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15 August 1968

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For the Commander:

W. T. Callon, Jr.
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SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. REDESIGNATION and REORGANIZATION

(C) USARPAC General Order 325 and 326 dated 28 June 1968 redesignated the 101st Airborne Division as the 101st Air Cavalry Division and changed the organization from an airborne to an airmobile configuration effective 1 July 1968. Reorganization of the division will be accomplished in three phases: phase 1 which began 1 July 1968 involved the organization of the 160th Aviation Group and a reorganization of the division base; phase 2 will involve the conversion of the Armored Cavalry Squadron to an Air Cavalry Squadron and the receipt of additional air assets; phase 3 will complete the conversion of the division to the airmobile configuration with the arrival of two batteries of aerial rocket artillery.

B. COMMAND

(U) On 19 July 1968 Major General Melvin Zais assumed command of the division from Major General Olinto M. Barsanti.

C. OPERATIONS

1. (C) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, the 101st Air Cavalry Division conducted operations to provide security and root denial operations for Hue and the surrounding area. The operations conducted during the reporting period include CARENTAN II (8 Mar - 17 May), DELAWARE (19 April - 17 May) and NEVADA EAGLE (17 May - continuing).

2. (C) Operation CARENTAN II consisted of the 2d Bde conducting RIF operations north and northwest of Hue to destroy enemy forces, base camps and installations, while the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div provided external security for Hue and conducted RIF operations east and south of Hue.

3. (C) The 1st Bde, 101st ACD conducted Operation DELAWARE from 18 April to 17 May in the mountains west of Hue. This operation was conducted in conjunction with the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 1st ARVN Div. As the 1st Bde, 101st ACD attached west from vicinity FB Bastogne (YD 621092) towards the A Shau Valley, the 1st ACD and ARVN forces conducted combat air assaults into the A Shau Valley. The 1st Bde, 101st ACD conducted RIF operations astride the axis of Hwy 547 and 547A to destroy enemy forces and locate enemy base camps and caches. During the period 1-17 May, the 1st Bde, 101st ACD engaged only small groups of enemy forces, who used delaying tactics, rather than the stiff defensive actions expected. As the 1st Bde, 101st ACD advanced west along Hwy 547 and 547A, they discovered...
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several trails capable of handling 1½ ton trucks. Subsequent searches along these trails after 17 May resulted in the discovery of sizeable vehicle, ammunition and weapons caches.

4. (C) During the period 17 May - 31 July, the 101st ACD conducted Operation NEVADA EAGLE. In this operation, the 101st ACD coordinated rice denial operations in Thua Thien Province and conducted offensive operations to defeat NVA/VC forces and to destroy enemy base camps and installations. The 1st Bde, 101st ACD continued RIF operations in the area vic Hwy 547 and 547A; the 2d Bde 101st ACD continued RIF operations in the coastal plains north and east of Hue and provided security and support for rice collection; and the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div continued security of fire bases astride Hwy 547 and conducted RIF operations along the entry and exit routes to the coastal plains.

5. (C) From 1 May - 5 June, the Division's combat operations were characterized by heavy fighting mainly in the coastal plains north and east of Hue, and the discovery of several weapons, ammunition and vehicle caches in the mountains west of Hue. For the remainder of the reporting period, contacts with and sightings of the enemy in groups larger than squad size were infrequent. The majority of the operations in June and July were conducted to locate the enemy and to protect the rice production. Continuous RIF operations and extensive night ambushes resulted in the capture of over 345 tons of rice and in impeding enemy movement throughout the Division AO.

6. (C) During the last week of the reporting period preparation for operation SOMERSET PLAIN began with a logistical build-up, and the building of fire bases.

7. (C) The chronological sequence of significant combat operations from 1 May - 31 July is as follows:

a. 1 May: 2-17 Cav was conducting a RIF operation and made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA Company, well dug in, occupying positions in the village area 13 km northwest of Hue (YD 534328). Trp A initially made contact and then maintained it while Trp B moved to a reinforcing position. Both Troops then withdrew to be supported by artillery and TAC Air. Following the softening up of the enemy positions, the Troops were able to make a partial sweep of the enemy objective area before darkness necessitated moving the armored vehicles to night positions. The operation accounted for 82 NVA KIA (BC) and 22 weapons captured; friendly casualties were: 2 US KHA and 26 US WHA.

b. 1-4 May: On 28 April the 2d Bde helilifted four companies to the Phuoc Yen village 7 km northwest of Hue (YD 6928) in response to intelligence reports which indicated that an enemy battalion was in the village. Upon landing near the village, the companies immediately made contact with a sizeable enemy force. Throughout the period 28 April - 2 May, numerous air strikes and heavy volumes of artillery fires were directed into the village.
several trails capable of handling 1 1/2 ton trucks. Subsequent searches along these trails after 17 May resulted in the discovery of sizeable vehicle, ammunition and weapons caches.

4. (C) During the period 17 May - 31 July, the 101st ACD conducted Operation NEVADA EAGLE. In this operation, the 101st ACD coordinated rice denial operations in Thua Thien Province and conducted offensive operations to defeat NVA/VC forces and to destroy enemy base camps and installations. The 1st Bde, 101st ACD continued RIF operations in the area vic Hwy 547 and 547A; the 2d Bde 101st ACD continued RIF operations in the coastal plains north and east of Hue and provided security and support for rice collection; and the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div continued security of fire bases astride Hwy 547 and conducted RIF operations along the entry and exit routes to the coastal plains.

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a. 1 May: 2-17 Cav was conducting a RIF operation and made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA Company, well dug in, occupying positions in the village area 13 km northwest of Hue (YD 634326). Trp A initially made contact and then maintained it while Trp B moved to a reinforcing position. Both Troops then withdrew to be supported by artillery and TAC Air. Following the softening up of the enemy positions, the Troops were able to make a partial sweep of the enemy objective area before darkness necessitated moving the armored vehicles to night positions. The operation accounted for 82 NVA KIA (BC) and 22 weapons captured; friendly casualties were: 2 US KHA and 26 US WHA.

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On 1 May after a CS drop and a series of air strikes, PSYOP broadcasts were made by an NVA PI captured during the early stages of the battle. Following the broadcasts and throughout subsequent broadcasts, 95 NVA soldiers surrendered. Theordon operation was concluded on 4 May and the final results were: 314 NVA KIA, 105 PI and 103 weapons captured. Friendly losses were: 6 US KIA, 43 US WIA (27 evacs). Interviews with PI revealed that the Battalion Commander and all company commanders were killed. The 8th BN NVA 223 Regt was decimated.

a. 6-7 May: 2-17 Cav and D/1-501 were conducting a RIF operation when they made contact and attacked an estimated NVA company occupying defensive positions in the village of La Chu, 5 km northwest of Hue (TD694240). Trp B with an OPFOR tank platoon maintained constant pressure to the front of the enemy force, while the mobile Trp A engaged the enemy with 106mm HA fire from the flanks. The battle was continued throughout the night under continuous illumination until contact was broken at approximately 0220hrs. The operation resulted in 55 NVA KIA (EC), 5 NVA WIA, 30 weapons captured. Friendly casualties were: 1 US KIA and 15 US WIA.

d. 19-28 May: During RIF operations along Hwy 547A, 10 km northeast of Ta Bat (TD4803), elements of 1-327 Abn Inf discovered significant vehicle and weapons caches containing, 54 trucks (1½ ton), 8x23mm AA guns, 5x95mm field artillery guns and 2x12.7mm MG and large amounts of 82mm, 76mm (tank), 75mm recoilless rifle, 82mm and 60mm mortar, 23mm AA and small arms ammunition.

e. 19 May: On 19 May A/2-327 engaged an NVA company 25 km southwest of Hue (TD569087) in an intense battle. TAC Air sorties and continuous artillery fires finally drove the enemy from the area. The results of the day long battle were: 6 US KIA, 19 US WIA, 24 NVA KIA and 6 weapons captured. Following the battle, Co A pursued the enemy and searched the battle area. During the search of the battlefield, Co A uncovered a series of weapons caches in bunkers via YD5609. During subsequent searches from 25 May to 4 June, they found 949 individual weapons and 90 crew-served weapons.

f. 20 May: At 0945 A/2-327, 7 km southeast of Hue (TD522118), received 35 rds of 82mm mortar fire and, shortly afterwards, was attacked by an estimated NVA platoon at 0942 hours. The enemy attack was repulsed with heavy volumes of SA/AA fire and supporting fires from TAC Air and artillery. Co A began to counterattack and continued to have heavy contact until 1510 hours, when the enemy filed. The 1st Platoon, while moving to link up with the rest of the company, engaged 4 remaining NVA in the area and killed them. Results: 1 US KIA, 9 US WIA (9 evacs), 31 NVA KIA, 9 NVA, 3 CSW.

g. 20-21 May: Reacting to intelligence reports which indicated increased enemy activity in village of Dong Gi Tay, 8 km east of Hue (TD521),...
B/1-501 conducted RIF operations to determine the exact location of the enemy. While moving north, Co B engaged an estimated company. Companies A/1-501, C/2-501 and D/1-502 conducted a combat assault into the battle area and quickly formed a cordon around the enemy. Co B was supported by 13 air strikes and 8", 155mm and 105mm artillery fires while exchanging SA/AW fire with the enemy. During 20 May the companies killed 57 enemy and captured 20 weapons. Throughout the night 20-21 May, artillery illumination was provided and at day-break, after silencing mortar fire inside the cordon, B/1-501 and D/1-502 swept through the village. The results of the cordon operation which terminated at 211700 hours May were: 12 US WHA, 62 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW, 42 IWC, 4 CSWC.

h. 21 May: At 0029 an estimated NVA battalion launched an intense mortar and rocket attack on the Division Base Camp, 8 km southeast of Hue (YD 808162). Over 400 rds hit the Base Camp between 0029 and 0138. Helicopters immediately lifted off to engage the enemy mortar and rocket launch sites (14 sites were located through radar and visual sightings). Under the cover of the incoming mortar rounds, the enemy launched a ground attack against the 1st Bde perimeter from YS 820142 to YD 836139. Using SA/AW fires, bangalore torpedoes, demolition charges and RPG-7 and RPG-2 fires, the enemy broke through the outer perimeter wires and moved toward the bunker line. Intense friendly AW/SA and LFT fires and direct fire artillery Bee Hive round repulsed the enemy attack. Artillerymen of the 2-320 Arty fired 4 rounds of Bee Hive at the enemy attempting to breach the perimeter and killed 12. The enemy fled from the area at 0500 and gunships continued to place fires on the retreating enemy. A sweep of the area at day-light revealed that enemy losses were 54 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW, 11 IWC, 5 CSWC, 40 satchel charges, 30 bangalore torpedoes, 50 RPG rockets, .x90mm RR rounds, and miscellaneous SA ammo and field equipment. Friendly losses were: 13 US KHA, 53 US WHA (16 evac). Damage to base camp equipment and station property was light.

i. 28 May: In response to intelligence reported indicating increased enemy activity 20 km east of Hue (YD 923208), A/1-501 conducted a combat assault to engage a suspected enemy company in the area. Co A engaged an estimated enemy platoon immediately upon landing. The Aero Rifle platoon (ARP) 2-17 Cav and B/2-17 maneuvered to Co A's area and, while Co A established a blocking position vic YD 923215, they attacked southeast over the enemy's position. Enemy losses for the battle were: 34 KIA, 1 VC PW, 5 IWC. Friendly losses were: 1 US KHA, 8 US WHA (8 evac) and 1 APC damaged.

j. 30 May: Because of intelligence reports indicating that rice was being stored in the area north of the village of Phuong Quan Cua, 8 km north of Hue (YD 6532), D/1-502 conducted RIF operations into the area and captured 36.5 tons of rice. The rice was evacuated and delivered to the district chief of Quang Dien.
k. 30-31 May: In response to intelligence reports, a combined operation involving 2-17 Cav and 3/3 ARVN Infantry Bn was initiated near the hamlet of Le Xa Dong, 12 km east of Hue (TD8023). At 0700, A/2-17 and 1 FF platoon began RIF operations from FB Forward (TD857276) south towards Le Xa Dong. As 4/2-17 moved south, it received an increasing volume of SA/AW and mortar fires. The 3/5 was moving overland to establish a blocking position from TD86224 to TD90226 at the southern end of the hamlet. As 2-17 elements attacked south into the 3/5's position, the enemy fires held up the advance of the forward elements of 2-17. Artillery, TAC Air and LFT's fires were placed on the enemy's position. At 1430 B/1-501 was alerted to conduct a combat assault into the eastern side of the hamlet, and at 1523 Co B established a blocking position via TD860230. The 2-17 attacked again, as LFT gunships flew over and covered likely avenues of escape to the west. As nightfall came, 2-17 was not able to attack through the hamlet, so C/1-501 was lifted into the western side of the hamlet and a tight cordon was formed around the enemy's position. Throughout the night continuous illumination and artillery was provided to prevent the enemy's escape. At daybreak, 2-17 elements and 1/C/1-501 swept through the village and destroyed the remnants of the enemy forces and resistance. The enemy losses during the combined operation were as follows: 14? NVA KIA, 46 P! and 59 weapons captured. Of these enemy losses, ARVN forces were responsible for 51 NVA KIA, 27 P!, 35 DBO. Friendly losses were: 6 US WIA, 2 FF KIA, 2 FF WIA.

l. 1-4 June: On 1 June a combined operation involving US and ARVN troops commenced an attack on the village of Trung Phuung, 1.6 km east of Hue (TD9419). A and B/2-17 Cav, B/2-501 Abn Inf, B/1-501 Abn Inf and TF 7, 1st ARVN Inf Div attacked on parallel axis to engage enemy forces which were reported in the area by intelligence reports. Contact was maintained throughout the afternoon of 1 June and a cordon was established around the village during early evening. The results of the battle were: 8 US WIA, 36 VC KIA, 3 P! and 20 weapons captured. At daybreak the companies swept through the village and continued to attack to the south toward the village of Vinh Phu (TD9716). Near Vinh Phu the combined forces engaged an enemy company and after heavy contact established a cordon around the village on the night of 2 June. During the night continuous illumination was maintained, and in the morning TAC Air and artillery continued to hit the enemy. PSYOP teams appealed to the enemy for surrender. On 3 June 50 VC surrendered and on 4 June a sweep through the village resulted in the capture of 3 P!. The results of the cordon operation of Vinh Phu were: 5 US KIA, 28 US WIA, 47 VC KIA, 57 P! and 57 weapons captured.

m. 4 June - 31 July:

(1) During this period the Division's operations were characterized by infrequent enemy contact, increased boobytrap incidents and the capture of
enemy rice caches. In June and July the enemy units broke down into groups of equal size or smaller forces and did not engage the Division's combat elements. Despite extensive RIF operations, saturation patrolling and numerous night ambushes contact with the enemy was infrequent and of short duration when he was engaged. Corresponding to the enemy's departure from the Division AO, guerrilla forces in the area became more active. Of the 40 US KHA and 375 US WHA (294 evac) from 4 June to 31 July, guerrilla-emplaced boobytraps, usually hand grenades or 105mm rounds with trip wire devices attached, accounted for 18 US KHA and 173 US WHA (144 evac). Units continued RIF operations and saturation patrolling, which, while not resulting in the destruction of enemy forces, resulted in the discovery and capture of numerous rice caches. In locating the rice caches, the Division's units were assisted greatly by the Regional, Popular and National Police Field Forces. The Vietnamese efforts contributed significantly to the overall success of the rice denial campaign which resulted in the capture of approximately 345 tons of rice.

(2) The 3d Bde, 82nd Abn Div, undergoing a turbulent personnel changeover, commenced training of incoming personnel. The training exercises and classes combined practical application of classroom instruction with limited combat operations. At the close of the reporting period, 3d Bde, 82nd Abn was declared combat ready and began conducting RIF operations in their assigned AO.

8. (U) During the reporting period the Division received excellent close air support from the 7th Air Force. The average daily air support missions were eight (8) FAC controlled and six (6) Sky Spot missions. Immediate air strikes were always available on call. A total of 3,301 sorties and 4,431 tons of ordnance were dropped in support of combat operations. These missions resulted in the destruction of numerous bunkers, trenches, and fighting positions and accounted for 353 enemy killed, confirmed by ground forces.

D. INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) G2 Operations:

a. This quarter (May, June, and July) covered a period of significant change in enemy tactics. The NVA multi-battalion operations in early May were characterized by attempts to seize and hold areas on the Coastal Plains; sustaining heavy losses by this method of operation the enemy was forced to retreat to mountain base camps leaving the tactical void filled by local guerrillas and the Viet Cong Infrastructure. As a direct result of this change, corresponding modifications in US intelligence efforts were necessary. In the battles of Phuoc Yen and Ha Chu in early May, intelligence collection operations followed essentially classic methods of exploiting FM's and agent reports. After the departure of the larger enemy units from the coastal

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plains, the collection efforts were directed primarily against the VCI and assumed the characteristics of "police raids" in that the US infantry platoons joined forces with local, RF, PF, PFFT, and FSB personnel to continuously patrol and search suspected areas. When a cordon was formed around an area, black lists for screening villagers were utilized. These lists were a product of the joint efforts of the MI Detachment, the 525th MI Group, and PHOENIX personnel. Other than this activity and an occasional engagement with a VC cell or command group, significant contacts were rare during late June and July.

b. Efforts on the coastal plains were directed towards the neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, while other forces attacked the enemy's jungle base camps in Thua Thien Province. The cover of the jungle, and rare instances of capturing a NV, and the fleeting but deadly engagements on hidden jungle trails forced a heavy reliance on the technological facets of intelligence collection - SIAR, INFRARED, aerial photography, and other specialized intelligence means. IRP operations also increased considerably during this period because of the teams' inherent skills for operating in such terrain.

c. In May, with the intent of developing the enemy situation, large-scale operations were launched into known or suspected base areas, yielding significant caches of weapons, ammunition, and trucks. In early June an enemy map of base areas and infiltration routes was found which gave the 101st its first indication of the scheme behind the maze of enemy trails and base camps discovered up to that time. Consequently, operations afterward were directed toward penetrating and neutralizing these camps. IRP teams were used to confirm the suspected trails and camps, as well as to screen flanks and to keep surveillance on areas recently vacated by friendly units.

2. (C) G2 Air and Imagery Interpretation

a. During the reporting period the G2 Air Section continued routine aerial surveillance and reconnaissance activities of the Division AO. In support of operations, 145 requests for photography, INFRARED and SLAR missions were processed, 79 of which were completed. An average of 20 hours of the visual reconnaissance was flown each day in the Division AO.

b. Night aerial surveillance continued to be a weak area. In an effort to improve its effectiveness, the G2 Air Section initiated an experimental program consisting of two IOW's carrying observers with starlight scopes. Plans are now underway to mount two night observation devices (medium size, starlight scopes on tripods) on Huey helicopters to further increase the Division's capability to detect enemy activity at night.

c. As the Division planned operations in various parts of the AO, the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section supported such operations with
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Special studies. Each study included an analysis of weather, drainage, trafficability, trails, cross-country movement, HL's, enemy installations, defensive positions, and other factors of military intelligence.

3. (U) Enemy Situation: The enemy was attempting to position his forces for an attack on Hue City in early May. NV's captured from 29th Regiment indicated they were going to attack Hue in that period but the attack was cancelled for unknown reasons. Since these units were in an attack position about 10 miles east of Hue, it is probable the timely defeats administered the 90th Regiment coupled with the presence of the 101st Air Cavalry Division in the area precluded the enemy from initiating their planned attack on the Imperial City.

4. (U) Enemy Tactics: In May and early June the regular elements utilized purely conventional tactics on the battlefield; however, as they were successfully defeated, the guerrillas began a harassing type, unconventional war. Mines and boobytraps, quick hitting, small-scale attacks, propaganda, assassination and terrorism thrive in the lowlands. In the mountains the enemy avoided contact and delayed only when absolutely necessary. It is believed his objective was and is to gain time in order to build-up for a new offensive. From agent reports, NV's, returns and documents it appears the enemy again will accept heavy casualties in his attempt to gain a significant political/propaganda victory.

5. (C) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses for Period: During the period enemy losses were as follows (including 3d Abn, 32d Abn Div OCON to 101st Air Cav Div):

a. VC/INA KIA (BC): 2,373
b. VC/INA NV: 387
c. HDI CHAIN: 448
d. Captured individual weapons: 1,763
e. Captured crew served weapons: 250
f. Rice captured or destroyed (tons): 349
g. Documents captured (pounds): 133

E. LOGISTICS

1. (U) General: During the reporting period, the 101st Air Cavalry Division participated in three (3) major combat operations in which the 101st Air Cavalry Support Command provided the necessary combat service support to
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To insure the accomplishment of the assigned missions. The basic concept for the support of the division remained the same throughout the reporting period. The concept included the disposition of forward support elements (FSE) consisting of a maintenance platoon, a medical company, and a supply detachment with their respective brigades in their bases of operation. The size of the medical company remained the same on all occasions; however, the size of the maintenance platoon and supply detachment varied in accordance with the distance of the brigade base camps from Camp Eagle or Bien Hoa.

2. (C) Supply:

   a. General: Logistical support of the division was provided by the 426th S&S Bn and augmented by the Ist Logistical Command.

   b. Disposition of units providing supply support is as follows:

      (1) Bien Hoa: The rear support element is located at Bien Hoa along with the Division Base. All TO&E items are handled through Bien Hoa to the 14th IOC (US Army Inventory Control Center) at Long Binh. This element also provided all Class I, III, II & IV, and V support for division units at Bien Hoa.

      (2) Phuoc Vinh (3d Bde): The 1st Logistical Command has a logistical support activity (LSA) located at Phuoc Vinh. This LSA provides the majority of the Class II & IV items. Back-up II & IV and all Class V requirements are handled by personnel from the 426th S&S Bn at Phuoc Vinh and Bien Hoa.

      (3) Division Forward (Camp Eagle): The 1st Logistical Command through Task Force Lane provides the division with a support activity supplied by Da Nang Support Command. All Class III and V support, portions of Class I and back-up II & IV support are provided through TF Lane. The 426th S&S Bn provides all II & IV support to include TO&E delivery, all ration breakdown for A and B rations for Camp Eagle, and minor Class II and V support.

      (4) The 1st Bde and 2d Bde are each provided a supply platoon from the 426th S&S Bn. These platoons provide brigade level support in all classes of supply.

      (5) JP-4 refuel points were established at LZ Sally, 11 km northwest of Hue (YD 638273), and Fire Base Bastogne, 18 km southwest of hue (YD 620093). The JP-4 point at Bastogne was moved back to Camp Eagle during June in order to support the increase in OH-57 aircraft. Also, during the last week in July, in preparation for Operation SOMERSET PLAIN, a JP-4 point was established at Fire Base Birmingham, 12 km south of Hue (YD 708103).

   c. Tonnage of supplies issued in support of the 101st Air Cavalry Division during the reporting period:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>1,179 s/t</td>
<td>1,193 s/t</td>
<td>934 s/t</td>
<td>3,206 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>1,305 s/t</td>
<td>963 s/t</td>
<td>1,277 s/t</td>
<td>3,545 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>2,730 s/t</td>
<td>3,168 s/t</td>
<td>3,098 s/t</td>
<td>8,996 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>5,345 s/t</td>
<td>4,424 s/t</td>
<td>3,376 s/t</td>
<td>13,145 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALES</td>
<td>10,559 s/t</td>
<td>9,748 s/t</td>
<td>8,685 s/t</td>
<td>28,992 s/t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Maintenance:

a. The 801st Maintenance Battalion provides maintenance support for the division. The 801st Main is deployed with Forward Support Platoons with each brigade for maintenance support. These forward support platoons comprise the maintenance section of the Forward Support Elements (FSE). Company A, 801st Maint En supports the division headquarters at Camp Eagle. Company C provides maintenance support for the Division Rear Elements at Bien Hoa. Company B (TAM) provides aircraft maintenance support for the Division from Camp Eagle. General support maintenance has been provided by 67th PS Company located at Camp Eagle. Aircraft GS maintenance is provided by the 610th Transportation Company located in Ta Hang, RVN.

b. The following maintenance jobs were accomplished during the reporting period by both forward and rear support areas:

   AIRCRAFT - 782
   AUTOMOTIVE - 1071
   SIGNAL - 3828
   ARMAMENT - 7240
   ENGINEER - 786

c. During the reporting period, 7,452 line items were issued from battalion ASL's. A company tech supply has been reduced from over 12,000 to approximately 7,000 lines by deleting non-demand support lines previously listed as mission essential.

4. (C) Transportation:

a. The 101st Transportation Company (Prov) was used in general support of the division and its attached units. The 101st Transportation Company (Prov) was augmented when necessary by the 39th Transportation Battalion, a unit of the 26th GS Group provided by 1st Logistical Command through D. King Support Command. Initially, the 39th Transportation Battalion hauled divisional supplies on a priority basis from the Ramp, Tan My Beach, and Utah
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Beach. The 39th Transportation Bn now transports all long hauls for the division. Further augmentation was provided by Force Logistics Group-Alpha, a USMC logistical activity located in Phu Bai.

b. Listed below is the breakdown of the short tons (s/t) of supplies and cargo shipped by all modes of transportation during the period 1 May 68 - 31 July 68. It should be noted that records for sea shipments during May are not available.

1) Number of convoys run in support of the division during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CONVOYS</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
<th>MILES</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,505.5 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>2,662 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,606 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>5,773.5 s/t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The decrease in the number of convoys run, miles traveled, and tonnage shipped during July is attributed to the increase of resupply by daily dispatch vehicles. These totals are not reflected above.

2) Aircraft sorties flown in support of the division during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>CARGO WT(s/t)</th>
<th>FAX</th>
<th>TOTAL WT(CGO &amp; FAX)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>1,558.4 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>8,484</td>
<td>1,836.1 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>887.1</td>
<td>9,645</td>
<td>2,052.2 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>2,387.1 s/t</td>
<td>25,764</td>
<td>5,496.7 s/t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Sea movements completed in support of the Division during the reporting period. cta covers the period 17 May 68 to 31 July 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>VESSELS</th>
<th>TO'WACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>VESSELS</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>7 - 3 LST 2 LCU 2 YFU</td>
<td>1,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>57 - 27 YFU 23 LCU 7 LST</td>
<td>6,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 65 7,352 s/t

5. (C) Medical: The following medical statistics reflect the medical support provided the entire division by the 326th Medical Bn:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Div Rear</th>
<th>1 Bde</th>
<th>2 Bde</th>
<th>3 Bde</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Station Patients</td>
<td>3492</td>
<td>3682</td>
<td>2811</td>
<td>1441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Patients</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury - Hostile Action</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>351</th>
<th>513</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>887</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle Injury</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>1533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod Proc Missions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Treated by ME &amp; CAP</td>
<td>3087</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>5382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Medical Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Disease</th>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>2nd Bde</th>
<th>3rd Bde</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever, Undet. Origin</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Disease</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuro Psychiatric</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injury</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During the reporting period problems were encountered in the following areas:

1. Malaria Control: The division's malaria rate steadily increased during this three month period. The chart below shows the increase per 1000 non per annum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The rise in the malaria rate can be traced to the following factors:

   a. Increased mosquito population caused by rising temperatures and an increase in precipitation.

   b. Increase in the carriers of malaria in the area to include enemy forces.

   c. Breakdown of personal protective discipline in Division Troops.

2. Fox-hole Strength: During the reporting period a problem was encountered due to the loss of fox-hole strength for medical consultations, sick call, hospitalization and medical profiles. The problem was multiplied...
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Diseases</th>
<th>1 Bde</th>
<th>2 Bde</th>
<th>3 Bde</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever Undetermined Origin</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Disease</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuro Psychiatric</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injury</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WT</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During the reporting period problems were encountered in the following areas:

1) Malaria Control: The division's malaria rate steadily increased during this three month period. The chart below shows the increase per 1000 non per annum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria Rate</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise in the malaria rate can be traced to the following factors:

(a) Increased mosquito population caused by rising temperatures and an increase in the precipitations.

(b) Increase in the carriers of malaria in the area to include enemy forces.

(c) Breakdown of personal protective discipline in Division Troops.

2) Fox-hole Strength: During the reporting period a problem was encountered due to the loss of fox-hole strength for medical consultations, sick call, hospitalization and medical profiles. The problem was multiplied
by the requirement that a patient go to Da Nang or Qui Nhon for most consultations. There was little en route control and individuals would be lost from their unit from 3 to 15 days. Patients were also being returned from hospitals with long medical profiles. Patients were also being held by the aid station for periods of several days at the base camp for outpatient medical care. All these factors resulted in high losses to foxhole strength for medical reasons. To correct these problems the Division Surgeon, with the help of the G-4, established a program that allowed outpatient consultations to be flown by a CH-47 helicopter on a bi-weekly basis to the hospital ship located off the Huo-Phu Bai coast. Since patients are taken to the ship and returned the same day, the loss time is reduced, in most cases, to one day.

(3) Hospital Returnees: A policy was established to insure that all patients discharged from a non-divisional medical facility were returned to the 101st Re-Imament Detachment at Bien Hoa. While at Bien Hoa all medical profiles are reviewed by Company 1326th Medical Battalion. If individuals cannot be utilized for full duty within the limits, he is returned to the hospital for further care or is reassigned to an organization where he can be utilized. Division medical treatment facilities have been instructed to evacuate any individual who cannot be returned to full duty in 48 hours.

(4) Brigade Surgeon: The shortage of medical officers assigned to the Division during the period made it necessary to utilize MSC officers rather than MC officers for Brigade Surgeons. Since the Brigade Surgeon's position is mainly administrative, it was found that the MSC officers function better in the administrative area than do MC officers.

F. PERSONNEL and ADMINISTRATION

1. (a) The G-1 section was primarily concerned with the conversion from the airborne to the airborne configuration upon receipt of the appropriate TOE and MTOE in mid-July. Emergency requisitions for additional personnel, particularly aviators and aviation mechanics, were submitted to fill existing vacancies. The personal requirements generated by the Division's four separate base camps and the Replacement Training School at Bien Hoa necessitated additional personnel not authorized by TOE. Each base camp maintained IX facilities and required MC personnel for normal base camp operations. The Replacement Training School conducted in-processing and in-country orientation/training for new replacements and also processed personal arriving for E&R and emergency leave. The present number of personnel authorized for the School does not insure effective training and processing for the large number of replacements and personnel from the forward areas. MTOE's indicating where additional personnel are needed have been prepared and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval.
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2. (U) The AG Section streamlined the process of awarding the Army Commendation Medal and Bronze Star for meritorious achievement and service. The Section provided unit commanders a computer listing of all personnel in their command who were eligible for the awards. The commander then indicated those personnel who deserved the awards and forwarded the listing to AG. Upon receipt of the listing, the Section issued orders for the awards using the UNIVAC 1005 card processor, completed the citations and forwarded the certificates of award for signature. This process not only insured that deserving personnel were recognized and medals awarded promptly, but also reduced the amount of time formerly needed to process recommendations for awards.

G. AVIATION

1. (U) The aviation units contributed materially to the combat success of the Division. During the period aviation units flew a total of 19,055 hours and transported 113,141 passengers and 23,284 tons of cargo in support of combat operations. Support rendered included numerous combat assaults, combat resupply, command and control, pacification and psychological operations, chemical dispersion, long range patrol insertions and extractions, armed convoy escort, reconnaissance, and close air support missions. In addition, aviation support was provided for many US and SVN, AR and IF combined operations conducted on the coastal plains. During combat operations aviation units were credited with over 250 enemy killed.

2. (C) The reorganization and reconfiguration of the division from the airborne to the airborne configuration activated the 160th Aviation Group effective 1 July 1968. Subordinate units of the Group are the 101st Assault Helicopter Battalion (formerly 101st Avn Bn), 195th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion (formerly 308th Qvb Avn Bn) and the 163rd General Support Aviation Company (formerly Co B, 101st Avn En). In addition to meeting combat and combat support requirements the Aviation Group spent July organizing and requisitioning personnel and equipment resulting from changes in TOE. Shortages of personnel and equipment hampered reorganization.

H. SIGNAL

(C) During the reporting period the 501st Signal Battalion participated in operations COLUMBUS II and NEWTON IV, providing command and control communications for the 101st Air Cavalry Division Headquarters and major subordinate elements. Communications provided included very high frequency (VHF) multi-channel telephone communications, high frequency radio teletypewriter service, communications center facilities, messenger service, telephone switching controls, single sideband radio voice integration (SSB RV1) service and frequency modulated (FM) secure and non-secure radio communications. The Signal Battalion also provided public address (PA) systems on numerous occasions including the change of command for MG Zais. In preparation for conversion to
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the airmobile Signal Battalion TOC 11-2057, several items of airmobile communications equipment have been received including 3 AH/MC-112 Radio Relay Terminals, 4 AN/AM-34 Teletype Terminals, and 4 AH/MC-10 Telephone Control Offices. The Signal Battalion has also been employing on a test basis the AH/GC-163 radio relay terminal, a 64 channel VHF equipment mounted in a one quarter ton truck.

I. ENGINEER

1. (U) General: During the reporting period the 326th Engineer Battalion continued to provide combat support for Operations DELVANCE, CAMESTAN II and NEVADA EAGLE. Companies were employed in direct support of the brigades.

Major activities during this period included the construction of fire bases Normandy, Brick, Eagles Nest, Georgia, and Berchtesgaden. The Battalion also assisted Co C, 307th Engr Bn in the construction of fire bases Panther I and Panther II.

2. (U) In addition to supporting combat operations other activities included the continuing development of Corp Eagle, construction of roads, heli-pads, artillery positions, protective structures and wire obstacles, the installation of minefields and obstacles, road and land clearing, production of potable water and the destruction of captured munitions.

3. (U) Civic action projects included construction of a footbridge over the Perfume River and a dispensary in Hue.

J. CHEMICAL

1. (C) General: During May, June and July, the 101st Air Cavalry Division's Chemical Section continued a widely diversified program of chemical employment in combat support. The attachment of the 10th Chemical Battalion on 6 June 1968 provided additional chemical equipment and trained personnel for the Division.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Riot control agents were used both in tactical support and bulldozer operations. Seventeen tactical drops of non-persistent CS munitions from UH-1 helicopters were conducted during the reporting period.

b. The F-158 CS canister cluster munition and multiple CS grenades were employed on suspected enemy base camps in direct softening roles in conjunction with TAC air and artillery strikes. The F-158 munition was used successfully from a C-130 aircraft in a new role of covering the extraction of a LIT team.

c. Helicopter mounted MS dispersers were used to disperse powdered persistent CS-1 smoke trails and river banks in an effort to restrict enemy movement. Ten bulk CS-1 drum drops missions from CH-47 aircraft were conducted with a total expenditure of 510 drums of agent to contaminate enemy base camps, IOC's and suspected rocket launch sites.
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d. Demolition operations increased sharply during the reporting period with 36 Air Force missions, 25 helicopter spray and 9 ground based operations. Primary targets for the Air Force operations were the enemy invasion and infiltration routes from the A Shau Valley area to the Hoi An complex.

e. 73 personnel detector missions were flown in support of the intelligence collection effort utilizing seven M63 mine pack personnel detectors and the recently acquired XMl1 airborne personnel detector.

f. The 10th Chemical Platoon also prepared and deployed 123 fifty-five gallon and 31 ten gallon flame field expedients to bolster the Corp Eagle defense perimeter. Additionally, the platoon provided 170 pre-mixed 55 gallon and 110 pre-mixed 10 gallon flame field expedients for divisional units for use at fire support bases.

g. The use of riot control agents in close support roles to reduce the effectiveness of enemy fires has decreased since the division's highly successful north-west cordon and search operations. A lack of appropriate targets was the primary cause of the reduction. There is a continuing urgent requirement for operational quantities of CS filled 4.2" mortar, 105mm howitzer, and 40mm grenades (used with the M-79), in order to provide the fighting elements of this division with a CS delivery capability using their responsive and accurate weapons.

K. TRAINING

1. (U) This reporting period saw several significant improvements in the training program of the Division. During the period, increased emphasis was placed on Mine and boobytrap Training. Combat operations northwest of Hue forced the enemy to withdraw from the coastal lowlands into the mountainous jungles west of the Ancient Capital. Mine and boobytrap incidents increased significantly as the enemy moved from the area. Training emphasized the use of mine detectors and propelling equipment. Particular attention was given to the identification of currently used VC trail markers and use of artillery and demolitions to "sterilize" a boobytrapped area. A significant innovation was the use of an engineer "Shovel's Footfiller" in conjunction with bulldozers and road plows to clear hazardous and similar terrain seeded with explosive devices.

2. (U) During the period, the Program of Instruction at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) was revised to insure inclusion of all combat lessons learned during the Division's tenure in Vietnam as well as other special skills peculiar to the combat environment in Vietnam. In addition to the revised SERTS '61, a 7 day Combat Leader's Course was initiated at the school to train providing L4's and L5's in the advanced skills and leadership techniques necessary to prepare them for future assignments in positions of greater responsibility. The course emphasized leadership development, night training and realistic practical work providing frequent rotation of students in leadership positions.

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3. (U) Throughout the Division, continued emphasis was placed on maintenance of the M16 rifle. In addition, all units continued to emphasize bi-weekly firing to confirm the zero's of all personnel armed with the M16 rifle.

4. (C) One of the most promising training projects during the period was the initiation of participating in the Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) program. The Division exchanges mobile training teams monthly with elements of the 1st LNV Infantry Division located in Hue. The LNV teams have taught classes on VC ambush, raid and SEPOP tactics and the counter-tactics which can be employed against them. The Division teams have taught classes on American tactics, equipment and air mobile operations. The classes most often requested by LNV Commanders are those on the characteristics, care and maintenance and immediate actions for the M60, M16, M72, and M79 weapons. The program is new and there is room for further improvement; however, during its short tenure, it has significantly increased the confidence, cooperation, and effectiveness of the many combined US-LNV operations conducted during the period.

5. (D) Another highly successful USA-VN training adventure involved the integrated training of the Division's Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company and the 1st LNV Reconnaissance Company. Various combinations of US-LNV soldiers were paired and trained as operational LRP teams. The combined teams developed proficiency in the use of the McGuire Rig for emergency extraction, hand and arm signals and various reconnaissance techniques. These teams were tactically employed in the field with considerable success. This experiment demonstrated the confidence and teamwork which can be developed in USA-VN operations - the language barrier not withstanding. The Division plans to continue further expansion and development of these and similar joint operations.

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS and CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. (U) Civil Affairs:

a. The units of the division assisted in the building, improving, and equipping of the Kim Long, Tay Loa, and Reo 36h Orphanages in Hue. This assistance included rebuilding facilities, building protective bunkers, and providing food, soap, sewing machines and other necessary items.

b. The Division assisted in the construction and equipping of medical facilities in Hue by:

(1) Providing concrete, metal roofing and paint for the building of Thuy Thuong dispensary which will serve 6000 villagers.

(2) Equipping the Quang Dien District Hospital with blankets and mosquito nets and repairing its facilities.

c. The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) of this division continued to provide timely and effective medical treatment for the Vietnamese.
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Total of 123 team visits were made throughout the Division AO and 17,307 patients were treated. In addition, the 6-5 and the Division Surgeon have initiated a project named COSLIT (Corrective Surgery for Little Tots). The Surgeon is coordinating with medical facilities in Hue and Tan Hung to aid 25 physically deformed children of Hue and the surrounding area.

2. (d) The Division assisted local districts by transporting captured rice to GVN storage areas and helping expand their storage facilities.

2. (II) Psychological Operations:

(a) Loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops have significantly contributed to our effort in South Vietnam. Numerous Ho Chi Minh have stated that they have been greatly influenced by our PSYOP dissemination media. One VC hamlet chief decided to rally after hearing one of our loudspeaker broadcasts which pointed out the hopelessness of the VC cause. He stated that he believed the reason and hearing it was the last straw. A VC district chief who had been working for the enemy for 18 years decided, after hearing a loudspeaker broadcast, that his best hope for the future was to rally to the GVN.

b. Statistics:

(1) The following statistics point out the type of propaganda media employed during this reporting period:

(a) Leaflets Disseminated - 73,844,000.

(b) Loudspeaker Broadcasts - 182 hours.

(c) Movies Shown - 26 hours.

(d) TV Broadcasts Shown - 18 hours.

(2) Ho Chi Minh. During this period a total of 448 Ho Chi Minh rallied to GVN and Allied Forces within the Division AO.

(3) Prisoners.

(a) On 1 May the 101st Airborne Division received the first mass surrender of the Vietnamese War. Elements of the 8th Battalion, 90th Regiment, 394B Division (NVN) were surrounded in a cordon operation at Phuoc Yen (ID 6928). 101st Airborne Division units engaged the enemy with aggressive combat operations supported by artillery and tactical air supports. After extensive use of firepower, PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts were made to the enemy which offered the opportunity to surrender. A total of 105 enemy soldiers surrendered.

(b) On 30 May a similar PSYOP broadcast was made to a surrounded enemy force at Le Chinh (ID 8823). A total of 50 enemy soldiers surrendered.
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3. 101st Air Cavalry Division TV Program: During the month of July this division coordinated, and began developing the first propaganda TV program in the I Corps area. This weekly program on the GVN Hie Station includes 10 minutes of news and a 10 minute interview in which Hoi Chanh explains how they were deceived. It compares life with the VC/PAVA to life as a "Hoi Chanh with the GVN." The Hoi Chanh interview is followed by a 10 minute local talent program with an appropriate Chieu Ho atmosphere. Total air time for this program is 30 minutes.

M. INFORMATION

(U) Major activities of the Division's information program during May, June and July were:

1. Providing information coverage for the combat units by attaching personnel to each maneuver battalion. The Division had 189 news and 165 photo releases on combat actions and activities of the Division during the reporting period.

2. The expansion of the Division's radio and television coverage by adding two information personnel to the Da Nang Armed Forces Radio staff.

3. The publishing of information within the Division to keep personnel informed which includes a weekly newspaper "The Screaming Eagle." In addition to the weekly newspaper, the Division Information Office has a daily publication entitled "Airborne Pateline," which gives a complete summary of late world news. At the Brigade level, a daily publication "Eagle Line" by the 1st Brigade, and a weekly publication "Eagle Line" by the 2d Brigade further supplement the information program.
II. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

A. (U) PERSONNEL.

1. (U) Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS).

a. OBSERVATION: The present authorized T Series TOE/MTCE strength for SERTS is not sufficient to effectively train new replacements joining the 101st Air Cavalry Division.

b. EVALUATION: Experience has shown that an additional 55 personnel are required to provide the most effective processing and training for replacements prior to their departure for their assigned units. These additional 55 personnel are taken from TOE/MTCE resources within the Division, thus creating vacancies in TOE units.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the 101st Air Cavalry Division be authorized an additional 55 personnel for SERTS.

2. (U) Base Camp Augmentation.

a. OBSERVATION: The dispersion of the Division assets over four separate static base camps necessitates additional personnel.

b. EVALUATION: The operation of 4 separate static base camps requires positions which normally service the entire Division to be established in 4 locations. For example:

   (1) Positions such as base development officer and base defense officer normally would serve the Division as one entity. The tactical situation requires 4 separate bases, therefore a requirement exists for each base to have a base development officer and base defense officer. These men must be drawn from Division assets which are programmed for other positions.

   (2) The Military Police are required to perform their normal MP functions such as escort duty and TOC security, as well as providing garrison type patrols, MP Operations desks and security gate guards at each fire base. This, in effect, quadruples the mission of the MPs without augmentation of their authorized strength. Additional personnel utilized by the MPs to effectively execute their mission are drawn from division assets.
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(3) Post exchanges are established at all four base camp
locations. The number of personnel required to man these exchanges
must be drawn from division assets which are programmed for other
positions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That higher headquarters consider the
personnel overhead requirements and resultant decrease in foxhole
strength when the Division maintains more than one base camp, and
authorize additional personnel for the specific duties listed.

B. (C) OPERATIONS.

1. (C) Aircraft Vulnerability.

a. OBSERVATION: Most incidents of aircraft being hit by
ground fire occurred at intermediate altitudes.

b. EVALUATION: Statistics show that the predominance of
anti-aircraft hits are sustained between 50 feet and 1500 feet above
mean sea level. Helicopters flying within 1500 feet of the ground
are within effective range of small arms sniper fire. The risk
increases with a decrease in altitude until the aircraft is so near
the ground that reaction time is denied the enemy. This point has
proven to be below 50 feet.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft should not operate between 50
feet and 1500 feet unless transitioning for landing or climbing
to cruise altitude. If weather conditions preclude flight above
1500 feet, nap-of-the-earth techniques should be utilized to reduce
hit probability.

2. (C) Armed Escort for Cargo Helicopters.

a. OBSERVATION: When CH-47 helicopters are operating in
areas of intensified anti-aircraft activity, the presence of a heli-
copter fire team has both a deterring and penalizing effect on
enemy anti-aircraft gunners.

b. EVALUATION: The size and utility of the CH-47 make it
a lucrative and vulnerable target for the enemy. Evasive action is
limited because of externally carried loads. The related weapons
systems provide inadequate self-protection. These factors combine
to encourage and aid the enemy gunner to direct fire by all types
of weapons against this aircraft. Experience has shown a reluctance
by the enemy to take under fire a cargo helicopter, if it is escorted
by an armed helicopter fire team.
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3. (U) Coordination for Combat Assaults.

b. OBSERVATION: A final coordination meeting between all elements involved in a combat assault will help ensure success of the operation.

b. EVALUATION: It is essential to the success of airmobile operations that all coordination be done prior to the day of the operation. This should involve a meeting between all principals concerned. Artillery fires, Tac Air, downed aircraft procedures, schedule of events, frequencies, and contingency plans must be thoroughly understood by all those involved and the wishes of the Air mobile Task Force Commander aired.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That a final coordination meeting of Ground Commanders, Air Mission Commanders, Artillery and Tac Air representatives be held to coordinate every facet of the operation prior to conducting a combat assault.

4. (C) Cordon Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: Cordon operations on the coastal plains are an effective means to defeat enemy forces.

b. EVALUATION: The Division's cordon operations were successful because:

1) All available forces not in contact were transported quickly to the enemy location. Helicopters, trucks, APCs and forced marches were used to position forces to close all avenues of escape. Other forces were alerted to be prepared for movement, if they were needed.

2) Volumes of artillery fire, numerous air organic weapons fire were continuously placed on the enemy.

3) Aerial observers and FACs stayed on station to select targets and adjust artillery and air strikes.

4) Continuous flare illumination was provided during the hours of darkness.

5) Riot Control Agents (RCA) were used to penetrate enemy bunker complexes. CS drops were made from CH-47s and were delivered by mortar and artillery rounds to maintain the RCA cloud.
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(6) PSYOP broadcasts by ARVN interpreters and captured PW accompanied by "dry run" air strikes, were made to encourage the enemy to surrender. All friendly forces were strictly controlled and no firing of any kind was permitted during the time set aside for surrender.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That during cordon operations maximum utilization be made of air, artillery, CS and organic fire power along with PSYOP broadcasts before sweeping the area.

5. (U) Psychological Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: That loudspeaker broadcasts both aerial and ground mounted are very effective and should be integrated into cordon operations.

b. EVALUATION: It has been found that during cordon operations, immediately after heavy contact and in areas where enemy troops are known to be under strong friendly pressure, loudspeaker broadcasts either ground mounted or aerial are extremely effective.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That greater emphasis be placed on PSYOP broadcasts during cordon operations.

6. (C) Boobytraps.

a. OBSERVATION: During the last seven weeks of the reporting period there has been a significant increase in the enemy's use of mines and boobytraps within the 2d Brigade area of operations.

b. EVALUATION: The increase in mine and boobytrap activity coincided with the withdrawal of NVA troops from the area of operations. During operations frequent problems arose in detecting the mines and boobytraps. Although the units used a homemade boobytrap detonator, a 155mm fuse plug attached to nylon cord, the device proved to be inadequate in detecting and detonating mines and boobytraps. The lack of an effective small hand carried device designed to detonate boobytraps hindered combat operations significantly and increased combat casualties.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Continue to improve techniques to detect and deface mines and boobytraps.

7. (C) Coordinated US and RF/PF Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: Coordinated US and RF/PF operations were very successful.
b. EVALUATION:

(1) In operations on coastal plains, 5 RF/PF squads were attached each day to US units. These squads were integrated into platoons on a ratio of 2 RF/PF to 3 US, with a majority of the RF/PF forces being placed in point platoons. This balance was used because of the RF/PF familiarity of the area and their ability in finding boobytraps and bunkers and in searching and interrogating local civilians. Each company had an interpreter for passage of information from RF/PF to the company commander.

(2) Numerous combined RF/PF-US operations were conducted with the operational planning being conducted jointly by the Bn Commander and his staff and the District Chief and his staff. Meetings took place nightly between the Bn Commander and the MACV Advisors with counterparts to coordinate the following day's operations, both joint and independent. The collection of the TAC CPs greatly facilitated the coordination and rapid exchange of information concerning both intelligence and operations.

(3) Joint airmobile operations usually consisted of the RF/PF elements being used as the primary assault force because of the increased number of troops that could be delivered under the same ACL. Control of such operations was effected by having the MACV liaison team on the Bn Command Net. The District Chief (English speaking in this case) was airborne with the Bn Commander in the Command and Control helicopter. Prior to each combat assault the S3 section gave instructions to the participating RF/PF forces on the on-loading and off-loading of the helicopters.

(4) As the proficiency of the RF/PF forces increased from participation in joint operations, they gained confidence and assumed a much greater role in conducting tactical operations in the AO, to include night operations. Joint planning resulted in the initiation of small Eagle Flight operations (normally 1 or 2 helicopters) conducted by RF/PF forces with a 2 man Bn liaison team from the S2 section. These operations were normally very successful as they were often conducted in rapid response to information received from a Chieu Hoi.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That consideration continue to be given to collocation of Battalion CPs with District Headquarters to insure that effective coordination between US and RF/PF forces is established and maintained.
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(2) That RF/PF forces be included in US unit training whenever possible to continue the development of RF/PF combat proficiency and to insure continued success in combined US and RF/PF operations.

8. (U) Eagle Flights.

a. OBSERVATION: Eagle flight operations conducted at Battalion level proved very successful in the populated coastal plain area.

b. EVALUATION: Unit experience with eagle flights proved that these operations were an excellent method of quickly deploying and concentrating troops in the areas of suspected enemy activity. The organization of eagle flights contained inherent security and allowed good flexibility and responsiveness to orders of the ground unit commander. The units devised a successful method of exploiting the eagle flight's salient advantages; the DS artillery battery fired on the target village with HC smoke, which indicated imminent scrub bmbardment and a subsequent combat assault. Interpreting the smoke rounds, the target area's inhabitants, both villagers and VC, would disperse into the nearby rice paddies to avoid the shelling and troops. Elements of the eagle flight would then deploy to blocking or contain positions to collect the villagers and VC as they moved from the village. While the villagers were confined to small areas, intelligence teams and RF, PP or National Police Field Forces would then screen the people and apprehend the individuals who were suspected VC and capture the identified VC. These operations resulted in the capture of numerous VC and aided in the subsequent identification of suspected VC. As the troops on the ground checked the people, gunships orbited and screened the area to detect, report and occasionally engage possible enemy targets.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That units deploying to Vietnam receive instruction concerning eagle flight techniques.

(2) That units conduct training exercises to improve their proficiency in eagle flight missions.

9. (U) Artillery Adjustment in Jungles.

a. OBSERVATION: Most artillery adjustment in the jungle is made by sound and by "creeping" the fire onto the target.
b. EVALUATION. Forward Observers are not able to observe rounds impacting in the jungle and therefore cannot apply observed fire adjustment techniques. As a result, most artillery fired in heavy jungle is adjusted by sound, and is moved slowly onto target areas when no air observers are available.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That Army Service Schools research techniques to improve junior leaders' proficiency in adjusting artillery fire by sound; sound adjustment be clearly identified as a less that accurate technique that should not be used unless absolutely necessary.

10. (U) Re-entry into TAOR.

a. OBSERVATION: Re-entry into an area of operations previously occupied by friendly forces poses many problems with respect to free movement in the area.

b. EVALUATION: Friendly forces occasionally construct minefields and obstacles in areas which they have previously occupied. If the units entering these areas do not have knowledge of the minefield's location and contents, their operations can be seriously hampered. In addition, enemy in the area may have placed mines and boobytraps in the abandoned fire bases and LZs. Therefore, units entering these areas must have access to and receive as much information as possible, prior to entering the area. Briefings, based on after action reports and intelligence reports concerning the area, would enable a unit to become more familiar with the area in a short period of time and to obtain the locations of the mined areas.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) That the headquarters directing a unit to enter an area, previously occupied by friendly forces, give detailed briefings about the area to the directed unit.

(2) That the briefing consist of detailed descriptions of the location of minefields, fire bases and LZs constructed by friendly units and of the enemy activity in the area.


a. OBSERVATION. When using persistent CS in tunnels, too much det cord caused the powder to burn rather than be dispersed into the soil.

b. EVALUATION. Persistent CS is often used to restrict the use of tunnels to the enemy. The best way to disperse this powdered form of CS is by wrapping det cord around the bag causing it to be mixed into the soil of the tunnel. When using the det cord as a means
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of dispersion, it was found that two many wraps around the bag of powdered CS caused it to burn, rather than to be properly dispersed. It was found that two wraps is the most effective amount of det cord to use.

c. RECOMMENDATION. That the use of det cord in the employment of powder form CS be restricted to two wraps per bag of powder.

C. (C) TRAINING.

1. (C) Unit Training.

a. OBSERVATION: Casualties, rotation and infusion of new personnel results in a large number of insufficiently trained personnel in line units.

b. EVALUATION: The infusion of new personnel into units require continuous training in markmanship, ambush, mines and boobytraps, adjustment of artillery fire, intelligence reporting, small unit tactics and maintenance of weapons. Units occupying firebases or on static security mission can establish company training teams using Co XO and selected personnel, to give refresher and replacement training.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on continuous training when not on combat operations.

2. (U) Demolition Training.

a. OBSERVATION: Jungle operations require special demolition training to expedite the clearing of PZs and LZs.

b. EVALUATION: Requirements for destruction of enemy bunkers, boobytraps, and for the construction of PZs and LZs in jungle operations for logistics resupply or medevac necessitate the frequent use of demolitions. Experience has shown more personnel need training to execute these type missions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Every platoon and company size unit train selected personnel in demolition techniques.

D. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

(C) Need for Improvement of the Present Photo Reconnaissance System.

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a. OBSERVATION: The USAF priority designation system for photo reconnaissance bears no relationship to the needs of this Division.

b. EVALUATION: "Immediate" and "Priority I" missions are described with such grave phraseology that it is virtually impossible for the Division to qualify for photo reconnaissance missions. For instance, "Immediate" requests are characterized by the Air Force as "emergencies". In reality, any unforeseen requirements for photo intelligence of immediate tactical value can fall into the category of an "Immediate". To illustrate, intelligence sources may point to the probable presence of an NVA battalion at a given location. Such a target most likely would not "prevent the accomplishment of the Division's mission" nor would it "threaten the national security of the Republic of Vietnam". But it does represent an important target, it could not be foreseen, and due to its mobility it should be confirmed quickly. Hence, such a target satisfies all of the "reasonable" criteria for an immediate photo mission. Such contingencies could be met by placing a portion of the overall aerial surveillance and reconnaissance assets on a standby basis. In addition to the use of specifically designated aircraft to accomplish immediate missions, aircraft that are airborne on missions of lesser impact could be diverted and given the immediate mission. Each corps should have the authority to both scramble aircraft for immediate missions and to divert aircraft from missions of lesser importance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the present system of establishing photo reconnaissance priorities be revised to permit a Corps Headquarters to initiate immediate photo missions and to divert committed aircraft to higher priority missions.

2. (U) LOGISTICS.

1. (U) Single Sideband Radio Set, AN/GRC-106.

a. OBSERVATION: The deadline rate on the AN/GRC-106 is extremely high.

b. EVALUATION: At the present time one Battalion has 26 AN/GRC-106 radios on hand of which 12 are deadlined. Six have been deadlined for over 90 days. All are awaiting parts which are on Red Ball Express requisition. These radios are either in direct support maintenance or have been evacuated to the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company. Fans, capacitors, diodes, and tube sockets are common items not readily available. The most common failure has been capacitor, C-22, variable glass, dielectric, FSN 5910-727-1664 in the AN 3349. Experience indicates that failure of this capacitor
can be a result of improper tuning procedure, power fluctuation or tuning two radios on the same frequency within 150 feet of each other.

c. **Recommendation:**

1. That action be taken to rectify the shortage of parts for the AN/GRC-106 Radio Set.

2. That an **PLL** be published to rectify the high failure rate of the C-2 capacitor in the AN-3349 Amplifier.

2. **Radio Relay Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163.**

a. **Observation:** The single 1.5 KW AC generator provided with the Radio Relay Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163, is inadequate as a power source for sustained operations.

b. **Evaluation:** The AN/GRC-163 has the capability to provide 4 voice channels and 2 channels of teletype. In our operation only the voice circuits have been used. The equipment which is installed in a 1 ton truck can be readily removed and transported to isolated areas on short notice in a UH-1D helicopter. The equipment is easily installed and operated and provides reliable communications. However, the primary power source is one 1.5 KW AC generator which is completely inadequate for sustained operations. With one generator the system must be closed down periodically to service the generator. This method of operation is unsatisfactory, so additional power must be provided to allow continuous operations. In most cases the AN/GRC-163 is employed where no other source is available, although the AN/GRC-163 has a power supply, P2-2953. In addition, no spare equipment is provided with the AN/GRC-163, which means the equipment must be replaced from another AN/GRC-163 or repaired before the system can be re-established. This can cause excessive outage. An additional problem encountered is that no estimated prescribed load list (PLL) or spare parts were provided with the AN/GRC-163 when it was introduced in the field on a test basis. As a result several pieces of equipment are deadlined for parts which are not available.

c. **Recommendations:**

1. That an additional 1.5 KW AC generator be provided as an item of basic issue for the AN/GRC-163.

2. That an estimated PLL be shipped with all new equipment sent to the field.
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F. (U) ORGANIZATION.

(U) Airmobile Signal Battalion TOE 11-205T.

a. OBSERVATION: Conversion from the Airborne Signal Battalion TOE 11-215G to the Airmobile Signal Battalion TOE 11-205T in December 1968 will result in major changes in the concept of operations with respect to communications within the Division.

b. EVALUATION: Under the current TOE 11-215G the Signal Battalion is capable of providing multichannel voice communications to the major and subordinate units of the Division to include fire support bases (FSB) and isolated infantry battalions. Army Area Communications System (AACS) support is used to establish backbone multichannel communications within the Division and to higher headquarters. The communications established by this Battalion in support of combat operations are considered essential to the successful conduct of these operations. Upon conversion to TOE 11-205T, much of the present multichannel capability as well as associated personnel will be lost, thus tremendously reducing the command and control communications which can be provided the Division. In an effort to avert the major difficulties associated with the reduction of personnel and equipment under TOE 11-205T, an MTOE has been prepared by this Headquarters. This MTOE corrects the concept in its organization and equipment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the MTOE submitted by this Headquarters to USAV on 14 July 1968 be adopted to insure required command and control communications are provided this Division.

G. (U) OTHER.

1. (U) Radio Relay Terminals Set AN/MRC-112.

a. OBSERVATION: The four channel radio relay terminal set AN/MRC-112 is ideal for termination of one system at fire support bases (FSB) or for similar missions.

b. EVALUATION: The AN/MRC-112 is easily transportable as an internal load in a CH-47 or as a sling load. However, when transported as an internal load, a prime mover is required to position the equipment when it is unloaded. Termination of two systems commits 100 per cent of the equipment in the AN/MRC-112, thus allowing no reserve or spare equipment. The power sources for the AN/MRC-112 are 2 each 1.5 KW AC generators which are inadequate for sustained operations. They must be carried separately from the AN/MRC-112 along with the team's personal equipment and POL. The AN/MRC has
performed well with a minimum of equipment failures, but is more limited in use than the AN/MRC-68, because it has no spare radio.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the Radio Relay Terminal Set AN/MRC-112 be used on commitments which require only one 4 channel system and that 3 KW AC generators be provided as the power source.

2. (a) COMSEC.

a. OBSERVATION: A program of command emphasis on COMSEC makes an SOI program of monthly changes and random suffixes readily acceptable.

b. EVALUATION: During the quarter the practice of making callsign and frequency changes at least once a month and utilizing random suffixes to NCP 119 callsigns was successfully implemented. A command wide emphasis on COMSEC and ample notice of the changes made the practice readily acceptable with only minimum problems.

c. RECOMMENDATION: A continuing program of command emphasis in COMSEC should include definite statements regarding the necessity and desirability of SOI changes.

3. (a) Preparation of SOIs.

a. OBSERVATION: Typing out monthly changes of callsigns and frequencies is very laborious and often results in many errors being made.

b. EVALUATION: Much experience in retyping monthly SOI changes still resulted in long hours of work and considerable error. A system of using punched cards for SOI input was developed with a short UNIVAC 1005 program for making callsign, frequency, and suffix changes, as well as renumbering new items and adding effective dates for new items. The actual labor required to produce a new SOI was reduced ten-fold, and the number of errors was also reduced drastically. An added benefit was gained with the automatic compilation of a complete and accurate list of frequency and call assignments for easy reference in solving interference problems.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That SOI changes of callsigns, frequencies and suffixes be prepared in a punched card format. A simple program using available finance and logistic computers can thus provide rapid, accurate printed changes and provide accurate listings of callsign and frequency assignments.
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4. (U) **Pre-printed Keylist.**
   a. **OBSERVATION:** There is a very definite need for pre-printed keylists in the tactical units. It eliminates the need for publication of keylist extracts from a master keylist, and is a tremendous time saver under combat conditions.

   b. **EVALUATION:** National Security Agency (NSA) has published an Oreste pre-printed keylist extract and disseminated it to the field. However, NSA neglected to classify the material "drop accountability", and, as a result, it must be treated as registered crypto material. Utilization of the pre-printed keylist would require destruction certificates from all holders before the material could be dropped. This would add a tremendous administrative burden to the Division DISTRIBUTION and subordinate accounts.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That pre-printed keylist be treated as "drop accountability" material. Once the material is issued, the custodian should require no further administrative action to clear his account.

5. (U) **Use of KY-38 with VRC-12 Series Radio.**
   a. **OBSERVATION:** The 101st Air Cavalry Division utilizes three different speech security devices (KY-8, KY-28, and KY-38). The Division would obtain considerable flexibility and versatility, if the KY-38 could be used with the VRC-12 series radio in addition to the AN/PRC-77.

   b. **EVALUATION:** The interchange of radio and added flexibility could be obtained through fabrication of a cable with the proper connectors for use with the VRC-12 series radio.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That cables for both the AN/PRC-77 and the VRC-12 series radios be provided as a basic item of issue with the KY-38.
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DA, HQ, XXIV CORPS, APO 96308 19 September 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The inclosed ORUL, 101st Air Cavalry Division, has been reviewed by this headquarters and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Item: Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS), page 21, para A1. USARV letter dated 27 August 1968, subject: Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), Augmentation, for the Division, Brigade and Armored Cavalry Regiment, states M70E action for additional staffing in replacement operations, processing, training and personal services has been submitted to DA.

b. Item: Base camp augmentation, page 21, para A2. This problem is currently being addressed in a USARV study for TDA augmentation to support base camp command, control and defense; educational development; safety; non appropriated fund administration; revolutionary development; special services; and labor management.

c. Items: Aircraft vulnerability, page 22, para B1, and armed escort for cargo helicopters, page 22, para B2. Concur. Recommend HQ, USARV disseminate this information to all aviation units to be included in their tactical SOP.

d. Item: Cordon operations, page 23, para B4. Concur with recommendation. The techniques described in the commander's evaluation have produced outstanding results.

e. Item: Psychological operations, page 24, para B5. Concur. This tactic worked very effectively to produce high numbers of PWs during cordon operations conducted on 1 and 30 May 1968. The advantages of PSYOP broadcasts over leaflets are reduced reaction time, greater flexibility and greater credibility. Recommend HQ, USARV disseminate this information to all major subordinate combat units to be included in their tactical SOP.

f. Item: Re-entry into TAOR, page 27, para B10. Concur. Recommend a briefing by representatives of the previously occupying organization, if available. This should be a matter of SOP for all combat and combat support organizations.

g. Item: Demolition training, page 28, para C2. Concur in principle. Recommend personnel be trained in demolition work to company/battery level in non-engineer units, and squad level in engineer units.

h. Item: Need for improvement of the present photo reconnaissance system, page 28, para D. Nonconcur for the following reasons:
(1) The present system for assigning priorities to aerial reconnaissance missions is valid. A high priority must be justified by the tactical situation of the requesting unit, the area to be photographed, and the objectives of the mission, e.g. to confirm movement of tracked vehicles or to locate active enemy artillery.

(2) HQ, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) currently has authority to divert already committed aircraft to higher priority missions, and HQ, XXIV Corps can do the same by coordination with III MAF.

(3) It is USAF policy that reconnaissance aircraft are not held in reserve, but are used to the maximum, based on established priorities. Consideration is given to the priority system during all phases of the recce cycle, during scheduling, imagery interpretation, reporting and photo delivery.

(4) The preferred target system currently in use allows tactical units to obtain photography of a selected area rapidly regardless of priority. Under this system, targets are designated one day to be flown the next. Unit preferred targets are flown on the same basis as priority II targets regardless of priority justification.

i. Item: Single sideband radio set, AN/GRC-106, page 29, para E1. Concur with recommendations. The following actions have been taken to rectify the problems mentioned:

(1) Repair parts for the AN/GRC-106 radio are in-country with the exception of C22 capacitors. The unit has been informed to provide Da Nang Support Command with a list of required parts.

(2) The C22 capacitor was not originally programmed for RVM. Contractor's representatives are in-country and are investigating problems with this capacitor. ECOM representatives have visited units, including support maintenance units in an effort to locate problems with capacitor, C22.

(3) A representative of General Dynamics will visit the 101st ACD to instruct operators on the correct operation and tuning of the AN/GRC-106.

(4) Da Nang Support Command is attempting to get a quantity of C22 capacitors from General Dynamics for issue to units.

j. Item: Radio relay terminal set, AN/GRC-163, page 30, para E2. Concur. Transportability of the AN/GRC-163 is greatly improved when removed from the 1/4 ton vehicle, and the equipment, operators and power supply can be moved in one lift by UH-1 aircraft. When off-mounted the power source is a 1.5 kw AC generator, which is inadequate for continuous operations. An additional 1.5 kw AC generator should be provided with each AN/GRC-163 radio.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, ROS CS FOR-65 (R1) (U)

k. Item: Airmobile signal battalion TDE 11-205T, page 31, para F. Nonconcur. On 18 August 1968, HQ, USARV proposed an MTOE for the division signal battalion to the 101st ACD and 1st ACD. Preliminary review by both divisions indicates that with minor exceptions, the proposed MTOE will be acceptable. The divisions are to submit concurrence and/or comments to HQ, USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy Furn:
DA, ACSFOR
CG, 101st Abn Div (AM)
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning radio relay terminal set, AN/GRC-163, page 30, paragraph E2. Action has been taken to request authorization of an additional 1.5 kw engine generator for each AN/GRC-163. Upon arrival of this request, the generator will be added as an additional line item to MTOE. The comment regarding PLL is valid. Action has been taken by the ECOM-V Area Office to obtain a recommended PLL and to advise USAECOM that spare parts support is essential. The unit will be notified of the above actions.

   b. Reference item concerning use of KY-38 with VRC-12 series radio, page 33, paragraph G5. USARPAC has concurred in this commander's request for 300 cables to enable the KY-38 to be used with the VRC-12 series radios. DA approval is pending on a USARV evaluation of the KY-38 and AN/PRC-77. The unit will be informed of the status of the cables.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

CPT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furr:
HQ XXIV Corps
HQ 101st Abn Div (AM)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Air Cav Div for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl

C. L. SHAFFER
CPT, AGC

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Inclosure 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION) to Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division for the Period Ending 31 July 1968.

Task Organization

101st Air Cavalry Division

HHC, 101st ACD

1st Bde, 101st ACD

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 502d Inf
3d Bn, 506th Inf (+) (OPCON 1FFV)

2d Bde, 101st ACD

HHC, 2d Bde
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf
2d Bn, 1st Inf, 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) (6-10 May)

3d Bde, 101st ACD (OPCON II FFV)

HHC, 3d Bde
3d Bn, 187th Inf
1st Bn, 506th Inf
2d Bn, 506th Inf

3d Bde, 82d Abn Div (Attached to 101st ACD)

HHC, 3/82d
1st Bn, 505th Inf
2d Bn, 505th Inf
1st Bn, 508th Inf
2d Bn, 321st Arty (105mm) (DS 3/82)
Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 17th Cav (OPCON to 2-17 Cav, 101st ACD)
Co C, 2d En, 34th Arm (OPCON 1-506 Inf)
Co C, 307th Engr
Co D, 307th Med
3d Plat, 82d MP Co
3d FASCOP, 82d Sig
Plat, 82d Avn Bn
Plat (+), 358th RRU
Det, 82d AG and Admin
Det, 82d MID
Det, 582d Supply Co
Det, 782d Maint
TACP

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Inlosure 1 (TASK Organization of the Task Organizational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division for the Period Ending 31 July 1968.

101st ACD Artillery

HEAD, 101st ACD Artillery
2d BN, 3rd Arty (105mm) (DG 3/101)
2d BN, 120th Arty (105mm) (DG 1/101)
1st BN, 321st Arty (105mm) (DG 2/101)
2d BN, 11th Arty (155mm) (GCR)
1st BN, 83rd Arty (8"/175mm) (GSR)
C Btry, 6th BN, 4th Arty (175mm) (GCR) (1 May - 1 July)
C Btry, 6th BN, 16th Arty (155mm) (GSR 1-321)
C Btry, 1st BN, 13th Arty (8") (Atch 1-65) (1 May - 12 June)
C Btry, 1st BN, 13th Arty (105mm) (GSR 2-121)
C Co, 65th Arty (AW) (GSR)
1st Plt, Co D, 1st BN, 44th Arty (AW) (SP) (GSR)

160th Artillery Group (Activated 1 July 1968)

HEAD, 160th Artillery Group
101st Asst Hqtrs BN (formerly 101st Avn Bn)
159th Asst Spt Hqtrs BN (formerly 308th Avn Bn)
163d Artillery Co (GS) (formerly 6 Co B, 101st Avn Bn)

101st ACD Troops

2d Sqdn, 17th Cav (OCPON 2/101 1 May - 25 July) (OCPON 101 ACD 25-31 Jul)
325th "Ng
501st Sig
Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (assigned 31 July)
Co F, 58th Inf (IRF)
101st Admin Co
101st MP Co
265th RRC
42d Inf Plat (Sat Dog)
47th Inf Plat (Sat Dog)
58th Inf Plat (Sat Dog)
557th Inf Plat (Sat Trackers)
10th Cml Plat (assigned 10 Jun 68)
20th Cml Det
36th Cml Det
22d Mil His Det
25th PI Det
34th PI Det
45th PI Det
101st MI Det
181st MI Det
204th MI Det
559th ASD (OCPON 3/101)
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Inlosure 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION) to Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division for the Period Ending 31 July 1968.

101st ACD Support Command

HHC & Band
5th TAM Bn
326th Med Bn
426th Spt and Svc Bn
801st Maint Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 101st Airborne Division (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations,

CC, 101st Airborne Division (AM)

**Report Date**
15 August 1968

**Contract or Grant No.**
N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** PAGE #: That page on which the item of interest is located.