligence: The S-2 Section published a Daily Intelligence Report. On 29 May the S-2 was tasked to provide daily intelligence for 17th Combat Aviation Group. Submission of the first INTSUM, covering a 24 hour period from 1500 to 1500, was initiated on 1 June 1968.

a. Enemy Activity: Following the TET offensive, enemy activity slackened considerably. During this reporting period only a few limited attacks were conducted on 52d Combat Aviation Battalion units. On 050255 May 1968, the 155th AHC, (then assigned to 52d CAB), received 30-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 UH-1H major damage, 2 UH-1D and 1 UH-1D minor damage. Throughout the night, installations in both Kontum City and the Pleiku Defense Sector received 122mm rockets, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire not affecting units of this battalion. On 150240 May 1968, the 815th Engr Bn at Connell Quarry in the Camp Holloway Area of Operation (AO) received 17 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US WIA and 3 US WIA. On 250110 May 1968, the 155th AHC received approximately 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in 8 friendly casualties, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 4 UH-1H (2 from the 92nd AHC) 1 UH-1D light damage, and damage to several buildings. On 260255 May 1968, the 155th AHC was again attacked, receiving 26 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results were 1 US WIA, 1 UH-1H, 3x3/4 ton trucks, 4x1200 gallon tankers, 1x2-1/2 ton truck, 2x5 ton cargo trucks, 1x5 ton tractor and 1x2-1/2 ton trailer receiving major damage. 1 UH-1H received minor damage. On 140455 Jun 1968, the 57th AHC at Kontum received 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire with only one round landing within the perimeter, results were 2 US WIA, 1 water tanker destroyed and major damage to 1 building. On 040212 Jun 1968, the 815th Engrs at Connell Quarry received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA. On 050200 Jun 1968, Camp Holloway received 14, 122mm rockets resulting in minor damage to 2 CH-54, major damage to 1 CH-47 and light damage to 1x3/4 ton truck. On 080155 Jun 1968, Camp Holloway again received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in minor casualties, heavy damage to 1 UH-1H, moderate damage to 3 UH-1H and 1 CH-54, and light damage to 1 UH-1H, 2 CH-54 and 1x5 ton truck. On 202247 Jul 1968, the 815th Engr Bn at Connell Quarry received 45 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA and light damage to 1 vehicle. The last incident of the reporting period occurred on 21 Jul when an unknown number of Sapper personnel detonated a charge at Holloway OP 97 at 2120 hours, resulting in
AVG-CC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968

3 US WIA. Numerous attacks on other than 52d CA Battalion installations in the Kontum, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot areas were recorded during the reporting period.

b. Movement: There was a reported significant shift of enemy forces in the Central Highlands. In early May, an entire division, the 325C, new to this area, moved into Kontum Province opposite the Dak To - Ben Het area and conducted a series of attacks on US Fire Support Bases. In mid-June, this division was reported to have moved back into Cambodia and is believed to be in the triborder area at the present time. The 6th Bn, 322d Regiment (previously part of NTI Division but now operating separately) conducted several large ambushes in May, 20-25 km north of Pleiku on Highway 14. This battalion lost over one third of its personnel in these ambushes and subsequently moved southwest of Pleiku to receive replacements, training and new arms. There were indications on 29 July 1968 that the 6th Battalion had completed its refurbishing period and is now located approximately 12-15 km NW of Pleiku City. There was no confirmed contact with any major unit of the NTI Division during the entire period. Continuing agent reports, Long Range Patrol (LRP) contacts and other intelligence factors during June and July indicated the NTI Division was moving south through the Central Plei Trap Valley. On 25 July 1968, a PW from the NTI Division security company indicated the Division was moving into Daklak Province to conduct operations. Further confirmation of an impending large scale attack against Ban Me Thuot in early August was received from 2 PWs captured in late July. Although still unconfirmed, it is believed a large portion of the NTI Division resources are currently in Daklak Province. During early June, operations conducted jointly by Special Forces and 4th Infantry Division units in the Dak Payou and Day Ayun areas southeast of Pleiku City forced redeployment of the 95B Regiment (an independent regiment), east into the Binh Dinh/Pleiku Province border area. Termination of the operation in mid July has allowed the 95B Regiment to reoccupy its former operations area 20-30 km south east of Pleiku City. In May, elements of the 2nd NT Division in Quang Tin Province forced evacuation of the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp and subsequently moved south into the II Corps Zone to conduct operations in the Dak Pok area. The 21st Regiment of the 2nd NT Division was identified in several contacts in the Dak Pok area. This Regiment evidently withdrew into Laos in early July and a PW, captured just prior to the end of the reporting period, indicated the regiment has moved northeast, into the Quang Tin area of I Corps, removing any significant threat to the Dak Pok area.

c. New Units: New Units in the provinces of Kontum and Pleiku during the period include the 325C Division and the 21st Regiment of the NTI 2 Division. The 325C Division, with the 101D and 95C Regiments, infiltrated from the Khe Sanh area, arriving in the Laos Border area between the middle and latter part of April 1968. In early May, the 325C Division crossed into Kontum and initiated activity against US Fire Bases. Interrogation of a PW captured in these engagements indicates one battalion of the
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS GSFOR-65 (B-1) (U)

29th Regiment of the 325C Division remained in I Corps, conducting operations in the Hue City area. One complete Sapper Battalion, the D-120, was attached to the 325C Division prior to leaving Khe Sanh and sappers were employed during the May attacks on US Fire Bases. Information on the 21st Regiment, NT 2 Division is reported in paragraph b above. Several new unit designations in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces have appeared in documents late in the reporting period. Documents captured on 1 July by ARVN forces north of Kontum indicate a new Local Force Battalion, the 306th was to be or had been formed. The documents however, were dated 21 January listing the strength of the 306th Battalion at 80 personnel. These documents also indicate the 3 Front NVA Headquarters was to initiate an intensive recruiting program to form provincial regiments with a strength of 2200 personnel each. There have been other reports that provinces were to form regimental size units. However, at least in the highlands, there has been no firm indication of an intensive recruiting program being initiated. It should also be noted that these same documents pre-date the TET offensive, and much of the VC replacement and recruiting effort has thus far been oriented towards replacing large personnel losses suffered during the TET offensive. Other than the document reported above and several agent reports, there is no evidence to confirm the 306th Battalion as an operational unit. Documents captured by a LRP team during operations against the 95B Regiment in early June also indicate the possibility of a 2nd Local Force Battalion in Pleiku Province. The document mentions the X67 and 408th Battalions subordinate to VC Gia Lai (Pleiku) Province. Documents captured west of Pleiku City on 20 May and others captured south and southeast of Pleiku on 15 July again mention the X67 and 408th Battalion. The possibility exists that the H15 Battalion and 407th Sapper Battalion may have assumed the designations X67 and D45. However, the documents captured on 20 May and 17 June were taken in areas far outside the normal AO of either the H15 or the 407th. The possibility still exists that at least one new battalion has been formed subordinate to VC Gia Lai Province.

d. New Weapons: No new weapons were introduced during the reporting period. Use of flamethrowers, first recorded in the highlands during March 1968 by units of the 325C, has continued in attacks against 4th Infantry Division Fire Support Bases.

e. Situation:

(1) Kontum: The 325C Division is located in the tri-border area, approximately 50 km WNW of Kontum City. The 304th LF Battalion and 405th Sapper Battalion are located approximately 15 km north of Kontum City. The 24th NVA Regiment is unlocated but reported to have moved to Darlac Province with elements of the 7th 1 Division. The 320th (PA 209th) Regiment of the 7th 1 is unlocated, possibly in Cambodia, 65 km due west of Kontum City. The 66th Regiment is unlocated, reportedly, in Darlac Province.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (K-1) (U)

(2) Pleiku: The 174th Regiment is unlocated, possibly in the north-
west Pleiku-Kontum border area, along the So San River approximately 35
km west of Pleiku. The 6th/32nd NVA Regiment is identified and located
approximately 10-15 km north and northwest of Pleiku City. The 408th Sa-
per Battalion is located approximately 20 km NE of Pleiku City. The 95B
Regiment is operating approximately 40 km east and southeast of Pleiku
City. The X17 and X18 Engr Co's (Sapper) are unlocated and believed
east of Pleiku City.

f. Capabilities:

(1) Kontum: Elements of the 325C division can conduct attacks up to
regimental size in the Dak To-Ben Hat area. The 304th LF and 406th
Sapper Battalions are capable of conducting limited indirect fire and
sapper attacks on Kontum City or interdict Highway 14N between Kontum and
Dak To.

(2) Pleiku: Conduct limited sapper attacks and attacks by fire on
Pleiku defense area installations employing the 408th Sapper Battalion and
elements of the K-31 Artillery Battalion. To interdict Highway 14N between
Pleiku and Kontum using elements of the 6th Battalion, 32nd Regiment. To
conduct limited interdiction of Highway 15E between Le Trung and the Mang
Yang Pass employing elements of the 95B Regiment and the X17 and X18 Engr
Companies.

4. (c) Operations, Training and Unit Movement.

a. Operations: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported the fol-
lowing operations during the reporting period: Mac Arthur, (92 days),
Matthews (19 days), Prairie Fire (92 days) and Omega (92 days). The 4th
Infantry Division was supported by the assets of two assault helicopter
companies and one assault support helicopter company. CH-54 support was
provided on a mission basis. Prairie Fire and Omega were supported by
one assault helicopter company.

(1) A detailed list of units and activities supported by the 52d
Combat Aviation Battalion are listed below. (A map of the operational
area is included as inclosure 4).

(a) 4th Infantry Division (Operation Mac Arthur)
1. 1st Brigade - AO Spaats (Search and Destroy)
2. 2nd Brigade - AO Middleton (Search and Destroy)
3. 3rd Brigade - AO Sultan (Search and Destroy)
(b) 5th Special Forces (Omega)
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AVGD-OC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period Ending 31 July 1968, BCS GFOR-65 (3-1) (0)

1. BAN ME THUOT - Clandestine
2. AN KHE - Clandestine
3. KONTUM - Clandestine

(d) Task Force Matthews: Operation Matthews was supported 25 May - 12 June 1968. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was the principal supporting aviation element during the operation. The mission was to provide responsive aviation support to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and attached or supporting elements. This battalion's normal daily operational commitment was 36 UH-1H's, 15 UH-1C(A)'s, 10 CH-47's and one CH-54. (For a detailed operational report of significant information and events, see enclosure 3).

(d) In addition, the following units were supported on a special aircraft allocation basis for the periods indicated. Activities varied from direct combat support to administration/liaison support.

1. GRID = DCS (16 days)
2. WRLD = DCS (11 days)
3. Highway Coordinator = DCS (92 days)
4. 22nd, 23rd Division (ARVN) and 24th STZ (ARVN) = DCS (34 days)
5. 3/506th Infantry Battalion = DCS (3 days)
6. 299th Engineer Group = DCS (4 days)
7. VIP Flights = DCS (6 days)

(e) AMOC: The establishment of an Area Movement Control Center (AMCC) was directed in May 1968 for the purpose of improving procedures to control aviation support and reduce the UH-1 flight time. This objective was to be attained by reducing the total flight hours in support of administrative missions by eliminating "useless" aircraft, consolidating aviation support when feasible and providing aviation support on a mission basis only. This program has met with minimum success due to the reluctance of requesting units and agencies to properly forecast requirements and provide tentative itineraries. One by one supported elements were excluded from the AMCC concept. Units currently supported by the AMCC are: 5th SEGA, IVFW Arty and DSA II Corps.

(2) The percentage of the total battalion lift capabilities which was allocated to supported units each month is as indicated:
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(a) 4th Inf Div -

(b) Omega/Prairie Fire -

(c) Others -

(3) Operational Statistics (1 May - 31 July 1968)

During the reporting period, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion flew 1951.9 hours in support of 152 combat assaults in which 21,496 assault troops and 2274.7 tons of combat equipment and supplies were lifted in 5,255 sorties. Hostile fire was received on 13 of these assaults. Two UH-LH's received light damage without injury to crewmembers. A total of 13.5 hours of LZ pre-strikes were made by UH-1C(A) aircraft.

b. Training:

(1) Aviator Training - Maximum training emphasis and effort was devoted to standardization during the reporting period. The increased number of aircraft available resulted in this unit completing all flight training requirements which include:

(a) 90 Day Flight Standardization Checks
(b) Instrument Proficiency Checks
(c) Tactical Flight Procedures
(d) In-Country Check-Out/Orientations

(2) Ground Training - This headquarters republished training directive 350-1 which consolidates and outlines training procedures and requirements of higher headquarters. All training requirements have been completed and complied with. This unit scheduled and conducted 27 days of formal instruction.
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(1) Unit Movement:

(a) The 2nd and 3rd platoons, 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) arrived at Nha Trang, RVN on 4 May and 18 July 1968 respectively. The six CH-54's (Sky-Crane) organic to these platoons arrived on 2 May and 31 June 1968 and the entire company was operational 27 July 1968. On 21 May the 2nd platoon with three CH-54's was relocated at PHU HIEP and was operational upon arrival. No problems were encountered pertinent to the relocation of personnel, equipment and aircraft. Warning and movement orders were received in sufficient time to allow final preparation by the sponsoring unit (268th CAB) at the new location.

(b) The 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT) equipped with 12 UH-1C(A) aircraft was relocated from DI AN, RVN to Holloway Army Airfield and was assigned to this headquarters. Movement began 22 May, was completed on 28 May 1968, and the unit became operational as of 2 June 1968. Seven of the UH-1C(A) aircraft have been replaced with the AH-1G (Cobra) and have supported convoy escort missions on route 19 between AN KHE and PLEI KI and provide armed helicopter support of US and ARVN units operating in the BAO LOC area. Operational support of the latter mission proved extremely difficult and problem areas are included in Section II "Lessons Learned".

5. Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance: The 52d CAB received its Annual General Inspection during the reporting period (20 May 68 - 25 May 68) and received a satisfactory rating. All deficiencies and short comings have been corrected. Areas that have received command attention are: Conex control, aircraft revetment improvement and COLES-IV reports.

(a) CLASS I: Non-availability of station property mess equipment requires field mess equipment as substitution and limits food service improvements.

(b) CLASS II: Repair parts supplies received have proven to be inadequate after a review of all outstanding requisitions was made to insure validity. PLL's do not contain required items in an "on-hand" status.

(c) CLASS III: Total JP-4 dispensed by the battalion for the reporting period was 4,053,750 gallons of which 1,200,000 were dispensed at the Kontum Airfield by the 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

(d) CLASS V: Total ammunition expenditure for the period is as listed below:

(1) Minigun (7.62) = 2,333,000 rounds
(2) 2.75 Rockets = 7,571 rounds
(3) M-5, 40mm Grenades = 9,310 rounds
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AVCD-00 (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, R33 C56:Ch-45 (r-l) (U)

(a) Aircraft Maintenance

(1) Maintenance Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>AH-1G*</th>
<th>UH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
<th>U-6A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Aircraft Per Co</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Rate (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDM Rate (%)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AH-1G aircraft were assigned only at end of quarter and availability rate was reduced by weapons system installation, test firing, and acceptance inspections. (For detailed statistical data, see Incl 2)

(2) During the quarter, a maintenance stand down program was initiated which has improved the overall maintenance posture of the battalion.

(a) Under the program, each aircraft of the battalion receives one day per week of concentrated first echelon maintenance which is accomplished primarily by the flight engineer, crew chief and gunner under the supervision of the flight platoon sergeant. Some of the tasks accomplished by the crew are:

1. Complete daily inspection. (FMD)
2. Maintenance operational check. (Run-up with qualified aviator)
4. Overall cleaning of the aircraft.
5. Lubricate aircraft.
7. Check of current status of all requisitions and work orders listed on DA Form 24,08-14.

(b) This program has increased availability, promoted crew pride in assigned aircraft and facilitated scheduled maintenance by correcting small discrepancies. Many safety of flight discrepancies have been detected and corrected during the maintenance stand down. The results of the program has been an improved safety record and better maintained aircraft.

(3) Aircraft on Hand Status as of 31 July 1968.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS OPFOR-65 (3-1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C(A)</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57 AHC</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>23/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119 AHC</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170 AHC</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189 AHC</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361 AC(E)</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>CH-54A</td>
<td>U-6A/UH-1D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 ASHC</td>
<td>16/16</td>
<td>9/9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355 AC(H)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (U) Information Office and Special Services Activities: The Information Office continued to release both printed and pictorial news releases on personnel assigned to the battalion. During this period, 150 hometown releases were processed. This battalion has made maximum utilization of every news media that serves the military audience and the "Dragon Fire" (a bi-weekly battalion newspaper), continues to be published. The primary special services activities available to personnel of this command are:

a. Arts and Crafts Shop

b. Library

c. R&R

7. (C) Signal

a. Each assault helicopter company of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion has now received a 1 ton mounted communications facility. The AN/MRC-119 provides each assault helicopter company the capability of operating in a single side band HF radio net with the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters as well as 17th OAAG. Reliable long range communications between Dak To and 17th OAAG, Nha Trang has been established demonstrating the capability of the AN/MRC-95 radio set.

b. In addition to the long range HF capability provided by the AN/MRC-95, the following radios are part of the AN/MRC-119 communications facility: AN/PRC-25, AN/PRC-41, AN/PRC-47, and AN/VRC-46. The additional radios provide each assault helicopter company the capability of operating a complete command post with radios for aircraft control as well as administrative traffic. These communications facilities can also be airlifted by OH-47 helicopters, thus increasing the deployability of this communications equipment.

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  6. The addition of direct distance dialing from Pleiku area has greatly increased the speed of long distance service. The reliability and speed of dial service in all cases has proved superior to the old tactical system which it replaced at Camp Holloway.

  8. (U) Surgeon: Since Camp Holloway has not been under attack for over two months, a mass casualty exercise involving all personnel at the dispensary was conducted on 23 July 1968. All personnel were made aware of their duties, station and responsibilities during and following an attack. Twenty simulated casualties from Headquarters Detachment were brought to the dispensary for treatment during this exercise.

  9. (U) Accident Prevention
   a. The accident rate (per 100,000 flight hours) was 13.5; all of which were major accidents. The following causes are cited:
      (1) May: Four Accidents; rate 28.2
         (a) 9 May 1968, UH-1C: Engine failure at low level over unfavorable terrain during the conduct of an assigned mission. (Engine undergoing analysis).
         (b) 6 May 1968, UH-1H:
            1. Failure to perform a proper hover check.
            2. Over loaded condition.
            3. Improper approach to a fire base (Pinnacle).
            4. Failure to initiate any corrective action.
         (c) 17 May 1968, UH-1C:
            1. Improper flight procedures. Pilot made improper entry to 180 degree autorotation.
               2. Instructor allowed student to proceed beyond point where a safe autorotation could be accomplished.
               3. Instructor Pilot failed to initiate corrective action.
            4. Engine Failure.
         (d) 18 May 1968, UH-1H:
            1. Improper flight procedures during maximum autorotative glide.

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2. Late corrective action to induced low rotor RPM.

(2) June: One Accident; rate 8.9

(a) 13 June 1968, UH-1D: Overloaded condition.

2. Lack of proficiency.

2. Unqualified co-pilot.

(3) July: Accident Free

b. FOD prevention continues to be the subject of command emphasis. This headquarters is now awarding a certificate to crew members who find any foreign objects which would cause FOD. Foreign object damage to aircraft during the period were:

(1) May - Six.

(2) June - Nine

(3) July - Seven.

c. The factors listed below have reduced the battalion accident rate:

(1) Reduction in the length of the flying hour day due to early morning inclement weather and a general release time of 1700 hours has resulted in:

(a) Decreased aviator fatigue.

(b) Decreased maintenance crew member fatigue.

(c) Decreased unscheduled maintenance.

(3) Increased the amount of daily maintenance inspections being performed during day light hours.

(c) Increased time for formal classroom flight crew instruction.

(f) Increased availability of aircraft to support the standardization and training program.

d. During the last reporting period the accident rate was 29.9%, or one accident for every 348 flying hours. During this reporting period the accident rate was one accident for each 7,466 hours. This rate was
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Further improved during the last two months of the reporting period for
which one accident would have occurred per 20,833 flying hours.

a. Flight Standardization: The Battalion Standardization Instructor
Pilot flew 88 check rides with primary emphasis to qualify instructor
pilots at company level.

(1) Two In-Country/Orientation Check Rides.
(2) Eight UH-1 Qualification/Proficiency Check Rides.
(3) Three Aircraft Commander Check Rides.
(4) Twenty-four, ninety-day Proficiency Check Rides.
(5) Fifty IP (Instructor Pilot) Check Rides.
(6) One post accident (IP) Check Ride.

10. (U) Chaplain: During the reporting period, the battalion chaplain
was responsible for all religious activities on Camp Holloway and at
operational sites. Protestant services were conducted by the battalion
chaplain. All other denominational services were coordinated by the
battalion chaplain and attended frequently by non of this battalion.

11. (C) Post Headquaters: The mission of Post Headquarters is to supervise
monitor and control activities on Camp Holloway (other than tactical opera-
tions) and in the Camp Holloway AO. Post Headquarters provides overall
planning administration, operations, security and maintenance of facilities
located at Camp Holloway. These functions fall in service and logistics
support, security and post operations and airfield operations and defense.
Projects initiated during previous reporting and completed are.

a. Two 80'x14' aircraft Maintenance hangers.
b. One 75'x202' metal aircraft maintenance hanger.
c. 14 (2,000 sq. ft.) HQ's.
d. Two (400 sq. ft.) Mess Halls.
e. Two (1,000 sq. ft.) Orderly Rooms.
f. Resurfacing of major roads.

12. Civil Affairs: During the period 1 May - 31 July 1968 this battalion
has increased its civil affairs activities. At a meeting of local major
unit civic action officers, each village in the area was assigned to a
specific supporting unit. The first visits were for the purpose of conduct-
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1968, ROE SI O-65 (M-1) (U)

...ing a survey of needs of the respective villages. Weekly visits have been made in an attempt to establish closer relations with the local people in an effort to promote their cooperation in providing information or warning of enemy activity since previous attacks on Camp Holloway were launched from areas in or near their villages. A plan has been augmented to bolster their economy by employing the villagers on a daily hire basis and providing medical assistance to the local villages on a weekly basis.

Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. Personnel (NONE)

2. Operations

a. Sling Loading Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: Supported units continue to use improper rigging techniques, material and equipment in the preparation of external loads to be airlifted by OH-54 helicopters. Often the air items used for rigging are unserviceable and continue in use only because of the nonavailability of new items.

(2) EVALUATION: Mission accomplishment has been delayed or cancelled in many cases. Through liaison with the supported ground units it was found that units had neither applicable publications nor valid requisitions for replacement air items.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: All ground units requiring aerial delivery of combat equipment continually review requisitions in order to maintain an adequate supply of rigging materials. Air items such as cargo straps, nets and attachments should be inspected prior to and immediately after each use to insure serviceability. Items found unserviceable should be turned in or destroyed to preclude further use.

b. CH-54 Utilization.

(1) OBSERVATION: The D5 and D6B bulldozer cannot be airlifted or air-landed into areas that require the CH-54 to hover out of ground effect, unless the bulldozer is broken down into 17,000 pound loads. The maximum lift capability of the aircraft preclude aerial delivery of either dozer as one component.

(2) EVALUATION: The D5 and D6B dozers are air transportable if tracks and blades are removed. The blades and tracks weigh approximately 7,000 pounds thus reducing the remaining load to 17,000 pounds. The tracks and blade can be prepositioned at the LZ by CH-47 helicopters. The dozer can then be positioned by CH-54 helicopter and reassembled with a minimum effort.
by ground units. Limited lift during high density altitude conditions applies primarily to confined or pinnacle type landing zones during which the aircraft must hover out of ground effect to deliver the equipment.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: In those cases which preclude the aircraft developing ground effect at a hover, it is recommended that a D-3 dozer which weighs 12,000 - 13,000 pounds be used. Due to its relatively light weight this dozer can be lifted into any Fire Support Base and other confined areas without disassembly. Missions should also be requested for early morning or late afternoon movement to take maximum advantage of low density altitude conditions.


(1) OBSERVATION: an interim manual entitled, "Air Transportability Guidance for External Sling Transport of US Army Material Using Aerial Cargo Sling, FSN 1670, by US Army Helicopters", dated May 1968, was issued to this unit during the reporting period. (Subject manual was not received by tactical units).

(2) EVALUATION: This manual provides excellent guidance that would benefit ground units in preparing for sling loading operations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Command attention be given to insure distribution of this manual to combat and combat support units for their use in preparing loads during sling load operations.

d. ARC/LITE Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: ARC/LITE operations conducted in areas where aircraft are operating has proven hazardous. Ordnance employed has impacted dangerously close to aircraft. No prior warning of the intended time or impact area of the ARC/LITE was received.

(2) EVALUATION: Prior to ARC/LITE operations, warning are normally announced by air traffic control agencies on emergency radio frequencies which are monitored by all aircraft. Radios, as a means of communicating the ARC/LITE time and impact areas, has proven unreliable. All aircraft do not receive the radio warning when operating at low level in isolated areas.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: ARC/LITE operations should be published as classified NOTAM's by the major requesting unit to supporting aviation.
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units to insure that airman have prior knowledge of ARCLITE operations. In addition, radio transmitting facilities should be expanded to insure complete area coverage to include aircraft operating at low level.

e. Warhead 2.75 Inch Rocket (Flechette, WD 44/A).

(1) OBSERVATION: The WD 44/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead was developed to fill the need for an area coverage antipersonnel weapon. The area coverage feature is valuable for use against a variety of targets, but is also important in over coming point targets. The warhead is presently in Vietnam Class V supply channels but current directives deny the use of this warhead.

(2) EVALUATION: The nature of several of this battalion's missions (some classified i.e. Prairie Fire/Daniel Boone) warrant the use of the WD 44/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead for effective engagement of revetted target under triple canopy jungle cover. On a specific mission basis the use of this warhead can be controlled to accomplish its designed effect.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Authority for the use of the WD 44/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead should be delegated to aviation battalion level for employment on a control ed and specific mission basis.

f. Artillery Advisories.

(1) OBSERVATION: Flight safety can be improved through standardized artillery advisories to airman for artillery fire, naval gunfire and air-strikes. A published list of all radio contact frequencies and call signs that provide total coverage of Vietnam should be available to airman.

(2) EVALUATION: Under current procedures airman are required to contact several different artillery agencies to receive artillery advisories when flying between major unit areas of operation. Presently, no single agency publishes a document that outlines the contact station and call sign for up to date artillery warnings for all areas within the Republic of Vietnam. Consequently, it is left to the ingenuity of the individual avia- tor to attain up to date artillery information.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The 58th Aviation Battalion (Flight Facility Mobile) consolidate one publication for the entire country which designates all artillery control agencies and contact frequencies. This document should be updated on a monthly basis and distributed with the current Army Flight Following System and "W" pilotage chart to all aviation units.

g. UH-1 Aircraft augmentation to TOE 1-157-T (Aviation Company "ESCORT").

(1) OBSERVATION: TOE 1-157-T, Aviation Company (ESCORT) does not
include authorization for UH-1 type aircraft. The organic AH-1G helicopters are not capable of supporting all aviation requirements of this unit.

(2) EVALUATION: The aviation company (ESCORT), operating as a separate unit, has no organic aircraft with which to support command and control missions or maintenance support to disabled aircraft in forward areas of operation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Modify the TOE to authorize UH-1 type aircraft to support unit requirements.

h. AH-1G Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: The AH-1G helicopter is not capable of carrying non-rated members as normally carried in UH-1C(I) gunships to assist in rearming and refueling. The standard ordnance load for the AH-1G is three times that of UH-1C(I) gunships. It is essential that during operations from other than base station the supported unit provide personnel to assist in refueling and rearming AH-1G helicopters.

(2) EVALUATION: Since no crew chief or gunner are carried as crewmembers, the pilot will require assistance during refueling and rearming operations. Due to the large amount of ordnance required to rearm the AH-1G, lack of assistance to the aircrew would cause an excessive turn around time and thereby reduce mission performance. Rearming and refueling takes in excess of one hour without assistance to the crew. It is not considered practical for the aviation unit to provide these ground personnel when AH-1G attack teams are operating at widespread points throughout the area of operation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Task supported units to provide ground crews at rearming and refueling points to assist in rearming and refueling operations under the supervision of the aircraft crew and reduce turn around time thus increase AH-1G armed helicopter support.

D. Loading and Unloading Operation Involving C-124 Aircraft.

(1) OBSERVATION: Five ton trailer maintenance shop vans are air mobile in C-124 type aircraft. Loading and unloading operations requires the assistance of a heavy duty winch on this type aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: Due to the angle formed by the aircraft cargo floor and the cargo loading ramp, the five ton tractor is not capable of positioning the five ton trailer into the cargo hole of a C-124 aircraft without the assistance of a heavy duty winch. All C-124 aircraft are not equipped with winches. The tractor can only move the trailer up the ramp until the angle described above exceeds the flex limits of the tractor-trailer attachment point at this point the tractor is detached from the trailer to settle onto its dolly wheels and winched into the aircraft.
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(3) RECOMMENDATION: When C-124 aircraft are requested for movement of five ton trailer shop vans, the request should specify that a heavy duty winch is required for loading operations.

3. Training (NONE)

4. Intelligence (NONE)

5. Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance
   a. Ammunition for AH-1G Helicopters

8. (1) OBSERVATION: It has been determined through experience that A165 Miniguns ammunition (7.62) is the only type that can be used for the AH-1G armament systems. It has also been determined that only 40mm grenade ammunition of lot number 331-8 or higher, which has the double welded links, is the only ammunition suitable for use in the AH-1G weapons systems.

(2) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that when A131 (7.62mm) ammunition in 100 round belts was used in the weapons system of the AH-1G, constant jamming and other malfunctions were experienced due to long rounds and bent links. The time required to link 100 round belts into 1,500 round belts for use in the XM-18 and XM-28 mini m pods significantly increases the rearming time to an unacceptable level for responsive mission support. Experience has further shown that when A131 ammunition without the double welded links is used in the XM-28 turret, the high torque of the feed systems spreads the links apart and allows the rounds to twist and turn in the feed assembly causing jamming and other malfunctions to the weapons systems.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When AH-1G aircraft are employed in operations where rearming is accomplished at other than home station, supported units stock the proper types of ammunition at the rearm points in quantities appropriate to the AH-1G armament systems.

   a. Maintenance Team Augmentation.

(1) OBSERVATION: Assault helicopter companies with ten or more aircraft, operating in forward areas 75 - 100 miles away from support maintenance facilities, experience maintenance discrepancies which required a maintenance team to evaluate and correct the deficiency.

(2) EVALUATION: Maintenance facilities are not located at forward areas. Time was lost and aircraft flying time wasted in transporting maintenance personnel to and from the forward area. Mission support was reduced due to aircraft awaiting maintenance repair. Maintenance teams consisting of a helicopter repairman and engine repairman were placed on station in forward support areas. These personnel were furnished by the
Supporting assault helicopter company and reduced the maintenance down time and increase mission support. However, this heavily taxed aircraft maintenance effort at the rear locations which are operating at reduced strength of experienced personnel.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Modify TOE 256-F NON-DIVISIONAL AVIATION BATTALION to authorize two maintenance contact teams with appropriate tools which could be employed at forward areas thereby relieving the overly committed assault helicopter company maintenance capabilities.

6. Organization

(1) OBSERVATION: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is tasked to operate and maintain all Camp Holloway Installation Facilities. Major activities are, post defense, base development, operation of special services facilities, post exchange, provision of utilities (electrical power and water), maintenance and repair of installation facilities, airfield operations, discipline, law and order of all tenant units located on Camp Holloway.

(2) EVALUATION: Functions and activities described above are supported and managed by a post headquarter section. Personnel required to fill positions in post headquarters section are provided from organic assets thus increasing the battalion's overall personnel shortages.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: In December 1967 a modified table of distribution and allowance (M-TDA) was submitted and returned without action. Approval of the M-TDA upon resubmission would recognize the continuing requirement and decrease personnel shortages.

7. Others (NONE)

WILLIAM C. CHAMBERLAIN
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION
See Next Page
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, HCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy thru: 17th CAG
    thru: IFFORCEV
    thru: 1st Avn Bde
    thru: USARV
    TO: ACFORUA

2 cy thru: 17th CAG
    TO: ACSFOR DA

2 cy TO: USARPAC

3 cy TO: USARV

1 cy TO: 1st Avn Bde

1 cy thru: 17th CAG
    TO: IFFORCEV (File)

1 cy TO: 17th CAG (File)
CONFIDENTIAL

DA, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 August 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic letter from the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion. Format does not follow that shown in USARV Regulation 525-15, dated 13 April 1968, which specifies two paragraphs only. Since correction would require redesignating all subparagraphs, such correction was not made. Appropriate pen and ink corrections of other errors have been inserted.

2. (C) This headquarters submits the following comments and recommendations.

   a. Section 2, Lessons Learned.

      (1) Reference paragraph 2a, Sling Loading Operations, page 16: Concur.

      (2) Reference paragraph 2b, CH-54 Utilization, pages 16 and 17: Concur. Although the maximum lift capability of the CH-54 aircraft is 18,000 pounds, one CH-54 transmission was destroyed during the lifting of a 17,000 pound dozer package. Recommend the D-3 dozer where lifts in mountainous and confined areas are required. Recommend early morning for all heavy lifts.


      (4) Reference paragraph 2d, ARB/LITE Operations, pages 17 and 18: Concur. See paragraph 2o(3), below.

      (5) Reference paragraph 2e, Warhead 2.75 Inch Rocket, page 18: Concur. Recommend delegation of employment authority to aviation battalion commanders upon distribution of an improved version of the presently unserviceable KDU-4/A warhead.

      (6) Reference paragraph 2f, Artillery Advisories, page 18: Concur. Control agency boundaries could coincide with division areas of operation.

      (7) Reference paragraph 2g, WE-1 Aircraft Augmentation, pages 18 and 19: Concur. In the 2nd indorsement to 361st Aviation Company letter, dated 28 July 1968, subject: Request for Aircraft Augmentation, this headquarters recommended the assignment of one WE-1D/H aircraft to the 361st Aviation Company.

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AVGD-SC 25 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, ROE CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)


(9) Reference paragraph 2i, Loading and Unloading Operations Involving C-124 Aircraft, pages 19 and 20: Concur.

(10) Reference paragraph 2a and 2o, pages 16 and 17: Recommend higher headquarters consider possible change to Combat Aviation Battalion TOE to include a Rigger Platoon, which would place the responsibility for rigging equipment and personnel on the aviation element.

(11) Reference paragraph 5a, Ammunition for AH-1G Helicopters, page 20: Nonconcur. The unit providing armed aircraft is responsible for stocking, maintaining, and loading ammunition. Sound logistical preparation for all operations is essential for mission accomplishment. The XD8 system is not restricted to A-165 minigun ammunition. Experience has shown that extra care is necessary to insure proper link alignment on all 7.62 belts for loading, including A-165, A-131, A-127, or any other 7.62 configuration. The 100 round linked belt is only one 7.62 configuration; another is the 200 round linked belt. Belt length should not affect the rearming time for AH-1G aircraft, provided the unit ammunition section is properly used. The fact that single spot weld 40mm ammunition does not function in the XD8 system was disseminated to all AH-1G units in the 34th General Support Group Newsletter, dated June 1968, and in the 1st Aviation Brigade Newsletter, dated July 1968.

(12) Reference paragraph 5b, Maintenance Team Augmentation, pages 20 and 21: Nonconcur. Assigned direct support maintenance detachments are capable of performing required maintenance in forward areas. Adequate planning and personnel management will prevent the problem outlined in basic letter. Augmenting the TOE of all non-divisional aviation battalions with sufficient personnel to provide maintenance contact teams at all potential forward sites is not feasible. The currently authorized four technical inspectors in the direct support detachment could constitute contact teams in unusual cases when aircraft maintenance can not be anticipated and aircraft replaced on a programmed basis.

(13) Reference paragraph 6, Organization, page 21: Concur. Unit should resubmit MODA.

b. Section 1, Significant Activities.
AVGD-30

25 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1966, CSB SFG 65 (K1) (U)

(1) Reference paragraph 5a, CLASS I, page 10: Station property mass equipment is available in depots. USAWR has directed issue of this equipment only to units at designated "eruptor" areas. The majority of our units are not located at these designated areas. This headquarters has dispatched a letter to 1st Aviation Brigade on the problem.

(2) Reference paragraph 5b, CLASS II, page 10: The comment in the basic letter appears to refer to RDF items, and not PLL items established by demand. Units must submit demand requisitions to establish the PLL and conduct constant review to insure the requisitions are filled or else submit follow-up requisitions. The basic PLL listed in maintenance manuals is not usually valid in SVN. Because of adverse operating conditions and continuous overflying of the flying hour program, the basic PLL must be expanded in number and quantities of line items to develop a PLL adequate to support sustained operations.


(1) Reference paragraph 5a, Mission Planning, pages 6 and 7: Concur. This headquarters is finalizing an orientation program for supported ground commanders.

(2) Reference paragraph 5b, Establishing Priorities, page 7: Concur.

(3) Reference paragraph 5c, E-52 Air Strikes, page 7: Concur.

(4) Reference paragraph 5d, Police of Landing Zones and Load Out Areas, pages 7 and 8: Concur.

(5) Reference paragraph 5e, Preparation of CH-47 Loads, page 8: Concur. See paragraph 2a(3), above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GERALD M. GOOD

LTC, AGC
Adjutant
AVFA-GG-OT (10 Aug 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, REG CFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 12 SEP 1968
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96399

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-ment and makes the following recommendations or comments.

a. Reference paragraph 2d section 2 page 17. ARC/LIGHT Operations. 
Many ARC LIGHT operations are developed on short notice and could not be
published in NOTAM's in a timely manner that would insure adequate noti-
fication. This headquarters recommends that USAF aircraft conducting an
ARC LIGHT operation announce the danger area to be avoided over the guard
channel (243.0).

b. Reference paragraph 2h section 2 page 19. AH-1G Operations. Non
concur with recommendations of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion and 17th
Combat Aviation Group as to the use of troops from the unit supported to
assist in rearming and refueling AH-1Gs. To safely assist in the rearm-
ing of the AH-1G aerial weapons systems personnel should be trained. The
aviation companies have trained personnel who have been working with the
various weapons systems while performing the job as door gunner on the
UH-1 B/Cs. This headquarters recommends that the door gunners be retained
by units receiving AH-1Gs and made available at the forward supply points
to safely expedite refueling/rearmament.

c. Reference paragraph 5a section 2 page 20. Ammunition for AH-1G
Helicopters. Non Concur with recommendation of the 52d Combat Aviation
Battalion for reasons given in the 1st Indorsement.

d. Reference paragraph 5b section 2 page 20 and 21. Maintenance Team
Augmentation. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned is not the pro-
der document to request additional personnel or equipment. Upon receipt
of a request for a change in the MTG this headquarters will evaluate
the request and make its recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
ROBERT C. GABBARD
LT, AGC
ASSF ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
17th CAG

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26
AVBAP.C (10 Aug 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 SEP 29 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except for the following:

   a. Section 2, paragraph 2a, page 18. Nonconcur. The M184 A/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead was a test item which, after testing, was declared unacceptable for tactical use. This headquarters instructed 17th Combat Aviation Group to turn in these warheads as unserviceable. It is recommended that these warheads be removed from Class V supply channels by 1st Logistical Command. An improved flechette warhead is being introduced in RVN at this time by the New Equipment Training Team. Upon acceptance of the warhead, authority to use it will be delegated to aviation battalion level.

   b. Section 2, paragraph 2h, page 19 and paragraph 2a(8), 1st Indorsement. Nonconcur. Paragraph b, 2d Indorsement. Concur except for retaining door gunners. The standardized MTOE for Aviation Aerial Weapons Companies, which is currently being staffed for approval at DA, will trade off the currently authorized door gunner spaces for critically needed aircraft armament mechanics and ammunition handlers. Supported units do not have personnel qualified to service and arm the AH-1G. The complexity of the AH-1G armament system and the necessity for proper ammunition handling and refueling procedures makes it essential that qualified personnel perform aircraft rearm and servicing tasks. It is unlikely that supported units would have qualified personnel for this duty. A UH-1D helicopter has been issued to the Aviation Company (Escort) assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion and could be used to transport personnel from their unit to man rearm/refuel points when required.

   c. Paragraph 2a(10), 1st Indorsement. Nonconcur. TM 55-450-11, Helicopter External Loads Rigid with Air Delivery Equipment, dated 21 Juno 1968, states that it is the responsibility of the transported unit to furnish sling, straps, cord, clevises, padding, tape, etc., used in
rigging the equipment and to prepare, rig, and hook up the loads. An assault support helicopter company normally supports separate units at one time from multiple locations. Having rigger personnel organic to the combat aviation battalion would require transporting these rigger personnel to each separate location in order to prepare the loads for the transported unit. This procedure is impractical when compared to the present system of personnel trained in rigging assigned to the transported unit. Technical assistance on the preparation of external sling loads is provided by the aviation unit when required.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Section 1, paragraph 5a, page 10 and paragraph 2b(1), 1st Indorsement. This headquarters forwarded to Headquarters USAF ATC: Avionics a letter request, subject: Restricted Issue of Containment Less Equipment and Personnel Quarters furniture, dated 23 August 1968. This letter requested the Heliku area be added to the current list of containment areas authorized to be issued less equipment.

b. Section 2, paragraph 2d, page 17. Action has been taken by USAF Aviation Officer with appropriate USAF agencies to improve AOE/Lite warnings to aircraft operating at low levels in remote areas. An airborne radio relay of such warnings is being studied at this time.

c. Section 2, paragraph 2f, page 18 and paragraph 2a(6), 1st Indorsement. Artillery advisory frequencies for the III Corps Tactical Zone are unclassified and published in a monthly frequency sheet by the 56th Aviation Group (FMN) (Prov). The artillery frequencies in the I, II and IV Corps Tactical Zones are classified and therefore are not published in this manner but rather are found in respective SUs. This headquarters will request that USAF consider action which will provide unclassified artillery advisory frequencies. Action could then be taken by this headquarters to have artillery advisory frequencies published in DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP). Artillery advisories can presently be obtained by pilots en route from the Army Flight Following Stations and Air Force Radar Control Agencies spotted throughout RVN.

d. Section 2, paragraph 2g, page 18, and paragraph 2a(7), 1st Indorsement. The Aviation Company (Escort) assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was issued a UH-1D helicopter on 12 September 1968. The unit was directed to submit NASA action to authorize this additional aircraft.
e. Section 2, paragraph 6, page 21 and paragraph 2a(13), 1st Indorsement. Base camp TDAs are not planned for installations other than divisional or separate brigade. The current personnel space limitations within USARV precludes the possibility of additional personnel being authorized. Approval of the MTDA cannot be granted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. D. SEGAL
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C)  MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning interim manual, page 17, paragraph 2c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a(3). TM 55-450-11, Helicopter External Load, Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, has been distributed to all major subordinate commands in sufficient copies for redistribution to all subordinate units.

b. Reference item concerning ARCLIT operations, page 17, paragraph 2d; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a(4); 2d Indorsement, paragraph a; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

c. Reference item concerning warhead, 2.75 inch rocket (flechette, WD 4A/A), page 18, paragraph 2e; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1a: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

d. Reference item concerning AH-1G operations, page 19, paragraph 2h; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1b: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

e. Reference item concerning artillery advisories, page 18, paragraph 2f, and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur. Effective 1 October 1968 the artillery warning frequencies and call signs in the I and II CTZ were being published by the 58th Aviation Group (Prov). This headquarters is presently studying the feasibility of including the stations in the IV CTZ in this publication. These frequencies, call signs, and locations are presently available over the air from the IV CTZ flight following stations.

f. Reference item concerning mess equipment, page 10, paragraph 5a; and paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement: Nonconcur. In order to be issued station property mess equipment in RVN, the locations must be major bases, have

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

adequate power resources to operate the equipment, and have adequate
facilities available in which to install the equipment. Recent consideration
has been given to authorizing the Pleiku area station property mess
equipment but the location does not satisfy the present criteria.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 52d CAB

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (10 Aug 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC

32
**SUBJECT:** Organizational Structure, 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
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<tr>
<td>52d Cbt Avn Bn - &quot;FLYING DRAGONS&quot;</td>
<td>LTC William C Chamberlain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters &amp; Headquarter Detachment</td>
<td>CPT Charles R Reay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Security Platoon</td>
<td>1LT Daniel A Berry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pathfinder Detachment</td>
<td>1LT Joseph C Parsons III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347th AOD</td>
<td>MAJ Leon D Jackson</td>
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<tr>
<td>755th Medical Detachment</td>
<td>CPT James R Peterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>822nd Signal Detachment</td>
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Incl 1
SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U): Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions: Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction. Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

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<th>HOURS UH-10(A)</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Percent DA Program on flying hours is based on the following flying hour program per aircraft: UH-10(A) 58 Hours, UH-1H 74 Hours.

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Incl. 2
SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U): Continued

<table>
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<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>159</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>77.6</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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<td>HHD</td>
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Recapitulation Availability, Mission Ready, EDP and EDM percentage taken from DA Form 1352 and Daily Aircraft Status.

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<th>UNIT</th>
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* Percent of DA Program is based on a DA Flying Hour Program per aircraft as follows: AH-1G 70 Hours, CH-47 60 Hours, CH-54 40 Hours.

Incl. 2
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1968.**

CO, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

**Report Date**
10 August 1968

**Total No. of Pages**
37

**Project No.**
N/A

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**Supplementary Notes**
N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**
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***PAGE #

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SUBJECT TITLE

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ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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