<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
AVCA CRB-GO-0

15 August 1968


THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. AC of S, Personnel and Administration.

   (1) Command: Colonel Kenneth F. Langland commanded from 1 May 68 through 30 May 68; total days commanded = 30 days. Colonel Albert Newton commanded from 31 May 68 through 31 Jul 68; total days commanded = 62 days.

   (2) Arrival and departures of key individuals for the period 1 May 68 through 31 July 68:

   (a) Arrivals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Newton</td>
<td>31 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>20 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lang</td>
<td>25 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lechler</td>
<td>31 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Mills</td>
<td>3 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Powers</td>
<td>17 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Sisca</td>
<td>3 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Kail</td>
<td>4 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Kreitz</td>
<td>24 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Oswalt</td>
<td>18 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Urciuoli</td>
<td>15 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Dir of Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir of Petroleum</td>
<td>COR Rep, Vinnell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enginner</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC of S, SP&amp;O</td>
<td>AC of S, Pers &amp; Admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Dir of Petroleum</td>
<td>Protocol Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ass't Engineer</td>
<td>Ops Br Ch, SP&amp;O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Group 4

   Downgraded at 3 year intervals
   Declassified after 12 years
   DOD Dir 5200.10

Inclosure 1
AVCA CRB-GO-0
15 August 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for period ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

(b) Departures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COL Langiand</td>
<td>30 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Attaway</td>
<td>13 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Cipolla</td>
<td>1 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Harvey</td>
<td>7 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Mauzrrhoff</td>
<td>1 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Newman</td>
<td>3 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Roseberry</td>
<td>6 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Arwood</td>
<td>16 May 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Barrowman</td>
<td>18 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Gannon</td>
<td>1 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Hunter</td>
<td>17 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Key</td>
<td>13 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Lieh</td>
<td>24 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Karlstad</td>
<td>16 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Mayfield</td>
<td>29 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Oberg</td>
<td>4 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Rother</td>
<td>7 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Weis</td>
<td>20 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Wiersma</td>
<td>17 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Woodward</td>
<td>3 May 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The following units of the USASUPCOM-CRB were gained, lost or deactivated during the period 1 May 68 through 31 Jul 68:

(a) Gains:
- 5th Signal Det
- 129th Maint Co

(b) Losses:
- 41st Eng Det
- 17th Eng Det
- 42nd Eng Det
- 23rd Eng Det
- 46th Eng Det
- 36th Eng Det
- 39th Trans Hn
- 26th APU
- 97th Eng Det
- 116th Eng Det
- 329th Eng Det
- 576th Eng Det
- 520th Eng Det
- 521st Eng Det
- 522d Eng Det
- 525th Eng Det
- 530th Eng Det

544th Eng Det
567th Eng Det
569th Eng Det
570th Eng Det
577th Eng Det
605th Eng Det
606th Eng Det
608th Eng Det
609th Eng Det
791st Eng Det
904th Eng Det
905th Eng Det

(c) Deactivated: No units were deactivated during the period 1 May 68 to 31 Jul 68.

(d) The offices of the AC of S, Personnel and the Adjutant General merged on 6 May 68 to form the present staff element entitled, AC of S, Personnel and Administration.

(5) Personnel Management:

(a) The proposed TDA for this headquarters has been submitted to 1st Logistics Command. Staffing was in accordance with the USARPAC Manpower Survey and consists of 78 officers, 4 warrant officers, 197 enlisted, 9 Department of the Army Civilians, and 16 local nationals, for a total of 304 spaces.

(b) The quality of personnel replacements has become a matter of concern, especially in the critical areas such as petroleum and ammunition. Personnel allocated to fill these positions in several instances were not qualified and were not awarded the appropriate MOS. This causes considerable problems in staffing vital positions in isolated areas.

(c) Local National Direct Hire authorization for the 1st Quarter FY 69 increased 129 spaces. Current authorization is 1214 spaces.

(d) Civilianization Program 6 has been implemented. A total of 29 employees have been hired and 169 recruitment actions are pending. Hiring has proceeded slowly because the labor pool from which the command must hire does not contain sufficient qualified personnel. Every effort is being expended to insure success.

(6) Civil Affairs:

(a) During this quarter a total of 94 units of this command participated in 240 projects; 30 of these projects were completed with the majority of the remainder being of a continuing nature.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for period ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

The average number of monthly projects was 73.

(b) Cam Ranh Bay Support Command contributed approximately $12,480 in supplies and equipment in direct support of the GVN recovery program. This included direct support to the victims of aggression and support to the GVN in the pacification effort.

(c) As a direct result of the TET Offensive, General Palmer, Deputy Commanding General, USARV, endorsed the Republic of Vietnam Tri lateral Relief Fund Drive which enabled the Vietnamese employees of this command and of US contractors an opportunity to participate in the relief of 700,000 victims of the VC/NVA/TET aggression. A total of 68,326VN was donated.

(d) A conversational English program instituted for local national employees was conducted during this period. The course was of 12 weeks duration, with approximately 20 students participating. The course was considered a success.

(e) The construction of a veterinary clinic in Cam Ranh City was proposed which would complement the approved garbage sterilization project, by providing the necessary support required to establish the successful development of a swine industry in Cam Ranh City.

(f) The Pork Production Program will provide edible garbage for about 5,000 pigs in the area, alleviating a critical feed shortage and increasing pork production, ultimately to 10,000 head.

(g) During this quarter, subordinate elements of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command implemented the required action, as outlined in Annex Q, 1st Logistical Command CPCR 1-68. Subarea Command at Cam Ranh Bay, Nam Trang, and Tuy Hoa assigned each unit in their respective areas a particular village and/or hamlet to insure maximum coverage. Each village and/or hamlet will be visited on a weekly basis, and the needs and the aspirations of the people will be considered and required projects will be assigned to a sponsoring unit for fruition.

(7) Personnel Services:

(a) On 16 May 1968, authority was received from 1st Logistical Command to transfer the responsibility for the Consolidated Chaplain’s Fund, Cam Ranh Bay area from Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command to Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Action was based on some units in the Cam Ranh Bay peninsula not being under the operational control of Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command. This change was also recommended by the USARPAC Manpower Survey Team during the recent survey of both USASUPCOM-CRB and CRBSAC.
(b) HQ, USARV established a policy whereby commanders would invest all non-appropriated funds in excess to immediate operational requirements. A valid guide is that non-appropriated fund activities should not maintain cash in excess of projected monthly requirements. Due to conditions in RVN, cash should be invested in bank savings accounts or time deposits. The Chase Manhattan and Bank of America military banking facilities have arranged investments for non-appropriated fund activities with their home offices as military banking facilities are not authorized to provide investment services.

(c) USARV Regulation 230-5, subject Other Sundry Funds, is under revision. Pending revision, HQ, USARV published interim instructions placing a ceilings not worth of $2,500 on Other Sundry Funds, to include fixed assets. Funds that exceed this amount will become separate open messes or annexes of existing open messes. Tuy Hoa Subarea Command is required to annex 10 clubs into its open mess system.

(d) Due to the serious balance of payments deficit, HQ, USARV deemed it necessary to control the purchase of goods by open messes from foreign vendors. All purchases by open messes of resale items or fixed assets from other than US vendors requires approval as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMOUNT OF PURCHASE</th>
<th>APPROVING AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Purchases up to $100</td>
<td>Commander responsible for Open Mess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Purchases from $100 to $1,000</td>
<td>Major Subordinate Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Purchases in excess of $1,000</td>
<td>HQ, USARV, ATTN: AVHGA-SF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purchases of items on the Vietnamese economy need not be approved as above. Open messes desiring to purchase these items on the Vietnamese economy defined as 'deemed transit', USARV Regulation 715-1 are required to obtain approval. In accordance with provisions of paragraph 4, USARV Regulation 715-1, commanders approving purchases should ensure that comparable items are not available for Vietnamese vendors prior to granting approval of purchase. When considering comparable foreign and American items of determination should be based on the functional nature of the item and not its artistic value. American foreign vendors will not be fragmented in order to obtain approval at a lower level.

(e) The reasons of 92 Armed Forces personnel and 92 Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel were processed through Cam Ranh Bay Support Command collecting points during the period 1 May 68 through 31 July 1968.
15 August 1968


(8) Adjutant General:

(a) Awards and Decorations: During this quarter, the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement, which are approved at this headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Strength of the Command:

1 May 68: 10,184 (OFF: 568 WO: 148 EM: 9,468)

31 Jul 68: 11,382 (OFF: 481 WO: 123 EM: 10,778)

(c) Gains and Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gains</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>1,376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Reenlistments:

SEE INCLOSURE 1

(e) Testing Status:

SEE INCLOSURE 2

(f) Congressional Inquiries received within the Command by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalized</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interims</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Casualty Reports:

SEE INCLOSURE 3

CONFIDENTIAL

**Adjutant General:**

(a) Awards and decorations: During this quarter, the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement, which are approved at this headquarters:

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<td>14</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>216</td>
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(b) Strength of the Command:

(1) 1 May 68: 10,184 (OFF: 568 WO: 148 EM: 9,468)

(2) 31 Jul 68: 11,382 (OFF: 481 WO: 123 EM: 10,778)

(2) Gains and Losses:

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<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalized</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interims</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Casualty Reports:

SEE INCLOSURE 3
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS OSPOR-65 (U)

(g) Promotions:
SEE INCLOSURE 4.

(h) Distinguished visitors:
SEE INCLOSURE 5.


(1) Security and Intelligence Division.

(a) During the reporting period, personnel security actions were
completed by the Security and Intelligence Division as reported below.

(1) Number of clearances validated: 260.
(2) Number of requests for National Agency Checks processed: 24.
(3) Number of requests for Background Investigations processed: 200.
(4) Number of requests for Background Investigations completed: 19.
(5) Number of Confidential clearances granted: 296.
(6) Number of Secret clearances granted: 223.
(7) Number of Local Files Checks performed: 300.
(8) Number of Debriefings performed: 80.

(b) During the quarter, four practice alerts were conducted with
particular emphasis given to improving notification and communication
procedures, and to deploying reaction force platoons to various sites of
simulated enemy activity. A major improvement has been accomplished
with the installation of an immediate notification telephone system by
the 7th Signal Battalion. This new "crash alert system" gives the command
the capability of notifying twenty (20) major subordinate units simul-
taneously on a call. A hotline of alert conditions. Also, experience has
shown that periodically it is desirable to increase our defensive posi-
tion to a degree approaching alert status, but which would not adversely
affect port and depot operations. Consequently, we are revising our
ground defense plans to include three phases of additional security which
will give the command the defenses needed in specific harbor areas without
putting the entire facility on alert and thereby hindering work schedules.
(a) Action is currently being taken to provide permanent facilities for docking and support of four PBRs (Patrol Boat, River) to increase the capability of the Provost Marshal and the Transportation Command of providing security for the harbor and 1st Logistical Command facilities therein. Two sapper incidents in the harbor this year emphasize the need for this added security. One platoon from the 458th Transportation Company (PBR) will be headquartered at Cam Ranh Bay. Coordination is now being effected with the engineers and the 97th MP Battalion to have a temporary facility ready and boats in the water by mid-August, and permanent facilities operative by early September.

(2) Plans and Training Division

(a) Training

(1) Average monthly attendance at the Replacement Training classes has increased to 1225, due to increase of command interest. Percentage of incoming personnel trained has greatly improved, and additional classes are being scheduled for assigned personnel not previously trained.

(2) The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of Instruction</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Counter III (PLL and ASL)</td>
<td>1 May 68 - 30 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR 500 Computer</td>
<td>1 May 68 - 30 Jun 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Counter IV (PLL and ASL)</td>
<td>1 Jul 68 - 31 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Force Development

(1) During the period the following moves were made among troop units of USASUPCOM-CRB:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MOVED FROM</th>
<th>MOVED TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th TC Battalion (Terminal)</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>GRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th TC Company (Medium Truck)</td>
<td>VRB</td>
<td>CRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Army Postal Unit</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>SGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th TC Detachment (Crane)</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>DNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39th TC Detachment (Ferry)</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>SGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295th TC Company (Light Truck)</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>VRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>565th TC Company (Light Truck)</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>VRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th TC Platoon (Light Truck)</td>
<td>VRB</td>
<td>IRG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates PCS unit moves within USASUPCOM-CRB area of support. All other moves were PCS out of this command.*

(2) During the period the following units, previously moved on TDY basis, were transferred out of this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAINING COMMAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; Main Support Co, 63d Maint Bn</td>
<td>USASUPCOM-DNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>458th TC Company (Light Amphibian)</td>
<td>18th MP Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>578th CS Company (Light Equip Maint)</td>
<td>USASUPCOM-DNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>635th TC Detachment (Tug)</td>
<td>USAMMAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the period no units of USASUPCOM-CRB were inactivated.

(4) During the period no units scheduled for USASUPCOM-CRB were diverted.

(3) Operations.

(a) The following operations were supported by United States Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay during the period of this report:

(1) Task Force South: A search and destroy operation in the four Southern Provinces of II CTZ with Hq's in Dalat by the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Brigade, 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade, 3rd Battalion, 506th Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery and other forces began 15 July 1968 and continues. This operation is supported by the following logistical operations:

- FSA Phan Thiet - this Forward Support Area continues to provide supply point distribution of Class I, III, and V material, unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items, back up support maintenance and transportation as well as laundry, bath and GR services.

- Task Force Tomblinso - this Forward Support Element was inserted into Bao Loc specifically for the support of TF South on 20 June 1968. This FSE provides the same support as FSA Phan Thiet but on a smaller scale.

(2) Operation Baling - A search and destroy operation in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa provinces by the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Inf Brigade began 19 September 1967 and continues. This operation is supported by limited unit distribution of all classes of supply, laundry, bath and GR services and back up direct support maintenance from Tuy Hoa Subarea Command.

(3) Operation MacArthur South - A search and destroy operation conducted largely in Daklak Province by the entire 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division began 13 July 1968 with the insertion of the tactical Headquarters, Task Force Fighter into Ban Me Thuot. To support this operation, a Forward Support Area
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(FSA) was inserted into Ban Me Thuot on 15 July 1968 providing supply point distribution of Class I, III, and V, unit distribution of fast moving Class II and IV items, laundry, bath and GR services as well as back up direct support maintenance.

(4) Americal Division - During the reporting period, this command served as the primary depot for Class V and Bulk Class IV supplies in support of the Americal Division, although United States Army Support Command Qui Nhon retained managerial control of the support operations.

(5) Routine Republic of Korea fire operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (south) continue to be supported as required from the United States Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay or the nearest Subarea Command. Transportation assistance is also provided to isolated areas.

(b) Air Drop: During the reporting period, the 109th Aerial Delivery Company continued its mission in support of tactical units throughout RVN by air dropping a total of 2,176 short tons of critically needed supplies. Of that total, approximately 1,073 short tons were free dropped, 355 gallon drums of Diesel fuel and JP5; a new technique of offensive employment of incendiaries, which proved highly successful during the period. The 623d Aerial Equipment Repair and Depot Company continued its high rate of recovery, classification and repair of air items during the reporting period, virtually eliminating the backlog incurred during the siege of Khe Sanh. A reorganization of aerial delivery maintenance, accounting and reporting procedures simplified and consolidated unit and depot air item operations, insuring an accurate estimate of the total existing in-country air drop capability at any given time for all levels of command.

(4) Logistical Operations:

(4a) During the reporting period, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command continued its assigned status of back depot in all classes of supply to the other Support Commands in the Four CBA.

(b) On 5 July a forward support element, consisting of 1 officer and 37 EM equipped with equipment was deployed to Ban Lao in support of TF South. Additionally a full FSA, consisting of 2 officers, 3 WO and 50 EM with all FSA equipment was deployed to Ban He Thuot on 17 July in support of TF Fighter. The deployment of these elements was directed, coordinated and monitored by the logistical operations control center (LOCC).

(c) For the first time in 3 months, a resupply convoy traveled from CRB to Ban Lao. This convoy was requested and tactically supported by elements under I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV). This marks the first implementation of IFFV’s plan for increased security on the road not in the II CTZ (South),
which will be supported tactically by TF South.

(d) Due to increased convoy re-supply requirements of tactical units within II CTZ (South), a severe strain has been placed on the motor transport assets of this command. However, through additional planning, coordination, and follow up action by the LOCC, this command consistently met lead times, supply requests and critical delivery dates.

(e) During the period of this report, the LOCC coordinated a total of 104 combat essential missions on an average of 14 less per day than during the Tet Offensive. The LOCC also coordinated and monitored all ARVAP missions, convoy security, deployment of support forces as well as monitoring routine logistical resupply.

c. AC of S, Controller.

(1) During the period 18-20 June 1968, AC of S, Controller Section, conducted the first of a series of Introduction to Automatic Data Processing Courses for Support Command personnel. The purpose of these courses is to familiarize company grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers with the basic operating fundamentals of ADP. The objective of the course is the improvement of the quality of source document preparation for input into the Data Processing Activities throughout the Command. The first class consisted of 18 students representing each major subordinate command. The success of the course was reflected by favorable student comments, command response, and interest expressed by higher headquarters in requesting 10 spaces for the next class.

(2) Review and analysis - on 16 April 1968 the first Support Command oral Quarterly Review and Analysis was presented to the Commanding Officer by major subordinate commanders and principal staff section chiefs and directors.

d. Director of Ammunition.

(1) Class V Storage Objectives and Quantities on hand at beginning and end of period in short tons:

(a) General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Beginning of Period</th>
<th>End of Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet FSA</td>
<td>Storage Objective</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Hand Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td>55'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Chuot FSA</td>
<td>Storage Objective</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Hand Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stockage Objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Beginning of Period</th>
<th>End of Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet FSA</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>1,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot FSA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Loc FSE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa ASP</td>
<td>17,727</td>
<td>17,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay ASD</td>
<td>82,563</td>
<td>82,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stockage objectives are based on weapon densities, required supply rates, usage factors, and storage capabilities. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes 34 days of the 60 day requirement for the I Corps Tactical Zone. The increase in the on-hand balance at Cam Ranh Bay is due to an increased number of deep draft vessels discharging at that location. Issues have remained generally stable. The substantial increase in the stockage objective at Phan Thiet is due to support requirements for 155mm weapons.

At the Bao Loc FSE the planned stockage objective was as high as approximately 600 S/T during the period. Anticipated fluctuations in the weapons density and contact with the enemy did not materialize. These factors coupled with the faster than planned input of stocks caused the on-hand balance to increase to the level indicated. The stockage objective is considered to be essentially stable, to be influenced only by changes in supported weapons density. The on-hand balance will be permitted to decrease through attrition.

The stockage objective at the Ban Me Thuot FSA is expected to increase to approximately 1300 short tons during the next period. The support requirements for 175mm and 8" weapons plus an increase in the number of days of supply on-hand will cause the increase.

(b) Discussion:

The stockage objectives are based on weapon densities, required supply rates, usage factors, and storage capabilities. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes 34 days of the 60 day requirement for the I Corps Tactical Zone. The increase in the on-hand balance at Cam Ranh Bay is due to an increased number of deep draft vessels discharging at that location. Issues have remained generally stable. The substantial increase in the stockage objective at Phan Thiet is due to support requirements for 155mm weapons.

At the Bao Loc FSE the planned stockage objective was as high as approximately 600 S/T during the period. Anticipated fluctuations in the weapons density and contact with the enemy did not materialize. These factors coupled with the faster than planned input of stocks caused the on-hand balance to increase to the level indicated. The stockage objective is considered to be essentially stable, to be influenced only by changes in supported weapons density. The on-hand balance will be permitted to decrease through attrition.

The stockage objective at the Ban Me Thuot FSA is expected to increase to approximately 1300 short tons during the next period. The support requirement for 175mm and 8" weapons plus an increase in the number of days of supply on-hand will cause the increase.

(2) Total storage capabilities at beginning and end of period in short tons:

(a) General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Beginning of Period</th>
<th>End of Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet FSA</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>1,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot FSA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Loc FSE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa ASP</td>
<td>17,727</td>
<td>17,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay ASD</td>
<td>82,563</td>
<td>82,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(b) *Discussion:* Storage capability is based on the planning factor of storing 1 short ton per 11 sq ft of storage space per FM 101-10-1. At Phan Thiet, one additional storage area has been added with 2 more planned for the next period. The storage facility at Phan Rang was demolished by the Air Force. They (Air Force) will rebuild at a different location. Estimated date of completion is unknown. There is no immediate requirement for the facility. The self-help reconstruction of ASA Yankee at Cam Ranh Bay is nearing completion. The project should be completed during the next period.

Reconstruction of the Tuy Hoa ASP is in progress with completion due during the next quarter. When finished the area will have well drained, stabilized pads with an improved road network. Overall storage capability will be reduced to approximately 10,000 3/T.

(3) *Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons.*

(a) *General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet FSA</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa ASP</td>
<td>3,241</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>2,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay ASP</td>
<td>20,679</td>
<td>19,356</td>
<td>21,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The mission of the Cam Ranh Bay ASP as a strategic backup for the other Support Commands is apparent in that approximately 40% of the total items shipped during this quarter was to the other Support Commands.

**Director of General Supply.**

(i) *Consolidation of Postal:*

The CO, with Point 81, Cam Ranh Bay, recently requested approval for the establishment of a consolidated postal supply facility. This involves consolidating the postal supply facilities for the 198th Signal Co, 135th Maint, and the Cam Ranh Bay ASP. All facilities are located in the same area. But due to personnel requirements, the request for consolidation was approved based on the need for efficiency and control. All units are performing direct support duties for the ROK forces (190 each).

(iv) TENT Inspection Team:

Directorate of General Supply has established a Technical Supply Capability Team. The team consists of the officers and one NCO. Their mission is to conduct inspections of internal operating procedures of
DSU/GSU Technical Supply operations. NCR 500 operations are also inspected. The ultimate goal is to enhance the operational efficiency of each supply, thus reducing zero balances and increasing demand satisfaction and accommodation to meet desired goals established in 1st Log Comd Reg 710-1. Statistical data received from DSU's over the past thirty (30) days denotes improvement in DSU supply operations.

(3) Increasing RO's at DSU's for Critical Repair Parts:

Recent action has been taken by headquarters to double the requisitioning objective for critical repair parts carried on the authorized stockage list for each DSU/GSU. This action will allow DSU/GSU's to reduce those lines carried constantly at zero balance by increasing on-hand stocks. This action should reduce deadline rates and zero balances at DSU/GSU's.

(4) Project Counter IV:

Project Counter IV is currently in operation within the USASUPCOM-CRB. DA directed teams are currently instructing throughout the command on PLL's and augmenting personal resources at DSU/GSU's and the depot on ASL operations. Programs have been established and both the ASL and PLL teams are in full operation. Project officers have been selected for each subordinate command to assist teams while in their areas. Project Counter IV will remain in operation from 1 Jul 68 through 1 Dec 68. Monthly reports of team performance are forwarded to 1st Log Comd for evaluation.

(5) Supply Manifest Test:

During April 1968, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command was selected to conduct a Supply Manifest Test for Vietnam. The test will last eight (8) months and is designed to provide Cam Ranh Bay with an advance manifest for each ship loaded in Okinawa bound for Cam Ranh Bay Port. Okinawa will transceive to the US Army Depot, CRB, using 23MCards (Supply Manifest Cards), which will be received at the depot in the form of a machine run-off. Some of the potential benefits to be derived from the advance supply manifest are:

(a) Improved RVN Supply Response
(b) Selective Discharge and Diversion of Vessels
(c) Improved Document Control
(d) Prior Planning of Storage Requirements
(e) Reduction of Depot Cargo Handling

(f) Planned Material Release

(g) Curtailed Local Procurement

(h) Reduction of Order and Shipping Time

(i) Timely, Complete Cargo Outrun Reports

(j) Timely and Effective Movements Control

(k) Improved Utilization of Transportation Resources

The test will be conducted in three (3) phases with phase I being accomplished during the first month of the eight-month test period. Phase II will consist of a six (6) month implementation period. Phase III will consist of a one (1) month review and test, final documentation of procedures and programs developed in Phase II, and preparation of final report.

(6) Establishing of CIF at the 22nd Replacement Battalion:

This headquarters was given the mission of establishing a clothing issue facility (CIF) at the 22nd Replacement Battalion for replacement personnel. The purpose of this facility will be to provide clothing and equipment to incoming military personnel processing through Cam Ranh Bay. Such a mission will mean that troops will arrive at their duty station with clothing and equipment. The replacement battalion currently processes 626 personnel daily which does not include those personnel processing for R&R. An interim facility will remain in operation until a permanent facility is established. Plans for permanent facility have been devised and forwarded to 1st Log Comd for approval.

f. Directorate of Maintenance

(i) General:

(a) Maintenance units were actively involved in support of Task Force South and Task Force Fighter.

(b) Materiel Readiness Inspection Team was formed on 30 May 1968.

(c) General Support Program Conference was held at the Support Command Directorate of Maintenance 17-19 July 1968 and the general support program was updated for FY 69.

(2) Selected equipment density and deadline at the end of the period:

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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

**NOMENCLATURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>% Deadline</th>
<th>% Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trk Cargo 2 1/2 ton</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk Other 2 1/2 ton</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk Cargo 5 ton</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk Tractor 5 ton</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk Dump 5 ton</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer 12 ton</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer 5000 gal</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklifts R/T</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen under 15KW</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen 15KW and over</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crwl over 20 ton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trk MTD 20 ton</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crane other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reefer Van 7 1/2 ton</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry Washer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry Dryer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Purif Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery Plats</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath Units</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulldozer F/T</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crane Floating</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>LARC V's</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM-8's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU's</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tug Boats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio AN/VRC-12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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<td>Radio AN/VRC-26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio AN/VRC-46</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio AN/VRC-43</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry Unit Conversion</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck 5 ton . / 10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, 20 CFM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, 6x 2 stage</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, 6x 1 stage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, 50 CFM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grader MTZD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoop Loaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scraper Towed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor, 10 ton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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**g. Director of POL**

1. The continual interdiction of the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa pipeline due to enemy activity and local national pilferage has necessitated an alternate means of POL resupply to be initiated. A new 6" pipeline directly opposite Phu Hlep Army Airfield has been installed to off-load T-1 tankers from shore to a tie-in with the present pipeline. This is to be used only for operational necessity. In cooperation with the Engineers, the present 6" and 8" pipeline will be relocated along QL-1. This relocation project will provide more security for these two pipelines.

2. Increased Air Force consumption with no increase of storage capacity at Tuy Hoa Air Base has taxed existing Class III supply conditions. This problem has been formally identified for first logistical Coordin with a request that new Air Force tankage be erected at Tuy Hoa.

**b. Directorate of Retrograde & Disposal**

1. Retrograde Division: During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, the total short tons of retrograde material processed by USASUPCOM-CRB units were as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIAL</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
<th>RECURVED</th>
<th>SHIPPED</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEGINNING</td>
<td>END</td>
<td>QUARTER</td>
<td>QUARTER</td>
<td>QUARTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Returns</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depot Issues</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
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<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(East Marine)</td>
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<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
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<tr>
<td>RETURNING ITEMS</td>
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<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1234</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Returns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (Short Tons)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Property Disposal Division: During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, the Property Disposal Fund within the command processed 2,907 short tons of Usable Property, and 17,334 short tons of scrap. Approximately 60% of both types of property were re-issued to various units within the command, while the remaining property was listed for sale. All scrap metals on hand at the Disposal Yard belonging to Stainless Processing Company, Chicago, Ill. Financial arrangements have been completed and Stainless Processing Company has begun removing scrap. To date, 2,421 short tons have been removed from the Disposal Yard. Sales of usable property have
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been accomplished with a net return of $38,281.00 back to the Government.

i. Director of Transportation

(1) Terminal Operations:

(a) The Sea-Land containership program continued to demonstrate its effectiveness in expediting cargo handling, local delivery, and vessel turn around. A total of 6 C-4 vessels called at Cam Ranh Bay during May, June and July.

(b) "Clean Sweep", a program to return excess and unidentifiable depot stocks to Okinawa, has become a matter of interest to the command. Since the inception of this project on 5 June 1968 11,542 short tons of cargo have been cleared. It is estimated that 10,000 short tons of "Clean Sweep" cargo can be shipped per month during the 1st quarter FY 1969 if vessels can be made available at a uniform rate throughout the period.

(c) The program 5/6 is being implemented as scheduled. USATC has recommended that the civilian spaces slated for Vung Ro be absorbed elsewhere within Transportation Command because of the security situation unique to Vung Ro Bay and the commuting distance from any adequate labor market.

(d) The vessel Newcastle Victory arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 22 July 1968. The cargo (ammunition) was block stowed by lot number. Preliminary indications are that block stowage greatly facilitates discharge and clearance. Further evaluation of horizontal vs. vertical stowage is required.

(e) Both Vinnell, Inc. and LamBroCo have increased their number of hatch gangs to 24.

(f) During July a hardstand staging area of 19,700 square feet, located between piers 1 and 2, was completed by the Engineers and turned over to US Army Transportation Command (Provisional). This will permit more even and orderly discharge and onload operations.

(g) Dredging operations by RMK Corporation on pier 5 (ammunition pier) were begun in June. After several delays and halts, dredging continues into August, 1968.

(h) Refrigerated cargo ships continue to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay with mixed stow of 6-way beef. The depot requires segregated storage of the beef to facilitate inventory and eventual issue. Because the ambient temperature precludes sorting of freeze cargo on vehicles, all segregation of 6-way beef must be accomplished in the holds of the ship prior to

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discharge. The resulting double and triple handling of 6-way beef slows the discharge operation considerably, and delays vessel turnaround. Block stowage of 6-way beef would facilitate discharge, thereby reduce ship turnaround time.

(1) Tonnage records set during the quarter are shown below.

(1) 22 May 68 - 12,124 S/T in deep and shallow draft, CRB.
(2) 22 May 68 - 11,735 S/T deep draft discharge, CRB.
(2) 22 May 68 - 15,303 S/T tonnage handled, CRB.
(4) July 68 - Monthly total handled, CRB, 208,803 S/T.
(5) June 68 - Monthly shallow draft discharge, CRB, 16,648 S/T.

(2) Highway Operations:

(a) The upgrading of QL-1 has continued throughout May - July 1968. The construction project includes widening of the road and bridge repair. Turnaround times for convoys to Phan Rang and Nha Trang should greatly improve during FY 69 upon completion of the upgrading program.

(b) On 18 May 1968 the 24th Trans Bn (Tvn) was sent to Vung Ro Bay. This battalion operates the outport through the 119th Trans Co (TS) and has two light truck companies assigned. The truck companies perform port and beach clearance and local haul between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay, and commit the remainder of their assets to line haul operations between Cam Ranh and Tuy Hoa.

j. Engineer

(1) Operations Division:

(a) During the reporting period, the activities of the Operations Division were directed toward supervision of the R&U Contractor, PA&E, Inc.; supervision of Engineer Detachments, to include Utilities, Fire Fighting, and Water Supply Detachments; control and allocation of equipment-in-place such as installation generators and air-conditioners; and staff supervision of contract as well as field laundry and bath operations. Liaison was maintained with engineer troop units engaged in construction operations within the Support Command.

(b) Upon the return of PA&E operations to the Ban Me Thuot area after the TET offensive, the 570th Engr Detachment (Util) was moved to
Nha Trang where urgently needed vertical construction was accomplished. Upon completion of the project at Nha Trang, the 570th is presently providing limited R&U assistance and minor construction capability to the Installation Engr, BMT Installation.

(c) With the passing of time, it became apparent that adequate numbers of trained replacement personnel to maintain effective operation of assigned Water & Fire Fighting Detachments within the Command were not arriving from CONUS. Personnel assigned to the Support Command with a general engineer MOS (51A) were held at the CRB Installation for a two week training period. During this period these personnel were trained by the FA&F Fire Chief in Fire Fighting techniques and Prevention principles and procedures. Approximately thirty (30) personnel were trained and assigned to the depleted ranks within the fire fighting detachments. Additionally, general engineer troops (51A) were assigned to water purification detachments and given On The Job Training with assistance from the Senior Water Supervisor, this Headquarters.

(d) Contract laundry operations have more than doubled within the reporting period as a result of arrival of additional equipment and expansion of real property facilities at the Modern Services Laundry, Nha Trang. Expansion of contract laundry service has released field laundry units for deployment with Forward Support Activities.

(e) Under direction of the US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, on 15 Jun 68, phasing out of the Operation Division was begun. Effective 1 Jul 68, phasing out was completed and all of the functions except staff supervision of laundry and bath operations became the responsibility of the Central District Engineer, US Army Construction Agency, Vietnam (USACEA/V).

(2) Plans Division:

(a) During the reporting period through review of all DD Forms 1391 was completed and revision was made in accordance with the authorized deficiency scope as prescribed by the USARV Ad Hoc Study Group on Base Development within the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

(b) The F59 ACA Program was finalized and submitted to USARV in June 68 of this reporting period.

(c) Due to the priority of work set on LOG type construction throughout Vietnam, Base Development has received low priority and has slowed considerably. It is expected that this trend will continue for at least another six (6) to nine (9) months.
15 August 1968


(d) Funding limitations set by USAEC on Minor Construction have made it imperative that commanders understand and participate in the functioning of the Installation Planning Board and the Work Order Review Board with their respective areas. Installation Planning Boards and Work Order Review Boards have been established at every major installation within the Support Command. The necessity for prior planning is being realized.

k. Staff Judge Advocate

(1) Operations: During the reporting period a total of 36 Special and 21 Summary Courts-Martial cases were advised, processed and reviewed by this office prior to being forwarded to higher headquarters. In addition, 759 Article 15 punishments were checked for legal sufficiency and 83 appeals adjudicated. A total of 107 legal written opinions were rendered covering the legal gamut of procurement, military affairs, admiralty law, international law, and military justice.

(2) Claims: A total of 29 claims under the Military Claims Act were received by the office of which 5 have been paid, 2 abandoned by claimants and 2 forwarded to higher claims channels. Dollar amount of claims as above itemized are as follows:

(a) Claims received: $7,683.71
(b) Claims paid: $806.03
(c) Claims abandoned: $217.04
(d) Claims forwarded: $1,320.00
(e) Claims in process: $5,340.64

(3) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to military and civilian personnel in the Cam Ranh Bay area continued to increase with a total of 1,727 cases handled by this office in the following categories:

(a) Adoption and change of Names: 14.
(b) Citizenship, Immigration: 70.
(c) Domestic Relations: 386.
(d) Non-Support: 34.
(e) Personal Finances: 255.

(f) Personal Property: 76.

(g) Real Property: 61.

(h) Taxation: 135.

(i) Torts: 13.

(j) Wills and Estates: 75.

(k) Miscellaneous: 273.

l. 10

Operations:

(a) The USASUPCOM-CRB Information Office during the months of May, June and July 1968, prepared, edited and sent out 110 CRB News Releases, 79 Photo News Releases, 96 USARV Daily News Summaries, 3094 Army Home Town News Releases, 229 Army Home Town News Photos, and 470 Home Town Radio Tape Interviews. The CRB IO also hosted 12 News Correspondents, and provided PIO coverage for 36 visiting VIPs, and 12 movie and television stars on USO tours of the command.

(b) In addition, several projects were undertaken during this period including a special CRB IO news team coverage of field operations at Bao Loc, Phan Thiet, Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa and Ban My Tho areas. A new program to provide better coverage of civil affairs activities was initiated. A special IO team obtained necessary material of the command and subordinate units to establish a 35mm color film library for briefing talks by the commander.

m. Staff Chaplain

(1) The Protestant Chaplains inaugurated a Bible Study Class following the Sunday Service.

(2) A chaplain orientation class has been inserted in the 7 Day Replacement Training Program.

(3) Plans have been initiated for Experimental Retreat Program at the 6th Convalescent Center. MACV Chaplain's Office, as well as USARV and 1st Log concurred in plans. Retreat to be two days a week for Catholic and two days a week for Protestant personnel convalescing at the Center. Preparatory requirement includes air conditioning of the 6th Convalescent Center Chapel. First Retreat to start 8 August 1968.
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(4) The Staff Chaplain directed a conference at Catholic Day of Recollection at Pleiku on 18 June 1968.

2. (U) Section II - Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel.

(1) Consolidation of Clerks:

(a) Observation: During the reported period the consolidation of all legal clerks of Support Command components continued in effect.

(b) Evaluation: This office views the consolidation as successful and the fact that not a single military justice case has been revoked by higher headquarters during the time the consolidation has been in effect, bears to the success. Equalization for the nature of courts, i.e., General, Special, Summary, in relation to accused and offenses and sentences in cases where accused was convicted, was possible by pre-trial and post-trial advice rendered to the Commanders by this Office. Equalization is also a fruit of the consolidation of all legal services in this area.

(c) Recommendation: None.

(2) Replacement of Water and Fire Fighting Detachment Personnel:

(a) Observation: Insufficient numbers of trained water and fire fighting detachment personnel are arriving in-country.

(b) Evaluation: Insufficient numbers of water and fire fighting personnel results in inefficient operation of equipment and limits the capability of these units to accomplish the assigned missions.

(c) Recommendation: That general engineer personnel (MOS 51A) be assigned to water and fire fighting detachments and use PA&E's water supervisors and fire chiefs to train these individuals to assume positions within the military detachments.

b. Operations

(1) Requests for Engineer Support.

(a) Observation: Frequent changes in unit locations and alteration of unit missions cause unforeseen requirements for billeting space, shower, and mess facilities, fortification materials, logistical support and other specialized real property facilities, i.e., repair parts storage, intramural Class III storage and intramural cold storage facilities.

(b) Evaluation: Many instances have occurred in which new units have moved into the Support Command area or an old unit has received an added specialized mission which must be initiated immediately. These units have come to the Installation Engineer with requirements as stated in para (a) above and have initiated Job Order Requests for the necessary construction with the added request that the work be done immediately.

(c) Recommendations: That units be made aware of the fact that urgent operational requirements caused by relocations or a change in mission should be requested through IFFV. Hq, IFFV, will then direct the Engr Bde to accomplish the work immediately on an "Operational Support" basis.

(2) Shipment of laundry and bath equipment for Forward Support Activities (FSA).

(a) Observation: Frequent requirements are placed on the Support Command to provide laundry and bath units to forward support areas.

(b) Evaluation: Earlier shipments of laundry and bath equipment by road convoy or sea transport have proven disastrous. Laundry and bath equipment by the nature of their operation have not been able to withstand the rugged treatment received in shipment by road or sea and oftentimes have been damaged beyond repair during these types of movement.

(c) Recommendation: All laundry and bath shipments by air.

d. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.
e. Logistics.

(1) Field Expedient Substitute for 3KW28V DC Motor Generator.

(a) Observation: Continued use of the 1.5 KW generator, in conjunction with a 5 ton truck battery, has proven an acceptable field expedient for operation of radioteletype set AN/GRC 46, in place of the 3KW28V DC generator, which is a command controlled item, and in short supply.

(b) Evaluation: Experience indicates that if a normal 9:1 (receive:transmit) ratio is used, and good operator maintenance is performed on generator and battery, the equipment will operate for an indefinite period of time.
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(a) Recommendation: That this field expedient be utilized by units employing this type of equipment, as the need arises.

(2) Block Stowage of Ammunition Ships.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period the first ammunition ship block stowed by lot number arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. The ship was the Newcastle Victory, which arrived on 22 July 1968.

(b) Evaluation: By block stowing ammunition by like lot numbers at origin, a great savings in time and effort in discharging and pier clearance is realized. When ammunition lots are mixed, they must be sorted in the hold and on the pier, prior to loading on clearance trucks. Small lots must be stacked and "sawed" awaiting a truck load, or trucks are dispatched with light loads. Increased discharge time is required due to the necessity of keeping lots separated. This in turn lengthens vessel days in port which results in additional direct cost to the Government.

(c) Recommendation: That all ammunition vessels bound for Vietnam be block stowed by ammunition lot numbers.

(3) Air Shipments.

(a) Observation: In the past this directorate experienced difficulty in scheduling POL Air shipments to CRB Support and supply points.

(b) Evaluation: Special mission Air requests for each Class III Supply Point were submitted 5 days in advance of Required Delivery Date (RDD). A wide variance in consumption often required action in less than 5 days. A forecasting system was devised for one month resupply of petroleum. Thus desired daily shipments for each location are scheduled on a timely basis. 36 hours in advance of RDD, POL is requested by quantity and type for each location. 8 hrs in advance of RDD, confirmation of flights are received by night duty personnel who may at that time alter the type of product but not destination or amount. This system has alleviated a daily administrative process, increased supply responsiveness, and reduced POL combat essential missions from 18 in 3d Qtr to 0 in 4th Qtr FY68.

(a) Recommendation: None.

(4) Use of Tactical Teletypewriter in Fixed Station Facilities.

(a) Observation: Tactical teletypewriters are incurring excessive wear by being used in fixed stations communication facilities at 100 words

per minute for long time durations. This is causing excessive maintenance and a short life prior to meeting rebuild criteria.

(b) Evaluation: Tactical teletypewriters are designed to operate at multiple speeds up to and including 100 words per minute. They were not designed to operate full time at their maximum capability.

(c) Recommendation: Units operating fixed station communication facilities should make a maximum effort to obtain a change in authorized equipment under the provisions of DA Circular 310-44, dated November 1967. This would give units authorization to replace tactical teletypewriters with fixed station models designed to operate at high capacities for long durations.

(5) Maintenance Float Electric Forklifts.

(a) Observation: During the first week of July, five (5) electric forklifts were received for use as maintenance float. As a result of the judicious and timely use of the maintenance float the Command's deadline rate for electric forklifts has decreased by approximately 10%.

(b) Evaluation: The maintenance float has served well its intended purpose, to replace unserviceable repairable equipment when timely repair of the unserviceable equipment could not be accomplished by the direct support maintenance activity. In addition to improving the operation readiness of electric forklifts within the unit, the direct support maintenance activity acquired more time to perform repairs and implement an overhaul program for electric lifts. The overall result has been an improvement in the maintenance posture of the entire fleet of electric forklifts.

(c) Recommendation: That more equipment be made available for use as float in support of combat and mission essential items.

(6) Battery Storage.

(a) Observation: Many dry cell batteries are lost each year due to improper storage facilities.

(b) Evaluation: Dry cell batteries require a cool storage facility. The lack of sufficient cool storage space within this command necessitates storage of batteries in uncooled warehouses. Estimated dry cell battery storage space needed is 70,400 cubic feet (for storage and work area). This command currently has approximately 8,318 cubic feet of cool storage space available in the Cam Ranh Bay area.
(c) Recommendation: That available space in Class I cold storage facilities be used advantageously for storage of dry cell batteries. This action is currently being implemented in this command. In addition, recommend all available 1600 cubic foot refrigerator vans be utilized to cope with this problem. This too is being implemented in this command.

(7) Multi-Fuel Engine.

(a) Observation: Multi-fuel engines in this command are being consumed by direct support maintenance units for replacement purposes at a rate of 100 each per month.

(b) Evaluation: Non-availability of multi-fuel engines seriously hampers the movement capability of supplies within this command. DSU's have been given the authority to double the requisitioning objective (R/O) for this critical item. This will allow for more on-hand stocks and less deadline vehicles within this command. The replacement rate is astronomical.

(c) Recommendation: That the reliability of the multi-fuel engine be tested by competent authorities for durability. Though these tests have been conducted elsewhere it is believed that tests of these engines here in Vietnam, where repetitive and rigorous line-haul missions are encountered, would be beneficial.

(d) Improper shipment of rockets, HE, 2.75".

(a) Observation: Shipments of subject ammunition arrive at this command with the items oriented on the shipping pallets with the nose end pointing in different directions or the "nose end" not shown on the boxes.

(b) Evaluation: Shipments are from the US Naval Ammunition Depot, McAlester, Oklahoma. As specified in TM 9-1300-206 and AMCR 385-224, rocket ammunition must be stored with the nose end pointing in one direction. Proper storage is achieved only after many manhours are expended in breaking pallets, correctly orienting the rockets, and repalletizing. Reports of this situation have been forwarded through ammunition channels. This command has been informed that naval munition regulations do not require rocket ammunition to be oriented as stated.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend the US Naval Ammunition Depot be advised of storage and handling difficulties experienced with these shipments. Also, recommend all rocket shipping facilities be evaluated for adequate pre-shipment action to insure that such improper shipments do not arrive in this theater. Recommend the Department of Defense be

requested to standardize the packing and shipping procedure for all ammunition items common to all services.

(9) Ammunition storage facilities at Forward Support Areas.

(a) Observation: At the end of the reporting period this command established a Forward Support Area at Ben Me Thout in support of a brigade-size force. Proper storage of ammunition during the initial buildup was hampered due to the lack of adequate storage facilities.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of sufficient engineer equipment, extended periods of unfavorable weather conditions, and delay in selecting the final location for the storage facility caused the construction to be delayed for several days. During this period ammunition had to be stored with a total disregard for quantity-distance requirements, compatibility, and personnel and equipment safety. In addition, physical security was minimal due to storage at widely separated locations.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that suitable storage areas be selected at all possible major task force base camp locations and module configuration storage facilities be constructed. The facility should be of sufficient size to store 2000 S/T. Also, airheads are constructed, an ammunition storage facility should be constructed concurrently. The availability of storage facilities would permit the immediate assumption of the support mission with a minimum of accountability, security, handling, and storage problems. An engineer effort of this type may also create a tactical advantage in that it may act as a turning movement of the enemy or cause costly delay in the implementations of his planned operations.

f. Organization.

(1) Unit Identity.

(a) Observation: Prior to February 1968, the Office of the Inspector General had been publishing consolidated reports of Annual General Inspections for each organization inspected, with the results of the inspection of each subordinate unit published as an Annex to the consolidated report.

(b) Evaluation: It was noted that many company-size units were frequently being reassigned from one organization to another for operational purposes. Since all the company-size units were numbered units, they immediately lost their identity with the former parent organization. A portion of these units were reassigned to another command. To insure that Annual General Inspection reports of all numbered company-size units
do not lose their identity and that accurate records are maintained.
A separate report is now being prepared for each numbered company
size unit. This allows the Inspector General to forward to the gaining
command dates and significant information pertaining to the last Annual
General Inspection of the unit reassigned.

(c) Recommendations: None.

(2) Integration of the Offices of the AC of S, Personnel and the
Adjutant General.

(a) Observation: Due to the similarity and overlapping of many of
the functions performed by the AC of S, Personnel and the Adjutant
General, it was believed feasible to combine the two offices into one
office entitled AC of S, Personnel and Administration.

(b) Evaluation: The integration of the two offices permitted a
personnel reduction of three spaces in the AC of S, Personnel and Admin-
istration portion of the new headquarters TDA. Additionally, the new
office organization gives commanders and staff officers one central
location for advice and guidance on personnel matters.

(c) Recommendation: None.

- Other: Radio Thefts.

1. Observations: There have been many thefts of vehicular mounted radios, in particular the AN/VRC-46 series, throughout this command during the past year. This places undue requirements on the supply system to provide replenishment items.

2. Evaluation: Thefts of radios are, in most cases, due to a lack of means of securing items.

3. Recommendations: That a locking device be devised by using a rod \( \frac{1}{2} \)" (diameter) x 2" (length) bent into a "U" shape and welded to the bottom of the bracket. A hole in the thumb screw used on the AN/VRC Radio Mount must be enlarged to 5/16" to accommodate a padlock. This information with pictures has been distributed to subordinate units of this command for implementation.

ALBERT NEWTON
Colonel, TC
Commanding

TEL: CRB 2820
AVCA GO-0 (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind


DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST, APO 96375

1. U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, United States Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph e(5)(b). Concur. In some instances proper utilization of available resources will alleviate the problem. CONUS training base is not sufficient to support the increasing need of petroleum and ammunition personnel within Vietnam. Therefore, concentrated OJT programs for other soft skill MOS assigned to petroleum and ammunition units should be used for that purpose.

   b. Reference Section I, paragraph C(1). Concur. This action is compatible with present objectives of the command to improve ADP and technical supply operations at the DSU/GSU level. This headquarters is preparing a plan for the expansion of Instruct and Inspect Teams for DSU/GSU. No action required by higher headquarters.

   c. Reference Section I, paragraph d(2)(b). Storage capability by MACV standards are 11 sq ft storage space per ton (NET). Gross space is computed at 14 sq ft per ton. This greater allowance generally provides for sufficient operating aprons on storage pads and results in enough space for segregation pads etc.

   d. Reference Section I, paragraph e(1). Concur with action taken by the 69th Maintenance Battalion to consolidate the technical supply activities of the battalion. However, approval for the move of the NCR equipment from the company to the battalion tech supply activity must come from G-4 (Logistical Systems), HQ, USARV.

   e. Reference Section I, paragraph e(2). Concur with the establishment of a Technical Supply Inspecting Team by the Directorate of General Supply. Recommend that the CRB SUPCOM team coordinate with the 1st Logistical Command LTSI (Logistical Technical Supervisory Inspection) Team chief at an early date to ensure that the USASUPCOM LTSI Team follows the standards established by the LTSI Team.

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1. Reference Section I, paragraph e(2). Concur. HQ, 1st Log recommended that the RO be doubled for critical repair parts as well as several procedures required to improve DSU/GSU operations. The original message to the SUCOMs stated that special management techniques would be used for items whose ROs have been doubled to ensure that they are adjusted when demands level out.

2. Reference Section I, paragraph G. Concur. The problem outlined in paragraph G(2) was identified to Headquarters USARV on 26 July 1969. Headquarters 7th Air Force has acknowledged this shortfall in storage capacity and have taken action to expedite the necessary coordination during FY 69.

3. Reference Section II, paragraph a(2). Concur. When there is a shortage of trained replacement personnel for water and fire fighting detachments the recommendation of this para is the optimum method of training. Since the responsibility for water and fire fighting detachments and FA&S was transferred from this headquarters to USACE on 1 July 1968, no action is required of this headquarters. It is recommended that USARV and USACE screen the records of all replacement personnel to insure that those with special skills, such as water point operators and fire fighters, are properly assigned.

4. Reference Section II, paragraph b(2). Laundry and bath equipment was designed to withstand the riggers of movement in the field. If equipment is not withstanding shipment via road convoy or sealift it would appear that an EIR is in order. It may be that equipment is not being properly prepared for movement IAW current TMs. The problem should be examined from that aspect prior to the submission of an EIR.

5. Reference Section II, paragraph e(1). Nonconcur. 1.5KW generators are not substitutes for the 3KW 28V generators. Although the M/CRG 46 radio teletype set may be proficiently operated utilizing 1.5KW generators, this does not make such use correct. Both generators are command controlled items and issuance of the 1.5KW in lieu of the 3KW 28V for the purpose cited will not be done. Additionally, there is presently no shortage of 3KW, 28V generators.

6. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Concur. The block storage of ammunition laden vessels is the result of coordination between this headquarters and the US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency, Joliet, Illinois. The Newcastle Victory is one of two ships sent to RVN on an experimental basis to test the block storage concept.
AVCA GO-0 (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
fr. Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

1. Reference Section II paragraph e(5). Nonconcur with recommendation as written. Appendix I, USARV Reg 750-17, Maintenance Float, 25 July 1968 prescribes the authorized percentage for maintenance float stockage levels. The aforementioned USARV Regulation and LC Reg 750-17, Maintenance Float, 8 August 1968 prescribe procedures for requesting an increase in maintenance float. Increases must be determined on a case-by-case basis. No action required by higher headquarters.

m. Reference Section II, paragraph e(6). Concur. However, it is recommended that batteries be stored in 1600 cubic feet refrigerated boxes, on a space available basis, and not in 1600 cubic feet refrigerated vans as recommended.

n. Reference Section II, paragraph e(7). Nonconcur. The multi-fuel engine has already been the subject of surveys by AAA, AMC and others. The superiority of the diesel over the multi-fuel is already an established fact. No action required by higher headquarters.

o. Reference Section II, paragraph e(8). Concur. This headquarters has advised US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (APSA), Joliet, Illinois of improper rocket orientation on pallets shipped to RVN. APSA has advised this headquarters that shipping agencies have been notified of correct procedure for shipping rockets to RVN.

p. Reference Section II, paragraph e(9). Concur. This recommendation is presently the approved method of establishing ammunition storage points at forward support areas. LC Reg 525-1 provides specifications for ASP construction.

q. Reference Section II, paragraph g. Concur. The employment of locally fabricated locking devices to secure vehicular mounted radios is desirable in the Republic of Vietnam. The use of such a device should reduce loss of this item through theft. In addition, it has been noted in recent engagements that VC/NVA forces have attempted to destroy the vehicular mounted radios of ambushed vehicles with small arms fire. This apparently was done in an attempt to prevent friendly forces from summoning reaction forces to their aid. In view of these circumstances consideration should therefore be given to devising armor plate protection for vehicular mounted radios to minimize damage from small arms fire.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: 2684
I. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

2. (c) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning consolidation of BSUs, page 13, paragraph 2i(1), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d: Concur. The action taken by the unit is appropriate.

b. Reference item concerning replacement of water and fire fighting personnel, page 23, paragraph 2a(2), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2h: Nonconcur. Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) water supervisors and fire chiefs are not trained or staffed to provide training to general engineer personnel. This headquarters monitors the assignment of personnel with HOS 51A.

c. Reference item concerning use of tactical teletypewriters in fixed station facilities, page 25, paragraph 2e(4): Nonconcur. An Army area fixed station communication center is under construction at Cam Ranh Bay and should be operational during December, 1968. At that time, tactical teletypewriter equipment will be replaced by fixed station AN/FGC-25X equipment and AUTODIK terminals.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cq furn:
HQ 1st Log Cmd
HQ USA Spt Cmd, CRB

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

**Abstract**

The objective of the unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1968 was to...

**Distribution Statement**

N/A

**Supplementary Notes**

N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1
* SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________________________
** FOR OT RD # ____________________________________________
*** PAGE # _________________________________________________

ITEM 2
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________________________
PAGE # _________________________________________________

ITEM 3
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________________________
PAGE # _________________________________________________

ITEM 4
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________________________
PAGE # _________________________________________________

ITEM 5
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________________________
PAGE # _________________________________________________

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.
** For OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.
*** Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.