<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD394111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
Best Available Copy
IN REPLY TO
AGAM-P (M) (13 Nov 68) FOR OT RD 683357


SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning self-addressed forms provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Special Warfare School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Commanding Officers
   US Army Limited War Laboratory
   US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
   4th Psychological Operations Group
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

AVCM-G


Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Section I: Operations: (C) Significant Activities (II)

1. (II) Group Headquarters (Saigon)
   
   a. General:

   (1) The Semi-Annual Command inspection of all battalions was conducted 4-13 June 1968 by the 4th PSYOP Group Headquarters staff.

   (2) 4th PSYOF Group, Propaganda Guidelines Pamphlets Number 2, "Development of Leaflets and Posters," and Number 3, "A Systematic Process for Propaganda Development" were published. The pamphlets are being produced in Vietnamese as well as English for distribution to ARVN POLWAR units.

   b. S1/Personnel

   (1) During the reporting period the Group presented 144 awards as follows: 34 Bronze Star Medals for Meritorious Service; 50 Army Commendation Medals for Meritorious Service; 37 Air Medals; 3 Purple Hearts; 3 Vietnamese Armed Forces Honor Medal Second Class.

   (2) During the reporting period, 37 officers departed the Group and 85 officers were assigned, leaving a total of 205 officers assigned.

   (3) Of the 205 officers assigned, 143 (65%) have received prior PSYOP training, 121 (85%) of the PSYOP schooled officers completed the long course while the remaining 22 (15%) completed the short course.

   c. Group Headquarters Propaganda Development Center (PDC)

   (1) 574 leaflets, posters and tapes were reviewed, of which 106 items were determined unsuitable for further use and discontinued. Copies of all

FOR OT RD
683357

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
reviews were sent to PSYOP Battalions and supported/requesting units to provide a basis for improving future propaganda.

(2) A total of 225 documents were translated during the period. Translations included leaflets, posters, confiscated enemy letters, diaries, directives and other media concerning PSYOP.

(3) A total of 707 interviews of NAPs, PWs and others were conducted during the period. Interview requirements included leaflet pretests (4 leaflets; 34 sources), data collection for research studies (3 studies; 281 sources) and special projects (1 questionnaire; 32 sources).

(4) Four in-depth PSYOP interrogations were conducted (Nguyen Van Duc, Executive Officer, 308th Battalion; Le Van Khol, Company Executive Officer and Staff Officer, 308th Battalion; Pham Van Thinh, Squad Leader, 306th Battalion, COL Le Van Ngoc, Commanding Officer, SR-5).

(5) Approval of the "Vietnamese Employee Magazine" was received from PSYOP Directorate, MACV. The magazine, entitled Thong Cam or "Mutual Understanding" is primarily designed to promote the images of US and US in RVN. Publications Printing Center, Japan will print the magazine from final layouts prepared by an editorial staff of the 4th PSYOP Group PDC. For purposes of evaluation the first three issues will be bi-monthly with limited distribution. Publication of the first issue will be completed on 1 October 1968 and distribution is 10,000 copies to Vietnamese employees of US Forces in the Saigon-Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. The publication will be published monthly commencing March 1969 with distribution of 80,000 copies to all Vietnamese employees of US Forces in III CTZ. Distribution will increase to 135,000 copies in May 1969 with distribution to all Vietnamese employees of US Forces in Vietnam.

(6) A three-member civilian research team from Human Sciences Research Corporation (HSR) joined PDC on 2 June 1968 to conduct a study for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) DOD. Its primary task is to determine best methods of applying Vietnamese values data to propaganda. The team is available as time permits to provide professional advice to PDC researchers. The HSR project is tentatively scheduled to last a minimum of 7 to 8 months.

(7) The 8th Behavioral Science Symposium was held on 12 June at the JUSAPO Press Conference Room. Guest speaker was COL Hihnham N. Wakin, head of the USAF Academy Department of Philosophy and currently working on an ARPA sponsored study of the VC infrastructure. COL Wakin spoke on "Science, Philosophy, and Vietnam." The 9th Symposium was held on 9 July at the 4th PSYOP Group Conference Room. Mr. R. Gary Bridge of the General Research Corporation spoke on "Project Echo", a new cross cultural survey technique for discovering behavioral norms, expectations and basis of social influence.
(2) The first monthly Group-wide PDC Conference was held 10 July at Headquarters, 6th PSYOP Battalion, Bien Hoa. Representatives from each PSYOP Battalion attended.

(3) In conjunction with S3, 4th PSYOP Group, "Quick Reaction Teams" were organized within Group Headquarters to provide a quick reaction propaganda development capability to support Capital Military District (CMD) in Saigon. To date 11 quick reaction leaflets, posters and tapes have been developed.

(10) A PSYOP Support Request Form (4th PSYOP Form 2?) was developed and distributed to each PSYOP Battalion. This form standardizes the PSYOP Support request procedure for all units within 4th PSYOP Group. 4th PSYOP Group Regulation 51-4 was formulated to establish policy, responsibilities and instructions concerning the use of the form.

(11) 4th PSYOP Group regulation 51-4, "Newsheets in Special Forces Operations," was completed and distributed to each PSYOP Battalion. The regulation establishes a program for the development of localized newsheets to enhance the work of Special Forces "A" Detachments.

(12) Protest of nine "Peace Talks" slogans was conducted for Psychological Operations Directorate, MACV, and layouts exploiting the three best slogans were developed and submitted to Psychological Operations Directorate. The leaflets will be printed by 7th PSYOP Group in sizes 6x2 inch and 4x2 inch, utilizing previously unused impression areas hence the term "scrap leaflets."

(13) Protest of a Prisoner-of-War "Home Leaflet" was conducted and the leaflet was determined to be acceptable. The report is being finalized and will be forwarded to Psychological Operations Directorate, MACV. Leaflets will be printed in several series listing names of all NVA PWS or KIAs for dissemination in HVN, I CTZ and II CTZ.

(14) A series of five posters exploiting 3 basic themes ("Chieu Hoi," "Support the GVN" and "Peace and Prosperity: When the VC/NVA Are Gone") were developed for Provisional Corps V (PCV). A team was also deployed to PCV to collect information on target audiences and seek recommendations for exploitation from 7th PSYOP Battalion and PSYOP Officer, PCV. Based upon the team's findings 5 posters were developed, tested and provided to the 7th PSYOP Battalion.

(15) A team visited refugee centers in the Saigon/Cholon area and obtained news items and pictures to exploit the refugee situation resulting from the 6 May VC/NVA offensive. Four posters emphasizing assistance by the GVN to refugees and 3 informational newsheets on the war were developed,
(16) Three posters and 1 leaflet were developed for the 59th MP
Group and CHD to support the "Voluntary Informant Program."

(17) A project plan for PSYOP exploitation of the 4th PSYOP Group
Civic program was developed. The purpose of this plan is to develop a
program for integrating PSYOP into Civic Action programs on a Group-wide
basis.

(18) A joint PDC-93 project was initiated to insure quality control
of propaganda materials. The project establishes a system of quality
control from message development through printing.

(19) An experimental tape catalog sheet has been developed by 4th
PSYOP Group. The catalog sheet provides necessary information to catalog
tapes. The catalog sheet is presently being reviewed by the Battalions and
will be finalized upon incorporation of battalion comments.

(20) The following studies and reports were completed during the period:

(a) Guidelines Pamphlet No. 2: "Techniques of Development: Leaflets
and Posters" and Guidelines Pamphlet No. 3: "A Systematic Process for
Propaganda Development." These pamphlets are part of a series being devel-
oped by 4th PSYOP Group for specific application to Vietnam. All pamphlets
are being translated and printed in Vietnamese for distribution to ARVN/
POLWAR units.

(b) "Friction Between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Forces." The
report outlines vulnerabilities for PSYOP exploitation.

(c) "How to Rally." The report, forwarded to Psychological Opera-
tions Directorate on 8 June, reviewed and recommended procedures to
standardize rally instructions.

(d) "CMH PSYOP Campaign." Two campaign plans developed to aid CMH in
increasing the Chieu Hoi rate and eliciting greater support for GVN
within the CMH. Copies were furnished all PSYOP Battalions, MACV and GPWD.

(e) "The August PSYOP Campaign." The plan was developed to provide
general guidance and propaganda materials to each PSYOP Battalion for
implementation during the month of August. Development of propaganda
materials for the three phases of the campaign will be completed 10 August.

(f) Evaluation of the "Psychological Cigarette" (see ORLL for period
Feb-Apr 69). The "Psychological Cigarette" is the name for a small pack
of cigarettes having a PSYOP message printed on the package. Questionnaires
AVG/IC


were administered, the results analyzed and the initial report submitted to ARPA through Psychological Operations Directorate. Evaluation to date indicates the cigarettes and package are effective in conveying a "GVN cares for you" message and enhancing effectiveness of face-to-face communication.

(21) The following studies were initiated or continued during the period:

(a) Development of Color Leaflet Series - Research Survey: "Connotations and Intensities of Colors" (see ORLL for period Feb-Apr 68). The research phase nears completion with over 800 responses to the survey received. A proposal for computer analysis of survey responses was submitted to the MACV Data Management Agency (DNA) and was assigned first priority for computer processing. Manual data tabulation began on 30 July 1966 and preliminary conclusions will be available o/n 1 September 1966. Manual tabulation will serve as a basis to support or refute the value of computer analyses in PSYOP.

(b) Guidelines Pamphlet: "Techniques of Audience Analysis." The initial draft is completed and is being staffed.

(c) Guidelines Pamphlet: "The Psychological Operations Interrogator in Vietnam." The initial draft is completed and is being staffed.

(d) A Study of Unit Defections: The study was changed to "Mass Surrender Case Studies." An interim report analyzed mass surrenders that occurred in World War II and the Korean War. The final report will include analysis of recent mass surrenders in SVN and determine how PSYOP can be used in conjunction with force to better induce mass surrenders.

(e) Background Data for the III CTZ SVN "Surrender Campaign." Background and additional data on the NVN has been compiled and forwarded to the 6th PSYOP Battalion. The data indicates NVN soldiers may be more susceptible to a "surrender or be captured" approach than a "rally" approach.

(f) Psychological Vulnerabilities Resulting From VC Interdiction of Route 4, Dinh Thoang Province: 4th PSYOP Group has provided additional background data to the 10th PSYOP Battalion. Based on this information the Route 4 campaign will be reviewed and updated.

d. S2

(1) A project was initiated to determine feasibility of Group use of the Automated Information Retrieval System at MACV. One system has been activated at Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) and another system, the Information Data Handling System (IDHS), will be activated in
the near future. These systems were developed after it was recognized that there was a need for rapidly and effectively handling large amounts of information processed by military intelligence activities. It will now be possible to store, on microfilm, raw PSYOP intelligence and interrogation reports and to automatically retrieve, upon request, those documents containing information required by Group and Battalion PDC and S2 sections. Arrangements for using the IDHS and CDEC's Automated Information Retrieval System Under J2, MACV were finalized during a conference held with the systems analysts of the Automated Information Retrieval Systems. All requests will be processed through the Research and Analysis Branch of MACPD. All reports on interrogations conducted by this headquarters will be forwarded to J2, MACV to be backed in the IDHS system. The S2 section will maintain a list of all material that is backed by the CDEC and IDHS systems.

(2) There were 403 personnel processed for security clearances.

a. S3

(1) During the reporting period the headquarters printed 302,125,000 leaflets, 326,000 posters and 7,000 newsletters; 236 leaflet bombs were packed for high altitude dissemination. This amounted to a 23.5 increase over production for the previous quarter.

(2) During the period Group Mobile PSYOP Advisory Teams were sent to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Tam An Province and the province CORDS representative Quang Nga Province to assist in establishing effective PSYOP programs in their respective areas of operation.

(3) PSYOP Orientation Courses were conducted in Cam Ranh Bay 17-20 June 1968 for Naval PSYOP personnel from each coastal division and personnel from all "A" teams of the 5th Special Forces Group at Nha Trang, 15-20 July and 22-27 July 1968. In addition the 7th PSYOP Battalion conducted a series of monthly courses for PSYOP personnel in I Corps TZ.

(4) The bi-metal plate process was adapted for use in the 4th Group Printing Plant on 23 June 1968. Since the implementation of this process production has increased and press down-time has decreased. A new monthly production record of 165,114,000 leaflets and 22,515,000 impressions was established for the month of July. In addition there was a 47% reduction in press "down-time."

(5) As of 1 June 1968 this headquarters was assigned a transportation release number by the Traffic Management Agency for in-country leaflet shipments. This allows immediate delivery to the 8th Aerial Port and shortens the transit time by 2 to 3 days.

f. Logistics: USARV has approved the 4th PSYOP Group request for
authorization to initiate and submit requisitions direct through the 2d Logistical Command Counter-Insurgency Support Office Quick Reacting Procurement System (QRP). This alternate requisition system will enable the 4th PSYOP Group to maintain adequate stocks of mission-essential expendable supplies and repair parts. During the last six months, using the QRR system, a substantial draw-down on stocks has occurred which will be corrected by the return to the QRP system.

2. (C) Tactical PSYOP Battalions (U)
   a. (U) 6th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 1).
   b. (C) 7th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 2).
   c. (U) 8th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 3).
   d. (U) 10th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 4).

Section II: (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.


2. Operations:
   a. Headlines on Leaflets:

      (1) OBSERVATION: On occasion, leaflets are being printed without headlines or with headlines which are not adequate.

      (2) EVALUATION: The principle function of a headline is to attract attention and introduce the reader to the text. Without a headline, the reader may be left in doubt as to the idea being presented and lose interest or even become confused.

      (3) RECOMMENDATION: A headline should be used when possible on all leaflets. It should be short and of larger type than used in the text. The headline should suggest to the reader that the text of the leaflet is vitally important to him, thereby creating the necessary interest to read the entire text.

   b. Questions on Survey Questionnaires:

      (1) OBSERVATION: Survey questionnaires frequently contain "double barrelled" questions, requiring two separate answers.

      (2) EVALUATION: Two-part or "double barrelled" questions are frequently confusing to the source, (e.g., "If you were to advise a friend how to
rally, when would you tell him to break contact with his unit and where would you tell him to rally?". Responses are often to only the first part of the question alone, leaving the second unanswered.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Questions on preprinted questionnaires should be short, simple, and deal with one thought, thereby requiring one answer.

c. Personal Messages From Hoi Chanh:

(1) OBSERVATION: Hoi Chanh, when writing a personal message to form the basis of a Chieu Hoi leaflet, will frequently write outside the space allotted to the image area of a leaflet.

(2) EVALUATION: A handwritten message which extends beyond the allotted image area will result in a leaflet with letters or entire words omitted from the final leaflet, detracting from the quality and credibility of the propaganda produced.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Paper on which a Hoi Chanh is to write a personal message should be cut exactly to the image area of the final product or a size in direct proportion to the image area. This technique "forces" the writer to confine his message to the desired space. The end result is a more professional propaganda product.

d. Exploitation of VC Terrorism:

(1) OBSERVATION: There have been many instances of indiscriminate enemy actions against civilian lives and property.

(2) EVALUATION: Extreme caution should be exercised as to whether or not the incident should be exploited in order to prevent a "backlash" reaction (i.e. broadcasting the effects of VC terrorism increasing fearful respect for the VC.)

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Indiscriminate enemy attacks against civilians, causing the loss of lives and property, should be exploited on a "quick reaction" basis only as long as they do not demonstrate the GVN's inability to provide security. For example, a previously advertised terrorist act against a hamlet because the hamlet went "against the orders of the VC," should not be exploited as it demonstrates the GVN's inability to provide security.

3. Training: none.

4. Intelligence: none.
AVCM-C


5. Logistics: none.

6. Organization: (Inclosure 5).

7. Other: none.

Section III: Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: none.

WILLIAM J. PECK
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

5 Incl

1. ORLL, 6th PSYOPS Bn
2. ORLL, 7th PSYOPS Bn
3. ORLL, 8th PSYOPS Bn
4. ORLL, 10th PSYOPS Bn
5. Organization of 4th PSYOPS Group
AMCS-357 (undated) 1st Ind (G)  W. K. Klineiman/dec/11/62 23
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations
Group for Period ending 31 July 1968, Rpt CORP-65 (G)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96575 16 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CHOF-P,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 4th
Psychological Operations Group.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning NOS training, Inclosure 2, (7th PSYOP
Battalion), Section II, paragraph 41: Concur. Headquarters, 2d PSYOP
Group, JFK Center for Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is
the COINC training base for PSYOP teams being deployed to Vietnam. Adequate
opportunity for the pre-deployment training of team members exists in
conjunction with exercises conducted by the Special Warfare School, the
2d Airborne Division, and the 3d PSYOP Group.

b. Reference item concerning motion picture film, Inclosure 2 (7th
PSYOP Battalion), Section II, paragraph 41: Discussion with the group
S-3 disclosed that the films in question are commercial, educational films,
purchased through NAGV or obtained on loan from USIS. The S-3 reported
that the problem discussed in the CRIL no longer exists.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

By furn:
HQ 4th PSYOPS Gp
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th PSYOP Gp for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed. Reference (page 6) paragraph 1f: This headquarters concurred with USARV recommendation to extend the QRP System, and requested approval by DA. Action by DA is pending.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
I. Significant Organisational Activities

A. Personnel

1. Promotions and Awards

a. During this period the Battalion promoted a total of 49 individuals. The breakdown of promotions is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To CPT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 1LT</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 1SG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To SP7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To SSG</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To SGT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To SP5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To SP4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To PFC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During this period the following awards were presented:

- Bronze Star: 6
- Air Medal: 17
- ARCOM: 9
- Certificate of Achievement: 28
- Foreign Awards: 9

2. Vietnamese Civilians

The 6th Battalion is presently authorised 12 Vietnamese civilian personnel. These authorisations include 1 clerk-typist, 1 illustrator, 1 sociologist, 6 personnel in the warehouse, and 3 guard personnel. At the
SUBJECT: Operational Report

present time, 1 illustrator, 3 guards, and 6 warehouse personnel have been hired and are working steadily.

B. Operations

1. Quarterly production totals
   a. Leaflets Printed: 85,916,800
   b. Leaflets Disseminated: 345,417,750
   c. Loudspeaker Hours: 1300 + 30
   d. Total Missions: 1110

2. Operation Tin Tuc (to inform) in which the 6th PSYOP Battalion is committed:

   The 6th PSYOP Battalion, in conjunction with II FFV G-5, started Operation Tin Tuc on the first of July. The operation is scheduled to last two months and is divided into three phases. The first phase is to inform the civilian populace, Viet Cong, and infiltrating NVA troops in III CTZ of the GVN's Chieu Hoi Program. This phase started on the first of July and went through the first of August. Phase two, 2 August through 16 August, is directed at informing the target audience on how to rally, how to become a Hoi Chanh. Phase three, 16 August through 1 September, is the rally phase. It emphasises the "Rally Now Theme." A fourth phase is now being developed and will be a continued and more specific effort at demoralizing and influencing the NVA soldier, in particular, to Chieu Hoi. Thus far, the 6th Battalion has dropped 87,409,000 leaflets and has recorded 478 hours of aerial loudspeaker time in support of this operation.

3. On 6 June, 1968, two HB teams were attached to CMAC to conduct airborne psychological activities in the CMD area of operations. On 15 June, 1968, an additional two-man team arrived for liaison, interrogation, and propaganda development in the CMD AO. Results of psychological activities have been highly successful in the CMD during the months of June and July. The teams have worked closely with the 50th POLWAR Battalion in developing, planning, and interrogations. The American teams have conducted operations exclusively from the air, utilizing U-10 aircraft during the day and the C-47 and UH-1D at night. The 50th POLWAR Battalion has concentrated its efforts exclusively from the ground.

4. As of the 25th of July, the 6th Battalion, in conjunction with CMAC, has a UH-1D chopper assigned to it from II FFV, with priority going to CMAC. This chopper is used for Quick Reaction missions, liaison visits with field teams, quick reaction leaflet deliveries and loudspeaker operations in III Corps Tactical Zone.
AVGM-6C
7 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report

5. Communication with 6th PSYOP field teams is greatly enhanced by using a ANVRC-46 radio. Since telephonic communications is extremely difficult, the Battalion has set-up a radio net utilizing the TOC's at the various units to relay messages to field teams. The radio net is approximately 75% complete and is extremely efficient and reliable.

6. Contact has been made with the Bien Hoa Chieu Hoi Center for the purpose of using mobile PSYOP teams in conjunction with Armed Propaganda teams. The idea was received enthusiastically by CORDS and the Chieu Hoi Camp Commander. This unit will help to train future armed propaganda teams. Future mobile PSYOP teams will be augmented with ten (10) armed propaganda team members, for the purpose of OJT and security. Formal training of these personnel will be conducted at the Bien Hoa Chieu Hoi Center.

7. On the 25th of July, the Battalion provided support for a 3-man team from the Australian Broadcasting Company. The team filmed aerial leaflet dissemination techniques of the U-10 and C-47 aircraft.

C. Training

1. Of the 38 Officers assigned to the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 26 have had formal PSYOP training. This represents 68% of the total number of Officers.

2. At the present time, 11 individuals are taking after-hour study courses.

II. Lessons learned

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations: Field Expedient 250 Watt Loudspeaker

a. Observation: The Field expedient 250 Watt loudspeaker system when properly mounted can be easily carried by one individual and is audible in a range of 300 - 500 meters.

b. Evaluation: The 250 Watt loudspeaker, jungle rucksack mounted, is a system which is easily carried by one individual and weighs less than 40 pounds. Its component parts are; loudspeaker, one cluster 250 Watt, one amplifier audio, one jungle rucksack frame, one BA 386/PRC-25, spare battery should always be carried with this unit, one microphone, one power cable. Mounting is accomplished by the following steps: loudspeakers are strapped to top of rucksack, amplifier minus airborne junction box is strapped to bottom of rucksack, BA 386/PRC-25 is strapped alongside or on top of amplifier, jacks of power cable are connected to loudspeaker and amplifier, the two leads of power cable are plugged into the battery, the white lead into the hole marked TA 215V, the black into -A1,-A2, place the spare BA 386/PRC-25 in between the horns, connect the microphone and the system is ready for broadcasting.

Testing: Company B tested the system under various conditions and
AVGM-6C

SUBJECT: Operational Report

the following results were recorded:

Test #1 - Conditions: weather, raining; speaker about 2 feet from the ground; terrain, flat ground surface. Results: the speaker was audible up to 260 meters; past 260 meters the clarity of the message sharply decreased. At a distance of 300 meters, the message could no longer be understood. Maximum effective range under above conditions: 260 meters.

Test #2 - Conditions: weather, clear; speaker about 6 feet from the ground; terrain, from a ridge to a valley. The message was clear but started to weaken at 500 meters. At 540 meters the message was clear but weak. At 560 meters only portions of words could be understood. Maximum effective range under the above conditions: 540 meters.

c. Recommendations: This field expedient system creates a one-man portable system weighing less than 40 pounds with an effective range of approximately 500 meters under fairly good conditions. The system is accessible to all areas, audible, and should be extensively used in ground operations. During both tests it was found that the amplifier should not be turned above 2; if turned any higher the amplifier will be blown out.

C. Training and Organization:

1. Training of Field Teams

a. Observation: It is impractical for the Battalion's field teams to be present when that Battalion's scheduled classes are given.

b. Evaluation: The Battalion field teams are stationed throughout III Corps, and come in once a month to get paid. Since it is essential to their mission that they stay with the unit which they are attached to it is impractical for them to come back to the Battalion more than once every month.

c. Recommendations: The field team leader should insure that his team members attend training with their assigned units and send back a DF at the end of the month with all of the pertinent information.

D. Intelligence and PDC:

1. Length of leaflet messages

a. Observation: Some leaflet messages are too long and are therefore not read by the VC or NVA.

b. Evaluation: Intelligence and interrogation reports of POW's and Hoi Chanhs state that because of measures taken against them, constant surveillance, indoctrination and threat of reprisals, most VC/NVA soldiers have little opportunity to read lengthy messages on leaflets.
SUBJECT: Operational Report

2. Text of leaflet and tape messages

a. Observation: NVA or VC soldiers are more apt to rally if they are told to do so by a high ranking personality of their unit and if they are guaranteed safety.

b. Evaluation: Combat psychological campaigns were waged with relatively large success in the Capital Military District area in operations during the period of 5 - 23 June. The most successful leaflets and tapes were those developed utilizing high ranking personalities of targeted units and leaflets guaranteeing them safe conduct and assurances for their safety.

Inclosure 1 includes confirmed psychological results. This does not include the total Hoi Chanh/POW figure in the CMD for this period; only those that have been interrogated and have confirmed that psychological broadcasts and/or leaflets influenced them to take desired actions. Inclosures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are those tapes and leaflets which had a result in causing desired enemy action. For every comparison, Inclosure 1 includes leaflets and tape numbers which had direct influence. Those which are most significant are underlined. For English text, see Inclosures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

c. Recommendations: For best results when targeting against a particular unit, every effort should be used to get a high ranking personality of that particular unit, to make a special Chieu Hoi tape or leaflet.

E. Logistics: None

OMER R. GORRELL
Major, Infantry
Commanding

Withdrawn, HQ, DA
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65(R-1)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
ATTN: Force PSYOP Officer
FPO 96602

TO: Commanding Officer
4th PSYOP Group
ATTN: AVGH-C
APO 96307

1. References:
   a. USARV Regulation 525-15, dated April 1968.
   b. Letter, 4th PSYOP Group, Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 17 April 1968.

2. Submitted herewith is the Quarterly Operational Report, Lessons Learned, for the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, prepared in accordance with the above listed references.

3. Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from CLASSIFIED enclosure.

DONALD B KEPER JR
Major Armor
Commanding

WITHDRAWN, HQ, DA

CF:
CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
USARV, ATTN: AVGHC-DST

CONFIDENTIAL
Section II: Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. (U) During the reporting period, the battalion engaged in 26 hours of mandatory training. This included weapons familiarization and gas chamber exercises. A training course was presented to a packet of replacement personnel that arrived at the battalion on 20 May 1968. It included normal replacement training, plus instruction on this unit's organization, mission, capabilities and role in the I Corps Tactical Zone psychological operations program. The entire replacement training program has been finalized and all newly assigned personnel now receive the required training. The battalion was engaged in 92 days of continuous operation during the reporting period.

2. (C) Minor organizational changes were accomplished during the past quarter. The battalion maintenance Section was under the command of the S4 during the previous quarter, and is now under the command of Company B, with the S4 maintaining staff supervision. This has provided a better maintenance program and better vehicle control. The Radio Operations Section has performed primarily in an advisory capacity. As such, it is more advantageous for the S3 to control the section than Company B, and this change was made during the past quarter. The most significant change during the past quarter was accomplished when a packet of approximately 60 replacement personnel arrived on 20 May 1968 from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The packet included personnel with HA, HB, HC, HD and HE team qualifications and they greatly improved the operational capabilities of the battalion. A current organization chart is attached as inclosure #1, and a list of current attachments is attached as inclosure #2.

3. (U) A III Mac Psychological Operations Orientation Course was presented twice, to a total of 64 personnel, who were all newly assigned to psychological operations jobs throughout I Corps. The objectives of the course are to prepare the newly assigned personnel to provide psychological operations advice, to prepare PSYOP plans and campaigns, and to make them aware of the PSYOP support available from the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion. During the previous two courses, emphasis was placed on changing the prevalent idea that units should develop leaflets, and the PSYOP battalion should print them. This attitude is slowly changing, and units are now starting to send in raw intelligence for development into related propaganda.

4. (U) Three primary campaigns were developed during the reporting period. The first was called "The Rice Denial Campaign". Leaflets and posters informing the people of a safe-haven rice storage program, were developed to be utilized in all portions of I Corps. Their rice would be protected by the hamlet, village and district officials. As a part of the program, GVN and allied troops aided in rice protection in all provinces. The entire program was staffed throughout the provinces prior to production. Leaflets and posters utilized in this program are attached as inclosure #3.

The second principal campaign developed and produced by this unit was a "Peace Talks Campaign". This campaign began during the first part of June. As new developments during the peace talks occurred, new leaflets were developed and produced. A letter of instruction was published with the first group of leaflets outlining guides for the use of the leaflets on various target audiences. In addition to 7th PSYOP Battalion leaflets, JUSFAC and 4th PSYOP Group leaflets were utilized in this campaign. Leaflets produced to date for this campaign are attached as inclosure #4. Additional leaflets will be prepared as significant events develop during the peace talks.
The third principal campaign developed by this headquarters was directed against the 2nd NVA Division. This campaign was a pilot project to demonstrate to the allied divisions that improved psychological operations can be accomplished by having the Propaganda Development Center develop leaflets, with the divisions planning the targeting. The first three leaflets developed for this campaign are attached as enclosure #5. This campaign is presently in initial stages and the complete effectiveness is not yet available.

5. (U) During the reporting period the following PSYOP support was provided to units in ICTZ:

a. Ground loudspeaker hours: 2,537:00
b. Motion picture hours: 364:15
c. Motion pictures shown: 596
d. Leaflets printed: 113,912,210
e. Leaflets printed in support of Chieu Hoi: 46,423,000
f. Posters printed: 91,450
g. Total impressions: 21,353,350
h. New leaflets developed: 147
i. Tapes made: 531
j. New tapes developed: 58
k. Sorties flown: 1,044
l. Leaflets dropped: 565,671,300
m. Aerial loudspeaker hours: 1,350:12
n. Leaflets shipped: 953,400

These figures indicate a substantial increase in PSYOP support over the past quarter. Ground loudspeaker time has increased 270 hours. Although motion picture hours decreased, the number of movies shown rose from 553 to 596. This was caused by efforts to reach more people by showing movies to more audiences. A total of 37,418,210 more leaflets were printed this quarter, a 48% production increase over last quarter. Although the Reproduction Section received 6 additional printing presses with the key augmentation, they could not operate any more than 5 presses at any given time due to power limitations. However during the last two months of the quarter the section operated 5 presses at all times, compared to other quarters when they continually lost printing time while 1, 2 or 3 presses were deadlined for repairs. During the next quarter production should increase approximately 80%, if adequate power facilities are secured for this headquarters (See Section II, Part I, Item B8). Aerial loudspeaker hours rose from 730:20 hours to 1,350:12 hours, utilizing the same number of aircraft both quarters. This was accomplished because of better flying weather and a more effective targeting system devised by the Air Operations Section (See Section II, Part I, Item B7). In conjunction with this tremendous increase in psychological operations support, the number of Chieu Hoi has risen from 419 last quarter to 653 this quarter.

6. (U) The battalion was given a semi-annual inspection by the 4th PSYOP Group during the reporting period. The inspection covered all facets of operations, and provided guidance to the principal staff officers concerning their areas of responsibility. An inspection report was published afterwards, and all deficiencies listed were corrected by 1 August 1968. This type of inspection is an excellent method of correcting minor deficiencies before they become major deficiencies.
7. (C) An operation has been prepared and submitted to the 101st Air Cav Division for implementation. The operation would be conducted by the Armed Propaganda Company in the 101st Divisions TACR. The primary objective of this operation is to bring psychological operations, with a "face to face" media, into a VC controlled area. The Armed Propaganda Company, which is composed of former VC, will move into the VC/NVA controlled area and launch an extensive Pro-GVN and Chieu Hoi program. One officer from this battalion will accompany the Armed Propaganda Company, and serve as an advisor throughout the operation. It will last 50 days, and will commence approximately 7 days after the 101st Air Cav Division approves the Operation Order.

8. (U) During the past quarter, this headquarters was responsible for maintaining the PSYOP Support Center (PSC). The primary function of the PSC is to receive, and process requests for psychological operations support from the supported divisions. The PSC assigns priorities to all requests, and conflicts between the PSC and the divisions have to be resolved by the Force PSYOP Officer. As more requests were received, the Force PSYOP Officer became increasingly involved in the assignment of priorities. It was felt that the best solution to this problem was to move the PSC to III MAF so that conflicts in priorities could be resolved as they occurred. Personnel from this battalion continued to work with the PSC for approximately 6 weeks, after which III MAF personnel assumed complete operation of the PSC.

9. (U) The entire health series, leaflets and posters, has been completely revised. The old series, called the "Yellow Hat Series", depicted good health habits, cleanliness, etc., through the use of cartoon figures on leaflets and posters. During a post test, conducted by the FDC Testing and Evaluation Section, it was brought out that many of the Vietnamese did not like these little cartoon characters because they felt it was an insult, i.e. Americans think Vietnamese look like these cartoon representations. The entire program was changed and drawings of Vietnamese men, women and children replaced the cartoon figures. The new series has been named "Health Is Gold", and has been well accepted in all pretests.

20
CONFIDENTIAL

Section II: Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. Personnel

1. (U) MOS Training

   a. OBSERVATION: The personnel that arrived at this headquarters on 20 May 1968 in the 4th packet were, in most instances, MOS qualified.

   b. EVALUATION: The OJT required for personnel that arrived with the 4th packet was minimal. The personnel trained as press operators and press mechanics were completely qualified to perform their duties. Due to a lack of experience, personnel trained as HB Team members (Combat Loudspeaker Teams) required extensive extra training in equipment utilization and employment techniques.

   o. RECOMMENDATION: Personnel on HE and HB Teams should receive training through field exercises prior to assignment to Vietnam.

2. (C) PSTOP Training

   a. OBSERVATION: The HB team leader should be fully qualified to provide psychological operations guidance to the local commander.

   b. EVALUATION: Personnel assigned as HB team leaders are generally not fully qualified to provide guidance to local commanders on matters of psychological significance. The HB team leader is an authorized Staff Sergeant B6 slot, and the slot is very often filled by an Acting Sergeant E4. The HB team provides psychological operations support to combat operations, and, because the team is present when the company or battalion commander realizes he has an opportunity to utilize PSTOP support, the commander often turns to the HB team leader for recommendations and guidance.

   o. RECOMMENDATION: Personnel strength levels of 96B MOS for HB teams should be maintained at the authorized grades. All personnel trained as HB team leaders should attend the psychological operations course at Fort Bragg to attain a solid PSTOP background.

3. (U) Replacement - DERCOS

   a. OBSERVATION: Efforts should be made to ensure replacements have at least 12 months of service remaining prior to reassignment.

   b. EVALUATION: Approximately 20% of the personnel that arrived with the 4th packet had less than 12 months service remaining when they arrived at this headquarters. One individual was a 90 day loss upon arrival. This limits the man's effectiveness and value to this unit.

   o. RECOMMENDATION: Personnel programmed as replacements should be screened to insure they have sufficient time remaining to make an overseas tour worthwhile.

CONFIDENTIAL

21
4. (U) Bank Structure

a. OBSERVATION: In order to properly perform their assigned jobs, personnel should not be over slotted, reference their actual grade.

b. EVALUATION: Generally, a SP4 is not capable of assuming the duties of a Staff Sergeant, and performing all aspects of the job in the most capable manner. In many cases, personnel assigned to the H3 teams with the 4th packet were 2 grades, and, in one case, 3 grades under the authorized grade for the job they were assigned to fill.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In the future, when complete teams are sent to Vietnam, as was the case with the 4th packet, personnel assigned to teams should be the grade authorized by M'CU.

5. (C) Strength Levels

a. OBSERVATION: MOS qualified personnel are not being supplied to meet existing needs.

b. EVALUATION: The HB and HE teams are still understrength in personnel, and still being filled by personnel without the proper MOS, due to the shortage of MOS-qualified personnel to fill the slots. As a result, it has been necessary to pull personnel out of other MOS slots in order to operate the teams. Additionally, there is a shortage of personnel to operate the battalion motor pool, resulting in an operating strength of approximately 50%. Normally, this situation would be acceptable, but 75% of these personnel are 90 day losses.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Additional emphasis be placed on personnel requisitions to fit the existing needs of the unit, and special emphasis be placed on eliminating rotational humps within specific grades and MCS's.

6. (U) Interpreters

a. OBSERVATION: HB and HE teams should have live broadcast capabilities.

b. EVALUATION: It has been recommended that a Vietnamese interpreter be attached to each HB and HE team in order to have live broadcast capabilities at all times.

c. RECOMMENDATION: An interpreter is now attached to each HB and HE team, although a small percentage of them have been relieved of duty with this unit because of failure to meet certain military standards. The majority of them, however, have proven very satisfactory.

B. Operations

1. (U) Motion Picture Film

a. OBSERVATION: HB teams require motion picture film and a higher quality film for operations.

b. EVALUATION: The quantity and quality of film for use by the HB teams in the I Corps area has constantly been a problem area. Currently,
the teams rely primarily on a film supply that is maintained at the American-Vietnamese Cultural Center at province level.

- **RECOMMENDATION:** It is felt that if a FSYCP film supply was made available through chain of command channels, and on a rotating basis between units within the command, it would be a more reliable and a more effective system. This unit is now beginning to deploy the AN/IZQ-85 (Audio-Visual Unit) in the field. It is a very expensive piece of equipment, and without adequate quantity and quality film, the teams will be functioning at much less than their maximum capabilities.

2. **(U) Television Usage**

- **OBSERVATION:** Television can be used as a psychological operations media for spreading the influence of the GVN.

- **EVALUATION:** A commercial type television receiver, using an external generator as a power source, has been effectively utilized by an HE team deployed in a counter-insurgency environment. A portable, versatile mount was made for the television receiver by utilizing a tripod mount from an AN/UDH-5 loudspeaker system and two pieces of lumber.

- **RECOMMENDATION:** The television receiver, as a means of disseminating psychological material, is considered to be very effective. Some considerations prior to utilizing the television include, type and time of programming, credibility established by the television transmitting station. To date, the television receiver has been used primarily in village market locations. There is always a receptive audience available at the market areas. By establishing rapport with the television station personnel, an advanced copy of the weekly programming schedule is provided the HE team.

3. **(U) Revolutionary Development Teams**

- **OBSERVATION:** HE team operations in conjunction with Revolutionary Development (RD) teams.

- **EVALUATION:** The HE team working in Thua Thien province has begun utilizing RD personnel in conjunction with HE missions. Cooperation has been excellent and it is felt that the end result will be rewarding.

- **RECOMMENDATION:** By utilizing the RD team in conjunction with HE operations, certain achievements have been obtained. The RD teams usually work and live in the village the HE team has a mission in. The RD team is especially helpful since many of the village people know them and trust them. Some of the RD personnel that are talented perform before the HE team starts its operations, the RD team utilizing the PA system of the HE equipment. This creates a greater combined community effort and a more receptive audience for HE operations.

4. **(U) Aerial Broadcasts**

- **OBSERVATION:** On occasion, units have attempted to broadcast Chieu Hoi appeals by sending a Hoi Chanh up in an O2B loudspeaker aircraft or a helicopter.
b. EVALUATION: Live broadcasts, using Hoi Chanhs, are undesirable. The vibration from the plane or helicopter motor effects on the ground, it sounds like he is scared which is undesirable to Chieu Hoi appeals. Also, a live broadcast is not desirable because, if the speaker hesitates or changes his appeal, the entire message will be unclear to the target audience.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Hoi Chanhs should make a tape on the ground utilizing a tape recorder, and then this could be rebroadcast.

5. (U) Surveys

a. OBSERVATION: The colors and pictures used on leaflets affect the acceptance of the leaflet by the target audience.

b. EVALUATION: Surveys were conducted to determine the effects of pictures and colors on target audiences. It was discovered that leaflets produced for NVA personnel are more readily accepted if they have a picture on them. Also, leaflets produced for Vietnamese rural audiences (civilian population) should not be multi-color. One or two colors was acceptable, but more than that distracted them from the message.

6. (U) Targeting for Aerial Broadcasting

a. OBSERVATION: By grouping aerial tape targets, a plane can increase broadcasting time without having to increase flying time.

b. EVALUATION: A method was devised by the Air Operations Section whereby aerial tape targets are grouped according to location. The pilots attempt to fly all of the targets grouped together and then attempt to pick up targets that do not fit into any group. In this manner they never have to back-track while picking up all their targets.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Aerial tape targets will be plotted and flown using a grouping by location whenever possible.

7. (U) Requestors Furnish Insufficient Information to FDC

a. OBSERVATION: Many units do not include all available information in their requests for P3YOF support.

b. EVALUATION: Incomplete feeder information limits FDC's ability to determine P3YOF objectives. In other cases, limited target information hampers development of specific vulnerabilities. Whatever the case, quality and effectiveness are reduced.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all organizations and agencies comply with the provisions of USAV Reg 515-7, dated 31 January 1968.

C. Training and Organization

1. (U) Range Firing

a. OBSERVATION: There are limited range facilities in the Danang area.

b. EVALUATION: Due to the limited range facilities available to this headquarters, continual problems were encountered in meeting weapons
qualification requirements. The range facilities utilized last quarter are no longer available.

c. RECOMMENDATION: A range was located through ARVN channels that will be made available to this unit at any time upon 3 days notice.

2. (U) Detachment Training

a. OBSERVATION: Detachment personnel cannot return to headquarters for training.

b. EVALUATION: Detachment personnel located with the supported divisions cannot train with headquarters personnel and cannot train with the divisions as requirements differ in the Marine Divisions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Detachment Commanders are furnished lesson plans for all mandatory training. The Detachment Commanders insure all field personnel receive the required training.

D. Intelligence

(U) Intelligence for PSYOPS

a. OBSERVATION: Intelligence reporting

b. EVALUATION: Intelligence reports are written for tactical use with little or no consideration given to PSYOP intelligence requirements. This results from the fact that Military Intelligence personnel have had little or no PSYOP training and are not familiar with the intelligence requirements of PSYOPS.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Intelligence personnel should be made aware of the provisions of USARV Regulation 515-3 which outlines PSYOP intelligence requirements. In addition, PSYOP units have the capability to analyze information from a PSYOP standpoint. This capability should be utilized by sending "raw" information to PSYOP units for analysis and evaluation.

E. Logistics

1. (U) Lost time due to deadlined vehicles

a. OBSERVATION: This unit has had problems with deadlined vehicles that are located in remote areas where there is no supporting maintenance available.

b. EVALUATION: When an HB team's vehicle becomes deadlined, while it is engaged in an operation in some remote area, it often means weeks of delay in getting the vehicle back to a DSU unit where it can be repaired. In addition, valuable time is lost as the HB team's effectiveness is reduced without the use of its vehicle.

c. RECOMMENDATION: This unit has implemented a quick reaction maintenance team, consisting of two trained mechanics, who are dispatched to the area where the vehicle is deadlined immediately upon notification from the HB team concerned. The initial notification is a telecom consisting
of a preliminary diagnosis of the trouble. The maintenance team will take spare parts that are most likely to be the remedy of the problem. This action permits on the spot repair in most cases and sufficiently reduces the time lost due to deadlined vehicles to a point where the HB team can, in most cases, complete the original operation.

2. (U) Paper Packaging

   a. OBSERVATION: Packaging of paper is not adequate for RVN conditions in open storage.

   b. EVALUATION: Extensive humidity damage has occurred to paper although it is packed in wooden crates. At first this damage was diagnosed as possible imperfections in manufacture and a letter to this effect was submitted to 4th PSYOP Group detailing these problems. Reference letter, "Paper Quality Variations", 4th PSYOP Group dated 8 May 1968. Upon further investigation during the quarter it became apparent that humidity conditions in RVN are causing the paper to swell if not kept in closed storage under dehumidified conditions.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: Since open storage from shipment in CONUS to use in RVN is by necessity the only way the paper can be stored, either a better packaging method should be adopted or a paper, less sensitive to humidity, should be procured for use by PSYOP battalions.

F. Other

1. (U) New Model Printing and Editorial Vans of the Printing Plant Special Warfare Transportable (Light Weight)

   a. OBSERVATION: This unit received six of the new model printing and editorial vans and attempted to connect them in a parallel circuit with the older style vans already in use.

   b. EVALUATION: When the power cables were connected (color to corresponding color) to the old style cables at the terminal box; it was discovered that there existed in the van circuit, a line to ground short. The new vans were disconnected from the circuit and all circuits in the new van circuit were tested for any possible short circuits with negative results. The cable color coding was checked to insure that it was the same as the old style cables.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: In the old style power cable, the line connection for a 3 phase, 208 volt circuit are as follows:

      Black: L1, Red: L2, White: L0, Green: L3

In the new style vans it was discovered that instead of White being L0 or ground it was in actuality L3; and the Green wire was L0; which is completely opposite to the color coding on the older style vans. In order to put the new style vans into operation, the green wire on the old style cable was connected to the white wire in the new style cable. The white wire in the old style cable was connected to the green wire in the new style cable. This action resulted in a correct parallel connection between the old and new style vans.

26
2. (U) Electrical Power

a. OBSERVATION: The standard TOE generators, procured for PSYOP use in Vietnam, have proven inadequate for supporting sustained power requirements.

b. EVALUATION: The present TOE generators of 30KW and 15KW are a constant source of problems due to breakdowns caused primarily because the generators cannot stand up to extended use under loads required to operate battalion resources. Non-availability of spare parts and the extremely slow reaction of the supply system, even under Red Ball procedures, have served to create a situation wherein all TOE generators presently on hand are deadlined at the time this report is being made.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that larger generators be procured with future special warfare sets. Further recommend that battalions be authorized two 100KW generators under some arrangement whereby they could be requisitioned or turned in as conditions dictate, either dispersed or centralized operations. Further recommend that authorizations be obtained from USARV directing supporting engineer units in each Corps area to provide generator power for PSYOP battalions which are presently operating in centralized locations.

Section II: Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part II: Recommendations

A. Recommend the establishment of a Civilian Personnel Office in the Danang area.

B. Recommend a PSYOP film supply be established through 4th PSYOP Group.

C. Recommend battalions be granted special authorization to obtain two 100KW generators.

D. Recommend command emphasis be placed on implementation of USARV Regulation 515-3.
List of Current Detachments

1. Detachment #1 – 1st Marine Division
   a. 3 HB Teams
   b. 1 HE Team

2. Detachment #2 – 3rd Marine Division
   a. 3 HB Teams
   b. 1 HE Team

3. Detachment #3 – Americal Division
   a. 3 HB Teams
   b. 1 HE Team

4. Detachment #4 – 1st Air Cav Division
   a. 3 HB Teams
   b. 1 HE Team

5. Detachment #5 – 101st Air Cav Division
   a. 3 HB Teams
   b. 1 HE Team

6. 7th PSYOP Battalion – B Company Headquarters
   1 HE Team

Incl 2 to Incl 2

29
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
APO San Francisco 96240

AVGM-8C 10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I

   a. General. During the period of this report the battalion re-
      sponded to the needs for on-the-spot collection, collation, and analysis
      of intelligence in the highlands. A Propaganda Development Section (PDS)
      was formed in Company B (Provisional), Pleiku. This section consists of
      the HD Team (Propaganda, Light Mobile Operation), augmented by analysts
      from battalion and locating them in the II Corps, G-2 offices. This
      implements a quality control system for media not before present and
      allows exploitation of ralliers and other tactical needs. Comprehensive
      studies of the highland provinces are now taking shape.

   b. Intelligence. There has been a noticeable reduction of intelligence
      during this period due to the overall lack of contact. During May,
      activities intensified in the northern II Corps highland provinces,
      however by the end of May, and during the following two months, contact
      lessened. The analysts have been capable of devoting attention to media
      quality and credibility as leaflets are being developed for future
      campaigning.

   c. Operations and Training

      (1) Plans

      (2) Operations

      (a) In May, we were faced with the prospects, the rumors, of the
      10 May "Paris Peace Talks." The Saigon offices of JUSPAO devised a
      leaflet to exploit, nationally, the facts of these talks (SF 2590 leaf-
      let number). The battalion was to receive ten million, however,
      problems arose and only six million made their destination. In II Corps
      the 8th Battalion's Propaganda Development Center (PDC) rose to the
task and devised a leaflet basically the same as the JUSPAO leaflet. A total dissemination in support of the talks took place from the 8th of May through the 11th of May; six million, nine hundred-twenty thousand JUSPAO leaflets, and four million, four hundred thousand locally produced leaflets were dropped.

(b) In early May, approximately 4 May, two NVA Hoi Chanhs, in the DAK TO area, stated that political officers were saying that two earlier defectors, Dr. Can and Captain Y, had been psychologically exploited by the Americans and executed. A "Dr. Can" project was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division. The process became a lengthy and uncoordinated project due to its having been initiated outside of the normal channels. Pictures of the now happy Dr. Can and Captain Y were taken in Saigon, statements were prepared by the new life Hoi Chanhs, and tapes were made. By 1 June, two million leaflets had been disseminated over NVA troops in the central highlands.

(c) Two noteworthy projects were initiated in late May. The first saw the installation of a Psychological Support Coordination Center (PSCC) on 25 May. This is a three nation, ROKFV, ARVN, and US, endeavor, wherein media and air support requests are coordinated. Though not having a chief as such, the ARVN Captain is the focal point in the media flow; he monitors the majority of requests and assesses their applicability to his country's and the II Corps tactical needs. The spirit of cooperation encountered is outstanding.

The second project was the initiation of a POLMAR augmentation project wherein a number of POLMAR (ARVN) PSTOFers will be trained with US counterparts in a mutual assistance program. This program really gained momentum in Company B (Provisional), 8th PSTOF Bn (Pleiku) during the second week of June. One officer and four enlisted men from the 20th POLMAR Battalion trained with the company as printers, photographers and an intelligence analyst in the PDS.

(d) On 8 June the 8th Battalion deployed a psychological operations team made up of three elements; (1) PSTOF staff unit, (2) a loudspeaker team, and (3) an Audio Visual team. This team was to support Task Force 3/506 in an operation SW of Dalat City in TUYEN DUC Province. A copy of the after action report is attached as inclosure 1.

(e) The battalion conducted an intensified campaign of PSTOF from 28 June through 10 July. The campaign was in response to an IFFORCEW desire to exploit the suspected movements of NVA units to base areas, establishment of caches guarded by stay behind elements, as well as to exploit several known vulnerabilities. The following are the campaign statistics:
10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 8th Psychological Operations Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, ROC OSFOR-65 (B1)

USAF missions flown 35
Targets hit 119
Aerial speaker hours 37:20
Leaflet dissemination 8,580,200
Number of impressions 1,996,250

(f) During the quarter, the battalion employed 2 loudspeaker (HB) teams in the central highlands and 1 loudspeaker (HB) team on the coast with TF 3/506 and TF South. A total of six audio visual (HE) units were employed. The following units and operations were supported:

- Co B, 5 SFG (A)
- 4 Inf Div
- 173 ABN Bde (Sep)
- 1FFORCE V
- 1FFORCE V (TF 3/506)
- TF SOUTH

Multiple Mobile Strike Force Operation
OPERATION MACARTHUR
OPERATION COCHISE
OPERATION BOLLING II
OPERATION MCLAIN
OPERATION MCLAIN

Numerous quick reaction missions utilizing both leaflets and tape were flown in support of 5 SFG (A) Headquarters and Installation Defense Command, Nha Trang.

(g) Battalion support rendered throughout II CTZ in support of tactical operations and revolutionary development is itemized:

- Leaflets produced 54,968,808
- Newspapers produced 1,798,900
- Posters produced 595,811
- Total impressions (for above) 18,298,273
- Leaflets disseminated 352,638,000
- Aerial speaker hours 1365:31
- Quick Reaction Missions flown 75
- Total air support missions USAF 2065

(3) Training. During the report period, one hundred-fifty five hours of mandatory, maintenance and familiarization training was conducted.

(4) Chemical.

(5) PSTMAR.

(6) Logistics. The battalion has not been able to create the desired supply levels at the battalion level or the company level. One critical item of supply, Gevaert copyrapid, continues to cause the greatest problems. The mobile PSTMAR unit was designed to operate using the pioneer platemaker process, the Gevaert, or Gevacopy plate. The 4th PSTMAR Group has acquired some of these items but the battalion has yet to receive them through the 1st Log channels. At the close of this report period we are being
faced with the possibilities of having to use an expedient measure in order to continue the plate making necessary to accomplish all printing missions. The non-availability of varitypers and headliners is still experienced. The jeepster, ICA audio-visual is in the process of being replaced by the AN/MSQ-85 Mobile Audio Visual Unit.

(b) Personnel. On 23 May a PSYOP packet arrived in Nha Trang. The packet consisted of 4 officers, 4 SSG E6, and 30 enlisted men. The packet had been activated at Ft Bragg, N C, in January 1968. Its hosts were the 2d PSYOP Group and the 15th PSYOP Battalion. Numbered detachments were assigned by CONARC and filler personnel were drawn from the host units. The size and destination for units also came from CONARC. Four weeks of Vietnamese language training, and on-the-job-training to qualify individuals in job specialties were conducted. In general the training appeared to be of value, however the great majority of personnel arriving in the 8th Battalion packet did not possess mission related MOS'. Several personnel arrived in Vietnam with less than four months until DEROS. One officer and 4 enlisted men were drawn down by 4th PSYOP Group and reassigned to another battalion. After interviewing and briefings the packet became distributed into MOS slots, printing teams, and one HE Audio Visual team were assigned intact. The picture which purported to look encouraging dimmed as the June - July rotation of in-country personnel took shape. Final assessment shows that little was gained by the packet except to relieve the immediate problem of printing personnel. The battalion at the close of the period shows some critical areas; 04B (Translators) 11 short, 41K (Repro repairman) 2 short, 71R (Foreign Language Ann) 3 short, 76A (Supplyman) 3 short (none in battalion), and 76L (Projectionist) 4 short. The 96B (Intell Analyst) though not showing as critically short does critically affect the units mission since 8 in team leader positions as E-6 are called for and only one such enlisted man is assigned.

2. Section II, Lessons Learned
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations

   (1) Observations. Aircraft flying PSYOP missions in II CTZ were not attaining their maximum utilisation, particularly in the use of loudspeakers.

   (2) Evaluations. It was determined through a trial period during July, that units were requesting either loudspeaker or leaflet support missions. Often missions requested several days ahead were flown over areas with no enemy due to the rapid changes in the situation.
Other factors were found existent such as; aircraft staying time, need for diversion to answer needs of changing tactical situations, and aircraft load capabilities. As a result of trial and error, our C-47 aircraft are now being loaded near maximum capacity with preplanned target leaflets, and the smaller O2B is being loaded with standard safe conduct passes and general Chieu Hoi material as well as carrying 5 Chieu Hoi tape appeals. Thus a flexibility is built into the system wherein an aircraft scheduled to fly a standard mission is available, with suitable material, to be diverted by using the air frequencies established for a pilot to gain clearance for entry to an area of operation. Our loudspeaker missions we have found are twice that of several months ago, and the number of leaflets dropped has shown numerical increase.

(3) Recommendation. It is recommended therefore that units weigh the possibility of similar utilisation of aircraft in their CTZ with an eye towards improving the aerial reaction to developing situations. Several successful large rally groups have been received through the immediate efforts of employing firepower and PSYOP together.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics: None
f. Other: None

1 Incl

EDMOND A. MERCIER
Major, Armor
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
4 - CO, IFFORCEN, AVFA-OC-OT, APO 96350
2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96596
3 - USARV, ATTN: AVHCC-DST
12 - CO, 4th PSYOP Op, ATTN: AVGM-C
2 - Unit file
SUBJECT: PSYOPS After Action Report of Operation BANJO ROYCE (U)

THRU: Chief, PDC, 8th PSYOP Bn, APO 96240

THRU: XO, 8th PSYOP Bn, APO 96240

TO: CO, 8th PSYOP Bn, APO 96240

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation BANJO ROYCE.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: (PSYOPS), 080600 June 1968 to 180400 June 1968.

3. (U) LOCATION: Tuyen Duc Province, southwest of Dalat City, in an area generally bounded by routes 18 and 20, but never tangent to them.


5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: First Lieutenant Jeffrey D. K. Blume, for First Lieutenant Robert V. Pierce.

6. (U) ORGANIZATION: (PSYOPS)
   a. HE Team, (1 officer, 1 NCO, 1 Interpreter)
   HB Team, (1 NCO, 1 EM)
   Staff Element, (1 officer, 1 Artist, 1 Analyst, 1 Interpreter)
   Armed Propaganda Team, (20 Returnees, 1 American Advisor)

   b. As conceived, the PSYOPS Organization or Propaganda Support Unit (PSU) was to travel with TF 3/506 as a complete PSYOPS "Package" capable of quick reaction with maximum intelligence analysis available for immediate exploitation. The HE Team Leader would serve as the OIC of the PSU and direct all operations. The so-called Staff Element was responsible for sector and district coordination as well as TF 3/506 liaison. The Staff Element was to take on the additional duties of briefing the Task Force CO regularly and making recommendations to both the PSU OIC and TF 3/506th CO for the proper employment of the APT.

7. (U) SUPPORT: TF 3/506: Logistics and Intelligence.
   Sector: Intelligence and Communication.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: Excluded.

Incl 1 to Incl 3 35
9. (U) **MISSION:** I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) directed the 8th PSOP Bn to supply a Propaganda Support Unit (see para. 6b) to TF 3/506 to support the Task Force in all elements of Psychological Operations, to advise the Task Force in all uses of Psychological Operations, and deploy the Armed Propaganda Team in support of the Task Force 3/506 Psychological Operations and Intelligence Objectives.

10. (U) **CONCEPT OF OPERATION:** To accomplish the assigned mission the 8th PSOP Bn PSU flew by C-130 Aircraft from Nha Trang to Dalat's Cam Ly Airfield on 081200 June 68. The Armed Propaganda Team from Binh Dinh Chieu Hoi Service had been picked up at Phu Cat Airbase prior to the aircrafts arrival at Nha Trang. Among the Team's equipment were one 3/4 ton truck and trailer, one GF medium tent, two GF small tents, five HT-1 handphones, three hand carried loudspeakers, one 1,000 watt speaker, one Hurricane Hustler (chute dispenser) and one Jeepster. In addition the sum of 100,000 $VN was provided for the subsistence of the APT, rewards for the APT, and payment of cash for returnees weapons if needed. Certain of these items arrived with RE Team at Cam Ly aboard a separate C-130 Aircraft from Phan Thiet.

11. (U) **EXECUTION:**

a. Method of Operation:

(1) As originally conceived, the Armed Propaganda Team would serve as the basis for all PSYOPS Operations during operation BANJO ROYCE. Ideally the Armed Propaganda Team would move with the headquarters element of the maneuver companies and/or operate in the vicinity of the tactical operations. In the latter case heavy consideration was to be given to the ability of the tactical unit to come to the aid of the Armed Propaganda Team in the event the situation required it.

(2) Leaflet and speaker operations, although by no means secondary, were planned to primarily exploit the findings of the Armed Propaganda Team. Use of both the Hurricane Hustler and 1,000 watt speakers, however, were to be by no means limited to APT support and/or exploitation.

(3) The OIC, PSU was to:

(a) Assume control of the Propaganda Support Unit.

(b) Assume "Command" of the APT and deploy as needed/recommended/ requested.

(c) Coordinate efforts among the elements of the Propaganda Support Unit.

(4) The staff element of the PSU was to:
SUBJECT: PSIOPS After Action Report of Operation BANJO ROYCE (U)

(a) Receive and analyse all current intelligence for exploitation through Psychological Operations.

(b) Accomplish, with the use of artist, interpreter, and analyst, as much of the leaflet development process as possible at location of the Task Force.

(c) Advise the commander of TF 3/506 on the status of the Psychological situation within the AO and make recommendations for use of the PSU.

(d) Advise the OIC, Propaganda Support Unit on the status of the Psychological situation in the AO and make recommendations for use of the PSU.

(e) Coordinate with the Senior Province Advisor and his staff and make recommendations for complementary Province PSYOP operations.

(f) Report to the CO, 8th PSYOP Bn and the CG, IFFV, daily on the status of the PSIOPS Operation.

(g) Provide financial support and rewards for the Armed Propaganda Team.

(5) The HE Team was to: Provide HE Support to PSU.

(b) The PSU initiated operations on 8 Jun 68.

(1) Problems arose because of a lack of population within the area of operations. It was learned that certain Montagnards could be found in the area at infrequent intervals, but their exact location was never known ahead of time. On the second day of operations (9 June 68) TF 3/506 requested a taped message played along the roads where most of the Montagnards had made their homes. The text of the message told the Montagnards to stay out of the forest. The tape - on the assumption it was effective - removed any prospective APT target audience from the area of operations. Proper utilisation of the APT became impossible. If APT operations were to be conducted outside of the AO coordination was necessary with TF 3/506 Province, and Sector. Security, which could no longer be provided by TF 3/506, had to be arranged with sub sector and transportation (choppers were necessary) would, get lower priority from the Task Force once we were outside the area of operations. Foremost among the problems was the fact that we were no longer supporting TF 3/506 directly. Whereas support of TF 3/506 could most certainly be effected outside the AO, these transportation and coordination requirements placed greater strain on TF 3/506 resources as well as sector's. Furthermore, the APT could not be used as conceived and valuable time had to be given while coordination was effected.

(2) On 9, 10 and 11 June, 1968, coordination among the Province Senior Advisor, Senior Province Military Advisor, Province Chief, Duc Trang Sub-sector Advisor, Duc Trang District Chief, Province PSYOP Advisor and TF 3/506 was affected. Coordination was hampered by the fact that because
the roads were insecure and the distance was too great for direct radio
contact, all conversation with Sub-sector required personal visits VIA
helicopter. Sub-sector solved the problem of security by supplying an
11 man Security Intelligence Team.

(3) On Wednesday, 12 June, 1968, with the use of 12 helicopter sorties,
the 11 man security squad and 18 members of the armed propaganda team were
inserted in a PF outpost overlooking the village of Phu Son (VIC AP 9516)
chosen after the unanimous recommendations of the advisors questioned.

Phu Son stood as the last Vietnamese village on Route 1B; not more than
10 Kilometers outside of the TF 3/506 and in an area known to be favored
by the Viet Cong for recruitment of troops. Furthermore it was one of
only three villages of any size within approximately 33 Kilometers of the
AO whose populace was Vietnamese. The unit was extracted VIA Chinook at
151030 June 1968.

(4) (a) The coordination necessary to accomplish the movement of
the APT to Phu Son pointed out the need for coordination well in advance
of any future operations, unless the AO should be expanded to include an
ethnic Vietnamese populace. Coordination, therefore, for movement of the
HE Team to a Montagnard village was begun more than five days in advance.

The village of Phi Liang (spelling not accurate) Vic AP 885241 was chosen
(again the unanimous recommendation of all concerned) because it offered
a situation where VC harassment was high (the village Chief had been kid-
napped on 8 June 1968) morale was low and the village had repeatedly requested
to be moved from the area. With a population of 700 people that meant 700
refugees. The PSU undertook the mission primarily to bolster morale and
to convince the people that they should stay in the village.

(b) It was learned that the Province Chief had been asked repeatedly
to make a trip to the village, but had never done so. In addition neither
the Province nor District Deputy for Minority Affairs had ever visited this
village and their failure to make the trip confirmed the villagers opinion
that the village was unsafe. It was determined to press the possibility
of personal visits by high Province Officials as a sign of confidence in the
villages security and security force. In addition to the normal films and
entertainment, MEDCAP/DENTCAP was scheduled as well.

(c) On Saturday, 15 June 68, at 0900, a Cultural Drama Team of eight, a
MEDCAP and DENTCAP with five people, the Province JUSPAO Advisor, the De-
uty District Advisor for Minority Affairs and four members of the staff
element of the PSU were inserted in Phi Lieng village. At 1000 hours the
audio visual jeepster arrived VIA Chinook with two members of the HE Team.
On the ground at the time of arrival were the Assistant Sector Advisor and
Training School Advisor. After two hours of entertainment by the Cultural
Drama Team, two hours of movies, and a continual MEDCAP/DENTCAP, the Pro-
vince Chief, Senior Province Advisor, Deputy Province Chief for Minority
Affairs, District Chief and District Advisor were inserted. About 40% of
the village was present for the presentation of the new GVN flag (supplied
SUBJECT: PSTOPS After Action Report of Operation BANJO ROYCE (U)

by the PSU Team), and a heated propaganda lecture by the Province Chief. In addition the Province Chief spent 45 minutes with most of the PF troops in the village (the remainder made up five patrols that continuously surrounded the village), and discussed the possibility of their receiving an officer to command the unit. At 1630 hours all elements were extracted.

(5) Further coordination for continued use of the APT and PSU Teams was underway on 17 June 68 when it was learned that TF 3/506 was due to leave the province in a matter of hours. All plans were cancelled on 170900 June 68.

(6) During the period 8 - 17 June 1968, very little contact was made by TF 3/506 and intelligence was not great. Standard use of loudspeaker and leaflet operations were hampered by the lack of knowledge of enemy's whereabouts or vulnerabilities. On 10 June 68, 101st Airborne Division "Informant Leaflets" were dropped along the populated areas of highways 1B and 20. The following day the same message was dropped in Koho in the Montagnard areas of the same highways. On June 16 and 17 Safe Conduct Passes were dropped throughout the AO VIA C-47 Aircraft and on 17 June 68 a Chieu Hoi mix was dropped VIC BPO25175 (center of mass).

12. (U) RESULTS:

a. The 8th PSTOP Battalion PSU accomplished its assigned mission of supporting Task Force 3/506 in all elements of Psychological Operations.

b. The following statistics are appropriate:

| Returnees | none |
| Leaflets dropped | 1,865,000 |
| Loudspeaker hours | 3 |
| Face to Face Contacts | approximately 3,000 |
| Handbills Distributed | 7,000 |
| Interrogations | 4 |
| Posters distributed | 1,000 |
| Movie Audience | 400 |
| Movie hours | 2 |
| Teeth pulled | 150 |
| Medical patients | 201 |

c. It should be noted here that the emphasis was on face-to-face communication and use of the APT. Hindering proper distribution of leaflets and speaker time was the absence of enemy within the area of operation and poor intelligence outside the area of operation. The PSU did learn of the base camp of a suspected two battalions which was outside the area of operations. Because we were in the process of departing the province at the time the information was passed on to the local province officials for their exploitation.

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES:
a. The HT-1 handphones supplied by Chieu Hoi Division were used very effectively to allow maximum saturation of a village or hamlet by the APT while still in close touch with the commander. In addition they permitted coordination between “forward elements” of the APT and local PF outposts.

b. Problems arose as to the methods of shipment of the Jeepster. Chinook helicopter was necessary but the problems of slinging the vehicle under the chopper were solved when it was found that with tire pressure reduced to about 10 lbs/sq in, the vehicle was capable of driving into the Chinook. This method of course, requires that the vehicle be inserted within a few hundred yards of its destination or where there is a two and \(\frac{1}{2}\) ton truck available to reinflate the tires.

c. The use of artist and analyst in the field was effective on one occasion. Rarely could the analyst be used as such because the intelligence was so limited. The artist was used to great advantage once however, in the designing of a Montagnard leaflet in Koho. Because the Battalion Headquarters was known to have interpreters the leaflet was entirely laid up in Koho in the field and sent to Nha Trang VIA courier ready for platemaking. The result was a leaflet which was disseminated within 24 hours. There could be some questions raised as to whether this one instance justified the addition of two individuals to the team. It could probably be shown that the cost of keeping these two individuals on the team for an extended length of time was greater than the cost of a Koho interpreter at battalion headquarters.

15. (U) **ANALYSIS**

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Item: Time wasted in coordination.

(a) Discussion: As has been pointed out much time was unnecessarily wasted after realising that there was no populace in the area of operation. Compounding the problem was the relatively poor radio communications network throughout the province. Both US and ARVN chains of command were involved - and in the latter case particularly - obscure. Adding to the problem was the fact that the forward Tactical Operations Control Center for TF 3/506 was not in Dalat and a minimum of four hours was lost each time a visit was made for coordination purposes. As has been shown, the APT was operational barely 40% of the time they were in the field.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Any future PSU should send the staff element ahead at least one week prior to D-Day. His target should be a complete PSXOPS intelligence analysis and close coordination with province and tactical units on the operation. Every effort should be directed to the accomplishment of both tactical unit and province objectives. Furthermore - and particularly in the highlands - the ethnic varieties within the local populace and PSXOPS priorities for those ethnic varieties should
be established before choosing the makeup of any Armed Propaganda Team.

(2) Item: Theft among the APT.

(a) Discussion: The Armed Propaganda Team consistently claimed and sometimes demanded that items issued to them for the operation were their property. Among these items were 45 blankets and 20 sweaters. Other items such as pots, pans and hammocks might be considered their property as they were purchased by Chieu Hoi Division funds. The latter two items were left with the APT because it might be interpreted as their property. The blankets, as they were not the property of either the PSU or the APT, were forced from them - only to be subsequently stolen back within 10 minutes. In addition the APT stole some pickets belonging to the S-3 TF 3/506. Fortunately in the latter case there were additional pickets available to the S-3 and any problem was averted.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: All items necessary for an operation with an APT should be issued by the local Chieu Hoi Division authorities. The responsible individual should check with local authorities at least 5 days in advance and outline the needs of the APT. In instances such as this where advance issuance of blankets in the summer months would only serve to give away the possible areas of operation in advance, American channels should be used to prepare the proper supplying of the Armed Propaganda Team. These American channels to go down to at least the local Chieu Hoi Advisor.

(3) Item: APT, ill-suited for any but the most secure field work.

(a) Discussion: The Armed Propaganda Team refused on at least one occasion to enter a hamlet reportedly friendly to the VC. Only after the Armed Propaganda Team American "commander" walked about 50 yards ahead would they follow. At the time they had with them one security squad of 11 men and there was also an excellent PF company within ten minutes walk from the village.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: It is possible that the unfamiliarity with Tuyen Duc Province was in part the cause for the behavior. In addition, the individuals involved, although not new to APT operations, had had much time off in the previous few days and had received considerable attention and response to their desires. Where possible APT's that ac
company a mission such as this one, where work in the field is often for three or four days, should be chosen for their experience and familiarity with the locale.

(4) Item: APT: Wanted too much money.

(a) Discussion: On more than one occasion the APT demanded (but did not get) more money than thought necessary by the team leaders. In fact the first ten days their American Advisor (who had been given money for their subsistence) spent 15,000VN on them. This was in addition to more than 500 pounds of vegetables that had been supplied by the local procurement officials free of charge. On one occasion they bought three chickens at a cost of 700VN each. After the departure of the American Advisor the APT told the PSU staff officer that his men would need 100VN per man per day in addition to some 40 kilograms of rice already in their possession. The problem was solved when the PSU staff member suggested that if 50VN per day per man was not enough that they should produce receipts proving it. Although the financial problem was solved there existed a rift between American and APT elements of the PSU.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Local Chieu Hoi officials should stress prior to any operation and prior to meeting the Americans the amounts of money they will be authorized for subsistence.

b. Notes:

(1) Cooperation received from TF 3/506 was excellent. Although no figure is available there was an estimated 50 hours of chopper time allotted the PSU.

JEFFREY D. K. BLUME
1LT, Infantry
Asst Chief, PDC
AVSM-10

15 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1968

Senior Advisor
IV OTZ
ATTN: G-3 Advisor
APO San Francisco 96215

1. Reference: USARV Regulation 525-15 dated April 1968

2. Significant Activities

a. Historical Activities

(1) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1968, this unit received 25 officers and 71 enlisted men. Within the same period, one officer and 21 enlisted men departed.

(2) On 20 May 1968, a PSTOP packet was detached from the 2d PSTOP Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for assignment to this battalion. The packet included eight officers and 46 enlisted men. Two sets of light mobile printing equipment were shipped separately, and arrived during the first week in June. With the addition of two printing presses and the replacement of two old presses, the total printing output was three times greater than the preceding quarter. Currently, the battalion has four operational presses. By 15 June 1968, packet personnel had completed processing and were on duty in their respective assignments, either with field teams or the headquarters. During the latter part of July, seven light mobile audio/visual units (MSQ-85) were received. This unit has movie and slide projectors and recording and loudspeaker capabilities. The MSQ-85's were sent to the field teams.

b. This report period covers 92 days; training was conducted on 13. Of the 92 reporting days in this quarter, 92 were duty days.

c. The IV Corps Campaign to instill an aggressive spirit in military, psychological and social welfare programs was officially terminated 14 June 1968. The success of the campaign (designated Truong Cong Dinh) was reflected by the increased motivation and aggressive spirit displayed within ARVN units. A new campaign in IV OTZ has been designated "Quyet Chien" (Trans: Determined To Win). The campaign will be directed toward the friendly military and civilian population. The theme is designed...
to create renewed enthusiasm toward improving social, economic, and political conditions. This battalion will assist within operational capabilities.

d. Operation Kon Tiki

(1) Sealed plastic bags containing the rural magazine "Hong jue," a newspaper "Tu Do," propaganda leaflets, a Vietnamese flag, and small miscellaneous gifts were set adrift in Delta waterways leading into VC controlled areas.

(2) The objective of the operation was to overcome the measures employed by the VC to limit the effect of leaflet and loudspeaker propaganda.

(3) The operation was completed as initially planned. On 15 May 1968, from 0400 through 0615 hours, 153,000 plastic bags were disseminated. Area of dissemination included 43 points within 11 provinces. A total of 85 Navy PBR's participated in the operation. Following the distribution phase, aerial and ground observation teams were sent into the target areas to determine if the bags were picked up. The observation teams reported no bags sighted.

(4) Feedback was received from the following provinces:

(a) Vinh Long reported the bags penetrated parts of the Viet Cong infested areas along the Mang Thit-Nicolai canal.

(b) Kien Hoa reported 500 bags were picked up by an unknown individual.

(c) Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support/Psychological Operations Division IV Corps reported the operation may have contributed to the increased Chieu Hoi rate which followed the operation and continued for two weeks.

(d) A Boi Chaah from Phong Dinh Province, interrogated at the Phong Dinh Sector Chieu Hoi Center, stated, "I read a directive ordering me to inform the people in my area not to touch the bags because they were poison." He further stated he had not seen any of the bags in his area.

(5) Results of the operation were inconclusive; however, the following areas for improvement were noted and will be considered in a follow-up operation:

(a) The distribution area should be smaller to effect tighter control.
CIU OBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1968

(b) Chieu Hoi themes should be specific rather than general.

(c) Extensive coordination should be effected to obtain maximum feedback.

(6) The initiation date for the follow-up operation has not been determined.

e. Shopping Bag Campaign

(1) A CORDS/POD IV Corps psychological operations campaign designated "Shopping Bag Campaign" has been developed. Small paper bags are to be overprinted with propaganda messages and disseminated to market place vendors. Goods purchased from the vendors will be placed in the bags.

(2) The objective of the campaign is to infiltrate propaganda into VC infested areas.

(3) In support of the campaign the battalion has developed and printed Chieu Hoi and National Police messages. Themes are:

(a) Cooperate with the National Police

(b) Chieu Hoi to a better way of life

(4) A third theme is being developed to encourage participation in civil defense organizations.

(5) Initially, 60,000 bags (20,000 per theme) will be disseminated. Upon receipt of feedback indicating positive effectiveness, the battalion will continue to develop and print messages in support of the campaign.

f. The battalion, in support of CORDS/POD IV Corps Public Health, has printed two pamphlets to be used in conjunction with health education classes in the IV Corps area.

(1) The first pamphlet was designed to acquaint elementary school teachers with the various visual signs and behavioral patterns which indicate poor health in young children. In addition to the pamphlets, teachers were given instructions explaining what medical problems are indicated by these signs or symptoms, and what courses of action should be taken to alleviate these problems.

(2) The second pamphlet concerns venereal diseases. It covers the subjects of: symptoms of venereal diseases, preventative measures to be taken against venereal diseases, and the dangers encountered when venereal diseases are not properly treated.
The National Route 4 Campaign

(1) The Dinh Tuong National Route 4 project to prevent Viet Cong interdiction of Route 4 continues. The objective of the psychological operations campaign in support of the project has been to convince the civilian population of the value of the road and the necessity for keeping it open.

(2) The most successful PSYOP support has been face-to-face communication of themes stressing the value of the road to the people. Leaflets, posters, handbills, and loudspeakers have been utilized to reinforce the themes. Battalion field teams have reported that civilian reports on VC activities and locations of VC weapons caches have increased. In one instance, civilians removed a VC road block and destroyed VC propaganda in the surrounding area.

(3) Based on the apparent success in Dinh Tuong, a CORPS/POD IV Corps psychological operations campaign plan has been developed to support the opening of the road throughout the IV CTZ area.

(4) This battalion will provide support to the provinces as required. Recommended themes for employment in propaganda media are:

(a) Target: Civilians

1. Volunteer information on VC activities
2. Your support is necessary to keep Route 4 open
3. The road is important to you
4. The VC destroy the road to hurt the people

(b) Target: VC

1. You have lost the support of the people
2. The GVN is too powerful to be defeated
3. Your leaders have misled and deceived their own people and sacrificed them needlessly in efforts to close Route 4
4. The Chieu Hoi program offers you a productive life
AVQCM-10
SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1968

(a) Additional support will be provided to prepare RF/PP units for the assumption of responsibility for security of Route 4 in the event of ARVN/US unit departure. Themes will be directed toward building the image of the RF/PP units.

h. In support of a forthcoming CORDS/POD psychological operations campaign, a battalion area assessment team was dispatched to Phu Quoc Island. The team conducted an area study from 17 July through 8 August 1968. Information obtained is being compiled into an area assessment which will provide the basis for the CORDS/POD campaign.

1. Radio and Television Advisory Team

(1) On 26 May 1968, a Radio Engineer officer from this battalion began advisory duties with the IV Corps radio and television station located in Can Tho. The advisor assisted in establishing training programs in proper technical operations and acted as liaison with the CORDS IV CTZ radio engineer.

(2) On 1 July 1968, two enlisted radio and television technicians were attached from the 4th PSTOP Group HQ to complete the advisory team. The advisory team supervised the installation of a microwave program link between the studio and the transmitter and began the final training phases in preparation for station operation.

(3) The battalion has developed and will print an advertisement poster and a television guide to be used in conjunction with the opening of the station.

(4) The TV station will become operational during the latter part of August 1968.

J. Summary of Operations

(1) Leaflet/Poster Requests: 416

(2) Items Printed: 34,265,110

(a) Leaflets: 33,394,110

(b) Posters: 859,800

1 Four color: 152,500

2 Three color: 93,500
AVGM-10

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1968

1 Two color: 66,500
2 One color: 547,300
3) Newspapers: 10,000
4) Booklets: 1,200
5) Impressions: 13,445,000
6) Air sorties: 1,753
7) Leaflets Disseminated: 342,250,000
8) Loudspeaker Hours: 378

3. Lessons Learned: None

ROBERT J. HEMPTON JR
Major Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION
3 SA, IV CTZ, ATTN: G-3 Advisor
2 CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DE APO SF 96558
3 USAV, ATTN: AVGC-DST
12 4th PSYOP Gp, ATTN: AVGM-C
2 File
4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP

ORGANIZATION CHART

HQ
4TH PSYOP GP
TOE 33-500F

HQ
6TH PSYOP BN
TOE 33-500F

HQ
7TH PSYOP BN
TOE 33-500F

HQ
8TH PSYOP BN
TOE 33-500F

HQ
10TH PSYOP BN
TOE 33-500F
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM 1</th>
<th>* SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>** FOR OT RD #</th>
<th>*** PAGE #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 2</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 3</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 4</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 5</td>
<td>SUBJECT TITLE</td>
<td>FOR OT RD #</td>
<td>PAGE #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310
Operational Report - Lessons Learned HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CO, 4th Psychological Operations Group