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AGO ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980  AGO ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO AGAM-P (M) (20 Dec 68) AGAM-P (M) (20 Dec 68) FOR OT-UT-683090 31 December 1968

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED, HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT (W), PERIOD ENDING 31 JUL 68

SEE DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONAL REPORTS BUREAU.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 30 days of receipt of covering letter.

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DEFENSE OF THE ARMY
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AVIC-WE

10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for period Ending 31 July 68 NCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Significant Activities

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May through 31 July 1968. During this period, the Blackhorse Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TACR), Tactical Area of Interest (TACI), and in the provinces of LONG KHANH, BIEN HOA, BINH DUONG, HAU NGHIA, GIA DINH, and LONG AN. The Regiment conducted operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) while under the control of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), and Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division. Operations were characterized by a parcelling out of squadrons and troops at various times to the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, to the 101st Air Cavalry Division, to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, to the 1st Australian Task Force, and to the 5th, 25th, and 18th ARVN Divisions. In addition, troop size units were OPCON to II FFV and Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). During the reporting period, the Regimental Headquarters was located at BIEN HOA (TT2746), FSB Ranger II (TT91319), again at BIEN HOA, and at LAI KHE (TT759375).

On 16 June, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was released from attachment to the 9th Infantry Division and became attached to HQ II FFV (USARV MO 2866). HQ USARV, however, retains authority over transfers, promotions, personnel requisitions, and administration and logistics. The Regiment conducted one Regimenal size operation during the reporting period, Operation TOAN THANG. Phase I was initiated on 7 April 1968, and was concluded on 31 May. Phase II continues as of 31 July. Operation TOAN THANG is a reconnaissance in force (RIF) operation to prevent enemy infiltration into the Capital Military District and to destroy enemy base camps, supply bases, and fortifications. It includes a security mission for the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA complex. The Regiment was engaged in TOAN THANG throughout the reporting period. Emphasis continued to be placed on support of...
the Revolutionary Development Program and on strengthening RF/PF outposts in the Regional Taoi.

On 15 July 1966, Colonel George S. Patton assumed command of the Regiment from Colonel Charles R. Gorder. LTG Frank T. Mildren, Dep CG, USARP, and LTG Fred C. Weyand, CG, II FFV, attended the Change of Command Ceremony. Colonel Gorder was awarded the Silver Star for Valor, the Legion of Merit, and the Air Medal for his services as the Commanding Officer of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period. (SEE INCL 1).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. General: During the reporting period, the Regiment was employed over a large part of the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Operations were conducted in the following Viet Cong areas:

   (1) Viet Cong Sub-Region 1
   (2) Viet Cong Sub-Region 2
   (3) Viet Cong Sub-Region 3
   (4) Viet Cong Sub-Region 4
   (5) Viet Cong BA BIEN Province
   (6) Viet Cong BA-1 Province
   (7) Viet Cong Military Region 10

b. Order of Battle: (SEE Sketch - Order of Battle, INCL 8)

   (1) On 5 May 1966, the enemy initiated a "Second General Offensive" to enhance his position at the Paris Peace Talks, which were scheduled to start in mid May. His target within the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's area of operation (AOR) was the Capital Military District. The squadrons were fanned out over VC Sub-Regions 1, 2, and 5, VC BA-1 Province, and VC BA BIEN Province with the mission of countering the heaviest attacks since the "TET Offensive". Initial contact was made on 5 May, when the 2nd Squadron countered the multi-battalion attack by the D440 and D445 VC Local Force Battalions on CAM KY Village in VC BA BIEN Province. Elements
of the 3rd Squadron under the operational control of the 25th US Infantry Division operated on the outskirts of Gia Dinh Province in VC Sub-Regions 1, 2, and 5. The Squadron was involved in six contacts which seriously disrupted enemy activities along the western approaches to the Capital Military District. Although enemy unit identifications were not obtained from all contacts, the 101st NVA Regiment, 141st NVA Regiment, 267th VC Main Force Battalion, and elements of the 9th VC Division were positively identified.

(2) By mid-May, the enemy began an exfiltration of forces from the SAIGON Area to base areas where he could continue to place pressure on the Capital Military District, conduct resupply operations, and reestablish command and control, which had suffered heavily. During this period, elements of the 1st Squadron in direct support of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division were engaged in six major contacts. Elements of the 9th VC Division and the 3rd Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment, were identified in four of the contacts.

(3) During late May and early June, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons operated with the 25th ARVN Infantry Division and the 25th US Infantry Division west of SAIGON between DUC HOA and CO CHI astride major routes of communication linking the Capital Military District and Cambodia. During this period, the enemy attempted to place pressure on the SAIGON Area with numerous attacks employing artillery fire and the piecemeal commitment of regimental size forces. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons had five major engagements during this period with elements of the enemy's 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, and of the 9th VC Division.

(4) By June, enemy units located in base areas around the Capital Military District were unable to launch successful coordinated attacks. Friendly operations had interrupted movement, interfered with supply activities, and had rendered combat forces ineffective to the point that they were no longer capable of conducting multi-regimental coordinated attacks. The "Second General Offensive" came to a close on 14 June 1968. During the offensive, the enemy suffered a total of 24,250 casualties (body count).

(5) From the end of the "Second General Offensive" to the close of the reporting period, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons operated in VC Sub-Region 1 and 5 and Military Region 10 under the operational control of the 1st US Infantry Division. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons concentrated on enemy infiltration and logistical activity east and west of Namat Cat, while the 3rd Squadron operated from Blackhorse Base Camp. The period was characterized by sporadic contacts; and, except on two occasions, the enemy did
not contest the seizure of his vital supply caches.

(6) At the close of the reporting period, units of the enemy's main force withdrew from their base camps near the Capital Military District to establish new base areas in TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and PHUOC LONG Provinces to resupply and reequip. High level VC cadre meetings occurred throughout the corps area to reassess the current situation and plan future operations.

(7) Although most contacts occurred with unidentified enemy forces, these enemy units were identified:

(a) 101st NVA Regiment
(b) 88th NVA Regiment
(c) 32nd NVA Regiment
(d) 267th VC Main Force Battalion
(e) D440 VC Local Force Battalion
(f) D445 VC Local Force Battalion
(g) 141st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division
(h) 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division
(i) 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
(j) 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
(k) 273rd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
(l) DONG NAI Regiment

(c) Major Engagements: There were twenty major engagements involving elements of the Regiment. (SEE OPCON Status of Regimental Units, INCL 3).

(1) 050400H May 68, 1S665925: CAM MY Village was attacked by elements of the D440 and the D445 Local Force Battalions with small arms, automatic weapons, recoiless rifle, and mortar fire. The enemy penetrated the perimeter and was occupying bunkers in the village when F/2/11 ACR and H/2/11 ACR reinforced the RP/FP outpost. Tactical, artillery, and light fire teams supported. K/2/11 ACR reinforced at 050845H. Contact
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

was broken at 051210H. Results: 4 US KIA; 11 US WIA; 1 ARVN interpreter KIA; 3 RP/PP KIA; 8 RP/PP WIA; 75 VC KIA (BC); and 5 VC PW's. The following items were captured: 1 crew-served and 6 individual weapons; 164 rounds of crew-served and 1415 rounds of small arms ammunition; and 120 grenades.

(2) 051300H May 68, XTR55237: L/3/11 ACR engaged an unknown size force from the 9th VC Division. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from a well fortified bunker complex. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact broke at 051900H. Results: 2 US WIA; 70 VC/WNA KIA (BC); 4 VC PW's; and 12 individual weapons were captured.

(3) 060830H May 68, XTR50559: 1/3/11 ACR and elements of the 4/23 US Inf engaged an unknown size force from the 101st NVA Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPC fire. Contact broke at 061600H. Results: 5 US KIA; 4 US WIA; and 51 VC/WNA KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 14 individual and 3 crew-served weapons and 50 grenades.

(4) 061000H May 68, XTR630125: H/3/11 ACR and elements of the 2/22 US Inf received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPC fire from an unidentified, unknown size force in CU CHI Village. Fire was returned with automatic weapons. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact broke at 070100H. Results: Negative friendly casualties and 14 VC/WNA KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 2 individual weapons and 13 grenades.

(5) 071300H May 68, XTR62110: H/3/11 ACR and elements of the 3/22 US Inf received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPC fire from the 267th VC Main Force Battalion. The enemy returned small arms and automatic weapons fire. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken sometime during the hours of darkness. Results: 3 US WIA and 6 VC/WNA KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 1 individual and 2 crew-served weapons; 50 grenades; and 41 rounds of crew-served and 1150 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(6) 090215H May 68, XTR18024: Elements of the 4/23 US Infantry received an unkown number of rounds of mortar fire followed up by a ground attack by an unidentified, unknown size force. 1/3/11 ACR reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, flareships, and light fire teams supported. Contact broke at 090545H. Results: 9 US KIA; 63 US WIA; and 14 VC/WNA KIA (BC)

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(7) 111400H May 68, XT897273: L/3/11 ACR and elements of the
2/26 US Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from
an unknown size force from the 141st NVA Regiment. Fire was returned with
organic weapons, tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams. Contact
broke at 112300H. Results: 1 US KIA; 10 US WIA; 36 NVA KIA (BC); and 1
NVA PW. The following items were captured: 1 crew-served and 10 individual
weapons and 5 RPG-2 rounds.

(8) 130918H May 68, XT897273: L/3/11 ACR and elements of the
1/7 ARVN Infantry engaged an unknown force from the 3rd Battalion, 88th
NVA Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG
fire. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact
was broken at 131335H. Results: 1 ARVN KIA; 5 US WIA; 67 NVA KIA (BC);
and 3 NVA PW's. The following items were captured: 25 individual and 4
crew-served weapons; 750 rounds of small arms ammunition; 12 bangalore
torpedoes; and 6 grenades.

(9) 131030H May 68, XT525105: C/1/11 ACR and elements of the
3/49 ARVN Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire
from elements of the 245th Infiltration Group, which is associated with
the 271st VC Regiment. Fire was returned with organic weapons. B/1/11 ACR
and D/1/11 ACR reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams
supported. Contact was broken at 131915H. Results: 5 OS VIA and 61 VC/NVA
KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 16 individual and 4
crew-served weapons and 470 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(10) 140940H May 68, XT741127: A/1/11 ACR and elements of the
4/7 ARVN Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire
from an unidentified reinforced enemy company. Fire was returned with organic
weapons, tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams. Contact was broken
at 141700H. Results: 1 US KIA; 10 US WIA; and 10 VC/NVA KIA (BC).
The following items were captured: 1 crew-served and 2 individual weapons;
13 rounds of crew-served and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition; and 5
grenades.

(11) 152240H May 68, XT603048: C/1/11 ACR engaged an unidentified
enemy battalion. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and
RPG fire. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact
broke at 152335H. Results: VC/NVA losses unknown and negative
friendly casualties.

(12) 161235H May 68, XT595065: D/1/11 ACR engaged a company size
force from the 3rd Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment. The enemy returned small
arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. B/1/11 ACR and C/1/11 ACR rein-
forced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact
broke at 161840H. Results: 22 US WIA; 22 VC/NVA KIA (BC); and 1 NVA PW.
The following items were captured: 1 crew-served and 8 individual weapons; 1,700 lbs of rice; and 10 rounds of crew-served and 360 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(13) 181540H May 68, XT532200: C/1/11 ACR and elements of the 3/49 ARVN Infantry engaged a company size enemy force with an anti-aircraft capability from the 227th VC Regiment and/or 272nd VC Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft, and RPG fire. D/1/11 ACR reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 182445H. Results: 1 US KIA; 28 US WIA; and 47 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 2 crew-served and 17 individual weapons; 26 grenades; and 6 rounds of crew-served ammunition.

(14) 251905H May 68, XT550025: B/1/11 ACR engaged an unidentified enemy battalion with an anti-aircraft capability from the 9th VC Division. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft, and RPG fire. D/1/11 ACR reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 260045H. Results: 6 US WIA; 9 VC/NVA KIA (BC); and 9 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The following items were captured: 3 individual weapons; 26 rounds of crew-served ammunition; and 3 grenades.

(15) 280322H May 68, KS693693: C/1/11 ACR and elements of the 51st ARVN Rangers engaged the 2nd Battalion, 271st VC Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. Elements of the enemy, possibly the headquarters of the 271st VC Regiment, withdrew south-easterly, leaving a company size force as a rearguard. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact broke at 281655H. Results: 2 US WIA; 55 VC/NVA KIA (BC); and 2 NVA PW. The following items were captured: 7 crew-served and 18 individual weapons and 50 rounds of crew-served ammunition.

(16) 301155H May 68, XT422128: B/1/11 ACR and elements of the 1/49 ARVN Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from a battalion size force of the 242nd Infiltration Group, which is associated with the 9th VC Division. Fire was returned with organic weapons. D/1/11 ACR and the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Sporadic contact continued through out the night and was finally broken at 310830H. Results: 5 US KIA; 3 ARVN KIA; 80 US WIA; 12 ARVN WIA; 27 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 1 NVA PW; and 1 ROI CHAM. The following items were captured: 7 crew-served and 49 individual weapons and 46 rounds of crew-served ammunition.

(17) 050120H Jun 68, XT485198: 3/11 ACR NDP received 60 rounds of mortar fire, followed by a ground attack from an unidentified enemy.
battalion. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. The enemy broke contact at 050205H. Results: 9 US KIA; 7 VC/NVA KIA (BC); and 1 VC PW. The following items were captured: 2 crew-served and 2 individual weapons; 3 claymore mines; and 7 rounds of crew-served ammunition.

(18) 061430H Jun 68, XT9144Q4: A/1/11 ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from a company size force, belonging to the 2nd Battalion, 165th NVA Regiment. B/1/11 ACR reinforced. Tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 091825H. Results: 2 US KIA; 11 US WIA; 16 VC/NVA KIA (BC); and 1 HOI CHANCE. The following items were captured: 2 individual weapons and 2 rounds of crew-served ammunition.

(19) 091545H Jul 68, TU393377: E/2/11 ACR, while searching a base camp, received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified company size force. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Tactical air, artillery, and a light fire team supported. Contact broke at 091830H. Results: 5 US KIA; 7 US WIA; and unknown VC/NVA losses.

(20) 180330H Jul 68, UX772105: A/1/11 ACR and C/1/11 ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 32nd NVA Division. Fire was returned with organic weapons, tactical air, artillery, and light fire teams. Contact was broken at 181500H. Results: 3 US KIA; 36 US WIA; 51 NVA KIA (BC); and 3 NVA PW's. The following items were captured: 13 crew-served and 27 individual weapons; 40 grenades; 46 rounds of crew-served ammunition; and 438 rounds of small arms ammunition.

d. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: The 11th Armored Cavalry operated extensively throughout six of the eleven provinces in III CTZ. This vast deployment required a large amount of intelligence from higher headquarters and from neighboring units. Consolidated intelligence data from II FFV and the Combat Intelligence Battalion of the 1st US Infantry Division provided a sound intelligence base for operations in BIRN DUYONG and BIRN LONG Provinces.

(2) Agent Reports: These reports were generally considered to be one of the most lucrative sources of intelligence information throughout the reporting period. Their reliability, however, was generally questionable when they failed to corroborate intelligence received from other sources.

(3) Casual Reports: Prior to and during the "Second General Offensive", there was a marked increase in reports from casual civilian informants in the central and southern sectors of the corps zone. These reports
tended to be highly exaggerated and were probably generated by the threat to civilian life and property. These reports declined with the conclusion of the offensive. Like agent reports, these reports had to be corroborated by other intelligence outlets.

(4) Ground and Airborne Sensors: Imagery obtained by ground surveillance radar, airborne infra-red cameras, side-looking airborne radar, and E-63 airborne personnel detectors (People Sniffer) were integrated into the intelligence collection plan to develop basic enemy patterns. While the Regiment operated on the outskirts of the Capital Military District, these airborne sensors were hampered by the dense civilian population in the area. In BINH DUONG and BINH LONG Provinces both the airborne and ground sensors were utilized to monitor infiltration routes and to confirm or deny existing intelligence data. Their contribution to the intelligence picture increased substantially in the latter half of the reporting period.

(5) Visual Reconnaissance—Photography: These sources were primarily responsible for locating enemy offensive and defensive installations, supply installations, lines of communication, and assistance in bomb damage assessment. Light observation helicopters were used primarily to locate enemy units and to monitor routes of enemy withdrawal when elements of the Regiment are in contact. Photography was used extensively for planning purposes. The Regimental handheld camera program (541st MI Det) also aided the reconnaissance and planning effort.

(6) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol: The 11th ACR LRRP mission primarily operated in the vicinity of Blackhorse Base Camp to augment its defense plan and monitor enemy movement through the TACR. In the latter quarter of the reporting period, it operated in BINH DUONG Province where it monitored infiltration routes and routes of enemy withdrawal from areas of contact. Their missions provided some intelligence information.

e. Enemy Losses:

(1) The following enemy losses were credited to Regimental units while operating under Regimental control:

(a) 225 VC/NVA KIA (BC);
(b) 132 VC/NVA KIA (POSS);
(c) 11 VC/NVA PW's;
(d) 2 HOI CHANH;
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 68

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(e) 57 Detainees;
(f) 91 Individual weapons captured;
(g) 12 Crew-served weapons captured;
(h) 192 Mortar rounds, 40 recoiless rifle rounds, 186 AT rounds, 21,936 small arms rounds, 17 Bangalore torpedoes, 1578 grenades, and 148 mines captured/destroyed;
(i) 68 Structures, 5 sampans, and 645 fortifications destroyed;
(j) 17 Tons of grain captured/destroyed;
(k) And 47.5 lbs documents captured.

(2) The following enemy losses were credited to Regimental units while under the operational control of other US units or in direct support of ARVN units:

(a) 625 VC/NVA KIA (BC);
(b) 5 VC/NVA KIA (POSS);
(c) 28 VC/NVA W's;
(d) 2 HOI CHANH;
(e) 31 Detainees;
(f) 214 Individual weapons;
(g) 46 Crew-served weapons;
(h) 5 122mm Rockets, 59 197mm rockets, 280 mortar rounds, 13 recoiless rifle rounds, 1,344 AT rounds, 71,478 small arms rounds, 7 Bangalore torpedoes, 225 grenades, and 221 mines captured/destroyed;
(i) 21 Structures, 4 sampans, and 769 fortifications destroyed;
(j) 48 Tons grain captured/destroyed;
(k) And 29 lbs of documents captured.
4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment inflicted heavy losses on the enemy during Operation TOAN THANG, conducted throughout the reporting period. The enemy suffered significant losses of personnel, weapons, food, and ammunition supplies as a result of the application of continuous pressure. The Blackhorse Regiment again demonstrated the flexibility of its organization by providing combat elements to the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, 101st Air Cavalry Division, and to the 5th, 10th, and 25th ARVN Divisions. In addition, troop size units were provided as RRF's to II FFV and to the 1st ATF.

(2) The enemy, recovering from losses suffered during the previous quarter, avoided large unit contact with the Regiment. On only two occasions did Regimental units engage a battalion size or larger VC force. Contact was characterized by small unit engagements to include frequent encounters with RPG teams and numerous mining incidents. In addition, the enemy rarely defended his base camps with more than token forces, which contrasted with the heavily defended base camps of the previous reporting period. A large number of base camps was uncovered and destroyed, causing heavy loss to the enemy's stock of supplies.

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted within the III CTZ and covered six provinces (LONG KHANH, BIEN HOA, Binh Duong, Nau Nghia, Gia Din, and Long An). (See Operational Map Sketch, Incl 8).

c. Operations: As the reporting period began, the Blackhorse Regiment continued Campaign TOAN THANG Phase I. The 1st Squadron continued to secure the key installations and provide RRF in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Complex. Troop A secured the Dong Nai River bridge and provided one platoon under the OPCON of Hq Commandant, II FFV. Troop B secured Widow's Village and blocked infiltration routes to Hq, II FFV. Team D was RRF for II FFV. The 2nd Squadron secured Blackhorse Base camp, Gia Nai Rock Quarry, and 62nd Engineer work parties on Highway 1 and provided a Troop (-) as RRF at Xuan Loc. The 3rd Squadron (-) continued OPCON status to 9th Inf Div. Troop I was in direct support of the 25th ARVN Div and Troop L was OPCON to the 1st Inf Div and became OPCON to the 25th Inf Div. The Squadron conducted a tactical road march from IS788772 to IX743168 to perform RIF operations in the Cu Chi/Phu Cuong Area. On 10 May, the 1st Squadron placed Troops A and D OPCON to the 3rd Bde, 101st Air Cav Div. Troop C became OPCON to the 3rd Squadron and moved to FSB Boston and relieved Troop I. Troop I conducted a road march to Long Binh and became OPCON to the 1st Squadron.
On 11 May, the 1st Squadron (--) was released from its security mission in the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area and Troops A and D were released from OPCON, 3rd Bde, 101st Air Cav Div. The Squadron (--) conducted a tactical road march to HAU NGHIA Province via DUC HOA (XS596960) and became in direct support of the 5th ARVN Div. Troop A was placed in direct support of the 5th ARVN Div. On 11 May, the 3rd Squadron was released from the 25th ARVN Div and Troop I was released from 1st Inf Div. The Squadron then conducted a tactical move to the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA complex and assumed the mission of the 1st Squadron. On 23 May, Troops I and K were released from OPCON to the 199th Lt Inf Bde and on 25 May, Troop L was given the NEWPORT Bridge Mission and placed in DS of the III CTZ Marine Task Force. On 25 May, Troop I was given the NEWPORT Bridge Mission and placed in DS of the III CTZ Marine Task Force. On 27 May, Troop G assumed the mission of securing HQ, II FFV, DONG NAI River bridge, and RRF for the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area. On 271200H May, the 3rd Squadron (--) became OPCON to the 25th Inf Div. The Squadron (--) moved from vic LONG BINH/BIEN HOA to DUC HOA (XS5997), and conducted RIF operations. Troop I assumed the NEWPORT Bridge security mission in DS of III CTZ Marine Task Force.

Significant contact was made with large VC forces on 30-31 May as a result of RIF operations conducted by B/1/11 and D/1/11 ACR in conjunction with 1/49 ARVN Bn. On 30 May, Troop A was released from the 25th ARVN Div and returned to the control of the 1st Squadron. On 3 June, the 1st Squadron was released from the 25th ARVN's control and became OPCON to the 1st Inf Div. On 6 June, Troop I was placed OPCON to TF MAY. On 10 June, the 3rd Squadron was released from DS of 25th ARVN and returned to Blackhorse Base Camp. The 1st Squadron was placed OPCON to the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, and began conducting RIF and NAP operations in AO VOODOO vic XT950370. The 2nd Squadron conducted a tactical road march to XT8424 in AO Blackhorse. On 12 June, 2/16 Inf Bde, 1st Inf Div, became OPCON to the Regiment for operations in AO Blackhorse. During the periods 19-22 June and 18-24 July, the 1/16 Inf Bde conducted operations in AO BLACKHORSE and VOODOO under Regimental control. On 24 July, the 1/16 Inf was relieved in place by the 2/28 Inf. During the period 12 June - 31 July, the Squadron's mission remained the same. The 3rd Squadron conducted RIF and NAP operations in the BLACKHORSE TAOR and provided one troop to secure the NEWPORT Bridge, WIDONS VILLAGE, and RRF for II FFV. The 1st Squadron continued OPCON status to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, until 17 July when they were placed OPCON to the 1st Bde for operations in the LOC BINH Area. The 2nd Squadron conducted RIF operations under Regimental control in AO BLACKHORSE and VOODOO.

d. Training:

(1) Replacement training was conducted throughout the quarter to
prepare new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The training was conducted in a six-day cycle. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

May 431
June 560
July 502

2) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School: The Regiment sent 10 personnel to the MACV Recondo School.

(b) NCO Academy: The 9th Inf Div NCO Academy provided training in the basic techniques of military instruction and leadership to the NCO’s and potential NCO’s of the Regiment. During the quarter, 14 Blackhorse personnel attended the academy.

(c) Jungle Environment Survival Training School: A three day survival course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, for aviation personnel. During the quarter, 6 aviators attended this course.

(d) Jungle Survival School: A 4½ day course conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, was available to aviation personnel of the Regiment. One aviator attended this course.

(e) Aircraft maintenance: The Army Maintenance Technical Assistance Program (AAMTAP) School, 765th Transportation Group, VUNG TAU, administered in country training to 15 mechanics from the Regiment and attached units during the quarter.

(f) Cobra School: A pilot qualification, avionics, engine, crew chief and armament school operated by a NETT team at BIEN HOA Air Force Base was available to personnel maintaining and operating aircraft. During the quarter, 8 personnel attended.

5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Artillery:

(1) General: During this quarter, the mission of the Regiment was to conduct RIF and screening operations in the vicinity of LAI KHE
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 68

(RCS GSPUR-65 (R1))

(1) Type of Mission: The types of missions fired by supporting artillery during Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) were:

(a) Defensive concentrations;
(b) Observer adjusted missions;
(c) Harassing and interdicting missions;
(d) Navigational (marking) rounds;
(e) Preparations;
(f) Preplanned fires on call;
(g) ARVN support missions;
(h) Illumination missions.

(2) Timeliness and Effectiveness: The timeliness and effectiveness of the artillery support provided during Operation TOAN THANG II was characterized by each RIF operation being within range of at least one supporting artillery unit. Each convoy move made by the squadrons and the Regiment was covered by the local artillery batteries along the route. During TOAN THANG II, the FSB's utilized by the Regiment were positioned to not only...
insure maximum fire support to the maneuver units but also to provide mutual support to each other.

Another factor influencing the effectiveness of the Regiment’s artillery support was the daily allocation of the U-1 "Birddog" aircraft for use as an air observer. This aircraft was allocated to one squadron on a daily basis dependent on the particular mission for that day. In this way, the squadron with the most critical mission was provided the air observer coverage all day.

(4) Ammo expended during the quarter by month was:

(a) May:  HE  8266  
          ILL  377  
          WP  217  
          Smk (yellow)  97  

(b) June:  HE  9067  
          ILL  820  
          WP  128  
          Smk (yellow)  24  

(c) July:  HE  10,761  
          ILL  652  
          WP  134  
          Smk (Yellow)  10  

(5) New Techniques: During the quarter maximum use was made of counter-mortar fires being fired by the mutually supporting FSB. If a FSB received hostile mortar fire, rather than firing counter-mortar concentrations, the gun crews were free to seek protection while the mutually supporting unit fired counter-mortar fires for them. This improves both the safety and morale of the troops receiving the incoming rounds.

b. Army Aviation:
Employment: The army aviation element supported the Regiment with nine OH-6A, eight OH-23, twelve UH-1D, and nineteen UH-1C. The OH-6A's were formed into a scout section in the Air Cavalry Troop when they arrived during the month of May. They proved invaluable in this role. Four of the nine OH-6A's were used as command and control (C&C) for the squadrons in support of the OH-23. Nine OH-23's were turned in when the OH-6A's were issued. The remaining eight OH-23's were assigned as follows: 1st Squadron, 3; 2nd Squadron, 3; and 3rd Squadron, 2. The OH-23's and OH-6A's performed command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment missions and provided liaison between squadron and higher headquarters. The UH-1D aircraft was employed in command and control, limited troop lift, and limited resupply missions, insertion and extraction of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), and daily courier flights. The UH-1C gunships were employed in all areas where the Regiment operated. In addition, gunships provided convoy cover, reconnaissance, and strip alert for mortar and rocket retaliation. During the latter part of July, the decision was made to reorganize the Air Cavalry Troop under a modified version of TOE 17-58G. This will reduce the Air Cavalry Troop gunship density to nine UH-1C aircraft pursuant to TOE. This shortage is partially alleviated by the programmed arrival of the AH-1G Cobras, which are scheduled for issue during August 1968. The Aero Rifle Platoon is to be reconstituted.

Training: Newly assigned aviators completed in-country orientation and training before being released for operational missions. Instrument training was conducted in the UH-1D when mission commitments permitted. In preparation for AH-1G arrivals, six pilots have been sent to the USARV transition course, and five CONUS qualified Cobra pilots have been assigned. In addition, appropriate numbers of crew chiefs have been trained for the AH-1G. The Regiment is well prepared for receiving the AH-1G aircraft.

Construction: Improvement was made on the ten point refueling area by resurfacing the area with crushed rock and a heavy coat of penesprine. During the reporting period, limited penesprine was spread on the airfield. The major interest was at the 398 Transportation Helicopter Maintenance Detachment area. Construction of an aircraft hanger was started during the latter part of July 1968. Estimated completion date is September 1968.

Safety: Safety procedures were stressed throughout the quarter. Emphasis was placed on the hazards of approaches and landing in rough, hastily cleared helipads which are frequently encountered in the AO. Traffic control was improved at Blackhorse with the installation of an AH-7TSQ-70A control tower. The tower came equipped with two 10kw generators which provides a constant electrical source for the radios.
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(5) Results: (SEE Army Aviation Statistical Summary, Incl 4).

c. Chemical:

(1) E-63 Personnel Detector Missions: The Chemical Section conducted a total of 57 missions from 1 May to 31 July.

(2) Riot Control Agent (CS) Operations: Riot control agents were used once during the reporting period. On 30 July, an E-63 Personnel Detector Mission was combined with a CS drop. The E-63 was employed over a likely enemy base area. CS bomblets, XM158, were then dropped from a OH-1D helicopter on the area reporting maximum readings. The CS drop was followed ten minutes later by a 15 minute artillery concentration. Results were inconclusive, although one secondary explosion was observed as a result of the artillery fires. Chemical missions were planned on three other occasions, but they were not employed as no suitable targets were developed.

d. Engineer Activity:

(1) General: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided direct Combat Engineer Support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment engaged in Operation TOAN THANG.

(2) Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, the 1st Platoon provided support to the 1st Squadron. Initially operating in the CU CHI/DUC HOA Region west of SAIGON, the 1st Platoon, using the D-7E dozer and organic M48A2C tank dozer, constructed 210 night defensive positions for the Squadron. The 1st Platoon also cleared 17,550 meters of road along tactical and main supply routes in this area. This operation continued until 4 June 1968, and kept the road network open and free of Viet Cong mines and boobytraps. On 4 June 1968, the platoon cleared 7,650 meters of road and prepared and launched seven AVLB’s as the Squadron moved to an area east of LAI KHE. On 25 June 1968, the Squadron moved again and the platoon cleared 2,000 meters of road. During the rest of June, the platoon, still operating with the 1st Squadron, attempted to interdict Viet Cong routes of infiltration and to locate enemy supply caches. On 16 July 1968, the 1st Squadron moved to an area east of LOCK M0NH to conduct RIF operations. The 1st Platoon prepared perimeter defensive emplacements at each base camp established by the Squadron. The positions consisted of over 80 fighting vehicle emplacements and barriers of concertina wire consisting of 400 meters of single strand outer circle. This operation continued through July.

(b) The 2nd Platoon provided support to the 3rd Squadron
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During the reporting period, operating in an area north of Củ Chi during the first weeks of May, the 2nd Platoon replaced over 300 fighting vehicle emplacements for the 3rd Squadron. On 7 May, the 3rd Squadron moved south of Saigon to the Ben Lui Region and conducted joint operations with the 9th Inf Div. The 2nd Platoon was again responsible for constructing night defensive positions. A strong perimeter was established by constructing a four feet high earth berm around the defensive positions and placing two defensive wire barriers using 2 rolls of concertina for the outer circle and a 9 roll strand for the inner circle. The 3rd Squadron moved on 23 May and set up new blocking positions to the north of Duc Hoa. Although more fighting vehicle positions were dug, heavy rains and the high water table made the positions unusable. On 31 May, the 3rd Squadron received the mission of route security on Highway QL#1 from the Hocction Bridge to Tay Ninh City, a distance of 60 kilometers. The 2nd Platoon successfully kept the route open for a period of 13 days, in one of the largest mine sweeping operations in Vietnam. Working with elements of the 65th Engineer Bn and 588th Engineer Bn, the second platoon opened the route to traffic two and a half hours after the clearing operations began. It was the responsibility of the 2nd Platoon to minesweep the route, fill road craters, and replace blown culverts. Due to successful completion of the mission, the main supply route (MSR) continued to carry traffic without incident for the resupply of two division base camps. The 2nd Platoon returned to Blackhorse with the 3rd Squadron on 12 June 1968. The Platoon was assigned the mission of keeping Route #2 clear from Xuan Loc to Cam My. On 11 July, two squads from the platoon were helicopter into a suspected VC cache site 8 kilometers east of Blackhorse. A thorough search was made of the area with negative results.

(c) In May and early June, the 3rd Platoon gave direct engineer support to the 2nd Squadron at Blackhorse Base Camp. The priority mission of the Platoon was to conduct mine sweeping operations on the road from Xuan Loc to Blackhorse. On 14 June, the 3rd Platoon supported a 2nd Squadron road march to a new area of operations in the Michelin Rubber Plantation and the Iron Triangle Region to stem VC activity in the area and to locate supply caches. During the march, the Platoon swept 3,200 meters of road and prepared 2 AVLB sites. The Platoon also assisted the Squadron in preparing defensive emplacements. This operation continued through the month of July.

(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and Training: The 919th Engineer Company continued its upgrading support in the Long Khanh Province by releasing 270 feet of corrugated steel culvert, 170 rolls of concertina wire, 420 steel pickets and 1800 sandbags, and giving technical advice and assistance in the use of the materials.
(4) Base Camp Development: The 2nd and 3rd Platoons, while located at Blackhorse Base Camp with their respective squadrons, planned and constructed 1 WABTOC large and 1 WABTOC medium and 1 60' x 20' building for the Regimental Training School. The units also constructed 150' of permanent fence and reemployed 1,500 meters of perimeter wire.

e. Signal Activities: Combat operations during the reporting period varied from Regimental size, which included all three squadrons, to operations where only one squadron was involved; the remaining squadrons were either OPCON or DS to other headquarters. Under these circumstances, the Regimental Command Post (CP) assumed three basic configurations which affected communications support requirements during the reporting period. The first configuration was the location of the complete Regimental CP at one site in a logistical/maintenance nodal point. The second configuration was the displacement of the Regimental Command Group (UMP CP) to a forward location in the AO, while the remainder of the CP was located at the logistical/maintenance nodal point. The third configuration was the location of the CP at the base camp of the unit to which it was OPCON, leaving a small trains element at a logistical/maintenance nodal point. Configuration one allowed the most adequate and continuous communications support for three reasons: First, location at the logistical/maintenance nodal point enabled better signal maintenance to be performed on a more timely basis; second, alternating current (AC) power generation requirements of the Regimental CP were adequately met by the use of 10kw generators presently on loan to the Regimental HHT; and third, direct current (DC) requirements for radio operation were adequately met by pooling organic DC generators presently on hand. Due to dispersion of men and material, both signal maintenance and AC/DC power generation were less satisfactory in configurations two and three. Configuration three proved more satisfactory than two, because the base camp facilities provided a better logistical maintenance base than the isolated forward command group.

6. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. General: During this quarter, the 29th Support Group continued to provide logistical support to the Regiment. The 551st Light Equipment Maintenance Company (LEMC0) and the 506th Supply and Service Company provided point distribution of Class I through IV. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion.

b. Supply and Maintenance:

(1) Class I
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(a) There were no problems with the issue of Class I. Milk, ice cream, ice, and perishable meats and vegetables were issued in proper quantities and in good condition.

(b) Prior to May 1968, almost 100% of the TO&E field range units and burners were 1937 models. The growing difficulty of obtaining replacement parts and increased maintenance problems necessitated phasing out of these models. Replacements are the M2, 1959 cabinets and burners. Through the help of the 551st LEMCO, the Regiment has been able to turn in over 80% of the old field ranges for the newer M2, 1959 models.

(c) A program began in May to provide all messes at Blackhorse with cantonment kitchen equipment as authorized in USARV Reg 30-10. Issue, however, was stopped based on future programming or base camp requirements.

(d) USARV Message 60520, dated 18 July 1968, placing an emphasis on field messes, authorized an augmentation of gas operated refrigerators for units not authorized cantonment "ess" equipment. A program to provide this equipment is underway.

(2) Class II and IV:

(a) The Regiment received 12 M548 cargo carriers during the reporting period. The carriers are equipped with two 500 gallon bladders and will be utilized to carry Class III to areas inaccessible by wheeled vehicles.

(b) The Regiment replaced all M109 howitzers with the new fifth year model M109. The 2nd Squadron received one M88. The Regiment received four M132A1 flamethrowers. 15 ACAV's were turned in for over-mileage under the closed-loop mileage program and rebuilt ACAV's were issued.

(c) Two new Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV) were drawn on 29 July for the 919th Engineer Company.

(d) Barrier equipment and supplies continued to be drawn from the 208th Yard. There were no problems in obtaining these supplies.

(e) The Squadron's PLL's averaged 1,200 line items per squadron during the reporting period. Many of these lines were at zero balance because of fast turnover and nonavailability. A few of the fast
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Turnover items are: M113A1 track; fuel, air and oil filters for all vehicles; and large batteries, master relays, starter relays, and spark plugs for the M48A2C tank.

(f) Field Maintenance Support:

(1) During the reporting period, 1 May to 31 July, field maintenance support for the 1st and 3rd Squadrons was provided by 551st LEMCO. A contact team of 12 to 17 men was employed in the forward area. The contact team had capabilities for automotive, small arms, and limited turret and instrument repair. Those items that could not be repaired in the field were evacuated to 185th Maintenance Battalion. Each squadron had a three man contact team from the 551st LEMCO for 3rd echelon repairs in the squadron trains locations. Toward the end of the period, the 2nd Squadron did not have an organic contact team and maintenance was provided with a recovery-contact team that had been working with the 1st Squadron. This team also gave the 2nd Squadron organic recovery capabilities when both MBT recovery vehicles became combat losses.

(2) Units operating in the BIEN HOA/LONG BINH Area received maintenance support from the 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company. This assistance was an asset throughout the period.

(3) Class III: No problem was encountered in the supply of fuel and lubricants to the Regiment. POL was drawn at 266th Dispensing Point for units in the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area. Squadron trains at divisional base camps drew Class III at those locations and flew 500 gallon bladders to the units in forward locations. The 12 new M548's increased the operating range of the squadrons. Lubricants were also obtained in a manner similar to POL at Class III dispensing points.

(4) Class V and Ammunition Storage:

(a) The Regiment continued to draw Class V from the 3rd Ordnance in LONG BINH. When units were operating too far from the 3rd Ordnance ASP for feasible supply, divisional ASP's were utilized and the issues were credited to the 11th ACR Authorized Supply Rate (ASR) at 3rd Ordnance.

(b) Improvements were made on the ammunition storage areas at the Regimental Ammo Dump. These improvements enable handling and storage procedures to be conducted as outlined in TM 9-1300-206. Plans have also been approved for the addition of two more ammunition pads on the west side of the ammo dump. Construction will be done by the 31st
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Engineer Bn, a Blackhorse Base Camp tenant unit.

(c) Due to the extreme interest in accounting for all ASR items, an ammunition NCO for the Regiment was placed at 3rd Ordnance Bn. This NCO is responsible for approving ammunition requisitions for all units within the Regiment. The ammunition NCO also keeps close liaison with ammunition representatives from other units with whom the Regiment is working.

(5) Aerial and Convoy Resupply:

(a) Throughout the quarter, the Regiment depended heavily on aerial resupply to forward areas. Units working in the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area have employed aerial resupply for all classes of supply. The Regiment has averaged 30 aerial resupply missions a day during the reporting period.

(b) CH 54 aircraft flew 15 missions during the quarter to recover combat loss ACAV’s.

(c) Wheeled convoys have continued to resupply Blackhorse Base Camp. Wheeled convoy employment to resupply the forward unit trains has been limited.

(6) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance support was generally excellent during the reporting period, when repair parts were on hand. Special turret and fire control teams were made available from the 140th Maintenance Co.

(b) A problem area noted during the period was the lengthy repair time, replacement time, and non-availability of parts for recovery vehicles, especially the M88. Both M88’s in the 3rd Squadron have been deadlined for engines; currently, neither M88 in the 2nd Squadron is on hand. One was turned in for salvage and the other was reported as a combat loss.

(c) Replacement of the M113A1 engine has been slow during the reporting period, causing excessive down time.

c. Medical:

(1) Activities: The health of the command continued to be excellent during this reporting period. No abnormalities have been noted in the morale and psychological effectiveness of the troops. The continuous field oper-
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(1) Medical: Ations experienced by personnel of the command over the past quarter have had no appreciable adverse effect.

(2) Employment: Both the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, under the operational control of the 1st Inf Div, have been able to maintain adequate medical support in the field. The 3rd Squadron is at Blackhorse Base Camp. The Regimental Surgeon's Office has been tentatively revised by moving the section to Base Camp to operate the Regimental Surgeon's Office and the Aviation Dispensary. This decision was prompted by the large medical load, both administrative and functional. Replacing the Regimental Aid Station in the field is a small detachment from the 37th Medical Company (CLR).

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Evacuation: The 45th Ambulance Company has provided the Regiment with smooth and efficient air ambulance service throughout the quarter. In May, a new and successful concept of medical support was instituted by the 1st Squadron. To eliminate needless evacuation of personnel who can be treated in the Field Aid Station, a combat support platoon including the Squadron Surgeon, was organized to provide better screening of combat casualties. This innovation also created a centralized landing zone for medical evacuation helicopters and is presently being evaluated for implementation within the entire Regiment.

(b) Hospitalization: The facilities of the 12th, 24th, 36th, and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals as well as the 7th Surgical Hospital were utilized by this command during the reporting period. The medical companies of the 1st Medical Bn provided excellent support to our field units under operational control of the 1st Inf Div.

(c) Disease:

(1) Malaria: Two cases of malaria were reported, both during the month of June.

(2) Venereal Disease: There was an average of 45 cases monthly.

(3) Unusual disease: One case of hepatitis and one of encephalitis were encountered in June.

7. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

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a. General: During the quarter the operational strength of the Regiment went from a low of 99% in early June to a high of 106.5% by the end of June. At the end of the quarter, operational strength stood at 105%. Replacements were generally well qualified.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by the month are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>PDT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4124</td>
<td>4221</td>
<td>4174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4124</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>4338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4124</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>4199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hospital returnees: During the quarter, 395 personnel were returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include those personnel who were treated and released immediately.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>NAD</th>
<th>NBR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. MOS Shortages: During the reporting period, shortages existed in the 11D series, but was relieved through the replacement stream. Shortages of medical specialists (MOS 91B20) now exists as a result of departing personnel. Replacements have been slow. The Regiment is authorized 164 (MOS 91B20) and has 133 assigned.

d. Replacements: The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycle conducted by the Replacement Training School provides a thorough orientation of personnel to their new environment, and conditions their initial apprehensions of being in a combat zone. The training program gives refresher training in basic skills with emphasis placed on troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety.

e. Services:
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(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 287 religious services were conducted with a total attendance of 7,454. In addition to the religious services, 121 confessions, 177 communions, 22 memorials, and 9 baptisms were conducted. The 287 services were divided as follows: 130 Protestant services and 157 Catholic services. Jewish services were conducted at BEAR CAT. Trips were arranged during the recent Jewish holidays. The five chaplains made 122 hospital visits, conducted 454 interviews and counseling sessions, 238 visits to quarters and 238 visits to the troop duty areas.

(2) Red Cross: For the three month period ending 31 July, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled 965 cases. No loans or grants were made during this quarter. The reporting and communication service totaled 677, including birth and death notifications, health and welfare reports, and verification of emergencies for leave consideration.

(3) Special Services:
   (a) During the last quarter, Special Services had 3 USO shows. These were the Peter Leeds Show on 2 May, the Lourie Tresier Show on 29 May, and the Jimmy Byrd Show on 31 May. On 15 July, Philip Ahn was on a handshake tour. There were five movies every week shown at the Amphitheater. In addition, 11 units on base camp showed five movies a week. Whenever possible, movies were sent to the troops in the forward area.
   (b) On 1 June, work was started on the Service Club, which is expected to be operational by November 1968. A Chevrolet Sports Van was purchased by the Central Post Fund for Special Services.

(4) Postal:
   (a) The 7th APU is operating at TME: one officer and fifteen enlisted men. Money orders, including fees, totaled $1,365,568.85 for the quarter. The number of money orders sold was 18,999, while 717 money orders were cashed for a value of $47,535.56. Total stamp sales for the same period was $15,000. The following is a breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOMING AND OUTGOING MAIL</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPATCHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (letter mail)</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (parcel post, etc)</td>
<td>4,270</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

1,159
389

1,046
851

Outsides Pieces
Registered Mail
Insured Mail

(b) During the quarter, airmail was received at the 7th APU 83 days and surface mail was received 3 days. The average transit time of airmail was 4 days; surface mail averaged 46 days. The parcel post, money order and locator windows are now open from 0730-1230 and from 1300-1630 seven days a week. Two money order men are in the field for approximately 5 days a month to accommodate 11th ACR personnel.

(6) Post Exchange: During the quarter, the Blackhorse Post Exchange experienced many changes. Complete lighting fixtures were installed in the exchange and accounting building. Many new products were added to the existing selections. There is a definite need for a new warehouse to meet the requirements of the increasing merchandise on hand. In addition, there is a lack of Japanese and Korean merchandise available to the Blackhorse Post Exchange. The snack bar has increased its variety of foods and drinks for the men at Base Camp.

f. Morale: A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The improved PX, snack bar and Special Services activities directly contributed to the men's morale.

g. Awards and Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending (this qtr)</th>
<th>Pending (last qtr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVIC-WF
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BS</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>ACM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 671 Purple Hearts were awarded.

b. Prisoners of War: The Blackhorse Detachment of the 720th Military Police Battalion processed three detainees during the quarter; of these, none were deemed a PW.

i. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Courts-Martial: During the quarter, the following court-martials were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Serious Incidents: There were three serious incidents reported.

(3) During the quarter, the largest number of MP reports concerned traffic violations. Larceny was second. Formal MP patrols continue around the Base Camp.

j. Problems: There were no significant problems noted during the quarter.

8. (FOOD) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The PSSTOP program supported Regimental combat operations on three occasions: twice in BUIEWOI Province and once in BUIH DOONG Province. The support was in the form of leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. These broadcasts were of a quick reaction nature designed to capitalise on the situation at hand.

b. Data: There were 77 aerial missions flown during which 5,103,500 leaflets were dropped. These consisted of rally appeals (CHIEN HOI), safe conduct passes, reward leaflets and propaganda describing the progress of
the government of Vietnam. There were ten ground missions, usually in
conjunction with NEDCAP team visits. During the ground missions 34,500
handouts were distributed. During 70 of the aerial leaflet missions,
loudspeaker broadcast appeals were made for a total of 54 hours of aerial
broadcast time. Ground broadcast time totalled 14 hours. In addition to
the tapes provided by the 6th PSTOP BN, nine quick reaction tapes were
recorded by the attached PSTOP team interpreters. The team also designed
one leaflet that was printed in 10,000 copies.

c. There were 10 rallies this quarter, 8 more than last quarter.
The success of the PSTOP effort is based on the fact that the majority of
the population in the LONG KHANH and BIEN HOA Provinces have been gener-
ally favorable toward the 11th ACR. Through aerial leaflets and aerial
and ground broadcasts, the Vietnames people are being continuously encour-
aged to support the legal government of Vietnam.

9. (FDOO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: The TET Offensive left in its wake even greater require-
ments for civic action projects. Aid to refugees and repair of damaged
structures were areas of paramount interest. A total of 1,246 man-days
was expended on civic action projects. The bulk of this work centered on
aiding refugees and reconstruction. NEDCAPS, previously limited by TET
related activities, were resumed. During the reporting period, 31 NEDCAPS
were conducted, treating 2,096 Vietnames patients. Instruction on sanita-
tion and preventive medicine was conducted in conjunction with this treat-
ment.

b. Civic Commodity Distribution:

(1) During the quarter, the following commodities were distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>5,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used sheet tin</td>
<td>560 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap lumber</td>
<td>159,000 BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>6,625 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar paper</td>
<td>2 rolls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The majority of these materials were used for the continued relief of the refugees who remained without food or housing after TBT. Revolutionary Development Teams and local villagers performed the actual construction.

(3) The Regiment continued to support the 52nd Ranger BN housing project with lumber, tin, and cement. Progress had been halted due to TST. In addition to the materials listed, 50,000VN$ was funded monthly in support of the project.

(4) Work continued this quarter on the four wells being constructed for new outposts. One well was completely successful; the other three are still under construction.

(5) The Regiment provided 159,285VN$ for civic action projects within the LONG KHANH Province. An additional 763,998VN$ worth of supplies were furnished for self-help activities.

c. Impact Program:

(1) General: The Regimental Impact Team continued support and improvements of RF/PF outposts during the quarter. Many outposts were visited, surveyed, and suggestions for improvement discussed with the unit commanders. Provincial outposts were receptive to this Regimental support; and in almost all instances, suggested improvements were acted upon immediately. The shortage of sandbags continues to be a problem. The shortage has been alleviated, however, by the construction of solid earth defensive positions.

(2) Materials: The following types and amounts of building materials were used by the impact program during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIALS</th>
<th>AMOUNTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbed wire</td>
<td>53 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina</td>
<td>70 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickets</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand bags</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin roofing</td>
<td>250 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip flares</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>16,000 BF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Claymores 482
M-79 rds 1,836
55 Cal drums 222
155mm Illum Ammo 374
Grenades 1,780
M-72 Law 55

(3) Status of RF/PF: At the beginning of the reporting period and at the end of the quarter, the following RF/PF outposts were classified as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1 May</th>
<th>31 July</th>
<th>1 May</th>
<th>31 July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LONG KHANH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category A</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category B</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINH TUY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. (U) INFORMATION:

a. General:

(1) During the quarter, the 17th Public Information Detachment provided widescale coverage of Operation TOAN THANG. Printed and photographic releases covering the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's participation in the operation received circulation in various newspapers both here and in the States. On 22 June, the USARV "Army Reporter" carried a full-page photo spread on the Regiment in TOAN THANG. Other photos covering the campaign were used in the "Stars and Stripes" and in the "Army Times".

(2) The Detachment continued to operate from the Regiment's field location. Contributions by the Detachment to the USARV Army Daily Summary resulted in various articles in Stateside papers concerning the activities of the Blackhorse Regiment.
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(3) A feature story on the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s LAAT Team (Logistical and Administrative Advisory Team) appeared in the May issue of the II Field Force "Hurricane" Magazine.

(4) A photo feature on the Blackhorse Regiment’s Organization Day appeared in the 3 May issue of the "Army Reporter". Photos provided by the Detachment showed the Regiment both in the past and present.

(5) The Change of Command Ceremony between Colonel Gorder and Colonel Patton was given full coverage by both civilian and military news media.

b. Statistical Summary:

(1) A total of 1,279 hometown news releases (DA Form 1526) were forwarded by the 17th PID to the Army Home Town News Center.

(2) A total of 54 news releases and 63 photo releases were given general distribution.

(3) A total of 12 news representatives were provided support. Two press briefings were held for the benefit of visiting news personnel.

11. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. The 31st Engineer Bn (Combat) began working on the unfinished projects of the 27th Engineer Bn (Combat) on 5 May 1968. The 34th Engineer Group has authorized 40 per cent of the 31st Engineer’s effort to Blackhorse Base Camp. The average for this quarter has been 25% of the Battalion’s effort expended in Blackhorse.

b. P&AE has completed 97 job orders totaling $69,455.51; 401 Maintenance Service Order (MSO) for $5,050.70 prepared and applied 76,450 square yards of dust palliative at a cost of $25,020 in support of the Base Camp.

c. The following is a list of major engineer projects and their current status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>PER CENT COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parking apron</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Service club 5
Grease racks 12
Aircraft Maintenance hangers 2
Mess facility 100
Road net 75
Aircraft revetment 100
Miniport 35

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Personnel:

   (1) Soldiers Deposit Program:

   (a) OBSERVATION: Participation in the Soldiers Deposit Program has remained low.

   (b) EVALUATION: Of the 4,200 men assigned or attached to the 11th ACR, only 270 enlisted men and 45 officers participate in the Soldiers Deposit Program. Although everyone agrees that it is an excellent program, most, however, do not invest because of the difficulty of withdrawing money when they leave Vietnam. Those who desire it as soon as they return are unable to do so because of field commitments at the time application was to be made. If they fail to request it before leaving Vietnam, they must wait 90 days after their return to the states. Most consider that this is too long.

   (c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That a better system be devised for those isolated in the field for requestion and obtaining immediate withdrawal upon reaching CONUS.

b. Operations:

   (1) OBSERVATION: Enemy Infiltration.
EVALUATION: Enemy efforts to infiltrate in rugged or jungle terrain are primarily conducted at night. To effectively counter their tactics, emphasis must be placed on night operations. Ambush patrols, radar, and night vision devices, both airborne and ground types, are particularly useful. Cross attachment of infantry units with armored cavalry greatly increases the Regimental capability to conduct these operations. Armor units can and must operate at night.

RECOMMENDATION: Emphasis must continue to be placed on night operations.

(2) OBSERVATION: Enemy base camps.

EVALUATION: The frequent encounters with enemy base camps of considerable size points out the difficulty of destroying them while continuing to pressure enemy forces. No really effective way has been found for destroying the bunkers and tunnel complexes without expenditure of large amounts of time, demolitions, and man power. Even after destruction, the fortifications can be rebuilt with minimal effort.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance in force operations against fortified positions and hedgerows.

EVALUATION:

(a) When encountering a well-armed and fortified enemy position, a double wave of armored vehicles was found to be the most effective means of combating the concealed bunkers and spider holes. Frequently, the enemy remains concealed until the initial assault wave has passed through his position. He then fires into the rear of the vehicles with RPG and automatic weapons. With two waves of vehicles assaulting in line, the initial wave, which should include tanks, if available, neutralizes the enemy's fire with its organic weapons and pins him in his holes while the second wave "mops up" using s-all arms and grenades. This organization has also proved to be effective when working with dismounted elements, who accompany the second wave.

(b) The dual wave also allows for easy rotation of elements. In the event the first wave suffers weapons failure or excessive casualties, the second wave can readily assist and/or replace them. The second wave also can aid in the evacuation of casualties and thereby allow the initial wave to continue the momentum of its assault.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 68

RECOMMENDATIONS: That when attacking well-armed and fortified enemy positions a double wave assault be adopted as the most effective method of defeating the enemy.

(2) OBSERVATION: Mine incidents—habitual use of access routes.

EVALUATION: Continual operation by armored elements in the same area typically results in an increase in anti-tank mining activity. Invariably, the mines are laid in, or adjacent to, previously cut tracks.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That whenever possible never use or travel adjacent to old tracks. That night ambush patrols should be used in areas likely to be mined.

(5) OBSERVATION: Mine incidents—mutual employment of anti-tank mines.

EVALUATION: It has been observed that anti-tank mines are frequently laid in pairs. There would be one mine five to ten meters adjacent to, or on a line with, the original mine.

RECOMMENDATION: That when detonation of a mine occurs, dismount a sweep team consisting of two men, one detector operator and one probe. Sweep in the vicinity of the mine in all directions prior to any further vehicular movement.

(6) OBSERVATION: Breaking jungle.

EVALUATION: While breaking trail through jungle growth and bamboo, a single column usually results in initial contact by the lead vehicle only and invites attack by three-man RPG teams. Conversely, the use of more than three vehicles abreast created serious control problems especially when friendly infantry are in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: That when "busting jungle", use three vehicles abreast with the unit commander and F0 vehicles behind the center track. Place other vehicles in column behind the flank vehicles. Use occasional volleys of artillery 300-500 meters in front to loosen the enemy and fire navigational rounds (400 meter WP high air burst) to aid in maintaining direction as required. Result, a useful two lane road through the jungle.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence:

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(1) OBSERVATION: Intelligence indicator.

EVALUATION: During late June and early July, eight B-52 strikes were targeted within the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment AO. Immediate bomb damage assessment by light observation helicopters were able to ascertain post strike trail activity entering or departing the strike zone. This was accomplished by monitoring foot traffic in the finely ground dirt caused by the impact of the bomb prior to the dust solidifying.

RECOMMENDATION: That aerial observers be alerted to the foregoing indicator on bomb damage assessment missions.

(2) OBSERVATION: Enemy Movement.

EVALUATION: While the Regiment operated in BINH DUONG Province, the majority of its small unit contacts were initiated by ambush patrols entering or departing their positions. With the enemy beginning to move prior to the hours of darkness and continuing till after sunrise, those patrols which were in position prior to 1600H and departed their positions after 0900H appeared to be more successful in the accomplishment of their mission.

RECOMMENDATION: That ambush patrols be in position prior to 1600H and not withdrawn until 0900H.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Organization: None.

g. Signal:

(1) Direct Support Maintenance Capability.

(a) OBSERVATION: The signal maintenance support capability of the Direct Support Company is inadequate to support the increasing amount of signal equipment within the Regiment.

(b) EVALUATION: When the Regiment is fragmented over a large area (III CZ), the Direct Support serves only as a collection and evacuation point to higher echelons of maintenance. This naturally increases time delays. In addition, elements near higher echelon repair shops often bypass their own Direct Support element and go directly to higher echelon repair shops to obtain better service.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That signal support activity within
the Direct Support Company be considerably expanded to provide adequate and timely service at several locations simultaneously. That Regimenental elements and attached units utilize this increased capability rather than by-passing their direct support element.

(2) **Alternating-Current (AC) Power Generation:**

(a) **Observation:** No TOE capability exists to adequately meet the AC power generation requirements.

(b) **Evaluation:** Power requirements for lighting systems and for fixed operation of radio systems exceed the capability of TOE equipment. Within the Regimental CP there exists a need for a minimum of two 10kw 110V generators. The existing requirements should be split to accommodate the RTOC and some stable loads on one 10kw source, and the remainder of the requirements on the second 10kw source. Each source should have a backup unit to provide for maintenance needs and break downs. Squadron CP's also need a large source of AC power. A 10kw source with backup would be sufficient.

(c) **Recommendation:** That the AC power generation requirement be recognized as valid and that necessary generators, parts, and repair personnel be authorized and added to the existing TOE to meet the needs.

(3) **Direct-Current (DC) Power Generator:**

(a) **Observation:** Organic equipment generating DC power for radio operations is inadequate.

(b) **Evaluation:** Operations, as presently performed in SVN, often require the use of tactical radio and carrier equipment in a semi-fixed environment. Organic capacity for DC power generation is wholly inadequate. Organic 3kw and 4.2kw generators are presently assigned on a basis of one per command post mounted communication facility. These lightweight generators are not capable of 24 hour a day operation over prolonged periods in dusty, dirty conditions, even with excellent maintenance support. Existing theater supply and maintenance procedures require an inoperative generator to remain in direct support maintenance facilities for 45 days before a replacement generator can be used. This causes an excessive period of operation with reduced potential and places communications facilities in an extremely hazardous condition. Although DC power can be provided by running the vehicle engine, this procedure, however, has proved detrimental to the vehicle because of excessive carbon deposits. Several dismounted radio configurations in support of base camps and remote
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 July 68  RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

relays require some means of DC power. At this time, there are no provisions
for this in the TOE.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That logistical channels provide ade-
quate AC/DC conversion rectification devices to support these semi-fixed
configurations. That a more effective support system be developed to
preclude a lack of parts and excessive delays in maintenance. That a more
realistic allocation of generators be accomplished to allow for 24 hour a
day operation.

(4) FM Antenna Configuration.

(a) OBSERVATION: Existing antenna group RC-292 is generally
inadequate to support communications over long distances in and over
jungle terrain.

(b) EVALUATION: Modifications have produced an antenna
with multiple radiators capable of reaching a height of 60 feet. This
is adequate to clear most foliage encountered. This modification requires
the use of a gimpole arrangement, which requires considerable space to set
up the antenna. Height, space, and time are three critical elements which
affect the quality of transmissions, site locations, and the period during
which command capabilities are reduced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a rapidly erected antenna system
that requires minimal space and provides capability for four to eight dif-
ferent radiators be made available. A system such as an AB-577/GRC modified
to reach at least 60 feet with multiple heads would be most adequate. Two
such units would be required at RTOC and one unit at each STOC.

h. Medical: None

i. Base Camp Development: None

j. Engineer:

(1) Viet Cong Minesfield Markers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Elements of the 919th Engineer Company
(Armored) located several methods that the Viet Cong are presently using
to mark mines and booby traps during the reporting period. After identifi-
cation of the marker, the teams searched the surrounding area with the
ANFRS/4 Mine Detector and mine probes. The mines were destroyed in place
after they were located.

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(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That more emphasis be placed on Viet Cong mine markers in the Replacement Training School. That trained personnel be better utilized in attempting to locate and identify mine markers.

GEORGE S. PATTON
COL, Armor
Commanding

DA, HQ II PPVCMV, APO San Francisco 96266  26 AUG 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOG(DST), APO 96375  
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for period ending 31 July 1968, with the following comment.

3. Reference Section I, para 6b (1), (c) and (d): The word "condiment" should be "cantonment".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. B. Perry  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG  

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MAJ Klingman/de/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 21 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning soldiers deposit program, page 32, paragraph 1a: Nonconcur. The system that is currently in effect allows the member to initiate a request for accelerated repayment of soldiers deposit after PCS orders have been received.

b. Reference items concerning inadequate AC and DC power generation, page 36, paragraphs 1g(2) and 1g(3): Concur. A proposed TDA augmentation to the TOE of units that are required to operate base camps is presently being reviewed by this command. When the TDA is approved, an increased AC and DC power generation capability will be available for use in base camps.

c. Reference item concerning FM antenna configuration, page 37, paragraph 1g(4): Concur. This headquarters has requested authorization of additional AB-577/C-RC antennas, with extension kits, for issue to divisions and brigade size units in RVN. If the request is approved, the unit will be notified of the basis of issue and directed to include the items in the next MTOE change.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 11th ACR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement: DA approval for 80 ea AB/577 antennas was forwarded to USARV on 4 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. I. SHORT
CPT, AGC

Cc furn:
CG USARV
**Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May-31 July 1968

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

**ITEM 1**

* Subject Title: 

** FOR OT RD #: 

*** PAGE #: 

**ITEM 2**

SUBJECT TITLE: 

FOR OT RD #: 

PAGE #: 

**ITEM 3**

SUBJECT TITLE: 

FOR OT RD #: 

PAGE #: 

**ITEM 4**

SUBJECT TITLE: 

FOR OT RD #: 

PAGE #: 

**ITEM 5**

SUBJECT TITLE: 

FOR OT RD #: 

PAGE #: 

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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