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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (20 Nov 68) FOR CT UT 683276 26 November 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR CT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA

The Adjutant General

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Forces Development
DA (ACSFOR, DA)
Washington, DC 20310

1. (C) SECTION I, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
   a. (C) Command:
      (1) General:
      (a) This quarter was characterized by the utilization of the group's assets to provide aviation support throughout the ICTZ. Major activities were highlighted by divisional operations along the mountain ranges bordering the coastal plains from Khe Sanh to Ba To. In support of these divisional operations the three battalions of the group were actively involved with combat assaults, troop lifts, resupply, repositioning of artillery units (including the 155 HOW battery by use of the CH-47B helicopter) and extensive use of the group's visual reconnaissance and surveillance capability.
      (b) Enemy activities: On 27 June and 12 July 68, Marble Mountain Air Facility was attacked by enemy fire with 122mm rockets (8 on 27 June; 9 on 12 July). Resultant damage was the destruction of one building and minor damage to one vehicle. There was no significant aircraft loss or damage during the above attacks.
   b. (U) Mission: 16th CAG continues to remain under operational control of CG, III MAF with the organizational mission of providing command (less operational control), administration, technical supervision and professionalism of all non-divisional US Army units in the ICTZ. There has been no change in this unit's mission during the period covered by this report.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

c. (U) Organization:

(1) Structure:

```
    16th CAG
   /     \
HHC    14th CAB  212th CS/AB
```

(2) Organizational Changes:

(a) The 132nd ASHC was assigned to the 14th CAB on 23 May 68.
(b) The 272nd ASHC was assigned to the 308th CAB on 6 June 68.
(c) The 308th CAB was released from attachment to 16th CAG on 1 July 68, and
    assigned to the 101st Air Cav Div.

(3) Station List: (Inclosure :)

j. (U) Personnel:

(i) Command Relationship

(a) Group Headquarters

CO: Col Daniel G Gust 036330 Thru 3 July
    Col William C Tyrrell 070541 4 July - Present

DCC: LTC Thorveld R Torgerson 069818 Thru 29 June
    LTC Ronnie M Cory 065207 30 June - Present

S1: Maj James A Boyd 0402196

S2: Maj Herdon Godfrey Jr. 01935345 Thru 31 May
    CPT JorJ C Head 05218635 1 June - Present
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 668, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

S3: LTC Rennie M Cory O65207 Thru 29 June
   LTC Milton Benz O1861990 30 June - Present
S4: MAJ Franklin N Harris O89499 Thru - 30 June
   MAJ George P Johanknecht O74734 1 July - Present

(b) Unit Commanders
   14th C&B LTC Ray M Carson OF106541 Thru 6 July
   LTC Charles A Klopp O71820 7 July - Present
   212th CS&J LTC Wilber A Middleton O70141 Thru 13 June 68
   LTC Bernard W Burns O73296 14 June - Present
   308th C&B LTC Charles S Stoen O66513

(2) Unit Strength
   (c) Military
      Subordinate Unit

      NHT Off auth O/H WO auth O/H EM auth O/H Total auth O/H
      17  22   2   3   51   98   70   123

   (b) Civilian

      HHC BIC VN auth O/H 3DMCT Contractor
      0   5   3   0   0

c. (U) Aircraft Status

      UH-1D U-21 OH-6N U-6N

      Auth  2   1   2   1
      O/H   2   1   2   1

f. (C) Operational Results (See Inclosure 2.)
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, GSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

(1) Plans: None

(2) Operations: Group operational activities were coordinated through the three group Army Aviation Elements (MAE) located in the three major headquarters supported by the group. Significant activities occurring during the reporting period for these MAE are outlined below.

(a) MAE, III MAF:

1. Increased support of Prairie Fire operations from the Phu Bai FOB and the evacuation of Kham Duc Special Forces Camp.

2. Establishment of radio relay and command and control aircraft support for Prairie Fire operations.

3. Flight Following and Air/Fire Support Coordination instructions for ICTZ were updated.

4. Helipad directory for ICTZ was updated.

5. Coordinated helicopter support of 1st Marine Division operations Mameluke Thrust, Allen Brook and Swift Saber. These operations involved the clearing of areas 15-20 miles around DaNang.

6. Coordinated helicopter support of operation Eager Yankee in the TF X-Ray area. This operation involved extensive helicopterborne operations in the 3rd Marine Division area.

7. Re-evaluation of aerial surveillance (OV-1) aircraft missions to effect improved support for PCV.

(b) I Corps MAE: Action undertaken by the I Corps MAE during the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968 that are worthy of note follow:

1. Increased VNLF support of SVN combat operations. Close liaison between the I Corps MAE, I Corps G3 Air Advisor and Air Force Advisory Team #5 (AFAT 5) has resulted in a marked increase of VNLF helicopter support of SVN combat operations. VNLF helicopters have participated with 16th Gp Aslt Helicopters in all SVN combat assaults during this reporting period with the exception of one operation where the L2's were not capable of accommodating CH-34 helicopters.
2 Increased helicopter support for Province Advisors. Senior Advisor of Quang Nam Province and Quang Tin Province are now being supported daily by helicopters OPCON to the Commanding Officer, I Corps Advisory Group. Senior Advisors of Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Ngai Provinces are receiving helicopter support from Provisional Corps Vietnam and the American Division on a daily basis. This arrangement for helicopter support of Province Senior Advisors was approved by the Commanding General, III MAF and has resulted in a marked increase of helicopter flying time available to Province Senior Advisors.

(c) JAE, FMAW: The JAE, FMAW was actively engaged in the following significant activities.

1 A UH-1 pilot exchange program between FMAW and 1st ACD (1/9th Cav) was effected during the period 1 May - 10 June 68. The purpose of this program was to evaluate operating procedures of the 1/9th Cav for possible adoption by Marine Forces. Although Marine reports were critical on some areas of operational procedures, they recommended that the exchange program be continued.

2 Operation Duckblind which was in the planning stage for two months became operational on 15 July 68. The Army has provided two officers and one EM to give technical assistance, equipment support and crew training to the Marine personnel involved in the operation.

3 Operation Thor: Army aircraft were used to support this operation as required visual reconnaissance aircraft requirements were beyond the capabilities of Marine assets.

4 The JAE is presently involved in a study to determine the visual reconnaissance/observation requirements for the 1st & 3rd Marine Divisions.

j Conducted briefings for Marine Staff Personnel on the intelligence gathering capabilities of the OV-1 and the capabilities of the OH-6 observation helicopter.

3) Training: None
i. (U) Logistics: None
j. (U) Information: None
k. (U) Surgeon: None
l. (U) Signal: None
m. (U) Aviation Safety:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th C.G. for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

(1) Aviation Safety: The group flew 66,282 hours during the quarter, with an accident rate of 24.13 per 100,000 flying hours. There were sixteen (16) major accidents: ten UH-1s, four O-1s, one OH-6 and one CH-47. Eight were pilot induced, seven were material failures and one was supervisory error.

(2) Total accident experience is as follows:

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2. (U) Section II LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Night target tactical air support.

(a) Observation: Night tactical air support is difficult to obtain.

(b) Evaluation: It is extremely difficult to get responsive night Tactical Air to strike targets developed by Army SLR/Infrared Systems in mountainous terrain. The present USAF/US/USMC team concept only works for targets located on the coastal plains and for most daylight targets. It does not provide the responsiveness and reliability on night missions as that of organic assets.

(c) Recommendation: Evaluate present system for possible renovation to meet the requirement to provide support against night targets developed by night surveillance means.

(2) Aviation assets

(a) Observation: The drain on aviation assets is undermining the mounted warfare capability of III M.F and the ICTZ.

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AVCM-SC
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

(b) Evaluation: Based on a recent USARV study, there is a requirement for four additional AHC in the ICTZ. These Aviation Units are needed to support Fov Corps Vietnam, two ARVN divisions, CORDS and the Special Forces. In addition, one Armed Helicopter Company is needed to support the many US and ARVN operations which frequently extend beyond artillery range of fire bases.

(c) Recommendations:

1 To reduce the deficit of utility helicopters within the ICTZ, an additional four AHC should be assigned to the 16th Combat Aviation Group to provide general support to PCV units, two ARVN divisions, CORDS and the Special Forces.

2 Further recommend that one armed helicopter company be assigned to the 16th Combat Aviation Group for general support of tactical operations within I Corps.

c. (U) Intelligence: None
d. (U) Logistics: None
e. (U) Organizational: None
f. (U) Other
(i) Surgeon
(a) Ballistic Helmets

1 Observation: The greatest problem with the ballistic helmet seems to be in sizing which does not correspond with that of the APH-5. Few can wear the medium-sized ballistic helmet and find it comfortable. This problem has resulted in a near depletion of the stock of large ballistic helmets and an abundance of medium and small sizes.

Evaluation: The role of the ballistic helmet in the prevention of head injury seems to have been fairly well established since its introduction into Vietnam. It has been found, however, that many crew members do not wear this helmet, preferring the older APH-5. The most common reason given for not wearing the ballistic helmet is discomfort. It has been learned that the helmet can be modified for better fit and better wearability with no decrease in protection. By cutting out a semicircle in the polystyrene liner so the earphone can recess more completely, and removing a coil or two of the earphone springs, a more comfortable fit is possible. It also helps to tie the earphones fully out and to use the older sizing pads. A block of wood may be placed between the earguards when the helmet is stored to effect a slight increase in lateral size.
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AVCM-FO
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th C.G for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CSFOR - 65 (HI) (U)

2. Recommendations:
   a. Research be conducted on the ballistic helmet to afford overall wearability.
   b. Individual modifications be made on helmets which may improve the fit.

(b) Field Sanitation Teams

1. Observations: The role of the field sanitation teams in environmental health is an established fact in those remote areas outside fixed installations where PA&E or Public Works does not function.

2. Evaluation: In the fixed base operations where PA&E or Public Works is responsible for environmental health, the field sanitation teams appointed under USARV Reg. 40-19 supplement the major duties of these contractual agencies. On occasion, as recently, PA&E loses certain of these contractual responsibilities and the field sanitation teams become immediately of instrumental importance in the areas of rodent control, insect control and field sanitation. The 16 hour instruction period set up by the surgeons section under the USARV Reg. 40-19 then becomes an invaluable asset in maintaining the health of the command.

2. Recommendations:
   a. That USARV Reg. 40-19 the Field Sanitation Teams continue to be appointed and properly instructed in field and environmental health.
   b. That surgeons make full use of these teams as an invaluable aid, supplemental or primary, in maintaining the health of the command.

3. (U) SECTION III HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION. NONE

WILLIAM C. TITTEL
COLONEL, CE
Commanding Officer

2 Incl
1 16th C.G Sta List
2 16th CAG Operational Results

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AVBA-C (10 Aug 68) 1st "The" 1st "The"

 SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968, ROG CSFOR-65 (P1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96374 5IP-5 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMC-DST,
APO 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: G3OP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 1b, page 1. The 16th Combat Aviation Group's mission is incorrectly stated. Correct mission as stated in the Brigade TOI is to provide aviation support, as directed, to JS, ARVN, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces for the conduct of combat and logistical counterinsurgency operations.

   b. Paragraph 2b(2), page 6. This headquarters is unable to evaluate the requirement for additional AHC in the ICTZ. Assignment priorities for AHC are determined by MACV based on recommendations made by major tactical headquarters.

   c. Paragraph 2f(1)(a), page 7. Research on the anti-fragmentation helmet has been and is being conducted by the appropriate Department of the Army agency. Recommended individual modification to the ballistic helmet is contained in DA MOD 10-8415-202-30/4 which has been reproduced in the October 1967 Supply and Maintenance Letter of the 1st Aviation Brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.
CPT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

9

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)  MAJ Klingman/de/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th CAG for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CMFOR - 65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning aviation assets, page 6, paragraph 2b(2): No additional assault helicopter companies are now available or forecast to be available in the near future.

   b. Reference item concerning ballistic helmets, page 7, paragraph 2f(1)(a): Concur. Research is being conducted on the overall wearability of the ballistic helmet. Modification kits designed to correct deficiencies in helmets currently in RVN have been issued to using units.

   c. Reference item concerning the use and training of field sanitation teams, under the provisions of USAV Regulation 40-19, page 8, paragraph 2f(1)(b): Concur. There is no plan to discontinue this program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 16th CAG
GPOP-DT (10 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 16th Cbt Avn Gp for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AOC
AOC AG
STATION LIST
16th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

Chu Lai:

14th CAB
21st TAC (212th CS.B)
71st AHC
132nd ASHC
176th AHC
178th ASHC

DaNang:

16th CAG
212th CS.B
245th SNC
282nd AHC

Dac Pho:

174th AHC

Hue Thu Boi

131st SNC (212th CS.B)
220th RAC (212th CS.B)
Corps Prov Avn Co (212th CS.B)

Incl 1

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** FOR OT UT #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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