<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD394868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 1980, DoDD 5200.10 Group-4; OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD394868

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO

confidential

FROM

secret

AUTHORITY

31 Aug 1971, DoDD 5200.10 Group-4

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AD 394868

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: CONFIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY:

DoD 5200.1-R
Nov 73

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (10 Dec 68) FOR OT UT 583250 23 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Air University Library
Army Representative, COMSEVENTHFLT
Commanding Generals
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Materiel Command
Il Field Force Vietnam Artillery
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
1. (S) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Administration/Personnel.

   (1) During this period there was a change in the command of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery. Brigadier General Charles Cantrell assumed command of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery on 1 June 1968. Personnel rotation was slightly higher than normal for the months of June and July. Replacements have been received in adequate numbers for all MOS positions with the exception of 05C (Radio Teletypewriter Operators). The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel.

      (a) Legion of Merit - 1
      (b) Bronze Star - 24
      (c) Air Medal - 13
      (d) Army Commendation Medal - 25
      (e) Army Commendation Medal (V) - 2
      (f) Purple Heart - 1

   (2) The headquarters was engaged in normal operations during the period with concurrent effort directed toward improving defensive positions.
SECRET

(3) Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) received the assignment of 15 Radar Detachments during the period.

(4) There were no administrative or tactical movements of the II FFORCEV Artillery Headquarters during this reporting period.

(5) Current organizational structure of II FFORCEV Artillery is at inclosure 1.

b. Operations.

(1) General. This reporting period was characterized by repositioning of Force Artillery to cope with the changing operational situation. Force Artillery capabilities were decreased appreciably by requirements for additional light artillery in IV Corps Tactical Zone and by the loss of control of artillery assets that have been tasked to defend the Saigon area as an integral part of Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). Continuing emphasis was placed on improving the effectiveness of ARVN Artillery and providing artillery support for SF/CIDG personnel.

(2) Tactical Deployments and Missions of II FFORCEV Arty Units. Current base camp deployments of II FFORCEV Arty units are listed in Inclosure 2. Heavy Artillery coverage within III and IV Corps Tactical Zones is portrayed graphically in Inclosure 3. General tactical missions are outlined in Inclosure 4, but individual unit missions have varied with operational requirements.

(a) Since the close of the last reporting period heavy artillery coverage has not changed. The 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (8"SP) which was attached to Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam was subsequently assigned to that headquarters by USARV General Order 2522, dated 27 May 1968.

(b) On 8 June 1968, the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm T), and the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm T) were detached from the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions respectively and assigned within II FFORCEV Artillery. The assignment of these light artillery battalions within II FFORCEV Artillery was considered necessary to meet the impending commitment of providing a light artillery battalion to Senior Advisor, IV CTZ and still maintain some capability of providing responsive and flexible light artillery support for II FFORCEV units. On 10 June 1968, the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, which had been selected to be placed OPCON to SA IV CTZ, was directed to
SECRET

deploy to Saigon in order to satisfy the critical need for additional artillery in the defense of the city. The battalion was placed OPCON to the newly formed Capital Military Assistance Command and was given a thirty (30) day delay in deployment to the IV CTZ. However, because the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery became such an integral part of the structure of CMAC, it was decided that the battalion be retained indefinitely in an OPCON status and that II FFORCEV select another light artillery unit to satisfy the commitment in the IV CTZ. The 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery was the unit selected to deploy to the IV CTZ and be placed in an OPCON status to the Senior Advisor.

(c) On 15 July 1968, the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery was reassigned from the 23d Artillery Group to the 54th Artillery Group and further attached for all purposes to the 9th Infantry Division. Special instructions contained in the reassignment orders specified that the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery would be placed OPCON to the Senior Advisor, IV CTZ, upon crossing the III - IV CTZ boundary. On 15 July 1968, the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery was reassigned from the 54th Artillery Group to the 23d Artillery Group but remained in an OPCON status to CG, CMAC, after the reassignment. The significance of the reassignment of these light artillery battalions to Force Artillery was a substantial increase in the Force's light artillery assets; however, the subsequent redeployments and current OPCON missions places them temporarily out of the control of II FFORCEV Arty.

(d) On 10 June 1968, Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery departed Bien Hoa for Xuan Loc. Concurrent with this move, Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery deployed by platoon echelon from Bien Hoa to Ben Luc and Battery A of the same battalion displaced from Ben Luc to Bien Hoa. The redeployment of these batteries was completed on 12 June 1968 and the use of the platoon method of displacement in most instances allowed for sustained heavy artillery coverage during the entire movement phase. This interchange of base camp locations was directed primarily to improve morale and maintenance conditions in the unit that occupies the Ben Luc position. The Ben Luc position is small, isolated, without significant infantry protection, and receives frequent mortar and rocket attacks.

(e) Effective 10 June 1968, the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was assigned to the 101st Air Cav Division by USARV General Order 2754 dated 7 June 1968. This medium artillery battalion had previously been assigned to the 23d Artillery Group and attached to the 101st Air Cav Division, but the redeployment of that division to I CTZ and the requirement for additional medium artillery to support operations in that

SECRET
SECRET

area resulted in the assignment of the battalion to the division. A Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, with a base camp at Phuoc Vinh did not deploy to I CTZ with the division and was left in III CTZ attached to the 23d Artillery Group. The attachment of this battery to the 23d Artillery Group left Force Artillery with an additional airmobile medium artillery capability; however, this unit may be considered only a temporary asset.

(f) At the close of the last reporting period, G Battery, 55th Artillery deployed to the I CTZ, subsequently was attached to the Americal Division, but remained assigned to II FFORCEV Artillery. Because the critical personnel functions of requisitions, assignments, and promotions could not be performed effectively by this headquarters with the records and morning reports maintained by the Americal Division, action was initiated to have G Battery, 55th Artillery assigned to the Americal Division. Assignment was effected on 1 July 1968 by USARV General Order 2981 dated 21 June 1968. The loss of this battery continues to be felt severely in light of the heavy demands for AW support throughout III CTZ.

(g) On 15 June 1968, Battery D, 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (AW) (SP) displaced from a base camp location at Tay Ninh vic XT 160 510 to Bearcat vic YT 160 000. This repositioning was directed in order to achieve an optimum location for the battery from which it could more effectively support II FFORCEV units. The relocation of this unit has increased measurably the equitable distribution and responsiveness of AW support for units which do not have an AW battery attached.

(3) Artillery in Support of the Capital Military Assistance Command. Increased hostile activity and rocket/mortar attacks concentrated in the Saigon area have necessitated the positioning of light and medium Force Artillery in the city of Saigon and in the outlying districts. On 10 June 1968, the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery was placed OPCON to the Commanding General CMAC and subsequently deployed to the Saigon area. Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery displaced from a base camp location at Lai Khe to the Capital Military District Compound and established a control/headquarters designed to function as a tactical-fire direction center, aircraft warning control center, and as a joint US - ARVN fire clearance facility. A Battery, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery established a fire support base in the Newport Bridge area vic XS 892 942. B Battery, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery and C Battery of the same battalion established positions in the Eighth Precinct and adjacent to Tan Son Nhat AFB respectively. Other Force Artillery assets directly available to CMAC and in direct communication with the 6th Battalion,
SECRET

15th Artillery tactical fire direction center include two (2) 105mm batteries from the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery and one (1) 155mm (SP) battery from the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery. This organization and positioning of artillery in the Saigon area allows for rapid transmission of counter-mortar/counter-rocket target information, uniform dissemination of fire clearances and tactical instruction, and greatly reduces the problem of control.

(4) Assistance to ARVN.

(a) Artillery of II FFORCEV continued programs of assistance to ARVN, SF/CIDG, and RF/PF in artillery fire support, training, and fire planning. During the period 1 May through 30 June alone, US Artillery fired 12,798 missions expending 51,160 rounds of ammunition in support of ARVN ground forces, SF/CIDG, and RF/PF. On 178 occasions US Artillery fired in defense of RF/PF outposts, and on at least seven (7) occasions Force Artillery displaced to support SF/CIDG operations.

(b) The program to extend survey control to high priority outposts throughout the III CTZ is nearing completion. Although the results of this program have not as yet been completely determined, a greater degree of accuracy has been achieved in firing defensive concentrations that are close to populated areas. This type of survey control has been extended to other outposts by artillery survey sections at division and group levels in response to requests from Province and District Headquarters. On numerous occasions survey assistance has been provided by US Artillery units to ARVN Artillery located in the same area of operation.

(c) The noted general improvement in ARVN Artillery during recent months was in part the result of the ARVN Artillery Refresh Training Program that was conducted by the Division Artilleries and supported by the Artillery Groups. The 1st, 9th, and 25th US Division Artilleries were given the mission of training the 5th, 18th, and 25th ARVN Division Artilleries respectively, and all ARVN Corps Artillery 155mm platoons in the ARVN DTAs. The 23d Artillery Group assisted the 1st and 25th Division Artilleries while the 54th Artillery Group assumed the responsibility for training the 18th ARVN Division Artillery when the 9th US Division was committed to extensive operations in the Delta area. This recently completed program required eight (8) months of instruction during which eight (8) ARVN battalions were trained. The training was conducted on site at each of the fifty-five (55) ARVN Artillery platoon locations throughout the III CTZ. With the completion
of the Artillery Refresher Course, ARVN has undertaken an extensive training program for artillery platoon leaders. This US inspired training will be conducted in three (3) phases at the III Corps Headquarters in Bien Hoa. In conjunction with this training, each ARVN class will visit a US Artillery battery in the Bien Hoa area. In addition to providing a higher degree of proficiency in ARVN Artillery units, the Refresher Training Program has given ARVN Artillery the required materiel and methodology to conduct similar programs with their own instructor personnel on a continuing basis.

(5) Assistance to SF/CIDG. Artillery training of SF/CIDG personnel at Katum and Thien Ngon has been completed. SF/CIDG personnel took over the operation of the guns at Thien Ngon on 1 June 1968 and at Katum on 15 July 1968. The decision to establish SF/CIDG manned artillery positions at these two (2) isolated sites near the Cambodian border was arrived at in late February 1968 when the 25th Infantry Division was tasked to provide two (2) 105mm howitzers to each of the SF/CIDG camps. Responding to this mission, the 25th Division provided one officer and eighteen (18) EM with two (2) guns and associated communications and FDC equipment from the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery at each location. Because this commitment constituted a heavy drain on the personnel resources of the US Artillery batteries the decision was made to withdraw US Artillery personnel and turn the artillery pieces and associated equipment over to the SF/CIDG on a temporary loan basis. To support the requirements of this decision III ARVN Corps agreed to provide the cadre to conduct artillery training prior to the turnover. The 25th ARVN Division Artillery organized two (2) teams of one (1) officer and ten (10) EM each and began artillery training at each camp on 1 April 1968. Additionally, III ARVN Corps provided one (1) ARVN officer and two (2) ARVN NCOs to remain at each artillery position in a supervisory capacity after the training program was completed. With the completion of the training program and the subsequent assumption of operations by SF/CIDG personnel, the US Artillery personnel at Katum and Thien Ngon were released to rejoin their parent organization. The intent of this turnover of responsibility was to provide responsive close artillery support in the critical TAOR of Thien Ngon and Katum without creating a severe personnel drain on the already heavily committed US light artillery units. Because the loan of artillery pieces could only be effected on a temporary basis, a lasting solution to the problem has not yet been arrived at. However, in the event that artillery pieces become available on a permanent basis and a transfer of accountability can be effected, the SF/CIDG at the two camps will have trained artillery personnel ready to assume operations.
Artillery Support of SF/CIDG. Force Artillery support of SF/CIDG operations was continuous throughout this reporting period and on some occasions it was necessary to reposition artillery units to provide the necessary coverage. USArtillery supported seven (7) Special Forces operations that required the displacement of artillery units and in all instances liaison and forward observer teams were attached to the supported unit for the duration of the operation. Additionally, the placement of a full time artillery liaison officer in the Co A, 5th Special Forces Group TOC has allowed for a timely and continuous flow of pertinent tactical information and has greatly facilitated the preparation of operations plans that require artillery support information. The most significant SF/CIDG operations supported by Force Artillery are listed below.

(a) On 1 May 1968, Force Artillery 175mm guns located at FSB St. Barbara supported a multicompany sized operation in the vicinity of LZ WAR PATH. Artillery support was continuous throughout the two (2) day operation and the fire support rendered was termed highly accurate and immediately responsive.

(b) On 15 May 1968, the 175mm guns at St. Barbara and the 105mm howitzers at Thien Ngon supported a large combat assault in the vicinity of LZ BOW (XT 907 905).

(c) During the period 1 June through 22 June 1968, Force Artillery supported six (6) Mobile Strike Force companies conducting operations in northern Tay Ninh Province. In support of this fast moving operation one (1) 155mm platoon from A Btry, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted to FSB St. Barbara. When the operation moved further north the same platoon was extracted from FSB St. Barbara and airlifted to Katum. In support of the same operation, an additional 155mm platoon from A Btry, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was airlifted from Bearcat to Tong Le Chon to provide supporting fires from that location for the duration of the operation.

Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.

(a) Survey. The greater part of the survey effort during this reporting period has been directed at refining the counter-mortar/counter-rocket defenses in the Saigon area. Additional counter-mortar defenses have been provided survey data at Bearcat, the 9th Infantry Division Headquarters, and around the ammunition unloading and storage site at Cat Lai. The 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) completed survey for 36 artillery concentration points along the northwestern perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The establishment of these defensive concentration points allows for the rapid delivery of massed artillery fires and improves greatly the accuracy of the fires.
delivered. To combat the rocket/mortar threat, the 8th Battalion, 23rd Artillery (TAB) surveyed nine (9) flash observation positions in and around the Saigon area. Each position is equipped with an M65 periscope which allows for accurate azimuth readings to the observed flash. Additionally, three (3) AN/MPQ-4A radar sites have been located on surveyed sites around Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The radar at each site has been oriented to scan in designated areas, which provides optimum radar coverage for the air base and facilitates plotting hostile launch positions. The current status of survey is shown in Inclosure 6.

(b) Calibration of Artillery Pieces. During this reporting period 311 weapons were serviced throughout III CTZ. Three hundred one (301) weapons were calibrated, and pull-over gauge readings were made on 311 weapons. Of a total of 51 units that received calibration service, 24 were ARVN units.

(c) Metro. The arrival of the 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery with an assigned meteorological section made possible the relocation of one metro station of the 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) from Nui Dat to Tan An. The significance of this relocation was to provide meteorological coverage in the gap that existed previously between the metro stations at Cu Chi and Dong Tam and to extend coverage to a previously uncovered area south of Saigon (see Inclosure 5). Additionally, the establishment of a meteorological station at Tan An will permit the station currently located at Dong Tam to displace and provide additional coverage of the 9th Infantry Division's area of operation.

(d) FADAC. At the close of the last reporting period the 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was assigned to FFORCEN V Artillery from their CONUS station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Arriving in country without FADAC, the unit immediately requisitioned and subsequently received FADAC through normal supply channels. Prior to issue, an orientation on the operation and maintenance of this equipment was given by a provisional element from the FADAC Orientation Team Pacific on 10 - 14 June 1968.

(8) Program to Insure Safety of Aircraft. On 23 July 1966, FFORCEN V published Regulation 385-2, which established air corridors through which aircraft could fly and into which artillery could not fire without prior clearance from aviation agencies. Additionally, this regulation provided for the establishment of artillery air control agencies in each tactical area of responsibility and in each area of operation for the purpose of providing pilots with comprehensive artillery information necessary for them to effect a safe departure from
an established flight corridor. The procedures set forth in this regulation insured protection for the comparatively slow and low-flying aircraft which operate throughout the III CTZ. However, these procedures would not accommodate the high performance commercial and military aircraft that habitually operate at higher altitudes under radar control from a centralized traffic control agency. The control agencies vectoring high performance type aircraft are not equipped or staffed to handle the large volume of pertinent artillery data necessary to insure the desired degree of safety for the aircraft they are controlling. To cope with this problem it was decided that only heavy artillery information would be reported and that high performance aircraft would be vectored around the artillery fires. Experience soon indicated that this vectoring system restricted the movement of aircraft excessively, and it became evident that further improvements to the present system had to be made. II FFORCEV Artillery in conjunction with concerned II FFORCEV staff sections formulated plans to improve upon the existing system and published a revised regulation. This new regulation established air corridors for Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Bases and set forth procedures for reporting all artillery with a maximum ordinate above 7000 feet to designated Air Force CRCs. It also provided for the establishment of artillery warning and control centers throughout III CTZ which function as route clearance and artillery warning facilities. At present there are 16 artillery warning control centers located throughout the III CTZ which receive all artillery firing data from US, FWMAF, and ARVN artillery units. II FFORCEV Artillery FSCE has conducted a recent analysis of the present system and has determined that the most efficient means of vectoring aircraft would be to give the Air Force responsibility for all aircraft flying above 5000 feet. In this way an equitable and manageable solution to the aircraft warning problem could be achieved. Effective 1 August 1968 all aircraft flying below 5000 feet will be controlled by Army agencies and all aircraft above that altitude will be an Air Force responsibility.

c. Intelligence.

(1) Counter-Mortar and Ground Surveillance Radar Detachments.

(a) On 6 May 1968, the ten (10) counter-mortar radar detachments and one (1) ground surveillance radar detachment assigned to the 97th Artillery Group (Air Defense) were reassigned to Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAH). This reassignment and the attachment of two (2) AN/TFS-25 radars on 28 July 1968 significantly increased the counter mortar capability of Force Artillery and allowed for greater flexibility of control in meeting the current threat.
On 30 June 1968, four (4) new detachments, the 257th, 258th, 259th, and the 260th Field Artillery Detachments (Countermortar Radar) arrived in country. These detachments were assigned to the 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) and were attached or placed OPCON to major commands within II FFORCEV. The 257th and 258th Field Artillery Detachments were attached to the 25th Infantry Division to assist in the defense of the base camps at Dau Tieng and Cu Chi. The 259th was placed OPCON to the recently formed Capital Military Assistance Command in Saigon to reinforce the counter-mortar/counter-rocket defense around the city and adjacent districts. The 260th Field Artillery Detachment was attached to the 1st Infantry Division to assist in the defense of Lai Khe. The assignment of these additional radar detachments within II FFORCEV provided for a more uniform distribution of radar coverage around designated vital areas throughout the command. At present there are twenty-six (26) counter-mortar radars in II FFORCEV TAOI.

(2) Radar Detachments in CMAC. There are seven (7) detachments assigned to the 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) currently employed in the defense of the Saigon area. The controlling headquarters for these detachments is the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). Coordination and supervision of the radar surveillance effort in the Saigon area is the responsibility of the CMAC Artillery Officer.

(3) Counter-Rocket Experiments. On 5, 7, and 9 June 1968, a team composed of personnel from II FFORCEV Artillery and the 25th Infantry Division conducted live firing experiments with captured 122mm rockets. A firing position was established adjacent to the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Point and an impact area was selected north of Bearcat. To provide a realistic evaluation of counter-battery detection capabilities, two (2) counter-mortar radars, AN/MPQ-4A, were positioned on the north edge of the Bearcat base camp, with a scan setting corresponding to the approximate azimuth of fire. One of the radars used to conduct the experiment had received a special modification to the computer to allow a lower beam solution to the problem. One of the primary objects of the experiment was to test the ability of the radars to detect the rocket during the down range, flat trajectory phase of flight. The experiment proved that the radars were marginally successful in detecting the rockets, and launch point location accuracies were for the most part quite poor. The main problem encountered was found to be in the design characteristics of the radar which limited its ability to strobe the distance between the entrance and exit points of the flat trajectory rocket as it intersected the beams (see In-closure 7). The AN/MPQ-4A radar which was designed to locate the...
SECRET

Point of origin for high trajectory projectiles was unable to compute a meaningful launch location for the low trajectory rockets. The results of this experimentation indicate that further testing should be conducted to determine what additional modifications should be applied to the AN/MPS-4A radar to provide a reliable rocket detection capability.

(4) Saigon Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack. To cope with the rocket and mortar threat to the city of Saigon, II FFORCEV Artillery was tasked to establish and integrate flash observation positions around the perimeter of the city. Nine (9) flash observation posts were constructed and configured to form a complete triangle around the metropolitan area. Three (3) of these observation posts are located on 60 foot steel towers, two (2) are located on 100 foot water towers, two (2) are positioned on buildings, and the remaining two (2) are on 80 foot radio towers. During the period 17 June through 1 July, the 8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (TAB) brought fourth order survey control to all nine (9) flash control towers which identified the exact location of each position. A flash control center was organized and placed under the operational control of CMAC. This control center determines the coordinates of the rocket or mortar launch point by a process of intersection based on the azimuths received from the tower sightings. Artillery personnel in CMAC report that this is their most reliable means of locating hostile rocket and mortar locations.

(5) Long Binh/Bien Hoa Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack. The flash base that was established around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area during the last reporting period is currently being relocated and re-organized to provide greater depth and increased accuracy. Sixty (60) foot towers are being constructed at selected locations to replace the present perimeter towers. The width of the flash base has been extended to provide greater accuracy in locating the enemy firing position. By replacing the wooden azimuth measuring devices with M65 periscopes the accuracy of the tower sightings has been increased. An M5 plotting board now is being used in the II FFORCEV Artillery flash control center to eliminate the inaccuracies inherent in the map plotting system and to facilitate rapid target location. The new flash base is currently forty per cent completed and should be operational prior to 20 August 1968.
2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations. None.

c. Training. FADAC Training.

(1) Observation: On 29 April 1966, the 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery arrived in country and was further assigned to 54th Artillery Group. Upon arrival the unit had no FADAC equipment and their personnel were only marginally trained in the use of the equipment. The unit immediately submitted a requisition for this equipment, and USARV filled the request from in-country resources. Once the unit received the FADAC equipment, designated personnel received professional on-site instruction in operation and maintenance from a provisional team of the FADAC Assistance Team, Pacific. At present, supply personnel report that there are no FADACs available in the inventory in RVN and that no other FADACs are programmed, other than those previously designated as floats or replacements. Moreover, when the FADAC Assistance Team, Pacific completely suspends in-country activity in August 1968, there will be no qualified instructors to school untrained personnel.

(2) Evaluation: Under the existing conditions it is imperative that all new artillery units deploying to RVN be equipped and trained with FADAC. FADAC measurably increases a unit's ability to conduct continuous operations in a counterguerrilla environment where artillery fire must be responsive and still meet the safety restrictions created by no fire areas. Artillery units in RVN operating without FADAC are handicapped considerably.

(3) Recommendation: That all field artillery units deploying to RVN be equipped and trained with FADAC prior to their departure from CONUS.

d. Intelligence. Flash Base Personnel.

(1) Observation: To cope with the threat of rocket and mortar attacks against Saigon and major military complexes throughout the III CTZ, an elaborate system of integrated flash bases has been employed around the areas most likely to receive enemy attack. The effective-
CONFIDENTIAL

ness of the counter-rocket/counter-mortar program will depend to a large degree on the quality of the personnel manning the observation posts. The personnel who man the observation posts never have received any formal training in sighting techniques and generally are unfamiliar with the equipment that is used.

(2) Evaluation: The heavy volume of rocket and mortar attacks represents a relatively new innovation in enemy tactics, and in the early buildup of forces it was difficult to foresee the need for additional target acquisition personnel to operate static defenses around high priority areas. The need for trained target acquisition personnel has now increased to the point where they are required in almost every major military area in the III CTZ. However, these personnel are not available within Vietnam in the numbers required to fill the key positions in the counter-rocket/counter-mortar defenses. Additionally, current personnel assets will not permit the assignment of troops to flash base positions on a permanent basis, and a roster system must be used. The use of the roster system means that personnel will not develop the proficiency that comes with daily experience on the job, and the accuracy of the flash sightings is substandard. Recent tests conducted by II FFORCEV Artillery have proven that the information obtained from the flash towers manned by personnel who perform that duty on a bi-weekly basis was inaccurate, untimely, and frequently invalid.

(3) Recommendation: That increased emphasis be placed on flash ranging and target acquisition techniques during AIT at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and that trained target acquisition personnel be assigned to a special TD for base camp defense of selected installations which cannot provide required personnel from their own combat unit resources.

e. Logistics.

(1) Meteorological Equipment.

(a) Observation: Rawin Set, AN/GMD-1 has been in the field for the past fifteen (15) years and no program for periodic overhaul or provision for support maintenance has been established. With the heavy demands placed on meteorological units in RVN, it is essential that the Rawin Set, which is the major piece of equipment in each meteor section, be given adequate maintenance support.

(b) Evaluation: The critical problems associated with the maintenance of Rawin Sets has caused the 1st Logistical Command to imple-
CONFIDENTIAL

ment measures called for in the Cyclic Overhaul Program. However, this program has not been effected to date due to the current Army-wide shortage of rawin sets which makes it impossible to obtain replacements for the sets that are scheduled for overhaul. At present, nine (9) of the eleven (11) sets in II FFORCEV exceed the criteria for cyclic overhaul by an average figure of ten (10) years. Because this major piece of equipment is vital to all meteorological operations, it is imperative that replacements be procured on a continuing basis to allow for the turn-in of the overage sets currently deployed in the field.

(c) Recommendation: That additional rawin sets be procured, and that a maintenance program as recommended in II FFORCEV Artillery letter dated 27 Jul 68, subject: Requirement for Maintenance Support of Meteorological Equipment, be initiated.

(2) Survey Equipment.

(a) Observation: The MC8 Distance Measuring Equipment used by the survey sections of II FFORCEV Artillery has proven to be most unsatisfactory, based on a down time experience of 75%.

(b) Evaluation: DMEs are vital to survey crews in Vietnam in the extension of survey control. The most practical method of survey in RVN, due to terrain and enemy forces, is traverse, and DMEs allow the surveyor to cover great distances with maximum speed, accuracy, and safety. The persistent maintenance problems associated with the MC8 DME have required surveyors to use less desirable methods in the extension of survey control in hostile areas and have increased the requirements for security forces necessary to protect survey personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That the MC8 DMEs currently in use be replaced by the more stable MRA 301 DME.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other. None.

Incl CHARLES CANTRELL
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
FFORCEV Artillery
2-Positioning of II FFORCEV Artillery
3-Artillery Coverage as of 31 July 1968
4-Missions
5-Metro Coverage
6-Survey Control
7-AN/MEQ-4A Radar Experiment

DISTRIBUTION:

1-II FFORCEV (File)
2-USAR PAC
3-USARV
4-ACSFOR
AVFBC-HG-H (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 26 AUG 68

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO-UT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, for period ending 31 July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Incl 0
O. B. IVRY
LT, AGC
Asst AG

04-B-68-228
38233
04-68-3225
2817311
AVC-68-S
ARV68S-2637
CONFIDENTIAL

AVICD-DST (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (c)

MAJ Klingen/ds/1/ W 433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Period Owing 31 July 1968, 8/7 86562 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 06725 31 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GEN-DEP, AT

96596

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning FADAC training, page 12, paragraph 2c: Concur. This recommendation is in effect and deploying units are FADAC equipped and trained prior to their arrival in RVN.

b. Reference item concerning flash lase personnel, page 12, paragraph 2d:

(1) Concur in the requirement for additional flash ranging and target acquisition training for enlisted personnel. Nonconcur, however, that it be provided in AIT. During his recent visit to RVN, the Director of the Target Acquisition Department, US Army Artillery and Missile School, indicated that the school intended to extend the enlisted survey specialist course by two weeks to include the requirement for flash ranging training.

(2) Nonconcur that trained target acquisition personnel be provided to base camp TD. Personnel trained in this specialty are expected to remain in short supply.

c. Reference item concerning meteological equipment, page 13, paragraph 2e(1): Concur with the recommendation to procure additional Rainbow Sets. This headquarters will inform DA and USA, of general and specific problems pertaining to meteological equipment caused by age and lack of repair parts and will recommend that this equipment be included in the Closed Loop Program. The recommendation pertaining to maintenance of Rainbow Sets is discussed in a letter from this headquarters to II Field Force Vietnam, dated 18 September 1968.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (c)

d. Reference item concerning survey equipment, page 14, paragraph 2e(2): Concur in the evaluation that the MC8 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is difficult to maintain. The MRA 301 DME is currently under evaluation and it cannot be determined at this time if it is an adequate substitute for the MC8 DME.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

7 IncI
nc

Cy fur.:
HQ II FFV
HQ II FFV Arty

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 95558 2 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

7 Incl
nc

FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION OF II FFORCEV ARTILLERY

1. The following units are assigned to HQ, II FFORCEV Artillery; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery. The following units are assigned to 8th TAB, 25th Artillery and further attached or placed OPCON as indicated:

a. 67th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance) OPCON SA Dong Nai.

b. 6th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

c. 9th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON SA Dong Nai.

d. 76th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON SA Dong Nai.

e. 79th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

f. 231st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

g. 234th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): Attached 1st Infantry Division.

h. 246th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON SA Dong Nai.

i. 247th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

j. 248th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON Dong Nai.

k. 249th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

l. 257th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): Attached 25th Infantry Division.

m. 258th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): Attached 25th Infantry Division.

n. 259th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): OPCON CMAC.

e. 260th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar): Attached 1st Infantry Division.
2. HQ, II FFORCEN Artillery has operational control of two (2) artillery groups and an automatic weapons battalion. The artillery battalions listed herein are assigned to the artillery group indicated and are under operational control of II FFORCEN Artillery, except as specified. The separate 155mm battery shown under the 23d Artillery Group is assigned with its parent battalion to the 101st Air Cavalry Division and is currently attached to the 23d Artillery Group.

a. 23d Artillery Group.

(1) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T).
(2) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm T) (OPCON CMAC).
(3) A Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm T) (Attached from 101st Air Cavalry Division).
(4) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (155mm SP).
(5) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175mm SP).
(6) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8"/175mm SP).

b. 54th Artillery Group.

(1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T).
(2) 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm T) (OPCON SA IV CTZ).
(3) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm SP).
(4) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm T).
(5) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175mm SP).

c. 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery.

(1) Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery.
(2) Battery I (SLT), 29th Artillery.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 30 April 1968</th>
<th>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 31 July 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHB, II FFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 051 111</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 051 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 8th Bn, 25th Arty (TAB)</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 053 112</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 053 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 23d Artillery Group</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 867 162</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 867 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 13th Arty (105mm T)</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 847 152</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 847 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 1st Bn, 27th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 497 481</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 497 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry A, 1st Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 845 158</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 845 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry B, 1st Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 143 525</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 143 525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 1st Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 497 481</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 497 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8&quot;/175 SP)</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 154 513</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 141 521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>French Fort XT 275 682</td>
<td>French Fort XT 275 682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 160 524</td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 160 524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 496 486</td>
<td>Dau Tieng XT 496 486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (8&quot;/175 SP)</td>
<td>Quan Loi XT 809 903</td>
<td>Quan Loi XT 809 903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Quan Loi XT 809 903</td>
<td>Quan Loi XT 809 903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Phuoc Binh YU 138 063</td>
<td>Phuoc Binh YU 144 073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh XT 965 493</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh XT 970 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry A, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (155mm T)</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh XT 965 493</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh XT 965 493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>LOCATION AS OF</td>
<td>LOCATION AS OF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 April 1968</td>
<td>31 July 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 54th Artillery Group</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 460 090</td>
<td>Xuan Loc XT 460 090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 9th Arty (105mm T)</td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 169 995</td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 166 001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 42d Arty (155mm T)</td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 169 995</td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 177 002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 2d Bn, 35th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nui Dat YT 428 665</td>
<td>Nui Dat YT 425 726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 470 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8&quot;/175 SP)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 026 149</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 467 098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 026 149</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 467 098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
<td>Bien Hoa YT 025 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 5th Bn (AW)(SP), 2d Arty</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 810 220</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 847 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cu Chi XT 650 170</td>
<td>Cu Chi XT 650 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 160 000</td>
<td>Dong Tam XS 417 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tay Ninh XT 160 510</td>
<td>Bear Cat YT 166 001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 810 220</td>
<td>Phu Loi XT 810 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 30 April 1968</td>
<td>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 31 July 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Platoon</td>
<td>Cu Chi XT 650 170</td>
<td>Cu Chi XT 650 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Platoon</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
<td>Long Binh YT 128 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 15th Arty (105mm T)</td>
<td>Lai Khe XT 780 379</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut AFB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

MISSIONS OF II FFORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS

1. 23d Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps.
   a. 2d Bn, 13th Arty - GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.
   c. 1st Bn, 27th Arty - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery.
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.
   d. 6th Bn, 27th Arty - GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.
   e. 2d Bn, 32d Arty - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
   f. 6th Bn, 15th Arty - OPCON Capital Military Assistance Command.

2. 54th Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps.
   a. 7th Bn, 9th Arty - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
   b. 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery - GS II FFORCEV,
      Btry A - GS-Reinf 12th Royal Australian Artillery Field Regiment.
   c. 7th Bn, 8th Arty - GS II FFORCEV.
      (1) Btry A - GS II FFORCEV.
      (2) Btry B - GS II FFORCEV.
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
   d. 6th Bn, 77th Arty - Attached 9th Infantry Division, OPCON SA IV CTZ.
3. 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery - General Support II FFORCEV.
   b. Btry B - Attached 25th Infantry Division.
   c. Btry C - Attached 9th Infantry Division.
   d. Btry D - GS II FFORCEV.
   e. Btry D, 71st Arty (MG) - GS II FFORCEV.
   f. Btry I, 29th Arty (SLT) - GS II FFORCEV.
## SCHEDULED NATO UNIT LOCATION BROADCAST TIMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Broadcast Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty Quan Loi</td>
<td>0200-0800-1400-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>9th Inf Div Arty Dong Tam</td>
<td>0200-0800-1400-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>25th Inf Div Arty Cu Chi</td>
<td>0600-1200-1800-2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1st Bn, 27th Arty Dau Tieng</td>
<td>0400-1000-1600-2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>6th Bn, 27th Arty Phuoc Binh</td>
<td>0300-0900-1500-2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>7th En, 8th Arty Bien Hoa</td>
<td>0400-1000-1600-2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>8th Bn, 25th Arty Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>0430-1030-1630-2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>8th Bn, 25th Arty Tan An</td>
<td>0430-1030-1630-2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>2d Bn, 32d Arty Tay Ninh</td>
<td>0030-0630-1230-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>2d Bn, 35th Arty Xuan Loc</td>
<td>0515-1115-1715-2315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>5th Bn, 42d Arty Nui De</td>
<td>0300-0900-1500-2100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Computer Metro broadcast times are 15 minutes prior to NATO broadcast times.
CONFIDENTIAL

TWO BEAM INTERCEPT - MORTAR. WITHIN DESIGN CAPABILITY OF THE RADAR

TWO BEAM INTERCEPT - ROCKET. EXCEEDS RADAR CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE DISTANCE BETWEEN A AND B.

ONE BEAM INTERCEPT - ROCKET. EXCEEDS RADAR CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE DISTANCE BETWEEN A AND B. ONLY PASSES THROUGH ONE BEAM.
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CG, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and include date)

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

5. AUTHORITIES (First name, middle initial, last name)

CG, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310