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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Support, Thailand (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Support, Thailand for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
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UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT
THAILAND

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96233

OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967
SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD D1R 3200.10

HQ USARPAC
5-67-1371
US ARMY THAI
120/THAO-CD
FEB 67

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17 FEB 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (RECS CSFOR - 65)

THRU: CINCUSARPAC
ATTN: GPCPL-OT
APO 96558

TO: ACSFOR
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Attached for your review and evaluation is the Quarterly Operational
Report for the period ending 31 January 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S.V. CAREY
Captain AGC
Asst Adjutant General

INCL

1

DOD CONTROL
NO 9-441

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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K' Headquartes
United States Army Support, Thailand
San Francisco 96223

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 67)

1. (O) GENERAL:

a. Since this report constitutes the first quarterly operational report for Headquarters, USSARYPTHAI, this general paragraph is included to provide a chronology of events from initial discussion on the establishment of this Headquarters to the end of the present reporting period. References to SECRET documents mentioned below are annotated at "REFERENCE". Security regulations governing local reproduction of classified material precluded their inclusion in this report.

b. The inception of Headquarters, United States Army Support, Thailand extends back to late 1965 and a proposal by Major General Richard G. Stilwell, Commanding General United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand. In a letter to JUSPAC on 16 January 1966 (Ref 1), General Stilwell officially enumerated his reasons for having a "small U.S. Army control headquarters to which all Army units... may be assigned." JUSPAC was concerned over the lack of an Army component headquarters in the event of expanded U.S. military operations in Thailand and Laos. On his own authority, General Stilwell had a proposal TD forwarded from his headquarters to USARPAC and called for a meeting in Bangkok on 28 January 1966 of representatives of COMTHIL, 9th Logistic Command (9LOGC), USARRC, and IX Corps (USARPAC gave immediate concurrence to General Stilwell's request as evidenced by their rapid response in the tasking of IX Corps Headquarters on Okinawa to prepare to assume the mission (Ref D and incl 17). The meeting in Bangkok constituted the initial planning for development of a ground component headquarters to be called United States Army Control, Thailand (USARCTHAI).

c. Headquarters IX Corps had been assigned to Okinawa since February 1956. Ten years later, at reduced strength, it provided USARPAC with the nucleus for a Corps-level headquarters to execute contingency operational missions as required with priority to unilateral and SAW operations in the Thailand/Laos area. It was in the right part of the world at the right time and, perhaps most important, it was the right size with regard to personnel space authorizations. IX Corps was reorganized to virtually zero strength (see incls 2 & 3), and 133 of its spaces were employed to organize Headquarters and Headquarters Company, USARCTHAI, by USARPAC General Orders 88 and 89, effective 25 April 1966, and Colonel Francis W. O'Brien, then IX Corps Chief of Staff, assumed command (see incls 4 & 5). The new headquarters met its readiness date of 15 June 1966.
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15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

a. The delay from organization in April to deployment in October revealed some interesting political sidelights with regard to employment of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia at that time. Ambassador Graham Martin concurred in the need for a control headquarters in January and reaffirmed his approval in April but wanted the Royal Thai Government's concurrence and instructions from our State Department (Ref B) before he would grant in-country clearance. State responded favorably in April, but the Thais seemed reluctant. This reluctance was not entirely bureaucratic red-tape but extended all the way to the Prime Minister level (see incl 6). Clearance was finally received on 23 September 1966 with instructions that the organization be redesignated United States Army Support, Thailand (USRSUPTHI) (see incl 7). The reason for hesitancy on the part of the Royal Thai Government in granting country clearance was never absolutely determined. The general opinion among U.S. officers, however, was that Thai authorities objected to the word "Control" in the new organization's title and feared that it might appear to the public that the United States was taking over operations in their own country.

c. Upon approval by Department of the Army, the final movement directives were prepared by USARPAC and USARYIS with a closure date for the unit of 15 November 1966. The first echelon, consisting of nineteen officers and twenty-eight enlisted men, arrived in Korat on 17 October 1966. Movement of vehicles and equipment departed on 19 October 1966; the second echelon departed Chinnam by air on 10 November 1966 while the rear detachment met the 15 November closure date.

d. USARPAC General Order 247 (see incl 8), dated 27 October 1966, assigned USRSUPTHI to USARPAC effective 1 November 1966 with operational control vested in COMUSOTHIII.

e. With the organization on such an austere strength basis, the Headquarters had certain limitations which hampered the assumption of all Army component responsibilities (see incl 9). In order to assume all command responsibilities, significant augmentations were required in sections such as the Adjutant General, Inspector General, G-4, Comptroller, Chaplain, Provost Marshal, and Special Services. A plan for a modest thirty-man augmentation in some of these areas was developed and forwarded to Department of the Army.

h. Brigadier General Edwin F. Black arrived on 11 December 1966, assumed command of Headquarters, USRSUPTHI (see incl 10) and almost immediately met with representatives from USARPAC, USARYIS, 9th Logistical Command (B), KOTHIII and USRSUPTHI staff members in Korat to discuss the transfer of functions from the various Army commands to
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Headquarters, USArmy, responsibility. On 1 January 1967 USArmy formally assumed command and/or operational control of all Army troops in Thailand by General Order #4 (see incl. 11).

1. As stated above, USArmy was commanded directly by CINCUSARPAC, with operational control vested in COMUSARRYTH. The major subordinate units over which the Commanding General, USArmy assumed direct command were Headquarters, 9th Logistic Command (B); Headquarters, 44th Engineer Group, and Headquarters, 428th Medical Battalion. In addition, operational control of the 29th Signal Group was given to CG, USArmy while the 1st Signal Brigade in the Republic of Vietnam retained command. Company D, 1st Special Forces Group was attached from USArmy to USArmy with headquarters exercising operational control (see incl. 12).

2. (S) MISSION: The missions of USArmy are as follows:

   a. Tactical: Provide the U.S. Army nucleus for a unilateral, bilateral or combined tactical headquarters to conduct ground combat operations in Thailand.

   b. Training: Conduct continuing OJT (on-the-job training) of assigned Army units.

   c. Planning: Conduct U.S. Army planning to support joint operational plans for current operations and contingency U.S. unilateral, bilateral and SEATO plans.

   d. Management: Exercise command management supervision of U.S. Army construction programs, logistic operations, real property, facilities and project stocks.

   e. Logistical and Administrative: Provide (1) logistical support to U.S. Air Force operations in North Vietnam and Laos and (2) U.S. Army and joint service support as directed.

3. (C) ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

   a. When the Headquarters was reorganized from IX Corps to United States Army Control, Thailand, under TD P6-1000-00, with authorized strength of 131 (a final two-space deletion from 133 was affected during re-organization), the assigned strength was 97. An emergency requisition was immediately submitted to bring the unit up to TD strength. The response to this requisition was favorable, with personnel arriving during the period July-August 1966.
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At the time, all personnel actions were frozen, including cases of personnel who were past their DEGOS and who had reassignment orders for CONUS. Numerous messages between this Headquarters, USARPAC, and Department of the Army resulted in the decision that those who had school assignments would comply with orders and that the others would deploy with the unit.

b. The foregoing actions were taken during the months of June, but during the months of August and September, it became evident that the long delay in deployment was causing serious morale problems. Discussions between the G1 of this Headquarters and USARPAC eventually resulted in recommending to Department of the Army a personnel policy for the unit which would be applicable regardless of the deployment date of the unit and which would, in effect, regularize personnel actions on the same basis as though the unit were not alerted. Events overtook the action, as the unit did receive clearance to move to Thailand late in September, and Department of the Army policy message was received which spelled out a personnel policy that was wholly consistent with current Department of the Army personnel procedures. Although there were individual cases of disappointment, the policy was in general well received, and the morale of the Headquarters substantially increased by the sure knowledge that the unit would deploy during the months of October and November.

c. Concurrent action was developed early in the planning of unit deployment with regard to travel of dependents to Thailand. CMGR, CM of this Command, and the Commanding Officer jointly developed a plan for designating fifty of the sponsor's in the unit table of distribution as "key" sponsors, the incumbents of which would be authorized to transport their dependents to Thailand. These dependents would reside in Bangkok while their sponsors were assigned to Korat; however, the original plan stipulated that under these circumstances, the sponsor would receive housing allowances based on the Bangkok rate. The sponsor would also be required to complete a two-year tour in Thailand as is the case for other unaccompanied personnel in-country. Despite some misgivings, the total concept was generally agreed upon and approved at USARPAC, USARV, MACV, and this Headquarters. Upon request from MACV to USARPAC that preliminary actions be taken to approve the travel of certain dependents, the real problems were allowances and order issuing authority came to a head. USARPAC queried Department of the Army, and the decision was announced from Department of the Army that the plan was acceptable and tacit agreement was implied that USARPAC could put the plan into effect; however, it was stated that sponsors moving under these circumstances would be authorized to receive only the Korat rate for his housing.
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allowance. By early October, the long delay in deployment, uncertainty as to the unit's status, and the troublesome question of allowance rates combined to cause most of the originally interested sponsors to lose interest in the dependent travel plan, and most had, in fact, by this time sent or arranged for sending their dependents home. M.C.THALI, therefore, sent a message to USARLPC on 4 October, with the concurrence of the Commanding Officer of this organization, effectively delaying any further implementation of the dependent travel program until the unit could arrive in-country and the entire action be completely restudied.

d. Another concurrent action was taken during the period in question regarding an augmentation for the Headquarters. Personnel both in M.C.THALI and this Headquarters felt that any component command in-country would require comptroller, inspector general and provost marshal personnel on the staff. To retain the austere posture of the unit, it was agreed that such an augmentation should be limited to thirty spaces. Tentative decisions as to the staffing of these thirty spaces were agreed upon at USARLPC level, and CINCPC had the augmentation group included in the JCS approved troop list for Thailand. The augmentation was subsequently deferred, then deleted, then restored to the approved troop list. A revised TM to include the thirty additional spaces was submitted to USARLPC along with emergency requisitions for personnel fill and action was still progressing at the close of the reporting period. Since the TM has not yet been approved by CSFOR, the requisitions remain in USARLPC for submission as soon as approval is received.

c. Early in the life of the new organization, it was decided that a distinctive unit insignia should be adopted. Such an insignia was designed and submitted to the Institute of Heraldry, Department of the Army, in June. The design was approved on 16 September and requisitions have been submitted for the insignia (see cover design).

f. From June until the unit's deployment during October and November, numerous liaison visits and conferences were held between representatives of this Headquarters and their counterparts in USARLPC, USARYIS, and M.C.THALI concerning the mission of the unit after its transfer and the corresponding transfer of functions between this Headquarters and USARYIS. These actions finally culminated in a single joint conference at the new Headquarters in Korat during the period 11 - 13 December. At that conference it was decided that the USARLPC commander would assume full responsibility for personnel actions and reports no later than the close of the third quarter of the fiscal year (most functional
transfers took place on 1 January 1967). One notable exception, insofar as personnel actions are concerned, had to be made in the case of those actions which require general court-martial action for decision; since GMC jurisdiction had to remain with USASMIS, the final decision on certain elimination actions will have to remain for the foreseeable future with USASMIS.

g. During the late stages of the unit's deployment to Thailand, the decision was made to re-designate the unit United States Army Support, Thailand. The official re-designation was accomplished on 23 September 1966 and the first echelon of troops deployed for X-ray on 15 October. From mid-October to 1 January, the target date for assumption of command of all Army units in Thailand by USASMIS, daily planning and coordination were effected regarding the many individual responsibilities that would have to be assured. Personnel of the G-1 Section -- two officers and two enlisted men -- planned for assuming supervisory control of the operations of the Adjutant General, Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Surgeon, Civilian Personnel Officer, Education Advisor, and Special Services Officer. It was decided to completely amalgamate the Adjutant General sections of this Headquarters and that of the 9th Logistical Command; to transfer entirely to this Headquarters the functions of the Civilian Personnel Officer, the Education Advisor, and the Special Services Officer; to task the 9th Logistical Command Chaplain and Provost Marshal with performing similar functions for this Headquarters in a "two-hat" situation; and to designate the Commanding Officer of the 428th Medical Battalion (which was to be detached from the 9th Logistical Command and assigned to USASMIS) as the Command Surgeon.

h. During the reporting period, directives and other guidance in his area of responsibility were initiated by the G-1. Close liaison was maintained with his USASMIS counterpart in planning for the transfer of functions being performed by the latter which properly belong to USASMIS. Personnel inadequacies in the G-1 section have delayed substantially the implementation of a full personnel program and the small staff has been mainly concerned with expedient actions. A great deal of emphasis was given during the month to the problems incident to the high venereal disease rate in-country, and a great amount of time was devoted to formulating a program for the control of venereal disease.

i. Surgeon:

(1) The Surgeon is responsible to the Commanding
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General, USARUPTHE. I for all matters pertaining to the health of the command; he exercises technical supervision of all U.S. Army medical activities in Thailand. Activities for the month of January were concerned primarily with the establishment of a Surgeon's Office under staff supervision of the G-1 rather than the G-4, where it was formerly located. With the present authorized strength, there is no professional complement to staff the Surgeon's Office. Personnel of subordinate units (Commanding Officers, 428th Medical Battalion, 252nd Dental Detachment, etc.) have been assigned additional duties as Surgeon, Dental Surgeon, etc., to give the Surgeon's Office capability in the various fields.

(2) Command emphasis was placed on a reduction of the high venereal disease rate in Thailand. The Surgeon is a member of -- and participated in activities of -- the USARUPTHAI VD Control Board. Specific emphasis is to be placed on education and counseling of soldiers, expanded use of the VD Contact Interview Form, and provision of increased club and mess entertainment. This approach should help to keep the soldier in camp, educate him in case he does go out and assist in finding the source of the disease should the education and entertainment be non-effective.

(3) Preventive Medicine Council was initiated to provide medical and technical advice to commanders who participate in the VD Control Council.

j. Civilian Personnel Office:

(1) U.S. Personnel:

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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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(2) The eighth member of the staff arrived on 7 January 1967. Until December 1966, this office was only 50% staffed. The three committed are due to arrive within sixty days. G-1 requested twelve additional spaces for Civilian Personnel Office by letter, dated 15 December 1966. US. ARMY HSG OFPE-OF 29501, dated 24 December requested submission of requisitions; this was accomplished. USARUPTHEI is awaiting written confirmation of these additional spaces. These additional CPO spaces will permit establishing a staff office at command level and three area offices in Thailand (Korat-Bangkok-Sattahip). With limited staff and rapid escalation, CPO is encountering minor difficulties. Routine operations are being sacrificed for the more important response to
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mission build-up. Regulation writing assistance has been requested of USARPAC. This assistance will be provided by USARPAC personnel on TDY commencing 6 February 1967.

(3) Status of all U.S. positions are as follows:

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<td>3</td>
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TOTAL: 32 17 17 10 6

Anticipated Additional Recruitments:

- Commissary 2 - indicates positions cancelled
- Real Estate 1 + substitutions for cancelled
- FDO 4
- Cent Welfare 1
- Education 4

Thus five additional spaces are needed.

(4) As indicated, two spaces are on recruitment in excess of the thirty-two authorized, one being the secretary for the Commandant General and one as a result of the Army's assuming the mortuary mission from the Air Force, effective 1 July 1966, without the transfer of space. Twelve other positions, as indicated, are in the process of establishment to recruit.

(5) Director of Personnel, 9th Logistical Command (B) initiated action to over-recruit at the recommendation of the Civilian Personnel Director in order to overcome the time lag on filling DLC vacancies. This procedure was again discussed with and has the approval of G-1.
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(6) The 3,070 OKV spaces — less non-USG/USILI units' 685 — reflect a utilization of 2,385 Local Nationals. The figure of 2,385 includes the 379th Signal Battalion and other Signal units (326), plus 215 for Special Forces. This results in a total of 1,844 for OKV funding. This figure does not include any Local Nationals to be utilized in Class "B" type units. Present requirements for type "B" units on a forty-eight-hour-week schedule is as follows:

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<td>313th TC Co</td>
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<td>291st TC Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>260th TC Co (Therm Sarckham)</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>200</td>
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TOTALS: 195 32 200

GROSS TOTAL: 427 X 3 = 1281 (24-hour operation)

(7) From the above figures, it seems that the imposed ceiling of Local National spaces for FY 67 is sufficient for the Command; other additional requirements can be supported from within our own resources. The 4th quarter, FY 67, may require Comptroller to decommit funds.

k. Education Center:

(1) Missions:

(a) To offer a program for commissioned officers to complete a minimum of a baccalaureate degree.

(b) To assist warrant officers in achieving at least the equivalent of two years of college.

(c) To assist enlisted personnel in completing high school or the equivalent and to provide work leading to the baccalaureate degree, also to assist them in preparation for attendance at Army Service Schools, for enlisted evaluation testing and for increased responsibility of career service.

(d) To offer a foreign language program (with emphasis on the language of the host country) to meet degree requirements and interest and needs of the military.
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(2) Operation of existing Army Education Centers:

(a) At present there are two fully operational Education Centers in Thailand: one at Camp Friendship, Korat, and the other at Bangkok. Mr. John L. Clark, D.C. Education Director, began setting up the Bangkok Center in December.

(b) The Friendship Center has five rooms, which are being used as regular classrooms. The Friendship Library occupies two other rooms at the center.

(c) The Bangkok Center has office, classroom, and testing room facilities, as well as a room which can be used as a language lab.

(d) Friendship now has two D.C. Education Directors and Bangkok has one.

(3) Proposed Education Center at Sattahip:

(a) A D.C. Education Advisor space is still being recruited for Sattahip.

(b) The Sattahip Education Center building is nearly completed.

(4) Plan a GED program to meet the Coram's needs:

(a) A program to meet the minimum education requirements which are (1) a baccalaureate degree for commissioned officers, (2) two years college equivalence for warrant officers, (3) high school completion and a G.F. score of at least 90 for all enlisted men, and (2) a language program for all military personnel who need to know the language (Thai) of the host country in which they are stationed.

(b) This will be accomplished through (1) day and night group study classes, (2) University of Maryland classes, (3) USAREF correspondence courses, and (4) spoken Thai language classes.

(c) During January, the Friendship Education Center started the following courses: (1) three classes in Thai spoken language, (2) United States Army Correspondence courses in psychology, and (3) a USAREF group-study course in general business.

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(d) The Bangkok Center began two spoken-Thai
classes in January.

(e) The Education Director for USAFRITH LI,
Mr. Paul B. Schenkamp, called a January meeting of all Education
Officers under USAFRITH LI. He briefed them on the goals of the
GED program and the opportunities for courses and testing available
to their personnel.

(f) The Education Center published in January
USAFRITH LI Regulation 621-1 to implement the Thailand GED program.

(g) At present, several areas of troop concen-
tration -- the 809th Engineer Battalion, the 538th Engineer Bat-
talion, and the communications sites north of Korat -- do not have
Education Director Centers. The Knewpower Office will be sending
in requests for DLC Education Directors and Local National slots
for those places.

(4) Operate a USAFLI Testing Section:

(a) Each Education Center will have a USAFLI Test-
ing Section, and the Education Advisor will be the TOO. Each Test-
ing Section will stock the high school GED tests, College Compren-
sive Test, USAFLI Achievement Tests, all college and as many high
school and Technical End-of-Course Tests as are needed. The Edu-
cation Center at Camp Friendship will stock most End-of-Course
Tests.

(b) Both the Bangkok and Friendship Centers
were approved as testing sections in January. The Bangkok Center
is already stocking tests and the Friendship Center will have its
tests in the near future.

(5) Operate a USAFLI Registration Center: Both Friend-
ship and Bangkok now have Registration Centers. These sections
stock at least two copies of all USAFLI Correspondence Courses and
as many copies as needed of all courses for which there is a demand.
For the time being, the Friendship section will serve all Educa-
tion Centers and units in Thailand other than Bangkok. Personnel
enrolling in USAFLI Correspondence Courses can now receive their
course material immediately upon enrollment.

(6) Offer Army Education Center instruction through
USAFLI group study classes and USAFLI-related classes:

(a) Off-duty classes in USAFLI high school level
courses to review all five areas of the 53 GED Test will be offered for personnel who need a refresher in only one or two areas. These classes will be held for three hours a week twice a week for ten weeks.

(b) Day classes in Preparatory Instruction will be offered for enlisted men who have a low education level and/or GI score.

(c) GI-related classes will be on-duty and scheduled as needed. These classes will be scheduled in twenty-hour blocks of instruction and will include such subjects as typing and shorthand; all USFI technical courses, such as electronics; and any subject not needed to review for a particular SES. Typing classes can begin at Camp Friendship Education Center as soon as typewriters, which are on order, are received.

(7) Operate language labs and offer spoken language classes:

(a) The Education Centers at Camp Friendship, Bangkok, and Sattahip will have permanent language labs with console and at least twenty student positions or booths, each with a tape recorder. A special language lab room has been built for the Friendship Center.

(b) The Education Centers located at camp sites of the 538th and 59th Engineer Battalions will have language labs consisting of portable tape recorders. Language classes will be given in the language lab, in the classroom with an instructor, or as a combination of both. Language classes will be scheduled in sixty-hour blocks of instruction. Three language labs are being purchased.

(c) While in Tokyo in November, Mr. Scheunemann contacted representatives of the Sony Corporation and began making arrangements for the buying and installing of the language lab equipment. The order is now being approved, and the equipment should be in Thailand by the end of July 1967.

(8) Operate a civilian school program:

(a) Interview all persons who have M.A. degrees to determine if they are interested in teaching in the University of Maryland program, and, if so, to assist in processing their applications. Also conduct surveys to determine for which classes there is...
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a demand.

(b) Determine the kind and number of classes to be scheduled and the number of full-time faculty to request. Perform all counseling and administration for the University of Maryland program. At present, University of Maryland classes are being held at Camp Friendship, Bangkok, and Sattahip.

(c) Dr. James Qlandor came to replace Mr. William Weinrich as the resident University of Maryland instructor during the January - March term. He will teach two classes in English composition. The Friendship Center is also offering Maryland classes in business law and personnel management. Sattahip will offer American History, its first Maryland class, this term.

(9) Maintain individual education records on all Army education in this command:

(a) D. Form 669, Individual Education Record, is maintained in the Education Center serving the personnel concerned. The records are forwarded to the Education Center when personnel arrive in the command and are collected when personnel depart. Records will be initiated on all personnel who do not have a DA Form 669.

(b) The Bangkok Center has begun initiating 669 Forms on all USASUTTILI personnel in the Bangkok area.

(10) Maintain participation records and report participation to higher headquarters:

(a) Maintain testing logs and report participation in testing quarterly to USAFI, Madison, Wisconsin.

(b) Maintain all informal and participation records and report quarterly to Department of the Army, through the next higher headquarters, this information on the Education Services Report, DA Form 1821. Also submit the General Education Data Report. This report gives the command personnel's educational level, the number of personnel (by category) who are below DA minimum education level, and the percentage of participation (by category) of personnel below.

(c) At present all personnel in Korat and in Bangkok who have not completed high school or who have a GT score below 90 are being given the USAFI Placement Test.
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11) Budget for the GED Program for appropriated and non-appropriated funds:

(a) Determine and budget for the amount needed for tuition assistance for all of Thailand and initiate a contract to be written for that amount with the University of Maryland. Budget for and initiate contracts for non-personal services (administration and instruction) for all part-time personnel.

(b) Budget for and initiate all purchase requests for supplies and equipment.

(c) Budget for salaries for all full-time personnel.

(d) Budget for and request non-appropriated funds to pay wages for all military personnel who teach off-duty courses.

(e) For FY 67, $90,000 in appropriated funds has been budgeted. Of this amount, $2,000 is for tuition assistance.

(f) Non-appropriated funds are being requested and granted as needed.

12) Coordination:

(a) Coordinate the GED program for Thailand.

(b) Coordinate the USAF Program with USAF, Madison, Wisconsin.

(c) Coordinate the Civilian School Program with the University of Maryland, Far East Division, Tokyo, Japan.

1. Assignment of units:

(a) During the period covered by this report, four additional military police units arrived for duty in Thailand. These units are the 281st Military Police Company, Sattahip; 219th Military Police Company, Korat; 136th and 73rd Military Police detachments, Sattahip; and the 89th Military Police Detachment, Korat. The 513th Military Police Detachment was transferred from Korat to Bangkok.
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(2) The foregoing units arrived in-country on the following dates: (1) 281st MP Company: advance party arrived in Thailand on 7 November 1966; main body arrived in Thailand on 11 November 1966, (2) 219th MP Company: advance party arrived in Thailand on 2 November 1966; main body arrived on 20 November 1966; (3) 89th MP Detachment: arrived in Thailand on 11 November 1966; (4) 136th and 73rd MP Detachments: arrived in Thailand on 7 October 1966.

(3) Deployment:

(a) The 281st Military Police Company with the 73rd Military Police Desk and Records Detachment attached will have the law enforcement mission for the Sattahip area command. The company headquarters and two platoons were attached to the Sattahip area command. This will provide the area commander with 74 enlisted men and 3 officers. The company commander and his officers established an operational Provost Marshal's office, and they will function in this capacity until the arrival of the authorized and requested Provost Marshal. One officer and thirteen enlisted men were detached and will support the 809th Engineer Battalion.

(b) The 219th Military Police Company with the 89th Military Police Desk and Records Detachment attached have been given the law enforcement mission for the Korat area command. The company headquarters and two platoons will operate in the Korat area. One platoon was detached to the 538th Engineer Battalion.

(c) The 513th Military Police Detachment was transferred to Bangkok. The 513th is quartered in the Kings Annex Hotel, Bangkok. The detachment commander was assigned additional duty as the Bangkok area Provost Marshal.

(4) Special Assignment: The Provost Marshal, 9th Logistical Command was levied for one officer, O3, to act as liaison officer with the Thai Security Guard Program. Also levied was one Military Police non-commissioned officer, E-6, and one clerk, E-4. The Deputy Provost Marshal, 9th Logistical Command, was selected as the liaison officer for the program. The liaison non-commissioned officer was selected from the 281st MP Company, Sattahip; the clerk, from the 136th MP Detachment.

(a) The Provost Marshal, 9th Logistical Command (B) was assigned additional duty as Provost Marshal, USASURTALI, effective 1 January 1967.
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n. Staff Postal Officer:

(1) During the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967 much has taken place to reorganize the Army postal mission in Thailand. Up to 14 November 1966, the 9th Logistic Command Postal Officer had direct operational control over three separate HOs: 96237, Uorn; 96232, Sattahip-Canon; and 96233, Camp Friendship and Korat Air Base. On 14 November 1966, the 9th Log turned over control of 96237, Uorn, to the U.S. Air Force. On 15 November 1966, Korat Air Base was given a special HO of 96238 and operational control was resumed by the U.S. Air Force. On 17 November 1966, operational control of 96232, Sattahip-Canon, was given to the commanding officer of the 153rd Army Postal Unit type (b), which arrived in Thailand on 11 November 1966. By the end of November 1966, the 9th Logistic Command Postal Officer had staff supervision over HO 96233, Camp Friendship, and HO 96232, Sattahip-Canon, but had direct operational control over only the Camp Friendship HO.

(2) After the period of operational change-over with the Air Force, personnel adjustments were made. Five enlisted personnel, TDY from Calmac, were returned to their permanent duty station. Camp Friendship staff were returned from duty at the Sattahip-Canon HO and the Korat Air Base. The personnel TD for the staff postal office activity of UNSUMTHAI is now deemed adequate for its mission if the personnel staffed are well trained. The staffing of the 153rd Army Postal Unit is also adequate if replacement personnel are furnished. The 153rd BU now runs HO 96232 at Sattahip and unit 1 at Imanon. An officer is no longer in charge of the day-to-day operations because the commanding officer of the 153rd BU is now the postal officer for UNSUMTHAI.

(3) Up to 9 January 1967, there were two postal officers in Thailand: the staff postal officer at UNSUMTHAI who had supervision over all postal activities in-country and operational control over HO 96233, Camp Friendship; the second postal officer was the commanding officer of the 153rd BU at HO 96232, Sattahip-Canon. As of 9 January 1967, the UNSUMTHAI postal officer was reassigned, and the commanding officer of the 153rd BU replaced him, leaving a vacancy at HO 96232.

(4) The mission of the Army postal activities in Thailand continues to be furnishing the best possible financial and parcel post service, as well as mail receipt and dispatch for all military and civilian personnel authorized HO privileges.
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n. Special Services:

(1) Bob Hope Christmas show: The Bob Hope Christmas show was presented on 21 December 1966. This show is handled mainly by representatives of Bob Hope and the Special Services Office, MACVHIl. The Air Force and Army Special Services Offices at Korat alternate in hosting this big show, with the Air Force hosting it this year. Action taken by the Air Force Special Services Office included providing a stage, transportation for the troupe and Air Police to direct traffic. Action taken by the Army 350 was to provide public address system and transportation to the show for Army personnel. Each Service provided their own publicity concerning the show.

(2) Korat Trade Fair Basketball Tournament: The Korat Trade Fair Committee invited the Special Services Office to arrange for U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force basketball teams to compete in a charity basketball tournament in Korat. The tournament was held in conjunction with the Korat Trade Fair, and proceeds from the games were given to the Korat Hospital. The Special Services Officer arranged for three teams from each Service to play in the tournament. The Civil Affairs Officer and the Public Information Officer were informed of the tournament. The tournament enhanced Thai-American relations and should be continued if the U.S. Army is asked to participate again.

(3) Sports Program: The basketball season came to an end with the USARMYTAI Basketball Championship Tournament which was held 29-31 January 1967. Six teams participated in the tournament and the winner went on to play in the Go/Btry Level Basketball Tournament on Okinawa. A total of twenty-six trophies were presented, and the tournament had a total attendance of approximately 750 spectators. It was considered one of the more successful tournaments conducted at Camp Friendship.

4. (c) ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

a. In accordance with CONFIDENTIAL letter, G-2/CA/IL, Headquarters USA, 30 December 1966, subject: Letter of Instruction (U), the G-2 began conducting intelligence operations that would (1) insure the security of U.S. Army personnel, units, bases and establishments in Thailand and (2) establish an intelligence data base to support current operations and contingency planning.

b. During November and December, primary emphasis was

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placed on coordination with other intelligence staff sections and organizations, both in-country and out of country, which have had responsibilities in Thailand, in order to delineate responsibilities and schedule their orderly transfer. This coordination effort culminated on 12 December 1966 at Headquarters, USASOUTHCOM in a meeting attended by LTC Bell, Plans Branch, G-2, USASOUTHCOM; Maj Denny, Security Division, G-2, USASOUTHCOM; LTC Yashita, 1690, 9th Logistic Command (3); Col Stoker, acting G-2, USASOUTHCOM; and Maj Grittonberger, Plans Branch, J-3, JSNA/JSNA (observer).

At this meeting, the orderly transfer to USASOUTHCOM of USASOUTHCOM and 9th Logistic Command responsibilities for the Army Security Program and the Army Personnel Security Clearance Program in Thailand was discussed. All agreed that OGC of S, G-2, USASOUTHCOM could assume all inherent and implied responsibilities, to include ISI case control, on 1 January 1967 without prejudicing end-of-year reporting requirements.

c. On 1 January 1967, the seven-man 17th H Detachment was reassigned from the 9th Logistic Command (3) to Headquarters, USASOUTHCOM in order to give this command a field counterintelligence capability. During this period the detachment has established a two-man field office in Sekon Sekon and another in Kudat. These field offices have been to lay the groundwork for exploitation of overt sources of counterintelligence information in the critical northeast region. Because of severe personnel and technical equipment shortages, the 17th H Detachment has not been able to respond fully to the command’s requirements for internal counterintelligence services or develop liaison contacts in the northeast to the extent desired.

d. The OGC of S, G-2 has also experienced critical personnel shortages which have delayed the section’s becoming fully operational. On 1 January 1967, of six officers and six enlisted men authorized, three personnel were present for duty: one officer, one non-com, and one enlisted clerk. Of these three personnel, one major (0-L) was filling a colonel (0-3) slot and one SSG (E-7) was filling a SGT (E-9) slot. An interim solution to this shortage has been found in requesting TDY assistance from USAINSC and USAINSC.

USAINSC has furnished two officers and one SGT and will shortly furnish an additional HCO in response to a request for three officers and three HCOs. However, the two first lieutenants furnished are required to fill major (0-L) slots. Neither USAINSC nor USAINSC foresees furnishing further assistance.

e. Neither the OGC of S, G-2 nor the 17th H Detachment engaged in significant training or troop movement during the period.
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1. 17 February 1967

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Thailand: 31 January 1967 (C. 35.02. 67).

Both devoted seventy-six working days to intelligence operations.

5. (1) OPERATIONAL HISTORY OF 6227, 6-3

- Force Deployments: During the reporting period, the
following units were deployed to Thailand:

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Exercise Able 31

(1) This Exercise was conducted at officers and one non-commissioned officer on extended term, and by 3,000 headquarters in London to test the validity of the Force planning for the prevailing 3,000 Exercise Able.

(2) 3,000 headquarters personnel and auxiliary forces will conduct a combined military exercise in the U.K. during April 1957. The main aims of the exercise are to ensure the continued military preparedness of 3,000 headquarters to meet aggression, to continue the development of cooperation between the 3,000 military forces, and to ensure that military planning is current with the situation in the Middle East at the time.

(3) Exercise Able 31 is designed as a current test exercise in the format of a major maneuver with the primary purpose of testing over the available options for initial control of Central Region Allied Forces operations (in 4/56, 14th Ed., 9/65).

The additional objectives are considered essential at this time for a successful current test exercise: the practice of headquarters staff actions relating to controlling the relief of national forces; by external forces, and the conduct of current test staff actions for the prosecution of the "army in obtaining defeat in the Middle East by joint and separate operations.

C. On 5 January 1957, J.C.S.112/3 instructed that all units in E.U.K. which had not previously been approved for the Joint Planning System (J.P.S.), a total of Thirty-five units were required to prepare an O.C. in accordance with J.C.S.112/31. These O.C.s were required to be forwarded to 31/112/312 by the following schedule:

(1) 15 February 1957: 50
(2) 10 March 1957: 50
(3) 31 January 1957: 50
(4) 15 February 1957: 50
(5) 10 March 1957: 50

As of 31 January 1957, six had been completed and forwarded to 31/112/312. It is anticipated that the remaining O.C.s will be submitted to 31/112/312.

6. (a) J.C.S.112/31: 3-3, 3-4

In the first week of the period, 3-4 was primarily concerned with the deployment of the headquarters and the
establishment of the operational base from the viewpoint of facilities and support. However, planned orientations and staff supervisory functions were carried on and/or implemented on a phased basis. This was a prerequisite in view of the extreme shortage of staff officers — a total of five being available to cover the critical functions incumbent in being in the fully logistical operation which is the Army role in India.

3. This shortfall had been recognized; earlier and staff visits were started to begin familiarization in selected priority logistical areas. Available personnel were concentrated on these specific areas and other operations held entirely at subordinate current levels with only minimal experience.

4. Actions were started for an augmentation and re-organized section prepared, raising the 0-4 section to a total of ten staff officers. In the same action, the Staff Liaison Service Officer, who had been serving as the only 0-3, 0-5 and 0-6 Officer, was returned to 0-4, cognizance and the Transportation Officer surrendered to the critical requirement for a comparable element in the Supply area. This left three officers for duty — a major and two captains — and a shortage of seven: four lieutenant colonels and three majors. The earlier decision for operation on a pure priority basis was expedited.

5. On the premise that the subordinate commands had been engaged in the basic operations for some time and with the application of some outstanding talent over some long hours, the section set its objectives and carried on its functions:

(1) One officer and one NCO concentrated on the staff assistance necessary to develop a complete plan for the very assumption of the 0-4 and corissary support mission from the Army.

(2) Staff support was directed to the problems of improving the 0-5 and 0-7 support which had been lagging for various reasons, including lack of personnel and facilities. An improvement program was coordinated and personnel assistance from 2nd Log Command arranged to further support the newly arrived supply company.

(3) The critical mission of the distribution planning was expedited and full coordination worked out with the Sub Area Petroleum Office (IPADD) and subordinate commands.
In the major effort of LOC and base construction, close and continued coordination was developed to provide staff assistance in joint planning, program planning and execution, and materials availability.

(5) The existing maintenance support plan which provided for evacuation to GFUs and replacement was determined to be unacceptable and arrangements were developed with the 2nd Log Command for priority support in their overhaul program, backed up by contractual support in-country as available and needed for immediate requirements.

e. These major actions were carried on only through the positive application of priorities and the maximum delegation to subordinate commanders.

7. (6) ASSTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

a. The Civil Affairs Officer has a two-fold mission: Civic Action/People to People Program and Safety Program.

b. The Community Relations Program is funded under USYPTIS Regulation 515-1 (c) with the primary purpose of achieving national cold war objectives. The Community Relations meetings are held monthly.

c. Outpatient Clinics:

(1) The 809th Engineer Battalion (Const) continues to operate an outpatient clinic in the Phnom Penh area, where local nationals are treated for minor illnesses and injuries on a sick-call basis. During the months of November and December 1966 and January 1967, a total of 6,361 local nationals were treated.

(2) The 538th Engineer Battalion operates an outpatient clinic in the Phnom Penh area; during the months of November and December 1966 and January 1967, this clinic treated a total of 1,380 local nationals.

d. The 31st Field Hospital continues to operate the joint Thai-American mobile medical team within outlying areas. This team treated 2,532 local nationals during November and December 1966 and January 1967. The 31st Field Hospital tuberculosis team also treated and rechecked a total of 416 local nationals during this period.
During the period 1 November through 31 December 1966, thirty-six pieces of athletic equipment (procured by collateral activities funds) were presented to local schools.

On the 1st and 5th of December 1966, the 9th Logistical Command (B) skydiving club staged exhibition jumps at Pho Co District, Chaiyaphoon Province. These jumps were the main attraction at a district fair held 1-3 and 5 December for the purpose of raising funds to supplement budget for construction of a water distribution system. The Governor of Chaiyaphoon Province presented a plaque in appreciation of the cooperation provided by the 9th Logistical Command (B) and the skydiving club. The plaque was accepted by LTC Fou-Linph, GOC, on behalf of the Commanding Officer, 9th Logistical Command (B).

On 11 January 1967, the 252nd Dental Detachment travelled to Chaiaphoon and gave out 1,300 toothbrushes and toothpaste to 1,300 elementary and high school students. In addition, hand bills and posters were distributed and two dental health films shown. This is the first of a three-phase program of dental health for this area.

On 18 January 1967, one hundred blankets were purchased from collateral activities funds at a cost of $87.51 and were presented to the Korat Home for the Aged.

The Engineer Section, less draftsman, arrived at Camp Friendship on 17 October 1966 as an element of the USAF/THAI advance increment. By 1 November, the majority of this section's records, files and office equipment had arrived and the section was operational. Operations during the period 1 November - 31 December consisted of the following activities:

1. A detailed study of the current Thailand RDD Program (FY 65(S), 66(S), and 66(S)) was undertaken. The study revealed one major problem area: the escalation of construction costs in conjunction with GAF contracts resulted in the elimination of certain proposed key facilities from the Korat Logistical Complex and the Satthip Port in order to keep costs in line with programmed funds. Immediate steps were taken to coordinate with OTCP/Thailand the establishment of priorities on those facilities scheduled to remain in the program. Those facilities that had already been dropped (9th Log mission-type) could not be recovered.
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at this late date. Also, to realign the expenditure of NEL funds, certain partially completed facilities and unstarted facilities were transferred to troop construction projects. This rescheduling and re-budgeting of construction effort saved $4.5 million of an estimated 12.9 million-dollar increase in costs.

(b) An evaluation of the requirements placed on the Engineer Section against its personnel resources on-hand resulted in the submission of an augmentation for two additional engineer officers (LTC - KCS 7010 and MAJ - KCS 4312).

b. Effective 1 January 1967 upon receipt of USNLC
LOI, this section became fully operational. Its major missions as Staff Engineer to Commanding General, USAMC/Thailand, are:

(1) Materiel Planning
(2) Engineering; and Program
(3) and in-Construction
(4) Policy and Projects
(5) Construction
(6) Local Estate

c. Also effective on 1 January 1967 was the transfer of the USMC/Thailand Office from 9th Logistic Command (b) to Engineer Section, USAMC/Thailand. In evaluation of this section’s responsibilities and requirements resulted in a request for an immediate augmentation, which was submitted to USMC.

d. During the period of 1-31 January 1967, the Engineer Section issued six job directives, the most significant of which was the one to proceed with design and construction of the Inland Road. This is a 124-kilometer road which will start at Setthiphot Port Road and join the Bangkok By-pass between Chatchoengsao and Thonon Seriakhun.

9. (U) Command Judge Advocate

a. The section closed in-country, along with the rest of Headquarters, USAMC/Thailand, on 11 November 1966. There were no movement problems, and the section provided continuous legal services.
to both parts of the command — Okinawa and Kure — throughout the movement period.

b. By letter dated 15 December 1966, USJCSUS determined under the authority of paragraph 5b, Manual for Courts-Martial, US, 1951, that U.S. Army Support, Thailand had special court-martial jurisdiction. This determination was essential for the future operations of the section and the command.

c. On 1 January 1967, USJCSUS assumed control of new units in-country, and thus the scope of legal services provided by this section became considerably broadened. Pursuant to this increased responsibility, the section promulgated USJCSUS Regulation No. 27-16, which established a "Report of Nonjudicial Punishments and Summary and Special Courts-Martial Cases to be Submitted to this Headquarters" from all the special courts-martial jurisdictions under the command of USJCSUS. This report will enable the section to obtain information sufficient to construct a data bank for the purpose of establishing a review and analysis report of nonjudicial punishment imposed under Article 16, UCW, and the operation of inferior Courts-Martial. This report will also enable the section to analyze the administration of military justice in the command to ensure compliance with required Department of the Army policies.

d. By message received 13 January 1967 from CINCUSMAC, amending LOI for USJCSUS dated 30 December 1966, it was ordered that enlisted personal actions requiring General Court-Martial jurisdiction be forwarded to USJCSUS instead of USJCSUS. This completed the already existing practice of having USJCSUS as the GCM jurisdiction for military justice and the reviewing authority for claims.

e. From 16 January 1967 to 20 January 1967, the Assistant Command Judge Advocate visited Sattahip and Bangkok Area Support Commands for the purpose of rendering legal assistance. It was concluded that as a result of the trip, similar visits should be made periodically, preferably monthly, to Sattahip and other catalyzing areas that do not have the services of a JAG close at hand.

f. A step in solving the section's principal problems of lack of space and trained personnel was accomplished on 21 January 1967 when the section moved into the same building occupied by the 9th Logistical Command (G) Command Judge Advocate. By doing so, the section has been able to share the services of the latter's
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The section's own Thai personnel can be better utilized now that they are physically present in the section (previously they could not be with the section because of its location in the headquarters building which is off-limits to personnel without a security clearance).

10. (U) ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. By Department of the Army letter, received prior to the departure of USASURTHAI from Okinawa, it was directed that when USASURTHAI arrived in Thailand, the USASURTHAI Signal Officer would also serve as Commander of the 29th Signal Group (USASURTHAI), Bangkok.

b. Colonel Theodore F. Schweitzer was assigned to USASURTHAI as Signal Officer. The section has since been redesignated the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, and Colonel Gene E. Heebe, CO 29th Signal Group, appointed as ACofS, GE with Colonel Schweitzer as Deputy.

c. During the period 18 October through 31 December 1966, the section was engaged in preparations for assuming the roles and mission of the Army component headquarters for Thailand.

d. The ACofS, GE, in addition to assisting the Commanding General and staff on all GE matters, was assigned the following responsibilities for staff supervision:

(1) GE plans, operations and training in the command.
(2) Cryptologic and cryptosecurity functions.
(3) Photographic and visual aid functions.
(4) Programming of non-tactical telecommunications requirements (NTT) for new U.S. Army requirements.
(5) Army Frequency Control.
(6) Preparation and publication of Army Communications Electronic Operating Instructions.
(7) Staff supervision over operational matters of U.S. Army signal units.

c. During the reporting period the following significant
actions affecting CE operations were completed:

(1) On 31 December 1966, the THCHL-CCC to USAR-LCC-SURTHL-CCC "hot line" was activated allowing direct voice access to the THCHL Emergency Action Console.

(2) On 16 January 1967, 29th Signal Group began on-the-job training for twenty-two members of the Royal Thai Army. Training is being conducted in eleven different job skills, is offered on a continuing basis and is recycled each quarter.

(3) On 21 January 1967, an interim Long Distance Switchboard, designated LDC/TCC-7 manual switchboard, terminating forty-three in-country trunks was placed in service in THCHL compound.

f. The main problem that existed during the reported period was the lack of sufficient personnel to perform the CE staff mission as assigned on 1 January 1967.

11. (U) CONTROLLER

a. The Comptroller has received preliminary budget guidance from USAR-LCC in connection with the FY 66 Command Operating Budget. This guidance has been disseminated to the staff sections for action. The completed FY 66 COB must be at USAR-LCC not later than 27 February 1967.

b. The 35th Finance Section (Disb) has been relieved as Class B agent to the 47th Finance Section to assume disbursing operations under its own Disbursing Station Symbol Number. This action was effective on 1 January 1967.

SECTION II - PART 1

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

1. (U) ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

c. Many conferences and liaison visits are still being held and formal and informal communication with higher headquarters is being maintained on a daily basis to resolve the many problems outlined and implied in Section I.

b. Surgeon: One of the most urgent problems to which
I have addressed normal emphasis is the inordinately high venereal disease rate among the troops. I accept the Surgeon’s counsel that VD is no longer a serious health problem, but the complacency toward this disease cannot be tolerated when it affects command-wide morale and troop effectiveness. The VD Control Board is helpful in identifying and treating local carriers, but I believe the expanded use of the Contact Interview Form and wider counseling and education at the unit level by officers and NCOs will make the problem more immediate to the individual soldier. Hopefully, with knowledge may come prevention.

3. Civilian Personnel Officer: It appears that long range plans for establishing two new offices at Khon Kaen, Settsad for the Civilian Personnel Office are near completion and relocation will be made during the month of February.

4. Provost Marshal: Maintenance support for certain military police equipment continues to be a problem. Specifically, the maintenance support for radios and vehicles was inadequate during the past quarter. Since the 513th MP Detachment is not authorized a motor section or a communications section under its present TO&E, the unit has been dependent upon logistical support from HQD, 9th Logistic Command (B). With the movement of the 513th to Surath, it is anticipated that this situation will be worsened due to the lack of any facilities at Surath to repair tactical vehicles. The 219th Infantry has the capability to maintain a motor section and a communications section; therefore, this unit’s vehicles and radios should be 80% operable at all times.

5. Hostel Officer: Considering the Army Postal activities in Thailand in an overall perspective, the outlook is good. Financial and postal post service has been increased to all serviced units. Transit time on “put-in and incoming” mail is being decreased by better distribution systems.

6. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

a. The severe shortage of personnel permanently assigned and present for duty must be resolved before the G-2 of S, G-2 can become fully operational. The present deficiency has precluded the establishment of an intelligence data base adequate for either good command security or good contingency planning input. It has also required the section to assume the command’s security responsibilities before it had the physical capability of publishing guiding directives.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (MIC CSFGH - 65)

b. In addition, under the present seven-man TC7A, the 17th
MI Detachment is inadequately manned and equipped either to
provide proper overt counterintelligence coverage of the insurgent
Northeast or to provide those counterintelligence services and inspec-
tions that insure command security.

c. Finally, the deployment of Headquarters, USASOUTHCOM
in Thailand without the 104th WISA Detachment or the 209th MI
Detachment (Corps) has left the command without a COSEC capability
and without those capabilities in Imagery Interpretation, Order
of Battle, and Combat Intelligence essential to developing an
intelligence data base adequate for corps or army level contin-
geney planning.

3. (U) ENGINEER SECTION

d. Throughout the entire period, the continuing problem
of performing a mission without proper staffing has forced the
Army to rely almost solely on COSEC for technical review of engineer-
ing design produced through COSEC contracts. As a result, the Army
construction in progress reflects in direct proportion the COSEC
effort. The COSEC Office emphasizes maximum attention to problem
areas as they develop. Full-scale attention to the requirements
of the overall COSEC Program is and has been impossible.

b. Continued unacceptable increasing construction costs
have adversely affected the entire scope of the COSEC program in Thai-
land. The inability of the Contracting Agency to forecast firm
costs, BODs, and additional requirements have made future plan-
ing a hit or miss proposition. There are no periodic or special
reports furnished by COSEC which present up-to-date and detailed
information required to permit keeping abreast of field progress.
This section has no field offices and must depend upon "grape
vine" type communication to discover problem areas. USASOUTHCOM
continues to function without instruction or clearly defined lines
of authority. It has been only recently, with the advent of
USASOUTHCOM, that USASOUTHCOM has become a recognized office.

4. (U) COMMAND JUDGE ADVOCATE: The only problems encountered
by the Command Judge Advocate Section during the last quarter
were of a logistical and organizational nature. There were no
major military legal problems. The previously cited problems
were partially alleviated by moving the section in with the
Command Judge Advocate Section of the 9th Logistic Command (B),
but the shortage of trained personnel continues to have a per timed
completion of cases.
15 February 1967

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EXJIN; 31 January 1967 (AG E3866 - 65)

SECTION II - LST 2

RECONSIDERATIONS

1. (u) END SEC;

a. The major problem facing the Headquarters as of the close of the reporting period is that of personnel stature of the command, both at present and in the future. Manpower, requisitions, and management procedures, the three most important aspects of the personnel program, were not being effectively supervised, planned for, nor carried out.

b. The fill on personnel requisitions for this command has been a problem for some time. It is recognized that USMAR has the first priority, but the modest unit build-up in Thailand over the past year has created a critical shortage in certain Mos that cannot continue indefinitely. It is necessary to accomplish portions of its mission in the best possible way. The quarterly operational reports for all the subordinate units of USMAR reflect the urgent need for replacements; particularly in the lower enlisted grades. I cannot wholly endorse the immediate solution of curtailment/extension of tours. At best it is a temporary expedient and not a real solution. Therefore, I cannot recommend strongly enough that USMAR give closer scrutiny to our current critical shortages and immediate requisition action on our critical AS shortages.

c. The Engineer Section, as presently staffed, does not have enough personnel to successfully accomplish its assigned mission. The recommended organization of the Engineer Section, to include ECAH, has been submitted for approval.

2. (u) END SEC; There is little to recommend in the improvement of the operational efficiency of this command. The major missions of this organization are the construction of the Inland Road from Chonburi to Sattahip and the development of the deep-water port in the Sattahip area. The almost superhuman effort of the engineers in surmounting their problems is admirable to say the least. The collateral activities of the local dispensaries and the medical units have done much in fostering Thai-American relations. In general, the sense of urgency with which the sub marine units treat their daily and prolonged difficulties when they arise is remarkable. The mission accomplishment of all organizations is performed outstandingly well within
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the resources available to them.

3. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: Company D (10G), 1st Special Forces Group is presently attached to this command for administrative and logistical support from the 1st Special Forces on Okinawa. Operational control is vested in the COMSHOCMIL. Our request to have this unit assigned as a separate company has yet to receive final DI approval. Recommend follow-up action by USAMC to expedite this transfer. In addition, the intelligence arrangements as described in Section II, Part 1 of this report amplify our previous requests for augmentation of the 17th MI Detachment so that additional field offices can be established in the Northeast as personnel become available. Also, to improve the over-all intelligence capability of this command, recommend approval of our request for deployment of the 104th MI Detachment and the 209th MI Detachment from Okinawa at full authorized strength.

4. (U) LOGISTICS: The planning and the development of "tailored organizations" such as MI.USA.10, should be completely monitored at higher headquarters and DI level to assure the maximum experience in review and adjustment. To this end, DI should assemble for internal as-well as field command use, an "experience" file on "tailored organizations" by functional groupings. Also, the supply system must be expanded to provide for priority operational requirements of elements supporting a combat area without subjecting such elements to the continuous over-riding priority of the combat area being supported.

EDWIN F. BLICK
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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1. CONFIDENTIAL msg fr CINCPAC, subj: Army Control Headquarters
2. CONFIDENTIAL msg fr CINCPAC, subj: U.S., Army Control Headquarters for Thailand (U)
3. CONFIDENTIAL msg fr CINCPAC, subj: Proposed Addition to Section III, Project Army-US Army-GENL-3-54-OP
4. USAREUR General Order Number 88, dated 21 April 1966
5. USAREUR General Order Number 89, dated 21 April 1966
7. CONFIDENTIAL msg fr CINCPAC, subj: In-Country Clearance
8. USAREUR General Order Number 247, dated 27 October 1966
9. Organization Chart, Headquarters, United States Army Control, Thailand
10. USAREUR General Order Number 19, dated 11 December 1966
11. USAREUR General Order Number 1, dated 1 January 1967
12. Organization Chart, U.S. Army Support, Thailand
13. Biography of Brigadier General Edwin F. Black
14. Photograph of 3d Black signing assumption of command order
15. Photograph of 3d Black's arrival at Korat, 11 December 1966

UNCLASSIFIED
1. Reference A: SECRET Letter to CINCUSARFAC from COMSHACTHAI, dated 16 January 1966, Subject: US Army Control Headquarters for Thailand (U), with two inclosures. Inclosure 1 to this reference is MG Stilwell's proposed TD for USARCONTHAI. Inclosure 2 is the supporting rationale for the need of such a headquarters.

2. Reference B: SECRET message to RUEPDA/DA from COMSHACTHAI, dated 010402 Apr 66, Subject: U.S. Army Control Headquarters for Thailand (U).

3. Reference C: TOF SECRET Booklet, HQ, SEATO Exercise AURORA, dated 1 December 1966, entitled "Basic Instructions Exercise AURORA."

Following is a list of distinguished visitors to the command during the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME, ORGANIZATION AND DUTY</th>
<th>ARE OF INTEREST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mr. Ralph N. Clough, GS-18E, U.S. State Department, 7 November 1966</td>
<td>Facilities at Sattahip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Messrs. Ben Gilless and Stuart P. French, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 November 1966</td>
<td>Project stocks, personnel shortages, major item density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mr. Frank J. Bartino, DOD, 6 November 1966</td>
<td>Command maintenance capability and troop requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Honorable David H. Henderson, Chairman, House Sub-committee on manpower, 25 November 1966</td>
<td>Civilian personnel requirements and port operations, Sattahip</td>
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<td>6. Rear Admiral L.B. McDonald, Commander HSTS, Far East, 24 November 1966</td>
<td>Fort facilities, Sattahip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Honorable Jonathon B. Bingham, N.Y., 27 November 1966</td>
<td>Facilities at Korat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mr. Verley W. Roxroad, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 8 December 1966</td>
<td>Facilities at Korat and construction projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. BG Clarence J. Lang, Director of Logistics, J-4, USSTRICOM, 12 December 1966</td>
<td>Facilities at Korat and Sattahip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Honorable J. Strom Thurmond, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 11 December 1966</td>
<td>Facilities at Korat and Sattahip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. MG John H. Hay, CG 11th Infantry Brigade, 16 December 1966</td>
<td>Project stocks at Korat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NAME, ORGANIZATION, AND DATE

12. GEN Harold K. Johnson, CSA, 31 December 1966

13. Mr. Phillip Odeen, CH3D for Systems Analysis, 19 January 1967

14. LTG Ferdinand Unger, CG, USARYIS, 21 January 1967

AREA OF INTEREST

Facilities at Korat and Northeast area

Facilities at Korat, Sattahip and new construction projects

Facilities at Korat, Sattahip and Northeast area
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) - Hq USARSUPTHAI

29 MAR 1967

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters USARSUPTHAI.

2. (C) Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Reference paragraph 1, Part II, Section II:
      (1) Representatives of Manpower Division, G-1, USARPAC, have recently completed a visit/survey in Thailand and have provided assistance in the problem areas.

      (2) USARSUPTHAI now has an approved TDA, and an MNA for an increased authorization of 30 spaces is being processed for the headquarters. The strength increase, when approved by DA, should provide the headquarters with an adequate staff.

      (3) Following the designation of USARSUPTHAI as a separate command on 1 January 1967, this headquarters took action with USARSUPTHAI and DA to validate all outstanding enlisted requisitions for Thailand. This procedure will be repeated on a monthly basis.

   b. Reference paragraph 3, Part II, Section II:
      (1) DA message 801266, DTM 1322014 Feb 67, granted authority to inactivate D Company, 1st Special Forces Group, and to activate 46th Special Forces Company with assignment to USARSUPTHAI. This headquarters is currently taking every possible action with ACSFOR and USARSUPTHAI to expedite approval of a new MTOE for the 46th Company so that a General Order can be published.

      (2) This headquarters is currently working with USARSUPTHAI to develop a more adequate organization for the 17th Military Intelligence Detachment.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U) — Hq USARSUPTHAI

(3) This headquarters is supporting USARSUPTHAI in its request for deployment of the 209th Military Intelligence Detachment from USARYIS to Thailand to provide the required Imagery Interpretation and COMSEC capability.

c. Reference paragraph 4, Part II, Section II: This headquarters has monitored and will continue to monitor the planning and development of USARSUPTHAI.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMULLIN
Maj, AG
Asst AG

1 Incl
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