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AUTHORITY

31 Aug 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO d/a ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Best Available Copy
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* Withdrawn, HQ, DA

** Withdrawn, HQ, DA; published sep as CAAR 68X073

*** Withdrawn, HQ, DA; published sep as CAAR 68X081

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20 August 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. (C) Introduction.

      (1) During this reporting period 1 May - 31 Jul 68, the 9th Infantry
          Division continued operations in support of mission and tasks either
          specified or implied by III Corps/IIFFORV Combined Campaign Plans
          1966, dated 15 Dec 67, and the RVNAF, JGS/MACV Combined Campaign Plans
          1968, AB 143, dated 1 Nov 67 and 1 Jun 68. Division headquarters remained
          at Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) until 25 Jul 68 at which time the headquarters
          displaced the forward command post at Dong Tam Base Camp (XS 4143). On
          7 Jul 68 the Division TAOI was reduced by the loss of the southern part
          of Long Khanh Province as depicted in Incl 3, Map of Div Tactical Area
          of Interest (TAOI). This area is now the responsibility of the 11th Armored
          Cavalry Regiment.

      (2) The mission of the 9th Inf Div is to conduct sustained, coordi-
          nated combined air and ground operations to destroy Viet Cong (VC) and
          North Vietnamese (NVA) main and local force units, and their installations
          and infrastructure in the TAOI; in close cooperation and coordination
          with Task Force 117 execute ground and riverine operations to interdict
          VC/NVA land and water lines of communication (LOCs) and deny the use of
          their base areas and to destroy targeted main and local force units;
          conduct consolidation and pacification operations to identify and destroy
          VC guerrilla units and infrastructure and secure population centers and
          LOCs in close coordination and cooperation with the government of Vietnam
          (GVN) forces; conduct support operations to further assist the GVN
          pacification program by enhancing the capability of the Army of the
          Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Popular Forces (PF), and Regional Forces (RF),
          and by contributing to the health-and-welfare of the civilian population.

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The 9th Inf Div has successfully accomplished this mission by conducting
the above operations in Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong,
Kien Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Kien Phuong, Long Khanh,
Phong Dinh and Chuong Thien Provinces.

(3) The 9th Inf Div was involved in combat during every day (92 days)
of this reporting period while conducting four major operations that commenced
or continued during the reporting period: Operation KUDZU, TOAN THANG
(Phases I and II), TRUONG CONG DINH, and PEOPLE'S ROAD (Duong Cua Dan).

(4) In addition to the operations listed above the 3d Squadron, 5th
Cavalry (-), participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical
Zone (CTZ). The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in
areas as designated. Troup D remained at Camp Martin Cox and participated
in missions as assigned by division headquarters.

(5) There were two major changes in division operations during this
reporting period. The first involved the exchange of missions and locations
of the 1st and 3d Brigades on 23 Jun 68. 3d Brigade with two maneuver
battalions relocated from the Tan An area to Dong Tam Base to facilitate
its transition to the second mobile riverine force. 1st Brigade
with three infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion now operates
in Long An province. The other change involved displacing the division head-
quarters from Camp Martin Cox to its new base camp at Dong Tam on 25 July
68. This move was made for two reasons, first to position the division
headquarters in the heart of the area of its operations, and second to
make room at Camp Martin Cox for the new Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force
(RTAVF). MG Ewell turned the Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat) Base Camp over to
MG Tawee, CG RTAVF on 29 Jul 68. A division rear was established in the
Bearcat TAOR. The RTAVF, which will depart on 15 August, is providing
in-country orientation and training for the RTAVF.

(6) On 1 Jun 68 BG Elvy B. Roberts replaced BG Morgan C. Roseborough
as ADC-A. On 16 Jun 68 BG William A. Knowlton, ADC-B, departed the command
and was replaced by BG James S. Timothy on 16 Jul 68. COL Ira A. Hunt
became Chief of Staff on 4 May 68, replacing LTC Myron E. Lee. On 28 May 68
COL Robert Archer assumed command of the 2d Brigade from COL Bert W. David.

(7) During the reporting period two of the division's battalion
commanders were killed in hostile action. LTC Van Deusen, 2-47th Inf (M),
died on 3 Jul 68 when his helicopter was shot down, and LTC Berzinac,
4-39th Inf, was killed by a mine on 30 Jul 68.

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(8) On 19 Jul 68 the 9th Inf Div was presented the Vietnamese Unit Citation for Valor-Armed Forces Level by LTG Khang, CG III CTZ at ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the division’s organization. MG Ewell received the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Pals in behalf of the 9th Inf Div officers and men. The unit award was presented for valorous and outstanding performance of duty against the Viet Cong and NVA during the period Dec 66 through Jun 68.

(9) On 22 Jul 68 the 9th Aviation Battalion was presented with the US Valorous Unit Award for military operations on 2 Sep 67 at Rach Kien, Long An Province in support of the 3-39th Inf.

b. (C) Organization

(1) In addition to the three brigades of the 9th Inf Div, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment remained O:CON to the division during this reporting period; and Task Force Forsyth and Task Force Funston, provisional headquarters formed by the division, continued the responsibility of the defense of Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) and Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) respectively. On 1 Jul 68 9th DISCOM assumed the duties of Task Force Funston and Task Force Funston was deactivated. On 20 Jun 68, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was detached from the 9th Inf Div by USARV General Order 2867.

(2) Under the provisions of Eq USARPAC General Order No. 354, dated 16 Jul 68, the 2d Brigade was reorganized under the new riverine MTOE. The riverine organization was designed to maximize an infantry battalion’s effectiveness for operations in inundated areas by eliminating non-essential personnel and equipment and by adding selected personnel and equipment made necessary by environment.

The brigade headquarters company has been enlarged to give it the capability to exercise command and control of the brigade elements from facilities aboard ship. The riverine battalions contain four rifle companies and a headquarters company organized to facilitate command and control of battalion operations from aboard the assault craft. Since the riverine battalions operate from ships and boats organic wheeled transportation has been replaced by a limited number of small boats. Experience has shown that the riverine battalions can operate more effectively with machine guns than with mortars. Therefore, the number of machine guns in the battalions has been increased from 24 to 36, and the number of 81mm mortars reduced from 12 to eight. Communications capabilities remain the same, but with manpacked radios substituted for vehicular radios. Personnel are provided to man the boat communications facilities in conjunction with the Navy.

The 105mm artillery battalion has been similarly streamlined to allow it to operate from towed barges. Wheeled transportation and handling
personnel for ammunition have been eliminated. Strength authorizations are as follows:

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<th>WO</th>
<th>Enl</th>
<th>Agg</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>189</td>
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<td>HHC (3-47 Inf, 4-47 Inf, 3-60 Inf)</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>814</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arty Battalion</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>423</td>
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(3) Organizational Structure - Incl 1.

(4) Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2.

(5) Division TAOI - Incl 3.

c. (U) Personnel and Administration

(1) General data: See Inclosure four for information and statistical data concerning the following:

(a) Maintenance of unit strength
(b) Personnel Management
(c) Development and maintenance of moral
(d) Maintenance of discipline, law and order

(2) Significant Activities: 

(a) Adjutant General:

The Awards and Decorations Branch completely reorganized during this period by adding a full time night shift. This was required because of the increased number of award recommendations resulting from heavy fighting during the period. In addition, a separate section was added for
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handling and processing ARVN awards. These additions have resulted in
more timely processing of awards as well as a significant decrease in the
backlog of awards.

2 Planning and preparation for the relocation of the AG Section to
Dong Tam Base was finalized and the move was accomplished during late
July. As of the end of this reporting period only the Personnel Services
Division and a minimum of personnel from each of the other divisions
remain at Camp Martin Cox. It is anticipated the entire AG Section will
be established and operational at Dong Tam Base by mid-September.

(b) Judge Advocate General:

1 General: During this quarter, four enlisted men and two commissioned
officers were tried by general court-martial; an increase over the total
of five enlisted men during the previous quarter. No significant trends or
problems were noted in this area during the quarter.

2 Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to units in the field was
rendered via the "circuit rider" method during the past quarter. In
addition to these field visits by the legal assistance officer, the
Staff Judge Advocate and the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate also made
numerous staff visits to commanders of the various units, providing legal
assistance and guidance where needed.

3 Judge Advocate Bulletin: On 11 July 1968 the office of the Staff
Judge Advocate prepared and distributed a new publication for the infor-
mation and guidance to the commanders. This publication is entitled
"Judge Advocate Bulletin." The purpose of the bulletin is to keep
personnel in the field abreast of changes in military and civil law and
to inform them of troublesome areas in legal administration at unit
level, as well as give guidance to preclude repeated errors. The first
publication covered items of interest in the field of military justice, claims
and military affairs.

4 During this period the Staff Judge Advocate implemented a new
command program of clemency for personnel confined. The Staff Judge
Advocate secures a daily report of gains and losses from the stockade,
posts the results on a roster and establishes suspense cards on each
prisoner. Each prisoner's record is screened weekly and he is visited
by a Judge Advocate when required. In any case a Judge Advocate will
visit a prisoner during his third week in confinement. The unit is
notified of the prisoner's record in the stockade and directed to re-
lease the prisoner on his thirtieth day of confinement or reply by

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indorsement, requesting further confinement together with specific justification for such request. Upon release of the prisoner from the stockade the Staff Judge Advocate assists in securing a rehabilitative transfer of the individual if requested by the unit. Although this program is still in the trial stages, it is firmly believed that it can be highly successful with the cooperation of major subordinate commanders and will sharply reduce the number of man-days lost through confinement.

Claims: Since the TET Offensive, approximately 360 claims were made resulting from the destruction and loss of personal property in billets, warehouses, and conexes which were either partially or completely destroyed by enemy mortar and rocket fire. Even though no funds were available for the payment of claims for the period 1 May through 28 June, 24% of these claims were processed as of 31 July 1968. Payment of these claims has enabled the individual soldier to replace his destroyed personal property, to purchase new items and to go on R&R by the replacement of destroyed funds saved for those purposes. A letter received from US Army Claims Service, 10 July 1968, provided that authority is granted effective 1 July to obligate and pay claims for Fiscal Year 1969.

Surgeon: "Operation Safestep" continued during this period. Its primary purpose is to investigate the pathogenesis, treatment and prevention and to implement measures designed to reduce the incidence of dermatological problems in troops operating in a riverine environment.

Testing continues in the area of paddy boots, special socks and lightweight tennis shoes designed to afford maximum temperature reduction to the feet.

Preliminary results again confirm the inadequacy of the first paddy boot. It does not provide adequate support and it allows too much mud and sand to gather in the boot, further irritating the feet. It also allows injury by minor objects such as paddy straw. It is believed that further experiments with this boot would prove useless and therefore the test should be abandoned. Kudora fabric and lightweight Nomex fabrics are also objectionable for the same reasons. Experiments with these are continuing and results will be forwarded to the Environmental Science Laboratories as soon as tests have been completely evaluated.

Two studies have been completed in the use of Grisoculvin prophylaxis in prevention of fungal disease. The results show a significant decrease in fungal disease.

Chaplain: During this period the Division Chaplain completed a study entitled Chaplain Operations in the Mobile Riverine Force. This
study, the first of its kind, has provided a comprehensive insight into the duties of a chaplain with the MRF.

(e) Red Cross: During this period one additional Assistant Field Director was authorized within the Division. The Red Cross Office now has one Field Director and seven Assistant Field Directors. In addition, the Vietnam-wide Red Cross Public Information–Public Relations Program was emphasized throughout the Division resulting in more troops becoming aware of the many services offered by the Red Cross.

(f) Tiger Scouts: The 9th Division Tiger Scout Program has made significant advances. At the end of this reporting period the Division was employing 186 Tiger Scouts and was fast approaching the USARV allocation of 200 Tiger Scouts.

In preparation for the Tiger Scout Language Training Program to be initiated by the Division, two enlisted men were selected as instructors and sent to the Joint General Staff Language School in Saigon. These instructors will be utilized to initiate a one-week language training course for the Division Tiger Scouts in order to augment the intelligence collecting agencies now utilized by the Division.

The Division has also published a Tiger Scout Dictionary. This dictionary gives Vietnamese, English and the phonetic pronunciation of the English word in Vietnamese. It is hoped that this will enable the Tiger Scouts to learn some English–Military terminology in order to facilitate communications with US soldiers. Eventually the dictionary will be printed on waterproof paper in order to increase its durability for field use.

The Tiger Scout Program has proved extremely effective and useful in the counterinsurgency environment. The performance of Tiger Scouts is directly proportional to the imagination and initiative of the employing unit. During the next period the Division hopes to increase the number and quality of scouts employed.

d. (c) Intelligence.

(1) Discussion and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle (See Inclosure 5 for Enemy Unit Locations).

(a) Discussion.

1. General: Since the TET Offensive the indicators showed the enemy was preparing for a second offensive on the city of Saigon; it was during the first week of May that the indicators became acute and attack was
imminent. On 5 May, the enemy began his coordinated attack on the city. In the Division Area of Operations the enemy attempted penetration with three battalions, particularly at the "Y" Bridge where they were virtually decimated as they attempted to seize the bridge leading into the city. The rest of the country was quiet as apparently the enemy did not have the strength to conduct another nationwide offensive. About the 12th of May, the enemy began withdrawal from the perimeter of the city to areas which he believed to be secure from Allied Operations. Throughout the rest of the reporting period the enemy continued to avoid contact and conduct preparations for future operations which it is anticipated will come in the form of another major attack on the city of Saigon some time in August or September. Enemy attempts to avoid contact were not always successful as the Allied units continually sought out the enemy in his base areas and inflicted substantial casualties to his units.

Long An Province: After the abortive Tet Offensive the bulk of the enemy's resources and energy in Long An - Southern Gia Dinh went into rebuilding shattered units and reorganizing the area in preparation for the May offensive on the Saigon Metropolitan complex. From the beginning of the offensive the enemy fought an essentially defensive battle. The only initiative the enemy retained was the actual start of the offensive and duration of time he was willing to commit his forces. The primary attack in Sub-region 3 (SR3) was by the Phu Loi II, the 506 and 5th Nha Be Battalions with the two latter battalions given the primary objective of the "Y" Bridge. The 2d Independent Battalion was in support, but was contacted south of An Phu and never entered the primary attack area. The 265 Battalion apparently had the mission of keeping the supply lines open but was interdicted northeast of Can Giuc. The enemy apparently drained his resources in manpower and supplies in order to conduct the May Offensive.

During the remainder of the reporting period enemy activity has been limited to interdiction of the LOC's and attacks by fire on selected targets. A major reassessment of the situation was undertaken by the enemy as indicated by documents and PWS while the primary target remains Saigon, the enemy has had to rebuild his entire main force structure to include a massive reorientation program for the cadre.

Within Long An Province, one new NVA battalion has been identified. On 23-25 June, south of Ben Luc, elements of the 1st Brigade contacted the newly infiltrated 294 Battalion and dealt them a serious defeat. PWS have indicated the battalion was given the primary support role for a forthcoming offensive on Saigon and an area of operations in Western Rach Kien and Northern Tan Tru.

The major capture of the period occurred on 8 July when the 1st Brigade captured the political officer of the 2nd Independent battalion in the
vic of Thuan My, XS 249567. On his person was a list of the new letter box numbers (LBNs) for SR 3 which reconfirmed the 294 Battalion. The Political officer also reconfirmed the enemy's continued threat against Saigon and the major reorganization. Included in the list of LBNs under SR 3 were precincts in Saigon indicating that the enemy may have reorganized the capital to eliminate part of the command and control problem that plagued his other attempts. The enemy has possibly introduced more rockets and rocket-capable units into Long An. The list of LBNs includes two 107mm companies and 107mm rockets have been used within Long An.

The fact that the VC were forced to rely on NVA units and fillers during this period is just one of several difficulties facing enemy forces. The enemy attempted to continue pressure on Saigon by interdiction of the LOCs highlighted by the successful attack on the Ben Luc Bridge. However, the prompt placement of the floating bridge across the Vam Co Dong nullified the economic impact of this action. The enemy units in Long An have continued their present policy of using widely dispersed base areas. One PW indicated that his 130 man company was spread over an area of 4 km. Contact with friendly forces has been avoided and the enemy's apparent primary mission at the end of the reporting period is protection of base areas, LOCs and preparation for a future offensive.

3 Military Region II: Since the beginning of May the enemy battalions in MR II generally attempted to avoid contact while local force units continue interdiction of LOCs, harassment of RF/PF outposts and limited attacks by fire on GVN controlled areas. The 306th Local Force (LF) Bn from Vinh Long Province was discovered in Saigon and the 261 B Bn to Kien Hoa indicated a definite shift in tactics; apparently the enemy is going to reduce large unit operations at least for the time being in the Delta.

a VC My Tho Province: The VC of My Tho Province during the beginning of May were widely dispersed with the 514 A Bn in Go Cong, the 261 A Bn northwest of My Tho, the 514 A Bn in My Hanh Dong, and the 263 Bn in Base Area 470. However due to aggressive allied operations the enemy was forced to withdraw to Base Area 470. The 7th ARVN Division put pressure on the 514 B Bn in Go Cong when on 7 May, ARVN Troops killed 25 VC in an attack led by the 7th ARVN Division Commander himself. A few days later on 9 May, the 7th ARVN division engaged the 261 A Bn on the edge of the Plains of Reeds northwest of My Tho and killed 97 VC. Both the 514 B Bn and the 261 A Bn suffering from severe casualties, moved generally west to the vicinity of My Hanh Dong (XS 2657), an area which they apparently believed to be secure. On 3 and 4 June the 1st Brigade conducted airmobile assaults into the area, killing 187 VC and forcing the 514 A, 514 B, 261 A and 261 B to retreat into Base Area 470 where they remained until the end of the reporting period. PW's report that allied B-52 strikes took their toll of
the already depleted enemy strength.

(b) VC Ben Tre Province: On 8 May the 516 Battalion attacked 2 battalions of the 10th ARVN Regt, inflicting heavy casualties. Since 10 May the enemy has conducted no significant offensive operations and has remained in his base areas. During Allied operations in the Province the 550 Bn and 520 Bn have been located but due to limited contact order of battle information has not developed on these units to date. A PW from the 261 B Battalion was captured and he stated that his unit had been operating in VC Ben Tre Province since the middle of April when it arrived from VC My Tho Province.

(b) Recapitulation

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(c) Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

During the May offensive the enemy attempted to infiltrate battalion size units into the city of Saigon and time and time again these units were detected and engaged by allied forces, and failed to penetrate the perimeter of the city. Since the May offensive, captured enemy documents suggest that during the next offensive the enemy will attempt to infiltrate the city in company size units utilizing guides provided by higher headquarters. In addition there is increased evidence throughout the area of interest that enemy units are being issued US and ARVN uniforms for the purpose of infiltrating allied installations and possibly the capital city. There is some evidence this tactic may have been used in the attack on the Binh Duc Training Center near My Tho. The enemy also appears to be feeling the effects of allied LOC interdiction activities during the hours of dark-
mess and there is some evidence he is attempting to move more supplies during the hours of daylight as unobtrusively as possible. In an attempt to deny his caches from allied searches it is apparent he is now turning to waterproof containers sunk along canal banks to replace the traditional cache sites in graves or bunker walls. A tactic he developed in reaction to massive allied air and artillery fire power was to build his bunkers about 75 to 100 meters beyond the nipa palm and wooded areas where we might expect to find him and would generally place our preparatory fires. The tactic of bunker displacement out of the woodline combined with the increased availability of anti-aircraft machine guns to local force battalions proved to be a real hazard until the tactic was identified and the fires and flight paths of the aircraft were adjusted.

(2) Enemy Losses (May-July)

KIA-2978
DETAINEES-1885
POs-326
CHIEU HOI-2
CREW-SERVED WEAPONS (C/S)-102
SMALL ARMS (SA)-562
AMMO-87643
MINES-1608
GRAIN (IN TONS)-2765
SAMPANS-619
STRUCTURES-1149
BUNKERS-6370

(3) Intelligence Sources and Agencies

(a) Progress continued during the reporting period in the identification of the Viet Cong infrastructure operating within the division TACI. A total of 837 personalities were added to the Counterintelligence Sections blacklist. Of this total, 68 were identified in Bien Hoa Province, 315 in
Long An Province, 367 in Dinh Thuong, 41 in Kien Hoa Province. These 837 political personalities included 106 military intelligence and security cadre, 58 comrade-liaison agents, 87 finance and economy cadre, 99 proselyting cadre, 55 military affairs cadre, and 434 local Viet Cong government leaders, officials and party secretaries. Viet Cong propagandists in Long An Province and Dinh Tuong Province continued their campaign to discredit US and GVN political programs and to rally local residents to the Viet Cong cause. The Viet Cong propagandists increased their efforts to persuade ARVN Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers to join the Viet Cong. Viet Cong intelligence cadre continued their efforts to gain information of PWNAP operating within the divisional TAOI to specifically include the 9th Infantry Division. The Viet Cong placed great emphasis on penetration operations. During the reporting period, five low level Viet Cong intelligence operations and a three man VC mortar damage assessment cell were neutralized at Dong Tam Base. A combined US-Vietnamese intelligence effort resulted in the neutralization of a large prostitute ring at Dong Tam Base. This prostitute ring's mission was (1) to gain information from US troops on Dong Tam Base, (2) to attempt to steal US weapons, and (3) to attempt to lure US troops away from Dong Tam Base where they would be captured by Viet Cong guerrillas. Intelligence reports indicated the Viet Cong will increase their efforts to recruit indigenous workers on 9th Infantry Division Base camps for the purpose of gathering information.

(b) The Division Interrogation Section processed a total of 1697 detainees. Of this total, 1153 were classified innocent civilians, 352 were classified civil defendants, and 192 were classified prisoners of war. In addition, the section processed 168 batches of captured documents, 118 of which were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 4000 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of medical supplies and Viet Cong clothing and equipment.

(4) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Activities.

During the reporting period, Company F, 50th Infantry (LRP) continued to phase its' operations deeper into the Mekong Delta. While the Company (-) continues to employ two 8 man patrols by River Patrol Boat along the Song Dong Nui and one 10 man patrol West of Hwy QL 15, the bulk of the patrol assets are employed at Tan An and Dong Tam. Reconnaissance/Bushmaster patrols attached to the 1st Bde, are continuing with above average success. The intensity of patrol activity has increased over the previous reporting period. New techniques of patrol operations and reporting procedures were developed. A sampan interdiction operation has proven quite successful in slowing down sampan movement through known VC lines of communications west of Bearcat. This operation requires one light fire team, one UH-1D, and one 5 man patrol. While flying over an area, the patrol keeps on the look-out.
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for any suspicious looking sampans. When a target is sighted, the team goes directly into the objective area and searches the boat. This can also be accomplished at night by the use of night observation devices and in case of an emergency it can serve as a reaction force. In order to insure that the patrol include all pertinent information in their debriefing the NATO Patrol report format is now being used. This format requires that every item of possible intelligence value is reported. This small step will greatly increase the professionalism and effectiveness of the Long Range Patrol Company.

(5) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(a) The application and availability of aerial surveillance assets throughout the division showed a marked increase during the period 1 May 68–31 July 68. As reflected by the statistics of the Imagery Interpretation Section (see (c)), the usage of aerial photography for planning and execution of missions by brigades and battalions increased approximately 66% over the last reporting period (1 Feb – 30 Apr 68). Night infra-red and SLAR missions were flown in the TAOI and were instrumental in detecting withdrawal routes utilized by VC/NVA forces following the attacks on Saigon 5–12 May 68.

(b) Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) machines were used far more extensively in this quarter than in the last reporting period (82 missions for a total of 316 hours vs 23 missions of 38 hours). A factor in the stepped up usage was the decentralization of machines to three locations, Tan An, Dong Tam and Bearcat, thus making the machine readily available in any portion of the TAOI. The division's capabilities were increased further with the receipt of an Airborne Personnel Detector machine in July, bringing the total to 10 machines in the division.

(c) The Imagery Interpretation Section accomplished the following during the reporting period: 101 aerial photography missions were received, processed and interpreted. From these photo missions a total of 102 Imagery Interpretation Reports were prepared and distributed. In response to specific requests, the section prepared 22 photo missions. The section also flew 36 visual reconnaissance missions and 16 personnel detection missions. A total of 183 photo missions were distributed to the brigades and battalions of the division. A new technique in providing useable enemy installation overprints was developed. All enemy defensive positions, including single isolated foxholes reported to the Division Imagery Interpretation Section were previously plotted on 1:50,000 scale map sheets with a corresponding written report keyed to each plotted item. These installation maps became extremely cluttered and confusing to the user. The written reports were not utilized at all and the installation maps received too little use to...
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Justify the number of man hours required in their preparation. Consequently, the written report was discontinued and only significant enemy installations and defensive positions are now plotted on the overprints.

(6) Weather and Terrain: During the reporting period, the weather had little adverse effect on operations. Rainfall, especially in the Delta, was well below the average annual rainfall. Strong gusts of wind, up to 30 knots, had adverse effects on aircraft and air cushioned vehicles. Early morning fog imposed some limitations, but it usually lifted by 0800 in the morning.

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action. (a) The enemy's firepower capability had increased significantly because of the continued introduction of the ChiCom family of weapons in increased numbers to the local force units. In so far as his personnel strength are concerned, the enemy suffered substantial losses during the reporting period; however, he has continually striven to overcome this by a concerted program of impressing civilians into his ranks and the integration of local force and guerrilla elements into his main force units. The problem he experiences with replacements is that he is unable to replace the experience which the soldiers he is losing have gained through years of combat.

(b) The enemy appears to be preparing for another offensive, again to be directed against the city of Saigon. He neither possesses the manpower nor material to conduct an all out offensive throughout III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. It is likely the next attack is planned for August or September and during the interim, the enemy will continue harassing attacks against targets of psychological value such as the Province Capitals, District seats, and key military installations. He is expected to continue to interdict LOCs and harass friendly outposts.

(c) Operations:

(i) There were a total of four major operations either initiated or in process by the 9th Inf Div during the period 1 May to 31 July 68. The highlights include the battle of South Saigon and the 1st Brigade encounter in the "Triangle" area at the southern edge of the Plain of Reeds. Again this quarter the division experienced heavy combat. The level of enemy activity continued to increase, reaching a peak during the 2d Saigon offensive. Following the offensive there was a sharp decrease in VC operations declining to normal proportions toward the end of the reporting period. In contrast to the Tet campaign and with the exception of the rocketing of Saigon, the frequency of enemy offensive operations decreased during this reporting period. It appears that the enemy has slowly resumed his pre-
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Tet posture and is building up for a new offensive. At the end of the
reporting period the 2d Bde began operations in the U Minh Forest which
is the deepest penetration yet by a major US Force into the Mekong Delta.

(2) Some new techniques were established this reporting period. The
Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) revised its counter-ambush procedures during
movement. The Riverine Convoys have increased reconnaissance by fire on
suspected enemy positions or known ambush sites, to offset increased canal
interdiction by the enemy. Along these same lines, the MRF has placed
greater reliance on the use of the E8, Tactical CS dispenser on river ass-
salt craft and has installed the M132 flamethrower on these craft. These
two items, CS dispenser and flamethrower, have become a very effective com-
bination for countering an ambush.

Because troop movement of VC/NVA forces occurs primarily during the
hours of darkness, the division continued extensive operations with target
acquisition radar. Sightings made during the night were used as a basis
for planning operations for the next day. More emphasis was placed on
waterbased operations due to the increase in sampan traffic and the wet
season. These conditions have resulted in increased use of LCM's, gunboats,
Boston Whaler boats, armored troop carriers, air boats and air cushioned
 vehicles by various units of the division in addition to the MRF.

(3) Combat Operations:

(a) THUONG CONG DINH: On 7 Mar 68, the 1st and 2d Bdes began opera-
tion THUONG CONG DINH in coordination with 7th Inf Div (ARVN), principal-
ly in DINH TUONG Province. The concept of the operation was to drive enemy
forces away from My Tho and to eliminate enemy interdiction of Highway QL
4 in the provinces. This was accomplished by conducting air mobile, ground
and riverine operations in the east, south and central DINH TUONG Province
and later in KIEN HOA, VINH LONG AND VINH BINH Province. During the period
14-18 May the MRF engaged the 516th Bn in Mo Cay District, KIEN HOA Province,
accounting for 57 VC killed. The MRF reinforced by the 3rd Bde, in coopera-
tion with III CTZ ARVN Forces, conducted operations in Than Duc District,
LONG AN Province, to reduce VC infiltration into the Saigon area. The com-
bined operation resulted in 126 enemy killed. A reconnaissance in force
operation to exploit a B-52 strike was conducted in Giong Trom District 26-
27 May resulting in 41 VC killed.

During the month of May the enemy generally avoided contact. On 15 May
the 1st Bde with the 2-39th Inf and the 2-60th Inf continued operation
THUONG CONG DINH. Strike operations conducted outside AO Crackerjack de-
veloped no substantial contacts until 1 June. Based on intelligence gained
from a prisoner captured on 29 May west of Dong Tam, a four day operation
was planned for 31 May-3 June. The intelligence revealed that the 514th En
was to rendezvous with the 261 A and B Bns in the tree lines 10 km south of the intersection of LTL 220 and 223 (XS345655). On 31 May the 2-39 Inf, and 2-60 Inf inserted in numerous LZ's in the area, trying to establish contact. Contact was gained on 1 June when trails were observed from the air running into a wooded area vic XS1870, and the air cav received maximum people sniffer readings and some ground fire. Two companies of the 2-39 Inf were inserted and were in heavy contact immediately upon touchdown. They were reinforced by several air strikes and massive artillery support. The action lasted until 012130H June. A search of the area the next morning found 41 VC bodies and 14 weapons. Documents confirmed that the 1st Bde had encountered the 261 A and B Battalions. Again taking to the air on 3 June, the Brigade Commander was able to track the two battalions to a suspected base camp area and then directly south into the Iron Triangle area (vic XS250515), where the 514 Bn was waiting to rendezvous. Two companies of the 2-39 Inf were inserted west of XON XHUA (vic XS274578) at about 1000H and immediately gained heavy contact. Two companies from the 2-60 Inf were inserted to the west vic XS265582. Two Co task force was inserted on the east (vic XS280578) and met very strong resistance while trying to break through to the canal on the north. Several air strikes were placed on the target and the troops finally reached the canal sealing the cordon at midnight. All units attained continuous contact until after 2400H.

Again massive artillery and 17 air strikes were placed on the target. A company of CIDG troops from My Phuoc Tay moved by boat and on foot to successfully close a vital area on the north side of the canal. Action in the Triangle continued until 0100H 4 June. On 4 June a body count on 192 VC was made and 47 individual and 8 crew served weapons were captured. Interrogation of the 1st Sqdn S1, after he "Chieu Hoi'd" on 8 June, revealed that the 1st Bde had inflicted in excess of 475 casualties on the 261 A and B and 514th B Bns.

On 4 June information received from a PW indicated where the 514th B Bn could be located. Rapid insertions were made by the 2-60 Inf on the south (vic XS255560), and 2-39 Inf on the north Vic XS240587. Heavy contact was established at about 1055H. The entire Dong Tam Base Camp Battalion, the 4-47th Inf, was inserted vic XS240574 on the east. To fill the gap on the west vic XS235675, a composite TF joined forces with a CIDG Company from MY PHUOC TAY Special Forces Camp, the cordon had now been closed. The 3-60 was moved directly from the mobile riverine base (MRB) to AO Crackerjack to secure the now vacant road. Two additional batteries of artillery were positioned to the south. The target was attacked for twelve hours by artillery and 16 airstrikes. Spookie, Moonshine and the night airborne retransmission unit were employed. A surprise occurred at 2330H, when after several playings of an airborne tape made by a POW captured in the morning, a Regimental S1 NVA Captain "Chieu Hoi'd". His mission was the evacuation of NVA bodies and personal effects. He verified the presence of the 261 A, 261 B and 267 B Battalions. The 261 A and 267 B had slipped out to the west before
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the encirclement could be completed. The POW admitted no knowledge of the battle of 3 June. On 9 June the battlefield was swept and revealed a 67 VC body count and 14 weapons captured. This brought the 9 day total to 400 VC (BC) (See inclosure II, 1st Bde ORLL and inclosure 20 1st Bde COAAR TRUONG CONG DINH).

On 10-11 June the MRF (2nd Bde) conducted operations in KIEN HOA Province. The enemy resorted to riverine ambushes rather than choosing to fight the infantry. The 2nd Bde and D Troop 3-5 Cav accounted for 45 VC killed during the two-day operation. From 14-23 June the MRF participated in the CAN THO campaign to relieve pressure on the city of CAN THO from an estimated force of five battalions that threatened the security of the city. Eighty VC were killed between 17 and 23 June. During the same period on 16 June the 1st Bde made contact with an unknown size VC force 9 km NW of My Tho (vic XS3953). A CIDG Co from My Phuoc Tay Special Forces Camp conducted Airmobile and Reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations to surround the VC force. D Troop, 3/5 Cav, supported by aerial recon, and on 18 June the 1st Bde swept the battlefield and found 62 VC KIA, 24 small arms (SA), 3 crew served weapons while sustaining 1 KHA and 24 WHA.

The month of July found very little contact with the enemy. On 15 July the 2nd Bde continued operations with the 3-60 Inf and 4-47 Inf Bn. The 4-47 made waterborne assaults, combat assaults and RIF operations vic XS 3511. Similarly the 3-60 Inf conducted waterborne assaults vic XS3511 and swept to the east. Both units engaged an unknown size VC force. The 2nd Bde was supported by TF 117 and C Troop 7-1 Cav. The results of the engagement were 17 US WHA and 47 VC KIA. The area was swept the next day resulting in 17 more VC KIA. On 30 Jul 68 the MRF with the 6th Bn VNMC began operations in Chuong Thien Province. This is the farthest south and west that the MRF or any major US unit has operated in the IV CTZ. The operations are under the control of the Senior Advisor IV Corps. On 30 Jul the 5th Bn VNMC accounted for 51 VC KIA (BC) and an additional 11 VC KIA (BC) on 31 July. D/3-5 Cav was credited with 12 VC KTA (BC) on 30 Jul. (See Inclosure 12, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 21, COAAR TRUONG CONG DINH, Phase II). The following are the cumulative results to date for TRUONG CONG DINH:

OPN TRUONG CONG DINH: US LOSSES: 168 KHA (56 USN), 778 WHA (681 evac) (141 USN), 5 MIA (1 USN); 1 barge, 2 105 How dest; 4 APC, 1 ACV, 1 helo, 1 2½ trk dam. VNMC: 4 KHA 22 WHA (evac); 2 LCM-8, 3 APC, 1 LCM-6, 4 How dest, 1 veh dam; 1 trk dest. ENEMY LOSSES: 1546 KIA, 89 FW, 1788 det; 279 SA, 28 CS wpsn, 47375 SA rds, 387 gren, 30 RR rds, 30 Unit, 24 batt, 44 RPG rkt, 857 mtr rds, 1 HR bipod, 18 gas masks, 6 mines, 9 exp1 chg, 232.5 docu, 5 SA stocks, 31 pr binoc, 1 bayonet, 361700 P, 6 wire cutters, 5 1st bits, 40 tins powder, 1 60mm mtr, 1 radio, 13 flags, 101 lb prtng mtr, 275 med sup, 189, 4 B40 detonators, 3 ID Cards, 1 flshlt, 2 ponchos, 33 shvl heads, 24 M79 rds, 82 gal unk Liq, 80 mtr fuzes, 260
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entr tools, 2 mags, 8 flares, 271 lb clothes, 15.5 T rice, 24 bombs
2 mtr tubes, 263 Arty rd, 325 RR rds, 10621 rds, 1565 gal POL, 98 booby
traps, 301 lbs sugar, 17 mines, 265 sampans, 184 gren, 8 fuses, 1 RPG rkt,
400 ft time fuse, 6423 blast caps, 17 punji pits, 4 RPG boosters, 20
claymores, 222 toe poppers, 5656 bnks, 1 hosp, 101 struct, 70 bnks, 1 sampan dam.

(b) PEOPLES ROAD. (17 March 68 to 30 July 68) (Operation DUONG CUA
DAN). This operation (previously discussed in the last ORLL) was generated
for the purpose of opening and securing a route or commerce between Saigon
and the agriculturally rich Mekong Delta area. This operation was further
intended to support the work plan of engineer units engaged in upgrading
and paving Hwy QL 4 from the junction of Hwy QL4 and LT6 6a, west to CAIL
LAY, (40 CRACKERJACK). From 23 May 68 this operation was incorporated with
TERUONG CONG DINH. The 1st Bde was given the mission of Operation Peoples
Road. Between 20 and 25 night ambush patrols have been employed daily to
carry out these missions. Great emphasis has been placed on the utiliza-
tion of surveillance devices such as the night dog teams, seismic intrusion
devices, etc. One 23 June the above mentioned switch of the 1st Bde & 3d Bde
was made. The 3d Bde now assumed this mission, The Peoples Road. The
operation has been so successful that it was given to DINH THUONG Regional
Forces as a mission effective at the end of this reporting period. The
cumulative results of Peoples Road are:

PEOPLE'S ROAD: US LOSSES: 28 KIA, 205 WHA, 1 MIA, 1 halo dam; CIDG:
12 WHA. ENEMY LOSSES: 239 KIA, 43 FW, 78 det, 83 GA, 6C/S wpons, 128 gren
67 ER rds, 67 RPG rds, 250 bangalore torp, 68 RPG rks, 109 mtr rds, 137 mines, 49 explosive chgs, 442 lb doco, 1000P, 615 lb med
sup, 43 mags, 21 blasting caps, 720 lbs explosives, 36 cratering chgs, 30
booby trps, 14 mines, 14 Arty rds 8 sampans 607 bunkers, .5 gal marijuana
dest, 9 struc.

(c) TOAN THANG (Phase I - 8 Apr-31May, Phase II - 1 June to date).
The TOAN THANG series of operations were continued during this reporting
period. The operation was initiated as a combined offensive to destroy
VC/NVA forces in LONG AN Province, Southern CMD, Nhon Trao District, Long
Thanh district Bien Hoa Province, and western Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh
Province. The task organization was composed of the 3d Bde, Task Force
Forsyth and the Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR). Though RTAVR
and Task Force Forsyth played a very significant part in this operation
only the 1st & 3d Bde has had significant contact with the VC/NVA. The
first significant contact began on 6 May 68. The 5-60 Inf was conducting
mechanized and mobile assaults and recon in force operations just south of

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Saigon near the Kinh Loi Canal (vic X3830673). Just prior to that, on 6 May 68, in response to the tense situation developing in Saigon, the 9th Infantry Division moved mechanized armour up from Long An province to reinforce the National Police in an area just south of the Kinh Loi Canal. The Division Commander also directed that the mech battalion commander establish a forward CP to maintain contact with the precinct officials. This proved to be a timely move as the VC had already begun their infiltration into the outskirts of the city. At first light on the morning of the seventh a battalion size enemy force attacked a National Police compound south of the canal between route 5A and the Y bridge. Co C, 5-60 Inf was located to secure the Y bridge and the beleaguered headquarters. Heavy contact ensued and after an hour the enemy withdrew to the southwest. Co C pursued and reestablished contact through aggressive reconnaissance in force. As the intensity of the conflict grew the battalion commander made a timely decision to commit his A Co from Ben Luc. Contact continued through the rest of the day becoming sporadic by 2000. Troop B/7-1 Cav supported the 5-60 Inf south of Saigon. During the day's operation the Cav unit killed 56 VC bringing the 5-60 Inf total VC body count to 213 VC KIA. The battalion suffered 2 KIA, 47 WIA and 1 MIA. Because of the serious threat imposed by the enemy the 3-39 moved to block below a built up area south of the Y bridge. At mid-morning on the 8th of May the 3-39 Inf departed their night positions to reconnoiter northward into the built up area. The scout platoon, 2-47 Inf, was placed OCPON to 3-39 Inf towards common objective area. By mid-afternoon all elements were in contact with a reinforced company. The Scout Platoon, 2-47 Inf, became OCPON to 3-39 Inf and together they pushed northeast toward the Y bridge. The going was slow due to the house-to-house type operations; at day's end, 115 VC had been killed. On 9 May there was fighting in four different areas. To the west, the 5-60 Inf reconnoitered in force toward the northwest from their night position. As they approached a built up area, they established contact that lasted for 2 hours. Near the bridge, 3-39 Inf, augmented by a company from 6-31 Inf reconnoitered through the surrounding area. To the northwest the 2-47 Inf, having been sent to the area from Bearcat by the CG, met the enemy shortly after crossing the canal. To the southeast, 2 companies of 6-31 Inf had been inserted and established contact. These operations accounted for 202 enemy dead. At the close of the third day of the battle of South Saigon, the 9th Inf Div had 5 battalions and two air cav troops operating in the Southern Capital Military District. The artillery support was doubled by bringing three more batteries within range. The 5th Vietnamese Marines were moved into Saigon, leaving the 9th Infantry Division responsible for their area. At dawn on 10 May an RP/IF Outpost to the south of the Y bridge came under heavy ground fire. A light fire team initially supported, then B/7-1 Air Cav was sent to assist. The Cav received such intense ground fire that A and C Co 5-60 Inf were committed from the upper Southern Capital.
Military District. Both companies approached within 600 meters of the outpost. Co A began to receive fire and dismounted while Co C supported from the northwest. At midnight the 3-39 commenced recon in force operations from their overnight position in the built-up area. Their plan was to work astride the ONG NHO River from north to south with a company on each bank. However, upon arrival at the river Co B received automatic weapons and small arms fire. Co A returned from the west bank and while crossing back over the bridges made heavy contact with the same force. The enemy force was of unknown size and was well bunkered. The results of the 5-60 Inf and 3-39 Inf contact were 113 enemy killed. On 11 May five companies OPCON to 3-39 Inf were drawn from different directions to a contact area southwest of the Y bridge. Action continued throughout the afternoon in varying degrees of intensity resulting in 116 VC dead. On 12 May the 3rd Bde conducted mopping up operations in the Southern Capital Military District. Five companies OPCON to the 3-39 Inf began recon in force operations in the built-up area south of the Y bridge. By mid day all companies had established contact with squad-sized enemy force near an abandoned RF outpost, resulting in 95 VC killed. This was the final day of the Battle of South Saigon. The fighting had been difficult, particularly in the built up area. Airstrikes were the only answer to the enemy bunkers along the southern edge of the river. The Air Cav supported our forces throughout most of the contacts as well as fires from Division Artillery. The final body count was 852 VC KIA compared to 33 US KIA. On 23 Jun the 1st Brigade moved to Tan An and assumed the TOAN THANG mission with six maneuver Bns, and the 3rd Bde with two maneuver Bns moved to Dong Tam. On the 24th, 1st brigade again established heavy contact. The brigade had three infantry Bns (2-39, 2-60, 6-31) and two Mechanized Inf Bns (2-47, 5-60). Heavy contacts generated during the first three days of this mission resulted in the 2-3 Inf (199 Lt Inf Bde) being placed under OPCON to 1st Bde to perform the rocket belt security missions south of Saigon. The brigade acquired a company from the 4-47 Inf later in the month. The Bde established heavy contact with an estimated NVA Battalion sized force southeast of Ben Luc in three separate day/night engagements on the 23rd, 24th and 25th of June and with a smaller force southwest of Ben Luc on the 28th. In each engagement the brigade employed most of the five battalions to encircle the enemy force. The actions varied from reaction to a heavy contact on the 23rd to a deliberate encirclement on the 28th in which mech units and air landed units simultaneously had seized objectives to deny the enemy escape routes. These engagements resulting in 166 VC KIA, 1 POW's and 82 weapons captured while the US sustained 20 KHA and 81 WHA. During the month of July contact was light with one exception; on 15 July the 1st Bde made a major contact with an enemy force. The 2-39 Inf was conducting RIF operation via XS7069. At 1039 via XS69668 Co C was inserted and was immediately in contact. In support of this contact other companies of the battalion as well as companies of the other battalions were inserted in an effort to box in the enemy. Contact broke
late that night. A sweep was made on 16 July and the results of that contact were 77 VC KIA with US sustaining 7 KHA and 20 WHA (See Inclosure 11, lst Bde ORLL, and inclosure 13, 3 Bde ORLL). The following are the cumulative results of Operation TOAN THANG:

**PHASE I:** US LOSSES: 90 KHA, 528 WHA, 14 USN WHA, 2 MIA. RTAVR: 1 KHA, 16 WHA, 10 APC, 1 helo dam, 3 APC, 1 helo dest; ENEMY LOSSES: 1460 KIA, 253 det, 10 PW, 238 SA, 42 C/S wpns, 126 lbs docu, 642 gren, 2 booby tps, 3107 rds, 56 lbs med sup, 149046 SA ammo, 228 RPG rkt, 12400 P, 115 fuzes, 43 rds 40mm ammo, 2 radios, 513 RPG rds, 1602 booby tps, 213 mtr rds, 37 gren, 53 struc.

**PHASE II:** US LOSSES: 58 KHA, 261 WHA (223 evac), 1 MIA, 9 helo, 3 helipads, 1 lov boy, 2 2½ T trk, 4 APC, 1 runway, 1 3/4 T trk dam, 2 trk, 1 APC 1 rame plow, 1 wrecker dest, RTAVR: 3 KHA, 15 WHA, (12 evac) 2 APC, 1 2½ T trk dam, ENEMY LOSSES: 563 KIA, 36 PW, 216 det, 1 Ho Chanh; 166 SA, 1 pk, 274 mtr rds, 4 RPG, 10 C/S wpns, 2 107mm rkt, 6 M79 rds, 900000 F, 5052 SA rds, 2 LAW, .2 T salt, 17 cs dynmt, 151 lb docu, 4 sampan str, 261 lb TNT, 59 RPG rkt, 4 radio, 95 gren, 25 cans C4, 1 typwrtr, 2 stoves, 22 mines, 8 warheads, 5.59 T rice, 4 vests, 2 fdl tale, 222 lb med sup, 65 lb clothing, 440 gal CS, 3 flags, 243 bnks, 30 rblds, 38 struc, 32 gren, 187 sampans, 2 RPG rkt, 1 brdg, 4 arty rds, 18, punji pits, .45 T rice, 38 booby tps, 41 sampn str, 2 rkt pads, 300 lb salt, 45 M79 rd dest; 7 bunkers dam.

(d) KUDZU (1 May to date). During the period of this report operation KUDZU continued with TF Funston securing draslirt's, conducting road surveillance, and providing the RRF for Dong Tam. Operations were characterized by numerous escort missions, road clearing and roadrunner operations. There were no significant contacts. On 1 July 9th Div Support Command assumed the duties of TF Funston and carried out the above mentioned missions with one maneuver battalion. The cumulative results to date are as follows:

**OP KUDZU, DISCOM:** US LOSSES: 11 KHA, 152 WHA, 139 (evac)(USN), 1 helo dest. ENEMY LOSSES: 68 KIA, 18 PW, 353 det; 14 SA, 17 mags, 10½ lb med sup, 35 M79 rds, 4 B40 rkt, 2421 SA rds, 3 chg, 1 RR rd, 33 lb docu, 1 gas mask, 1 ctn, 1 flshlt, 2 maps, 2 radios, 1 compass, 8 gren, 77 arty/mtr rd, 4 patl hlt, 50 booby tps, 15 sampans, 2 mines, 1 struc, 1 firing device, 5 gren, 59 bnks, 5 T rice, 2 rbblk dest.

(4) Combat Support Activities:

(a) Artillery Support:

1. This period found the firing batteries and battalions of Division Artillery working in the vast expanse of the Mekong Delta from Saigon to Can Tho. Timely and continuous fire support was provided to division...
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elements, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units and Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts. The TPS-25 radar was employed in an offensive role to search and detect enemy movement along the major infiltration routes to Saigon. Once detected, coordinated TOT's were placed on the areas of movement. In addition the sightings were used in planning for infantry operations. Illumination, fired as a TOT in coordination with the gunships at a predetermined point, was used to insure the effectiveness of sampan interdiction of the major water infiltration routes within the area. Six firing batteries from II Field Force Vietnam Artillery were used to supplement the fires of 9th Inf Div Arty units primarily in Long An and Bien Hoa Provinces.

2 Artillery with 9th Inf Div fired a total of 228, 446 - 105 rounds, 51,286 - 155 rounds, and 7,779 - 8 in rounds. These figures do not reflect (during this quarter) support from adjacent firing elements as figures were not obtainable for these fires. A chart reflecting a breakdown of rounds fired by Artillery with the division is attached at Inclosure 6. Reference also 9th Inf Div Arty Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 May - 31 July 1968, which will be forwarded separately.

(b) Helicopter Gunships Support:

1 The 9th Aviation Battalion gunships flew 2,017 sorties. Missions included escort for; VIP flights, aerial displacement of artillery by cargo helicopters, medical evacuations, river and road convoys and long range patrols insertions and extractions. Additionally, the gunships provided suppressive fire for units in contact, flew VE missions in the rocket belt around Saigon and provided countermortar/rocket standby teams at Bearcat and Dong Tam. The gunships accounted for 54 VC KIA (2C); destroyed 108 structures and damaged 33 other; destroyed 17 sampans and damaged 14 others.

2 D Troop, 3-5 Cav supported all Division elements during this period, providing an average of 4 gunships daily. Missions including reconnaissance and extractions and countermortar/rocket standby at Bearcat were performed. Additional support was provided by Air Cav elements of the 7-1 Cav and 3-17 Cav.

(c) Tactical Air Support: Close air support increased substantially during this period and this is attributed primarily to increased activity around the Saigon area. The large increase in body count (KIA) resulted primarily from the 1st Bde operation in the Plain of Reeds during the early part of June. Tropic Moon, a new night surveillance plane with its organic ordnance was initiated in early July. The division continued to use the Combat Sky Spot to harass the enemy during the hours of reduced visibility. (See Incl 7)
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(d) Strategic Air Support: The number of B-52 strikes conducted within the 9th Inf Div TA0I increased during this period. A total of 21 strikes were conducted in June and 8 in July. The strikes in the Nhon Trach/RSSZ were most profitable. Numerous ammunition storage areas were hit, resulting in secondary explosions. An ammunition factory was hit and destroyed in the RSSZ. A sweep of the area resulted in the capture of a large number of munitions and equipment used in the manufacture of these munitions.

(e) Naval Fire Support: There has been no Naval fire support rendered except that given to the 2nd Bde as part of the Mobile Riverine Force.

(f) Chemical Support:

1. E63 Personnel Detector: This quarter the Division Chemical Section flew a total of 316 hours covering 82 missions using the E63 Man-pack Personnel Detector (People Sniffer). This represents a substantial increase in usage compared with the previous quarter and results have been gratifying. Results were reported either to the G2 or to the Brigades for immediate reaction to maximum readings.

2. Riot Control Agents: Bulk CS was dropped from CH-47's contaminating VC base camps, line of communications and infiltration routes. Over 19,000 pounds of Bulk CS were dropped (238 drums). A total of 241 E158's were employed this quarter. This munition is finally becoming readily available through supply channels.

3. Defoliation: Herbicide was sprayed around the Bearcat perimeter, along the Rach Doi river west of Rach Kien, and around the perimeter of the Signal Detachment on Gia Ray Mountain. A total of 193 hectares have been treated this quarter.

(5) Tabulated Operations Data - Incl 8

f. (U) Training:

(1) During the reporting period, division training consisted of the following:

(a) Replacement training.

(b) NCO Leadership training.
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(c) Battalion refresher training.

(2) Replacement Training consists of five and one half days of intensive orientation and is designed to prepare the individual for combat in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed by the 9th Inf Div, conducted all replacement training. The following table shows the number of personnel trained during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) In addition to receiving the normal replacement training, company grade officers and non-commissioned officers received an additional three day orientation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment in use in Vietnam is demonstrated when practical, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed. One hundred fifteen officers and 60 NCOs attended this course.

(4) The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership and instruction and practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialist and junior NCO who have not had the benefit of prior formal leadership training and who will probably be required to assume leadership positions during combat. During the past three months, 307 personnel have completed the NCO Leadership Course.

(5) Battalion refresher training is conducted by the maneuver battalions on a schedule of one day training per company per week. This flexible schedule allows timely instruction and also permits each maneuver battalion to complete its refresher training each month.

(6) The 9th Inf Div continued during this reporting period to qualify personnel in specific MOSs by sending them to courses being conducted for this purpose by support units.

g. (C) Logistics: Throughout the quarter that ended on 31 Jul 68, logistical support was provided for all assigned and attached units of the

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9th Inf Div. Problem areas encountered along with solutions employed are
listed below:

(1) Supply:
   (a) Inadequate flow of repair parts from depot thru direct support to
user units.
      (b) Solutions: A thorough investigation revealed that many requisi-
tions had been improperly made out and submitted. This resulted in poor
distribution of parts to units in dire need. To correct that situation,
all non-aircraft requisitions were cancelled on 4 Jul 68. Instructions
were given to units to resubmit new valid requisitions. Although it is
too early to make a complete assessment of the results, early evidence does
indicate positive results.

(2) Service:
   (a) Generators (10KW and over):
      1 Frequent breakdowns due to operating under overload conditions.
This problem is caused by an increasing requirement for electricity inherent
to the building of a base with a large number of troops.
      2 Flow of repair parts for generators is slow which increases the
workload on operable generators.
      (b) Solutions: Accurate reporting of needs and timely forecast of
requirements. USARV controls the issue and maintenance of these items.

(3) Support:
   (a) ENSURE items: Failure to have a designated support unit for

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some ENSURE items has caused difficulty.

(b) Air Cushioned Vehicles (ACVs) and Air Boats are two items that have caused more difficulty. Technically qualified factory representatives have been sent to the Division for repairs on ACV's.

(4) Transportation:

(a) Providing a steady flow of goods and services to Dong Tam Base proved to be difficult when a bridge in Ben Luc (615758) was severely damaged on 30 Jun 68. An M4 T6 bridge was installed as an interim measure while repairs were being made to the damaged bridge.

(b) Staging convoys on both sides of the bridge for an early morning crossing proved to be efficient once the bridge was back into operation.

(5) See Inclosure 15, Support Command ORLL for logistical support in depth.

h. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) Themes being emphasized during this period. Psychological Warfare messages targeted against Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units received second priority immediately following the enemy's second offensive against the City of Saigon in the early days of this reporting period. This unusual condition was similar to that which existed following the Tet offensive period when the civilian population became the primary target group. These priorities began to change in June as sharp increases in the amount of propaganda directed against VC and NVA units were made. Approximately 60% of all FSYP messages were directed against these units during the month of July; this ratio should remain essentially fixed barring significant changes in the enemy's tactics or level of activity. Specific themes which were emphasized during this reporting period were the NVA takeover of many Viet Cong units, the enemy's requirement to recruit local children to bolster their severely depleted forces, and a concerted FSYP effort in support of the Highway QL4 "Peoples Road" project. An underlying theme exposing Viet Cong lies pervaded virtually every message disseminated.

(b) Chieu Hoi Trends. The number of ralliers received by the government of Vietnam in the Division's Tactical Area of interest (TAO) continues to be discouragingly low. The figures for May, June and July
are statistically comparable to those for February, March and April with wide deviations from month to month, but no sustained trend is discernible. The totals achieved for the current reporting period represent only 28% of those for the comparable period in 1967.

(c) Intimate Psychological Warfare. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division is currently conducting operational evaluations of the concept of Intimate Psychological Warfare (INPSYWAR) to induce small unit defections from the enemy ranks. The INPSYWAR concept was developed based upon indications that small VC/NVA units, plagued by deteriorating morale, loss of faith in their leadership, and lack of public support may be talked into surrendering if properly approached under the correct circumstances. In essence, INPSYWAR involves making a timely appeal to small VC/NVA units, which have been pinned down and/or surrounded by friendly troops, with the purpose of inducing them to surrender. The entire effort is conducted at platoon level supervised by the platoon leader and executed by a Tiger Scout, Vietnamese interpreter or specially trained soldier using pre-planned messages and a small, portable public address system which can be rapidly employed when contact is made. A heavy volume of friendly fire is alternated with periodic cease fires during which the appropriate surrender message selected by the platoon leader is transmitted to the enemy, guaranteeing him fair treatment and medical care if he will surrender and certain death if he continues to resist or tries to escape. To ensure that the proper appeal is made prepared "pitches" in the form of small laminated cards are available to each platoon leader from which he may select the desired message. The themes are simple and are aimed at countering the enemy's indoctrination that he will be mistreated if captured. The appeals emphasize humane treatment, the availability of food, water, cigarettes, etc., plus the opportunity for rest from the hardships of war. Evaluations of this concept have not been completed but results obtained thus far have been encouraging. In separate instances, groups of 2, 6, 8, and 13 were induced to surrender. A comparison of 1st Brigade achievements in obtaining defectors using INPSYWAR techniques with the results attained by the other two brigades of the Division indicates that they have received more than double the number of the next highest brigade. Achievement of psychological success and the surrender of enemy soldiers at the platoon level could well be the catalyst needed to spark surrender by larger enemy units, which unlike previous wars, has not yet occurred in Vietnam in spite of all the existing factors (unsophisticated logistical system, poor medical care, hardships of war, etc.) which should lead to surrender by units. Once a battalion or comparable size unit does surrender, the psychological warfare opportunities become unlimited. Using this unit as an example of the good faith and kind treatment by US Forces,
other enemy units could then be enticed to surrender.

(d) PSYOP support in the Saigon area. One of the most interesting and significant examples of the benefits of closely linking psychological operations (PSYOP) with civic action was provided by the intensive civic action/PSYOP program conducted in the 8th Precinct of the City of Saigon and the Nha Be District of Gia Linh Province following the enemy's second offensive against Saigon 7-12 May. The heavy city street fighting and strong Viet Cong resistance from civilian homes necessitated the use of air strikes and artillery. The resultant widespread destruction caused resentment among the Vietnamese civilians and local officials which was further inflamed by the work of several agitators in the area who openly blamed the US troops for the destruction. Immediately following the cessation of fighting, the people were obviously hostile toward and fearful of the Americans. In order to counter this adverse reaction, Division PSYOP assets were integrated with those of the Vietnamese Information Service, which routinely conducts a comprehensive psychological operations program throughout the city. This proved to be an unusual experience for the Division PSYOP personnel in that the approach normally used by them in the rural areas of the Mekong Delta could not be applied toward this more sophisticated urban audience. A "soft sell" approach was taken, closely linked with the extensive civic action effort described in paragraph h(2)(b).

The Division G5, accompanied by the Civic Action Officer, personally visited with more than forty of the most seriously affected families, expressing mutual sorrow and condolences for the loss of so many innocent civilians and US personnel during this hard fought battle. Solatium payments and commodities were presented to each of these families, which in itself reduced the effect of the agitators' charges that the US had no concern for the civilian population. No independent PSYOP activities were attempted by Division personnel. Any messages passed to the people were accompanied by tangible expressions of our concern such as MEDCAPs, DENTCAPs, public works assistance, repair and construction projects, and the nominal help provided to individual families. During the last phases of the Division's activities in the devastated areas, it was equally obvious that a complete reversal of public opinion had taken place. Hostility and fear had apparently been replaced with friendliness and trust.

(e) Division rapid reaction leaflet capability. In order to support the Division's continually increasing face to face operations there has been a corresponding increase in the production of limited quantities of leaflets suitable for hand distribution using organic equipment. The limited capacity of this equipment precludes its practicable use in the production of quantities of leaflets required for air dissemination, but
it is ideally suited to the relatively small quantities of leaflets (4,000 to 10,000) needed for hand distribution in support of face to face operations. Organic PSYOP personnel are becoming increasingly responsive in the development and production of leaflets as experience is gained and technical proficiency is improved. The most important factor limiting the quality of the finished leaflet is the absence of a Vietnamese national psyoperator. The Division is attempting to obtain the regular services of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Political Warfare Officer in order to correct this adverse condition.

(f) PSYOP activity statistics 1 May through 31 July.

1 Total Leaflet Missions: 393
2 Total Loudspeaker Missions: 211
3 Leaflets:
   Total Dropped: 16,450,526
   Total Hand Distributed: 484,611
   Total Rapid Reactions Produced by Other Agencies: 24
4 Total New Leaflets Produced by Division: 10 (80,000 disseminated)
5 Total Loudspeaker Hours: 1009.5
6 Number of Movies Shown: 58

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) Civic Action, General. Ninth Infantry Division Civic Action Programs were greatly influenced during this reporting period by the enemy's second offensive against the City of Saigon, and by major changes in operational areas of several major subordinate commands. Many civic action resources of the Division were shifted toward refugee and disaster relief projects in the southern portions of Saigon and its surrounding areas following the battles 7-12 May 1968. These resources were gradually withdrawn as projects were completed and the GVN regained the ability to respond to the needs of its people. Withdrawal of all Division personnel from the City of Saigon was completed on 24 July. Major changes in the base camps and areas of operation of the 1st and 3d Brigades, Division...
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Support Command (DISCOM), and elements of the Division Headquarters, compounded by the inactivation of Task Force Funston temporarily depressed the level of civic action throughout large areas of the Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). Indeed, major changes in the TAOI itself contributed to this temporary reduction in activity.

(b) Civic Action in the Saigon area. The heavy fighting in the 8th Precinct of Saigon and the Nha Be District of Gia Dinh Province in early May resulted in many thousands of persons being left hungry, homeless, and in many cases injured or sick. The 5th Medical Battalion assumed the responsibility for providing medical care in these areas. In addition, a preventive medicine program was placed in effect to help alleviate the imminent threat of widespread disease. MEDCAP teams working with the assistance of the Vietnamese National Police were successful in recruiting the local populace to conduct a general cleanup program. Refuse and waste materials were collected and burned and fifty-five gallon drums were distributed throughout the area to be used as trash receptacles. Heavy engineer equipment was brought in by the 15th Engineer Battalion to clear rubble from the streets and to dig numerous drainage ditches to eliminate many large pools of water, thus eliminating breeding areas for mosquitoes and other insect vectors. Personnel from the Division Band sprayed the entire disaster area with DDT in an effort to reduce the insect population. The Band also distributed soap and personal care pamphlets to assist in improving hygiene standards. In the Nha Be District of Gia Dinh the problems were essentially the same, but the GVN was less able to respond to them than it was in the City of Saigon. In addition to the relief measures described above, food supplies were brought in by Division personnel and distributed through GVN officials, and construction materials were provided to the District Chief. Following the initial emergency relief measures, two large scale projects were begun; the reconstruction of the Phan The Hien Dispensary and the six room La San Primary School, both of which had been severely damaged. Responsibility for the dispensary was assumed by the Division Support Command (DISCOM), and work was begun on 1 June 1968. The men of DISCOM voluntarily contributed over nine hundred dollars to purchase materials and to hire civilian skilled labor. Initially, the Vietnamese people were afraid to work in the area due to the presence of Viet Cong who remained in the vicinity. The DISCOM S5 NCO, accompanied by his Vietnamese interpreter, went into the area and stayed. He was then able to hire the needed workers due to his apparent confidence and work progressed without difficulty. With the exception of the S5 NCO, all work was performed by indigenous labor. A dedication ceremony was conducted on 22 June and was attended by several high-ranking GVN officials. The dispensary is now in full use, serving approximately 6,000 patients per month. On 5 June, the 15th Engineer Battalion began rebuilding the
Le San Primary School. This six room building constructed of reinforced concrete and heavy timbers, was extensively damaged, with several walls collapsed and many beams burned out or knocked from their foundations. A team of thirty five men was assigned to this project which required numerous items of heavy construction equipment and more than five thousand dollars worth of materials. The reconstruction effort was severely limited by monsoon rains and movement of the equipment was severely handicapped. More than 100 truckloads of dirt fill and laterite were brought in to reduce the flooding in the area surrounding the school. Dedication ceremonies were conducted on 24 July.

(c) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) has recovered from the severe drop in activity experienced during the last reporting period. The number of MEDCAPs increased by 46% and the number of patients treated increased by 67%. These increases are attributed to the easing of restrictions imposed by the Tet offensive, the requirement to conduct a large number of MEDCAPs for the population in the devastated areas around Saigon, and the addition of an exceptionally active MEDCAP program conducted by a battalion recently arrived in the Division, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. The latter percentage improvement was further increased by the initiation of an immunization program for school children where large numbers of patients may be treated in a relatively short period, the large numbers of patients treated during each MEDCAP in the Saigon area, and finally the improved acceptance of Americans by the villagers in outlying areas.

(d) Educational activities. The Division is attempting to develop a program of educational classes for indigenous personnel, adults as well as children, throughout the TAOI, but initially concentrating on areas near its base camps. At present, the program is limited in scope and has met with resistance, but it is one of the most extensive programs in the field of education conducted by USARV units. Classes in animal husbandry and farming methods are presented by US personnel at the Civic Center located at the gate to the Dong Tam Base Camp. These classes have been well received and it is felt that they are beneficial in that they foster better community relations as well as develop the knowledge of the students. Another subject area which will be expanded in the near future is that of teaching English to Vietnamese living in areas near Division base camps. One apparently successful pilot class is being conducted in Long Thanh Village, Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province. Approximately forty students regularly attend these classes. In a previous attempt at conducting English classes, the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry met with the problem of Viet Cong terror attacks in Binh Son Hamlet, Long Thanh.
District, Bien Hoa Province. The unit began to teach English to the local children in the hamlet school. This program met with consistent reluctance on the part of the children's parents as the VC persistently threatened and terrorized the adults for allowing their children to participate in the program. The Vietnamese school teacher who had cooperated in establishing the language classes reported that the VC infiltrated Binh Son each evening and that they had identification cards that looked authentic. He requested National Police or Regional Force/Popular Force troops to come into the hamlet but no action was taken by the local GVN officials. As a result of his cooperation with US personnel, he was stabbed to death and a note was pinned to his chest stating that he committed crimes against the National Liberation Front (NLF). It is obvious that future programs of this nature must be conducted only in relatively secure areas where the population is receptive or undue risk will not be incurred by all concerned.

(e) Innocent Civilian Center. During the period 1 July through 31 July, the Division captured 1,153 detainees who were eventually classified as innocent civilians. On 12 June the Division formally opened its Innocent Civilian Center, a pioneer project in this area of civic action and psychological operations. This large, well equipped facility is now being used to provide temporary housing for detainees who have been cleared as innocent civilians pending their return to their homes. The center's capacity is 70 persons and covers an area 130' by 170'. Beds, food, and entertainment are provided and every effort is made to establish pleasant, comfortable surroundings. These facilities are a complete departure from the traditional barbed wire enclosure typical of most processing points. The program centers around fair treatment, good food, medical care if necessary, and expeditious return by helicopter, boat or truck to the district capital nearest their home. During the innocent civilians stay at the center, he is exposed to the truth about the US mission in Vietnam and the GVN's objectives, programs, and capabilities. The impact of the center upon the Vietnamese population has been demonstrated several times during its brief existence. On one occasion, several civilians were preparing to return to their homes and expressed their desire to talk with the G5 officer in charge of the center. In typical Vietnamese fashion they appointed a venerable gentleman as their spokesman to express their appreciation for the fine treatment received at the center. They pointed out that the Viet Cong had painted a very dark image of American soldiers. They discovered that the opposite of this was true and stated that they would carry this information back to their relatives and friends. On 9 July, the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment received more tangible benefit from the Innocent Civilian Center in the form of a list of 54 names of VC operating in a village in Kien Hoa Province. The list was processed through the Center. When asked the reason for his unusual cooperation, he stated...
that he did it because he was befriended by the G5 personnel at the center.

(f) National Highway L4. One of the most extensive civic action projects ever attempted by any US unit in Vietnam was the reopening of National Highway L4, commonly known as "People's Road". This vital line of communication is considered to be the lifeline of the delta. The vast population in and around the City of Saigon, as well as many people farther north, are greatly dependent upon this road for the transportation of their food from the agricultural area of the Mekong Delta. Closing of the road produces serious economic problems as well, as food prices soar beyond any reasonable level. The Viet Cong produced 385 craters in the 57 kilometer section of the highway running through Dinh Tuong Province. The 9th Infantry Division was assigned the mission of reopening the highway, and the 86th Engineer Battalion was placed under the Division's operational control. Work was begun on 1 March. A total of 36 kilometers of road had to be completely resurfaced, and work was hampered by repeated Viet Cong sniping incidents, 141 additional craters resulting from VC mines, roadblocks which were usually booby trapped to delay removal, and the onset of the southwest monsoon season. The cost of the project in terms of expenditures for materials was $95,380, which was used to provide, among other things, asphalt (226,600 gallons), coal asphalt mix (1,830 tons), and rock fill and road base (26,300 tons). A total of 4,902 pot holes were repaired during this period. The cost in terms of US casualties was 28 killed, 1 missing and 205 wounded in action. The mission was brought to a successful completion on 15 July.

(g) Table of Accomplishments. Civic Action conducted during the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968:

1. MEDCAP II
   Operations 1050
   Patients 96,809

2. Efforts to Improve LOC:
   Bridges Constructed 22
   Bridges Repaired 19
   Roads Constructed 47
   Roads Repaired 171

3. Repair and Construction:
   Schools 17
   Dispensaries 4
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Playgrounds 12
Other Major 34
Other Minor 28

4. Commodities Distributed:
   - Cement 302,620 lbs
   - Lumber 190,861 bd ft
   - Clothing 4,505 lbs
   - Health & Sanitation Items
   - Tin Shells 3,507 ea
   - Foodstuffs 119,594 lbs
   - Light 10 gals

1. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training.

   (1) The Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Re-Training Program continued during this period. The 1st Brigade completed refresher training to the 3rd Bn, 52nd ARVN Infantry. At the termination of training the CEE was conducted but the Battalion was graded unsatisfactory by the Vietnamese maneuver director. Unfortunately, the new II FFORCESV directive became effective prior to this CEE being rescheduled. The 3rd Brigade also completed training the 1st Bn, 50th ARVN Regiment during this period but, again, the CEE was not administered due to the new directive taking effect. The new directive has the 9th Infantry Division providing refresher training to the following 25th ARVN Infantry Division battalions:

   - 2-46th Infantry
   - 3-46th Infantry
   - 1-50th Infantry

Training of the first unit (not identified) will commence approximately 2 December but the exact starting date will be dictated by the availability date of the ARVN unit.

   (2) Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/FF) Upgrading Program continued to be supported with primary emphasis directed towards improving those outposts situated along Highway QL 4 from to the My Tuan Ferry Site, Giao
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Duc District, Dinh Tuong Province. Specific teams employed to support the various programs were: Mobile Advisory Teams (NAT), Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), and Improvement Action Teams (IMPACT). In early April the Logistics Administration Advisory Team (LAAT) was transferred to MACV and the majority of the U.S. personnel remained as previously positioned.

(a) Five 9th Infantry Division MATs were operational during this reporting period. Their upgrading efforts again covered the spectrum from outpost defensive improvements to the conduct of tactical operations. Although the personnel and equipment support was provided by Division, the employment location was as directed by II FFORCESV. Normally the MATs were situated in an area where an RF company was tactically supporting the RD effort. Significant improvements were noted in RF/FF living conditions, in outposts construction and in the type and frequency of offensive and defensive operations. As of 31 July 1968, the five MATs were deployed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF Forsyth</td>
<td>XT278101</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Brigade</td>
<td>X031866</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XS740698</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XS540720</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XS850858</td>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional MATs were positioned in the 9th Infantry Division TAOI, but were under the operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. They were located in Binh Tuy (XT380264) and Long Khanh (XT322250) Province.

(b) In mid-June the 1st and 3rd Brigades exchanged TAOIs and are now located in Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces respectively. To allow for closer supervision and better logistical support, the IMPACT teams deployed with their individual units. The locations of the teams at the termination of this reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>Binh Phuoc</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rach Kien</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tan Tru</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Due to the mobility of the three Brigades the IMPACT teams had numerous opportunities to cover a majority of the TAOI, especially the area south of Saigon. These 2-man teams continued their high impact, short term visits and were most appreciated by the Vietnamese officials and their US advisors. The amount of RF/FF IMPACT support provided is shown on inclosure 2.

(c) The CRIPs continued their employment in Long Thanh, Bien Hoa Province and in Tan An, Long An Province. Due to the departure of some US military units from Bearcat to Dong Tam and the exchange of TAOIs between the 1st and 3rd Brigades, both CRIPs were faced with personnel turbulences and a change in command control. However, by 31 July both platoons were fully organized and functioning as a combined force. Again, during this period the CRIPs experienced marked success and performed a variety of missions ranging from the employment and use of air boats to the seeking and destroying a specific VC infrastructure target. The Long Thanh CRIP's accomplishments were especially noteworthy during the latter part of June in the western Long Thanh District area. Their interdiction of the VC waterways achieved significant results and prevented the VC from having a relatively free LOC leading through that particular area.

(d) The Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) did not present any classes during the period but considerable progress was made toward formulating the US and Vietnamese teams. It is planned that approximately ten hours of instruction would be presented by the US team to designated Vietnamese battalions. Initially the Vietnamese RMTT was scheduled to present ten hours of various classes to the US battalions, but progress towards this end was amazingly slow. At this time an effort is being made to position two or three Vietnamese instructors at the Reliable Academy and thereby have the RMTT present basic subjects to the newly arrived 9th Infantry Division replacements. The program has distinct possibilities and signs are encouraging that the Vietnamese will cooperate in this plan.

3. (U) Engineer Support. (1) During the reporting period engineer support continued to be provided primarily by the division's organic 15th Engr Bn, the 86th Engr Bn and the 93rd Engr Bn. Mine sweeping and road
block clearing continued to occupy a majority of combat support operations. Base construction at Dong Tam Base also accounted for a large portion of engineer effort. Significant activities during the reporting period included the completion of road upgrading on Highway QL4 in Dinh Tuong Province on 15 July 1968. The 15th Engr Bn Emplaced a 160-foot double triple Bailey bridge northeast of Tan An in Long An Province to replace a similar one that collapsed due to sabotage and assisted in the construction of a 920-foot M4T6 float bridge at Ben Luc to replace a bridge on Highway QL4 destroyed by enemy efforts. The 15th Engr Bn played a major role in the upgrading of bridge approaches and final emplacement of the bridge.

(2) During this quarter, the 15th Engr Bn pursued an active civic program. Eight medcaps were conducted in the battalion’s area of operation, in which 549 civilians were treated. Materials and labor were donated in rebuilding a school in Saigon and an orphanage in My Tho.

(3) New enemy techniques encountered were the increased use of hard-to-detect plastic mines in place of metal mines and the construction of numerous small (1 foot high, 1 foot in diameter) road blocks in clusters instead of one massive earthen road block. Within each cluster, several are booby trapped. Since any of them might be rigged, each one has to be painstakingly cleared which increases the time expended opening the road.

(4) New techniques employed by the 15th Engr Bn included the use of a plow which is mounted behind an Armored Personnel Carrier and which travels alongside the road to locate and cut command detonating wires. Another innovation was the evolution of a battalion security platoon consisting of four flame tracks, two 3/4-ton trucks with 50 caliber machine guns and two 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on 1-ton trucks. This platoon is used for providing security to engineer work parties, infantry troop movements, convoys and base camps to include Dong Tam Base (See Incl 16, 15th Engr Bn’s ORLL).
and IV Corps TOCs and Senior Advisors, various Sector Advisors and a complete tie-in with the long distance trunking system were validated. Further, requirements for a telephone dial system at Dong Tam had to be determined and coordinated. As a result of this coordination on the 26th of July when the division headquarters relocated, the ground work had been laid and circuits vital to the operation of the headquarters were routed to those locations required for coordination.

(2) (U) Frequencies for the FM tactical radios have continued to be a problem. Since the greater portion of the frequencies assigned by II Field Force to the division are shared with other US and allied units, careful study of the area where a frequency is to be used must be made prior to the actual assignment for use by a unit. Even when this is done some problems occur. Since all units in the III and IV Corps Zones are not controlled by II Field Force, frequency assignments made by the Signal Office often duplicate those of other major units (Navy, Advisors, Artillery, etc). The problem is further complicated by the regular changing of frequencies when a new CEOI is placed into effect. Close coordination is maintained with Brigade Signal Officers to provide frequencies that will be relatively clear in each area of operation.

(3) (U) Communications security is of vital concern in the 9th Division. In this area further advances have been made in the regular changing of the CEOI. For the first time since the division departed Fort Riley, a reserve edition of the CEOI has been in the hands of units to be implemented in the event of a compromise. A scheduled change to the CEOI was placed into effect on the 16th of June. This edition of the CEOI was compromised by loss in early July and as a result the reserve was placed into effect on the 11th of July. The publication of new and reserve CEOIs required complete re-alignment of methods of operation in the Division Signal Office. Since this has been accomplished, new CEOI items are prepared constantly for division distribution.

(4) (U) Instructions on the use of the CEI (CEI) were last published at Fort Riley. During this quarter a new issue of Communication - Electronic Instructions have been compiled. Complete distribution to all holders of the 9th Division CEI will be made during the month of August. These will provide updated current information on division radio nets, codes, wire operations and all aspects of communications within the division that do not regularly change.

(5) (U) Due to tactical operational requirements that have probed deep into the Mekong Delta, a requirement existed to provide long range voice radio contact between the division's headquarters and the mobile riverine headquarters. This problem was solved by the establishment of a single
sideband voice radio net. Dependable direct radio communications are now available regardless of the location of the Riverine Force. FM retransmission stations have proved impractical due to the distances and lack of suitable secure location in which to place them.

(6) (U) In addition to the direct radio voice net to the Riverine Force, a requirement for direct telephone and teletype communications existed. Through careful planning and coordination with the 2nd Brigade Signal Officer, methods have been devised to track the USS Benewah with VHF antennas in order to maintain solid communications. When the ship approaches the maximum range of the VHF equipment strategically located radio relay stations are activated to maintain the telephone and teletype circuits. Using this scheme of operations these communications are maintained with a minimum outage time. Prior to this quarter these methods had not been attempted. Also developed for the Riverine Force was a concept for telephonic communications when they establish a forward CP at a location remote from the Benewah. In this case a method was devised to mount a VHF station on a medium landing craft and track it in the same manner as the Benewah is tracked. This proved to be highly successful and provided the multi-channel telephone communications to the 2nd Brigade which are so vital for an operation of this type.

(7) (U) Teletype message traffic continues to be of vital concern to the Signal Officer. In coordination with the Adjutant General, the Division now has an established Message Review Board. Since the establishment of this board constant improvements have been noted in this area. Staff sections or headquarters that dispatch messages determined by the Message Review Board to be over-classified, verbose, containing too high a precedence or other means should have been used, receive a DF or letter signed by the Chief of Staff informing them of the findings of the board. The continued command emphasis in this area has shortened communication center handling time of teletype traffic and provided the 9th Division with a much more efficient teletype system.

(8) (U) During joint operations with the Navy and Air Force a need arose to have an operations code that contained phrases that were common to all three services. Through coordination with USARV arrangements were made to obtain joint KAC codes and numerical/authentication tables from DIRNSA that met these criteria. The issue of these codes should considerably reduce the time required to encipher messages that previously had to be spelled out letter by letter. Terms and phrases required by the Army and Navy are contained in this one KAC booklet.
1. (c)

(1) General: During the reporting period, Army aviation supported division operations daily. The defeat of the enemy's second Saigon offensive was characterized by the use of multiple assault helicopter companies, armed helicopter platoons. Medium and heavy helicopters were used for movement of artillery, supplies and troop lifts. The 9th Aviation Battalion provided general support to the division during the period and responded to request from units in contact. II FFORCEV supported the division by providing a daily average of 1.8 assault helicopter companies and two CH-47's for resupply, artillery movement and troop lifts.

(2) Employment of Army Aviation in support of operations: The 9th Aviation Battalion continued to provide general aviation support to the division by furnishing on a daily basis 17 UH-ID's, 3 LOH's and 6 UH-IC gunships. During the reporting period, the 9th Aviation Battalion has supported the division by flying 21,186 sorties, hauling 360 tons of cargo, airlifting 33,385 passengers, conducting 168 med-evacs, averaging 3,362 flying hours per month, flying 1,435 night hours, and 1,397 hours of combat assaults.

(3) On 15 Jul 68, 9th Avn Bn in conjunction with 709th Maint Bn began a test of the Decentralized Aircraft Maintenance concept when Company B/709th Maint Bn was attached to and collocated with the 9th Avn Bn. (See Inclosure 18, 9th Avn Bn's ORLL)

m. (c) Chemical Operation

(1) E63 Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD) (People Sniffer)

(a) During the reporting period there were 82 MPD missions flown for a total of 316 hours. Missions were flown utilizing both the UH-ID and OH-6 aircraft. Results were reported either to G2 Air for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence indications or to Brigade Headquarters for immediate reaction to maximum readings. Total flying time during the previous quarter was 39 hours covering 23 missions. The primary reason for the tremendous increase in usage is due to the fact that each brigade now has a "People Sniffer" team available for instant use when required by the tactical situation.

(b) One significant example citing the use of the "People Sniffer" occurred on 1 Jun 68 when the 2-39 Inf and 2-60 Inf inserted after recording maximum people sniffer readings and receiving some ground fire. Two companies of the 2-39 Inf moved toward trails located in the area and immediately received heavy ground fire. Ground elements were supported by
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several air and massive artillery strikes. Contact lasted until late at night. As a result of a sweep of the area the next morning 41 VC KIA (BC) were found and 14 weapons were captured.

(c) With the introduction of the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD), intelligence capabilities have been increased considerably, due to the fact this instrument is far superior to the Manpack Personnel Detector.

(2) Riot Control Agent Operations: During the reporting period there were seven missions flown utilizing bulk CS as a persistent contaminator. Over 19,000 pounds were dropped covering over 105 hectares. There were 241 E158 CS Canister Clusters employed this quarter during 32 missions. The most significant results were:

(a) 3 Jun 68: 12 E158 CS Canister Clusters were dropped at XS275564, XS340590 and XS260582, in support of the 2-39 Inf and 2-60 Inf in contact with a VC Battalion. After the munitions were dropped, the VC abandoned their positions and exposed themselves to LFT and ground infantry fire. The results were 52 VC KIA (BC), 14 SA and 3 C/S weapons destroyed or captured.

(b) 8 Jun 68: 11 E158 CS Canister Clusters were dropped at XS228764, XS240564 and XS239582, in support of the 2-39 Inf, 2-60 Inf, 2-47 Inf and CIDG elements in contact with a VC Battalion. Again as soon as the munitions dispersed the CS, the enemy was forced to expose himself. Results of the contact were 73 VC KIA (BC), and 1 POW, 3 AK-47's, several 840 rds, several uniforms and gas masks were captured.

(c) 17 Jun 68: 8 E158 CS Canister Clusters were dropped at XS394335 (center of mass), in support of 2-39 Inf, 2-60 Inf and CIDG elements in contact. Results were: 57 VC KIA (BC), and 1 POW, 11 AK-47's, and 1 anti-aircraft weapon captured.

(d) 23 Jun 68: 8 E158 CS Canister Clusters were dropped at XS667736, in support of 2-39 Inf, 2-60 Inf in contact. Results of the contact were: 41 VC KIA (BC), and 1 60mm mortar, 11 AK-47's, 1 POW and 900,000 piasters captured.

(e) 25 Jun 68: 12 E158 CS Canister Clusters were dropped at XS609708 (center of mass) in support of the 2-47 Inf (M), 2-39 Inf, 2-60 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) elements in contact. Results were: 42 VC KIA (BC), and 10 AK-47's, 1 AK-50, 2 light MG's, 2 RPG's, and 1 pistol captured.

(3) Defoliation

(a) During this reporting period there were herbicide missions flown
at Bearcat perimeter, Rack Doi Ma River west of Rack Kien and Cia Ray Mountain. A total of 193 hectares have been treated thus far.

(b) Requests have been submitted for defoliation of the perimeter at Dong Tam and extensive areas to the west and east of Dong Tam.

(4) Enemy CER Activity

(a) Although there were a few VC gas masks captured, there were no significant enemy CER activities within the 9th Inf Div TAOI during this reporting period.

(b) The enemy probably does not possess the capability for CER Warfare with the possible exception of the employment of Riot Control Agents with small area coverage such as grenades.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. (C) Personnel

      (i) (U) Morning Report and Statistical Inquiries.

      OBSERVATION. Timely and accurate response to requests concerning morning reports and/or statistical inquiries is often precluded by distance of subordinate units from this headquarters and the tactical situation.

      EVALUATION. Data reported under the Army Personnel Accounting System is used in reports which form the basis for significant command and management decisions at all echelons of command. It is therefore important that requests for clarification or additional information be given priority attention.

      RECOMMENDATION. That AG establish a Suspense Control Section to handle all suspense and regular morning report correspondences to include requests for clarification or additional information.

   (2) (U) Erroneous Casualty Reports.

      OBSERVATION. Casualty reports involving KIA and seriously WIA, called in during the confusion of combat require confirmation prior to release to USARV. Confirmation is often difficult to obtain within the USARV imposed limit.

      EVALUATION. The confusion of combat causes a distinct possibility of erroneous casualty reporting regardless of the care taken to insure accuracy. Communications problems add to this possibility since Casualty Branch personnel are often unable to contact units and/or graves registration points to verify casualties. The added pressure of meeting reporting suspense dates along with these other problems often results in reports being submitted without proper confirmation.

      RECOMMENDATIONS. Casualty Branch, units and graves registration points utilize any and all means of communications available to confirm initial reports. Casualty Branch should confirm reports prior to relaying them to USARV.

   (3) (U) Requisitioning of Blank Forms from Japan.
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OBSERVATION. Units are encountering delays in receipt of requisitioned blank forms.

EVALUATION. The US Army AG Printing and Publishing Center, Japan has over 1,100 separate accounts from units in Vietnam. Units have not been following proper requisitioning procedures and have submitted an excessive number of special requisitions, thus, increasing the workload on USAAGPPCJ. These factors are causing unnecessary shipments of blank forms by air transportation and considerable delay or non-receipt of needed forms. Positive actions are being initiated to minimize the problems as follows:

(a) Requisitions are being consolidated at battalion or higher level.

(b) Publication accounts at USAAGPPCJ for company and smaller size units are being cancelled.

(c) Special requisitions are being routed through this headquarters where an attempt to obtain the required forms will be made prior to forwarding the requisition to USAAGPPCJ.

RECOMMENDATIONS. Units consolidating requisitions for blank forms take positive action to ensure that monthly requisitions are submitted promptly and correctly and that all units are maintaining at least a sixty day stockage of forms.

(4) (C) Transportation for Personnel (2d Bde).

OBSERVATION. The MRF has been experiencing difficulties in securing transportation for troop passengers when the MRF is located away from a base which cannot be reached by surface transportation.

EVALUATION. Personnel departing the MRF to go on R&R are often delayed several days, and in the past have been unable to arrive in time to depart on their scheduled flights. Personnel departing for DEROS purposes are often delayed, but since they usually leave early, the delay does not affect them as much as those who have to wait to meet them at the R&R site. This results in considerable financial loss, to say nothing of the serious morale problem it creates. Personnel leaving for the purpose of conducting business have waited as long as 3 days before transportation arrived. At the present time, the order of priority for personnel departing the MRF is as follows: 1. Emergency Leave 2. R&R 3. DROG 4. Official Business. Since the Brigade usually has only 2 or 3 flights per day, only the people with top priority get to leave.
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In addition, Army correspondents, key G-2 personnel (interpreters, etc.) and visiting officials receive a top priority rating, second only to those going on emergency leave. During one 7 day period that the MB was away from Dong Tam, the Brigade averaged 25 departing personnel per day. Personnel returning from leave have the same problem. Recently the Brigade received 60 (replacements, R&R) troops, by ship, who had been waiting at Dong Tam for several days. This again presents a serious morale problem and also reduces the number of people available for use in the field.

RECOMMENDATION. That two utility helicopters be placed at the disposal of the 2d Brigade to alleviate its administrative transportation problems.

b. (C) Operations

1. (C) E158 CS Cannister Cluster used with the Personnel Detector (1st Bde)

OBSERVATION. The E158 CS cannister cluster used in conjunction with the personnel detector is an effective method to locate the enemy and drive him from prepared positions.

EVALUATION. The personnel detector and E158 CS dispenser are carried in the UH-1D utility helicopter. When a high reading is obtained on the personnel detector in a suspected enemy location, the CS can be placed on the location in order to drive the enemy from his cover and concealment. This method is most effective when the CS drop is followed immediately by an assault by ground forces or by artillery fire. This technique has worked effectively in tree lines, along canals, and in bunker complexes. One precaution that should be taken is to insure that at least one of the helicopter pilots is equipped with a protective mask.

RECOMMENDATION. Continued work must be undertaken in employing the CS and "people sniffer" to improve air drop accuracy and to determine what maneuver or fire support actions best follow up the use of CS gas.

2. (C) Effectiveness of Combining PSTWAR with the "Pilling-on" Techniques (1st Bde)

OBSERVATION. Considerable tactical success can be obtained by combining the use of CS, "people sniffer", ambush patrols, air landed operations, and the "intimate psychological warfare program" with the "pilling-on" technique.
EVALUATION. The most effective group of tactical techniques developed during this period concerns the action taken to annihilate enemy units. The sequence involves location of enemy forces, "piling-on" all available forces to encircle the enemy, and cause the encircled force to surrender or be annihilated. The various techniques developed to support this desired end have shown gratifying results. Initially the brigade begins its operations by employing the "people sniffer", airborne CS, helicopter, ambush patrols, and air landed operations to locate the enemy. Once contact is established the brigade uses every available resource, stripping the base camps bare, to surround the located enemy force. Movement is continued even during the hours of darkness to ensure that the encirclement is complete. Then the brigade employs all available air and artillery to pound the enemy force, halting occasionally to practice the "intimate psychological warfare" described below. Finally the area is swept to destroy those who refuse to surrender. The primary object of this group of techniques is to obtain the surrender of a large enemy force. While the brigade achieved some success in this direction against local forces in DINH TUONG Province, prospects are expected to be better against the NVA units, who should be more susceptible to the appeals of the "intimate psychological warfare" program. If all the techniques are employed properly and a certain element of luck is present the "piling-on" tactic might yield gratifying results. We also further wish to refine this tactic through the inclusion of other friendly forces. This worked quite well in DINH TUONG Province when we acquired the cooperation of CIDG units.

RECOMMENDATION. More study and practical work must be undertaken on both methods of gaining contact with the enemy and methods of encircling an enemy contact. Techniques must be further refined.

(3) (C) Improvement of "Intimate PSYWAR" Techniques (1st Bde)

OBSERVATION. Techniques concerned with the employment of the "intimate psychological warfare" program can be refined.

EVALUATION. During our encounter with main force battalions outside AO CRACKERJACK we quickly realized that our psychological appeals to the individual soldier were not applicable to these type targets. A second set of appeal cards are presently being prepared to hit directly at the cadre and leaders of these main force units aiming at the surrender of an entire main force unit. With a selection, the US commander can choose his appeal based on the character and size of the contact. In debriefing an NVA Regimental S1 we found that our timing suffered. The trapped battalions had not been pounded long enough before we started our 15 to 20 minute appeals. He related to us that when the rhythm of "appeal-
firepower - appeal" was set up the NVA used the lull to maneuver their troops away from the bombed area. In our next encounter we plan a 4-5 minute appeal and if we do not receive a mass turnout, we intend to resume the firepower quickly.

RECOMMENDATION. Debriefing and evaluations of tactical techniques must be utilized to hone our techniques to the finest edge possible. Information obtained from POW's can assist evaluation considerably. The "intimate psychological warfare" program is an area of great promise. Every opportunity to utilize it must be seized and every utilization studied.

(4) (U) Attacking Fortified Positions (2d Bde)

OBSERVATION. When conducting operations, in areas where there are known or suspected enemy fortified positions, it is important to employ the point element to the advancing unit at a reasonable distance so as to force the enemy to disclose his position prematurely.

EVALUATION. Most fortified positions are constructed along the edge of tree lines, and are reinforced with mutual supporting firing positions or spider holes. The average fortified position is normally designed with a killing zone in one general direction. The average port of these positions are approximately eighteen (18) to twenty-four (24) inches above the ground level.

RECOMMENDATION. If the main body is close enough to be engaged at the same time as the point, there is no need for a point. The point element or scout team must move in advance under the cover of the platoon, usually at the limits of visibility and supportability. The density of the terrain should dictate the distance between the point element and the main body; in close terrain, this is purely a matter of judgement. When the point element is engaged, the ground commander must be aggressive and maneuver his force while supporting by fire. Only the ground commander can determine what distance he can support by fire and still be free to maneuver. In doing so he must realize that fortified positions are attacked by placer direct fire on the embrasures, maneuvering to a flank, blinding the enemy's visibility with artillery (HE) or grenades (WP), and assaulting with flame and explosives. If casualties result during the engagement of the point element, the main body must endeavor to retrieve the wounded but not at the risk of exposing more men foolishly and ignoring the mission of destroying the enemy.
OBSERVATION. Most ambushes on waterways are established along curves or bends in the river.

EVALUATION. An effective anti-ambush measure against ambush positions located near a bend in the river is to employ artillery and airstrikes (preferably napalm) on likely and known positions prior to entering the area. This is not always feasible because of ground clearances and compromise of the route of movement. In addition, light helicopter fire teams, when reconnoitering likely ambush positions, often discourage the enemy from engaging troop-laden craft. Recent experiences indicate that the enemy prefers to engage assault support craft when gunships are not providing direct coverage during riverine movements. When the assault craft are moving without aerial coverage, it is logical for each assault boat to select an area for reconning by fire or suppressing enemy fires. This provides a greater and more effective dispersion method for returning fire or reconning by fire.

RECOMMENDATION. Once an ambush is encountered, it is essential to accurately locate and mark the ambush. At the same time, all available fires must be brought to bear on the enemy, suppressing his initial fires and discouraging him to continue the ambush.

Cultural Drama Team (2d Bde)

OBSERVATION. A Vietnamese Cultural Drama Team can be used in conjunction with a MEDCAP/DENTCAP and a definite benefit can be obtained.

EVALUATION. On past MEDCAP/DENTCAPs there has been a definite lack of control among the civilian populace even though interpreters were present. The civilians have an overwhelming curiosity and will crowd around the doctors and dentists affording them little room to work. During a recent CIVAC operation, it was observed that Vietnamese are fond of musical programs. The members of the drama team create a diversion with their skits, and therefore can assist in keeping the people, especially the children, entertained and away from the doctor and dentist. The civilians seem to be greatly enthused by their shows and more control and better working conditions are created.

RECOMMENDATION. The use of a Vietnamese Cultural Drama Team be employed in conjunction with MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS when available.
OBSERVATION Commanders and small unit leaders must insure that members of patrols operating in swamps or riverine environment are able to maneuver themselves in the water.

EVALUATION. During the conduct of a night ambush patrol, five members of the patrol drowned while attempting to embark an assault support patrol boat (ASPB). It was later determined that none of the drowning victims could swim, or was equipped with a life preserver. Other factors having considerable influence of the incident were:

(1) Prior to and during the extraction, the patrol was briefly engaged by enemy small arms fire; this caused both the boat crew and the patrol to be disorganized in executing the extraction.

(2) Individual's gear consisted of steel helmets, flask jackets and web gear which hindered the patrol's movement in the water.

(3) No prior training had been received in ASPB night boarding procedures.

(4) Half of the patrol members wore glasses and the muddy water splashing on their glasses reduced their visibility.

(5) None of the patrol members wore life jackets.

RECOMMENDATION.

(1) Prior to initiating a patrol in a riverine environment careful consideration should be given to pairing off non-swimmers with strong swimmers, thereby establishing the buddy system. Non-swimmers should be equipped with life jackets.

(2) Small boat training, with emphasis on night loading and unloading techniques, should be taught prior to conducting operations involving small craft.

(3) Equipment should be tailored to the mission and the environment.

(4) A review and rehearsal of all procedures and tactics be made prior to the operation.
(8)(C) Employment of the MK-33 Fragmentation Grenade (2d Bde)

OBSERVATION. The MK-33 Grenade has an effective casualty producing radius of 30 meters. The grenade is well constructed, and it is a definite asset in destroying the enemy. On several occasions, the grenade has been employed to destroy unoccupied enemy bunkers. However, employment of the grenade in that manner resulted in friendly casualties due to its increased bursting radius.

EVALUATION. The MK-33 grenade should not be employed as a means for destroying empty bunkers. The grenade is extremely effective for the purpose for which it was designed. The arming device provides ample time for the grenade to be thrown and protective measures taken.

RECOMMENDATION. That a program of instruction and training be presented in all units concerning employment of the MK-33 fragmentation grenade.

(9)(U) Identifying Weapons of Casualties (2d Bde)

OBSERVATION. During medical evacuation from the battle area, weapons of casualties are often misplaced.

EVALUATION. The task of recovering weapons from battle casualties has proven to be difficult at times. Unnecessary confusion can result in identifying those weapons which are to be evacuated. Sometimes the wrong weapons are collected because of several factors, e.g. the serial number is not readily available, the unit's desire to continue its operation, and the act of redistributing weapons within the unit.

RECOMMENDATION. A workable solution to alleviate this problem is to mark each weapon with a designated number. The marking can include the unit designation and should be stenciled using paint to preclude rubbing or wearing off. The weapon can be marked on its stock, making it easy to read. Once a weapon has been evacuated, immediate administrative action should be initiated to record its disposition.

(10)(C) Street Fighting in Built-up Areas; Use of Tanks and APC's (3d Bde)

OBSERVATION. In many instances entire elements can be pinned down by fire from relatively small enemy elements.

EVALUATION. From the standpoint of rapid reaction and shock, it
would be extremely advantageous to have tanks and APC's working in close conjunction with the foot soldiers.

RECOMMENDATION. When it becomes evident that extensive street fighting is to be conducted, tanks and APC's should be immediately available to ground commanders.

(11)(C) Control of LFT's, TAC Air, and Artillery when two or more Companies are in Contact in the Same Built-up Area (3d Bde)

OBSERVATION. During street fighting in built-up areas, wide dispersion of company-size elements is required when two or more companies are in contact at the same time. It becomes extremely difficult to control movement and to maintain exact locations of units. Due to the difficulty in control, coordination of supporting artillery, TAC Air and light fire teams (LFT) are difficult. From actual experiences in Saigon, there were times when as many as three LFT's were working for different companies at the same time that TAC Air and supporting artillery were being utilized.

EVALUATION. It was found that the system that worked best in a situation like this was to have the LFT's utilize the FM frequency of the company being supported and work directly with the company commander. TAC Air was controlled by the battalion commander. Artillery was coordinated through the battalion commander and controlled by the companies. The unit in the target area maintained communication with FAC to identify friendly locations.

RECOMMENDATION. That control be decentralized as indicated.

(12)(C) Expedient Fighting Positions Utilizing Plastic Assault Boats (PAB) (3d Bde)

OBSERVATION. In many areas of the Delta, it is impossible to tie-in defensive positions except by fire due to the vast open areas of water-filled rice paddies. Obviously soldiers cannot occupy a position while standing or sitting in water all night, consequently defenses are not tied-in as closely as desired.

EVALUATION. This problem has successfully been overcome by the use of plastic assault boats (PAB's) which can be sling-loaded by helicopter into defensive positions with little trouble. PAB's were positioned in the water to fill gaps in the defense, camouflaged with natural vegetation and used as a fighting position. Sandbags can be used to fortify the inner walls of the PAB to give protection to the occupants. The added weight also lowers the silhouette of the PAB in the water.
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RECOMMENDATION. That this method be used to fill gaps in defensive positions caused by open, water-filled areas.

(13)(C) Night Insertion of Troop Units (3d Bde)

OBSERVATION. The difficulties of inserting a tactical element by helicopter during the hours of darkness are far greater than those of daylight insertions. Even identification of the LZ itself can be almost impossible on dark, moonless nights without proper supporting illumination.

EVALUATION. A special SOP covering night insertions can result in a more effective, faster and safer operation. Plans should be made for the use of Pathfinders, Moonglow illumination ships, advance parties into the LZ to act as guides for subsequent lifts of troops, for reinforcement of elements in the event of contact and for the employment of supporting artillery, TAC air and gunships for LZ preparation and to cover the insertion. The same plan should cover night extractions.

RECOMMENDATION. That each unit adopt an SOP to cover night airmobile operations.

(14)(C) Riverine Operation Counterambush Plan (3d Bde)

OBSERVATION. Unlike operations conducted on land, waterborne operations are often characterized by the necessity of units utilizing the same route of return as was used for entrance into an operational area. On the return route the possibility of ambush is greatly increased.

EVALUATION. A need exists to establish an SOP to cover counterambush techniques to be used during riverine operations. Units must conduct extensive training in counterambush techniques used on waterways prior to engaging in actual operations. The plan should cover a variety of situations likely to be encountered on any riverine operation. Also plans should be made to cover any situation that may arise from a particular operation not covered in the SOP. An SOP of this type may not eliminate the ambushes, but will assist the unit in successfully combating them.

RECOMMENDATION. That it be mandatory that all units participating in riverine operations have a counterambush SOP and be required to participate in extensive counterambush training prior to conducting actual riverine operations.
OBSERVATION. Airstrikes on intelligence targets can be made more
effective and result in increased VC body count if the forward air con-
troller (FAC) remains out of the target area until the time to mark the
target with smoke rockets.

EVALUATION. Prior to putting in an airstrike, a FAC must recon the
target to insure the coordinates are correct, that there are no friendly
troops in or near the target area and to pick the exact location where the
fighters are to drop their bombs. When the fighters arrive the FAC then
points out the target and sets up a strike pattern. This takes anywhere
from five to ten minutes. It has been proven by 3d Bde FAC's that recon
of the target using binoculars while flying 1-2 kilometers away and flying
at an altitude of 3000 feet or higher increases the chances of catching the
VC off guard in the target area. VC on the ground cannot hear the 0-1 air-
craft flying at that altitude until the FAC marks the target with a smoke
rocket. The time between the mark by the FAC and the first bomb drop by
the fighters can be as little as ten seconds thereby denying the VC time to
get into bunkers.

RECOMMENDATION. That this technique be used by FAC's when putting
airstrikes on intelligence targets or on known VC locations.

(16)(C) Conduct of Night Airmobile Assaults (9th Arm)

OBSERVATION. Airmobile assaults under the cover of darkness can
provide the ground commander with an effective means of delivering his
troops to an objective with a high degree of surprise.

EVALUATION. There are certain inherent problems in aviation support
of night assaults that can, with proper preparation, be overcome to the
degree necessary for the performance of successful operations. One prob-
lem is the difficulty in locating the selected landing zone (LZ) at night.
A detailed daylight reconnaissance by the air mission commander and the
ground commander should be made. Selection of routes to and from the LZ
along with selection of check points that can be easily identified at
night will facilitate finding the LZ at night. Pathfinders have been suc-
cessfully used to provide positive control in the LZ. Radio communica-
tions are established between the lead aircraft and the pathfinder ground
control. Use of directional light signal guns provide positive identifi-
cation of the LZ.
Control of large formations becomes more difficult at night. Smaller formations should be used for ease of control, depending on the requirement of the ground commander for massing troops in the LZ.

In order to succeed in producing an element of surprise, consideration should be given to deceptive reconnaissance. By reconning several different areas, the chance of giving away the actual LZ to the enemy is lessened. Successful five ship formation landings have been made in darkness without the aid of illumination. The bottom half of aircraft exterior lights have been taped to reduce detection while in flight.

Night airmobile assaults require more planning, close coordination between air and ground elements, detailed daylight reconnaissance, positive control en-route to and in the LZ's and a simple but thorough plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS. That detailed daylight reconnaissance of pre-planned LZ's be made so that landing may be accomplished without flare illumination.

That pathfinders be inserted in the LZ five to ten minutes ahead of the first lift to provide positive identification and control of LZ's.

That five ship formations with one minute intervals between lifts be considered for ease of control.

(17)(U) Use of Masonite (15th Enpr)

OBSERVATION. Masonite has a tendency to warp when it becomes wet or if the sheets are placed together too tightly.

EVALUATION. Much of the construction recently accomplished has included the use of masonite. It has been noted that this material often warps when wet or placed tightly together. In an attempt to prevent this warping, measures were taken to assure a nailing area across the center of the sheet of masonite and an extra ¼" space left between sheets. Approximately a two inch masonite strip can be used to cover the seam.

RECOMMENDATION. When installing masonite, provide it with as much nailing area as possible and allow space between sheets for expansion.

(18)(U) Concrete Pads (15th Enpr)

OBSERVATION. Precautions must be taken when pouring concrete during periods of adverse weather conditions.
EVALUATION. During the pouring of concrete foundation pads, a number of problems have been experienced. In view of heavy requirements for concrete pads, it has been impossible to pick the days for placing concrete. Thus, the hard rains and intense heat of the monsoon season have made the process very difficult. To combat this problem, pieces of plastic were placed over the surface of the concrete and smoothed by hand with the plastic in place to produce a semi-fine finish. By doing this, the rain only slightly affected the surface of the fresh concrete. After the rain the plastic was removed, and the surface was trowel finished.

RECOMMENDATION. When it becomes necessary to pour concrete during adverse weather condition, a procedure similar to that described above should be used.

(19)(U) Skin Rash (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. After working in concrete for some time, some of the men developed a skin rash from concrete poisoning. This skin rash was more prevalent with those persons who worked with the dry cement while charging the mixer.

EVALUATION. Immediately after working and during every break throughout the day, each man who had cement on his body was required to wash himself at the work sites. Not allowing the cement to linger on the skin any longer than necessary proved to be a great help in reducing the number of skin rash cases.

RECOMMENDATION. When personnel are working long periods of time with dry cement, insure that they have a means of periodically washing their skin free of the concrete powder.

(20)(C) Plastic Mines (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. The enemy is now emplacing plastic mines in roadblocks which are extremely hard to detect with the DTR-PRS-3 or 153 Mine Detectors.

EVALUATION. The use of plastic mines by the local VC make the clearing of roadblocks a time consuming and expensive proposition. Since our mine detectors are not detecting these booby traps, we must destroy each pile of mud which necessitates a great quantity of explosives.

RECOMMENDATION. Modify a D-5 Dozer by attaching a deflection shield on the rear of the blade. This will also require metal shields similar to
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those on an MP escort jeep to provide the driver with protection from booby traps on the sides. The D-5 Dozer is capable of removing a majority of the roadblocks encountered.

(21)(U) Overheating of D-5 Dozer (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. The air mobile D-5 Dozer is issued without a belly pan and a radiator screen. When working in soft soil or in wooded areas, it continuously overheats.

EVALUATION. In order to prevent this overheating from occurring, we have fabricated a belly pan from 3/4" plate steel which helps keep soil, limbs, and other foreign matter, out of the underside of the engine and helps keep the radiator from being punctured. A screen was mounted similar to that on a D-7 and all extraneous matter was kept away from the radiator, thus allowing the engine to keep cool.

RECOMMENDATION. All D-5 Dozers should be issued with belly pans and radiator screens installed.

(22)(C) Use of Non-Metallic Mines Against Vehicles. (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. As in the case of the previously mentioned roadblocks, the VC are planting non-metallic mines in the road.

EVALUATION. In view of the inability of our standard mine detectors to pick up this type of mine, it has become necessary to develop an alternate device. At present we have achieved some success by employing a plow pulled by an APC, which cuts a furrow along the side of the road. One man is assigned the mission of inspecting the furrow closely for wires. Although not perfected, by next quarter there should be a plow configured so it can cope with the rice paddy dikes and sharp enough to penetrate to a depth of 8". Perhaps a civilian hydraulic disc is the answer.

RECOMMENDATION. Effort should be placed toward developing a standard device to accomplish the task described above.

(23)(C) Anchorage System for Floating Bridges (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. When we consider that every road south of Saigon is virtually a causeway, the problem of supporting anchor systems becomes an unusually difficult one. The areas in which an anchor tower would be placed is usually in the rice paddy.
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EVALUATION. We have found that an 8' x 8' floatation platform can
be used as a floatation platform. The deadmen are a related problem and 55 gallon
drums filled with concrete seem to be the answer. They must be placed
with the aid of a helicopter, but once in place, they do the job.

RECOMMENDATION. Under the conditions stated, a system similar to
that described above should be used.

(24)(U) Whip Antenna Mount (15th Engr)

OBSERVATION. In its present configuration, operation of the 1/4 ton
truck over rough roads causes excessive metal fatigue to the fender near
the antenna mount.

EVALUATION. By utilizing a 1/4" thick steel plate to sandwich the fender,
additional strength is gained thus reducing metal fatigue to the aluminum
fender.

RECOMMENDATION. A modification should be made to the 1/4 ton truck to
strengthen the weak points over the wheels where radios are normally
mounted.

(25)(C) Communications from an LCM (9th Sig)

OBSERVATION. On 24 Jun 68, the 9th Signal Battalion was tasked with
the responsibility of providing tactical telephone communications to the
2d Brigade Forward Command Post (CP). The brigade forward CP is colocated
with the CP of the Brigade direct support artillery and operates from
a Landing Craft Medium (LCM). During combat operations the Brigade
Commander utilizes the LCM as his forward command post and spends a con-
siderable amount of time aboard this craft. Because the LCM frequently
relocates, the only practical means of providing telephone communications
was from a boat traveling with the forward command craft.

EVALUATION. On 25 Jun 68, a Radio Terminal Van, AN/MRC-69 mounted on
a 2 1/2 ton truck with generators was driven aboard a LCM-8. The next morning
the craft departed following the Brigade Forward LCM. A 30 foot antenna
was erected and attached to the side of the van. Initially communications
were to be installed between the boat and the 9th Signal Battalion signal
center at Tan An. The distance proved too great so a relay atop Vung Tau
Hill was activated and the communication link established. For the remainder
of the operation excellent communications were maintained even while the

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boat relocated, which was six different times during the nine-day operation. Naturally, the circuits could not be terminated to the subscriber while the boats were moving, however, once stopped, the subscribers were tied into the carrier using WD-1. The circuitry included sole user lines to Division Main elements, the Brigade CP (also aboard a boat) and Division Artillery elements.

RECOMMENDATION. (a) A crank-up type antenna such as is used for the AN/GRC-50 antenna should be used for this type operation. This antenna facilitates the lowering of the antenna as well as extending the antenna height. The antenna is also easier to rotate and improves communications while moving.

(b) The van should be off-mounted from the truck as the coxswain's visibility is reduced because of the height of the van. In addition, the removal of the truck from the LCM reduces the boat silhouette thereby decreasing the danger of equipment damage from enemy action.

c. (C) Training.

(1) Newly Graduated Aviators (9th Avn).

OBSERVATION: During this reporting period there has been a large influx of newly graduated aviators with a corresponding attrition of experienced aviators.

EVALUATION. The single ship, single fire team missions of the 9th Avn Bn require each crew or team to operate on its own. After an initial in-country orientation ride, the large part of a newly assigned aviator's training is gained by experience on operational missions with an aircraft commander or with another pilot who has flight experience in the TAOR. The battalion standardization instructor pilots are endeavoring to train additional qualified aviators as unit instructor pilots (IP) to provide a large experienced training base.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Integration of Target Acquisition and response means.

OBSERVATION. During this reporting period, there has been an increased use of people sniffers and radar to detect the enemy. Best results have been obtained when response was immediate.
EVALUATION. Due to the fleeting nature of targets in the Delta and their close proximity to population, the most effective use of the detection devices has been with an immediate response force that can move immediately into the target area. Experience has shown the response should be measured in minutes rather than hours. The 1st Bde on 24-25 June used the people sniffer to survey the surrounding area of a 23 June contact. Maximum readings along a streamline were exploited immediately by a airmobile force establishing contact with enemy force.

(2) Capture Data Essential for Interrogations.

OBSERVATION. A high proportion of detainees were released as innocent civilians due to lack of capture data details for interrogators to use when screening the detainees.

EVALUATION. During first part of the reporting period insufficient stress was placed on the detaining unit to list the detailed reasons for detaining an individual results in an abnormal amount (60%) of detainees from some units being released as Innocent Civilians. When detailed capture data was demanded the ratio of innocent civilians to Civil Defendants and PWs was reversed and a significant increase in the amount of intelligence information obtained has been noted.

e. (c) Logistics

(1) (c) Resupplying Field Units. (2d Bde)

OBSERVATION. Resupply activities during combat operations can be expedited if the kits are properly prepared.

EVALUATION. If at all feasible, units should be resupplied prior to the hours of darkness; this will allow units to establish and properly secure a landing zone (when receiving resupply by air), and will further permit the unit to displace to a new location after receiving its supplies. When the tactical situation does not permit resupply prior to darkness units should be provided the essentials of ammunition and rations (to include water). However, the resupply kits must be of the minimum. Frequently the enemy will avoid contact with the ground forces, until they are in the process of receiving night resupply kits. At this time both the ground force and resupply helicopters may be engaged or harassed with small arms and automatic weapons fire. There are many basic procedures that will assist in expediting resupply operations. One which has been emphasized in riverine operations is that of displacing the night resupply kits to pick-up zone in the vicinity of the FSB for
subsequent airlift into the AO. The supplies must be neatly arranged and properly marked with the unit’s designation. Prior to initiating resupply by air, the pilots must be briefed as to the unit’s disposition, radio frequency, and call sign.

(2) (C) Inadequacy of Organic Power Resources (9th Med).

OBSERVATION. Organic TOE power resources are inadequate for the equipment of the Division Medical Company.

EVALUATION. During recent months, the withdrawal of the aviation units with their generators from Tan An and movement of Company B to Dong Tam, where no PA&E generators are available, have left our units with inadequate electrical power resources. In the Mekong Delta, refrigeration of foodstuffs and medical supplies is a constant problem. Units are authorized two 65 cu ft refrigerators, two 12 cu ft freezers and 18 12 cu ft refrigerators. Organic generators include three 5 KW and eight 1.5 KW for each unit. Since lights, radios, compressors for dental units and motor pool, and emergency electrical power for medical facilities are required, there is an insufficient power source by TOE 8-36E. In addition, each unit is authorized a 15-59 MA X-Ray machine which also requires a minimum of 20 KW. These requirements for power are prevalent only in Vietnam. Here, medical companies perform base type operations for area coverage in a stable, contonement situation which can accommodate and requires this more sophisticated equipment.

RECOMMENDATION. That units be authorized two 45 KW generators per company in a contonement situation where post power (PA&E) is not available.

(3) (C) Airmobile Engineer Equipment (15th Engr).

OBSERVATION. Metal shavings have been found in the transmission of the International 3414 Diesel Tractor Loader equipped with the International 3121 Backhoe.

EVALUATION. These metal fragments are the suspected cause of equipment breakdown and transmissions wearing out prematurely.

RECOMMENDATION. A thorough inspection should be performed on all 3414 Diesel Tractor Loaders when issued to insure that the transmissions are free of these metal fragments. Closer inspection at assembly sites may help in reducing this problem.
Photographic Supplies (9th Sig).

Observations. The 9th Signal Battalion furnishes photographic coverage for the 9th Infantry Division and various other non-divisional units located in the general area. This larger area type support has created a problem in obtaining proper photo supplies and materials through normal divisional supply channels.

Evaluation. Examples of items which have become in short supply through regular supply channels are: 8 x 10 projection paper, 35 mm Tri-x pan film, various types of developer, and polaroid color film. Without these essential photographic supplies the 9th Signal Battalion was placed in a position of not being able to adequately support the 9th Infantry Division with photographic coverage. As a result, the photo lab personnel were forced to go to other signal battalions throughout Vietnam, trading and borrowing photographic supplies so that they would be able to continue supporting the 9th Infantry Division with efficient photographic coverage. A practical solution to photo supply problem was found by working closely with the Division Supply Office and placing all needed photographic supplies on a weekly usage list. From this list, it was determined what the authorized stockage should be. The Signal Battalion would then place weekly requisitions for all expended photo supplies so that the authorized stockage would stay at a pre-determined level and enable the Signal Battalion to continue normal production. Some items of photographic supplies, such as projectionist paper and polaroid film are still in short supply in Vietnam, however, the above procedure has enabled the 9th Signal Battalion to obtain previously hard to get photographic supplies and partially alleviate a serious supply problem.

Recommendation. It is recommended that this procedure be continued and possibly expanded to include expendable items which are subject to a recurring demand.

Transportation Between Camp Martin Cox and Dong Tam by Land LOC (DISCOM).

Observation. The most significant logistical activity during the reporting period was the transportation of supplies between Camp Martin Cox and Dong Tam after the Ben Luc Bridge (KS615758) was partially destroyed by enemy activity on 30 June 68. The loss of the key bridge on Highway QL4 between Saigon and Dong Tam and the lack of instructions to request large amounts of lumber to meet the demands created by the build-up of troops at Dong Tam, created the main logistical problems. A large number of units
did not requisition bunker materials until they arrived at Dong Tam. This problem was minimized by trucking lumber from Long Binh.

RECOMMENDATIONS. A more detailed evaluation of supply requirements should be made during the planning phase to insure that shortages are kept at a minimum. If adequate demands are placed on the supply system a steady flow of materials of this nature will be available or if a large requirement develops, a special notification should be sent to supply agency.

(6) (C) Resupply of Dong Tam by Water (DISCOM).

OBSERVATION. Recent activities during the past month including the damaging of several bridges between Dong Tam and Saigon point out the need for increase of logistical support utilizing water lines of communication.

EVALUATION. The very limited port facilities at Dong Tam will hinder any large scale resupply effort between Vung Tau and Dong Tam. This was exemplified when the LST ramp was damaged on 14 Jul 68 to such an extent that LST's cannot be used to transport cargo to Dong Tam until the ramp is repaired. No pile driving equipment was immediately available to repair the ramp.

RECOMMENDATION. To adequately support Division Supply requirements the beach discharge area must be expanded to allow for additional cargo storage area and adequate off-loading facilities. Dong Tam Harbormaster is submitting plans to the Base Development Officer that will indicate what facilities, space, and materials are required.

f. (U) Organization.

None

g. (U) Other:


OBSERVATION. Heat exhaustion can seriously affect combat operations in Vietnam.

EVALUATION. During the day under active combat conditions, one canteen of water is sufficient to maintain peak efficiency of the soldier for a maximum of 3 hours. If water supply is not adequate, the field commander can expect 10-40% losses from heat exhaustion in a day of active combat.
Planning for water and salt supply should be in two phases - initial and resupply. Most to the heat casualties of this division have been in the initial phase of an operation, generally when contact made resupply impossible. Most paddy water in the delta is not suitable for drinking even with iodine tablets due to the high organic material and minerals found in the water.

RECOMMENDATION. That each man have at least two full canteens of water before going on an operation. That each man carries a supply of water purification tablets. That each company have available for immediate resupply extra water and extra water purification and salt tablets.

(2) (U) Processing of Court-Martial Charges, Lack of a Speedy Trial.

OBSERVATION. During the last quarter it was noted that in a number of instances there were lengthy delays from the date of the latest offense until the date of trial, often while the accused was confined. The right of every accused to a speedy trial, subject to the relative right of the Government to collect its proof and bring the accused to trial consonant with other requirements, including tactical situations, is recognized.

EVALUATION. Unnecessary delays in trials tend to bring the military justice system into disreput, increase man days lost through pretrial restraint, result in acquittals through lack of proof due to material witnesses having been injured and evacuated, killed or rotated out of country, and upon Motion, result in dismissal of charges based upon lack of speedy trial. Four major reasons for the delays occasioned have been noted: (1) Delay in securing laboratory reports from the Military Police Criminal Investigations Laboratory, especially in marijuana cases. The Military Police Crime Lab has noted that the subpoena of technicians to testify in trials is a substantial factor in delay of analysis of all samples sent to them. In many cases the use of stipulations and depositions would minimize the need to subpoena expert witnesses, thereby permitting work on laboratory analysis. Furthermore, use of expert witnesses to identify marijuana by other than laboratory analysis will eliminate the need for laboratory analysis. (2) Delay to await completed CID cases. It is not normally necessary to await completion of CID report. Normally the CID can furnish sufficient information for prosecution sooner than they can close a case as complete. Close liaison between command representatives and the Provost Marshal will eliminate unnecessary delays. (3) Lack of proper supervision of courts and boards personnel and trial and defense counsel to insure that assigned duties are performed without unnecessary delay. Investigation of delays has shown that in a number
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SUBJECT: Operational Reports of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

of cases the commander is not exercising proper supervision over courts and boards personnel and trial and defense counsel and that, consequently those individuals are performing other duties and not properly and promptly performing their duties in such a manner that cases are tried without unnecessary delay. (4) Tactical situation. Recent incidence of delays of a month or more while an accused was in pretrial confinement in the stockade caused an investigation which revealed that the sole reason for the delay was given as tactical operations. This reason, particularly when combined with (3), revealed a lack of candor and frankness in some cases. No battalion has been omitted without periodic standdowns, for such protracted periods. In any event, methods of insuring trials are permitted to borrow officers from other units, with the concurrence of the commanders of such units, for the use as counsel or court members. Cooperation between battalions and coordination by brigade headquarters can do much to reduce delays in trial because of the tactical requirements on officers of any particular unit.

RECOMMENDATION. The basic problem is one which can be solved through a thorough education of commanders by the Staff Judge Advocate, and the wholehearted cooperation of commanders in reducing delays in trials. Administrative support of the Staff Judge Advocate, especially air transportation to battalion headquarters will allow closer coordination. Command emphasis on reduction of delays will provide commanders with an added incentive to try cases under this jurisdiction with dispatch, thereby reducing mandays lost in pretrial confinement.

(3) (U) Volume Level of PSYWAR Loudspeaker Broadcasts (1st Bde).

OBSERVATION. It was discovered that many POW's and CHIEU HOI returnees stated that loudspeaker broadcasts were too loud and difficult to understand.

RECOMMENDATION. That PSYOP battalion conduct or request from DA a test in order to determine at which volume and at what altitude aerial broadcasts should be conducted. Results should be published down to Brigade level.

(4) (U) Need for Chieu Hoi Instruction Broadcasts (1st Bde).

OBSERVATIONS. It was reported recently that many NVA personnel were not aware of the CHIEU HOI program.

RECOMMENDATION. That all units reemphasize the CHIEU HOI program and make a concerted effort to broadcast current instructions and information about the program over suspected NVA avenues of approach into South Vietnam.
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OBSERVATION. Communication problems have risen with the installation and operation of KY-28's in the ASC-10 and ASC-11 command and control consoles.

EVALUATION. The 9th Aviation Battalion has the responsibility of installing and maintaining the secure radio equipment used in the command and control helicopters. The three generals' ships and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigade commanders' ships have been equipped with KY-28's for use in a secure net. The consoles used in these helicopters are the ASC-10's, which use two ARC-54 radios. These consoles have been in operation for over twelve months and many deficiencies are becoming prominent. It has been found through experience that the use of the KY-28 will make any deficiency more pronounced and in many cases disable the console completely. The faults that cause poor or inoperative conditions of the secure consoles are:

1. Worn or frayed wires.
2. Worn or defective push-to-talk switches.
3. Weak or mismatched FM sets.
4. Inadequate or fluctuating power supply to console.
5. Malfunctioning headsets (Hi01/0).
6. Inexperienced operators.

RECOMMENDATION. After conferring with technical representatives from MACV and USARV, the solution to making a completely operational secure console would be as follows:

1. Replace all cables, connectors, headsets, etc. as necessary.
2. Check voltage regulator of helicopter for proper power output.
3. Inform operators of procedures when using secure equipment and of modified operating procedures when using secure equipment, i.e., on the ARC-54, the duty cycle is a ratio of 3 to 9. That is, for three seconds of transmission there should be at least nine seconds of cooling time. No single transmission should be longer than 20 seconds, and a minimum of one minute should be allowed for cooling.
4. Action has been initiated to test and replace equipment as necessary. Consoles will be tested by field maintenance avionics one at a time until all have been completed.

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3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover and Deception.

   a. (C) False Airmobile Insertions and Extractions at Night (1st Bde).

      OBSERVATION. The use of false insertions and extractions during night airmobile operations could offer some tactical advantages.

      EVALUATION. On 22 and 23 Jul 68, company sized elements of the 1st Brigade made night helicopter insertions into areas known to be used by enemy infiltrators. The initial insertions were made to gain experience in night techniques as well to exploit intelligence targets. Night helicopter operations could offer several advantages. First, false insertions to confuse the enemy as to actual landing zone locations should work better at night because of the reduced visibility. Second, false extractions or partial extractions to leave unobserved stay-behind forces can be most successful. Third, false insertions and extractions could cause an enemy reaction which might cause him to avoid certain areas he needs for his night movement. Tactical success on the nights mentioned above was limited because of the lack of enemy targets and the compromising effects of the illumination required for the night helicopter operations.

      RECOMMENDATION. Continued development of night helicopter tactics should be undertaken when suitable targets are available. Such operations will probably work best to leave stay-behind groups.

   b. (C) Methods Employed by MRF to Achieve Tactical Surprise.

      OBSERVATION. The Mobile Riverine Force constantly endeavors to achieve the tactical elements of surprise when planning and executing strike and riverine operations.

      EVALUATION. The act of achieving tactical surprise is rarely obtained when early coordination is effected for AO's and specified strike zones. Often, this early coordination and dissemination of operation plans tend to provide the enemy with opportunity to obtain advance or prior warning of the intended target or AO. Once an operation is initiated, movement of the river assault craft to and within the AO must be deceptive until the evacuation of beach assaults by infantry elements. Naturally, deceptive movement to and within the AO is contingent upon existing and navigable waterways. If prior knowledge of the scheme of maneuver is obtained by the enemy, the probability of encountering ambushes along waterways is extremely high. In addition, the maneuver battalions will either find an absence of significant size enemy forces or the remnants of his delaying forces.
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There are no concrete solutions for achieving the desired element of surprise. It is realized that the very nature of the enemy and his tactics will not always permit maneuvering elements to locate, fix, and destroy him in the most expeditious manner. However, the MRF employs a variety of deceptive measures to deny the enemy a comprehensive evaluation of his tactics. New techniques employed are:

(1) Varying the pattern of operations by changing the times of attacks. Early morning landings as well as midday landings are initiated to alter the pattern of attacks.

(2) Relocating the MRF several kilometers (i.e. 10 or more) from the immediate AO during tactical operations.

(3) Requesting several or an extremely large AO for each operation planned.

(4) Deceptive movement of river assault craft to and throughout waterways in AO's other than the intended AO.

(5) Executing multiple riverine and airmobile insertions using the "eagle float" and "eagle flight" techniques respectively.

(6) Deploying maneuver battalions into the AO prior to establishment of a FSB. This requires coordination for employment of ARVN or other U.S. artillery fire support for the maneuver battalions until the brigade's DS unit has established its FSB.

(7) Collaborating with sector and district advisors to disseminate deceptive information.

RECOMMENDATION. None.

23 Incl

1. 9th Inf Div Organization/BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA
   Task Organization and Unit Acting Commander
   Locations
   * 2. Roster of Key Personnel
   * 3. Tactical Area of Interest (TACI)
   4. Personnel and Administration Data
   5. Enemy Unit Locations
   6. Artillery Support

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20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

* 7. G-3 Air Operational Support Chart
* 8. G-3 Tabulated Operations Data
* 9. IMPACT Support To RF/FP
* 10. Base Operations
* 11. 1st Bde Operation Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL)
  12. 2d Bde ORLL
* 13. 3d Bde ORLL
* 14. 3-5 Cav ORLL
* 15. DISCOM ORLL
* 16. 15th Engr Bn ORLL
* 17. 9th Sig Bn ORLL
* 18. 9th Avn Bn ORLL
* 19. COAAR Operation HOPTAC I (1st Bde) (68X079)
* 20. COAAR Operation TRUONG CONG DINH Phase I (1st Bde) (68X080)
* 21. COAAR Operation TRUONG CONG DINH Phase II (2d Bde) (68X084)
** 22. COAAR Operation TOAN THANG (2d Bde)
*** 23. COAAR Operation TOAN THANG (3d Bde)

* Withdrawn, HQ, DA
** Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as CAAR 68X073
*** Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as CAAR 68X081
AVFBC-RE-II (20 Aug 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA: H.: II JVFC/JV, APO San Francisco 96266 12 SEP 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC(DST), APO 96375
       Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO IP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LT, AG
Asst AG

70
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATT: GFOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning overheating of D-5 dozer, page 57, paragraph 2b(21). The unit will be notified to submit a modification work order (MW) in accordance with TM 38-750.

   b. Reference item concerning whip antenna mount, page 58, paragraph 26b(24). Concur. The unit will be advised to submit an equipment improvement recommendation under the provisions of AF 735-35.

   c. Reference item concerning inadequacy of organic power sources, page 61, paragraph 2e(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2. The unit has been advised to submit a request for TDA augmentation.

   d. Reference item concerning volume level of PSYWAR loudspeaker broadcasts, page 65, paragraph 2g(3). An evaluation to determine the optimum altitude and volume level for airborne loudspeakers is currently being conducted in the ICTZ. The results of this evaluation will be disseminated through command channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARNTZ
Chief, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy for:
HQ II FFV
HQ 1st Inf Div
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATION

ASSIGNED UNITS

BBC 9th Inf Div
BBC 1st Bde
BBC 2d Bde
BBC 3d Bde
BBC Div Arty
2-39 Inf
3-39 Inf
4-39 Inf
2-47 Inf (M)
3-47 Inf
4-47 Inf
2-60 Inf
3-60 Inf
5-60 Inf (M)
6-31 Inf
3-5 Cav (3-5 Cav D Trp OPCON to 1st Air Cav Div)

2-4 Arty
1-11 Arty
3-34 Arty
1-84 Arty
9th Avn Bn
12th Engr Bn
9th Sig Bn
9th MP Co
43d Inf Plt (SD)
45th Inf Plt (SD)
Air Cushion Veh Unit
631st AVN Det

1st Air Boat Plta
2d Air Boat Plta
E/50th Inf (IRP)
Task Force Forsyth
Task Force Funston
(Deactivated 1 Jul 68)

BBC & Band, DISCOM
9th S&T Bn
709th Maint Bn
9th Med Bn
9th Admin Co

Reliable Academy
9th MI Det
584th MI Det
39th Chem Det
19th Mil Hist Det
47th Mil Hist Det

18th PI Det
19th PI Det
22d PI Det

65th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
1097th Med Boat

ATTACHED UNITS

335th RRC
137th Med

5-2 Arty (AWSP) (DS)
6-77 Arty

11th ACR (Detached 20 Jun 68)

OPCON UNITS

Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment

Inclosure 1a
### Task Organization and Unit Locations as of 0600

**AVDE-GT-T**

| 9th Inf Div Main | DONG TAM | XS 4143 |
| 9th Inf Div Rear | BEARCAT | XT 1600 |
| D/3-5 Cav | BEARCAT | XT 1600 |

| 9th Div Arty |
| 1-8 Arty (–) |
| A/1-84 Arty | BEN LUC | XS 6376 |
| B/1-84 Arty | FSPB MOORE | XS 2650 |
| C/1-84 Arty | TAN AN | XS 5565 |

| 4/7-8 Arty (GCR) |
| 5-42 Arty (GSR) (–) |
| A/5-42 Arty | BEN LUC | XS 6376 |
| 7-9 Arty (GSR) (–) |
| B/7-9 Arty | BEARCAT | XT 1700 |
| C/7-9 Arty | FSPB TAK | XS 1289 |

| 3d Bde |
| 3-39 Inf (–) |
| A/3-39 Inf | FSPB MOORE | XS 2650 |
| C/2-47 Inf (M) | FSPB LAMBERT | XS 3249 |
| 1-11 Arty (DS) (–) |
| A/1-11 Arty | FSPB TAK | XS 1289 |

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**OPERATION TRUONG CONG DIN**

| 3d Bde |
| 3-39 Inf (–) |
| A/3-39 Inf | FSPB MOORE | XS 2650 |
| C/2-47 Inf (M) | FSPB LAMBERT | XS 3249 |
| 1-11 Arty (DS) (–) |
| A/1-11 Arty | FSPB TAK | XS 1289 |

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**Incl 1b**

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Downgraded at three year intervals
Declassified after twelve years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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30 July 1968

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**OPERATION TOAN THANG (Phase II)**

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30 July 1968

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A/5-60 Inf (M) .
C/5-60 Inf (M) XS 6155
4-39 Inf .
0/15 Engr (-) Tan An XS 5565
2-4 Arty (-) Tan An XS 5565
A/2-4 Arty Rach Kien XS 6155
B/2-4 Arty (-) (2 tubes) Binh Phouc XS 6155
(4 tubes) Tan Tru XS 6663
C/2-4 Arty XS 5885
C/1-11 Arty Can Giouc XS 8271
RTAVR Bearcat TT 1289
1/RTAVR FSFB Tak XS 1289
2/RTAVR Binh Son XS 2193
Btry RTAVR Bearcat TT 1502
TF Forsyth Bearcat YS 1799
2-47 Inf (M) (-) Bearcat YS 1799
A/2-47 Inf (M) Bearcat TT 1000
B/15 Engr Bearcat TT 1600

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Personnel and Administration Data (U)

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   a. Division Strength:
      (Comparison as of 1 May 68 - 31 Jul 68)

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(Strength by Month)

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31 July 1968

c. Casualties:

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d. Analysis of Casualties:

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CONFIDENTIAL

78
**CONFIDENTIAL**

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31 July 1968

Patrol 4 51
Base Areas 4 134
In Flight 9 17
Ambush 3 18
Attack 1 0
Other 7 162

2. (U) Personnel Management:

a. The division experienced a critical reduction in the field strength of its maneuver units early in the reporting period. This occurred because of the elimination of overstrength in combat MOSC's by higher headquarters and a heavy loss of combat MOSC personnel within the division. A careful examination of the problem revealed that too many combat MOSC personnel were being promoted out of their MOSC. It was also found that the division "twice wounded" reclassification program which was in effect was not feasible as combat MOSC personnel were being utilized in noncombat duty positions.

b. The "twice wounded" program was eliminated and an intensive campaign was initiated to alert commanders of the problem area and to elicit their support. Finally, rigid controls were established at division personnel management level to police the program. The campaign has been successful and field strength has been improved.

3. (U) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

a. Morale continues to be high in all units.

b. Special Services Activities.

(1) Facilities:

(a) Swimming pool - A new liner was received and installed in the Dong Tam swimming pool.

(b) Service Club - The Ponderosa Service Club at Dong Tam was closed for repairs during the period 8 Jun to 4 Jul due to damage as a result of mortar attacks.

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(c) All the Bearcat Special Services facilities were officially turned over to II Field Force non-divisional units on 16 Jul 68.

(2) Entertainment:

(a) USO Handshake Tour
   Johnny Grant  
   DATE 12 Jun 68

(b) USO Shows
   Peter Leeds  
   DATE 5 May 68
   Jimmy Byrd  
   DATE 1 Jun 68
   James Brown  
   DATE 14 Jun 68
   Australian Concert Party  
   DATE 18-19 Jul 68

(c) Soldier Shows
   String Along  
   DATE 21 Jun 68
   Mr. T and the Originals  
   DATE 18-20 Jul 68
   Cumberland Trio  
   DATE 28 Jul 68

(3) Rest and Recuperation Allocation and Utilization:

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(4) Sports: Volleyball - The volleyball season began on 5 May and ended on 15 Jun with the conclusion of the championship tournament. 12 teams participated in the tournament with 9th Medical Battalion winning 1st place; 709th Maintenance Battalion, 2d place; and 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion, 3d place. Trophies were awarded to the 1st and 2d place teams.

o. Postal Services: On 1 Jun 68, APO 96370 terminated its finance
operations at the Bearcat Post Office. The parcel post, money order and stamp sales continued to be handled at Dong Tam by elements of the 48th Army Postal Unit. APO 96370 elements released from Bearcat were sent to Dong Tam Base Post Office to augment their financial facilities. A finance unit capable of selling both stamps and money orders was established at Tan An to service elements of the 1st Brigade located there. This team is also available for movement to field locations. The breakdown table and equipment for mail addressed only to APO's 96371, 96372 and 96373 were also sent to Dong Tam Base. As most maneuver elements of the division are in the Delta area, mail service has improved. The mail arriving at the Dong Tam Post Office is carried daily by a 5-ton truck which makes the run from Saigon to Dong Tam in approximately three hours. The hospital mail section was moved from Dong Tam Post Office back to Bearcat to preclude the delay in the handling of casualty cards between the Casualty Branch and the hospital section. Two more personnel have been added to expedite the processing of hospital mail. A new currency control system has been scheduled for implementation effective 1 Aug 68. The "credit card" machines have been received at the APO and will be in operation on the date specified. The facilities at the Dong Tam Post Office must be significantly expanded to accommodate the volume of mail it receives. The disruption of travel on Route 4, due to the destruction of the Ben Luong Bridge, demonstrated the need to remain flexible as to modes of transportation available. Close coordination with the Division Transportation Officer resulted in little disruption of the smooth flow of mail to those units at Dong Tam even though mail was trucked from Saigon to Bearcat, and then flown to either Tan An or Dong Tam.

d. Awards and Decorations: Awards issued (1 May 68 – 31 Jul 68).

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31 July 1968

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**GRAND TOTAL**: 6622

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</table>

83
Compared with the last reporting period there were more services provided; however, there was also a decrease in attendance. The decrease in attendance is attributed to the Saigon offensive beginning 5 May; the shift of the brigades; and acceleration of tactical operations.

f. Red Cross:

(1) Red Cross support rendered during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASES HANDLED</th>
<th>LOANS/GRANTS (AMT) (\text{EMER LEAVE} )</th>
<th>(\text{NON-EMERGENT LEAVES} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1307</td>
<td>7 ($1045.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>3 ($430.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>4 ($290.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The number of cases handled each month remained fairly constant during the quarter, averaging slightly more than 1300 per month. The figures shown above are not considered high for a command this size.

(3) The Red Cross Clubmobile girls made a total of 657 visits to company size units throughout the 9th Division during this period.

g. Education Center:

(1) During this quarter the following number of men participated in the division education program:

(a) Testing Service

1. High School tests completed 171
2. GED (one or more parts) 31
3. End-of-course tests 9
4. Subject standardized tests 15
5. College Comprehension Tests 10

84
(b) Correspondence Registrations

1. High School Level  
   68
2. College Level  
   238
3. Technical  
   42
4. Military Correspondence  
   355

(c) Tutoring enrollment during quarter  
   31
(d) College two year evaluation  
   7
(e) Assistance for VA inservice education  
   45

Total Participation  
636

(2) The following materials and equipment have been received by the Education Center during the quarter:

(a) Equipment:
   (1) Electric portable typewriter
   (2) Electric adding machine
   (3) 16mm motion picture projector
   (4) Filmstrip projector
   (5) Counter

(b) Materials:
   (1) USAFI instructional material for the Core Program
   (2) Advertising posters

(3) Necessary forms from the University of Maryland, Far East Division, for implementing the Maryland program.
31 July 1968

(4) Lesson plans are being developed for instructing the Tiger Scouts basic English. Ten lessons are complete.

(5) Plans are being developed to begin classroom instruction on the high school and college level after the move to Dong Tam is complete.

4. (C) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

a. Discipline:

(1) Crimes against Persons and Property: The Division has experienced a decrease in these types of crimes. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnal Knowledge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary &amp; Housebreaking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (under $50)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (over $50)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongful Appropriation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Miscellaneous and Military Offenses: The division has experienced a significant decrease in this category. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Miscellaneous Offenses</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly Conduct</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-narcotic Abuse Drugs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Market</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offenses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Offenses</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY OFFENSES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violations of Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Violations (incl in others)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform Violations (incl in others)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Offenses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Traffic Offenses: The division experienced a significant reduction in the number of traffic offenses for this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic Offenses</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular Homicide</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invol Mansl (FOV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 July 1966
### 31 July 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic Offenses</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negligent Homicide (MIL)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunk Driving (MIL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reckless Driving (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reckless Driving (MIL)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding (MIL)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Moving Violations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Violations (Except Parking)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleeing Scene of Accident (MIL)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Traffic Offenses</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) 55 CID Reports of Investigation were received this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CID CASE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opened</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Detainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PW's</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (Chieu Hoi)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Evacuated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83
Military Justice: During this period 1 May through 31 Jul 68, four enlisted men and two commissioned officers were tried by general court-martial. This is a slight increase over the number of cases tried by general court-martial during the previous quarter when five enlisted personnel were tried. No significant trends or problem areas were noted in this area during the quarter. In some cases more than one offense was charged and a breakdown of the offenses charged and tried by general court-martial this period follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offenses Charged</th>
<th>Number Charged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disobedience of lawful orders or commands</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False official statements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifting weapon against superior officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongful discharge of firearms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary manslaughter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthless checks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ENEMY UNIT LOCATIONS

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31 July 1968

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

SUMMARY OF ROUNDS FIRED
ARTILLERY WITH THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
1 May 68 - 31 Jul 68

DIVISION ARTILLERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm HOWITZER</th>
<th>155mm HOWITZER</th>
<th>8&quot; HOWITZER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,919</td>
<td>191,426</td>
<td>3,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NON-DIVISION ARTILLERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm HOWITZER</th>
<th>155mm HOWITZER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,383</td>
<td>37,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIRED IN SUPPORT OF ARVN - RF/FF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm HOWITZER</th>
<th>155mm HOWITZER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608</td>
<td>18,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 6
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DIVISION OPERATIONS DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPS</th>
<th>CONTACTS</th>
<th>OPS/CONTACT</th>
<th>EN LOSSES/US KHA</th>
<th>EN LOSSES/CONTACT</th>
<th>US KHA/CONTACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>2778</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>2592</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUARTER</td>
<td>8065</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DIVISION COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>US KHA</th>
<th>US WHA</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC PW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUARTER</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>2362</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

incl 8

92
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>US KIA</th>
<th>US WKA</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC FW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-60</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAVR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONFIDENTIAL

### UNIT OPERATIONS DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>#OPHS</th>
<th>#CONTACTS</th>
<th>OPHS/CONTACT</th>
<th>VCLOSES/US AHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-39</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-39</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-39</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-47</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-47</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-47</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-60</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-60</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-60</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-31</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAVR</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>185.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96372

AVDE-47MH-A

30 July 1968


THRU: Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO San Francisco 96376

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C., 20310

Reference: AR 525-15, dated 26 January 1968

SECTION I

Operations: Significant Activities

1. (C) Introduction:

a. During the period for which this report is prepared, the 2nd Brigade continued offensive operations as an integral constituent of the Mobile Riverine Force. The combined Army - Navy Team increased the tempo of strike operations directed specifically at destroying the enemy, denying him the opportunity to reorganize and redistribute his personnel and resources, and to impede his efforts to launch large scale offensives against GVN Forces and cities within the Mekong Delta. During this period the MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE conducted 19 tactical operations in support of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH which commenced on 7 March 1968. On several occasions, operations were initiated to interdict infiltration and exfiltration routes in order to meet the increasing threat inherent by the presence of enemy forces in the Capital Military District of Saigon, Ben The, Sa Dec, and Can Tho. The Mobile Riverine Force operated in eight provinces of the Mekong Delta during this period. All missions and tasks, either specified or implied by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, were planned and executed with the same magnitude of unity and professionalism, characteristic of the Mobile Riverine Force. Most of the combat operations conducted involved the employment of the Brigade's two maneuver...
b. The predominant characteristics of combat operations conducted during this period may be best summarized as follows: The enemy avoided wholesale or large-scale contact with the maneuver battalions, with the exception of a few operations, he repeatedly evaded the infantry battalions and resorted to harassing them with small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket fires, all of which were employed by small groups of insurgent forces. Considerable attention was given to ambush of the Navy's assault support craft of Task Force 117 or to carrying troops into battle and supporting the ground forces. The boldness of the enemy's desire to engage the Flotilla ships and Army vessels is exemplified by the rocket and recoilless rifle attack which occurred on the afternoon of 15 April. Previously, the enemy was reluctant in his initial engagements, but later during the reporting period he has not only been aggressive, but particular in his selection of his targets.

c. The Mobile Riverine Force was involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of brief periods of transits or stand-downs. The 2nd Brigade has successfully accomplished its mission as a mobile striking force by participating in offensive operations in Kien Hoa, Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Binh, Chung Thien, Vinh Long, and Phong Dinh Provinces. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations and during periods when the battalions were rotated at Dong Tan or preparing for future operations.

2. Organization

a. Several organizational changes occurred during the reporting period. However, the changes did not in any manner alter or impede the momentum of combat operations. The most significant change which occurred was the approval of the Brigade's Riverine MTOE. The MTOE was approved by Department of the Army; implementation is pending publication of General Orders by USARPAC. The new Riverine MTOE became effective on 26 July 68. The new Riverine MTOE increased the authorized strength of the Brigade's Headquarters and Headquarters Company by 2 officers and 68 enlisted men. The new MTOE provides an augmentation of the Brigade's communication platoon thereby increasing its capabilities to support the present and projected communications requirements of the MRF. The new MTOE provides for the employment of six communication operations teams to be embarked and capable of self-sufficient operations aboard ships of the MRF. In addition, an intelligence, maintenance and photo team are provided to support Brigade operations. Other changes inherent with the approved MTOE provides for additional enlisted personnel to perform duties in the Tactical Operations Center; elimination of the majority of vehicles and associated motor maintenance personnel, and the deletion of the HHC Executive Officer positions.
at Brigade and battalion level. Although no noticeable personnel strength changes are reflected in the infantry battalions, the field strength of the combat elements are increased. Personnel vacancies resulting from lost of motor and maintenance personnel are reallocated to increase the combat field strength. Another significant change in the Brigade's organization was the detachment of the 3-34th Artillery Battalion. On 1 June, the 3-34th Artillery reverted back to its parent Artillery Command (9th Division Artillery), which was then tasked to provide direct artillery support to the Brigade as required. The 3-34th Artillery was placed DS to the Brigade. One battery of the 3-34th Artillery is frequently employed at Dong Tam Base.

b. As presented in the past Operational Report of the 2nd Brigade, the Brigade's organization for combat remained basically unchanged. Two of its three maneuver battalions remained afloat with the Mobile Riverine Force, while the third infantry battalion was employed in defense of Dong Tam Base. The absence of the third battalion was compensated for by initiating operations in coordination and cooperation with ARVN Units, and conducting operations which complemented other U.S. and GVN operations.

(1) The Mobile Riverine Force conducted combat operations in coordination and cooperation with the 2nd Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps during the period 23 - 24 April, and 27 - 30 April, and 6 - 11 May in DINH TUONG Province.

(2) During the period 16 thru 18 May, the MRF initiated combat operations in LONG AN Province; at which time, the 3-39th and 4-39th Infantry Battalions (-) were OPCON to the 2nd Brigade. The operation, employing four maneuver battalions, was one of the most significant operations conducted during the reporting period.

(3) The Brigade was tasked to place one of its two infantry battalions (3-60th Infantry) OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period 2 thru 5 July. However, the Brigade continued its operations and employed the 3-47th Infantry in reconnaissance-in-force operations. The absence of the second maneuver battalion, though temporarily, limited the magnitude of strike operations.

(4) During the periods 4, 7, 10, 15 and 16 July, the MRF initiated operations in GO CONG, KIEN HOA and VINH BINH Provinces in coordination and cooperation with ARVN, RF and PF units.

c. As of 16 July, no definite date was established for embarking a third infantry battalion aboard ships of the MRF. Short range plans project the arrival of two additional auxiliary personnel barracks ships in early August 1968. However, the Brigade's obtainment of the third infantry is also contingent upon readjustments in the 9th Infantry Division security missions.
3. (C) Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel.

(1) Unit Strength: The average assigned of major subordinate units of the Brigade during the period 15 April - 20 July 1968 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2nd Brigade</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 47th Infantry</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 47th Infantry</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 60th Infantry</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 34th Artillery</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The field maneuver strength of each infantry battalion was approximately three-fifths (3/5) of its assigned strength. This percentage does not include personnel who were involved in administrative and other matters such as hospitalization, details, R&R, leave, transit, sick call, profiles and light duties because of wounds. To increase the field maneuver strength, commanders and their staffs initiated administrative measures to increase the number of personnel available for employment in combat. Personnel having MOS's in the 11 series were removed from headquarters sections and placed in line units to augment the strength of the rifle companies.

(3) During the period 15 April 1968 through 25 July 1968, there were several changes in the key personnel of the Brigade; these were as follows:

(a) Colonel Robert E. Archer assumed command of the 2nd Brigade replacing Colonel Bert A. David, on 28 May 1968.

(b) LTC James L. Scovel assumed the duties of 2nd Brigade Executive Officer, on 1 June 1968, replacing LTC John C. Conlin, USMRC. LTC Conlin, USMRC, continued to serve in the capacity of Riverine Advisor.

(c) LTC John C. Conlin, USMRC, assumed the duties of 2nd Brigade Executive Officer, replacing LTC James L. Scovel, on 8 July 1968.

(d) LTC George E. Marine assumed command of 3-60th Infantry, replacing LTC John G. Hill, on 22 June 1968.

(e) LTC Jack N. Merritt assumed command of 3-34th Artillery, replacing LTC William E. Rawlinson, on 13 July 1968.
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(f) LTC Ishmael Pack assumed duties of 2nd Brigade Executive Officer, effective 25 July 1968.

(4) Casualties as a result of hostile action for the period 15 April to 28 July 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>WFA</th>
<th>KFA</th>
<th>MFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 47th Inf</td>
<td>15 May thru 30 April</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 May</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 30 June</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 28 July</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 47th Inf</td>
<td>15 May thru 30 April</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 May</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 30 June</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 28 July</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 60th Inf</td>
<td>15 May thru 30 April</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 May</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 30 June</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 28 July</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 34th Arty</td>
<td>15 May thru 30 April</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 May</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 30 June</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 28 July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Total casualties as a result of hostile action for the period 15 April thru 28 July 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WFA</th>
<th>KFA</th>
<th>MFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>494</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Administration.

(1) Awards and Decorations:

(a) Number of awards and decorations recommended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3-47th Inf</th>
<th>4-47th Inf</th>
<th>3-60th Inf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recom</td>
<td>Recom</td>
<td>Recom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved</td>
<td>Approved</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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for Period Ending 30 July 1968, Report Control Symbol
CSFOR-65 (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3-47th Inf</th>
<th>4-47th Inf</th>
<th>3-60th Inf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS(V)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM(V)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) On 19 July 1968, the 9th Infantry Division was awarded the Vietnamese Unit Citation - Armed Forces Level which acknowledged the military accomplishments of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.

(2) During the reporting period, representatives of the division special staffs continued to augment the administrative functions of the Brigade. The special staff augmentation consisted of: a postal section, finance team, public information detachment and a reenlistment NCO. Periodically, other teams such as AG, JAG, IG and photography teams were dispatched from division to serve in the troops, as required. This program has proved to be very successful and has greatly contributed to the efficiency of the Brigade operations. It eliminates unnecessary troop movement and increases the morale of the unit by providing fast, efficient, personnel services to soldiers in the line units.

(3) At the termination of the last reporting period, an insufficient number of administrative helicopters impaired the movement of troops, mail, and incoming and outgoing personnel. Since that time the mail problems have been alleviated by close coordination between the Postal Officer, the Adjutant General's Office, and the Brigade S-1. Under the present system, the postal clerk accompanies the mail to and from the Post Office to insure that the mail has priority over other deliveries to the MRB. Transportation requirements for troop movements remain, basically, the same. Individuals participating in a five day out of country R&R can be expected to be absent from their units for a period of 10 to 13 days, due to inadequate transportation assets. Personnel returning from leave are confronted with the same problem; this again presents a serious morale problem and also reduces the availability of personnel for employment in the...
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field. At the present time, coordination between the Brigade and Division is being effected to reduce and subsequently eliminate this problem area.

(4) Health remained "excellent" throughout the period. Due to the fact that the malaria rate is extremely low in the Mekong Delta, the Brigade encountered no significant problems with the treatment or increase of that disease. Most of the man-hours lost were due to foot problems. With the advent of the "rainy season", the number of foot problems per month increased slightly; however, with the additional command and medical attention given to foot care during this period, the number of man-hours lost was kept to a minimum. During periods of standdowns (days on which there are no operations), the men are encouraged to "dry out" their feet in the sun. With the added emphasis on the proper care of feet, the number of patients will be further reduced in the future.

(5) Morale remained extremely high throughout the period. Excellent living conditions, well prepared food, and continuous success during combat operations contributed toward maintaining an extremely high state of morale throughout the command. Special Services provided a number of musical programs for the Mobile Riverine Force, which aided considerably in maintaining the high state of morale. At the present time, the Brigade is planning a Special Services program to meet the problems peculiar to its environment. Since the men of the 2nd Brigade live on the ships of the MRF, they have little or no opportunity to use the recreational facilities at Dong Tam or any other land base area. Our constantly changing areas of operation, and the fact that our personnel are quartered on five different ships, make it extremely difficult for the men to participate in any existing recreational program. Due to the limited recreational facilities aboard the ships of the MRF, this command requested the Division Special Services Section to assist the Brigade in the establishment of a recreational program for the men.

(6) Because of the unique nature of the Mobile Riverine Force, the ships of the MRF have become a key point of interest for personnel visiting Vietnam. Numerous visitors, both civilian and military, have visited the MRF; to date, the majority of these visits have been beneficial in that proper recognition and publicity has been given to the men of the combined team. The recognition received as a result of the official visits has more than justified any slight inconveniences that occurred. In no way were operations hindered; the Mobile Riverine Force continued to accomplish its mission.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. During this reporting period, enemy activity has been characterized by the multiplication of units through division of existing Main Force and Provincial Mobile Battalions, and upgrading of
local guerrillas and District Coordinated Units. The enemy forces have thus, almost doubled their existing troop units and increased their strength, but have reduced their combat effectiveness with inexperienced troops. Continuous and energetic resupply activities became an area of principal concern for the enemy as well as continued proselytizing and recruiting activity. It appears the enemy has placed emphasis on increasing the quality of its weapons. Presently, many units that were previously armed with Chicom carbines and submachine-guns, are now found with AK-47's and K-50's.

Road intrusions and land attacks on local outposts continue to be a favorite enemy tactic. Initially, stand off mortar and rocket attacks were somewhat reduced, but as the enemy concentrated on his resupply and ammunition became available, these attacks were realized once more.

Continued reports indicated that the enemy is constantly harassed and demoralized by artillery and airstrikes, and his morale has been substantially reduced. It is apparent that the introduction of the local guerrillas into previously "Hardcore" Main Force Battalions has generally had an adverse effect on the morale of all concerned. In order to combat this, the enemy has adopted the policy of attributing the status of "Battalion" to those units which heretofore have been referred to as Local Companies. Three recently organized Battalions have been confirmed in KIEN HOA Province: the 550th MF Battalion, the 520th and 530th Battalions. Also, there are indications that there is a rift developing between the military and political factions of the insurgent's movement with a certain amount of dissatisfaction being voiced by military elements. Examples of the enemy's division: upgrading of local guerrillas, and infusion of these guerrillas with accepted units can be seen in the 514th PMB. The 514th Battalion was divided into 514A, 514B and 514C Battalions and District Units were levied to provide the additional personnel. Also, the 516th PMB was upgraded to a Main Force Battalion and therefore was withdrawn from the control of the VC BEN TRE Provincial Committee and placed under COSVN Command.

Major movement trends during the reporting period were experienced from West to East, and Southeast to Northwest toward SAIGON. Enemy units continue to rotate through the SAIGON/CHOLON area to maintain pressure on the Capital and are then withdrawn to Cambodia and the RSSZ to rest and resupply. This tactic has probably been adopted as a means of influencing the Paris Peace Conference. However, the VC are now alienating themselves from the population by their newly adopted tactics and demonstrating that their area of principle concern is not the people of Vietnam, but advancing Communist ideology.

Information and intelligence was exchanged liberally between all agencies and the Brigade by means of liaison officers, message traffic and personal (staff) coordination and liaison. Significant intelligence information/material was obtained from the following

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sources: The 9th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment located at Dong Tam, prisoners of war (PW) and sympathizers, 7th ARVN Division Agent Net, 525th MI Detachment, field information reports from Naval Intelligence Liaison Office, spot reports, intelligence summaries and electronic means. In most cases, information and intelligence were not particularly effective because they were not timely.

Enemy capabilities and limitations exhibited during the reporting period remain the same. The enemy retains the capability of conducting platoon and company size attacks on outposts and villages as well as battalion size attacks on district and provincial towns and military installations. He can also conduct stand-off mortar and rocket harassing attacks. Indications are infiltration, proselytizing and resupply activity will also continue on a large scale, in addition to the interdiction of major lines of communications. His desire to gain control of rural population will continue to be a priority mission, even though he is not capable of maintaining the desired degree of political and military control. Despite his military and political objectives, the enemy remains vulnerable to massed artillery fire, aerial observation and electronic surveillance. Considering the enemy's capabilities it is thought that his possible courses of action will include continued recruitment, training and resupply activities, in addition to the initiation of attacks against minor targets in strength, intensifying harassment of major lines of communications and military installations. If at all feasible, the enemy will initiate an offensive on the same scale as his TET offensive.

5. (C) Combat Operations.

a. Two major operations were conducted during this reporting period: OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH and OPERATION TOAN THANG. Phase I of the OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH terminated when the Brigade rotated its maneuver battalions at Dong Tam Base on 2 April 1968. Phase II of OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH commenced concurrently with the termination of Phase I; to date, Phase II is continuing. The Mobile Riverine Force has participated in 22 significant operations during this reporting period, the majority of which were initiated in continuation of OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH Phase II. On 15 July, the Brigade was assigned a tactical area of operational interest (TAOI); the TAOI designated was KIEN HOA Province. Concurrent with the assignment of the TAOI, the Brigade was tasked to effect complete military pacification of the province. The mission was to be accomplished by: (1) destroying VC main and local force offensive capability with priority given to those areas which directly effect the pacification Rural development mission, (2) Disrupting enemy replacement, training and regroupment throughout his base area network, (3) providing military support for rural development programs, (4) providing military assistance to upgrade key RF/FF outposts throughout the TAOI, and in training to local forces whenever possible. Assignment of the TAOI does not restrict the Brigade functioning as a mobile strike force. It is simply an area of
primary interest into which civic action, psychological operations and rural development efforts will be concentrated.

b. The advent of a second major VC offensive, in the Mekong Delta required the Brigade to temporarily suspend OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH. The Mobile Riverine Force was tasked to move to LONG AN Province to interdict the infiltration and exfiltration of enemy forces near the Capital Military District of Saigon. When an apparent increase of enemy activities and threats endangered the city of CAN THO, the MRF deployed to PHONG DINH Province and initiated combat operations as directed by the Senior Advisor IV CTZ. The early presence of the MRF reduced the ability of enemy units to assemble and launch an attack against the city of CAN THO. The enemy was compelled to evocate the maneuver battalions, and disassemble into small increments. Operations in both LONG AN and PHONG DINH Provinces stressed that effective employment of ground forces, assault support craft, artillery, gunships and tactical airstrikes will defeat a determined enemy force.

c. Combat operations implemented in support of TRUONG CONG DINH Phase II includes those operations conducted during the month of April, which were not inclusive in the previous Operational Report prepared of the Brigade. Significant operations of the MRF during the period are summarized herein. Specific details of each operation are contained in inclusion #4 (Combat Operations After Action Report - TRUONG CONG DINH, Phase II).

(1) Immediately upon completing rotations of the Brigade’s Infantry Battalions, the MRF made a major incursion into TRUC GIAN and GIONG TROM Districts, KIEN HOA Province to locate and destroy the 560th LF Company and 516 HF Battalion located in the vicinity of the “Crossroads” on the SONG BA LAI. The operation was launched on 4 April in continuation of OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH. It was during this operation, that the Brigade and Task Force 117 encountered the fiercest engagement since the VC TET Offensive. As the assault support boats of River Division 92 entered the SONG BA LAI to disembark the 3-47th Infantry, the riverine column was assailed with small arms, automatic weapons and rocket fire. The 3-47th Infantry, upon beaching, assaulted the enemy positions, and the 4-47th Infantry was inserted to reinforce the engagement which continued until the evening hours of 4 April. Subsequent operations were initiated on 5, 6 and 7 April to pursue and destroy the enemy in the marshy tributaries of the SONG BA LAI.

(2) Subsequent operations conducted during the month of April employed the MRF in response to intelligence reports of increased enemy activity. From 10 thru 12 April, enemy forces in Dinh Tuong and GO CONG Provinces were targets for the MRF. A two day operation was later conducted on 14 and 15 April in BEN THE District, KIEN HOA Province against the 550th and 560th DCUs. Another significant engagement occurred on 17 April, when the Brigade was employed in CAM LAY.
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District, DINH TUONG Province against the 521st Inline Battalion; 93 enemy were killed at the loss of four U.S. lives. The Brigade, in cooperation with the 2nd Battalion VNNC, continued operations in DINH TUONG Province on 23 and 24 April. The joint operation in GIANG DUC District resulted in 61 VC KIAs of the 501st VC Battalion. The Mobile Riverine Force continued operations in GIAY LAY District during the period 27 - 30 April, and redeployed on 2 and 3 May to KIEN HOA Province.

(3) On 5 May a survey was made of RF/PF outposts in CAI BE District, to determine the extent of damage resulting from enemy attacks. Operations were initiated from 7 thru 11 May against the MR II VC Headquarters in GIANG DUC District, DINH TUONG Province. The Brigade and 2nd Battalion, VNNC, conducted reconnaissance in force operations without establishing any significant contacts; 21 VC KIAs resulted from the operation. Enemy engagements increased during the period 14 thru 16 May, when the MRF was employed in MO CAY District, KIEN HOA Province against the 516th VC Battalion; 57 VC KIAs resulted. The Mobile Riverine Force and elements of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division initiated operations from 16 thru 18 May, in THAN DUC District, LONG AN Province. The operation was further conducted in cooperation with III CTZ ARVN Forces to reduce VC/NVA infiltration into the SAIGON area. The two day joint operation resulted in 126 VC KIAs (See enclosure #5 Combat Operations After Action Report - TDAN THANG, Phase I and II). The Brigade continued operations in LONG AN and DINH TUONG Provinces without any significant contact until 26 May. At which time a two day operation was launched to recon-in-force and exploit the area of a B-52 strike in GIANG TRON District, KIEN HOA Province. The two day operation yielded 41 VC KIA at the loss of four U.S. lives. Fifteen VC were also killed in MO CAY and DON TON Districts when elements of the 516th DCU were targets for the Brigade.

(4) During the month of June the enemy generally avoided contact with the maneuver battalions and intensified his attacks against Naval assault support craft of Task Force 117. On 5 and 6 June the MRF initiated reconnaissance in force operations in SA DEC and DUC TON Districts, VINE LONG Province. Maximum employment was made of the E-8 tactical CS launcher and "ZIPPO" flameboats to dislodge the enemy from fortified positions and suppress his sniper fires. The period 4 thru 8 June saw the MRF conducting operations in the SA DEC and BACH RUONG areas, and KIEN VAN and MY AN Districts, KIEN PHONG Province. Returning to KIEN HOA Province, the MRF initiated operations on 10 June in GIONG TRON and TRONG GLAIG Districts. Although ground contacts were not obtainable, B/7-1st Air Cavalry and Naval assault support craft succeeded in destroying 45 VC during the two day operation. On 16 June, the MRF deployed to CAI THO, and initiated operations as directed by the Senior Advisor IV CTZ to prevent a major VC offensive against the city. A four day operation which commenced on 17 June resulted in 84 VC KIA. The majority of the enemy's losses resulted from A/7-1st Air Cavalry engagements in support of the maneuver battalions.
Completing operations in PHONG DINH Province, the MRF deployed to Dong Tam. After a brief period of operations, the MRF proceeded on 26 June to LONG AN Province where it was again employed to interdict infiltration and exfiltration of VC/NVA forces near SAIGON. Contrary to the Brigade’s earlier operations in LONG AN Province, the enemy avoided contact with the maneuver battalions for the duration of the month.

(5) The Brigade was tasked to place the 3-60th Infantry Battalion OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division which had establish contact in DINH TUONG Province. The battalion remained OPCON to the 3rd Brigade from 2 thru 5 July. During that period, the MRF continued its operations in LONG AN Province until 5 July when it redeployed to Dong Tam. On 6 July the 3-47th Infantry relieved the 4-47th Infantry of its security mission at Dong Tam Base. The Brigade continued combat operations on 7 July in KIEN HOA Province. The target selected was those enemy forces entrenched west of the "crossroads" where the Brigade participated in its heaviest engagement of this reporting period. The 4-47th Infantry entered the objective area and beached without incident. The 3-60th Infantry conducted airmobile combat assaults to LZs south of the 4-47th beach sites. The only engagements of the day occurred; when E/4-47th Infantry killed two VC after receiving sporadic small arms, and D/3-5th Air Cavalry received sporadic automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of XS5237. The absence of enemy activity in the AO was unusual. On 10 July, the MRF initiated operations in KIEN HOA Province to locate and destroy enemy forces and equipment within HUON MY and MO CAY Districts. Subsequent operations were initiated 11 thru 13 July employing both the 4-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry in beach assaults, airmobile and cagel float operations. During the period 15 thru 17 July the MRF continued Operation TRUONG CONG DINH, conducting reconnaissance in force, airmobile and riverine operations in CANG LONG, CHAU THANH Districts, VINH BINH Province. The operation on 15 July in coordination and cooperation with the 9th ARVN Division. During the three day operation, the Brigade and its supporting elements accounted for 62 VC KIAs. Completing operations in VINH BINH Province, the MRF deployed to Dong Tam Base on 18 July. While anchored off Dong Tam, the Brigade employed the 4-47th Infantry, on 20 July, to conduct saturation patrolling and establish night ambushes on the south bank of the MY THO River in the vicinity of XS4740, TRUC GIANG, HAM Long Districts, KIEN HOA Province. On 21 July the 3-60th Infantry was employed in a cordon and search operation in coordination and cooperation with RF/PP elements on THOI SON Island. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH continued on 23 July in accordance with OPORD 61-68 in GIONG TRON, TRUC GIANG Districts, KIEN HOA Province. The operation was initiated in coordination and cooperation with the 3-10th ARVN and 1-10th ARVN Regiments. On 25 July, the Brigade terminated its operations in KIEN HOA Province; and on 26 July the MRF deployed to VINH LONG Province. After completing final plans and preparation for its transit, the MRF departed its Vinh Long anchorage on 28 July and deployed to PHONG DINH Province, arriving the same day. On 30 July,
the MRF initiated offensive operations in coordination and cooperation with the 5th Battalion, VNVN, in KIEN LONG, KIEN HUNG and DUC LONG Districts, CHUNG TKIET Province. To accomplish its mission, the Brigade disembarked the MRB and established its Headquarters and Tactical Operations Center inland in the vicinity of VI THAMH. The introduction and operations of the Mobile Riverine Force in the AO marked the first time in the history of the Vietnam War that a major U.S. Force has conducted tactical operations in the southern extremity of the Republic of Vietnam. To date, the operation continues.

d. Combat Support Activities:

(1) Artillery. During the reporting period, the 3-34th Artillery continued its direct support role in MRF operations, employing two of its firing batteries on floating barges. On several occasions the third firing battery was deployed from Dong Tam Base and joined the artillery battalion in support of the Brigade. Since the detachment of the 3-34th Artillery from the Brigade, the artillery support now provided by the battalion remains unchanged. The 3-34th Artillery performs its mission in the same manner of esprit and professionalism as it did when attached to the Brigade. Throughout the period, the Brigade's 4.2 inch mortars (also mounted on barges) were attached to the 3-34th Artillery. The 4.2 mortars barges travel with the 3-34th Arty, and their fires are coordinated by the battalion's fire direction control center to yield the best and maximum fire support for elements of the Brigade. The mortars were constantly employed on counter mortar missions as well as defensive fires and blocking fires for the infantry battalions. Employment of the mortars in this manner assists the artillery battalion in responding to numerous fire missions, and is quite effective during contact missions and canal entrance props which are close to the fire support base. Co-locating the mortars with the artillery present minimum quadrant elevation problems for the firing batteries.

(2) Army Aviation. Throughout the reported period, Army aviation assets substantially assisted the MRF in accomplishing its many missions. Aviation support provided, included light fire teams and assault helicopter companies. When air cavalry units were placed in support of the MRF, their employment enhanced the striking power of the force. Tactical plans and operations were occasionally modified when air assets were not available, diverted or withdrawn from the Brigade to re-allocate for high priority missions. Assault helicopter companies played a major role in positioning ground forces to block, engage and destroy the enemy. Beyond any doubt, air cavalry units demonstrated their initiative to seek out and destroy the enemy. All Army aviation support provided was outstanding throughout the reporting period.

(3) Tactical air support. Air support throughout the reporting period was provided by the 7th U.S. Air Force. Tactical air support provided consisted of preplanned and immediate airstrikes which
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were employed against fleeing enemy forces, fortified positions and in preparation of beaching and landing zones. On several occasions, "Spooky" flare ships, equipped with miniguns, were employed to support and reinforce elements of the Brigade which were in contact during the hours of darkness.

(4) Naval fire support. All combat operations of the MRF are contingent upon introduction into the AO by river assault craft. It is during these riverine movements that assault support boats and troop laden craft are subjected to be ambushed. To minimize the possibility of being ambushed, Naval craft are continuously reconning by fire in known or suspected ambush areas. In addition, Naval fires are always employed in support of the maneuver battalions with direct or indirect fires in zone. However, the MRF has not been able to fully develop detail fire coordinating techniques for employing Naval fires in direct support of ground forces in contact. Thus far, direct fire is limited to "proping" beaches prior to their assault, and suppressing enemy fire directed at the craft or ships of the MRF. Controlling Naval fires is extremely difficult when troops are within their zone of fire.

e. Tactics and Techniques.

(1) The ever present problem of achieving tactical surprise is one of the major considerations in planning for riverine assaults. Unless surprise is achieved, the MRF is likely to find either a "dry hole" or encounter an ambush. The problem becomes especially difficult when MRF operations remain localized in a particular area for a period of time. The VC sometimes organize early warning systems which afford an hour or two advance notice of the MRF's deployment and employment within an AO. New techniques to counter this have been instituted. Pre-dawn landings as well as midday landings have been conducted to break the pattern of assaults. Other measures such as deception, radio silence, deceptive movement by river assault craft and "fake" insertions have been planned and executed to deceive the enemy as to our actual operations, and achieve tactical surprise. Areas of operation are cleared with Vietnamese authorities at the last possible moment in order to reduce the possibility of compromising the operation.

(2) As a result of the increased threat of riverine ambushes, the MRF has revised its counter-ambush procedures during riverine movement. Riverine convoys have increased reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy positions or known ambush sites, where permitted. The installation of the E-8, tactical CS dispenser on river assault craft provides a readily available CS agent for counter-ambush use. The installation of M132 flame turrets on an Armored Troop Carrier ("ZIPPO") provides the MRF with a riverine flamethrower. The Tactical CS dispenser and the "ZIPPO" formed an effective combination for deflating an ambush in conjunction with other fires. The light helicopter fire team (LMFT) providing overhead cover and advanced reconnaissance is in
position to effectively engage the enemy flushed out by the "ZIPPO" and the CS agent.

6. (c) Training:
   a. Individual and unit training was conducted in those areas requiring improvement as determined from previous operations. During the reporting quarter, there were few specified/designated periods for training. The majority of training was conducted during brief periods, when the Brigade rotated its maneuver battalions and/or prepared for future combat operations.

   b. During the month of June, a special presentation was made to officers and NCOs who are responsible for planning and initiating airlift resupply operations. A two hour class on "The techniques of sling loading" was presented to S-4 representatives of the Brigade staff and each maneuver battalion. The scope of the material presented was to familiarize personnel concerned with procedures for resupplying units by air, and new techniques of preparing supplies and equipment for movement by light lift aircraft.

   c. Another special training program was conducted in response to increased command emphasis on care and maintenance of individual and issued weapons. An item of particular interest was the buffer assembly of the M16 rifle. All elements of the Brigade conducted training in care, cleaning, maintenance and inspection of the M16 rifle, and all M16 rifles were provided with new buffers, if required. Subordinate units' weapons training included zeroing of individual weapons, and zeroing, boresighting and familiarization firing of other organic weapons.

   d. Other training conducted by the maneuver battalions included critiques of previous combat operations and classes on:
      - Communications
      - River/Stream crossing techniques
      - Fire and maneuver
      - Preparation of night resupply kits
      - Safety
      - Land navigation
      - Airmobile operations
      - Perimeter defense
      - Medical evacuation
      - Navy customs and courtesy

7. (c) Logistics:
   a. No significant logistical activities occurred during this
reporting period. Logistical and combat service support provided during the period were accomplished on an integrated basis, wherein both Army and Navy requirements were fulfilled in accordance with the established MRF logistical concept. Presently, the logistical support system continues to provide the Brigade and TF 117 with a continuing volume of material, regardless of the disposition of the combined team. Supplies were sent from VUNG TAU by a landing ship, tank (LST) and then transferred to the LST organic to the MRF. The forward detachment of the 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion, embarked on the MRF's LST, continued its direct support mission and distributed supplies as requested. Maintenance and services provided during this period continued with no major problems. The detachment of the 709th Maintenance Battalion shifted its base of operation from the USS ASKARI to the USS SPHINX; the latter temporarily replaces the USS ASKARI as the MRF's maintenance ship.

b. Internal supply and resupply.

(1) All classes of supply and material required for two maneuver battalions were stocked on the support LST. The third maneuver battalion drew the majority of its supplies through Dong Tam. On or about 1 August 1968, the third maneuver battalion will be embarked and its supply activities will be integrated into the MRF's supply system. The aforementioned method has proven to be the most efficient means of procuring and issuing material to the Brigade elements. All items necessary for the Brigade's functioning were transported with the MRF, thereby eliminating unnecessary delays between resupply operations.

(2) Resupply of maneuver battalions, during combat operations, was accomplished by air, water, or a combination of both. Resupply using air assets continues to be the most expeditious and effective mode. During the reporting period, the majority of resupply operations was conducted using a combination of water and air. Kits containing supplies were introduced into the AO by water transportation, and staged at the fire support base. When air assets were available, the resupply kits were flown to the location or night defensive positions of the rifle companies. When air assets were not available, the resupply kits were delivered by assault support craft. Resupply conducted solely by water, was dependent on the disposition of the maneuver battalions; units were required to be positioned in close proximity to navigable waterways.

c. Materiel and Services.

(1) Class I:

Class I supply did not present any serious problems during this reporting period. During the quarter a total of 388,092 meals (combat individual) were issued, reflecting a new peak for both Army and Navy elements. At no time during the quarter did existing
Dong Tam. This transaction was initiated in order to upgrade maintenance required for the boats. The engineer battalion, in turn, is tasked to provide boats, organizational and direct support maintenance to the Brigade. Because of the nature of the MRF's operations, the requirements for boats and engineer (boat) maintenance personnel are such that they must be embarked with the Brigade. Although this policy, to improve maintenance, has not had ample time to be evaluated, several immediate impacts have been experienced: (1) The Brigade presently has less boats available for tactical and administrative use, (2) additional berthing and operational spaces, which are presently limited, must be provided to the engineer maintenance personnel, and (3) centralization of the Boston Whalers will increase transportation requirements to and from Dong Tam Base. Past experience dictates that the most singular factor influencing the operational status of Boston Whalers within the Brigade has been the non-availability of repair parts (specifically transistorized amplifiers). If these transistorized amplifiers were obtained for the ignition system, 70% of the boats on deadlock status would be operational. Presently the Brigade is largely dependent upon limited Navy assets (LCVP's) for administrative transportation within the MRB or to and from a nearby land base when no security is required. Subordinate units of the Brigade are required to coordinate their requests for administrative transportation with the Brigade S-4.

8. (C) Civic Actions:

a. Civil affairs activities were continuously planned and initiated to meet the requirements and limitations imposed by the MRF's organization and employment as a mobile striking force. The following Civic Action Programs were conducted during the period covered by this report.

(1) MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS. The flexibility of the MRF continues to be a decided asset in bringing medical/dental aid to isolated populations of the Mekong Delta. Sixteen MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS were conducted bringing medical and dental relief to four thousand, five hundred and five (4,505) Vietnamese villagers throughout the Mekong Delta.

(2) Commodity Distributions. Operational commitments away from Dong Tam, limited Commodity Distributions to food stuff, health items and school kits. With the exception of MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS coordination was affected with local officials prior to distributing commodities to the populace.

(3) Processing Innocent Civilians. Detainees were consolidated at the MRFs combined tactical screening center (collection point), for immediate exploitation, and later evacuation to Dong Tam for further interrogation, classification and evacuation. The advent of this system reduced significantly the number of personnel classified.
as innocent civilians at the MRF Collection Point. Consequently Civic Action was limited to providing explanations to detainees using tapes and interpreters as to why they were being held, and those classified as IC would be returned to their homes. As an added means of appeasing the personnel they were given health packs and medical treatment as required.

(4) Cordon and Search. On 21 July 1968, a Cordon and Search Operation was conducted on THOI SON ISLAND, DINH TUCONG Province. This operation was conducted in conjunction with the Vietnamese National Police and RF/PF units to clear the island of enemy forces, who use the island as a Rest and Recuperation Center. In an attempt to win the collected personnel over the GVN, a Vietnamese cultural drama team presented an hour show for the local inhabitants. A commodity distribution was made in conjunction with the performance.

(5) Improvement Action Teams. The three teams formed following TET, remained in DINH TUCONG Province to assist in upgrading existing outposts and construct new as required. Senior American Advisors in each province consider the MRF effort to be invaluable in keeping Highway #4 open from the Eastern CAI LAY border to the west (GIAO DUC). During the period the following supplies were requisitioned and distributed: 52 thousand sandbags, 451 rolls of barbed wire, 2,142 rolls of concertina wire, 560 claymores, 87 LAWs, 648 anti-personnel mines, 366 M-26 fragmentation grenades, 120 red star clusters, 26 trip flares, 1679 stakes and 250 pickets.

b. The following limitations were encountered during the reporting period:

(1) Space limitations on assault support boats and air-mobile assets often reduce the effectiveness of civil affairs activities. Civil Affairs teams are normally transported on assault support craft. Oftentimes, the boats must be positioned to provide optimum support of the maneuver battalions; this may not be the most advantageous location from civic action standpoint of view.

(2) Supply space aboard the USS BENVENAH has improved over the past reporting period. However, present storage space will only sustain a two day operation.

c. New and improved procedures.

(1) A MRF Civic action team consisting of the following personnel was formed from assets aboard the USS BENVENAH.

(a) Brigade S-5 (OIC)
(b) Navy medical doctor (1)
(c) Navy dentist (1)
9. (C) Psychological Operations:

a. General: During the reporting period the majority of psychological operations were directed toward enemy units to decrease their combat effectiveness, increase their rate of defections, and demoralize individuals and their units. Additional PSYOPs were directed toward civilians and detainees assembled at the Brigade's Combined Tactical Screening Center. These operations were conducted to explain the presence of U.S. Forces in the area, explain the role of the GVN and soliciting support for its goals, control the civilian populace during MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS, and induce the people of Vietnam to inform on the Viet Cong. In support of these objectives 9,191,960 leaflets were disseminated and 52 hours of loudspeaker time were logged.

b. High altitude leaflet drops were conducted by U-10 aircraft flown by the 5th Air Commando Squadron from Binh Thuy Airfield located in PHONG DINH Province. Leaflets were also disseminated from UH-1B helicopters in conjunction with "people sniffer" missions, and whenever aircraft availability and the tactical situation permitted. The U-10 flights employed approximately 175,000 leaflets per mission, while the UH-1B averaged approximately 30,000 leaflets per mission. Leaflets were distributed to detainees assembled at the Combined Tactical Screening Center, and to local inhabitants within the AOs by ground troops operating therein.

c. Other media employed by the PSYOP field team were loudspeaker missions conducted by both U-10 and UH-1B aircraft, and waterborne speaker missions using the AN/UH15 speaker system mounted temporarily on Naval assault support craft. The U-10 aircraft has a modified speaker system built into the side of the plane, and the UH-1B is used to carry a 1000-watt speaker system which is built on a sled and mounted in the door. The AN/UH15 system, which is only 250 watts, is better than either of the aircraft systems because the broadcast is not distorted. Where as, the sound projected from airborne speakers tend to be distorted when using helicopters. One member of the PSYOP team was
also employed at the Combined Tactical Screening Center during all operations to play JUSPAO tapes to the detainees.

d. Tape and leaflet themes directed toward the VC were Safe Conduct Passes, Twenty More Years of Fighting, Rally or Die, 9th U.S. Infantry Division has returned, Rally-Mother's Sentiment, Diary of a Hoi Chanh, Weapons Reward, Wandering Soul, Rejoin Your Family Through Chieu Hoi, Hanoi is Using You, and Rally to the Green Boats. One of the best booklet type leaflets is the "Diary of a Hoi Chanh" which tells the story of a VC from the time he finds a Chieu Hoi leaflet until he rallies and meets his family at the New Life Hamlet. The booklet is 16 pages long and contains a Safe Conduct Pass and Weapons Reward chart. The "Wandering Soul," a tape in which a dead VC is talking to his wife and family, is also used quite often. VC Bring Death and Mourning, Support GVN, Anti-VC Tax and Food Collection, Explanation of American Presence, VC Force Us to Fire at Your Homes, VC Atrocities and JUSPAO News and Entertainment were the main themes of tapes and leaflets directed toward civilians and detainees.

e. During the reporting period, FSYOP personnel worked in conjunction with the MEDCAP/DENTCAP Teams on many occasions. Go Cong City, Ben Luc City and Cho Gao Village are a few of the places where these MEDCAP/DENTCAP were conducted. FSYOP supported consisted of distributing medical aid leaflets, which describe MEDCAPS and provide instructions on personal hygiene. News and entertainment tapes were also utilized. Interpreters, using portable megaphones, assisted in directing and controlling the civilian populace activities at the MEDCAP/DENTCAP sites.

f. Recently, the Brigade's FSYOP team has lost much of its operational ability as a result of several problem areas. The lack of equipment and replacements items for equipment previously turned-in for maintenance is the predominant problem. An AN/UH15 speaker system, Sony TC-800 Tape Recorder and projector have been on work orders for over a month. Also, regularly scheduled weekly loudspeaker and leaflet missions have been reduced from three per week to one a week, with the exception of equipment borrowed from the Navy, the team has a minimum amount of its organic equipment operational.

g. Two problem areas encountered by the psychological operations team were the absence of creditable intelligence feedback, and the opportunity to work in one area for a sustained period of time. If creditable intelligence information could be obtained indicating the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of psychological operations conducted in a specific AO, the information would assist the FSYOPS team to develop appropriate tape themes for the AO. When detainees have been asked questions as to the effectiveness of psychological Operations activity and material, they seem to be reluctant to give answers. The answers that are given appear to be slanted so as to appease the person who is conducting the interrogation. In order for the civilian populace
to respond freely to the "Voluntary Informant and Weapons Reward Programs," some guarantee of security to prevent reprisals from the enemy must be offered. Due to the intrenched nature of the Brigade, this desired security cannot be provided.

h. Noticeable trends in the PSYOP effort recently have been in the hand dissemination of leaflets by troops in the AO and PSYOP participation on MEDCAPS/DEINTLs. During a recent operation near Can Tho, the PSYOP team made a night insertion into the AO and played tapes to an unidentified number of VC surrounded by friendly forces, as a result of the mission, the team assembled a ground speaker backpack which consists of a 250 watt speaker, an amplifier and a tape recorder. When the tactical situation permits, the backpack is employed within the AO by two members of the team.

16. (C) Chemical:

a. During the reporting period several chemical operations were conducted employing the manpack personnel detector "people sniffer" and E-158 CS Cluster. First operations were limited to those conducted by Naval assault craft supporting combat operations. No chemical defoliation missions were initiated or requested by the MRF during the period.

b. Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD).

(1) The manpack personnel detector, commonly known as the people sniffer, is a machine designed to register ammonia vapors given off by the human body thru the metabolic process. The machine is employed with two individuals in an UH-1D helicopter. The two accompanying personnel are required to monitor the instrument and plot its readings. Indications of human presence (high reading from the machine) are radioed to an airborne FAC, and are subsequently received and processed by the Brigade 0-2. Significant readings do not dictate that a given number of people are present in the area, since ammonia vapors may be present in an area for a period from several hours to days.

(2) The sniffer has been employed as an intelligence gathering device. Best results have been obtained when used early in the morning or after a light rain. The area to be sniffed must be one in which there is a low density of indigenous personnel, since the machine is unable to distinguish between friendly and enemy personnel. It was found that smoke from burning trees or brush will register maximum readings on the machine. It will also pick up and register smoke from artillery or B-52 strikes. Many areas of the Delta are unsatisfactory for sniffing due to large concentrations of native personnel. During a recent operation, maximum readings were obtained in the vicinity of X-384095 for three passes. On the fourth pass the aircraft was engaged and the co-pilot wounded. Troops were deployed to the area and engaged by an estimated VC platoon; results are unknown. It has
been determined that the sniffer is best employed as an area surveillance machine, instead of restricting it to one grid square or short distances. This is because at 60-85 knots the sniffer will register readings about 300 meters beyond the target. One of the largest maintenance problems encountered was the lack of repair parts in-country. Because it is currently an experimental item, all repair parts must be ordered directly from factories in CONUS. This makes the average "down time" for sniffers about three weeks. At the end of the quarter, the Brigade S-2 assumed the responsibility for staff supervision for planning sniffer missions. The S-2 outlines areas for sniffer missions based on other intelligence data collected. Members of the S-2 section will also obtain on-the-job training with the machines, and eventually assist the Brigade chemical officer in employing the machines.

c. E-158 Clusters.

The E-158 CS Cluster can be an effective munition if employed properly with favorable climatic conditions. It is an experimental munition, recently developed and currently being employed in Vietnam. The E-158 CS Cluster has the capability of disseminating enough CS to cover a football field with a good cloud of CS. It has been found that the E-158 is effective when used against troops in bunkers or for flushing personnel out of thick vegetation. The primary limitation encountered is using the E-158 is the weather. Careful consideration must be given to wind conditions. An untimely wind change could bring much discomfort to the troops and place the operation in serious jeopardy. Field protective masks must be worn during any operation, when CS is planned for use. At least one pilot must be wearing a pilot's protective mask while flying on a gas mission. It was found that the agent may rise up to 1000 feet and still cause irritation. It was also learned that weather adversely affects this munition. The timing and initiating mechanisms tend to rust, thereby resulting in "dud" rounds. The munition must be kept in its plastic and foil wrappers until the tactical situation calls for its employment.

d. Employment of flame against enemy positions.

(1) During several operations, MRF units have made contact with enemy elements in fortified positions. During those engagements, when friendly units were in close contact, conventional fire could not be brought close enough to be effective in reducing the fortified positions. In these instances, the use of portable flame throwers (PFT) should be considered. In order to provide this capability each maneuver battalion of the Brigade organized a flame thrower section with the following equipment: four PFTs, one M27 service kit and one 3.5 CFM compressor. One gunner and assistant gunner were trained for each flame thrower.

(2) During this reporting period, the infantry battalions did not employ portable flame throwers. Naval assault boats equipped
With two M-132 flame throwers were employed extensively in support of ground forces and along likely ambush locations. Two factors prevented employment of PFTs; these were maintenance requirement and the cumbersome weight of the PFT. To date the 3-60th Infantry has had four PFTs in maintenance since 21 May 1968. The 3-47th Infantry has one PFT on requisition and three distributed to its companies. The 4-47th Infantry has had three PFTs in maintenance since 21 April 1968. The portable flame thrower has certain limitations which must be considered before its employment. One limitation is its weight (65 lbs loaded) and a second is its firing time (approximately nine seconds). This weapon cannot be back-carried for any extended period of time in the Delta because of its weight. It must be introduced into the AO by aircraft or boat. The nine second firing time demands that the operator choose his target carefully. Once the fuel is expended, the weapon is of no future tactical use and therefore must be extracted from the AO.

11. (C) Signal:

a. During this reporting period, the principal means of communications within the Brigade, and with TF 117 and higher headquarters were FM Voice Radio and a joint (Army-Navy) single side band voice net. Occasionally, re-transmission stations were employed to support and provide communications during combat operations. Re-transmission stations were specifically employed during periods of transit or when the MRF was distance to the area of operation. Communications during this reporting period were excellent, and no major problems occurred. Supplementary communication support was provided by the 9th Signal Battalion.

b. Some of the significant signal activities and improvements made during the period are as follows:

1. An UHF voice net was established in joint tactical operation center. The system was established to provide the Brigade's S-3 Air operation Officer communications with all Army Aviation Assets supporting combat operations. Presently an AN/MRC-107, on temporary loan from the Air Force, is installed to provide this capability; the system will be replaced by an AN/VRC-24 Radio currently on requisition.

2. On 17 June, the Brigade established its station in the Division's single side band voice net. This provides the Brigade an excellent capability to communicate with Division Rear (Camp Martin Cox) and Division Forward (Dong Tam Base) when its disposition is not within effective range of the Division's operations voice net. The single side band voice net was used extensively when the MRF was located in PHONG DINH Province.

c. To alleviate communications on the Brigade's FM tactical voice nets, an AN/MRC-69 terminal was located (installed) on a LCM-8 Boat which is employed at the Brigade's FSB. Activation of the system into a shore nodal point provides telephone voice service to the MRF's
d. Requests for joint operation and numerical codes (US KAC 266 and 270) have been approved for use by the Brigade. The codes will be used in conjunction with TF 117 which is presently using them.
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SECTION II

Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. **PERSONNEL**
   a. Transportation for personnel.

   **Observation.** The MRB has been experiencing difficulties in securing transportation for troop passengers when the MRB is located away from a base which cannot be reached by surface transportation.

   **Evaluation.** Personnel departing the MRB to go on R&R are often delayed several days, and in the past have been unable to arrive in time to depart on their scheduled flights. Personnel departing for DEROS purposes are often delayed, but since they usually leave early, the delay does not affect them as much as those who have to meet a deadline for their flights. For those who have arranged for their wives to meet them at the R&R site, this results in a considerable financial loss, to say nothing of the serious morale problem it creates. Personnel leaving for the purpose of conducting business have waited as long as three days before transportation arrived. At the present time, the order of priority for personnel departing the MRB is as follows: 1. Emergency Leave 2. R&R 3. DEROS 4. Official Business. Since the Brigade usually has only two or three flights per day, only the people with top priority get to leave. In addition, Army Correspondents, key G-2 personnel (Interpreters, etc) and visiting officials receive a top priority rating, second only to those going on emergency leave. During one 7-day period that the MRB was away from Dong Tam, the Brigade averaged 25 departing personnel per day. Only through the cooperation of the S-3 was the Brigade able to divert an airmobile company to the MRB to provide transportation. Personnel returning from leave have the same problem. Recently the Brigade received 60 (replacement, R&R) troops, by ship, who had been waiting at Dong Tam for several days. This again presents a serious morale problem and also reduces the number of people available for use in the field.

   **Recommendation.** That two utility helicopters be placed at the disposal of the 2nd Brigade to alleviate its administrative transportation problems.

2. **OPERATIONS**
   a. Attacking Fortified Positions.

   **Observation.** When conducting operations, in areas where there are known or suspected enemy fortified positions, it is
important to employ the point element of the advancing unit at a reasonable distance so as to force the enemy to disclose his position prematurely.

Evaluation. Fortified positions are mostly always constructed along the edge of tree lines, and are reinforced with mutual supporting firing positions or spider holes. The fortified positions are normally designed with a killing zone in one general direction. The average port of these positions are approximately eighteen (18) to twenty-four (24) inches above the ground level.

If the main body is close enough to be engaged at the same time as the point, there is no need for a point. The point element or scout team must move in advance under the cover of the platoon, usually at the limits of visibility and supportability. The density of the terrain should dictate the distance between the point element and the main body; in close terrain, this is purely a matter of judgement. When the point element is engaged, the ground commander must be aggressive and maneuver his force while supporting by fire. Only the ground commander can determine what distance he can support by fire and still be free to maneuver. In doing so he must realize that fortified positions are attacked by placing direct fire on the embrasures, maneuvering to a flank, blinding the enemy's visibility with artillery (HC) or grenades (WP), and assaulting with flame and explosives. If casualties result during the engagement of the point element, the main body must endeavor to retrieve the wounded but not at the risk of exposing more men foolishly and ignoring the mission of destroying the enemy.

b. (C) Anti Ambush Procedures (Riverine)

Observation. Most ambushes on waterways are established along curves or bends in the river.

Evaluation. An effective anti-ambush measure against ambush positions located near a bend in the river is to employ artillery and airstrikes (preferably napalm) on likely and known positions prior to entering the area. This is not always feasible because of ground clearances and compromising the route of movement. In addition, light helicopter fire teams, when reconning over likely ambush positions, often discourage the enemy to engage troop laden craft. Recent experiences indicates that the enemy prefers to engage assault support craft when gunships are not providing direct coverage during riverine movements. When the assault craft are moving without aerial coverage, it is logical for each assault boat to select an area for reconning by fire or suppressing enemy fires. This provides a greater and more effective dispersion method for returning fire or reconning by fire. Once an ambush is encountered, it is essential to accurately located and mark the ambush. At the same time, all available fires must be brought to bear on the enemy, suppressing his initial fires and discouraging him to continue the ambush.
c. (C) Cultural Drama Team

Observation. A Vietnamese Cultural Drama Team can be used in conjunction with a MEDCAP/DENTCAP and a definite benefit can be obtained.

Evaluation. On past MEDCAP/DENTCAPs there has been a definite lack of control among the civilian populace even through interpreters were present. The civilians have an overwhelming curiosity and will crowd around the doctors and dentists affording them little room in which to work. During a recent CIVAC operation, it was observed that Vietnamese are fond of musical programs. The members of the drama team create a diversion with their skits, and therefore can assist in keeping the people, especially the children, entertained and away from the doctor and dentist. The civilians seem to be greatly enthused by their shows and more control and better working conditions would be created.

Recommendation. The use of a Vietnamese Cultural Drama Team be employed in conjunction with MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS when available.

d. (C) Night Operations (Combat Patrols)

Observation. Commanders and small unit leaders must insure that members of patrols operating in swamps or riverine environment are able to maneuver themselves in the water.

Evaluation. During the conduct of a night ambush patrol five members of the patrol drowned while attempting to embark an assault support patrol boat (ASPB). It was later determined that none of the drowning victims could swim, or was equipped with a lift preserver, Other factors having considerable influence on the incident were:

1. Prior to and during the extraction, the patrol was briefly engaged by enemy small arms fire; this caused both the boat crew and the patrol to be disorganized in executing the extraction.
2. Individual's gear consisted of steel helmets, flack jackets and web gear which hindered the patrol's movement in the water.
3. No prior training had been received in ASPB night boarding procedures.
4. Half of the patrol members wore glasses and the muddy water splashing on their glasses reduced their visability.
5. None of the patrol members wore life jackets.
Operations Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 30 July 1968, Report Control Symbol
CSFORD-65 (R1)

Recommendations.

1. Prior to initiating a patrol in a riverine environment careful consideration should be given to pairing off non-swimmers with strong swimmers, thereby establishing the buddy system. Non-swimmers should be equipped with life jackets.

2. Small boat training, with emphasis on night loading and unloading techniques, should be taught prior to conducting operations involving small craft.

3. Equipment should be tailored to the mission and the environment.

4. A review and rehearsal of all procedures and tactics be made prior to the operation.

5. Employment of the MK-33 Fragmentation Grenade.

Observation. The MK-33 fragmentation grenade may cause self inflicted wounds when improperly employed.

Evaluation. The MK-33 Grenade has an effective casualty producing radius of 30 meters. The grenade is well constructed, and it is a definite asset in destroying the enemy. On several occasions, the grenade has been employed to destroy unoccupied enemy bunkers. However, employment of the grenade in that manner resulted in friendly casualties due to its increased bursting radius. The MK-33 grenade should not be employed as a means for destroying empty bunkers. The grenade is extremely effective for the purpose for which it was designed. The arming device provides ample time for the grenade to be toss and protective measures taken.

Recommendation. That a program of instruction and training be presented in all units concerning employment of the MK-33 fragmentation grenade.

6. Identifying weapons of casualties.

Observation. During medical evacuation from the battle area, weapons of casualties are often mislocated.

Evaluation. The task of recovering weapons from battle casualties has proved to be difficult at intervals. Unnecessary confusion can result in identifying those weapons which are to be evacuated. Sometimes the wrong weapons are collected because of several factors, i.e., the serial number is not readily available, the unit's desire to continue its operation, and the act of redistributing weapons within the unit. A workable solution to alleviate this problem is to mark each weapon with a designated number. The marking can include the unit designation and should be stenciled using paint to preclude
rubbing or wearing off. The weapon can be marked on its stock, making it easily read. Once a weapon has been evacuated, immediate administrative action should be initiated to record its disposition.

3. TRAINING: None.

4. INTELLIGENCE: None.

5. (C) LOGISTICS:

   a. (C) Resupplying Field Units.

      Observation. Resupply activities during combat operations can be expedited if the kits are properly prepared.

      Evaluation. If at all feasible, units should be resupplied prior to the hours of darkness; this will allow units to establish and properly secure a land zone (when receiving resupply by air), and will further permit the unit to displace to a new location after receiving its supplies. When the tactical situation does not permit resupply prior to darkness, units should be provided the essentials of ammunition and rations (to include water). However, the resupply kits must be of the minimum. Frequently the enemy will avoid contact with the ground forces, until they are in the process of receiving night resupply kits. At which time both the ground forces and resupply helicopters are engaged or harassed with small arms and automatic weapons fire. There are many basic procedures that will assist in expediting resupply operations. One which has been emphasized in riverine operations is that of displacing the night resupply kits to a pick up zone in the vicinity of the FSB for subsequent airlift into the AO. The supplies must be neatly arranged and properly marked with the units designation. Prior to initiating resupply by air, the pilots must be briefed as to the units' disposition, frequency and call sign.

6. ORGANIZATION: None

7. OTHER: None
SECTION III

Observation. The Mobile Riverine Force constantly endeavor to achieve the tactical element of surprise when planning and executing strike and riverine operations.

Evaluation. The act of achieving tactical surprise is rarely obtained when early coordination is effected for AO's and specified strike zones. Oftentimes, this early coordination and dissemination of operation plans tend to provide the enemy with the opportunity to obtain advance or prior warning of the intended target or AO. Once an operation is initiated, movement of the river assault craft to and within the AO must be deceptive until the execution of beach assaults by infantry elements. Naturally, deceptive movement to and within the AO is contingent upon existing and navigable waterways. If prior knowledge of the scheme of maneuver is obtained by the enemy, the probability of encountering ambushes along waterways is extremely high. In addition, the maneuver battalions will either find an absence of unit size enemy forces or the remnants of his delaying forces.

There are no concrete solutions for achieving the desired element of surprise. It is realized that the very nature of the enemy and his tactics will not always permit maneuvering elements to locate, fix and destroy him in the most expeditious manner. However, the MRF employs a variety of deceptive measures to deny the enemy a comprehensive evaluation of his tactics. New techniques employed are:

a. Varying the pattern of operations by changing the times of attacks. Pre-dawn landings as well as midday landings are initiated to alter the pattern of attacks.

b. Requesting several or an extremely large AO(s) for each operation planned.

c. Relocating the MRB several kilometers (i.e. 10 or more) from the immediate AO during tactical operations.

d. Deceptive movement of river assault craft to and throughout waterways in AOs other than the intended AO.

e. Executing multiple riverine and airmobile insertions using the "eagle float" and "eagle Flight" techniques respectively.

f. Deploying maneuver battalions into the AO prior to establishment of a FSB. This requires coordination for employment of ARVN or other U.S. artillery fire support for the maneuver battalions until the Brigade's DS unit has established its FSB.

g. Collaborating with sector and district advisors to disseminate deceptive information.
UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. Organic/Assigned Units
   a. HHC, 2nd Brigade
   b. 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry
   c. 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry
   d. 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry

2. Attached Units
   a. 47th Military History Detachment
   b. Team, 10th PSYOP Battalion

3. Direct Support Units
   a. 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery
   b. 1097th Transportation Company (Med. Boat)
   c. 3rd Plt, Co D, 15th Engineer Battalion
   d. Detachment, Co B, 9th Signal Battalion
   e. Detachment, Co D, 9th Medical Battalion
   f. Detachment, Co A, 9th S&T Battalion
   g. Detachment, Co E, 709th Maint Battalion
   h. Detachment, 9th MI Company
   i. Detachment, 2nd Plt, 9th MP Company
   j. Team, Finance Section, 9th Inf Division
   k. Postal Team, AG Section, 9th Inf Division
   l. Team, 18th PIO Detachment

Inclosure 1

UNCLASSIFIED;
**ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL**
(As of 25 July 1968)

**HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE**

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Inclosure 2
### SUBORDINATE UNITS

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GLOSARY OF TERMS

AO . . . . An abbreviation used to designate an area of operations for a combat operation.

Assault Craft (Riverine) . . . . A series of Naval assault craft which provide an important source of direct fire support to the infantry elements, and an efficient means of delivering forces to a targeted area. These craft include:

a. Armored troop carriers (ATCs); each of which can carry an infantry platoon.
b. Monitors; a shallow-draft, heavily armed fire-support boat.
c. Command and Communications Boat (CCB); similar in construction to monitors and capable of providing necessary control facilities to the infantry battalions.
d. Assault Support Patrol Boats (ASPBs); well armed, but faster craft which provide additional direct-fire support to the infantry, conduct interdiction patrols, and assist in riverine blocks.

"ZIPPO" . . . . The "ZIPPO" is a modified Naval assault craft containing two M-132 flame thrower turrets. This is the same flame turret that is mounted on an M-133 mechanized flame thrower. Each flame gun has a maximum range of approximately 180 meters. Four 50 gallon tanks are constructed within the boat to carry 200 gallons of thickened fuel.

MRB . . . . Mobile Riverine Base: Five ships formed a Mobile Riverine Base for the Army - Navy Force, and provide it repair and logistic support, messing and berthing facilities, office space for staff sections, and flight docks for helicopters. Two of the five ships provide control facilities for MRB operations, one of these, the USS Benewah being the principal command and control facility of the force. The five ships of the MRB compose, literally, a base of operations equivalent to a Brigade base camp ashore.

MRF . . . . Mobile Riverine Force: the combined Army - Navy team operating as a mobile strike force in the Mekong Delta.

JTOC . . . . Joint Tactical Operations Center; the combined Army - Navy operations center on the USS Benewah is the nerve center of force activity. It monitors local security operations for the MRB, relays the orders of the force commanders, keeps an up-to-date log of all MRF activities, and coordinates the work of subordinate units.

Inclosure 3
RAS . . . . River Assault Squadron; a squadron is composed of two River Assault Divisions.

RAD . . . . River Assault Division; a Navy unit organized with sufficient river assault craft to support an infantry battalion.

MPD . . . . The manpack personnel detector (MPD) is a machine designed to detect the presence of personnel in an area. The machine is constructed to sample and register the amount of ammonia vapor given off through the metabolic process. The source of ammonia vapor is normally urination or perspiration from human body; the vapors will persist in an area from a few hours to several days, depending on local climatic conditions. The manpack personnel detector is commonly referred to as the "People Sniffer".

E-158 . . . . The E-158 "CS" Cannister Cluster is a munition designed to employ the irritant agent "CS" from fix-wing aircraft or helicopter. The E-158 provides the commander an effective means to disseminate the irritant agent in support of ground forces. It consists of 264 CS cannisters and effectively cover an area about the size of a football field. The E-158 launcher may be employed from heights of 700 to 1400 feet.

CTSC . . . . Combined tactical screening center. A facility established at the Brigade's fire support base where detainees are processed and interrogated.

FSB . . . . Fire Support Base.

MEDCAP . . . . Medical Civic Action Program designed to improve or provide medical assistance to isolate populations of South Vietnam.

DENTCAP . . . . Dental Civic Action Program designed to improve or provide dental assistance to isolated populations of South Vietnam.

IC . . . . . Inert Civilians. Those local inhabitants apprehended during combat operations, who were subsequently released after interrogation.

Health Packs . . . . Commodity packages containing the following: Shower shoes, Washcloths, Soap, Combs, Toothbrush, Toothpaste and a dental hygiene leaflet which are distributed during MEDCAPS/DENTCAPs.

Cultural Drama Team . . . . A group of Vietnamese persons consisting of singers, musicians and comedians who participate with Allied Forces to assist in winning the support of the populace for the GVN.
PSYOPS. . . . Psychological Operations.

CIVAC. . . . Civic Action

RF. . . . Regional Forces, South Vietnam.

PF. . . . Popular Forces, South Vietnam.

Chieu Hoi. . . . The open arms program under which VC are permitted to return to the GVN and be treated as equal citizens instead of prisoners of war.

Hoi Chanh. . . . The name given to a former VC after he has rallied by means of the Chieu Hoi Program.

Impact Team. . . . (Improvement Action Team). A team consists of a lieutenant, NCO and interpreter. The mission of the team is to provide technical and tactical advice necessary to improve and upgrade RF and PF Outposts.
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** FOR OT UT #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
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