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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (6 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 683331
10 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

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1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. (U) Introduction:

   The Capital Military Assistance Command (Provisional) was established effective 4 June 1968, as a command arrangement to provide for an effective defense of Saigon and Gia Dinh Province. Inherent with this responsibility is coordination with Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam for close integration of effort.

   b. (C) G-1 Activities:

   (1) When the Capital Military Assistance Command (Provisional) (CMAC) was formed, personnel were to be assigned from the Capital Military District and Gia Dinh Province Advisory Teams. As these sources were depleted, II Field Force Vietnam and USARV were levied by MACV for completion of the manpower requirement. The original estimate for finalization of personnel input was determined by JI, MACV to be 30 June. The proposed Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), not yet approved, required 168 officers, 1 WO, 353 enlisted personnel, 1 DA civilian, and 27 local Nationals. Advisory positions from all sectors/subsectors within the Capital Military District and Gia Dinh Province area were included in the military strength figures.

   (2) Stringent evaluation of mission requirements prompted Commanding General, CMAC, to submit a revised TDA to MACV for consideration on 11 June. This action was taken with concurrence of CG, II FFV. The revised TDA recommended a strength of 92 officers, 1 WO, 234 enlisted personnel, 1 DA civilian and 27 local Nationals.

   (3) Responsibility for organizing CMAC was not clearly established, and there was a period of uncertainty concerning CMAC's mission and command relationships. Consultation between MACV and USARV Staffs on 13 June determined that USARV would assume responsibility for the complete establishment of CMAC. USARV G3 Force Development Division visited HQ, CMAC on 14 June to finalize manpower requirements. Overlapping functions which existed between CMAC and USAHAC, i.e., billeting, mess, supply, transportation, maintenance,
and medical facilities were deleted from the third TDA which contained 302 military spaces, 1 DA Civilian, and 27 local National Interpreters. On 17 June, USARV G1 began levying units for existing shortages.

(4) G1, CMAC requested, through MACV J-12, that personnel be processed through II FFV prior to being sent to Saigon for duty. This was not done, and individuals began reporting to CMAC, Camp Le Van Duyet, on 18 June. Problems arose because of inadequate processing facilities. Many personnel lacked orders, weapons, equipment and clothing. Office space and equipment were minimal. On 22 June, four days after in-processing had begun, a personnel team arrived from II FFV to augment CMAC efforts. They were very limited in their effectiveness because of inadequate working area and equipment. The absence of numerous personnel records magnified the problem further. Personnel accountability became increasingly difficult during this stage of organization.

(5) On 25 June, representatives of USARV G3 Manpower Branch visited CMAC G1 to ascertain the correctness of the existing TDA. As a result of this visit a TDA was published that eliminated the advisory spaces and contained 302 military spaces. Through additional operating experience, revised missions and awareness of new requirements, it became apparent that critical personnel shortages were developing within particular sections. Artillery, Signal, and AG were understaffed and had many unqualified individuals. Personnel grades, job descriptions, and MOS qualifications were determined to be inadequate and did not conform to required standards and authorizations. Requests for additional personnel were sent to USARV.

(6) USARV G3 Force Development Division conducted a manpower survey on 8 and 9 July. Ample time had not passed to allow meaningful workload data to be compiled to reflect required changes. Discussions between manpower survey personnel and staff sections indicated that 8 officers, 1 WO, and 60 additional enlisted personnel were required. The team also concluded that 3 officers, 1 WO, 34 enlisted personnel, and 27 local Nationals were excess to CMAC needs. Based on previous TDA's and information from the survey, a fifth TDA was developed. CMAC G1 coordinated closely with USARV G3 to insure stabilization and correctness of positions, job descriptions, and MOS qualifications. A revised USARV General Order was published authorizing 81 officers and 284 EM, the current authorized strength.

(7) With personnel turbulence beginning to stabilize in early July, CMAC requested a courtesy inspection by the II FFORCEV IC which was scheduled for the 19th and 20th. On 14 July, USARV General Order 3331 reassigned CMAC (Prov) from II FFORCEV to USARV, but attached to II FFORCEV for OPCON. The 581st MID was assigned to CMAC as a carrier unit for morning report purposes on this same date.
(8) The IG inspection was conducted as scheduled and it was anticipated that problem areas discovered and remedial action recommended would be a catalyst for smoothing organization and functions.

c. (C) G-2 Activities:

(1) Prior to 4 June, the G2 Section of the Capital Military District Advisory Team consisted of three officers (G2 Adv, DG2 Adv and IPW Adv), one NCO (NCOIC), and three enlisted men (OB Analyst, OB Analyst Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area, and IPW NCO Adv). The G2 Section was formed superimposed on this framework. When completed it consisted of 15 officers, 5 NCOs, and 15 enlisted men. In order to provide an experience base and to provide for production of valid intelligence, selected personnel from the Advisory Team were absorbed into the section in such positions as Chief Production, OB NCOIC, G2 Section NCOIC, and Collection NCO. In this manner, while the organizational problems were being solved, the section was able to continue daily operations and train new personnel.

(2) Space limitations permitted only those elements required for immediate response (G2, Asst G2, G2 Air, Operations Officer and TOC) to be located in the CMD Compound. The remaining elements (OB, IPW, CI, Collection Production and Administration) were located in the MACV Annex, 30 minutes distant. This division of the section has imposed some problems. Location of the entire section in the CMD Compound is currently being negotiated.

(3) The initial TD made no provision for a CI Officer. The position was added to the current TD to provide for supervision of the Command CI, CONSEC and Internal Security programs. No field inspection or CI investigation capability is provided. Assistance is being obtained from the 525th MI Group.

(4) Rapid exploitation of POWs and documents has been a problem. POWs are picked up and detained by U.S. and ARVN units (both OPCON and non-OPCON), district forces, National Police, and others. There has been no central facility for receiving, screening and interrogating POWs. During July, CMD began construction of a central facility to meet this need. The facility will be located in the CMD Compound. Details of operation have not been finalized but it is anticipated that POWs and documents from all capturing agencies will be evacuated to the center, resulting in more rapid and effective exploitation.

(5) The establishment of a G2 element in the CMAC TOC has provided for expeditious receipt and dissemination of intelligence reports. The CMAC Intelligence Net is controlled by this element and includes the six District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC), the 9 Saigon Police Precincts, and OPCON units. This net, established late in July, is expected to expedite the flow of information and intelligence.

(6) The enemy threat to Saigon and the Capital Military District includes attacks by fire with rockets and mortars with or without infiltration or ground attacks. The enemy has been versatile and ingenious, particularly in employing rockets. Initially, rocket attacks were conducted by trained crews who carefully planned and laid out deliberate firing positions, protected by security
forces. More recently, rocket launch positions have been in the open, with launch tubes not always used. Methods of ground attacks have also varied. During the Tet Attacks, numbers of enemy forces infiltrated into the city and attacked in small groups. Other forces conducted mass attacks outside the city. Another technique was to infiltrate within the edge of the city, dig in and conduct either a determined defense or assault. Infiltration usually took place in small groups on foot at night. Personnel and supply movements also may be by sampan, especially ammunition and weapons. Infiltration has been in civilian clothes, RVNAF uniforms, among passengers on buses, and in secret compartments on buses. One pattern that continues is the use of district, province and friendly unit boundaries as routes, and for location of caches.

d. (C) Operations:

(1) As a part of the massive reaction to the NVA/VC 1968 Tet Offensive, key representatives of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam commanded by Major General Keith L. Ware, then Deputy Commanding General, deployed to Capital Military District Headquarters. For two days General Ware utilized the facilities and staff of Advisory Team 100, then transferred to JGS Compound when more personnel and equipment arrived. For the following twelve days "Hurricane Forward" controlled all U.S. Forces within the Saigon/Gia Dinh area, and advised RVN elements in actions required to defeat the enemy penetration.

(2) On 5 May, Hurricane Forward moved again to Saigon for an 11 day period in order to stop and turn back threatened enemy penetrations. Hurricane Forward was designated "Task Force Hay" and was expanded to include more operations and intelligence personnel, a G-1 and a small Headquarters Commandant Section. Commanded by Major General John H. Hay, newly appointed DCG, II FFV, UoS. forces played a significant role in inflicting severe punishment on die-hard enemy units. The enemy was forced to withdraw as far north as War Zone "C" and northwest to the Cambodian Border.

(3) Task Force Hay returned to the Capital Military District later in May in response to intelligence, but a determined attack failed to materialize.

(4) In view of the continuing threat against the Capital Military District, Task Force Hay moved to Saigon 4 June, and was established on a permanent basis. The new headquarters began to expand in order to assume additional responsibilities in the defense of the Capital. On 27 June, Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam published General Order Number 3086, establishing Headquarters, Capital Military Assistance Command (Provisional) with an effective date of 4 June 1968. The missions stated were:

(a) Exercise OPCON over designated U.S. units in defense of Saigon and of specified areas within CMD.

(b) Provide surveillance and countermeasures to prevent rocket and mortar attacks on Saigon.

(c) Advise and assist Saigon Military Governor and Commanding General CMD, with particular emphasis on providing for the effective defense of Saigon.
(d) Direct U.S. Advisors to ARVN, RF/PF, and National Police Forces in security matters.

(e) Exercise OPCON of USARV defense and security matters.

(5) The period following the relatively heavy fighting in early June was characterized by intensive operations throughout CMAC AO, without major enemy contact. Cordon and search, search and destroy, air assault, reconnaissance-in-force, and riverine operations are conducted on a daily basis. The usual pattern consists of U.S. units providing cordon/security while ARVN units search the area of interest. Combined sweeps and reconnaissance in force operations are also common, with effective cooperation between U.S. and ARVN commanders, and RVN District personnel. Results, while not of major importance, have been steady and have resulted in further denying the enemy access into and freedom of movement within CMD.

(6) CMAC has successfully undertaken its assigned missions. An effective counter rocket system is operational. U.S. Army ground and aviation units under operational control of CMAC conduct aggressive operations in order to find the enemy and destroy him. Excellent U.S. - RVN relationships insure continued close coordination and cooperation in the overall security of the CMD.

(7) Units under OPCON to Headquarters, CMAC with effective dates are as follows:

(a) 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) - 20 June.

(b) 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division - 5 July.

(c) 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (-) (attach: B Trp, 7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cav) - 5 July

(d) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery - 10 June

(e) USARAC (for security matters only) - 27 June.

(8) On 25 July, Major General Hay departed the command for CONUS. Brigadier General Emil P. Eschenburg, Deputy Commanding General, assumed command until the arrival of Major General F. K. Mearns on 3 August 1968.

(U) G-4 Activities:

(1) During the reporting period the CMAC G-4 Section was involved in determining and developing equipment requirements; liaison and coordination with HQ, USARV and Logistical Command units on availability of stocks in depots; obtaining releases, and picking up required materiel. Additional coordination was also required with other headquarters which were tasked by USARV to provide equipment that was not available from depot stocks.

(2) On 20 June, each staff section submitted a list of equipment required for their operation to the G-4 Section. The consolidated list was delivered to USARV G3 Force Development Division on 21 June for use in preparation of a tentative TDA for HQ, Capital Military Assistance Command. This list of equipment was attached as Inclosure 2 of USARV General Order Number 3086, 27 June 1968.
(3) Prior to publication of the General Order and tentative TDA, USARV MSG 56649 TCG 23 0763-Z June 68, directed 1st Log Command to prepare supply directives on twenty (20) vehicles and the bulk of the office furniture required for immediate use by this command. Other USARV messages were released late in June and continued through July, directing that supply directives be prepared or lateral transfers (unit draw down) be made on the bulk of the items appearing on the original TDA.

(4) During the period when the first equipment and expendable supplies were being drawn, the Property Book Section, Advisory Team 100, CMD, provided invaluable support for this headquarters. This support was urgently needed since the Property Book Section under the HQ Commandant had not been established and staffed.

(5) Because of the urgent requirements of this Headquarters following activation, all supply requests were assigned a high urgency of need designation and were hand-carried through each supply support activity to expedite release and pick up. After obtaining the supply directives from the 14th Inventory Control Center, they were carried to the stock control section of the 506th Field Depot to obtain the material release order (MRO). The MROs then had to be hand carried to each storage location to be checked against stock locator files. Many times the item requested would not be on hand at any of the storage locations, and the procedure would have to be repeated to obtain a suitable substitute item under a different Federal Stock Number. This hand carry procedure continues to be very time consuming for both the requesting unit and supply support activities, and keeps unit supply personnel occupied trying to pick up critical items.

(6) The support from the 506th Field Depot has been poor due to the many warehouse denials, and the additional time required to process new paperwork for substitute items. It is realized that they were in the process of moving to a new depot location and the stock locations were not computerized. Little assistance was provided by depot personnel in locating items that were required by CMAC. Support provided by USAD, Cam Ranh Bay, as backup to the 506th Field Depot, has been excellent.

(7) Because of expanding missions and the addition of personnel to the headquarters, equipment requirements were revised and further coordinated with representatives from USARV G4. On 23 July 1968, a new list of TDA equipment requirements for CMAC was finalized, and furnished to CMAC in General Order Number 3652, 29 July 1968, which superseded Inclosure 2 of General Order Number 3086.

(8) This Headquarters was organized without organic capability to perform organizational maintenance. Maintenance units under the 29th General Support Group, Saigon Support Command were designated to provide maintenance support. Representatives from the 29th GS Group and the 79th Maintenance BN visited this Headquarters to designate locations where maintenance support is available for each type of requirement. They have accepted equipment at any time day or night and have provided prompt service to get the equipment back in operation.

f. (U) G-5 Activities:
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(i) Upon activation, G-7 personnel and equipment were initially provided by Advisory Team 100 with the remaining personnel requirements to be supplied from MACV and USARV resources. Expedient methods and initiative on the part of section personnel allowed organization and operations to proceed simultaneously. Requirements were met despite the unfamiliarity of most of the section personnel with their jobs and with the overall organization.

(ii) Prior to 27 June, activities were conducted by Advisory Team 100 with three PSYOP Teams from the 6th PSYOP Bn. On 27 June, these teams were placed under control of G-5, CMAC. During the entire period 4 June to 31 July, PSYOP missions were conducted on a daily round-the-clock basis resulting in 197 ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program.

(iii) Administration and supply problems incidental to the organization of this section were not a significant handicap. Despite the withdrawal of key personnel - two of three officers - by the 6th PSYOP Bn, a high level of effective PSYOPS continues to be directed against both enemy and civilian targets. Tactical Psychological Operations were conducted daily during the 58 day reporting period.

(C) Artillery:

(i) The CMAC Artillery Section was formed in accordance with General Order 3086, dtd 27 June 1968, HQ, USARV, utilizing personnel and equipment from HQ, 6th Bn, 15th Artillery. The FSE was established and became functional on 10 June 1968. The mission of the Artillery Section focused upon the defense of Saigon against rocket and mortar attack. The necessity for a means of detecting rockets/mortars became immediately apparent. Nine flash observation posts were established at strategic locations manned by personnel and equipment from the 6/15 Artillery. A counter battery program using locations of previous and suspected enemy firing positions was developed and disseminated to all clearing agencies - OPCON Artillery Battalions, Infantry elements and RVN District and Province Chiefs. Quick reaction techniques were perfected for immediate delivery of fires on preplanned and precleared targets in event of attack by mortars or rockets.

(ii) A survey of the Saigon defense area and research of past rocket attack data resulted in the establishment of four aerial surveillance corridors. These corridors were placed under continuous surveillance by Cobra gunships and light observation helicopters during the hours of darkness. A counter rocket/mortar radar surveillance plan was formulated and executed utilizing AN/MFQ-4 radars OPCON to CMAC. Orienting and positioning data were developed for these radars, and nine active counter-mortar/rocket sites are now integrated with the Saigon defense system. Three TPS 33 surveillance radars were later placed under operational control of CMAC Artillery. These radars are currently being replaced with the AN/TPS 25 which is easier to maintain and more reliable.

(iii) On 26 July, the 6/15 Artillery was relieved of responsibility for CMAC Artillery operations and placed in a general support role to CMAC. The counter rocket/mortar defense system presently employed by CMAC was evaluated by a team from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at the request of CG, II FFORCEV. The evaluation was completed on 30 July, with results forthcoming.
h. (U) Engineer:

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(1) The Engineer Section was originally authorized one officer and one EM. It doubled in size on 17 July, and a third officer was assigned on 25 July. In addition, an officer was temporarily attached on 19 July for the sole purpose of performing road and bridge reconnaissances. There were no Engineer units OPCON to this Headquarters, therefore engineer support was requested from II FFORCEN and subsequently provided by the 20th Engineer Brigade. The CMAC Engineer Section coordinated all available support and assigned priorities when required.

(2) The predominant operational mission of the Engineer Section was improvement of bridge security, particularly on 24 key bridges. Pier protection was installed on 7 bridges, lighting was installed or improved on 9 bridges, and defensive positions were improved on 18 bridges. Two hundred and sixty-six day and night surveys for security of bridges were conducted. Responsible units were directed to improve security measures. ARVN units were requested to improve their bridge security, with encouraging results in many instances.

(3) Four radar towers and three observation towers were constructed to support the counter rocket program. Also two observation platforms and four weather shelters were completed in existing structures. A bridge span which had been destroyed at coordinates YS004972 was removed to allow navigation.

i. (C) Signal:

(1) With the rapid expansion of CMAC there was an immediate demand for communications. Immediate response to this demand was hindered by the lack of organic signal equipment and personnel. Initial communications were provided through borrowed equipment, which was slowly phased out as TDA equipment became available. An initial problem and one which remains was insufficient operating space. The VHF terminal equipment was initially located at the Free World Tower, a walking distance of 20 minutes. The remaining sections - operations, switchboard, and message center - were located along an open porch. The radio room was the only area with minimum required space to operate. It was originally the CMD radio room and was converted for use by CMAC with redesigning of an existing console to accept the additional radios and remotes. A partition was then installed to provide an isolated area for the switchboard. With the acquiring of an MSC-25 van and more space, the Signal Operations Section was established and was able to increase security of and exercise improved control over communications.

(2) A significant improvement was conversion from an SB-06 switchboard to a 3 position common battery board, allowing installation of common battery telephones, increased trunking and drop capability, as well as an increased number of instruments in service. The new switchboard was not without faults. There were no trained operators, and many internal problems within the board developed as a result of age. The inadequate commercial power system caused other operational maintenance difficulties. The power problem was partially eliminated with the temporary installation of 10 KW generators. The continual shifting of headquarters office facilities as more space became available posed a problem for telephone installation and operation. As offices moved or were redesigned, many internal wire lines had to be rerouted resulting in personnel
being removed from other pressing work projects to reinstall already existing facilities.

(3) The effort to establish CMAC FM Radio Nets was hindered by slow receipt of radios and antennae. Much of the organizational signal equipment received as a result of unit draw down was either incomplete or inoperative and was rejected, further delaying full operational status. The CMAC SOI was changed continually to keep pace with net configurations. On 31 July, there were 10 operational FM radio nets as follows:

(a) CMAC Command
(b) CMAC Secure
(c) CMAC Intelligence
(d) Air - Ground
(e) Rocket - 1 (tower spotters)
(f) Rocket - 2 (radar surveillance)
(g) Aircraft warning
(h) Artillery Fire Direction
(i) Water
(j) Advisor Control

(4) During the reporting period 1st Signal Brigade provided outstanding support to this Headquarters. They assisted in the establishment of critical voice and teletype circuits, provided installation assistance and maintenance support for the AN/TTC-7 Switchboard, and assisted in the installation of inside and outside plant wire construction.

j. (U) Information Office:

(1) The CMAC Information Officer conducted seven major briefings. MG Hay briefed the press corps on 28 June at HQ, CMAC; Time-Life, Newsweek, United Press International (UPI), Agence France Presse (AFP), the New York Times, and Empire News Service were briefed by the Information Officer. Major photographic assignments were completed including preparation of material for MG Hay's scheduled White House briefing, visits by Secretary of the Army Resor and President Thieu to CMAC, and MG Hay's departure ceremony. Photographing the weekly CMAC progress report for COMUSMACV was begun on a continuing basis.

(2) Photographic processing and printing support from Southeast Asia Pictorial Center/MACV detachment was inadequate; their work being neither prompt nor of acceptable quality. This problem was partially solved by establishing a relationship with the 600th Photo Squadron (Tan Son Nhat). Their facilities, however, are available only on an occasional basis. The Audio-Visual Section of MACOI has assisted by providing equipment on temporary loan.
(3) Because of the lack of reliable facilities, temporary expedients have been employed. In order to accomplish the photographic mission, personnel process film in their quarters and print in the USAHAC craft shop.

k. (U) Medical:

(1) The Medical Section became operational with the assignment of one captain, MSC, MOS 3506 and one SFC E7 MOS 91B4H on 21 June 1968. From 21 June to 1 July, the personnel became familiar with the operation of the Capital Military Assistance Command and of medical support units within the area.

(2) During the first half of July, the Medical Section coordinated the medical support for Headquarters, CMAC. The 218th General Dispensary assumed the primary responsibility for medical care. The 20th Preventive Medicine Unit assumed the responsibility for billets, mess and water inspection, Headquarters Area Command PA&E began providing insect and rodent control of CMAC Headquarters area.

(3) On 9 July, one Medical Evacuation helicopter was field sited at the Tan Son Nhut Helicopter field by the 68th Medical Group to provide quicker response time for evacuations within the CMAC AO. Difficulties with communications at first limited the use of this helicopter. On 19 July 1968, the heliport tower authorized the use of one tower frequency for temporary use of Saigon dustoff. This will eventually be replaced by an emergency call system integrated with the dustoff net for the III and IV Corps Area.

1. (C) Capital Military District Advisory Detachment (Adv Tm 100):

(1) After evaluating command and control problems encountered during the VC attack on Saigon, both ARVN and U.S. forces recognized the need for a centralized command responsible for the defense of the Capital City. On 4 June the Capital Military District Headquarters was reorganized under the command of MG Nguyen Van Minh, who was also designated Military Governor, Saigon. The Capital Military Assistance Command was formed concurrently under the command of MG Hay. The desired arrangement was achieved since headquarters and Tactical Operations Centers are co-located for effective control of security forces within the CMD.

(2) In order to limit the enemy use of waterways, a Waterway Denial Plan was implemented on 20 June utilizing two VN River Assault Groups (RAG), two Regional Force Boat companies, elements of US Navy Task Group 116.4 and National Police River Patrol Boats. All major waterways within the CMD area are patrolled by day and night and checkpoints are established on a random basis throughout the area. In support of night operations aerial recognition lights are being installed on patrol boats, four starlight scopes have been requisitioned and plans are being prepared for the use of 4 night observation devices, plus searchlights with IR filters on RAG boats.

(3) On 8 July 1968 the CMD G-3 in coordination with CMAC G-3 established a plan to provide "floating" boundaries between US/ARVN Brigades located inside CMD. The boundaries are changed on an irregular basis thus preventing
the VC from using them for "safe" areas.

(4) Utilising the experience gained in fighting the VC/NW in built up areas during the first part of the year, ARVN units with assistance of U.S. Advisors established combat-in-cities training programs. The Marine Task Force was the first unit to complete this program. At the close of the reporting period, the 5th Ranger Group and the Airborne Brigade were undergoing refresher training scheduled for completion in August 1968.

2 (c) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(i) Personnel In-Processing.

(a) OBSERVATION: In-processing of newly assigned groups of personnel should be accomplished by an experienced team with adequate facilities.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found that the lack of qualified personnel, facilities and equipment made in-processing exceedingly difficult. Organization and staffing were attempted with such urgency that incoming personnel were without records and personal equipment in many cases. Personnel accountability became extremely difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when units are levied for a newly established organization, detailed instructions accompany all change of station orders and prior arrangements be made to insure that soldiers' records are properly administered.

b. Operations.

(i) Enemy Use of Boundaries.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy uses organizational and political boundaries as sanctuaries for troops and cache locations.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy quickly recognizes fixed boundaries when friendly forces fail to operate across them or fail to bring fires to bear on that vicinity for no apparent reason. Aircraft also may tend to fly along fixed lines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That boundaries between units not coincide with political boundaries, and that boundaries are changed ("floated") at irregular intervals.

(2) Placing Fire on Enemy Locations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Actual sightings and indications of enemy activity have been reported only to disappear before clearance to fire could be obtained.

(b) EVALUATION: Casualties have still been inflicted by placing fires from artillery, gunships, and/or TAC air into the area and along nearby routes and possible hiding places as soon as clearance is obtained.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That fire power be brought to bear on known or suspected enemy locations as soon as clearance to fire is obtained.

(3) Clearance for Airstrikes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Clearances from RVN agencies for pre-planned airstrikes in some cases have not been received in time to submit requests through channels.

(b) EVALUATION: Some RVN personnel are under the impression that pre-planned airstrikes are H&I type fires and are not to be controlled.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That coordination with and advice to RVN elements continuously stress the correct use of air support.

c. Training.

Use of Airboats.

(a) OBSERVATION: The airboat is a valuable asset to an infantry unit when used within its limits and capabilities.

(b) EVALUATION: The airboat is fast and highly maneuverable in partially inundated areas; however, it is particularly vulnerable to both puncturing and swamping, and it requires careful maintenance. An airboat operator must be well trained prior to conducting operations, and continue exclusively as an operator for as long as the unit utilizes airboats.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That airboat operators be given that job exclusively and that maintenance personnel be required in all unit requests for boats.

d. Intelligence.

Enemy Use of Subterfuge.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy uses a variety of clever disguises to enter and leave areas controlled by friendly forces.

(b) EVALUATION: According to intelligence sources, the enemy is using both U.S. and ARVN uniforms to infiltrate friendly held areas. The enemy is known to use the guise of invalids, monks and pregnant women. Recently a U.S. unit found female clothing including wigs and padding which could be used by a man to pose as a woman. Another tactic used is to fake nausea at a check-point in an effort to discourage interrogation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units be made increasingly aware of the enemy's utilization of these and similar techniques.

e. Logistics.

(1) Determination of Equipment for Newly Established Headquarters.

(a) OBSERVATION: This Headquarters was activated rapidly without
sufficient time to fully evaluate equipment needs.

(b) EVALUATION: The planning for essential equipment should be developed concurrently with the initial concept of operations and mission. Personnel finding themselves assigned to a new unit encounter a great deal of difficulty in determining complete, accurate lists of required equipment. An existing list of equipment, however, based on the concept of operations and mission, could be refined after a relatively short time with a minimum of confusion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That force development personnel be utilized early in the planning stage to assist in developing initial staffing/material requirements.

(2) Expediting Receipt of Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The designation of staff project personnel to expedite and equip a newly activated organization will not necessarily insure the same sense of urgency.

(b) EVALUATION: A project officer at a higher headquarters is able to assist in obtaining supply clearances and staff approvals on controlled items. Once such documentation is obtained, it should be forwarded to a supply activity having a designated project team to prepare release documentation, locate and assemble items, and to coordinate transportation for pick up or delivery to the unit. This was done in the case of the Americal Division and assisted in overcoming potential delays.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a directive applying to all headquarters and support agencies be prepared, specifying action to be taken by project teams to enable newly activated units to obtain equipment without undue delay.

1. Organization. None
2. Other.

(1) Quick Reaction PSYOP.

(a) OBSERVATION: Quick reaction PSYOP tapes and written messages are often unusable due to length.

(b) EVALUATION: In the preparation of quick reaction PSYOP tapes and leaflets, it has been found that PSYOP messages are often too long for optimum use by aerial loudspeaker equipped PSYOP teams. Also, written messages frequently will not physically fit within the leaflet itself, causing delays in layout and printing. Rallys, PWs, etc., should be closely supervised when preparing messages; otherwise the original spontaneous message must be replaced by a rewritten one which sounds less.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units prepare and issue suggested formats which will insure quick reaction messages are timely and of proper length.
(2) Security of Bridges.

(a) OBSERVATION: Security elements guarding bridges frequently concentrate on guarding the top of the bridge and the land accessways, leaving the critical sub-structure vulnerable.

(b) EVALUATION: Guards have been found guarding only the top of a bridge with lights placed only on the decks and road approaches. A bridge can be damaged by placing charges on the deck, but the damage is usually easily repaired. Much greater damage can be done by placing charges on underwater piers or abutments since this procedure usually collapses at least one complete span. The VC have the capability to place underwater charges using swimmers or divers. They can also use floating charges.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the first priority for bridge lighting should be to piers and abutments; guards should be positioned to observe them in addition to the top of the bridges and the land approaches.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. Burkhalter
Major, ACC
Adjutant General

7 Incis

1. AO of CMAC OPCON Units
   (Sketch Map)
2. CMAC Commanders Notes/Op
   Lessons Learned, 5 Aug 68
3. CMAC Weekly Commanders Notes/Op Lessons Learned, 26 Jul 68
4. CMAC Commanders Notes/Op Lessons Learned, 14 Jul 68
5. CMAC Commanders Notes/Op Lessons Learned, 3 Jul 68
6. CMAC Commanders Notes/Op Lessons Learned, 24 Jun 68
7. USCMAC Operational Concept, 1 Aug 68 *Withdrawn, HQs, DA

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   Dir of Evaluation (For Information)
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1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (1.OC), for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

To: II FFORC, APO San Francisco 96266

9 SEP 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AV:GC(DST), AIO 5375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Capital Military Assistance Command for the period ending 31 July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. R. FORY

1LT, AGC

Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, Capital Military Assistance Command (Provisional).

2. Reference item concerning expediting receipt of equipment, page 12, paragraph 2e(2): Nonconcur. Newly activated DA approved TDA/HTOC units are assisted by project officers and teams in drawing their initial issue of equipment, whereas provisional units are assisted in other ways. The reason for the difference is one of priority. The "project system" gives the unit being organized the highest priority for issue and receipt of equipment. Provisional units are assisted in their activation by a draw-down on other USARV units wherever possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ, CMAC
GPOP-DT (undtd) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Capital Military Assist Comd (Prov)
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVCE-CS

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

TO: See Distribution

These Notes/Lessons Learned are based on current experience. They are important, timely principles and procedures to be applied in order to achieve best results in the present tactical environment. This is the 5th of a series of such notes, which are published periodically.

1. The enemy will go to extremes to conceal weapons, equipment and munitions rather than expose them to seizure by FWMAF during ground operations. Mine sweepers, probing rods, and dogs should be used to assist in locating enemy materiel. Give particular attention to suspected VC infiltrated hamlets. Old tunnels and underground fortifications are used regularly as cache sites and will usually yield weapons and material (often booby trapped) when the enemy is forced to withdraw in haste.

2. Detailed planning and coordination are especially important in US-ARVN combined operations. Differences in language, background and experience increase the possibility of misunderstanding. The assumption that both parties understand the intricacies of a pending operation is a dangerous one, regardless of the amount of time spent in joint planning. Coordination between commanders must be continuous throughout a combined operation to minimize and detect misunderstanding before it causes confusion.

3. When one unit is under operational control of another, responsibilities for maintenance and support should be specified. This responsibility normally remains with the parent organization; however, this and other support arrangements should be specifically directed.

4. Solatium payments of civilians wounded or killed as a result of U.S. operations will be made within forty-eight hours of the incident. Payment will be made in person by a U.S. Officer, directly to the person(s) concerned. In addition, when the remains of VN civilians who die of wounds in U.S. Hospitals are returned to their family, they will be accompanied by an officer.

5. Use proper radio telephone procedure for speed and accuracy during rocket suppression missions. Emphasis on use of proper R/T procedures has resulted in significant improvement in reaction time to report sightings of suspect rocket/mortar firing locations to the CMAC FSE.

Incl 2
6. Personnel manning the CMAC Flash Base OP's for 12 hour periods become excessively fatigued and ineffective. Better performance results when OP duties are rotated every 4 hours. Rotation also enhances cross-training.

7. Signal personnel were assigned from other units in Vietnam to establish communications for CMAC Headquarters. In many cases they lacked experience and training. After 40 days of operation only 50% of authorized personnel had been assigned. They had never worked together before, were using equipment borrowed from other units, and had no spare parts, tools or technical manuals to maintain equipment. For effective command and control trained commo personnel should be in place and functioning before, or as soon as possible after the headquarters commences operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. B. WATSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (PROV)
APO San Francisco 96243

AVCE-CG 26 July 1968

SUBJECT: Weekly Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned (U)

TO: See Distribution

These Notes/Lessons Learned are based on current experience. They are important, timely principles and procedures to be applied in order to achieve best results in the present tactical environment. This is the 4th of a series of such notes, which are published weekly.

1. (U) Establishing the CMAC as a new organization emphasized the importance of responsible personnel management. Each individual must understand his mission and the mission and operations of the command and its headquarters. Establishment of the headquarters organization must be coordinated among all staff sections. Proposed personnel requirements must be commensurate with the mission. Structure, grade, MOS, and job description must be clearly defined and duties thoroughly explained by each staff section. The initial organization should be stabilized before any but the most urgent changes are made. After sufficient time has elapsed to prove out any additional requirements, excesses or variances, necessary modifications may then be recommended. Hasty changes, not thought out, should be avoided.

2. (C) Intelligence is a key to successful Cordon and Search Operations and especially essential in attacking the VCI. If the next enemy attack were to achieve any success, a major role would be played by VC infrastructure (VCI) in providing guides, food, ammunition, commo-liaison support, porters, forced laborers, medical assistance and facilities. The infrastructure can be degraded and its effectiveness limited, thereby placing any main force units conducting an attack at a great disadvantage.

   a. Cordon and Search Operations will be effective in eliminating the VCI only if coordination is made with reliable friendly local intelligence agencies prior to the operation. The intelligence agencies, particularly the DIOCC's can provide information on known and suspected Viet Cong in the area and routes to be sealed off while conducting operations.

   b. Increased employment of Cordon and Search Operations based on good intelligence will also destroy the base of VC/NVA infiltration.

3. (C) Of all the bridges in the III Corps Tactical Zone damaged or destroyed by the enemy since January 1968, 47% were attacked early on a Sunday.
4. (C) Actual sightings and indications of enemy activity have been reported, only to disappear before clearance to fire could be obtained. Nevertheless, this should not preclude gunship or artillery fire from being placed into the area and along routes and possible hiding places nearby as soon as clearance is obtained. Many enemy have been eliminated in this manner.

5. (U) The use of Recon by Fire by ground troops is a valuable technique. It will often open the battle at 100-200 meters rather than at close range (20-30 meters) where the moving friendly element is at an initial disadvantage and the employment of supporting fires is difficult or impossible.

6. (U) Transporting troops in trucks in unsecured areas is extremely dangerous under any circumstances. There is an ever present possibility of ambush and mines on unsecured LOC. The individual soldier must do as his leaders decide, and is at the mercy of your judgement. Do not send him out in a troop convoy on unsecured roads, by day or by night.

7. (U) If the enemy is capable of approaching undetected to within 400-500 meters of an NDP, that position is subject to indirect observed and direct fire, as well as inadequate reaction time to counter a major attack. To prevent this, local daylight patrols, to be effective, must be out frequently to 1000-1500 meters from NDPs.

8. (U) Clearances from local RVN sources for pre-planned airstrikes in some cases have not been received in sufficient time to submit requests to USAF. Some units are apparently under the impression that airstrikes are H&I type fires and are not to be controlled. Understanding between U.S. and RVNAF personnel at all levels must be continuous, to include how airstrikes are controlled and what precautions are taken to preclude friendly casualties and damage.

9. (U) During adverse weather conditions with low ceiling and poor visibility, the UH-ID can sometimes be used more effectively than a C-47 or U-10 aircraft to fly leaflet and loudspeaker missions in the Saigon and Gia Dinh area. When available, especially during the summer months, helicopters should be used as an alternate means if fixed wing aircraft cannot successfully complete these missions due to altitude and weather restrictions.

10. (U) It is imperative that artillery units keep an accurate, detailed record of each step taken during a rocket/mortar attack. Include as a minimum the exact time a target is identified, when clearance is requested and a decision is received, time each target is engaged, time quick reaction fires commence, and number of rounds expended on each target. Further, this information must be reported to CMAC FSE as soon as possible after each rocket/mortar attack in CMD.

11. (U) Lights are frequently used as part of a bridge security system to
SUBJECT: Weekly Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

Illuminate piers, abutments and water access ways. However, care should be taken to keep defensive positions and sentries in darkness. Also, lights should be installed in such a manner that the lights and light reflections do not shine in the sentry's eyes and interfere with his vision.

EMIL P. ESCHENBURG
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
14 July 1966

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

These notes/lessons learned are based on current experience. They are important, timely principles and procedures to be applied in order to achieve best results in the present tactical environment.

a. All/APOC radars should on command of MACP CSO, swing their beam onto suspected rocket/mortar locations and be prepared to adjust artillery quick reaction fires onto a suspected grid. Adjustments can be accomplished by transmitting corrections to MACP CSO to be relayed to the DS/Control Artillery BN.

b. In areas where contact has been frequent, an aerial observer should be immediately available (airborne or ground alert) to adjust close in artillery fires.

c. All letters, notes, diaries and other documents taken from enemy POWs and bodies should be passed to intelligence personnel regardless of how insignificant the material may seem. A mere note could reveal the unit's identity, location, or possible movement. Souvenirs are nice to have, but the one YOU keep might provide the key to a successful engagement.

d. The CH-54 Flying Crane can be used effectively to extract obstacles such as small fallen bridge spans from navigable streams. The rigging attached to the obstacle must extend above the water surface since the hook block from the crane is operated electrically and cannot be operated in the water. The unit performing the ground operations must be prepared to provide sufficient rigging to allow above-water hook-up so as to avoid delaying the supporting aircraft or aborting the mission.

e. When units move as a result of changes in OPCON status, those units must be accounted for at all times. This requires actions by both the gaining and losing commanders and by the unit making the move. Each must insure that necessary reports are rendered and that information is disseminated to all concerned.

f. When intelligence concerning enemy locations and movement is passed to units within or immediately outside the CID boundaries, follow up to determine what action is planned or taken in response to.
the information. If none is planned after adequate verification has been accomplished, then operations and intelligence personnel must follow up to generate the appropriate action. This may include making arrangements for air, artillery, or gunship strikes, VR of the area and aerial photo missions.

J. H. Hay
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CMAC-OH 3 July 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

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These notes/lessons learned are based on current experience. They are important, timely principles and procedures to be applied in order to achieve best results in the present tactical environment.

a. The enemy uses fixed boundaries between our units as sanctuaries for troops and for cache locations. Boundaries should be arranged for periodically to allow units on each side to operate astride the boundary thereby denying these sanctuaries.

b. The enemy uses sampans to move weapons and ammunition. Find them and seize their contents, which experience reveals could be hidden. This headquarters can assist with specially trained divers if the sampans or cargo are likely to have been sunk or dropped overboard.

c. Plotting for clearance of artillery fires must be accurate in the FSE (CMAC) and at District HQ when requesting artillery clearances. An incident on the night of 27 June, in which 6 houses were 50% destroyed, is a case in point. Apply this to all fire support actions, emphasizing accuracy as well as promptness. Speed comes with practice and precision.

d. Downed aircraft will be evacuated by the most expeditious means. They will not be repaired in the downed field location if the repair takes longer than 30 minutes. Repair in the field endangers aircraft and ties up security forces for excessive periods of time.

e. Surveillance aircraft must not leave their orbit except to engage targets when so directed by the FSE. Landing to pickup detainees is an example of unnecessarily hazardous and improper diversion from assigned mission. This degrades the mission and could waste aircraft and personnel.

f. Coordination between river boats and friendly units on the canal and river banks must be very close and continuous. Otherwise, friendly casualties may result from exchange of fire between friendly units. A coordination system and communications are established. Use them.
CMAC-OC  
SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned  
3 July 1968

g. Before sending information to units bearing an intelligence evaluation, verify the evaluation. For example, an A-1 rating means: Completely reliable and confirmed. Accordingly, an A-1 may cause a commander to commit forces which may be needed elsewhere. Do not change an evaluation without valid information, as it may result in a waste of time and resources.

h. Artillery units should continually analyze all available intelligence data to determine possible enemy rocket/mortar firing locations. Locations should then be posted as concentrations and included in the counter rocket/mortar fire program. Every effort should be made to pre-clear these targets to insure minimum response time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN W. GRUBE  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

To: See Distribution

The following points are based on current experience. These are important, timely principles and procedures to be applied in order to achieve best results in the present tactical environment. Units under this command will indoctrinate personnel concerned. Supporting commanders are requested to apply these lessons.

a. Vary the location of ambush positions and inspection control points by at least 500 meters each day or night and do not return to a former location for several days.

b. Use enough supporting fire power (artillery/air when cleared) to defeat such enemy targets as are believed to be present. Make use of reinforcing as well as direct supporting fires.

c. When the enemy is in bunkers, you have to use hard bombs, napalm and 8 inch/175mm artillery (preferably with delay fuse). Anything less is wasted effort. Again, use plenty of volume (e.g. 15-20 air sorties x 5-10 runs).

d. When using smoke, put it on or a few yards in front of the enemy's position; close enough for flame throwers to reach enemy bunkers from outside the area of smoke. Take precautions against starting fires in friendly built up areas.

e. When receiving and reporting intelligence, G2, G3 and the commander must know the meaning of, verify where possible, and act on such intelligence at each headquarters when it is processed. For example, reports of nearby enemy presence should be verified or refuted when possible, before passing such reports on.
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CMAC-OC

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes/Operational Lessons Learned

24 June 1968

f. Practice those procedures which must be perfect (e.g. sighting, recognition and location of rocket/mortar launch/firing sites by ground and aerial OPs, using captured enemy weapons by day and night). Work to improve accuracy and reaction time, communication response, and recording/plotting of enemy targets.

g. Use a separate listening station to monitor each radio net, using English and Vietnamese monitors. Quickly identify any interfering station and take immediate corrective action, entering the net when necessary to do so.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN W. GRUBE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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29
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned

HQ, US Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1968**

**CO**, US Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov)

#### 2. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

#### 4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1968

**CO**, US Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov)

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