

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD394094

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

DoD Controlling Organization: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

14 Nov 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General's Office ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD394094
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO
confidential
FROM
secret
AUTHORITY
14 Nov 1969 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

①

AD 394094



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (25 Apr 67) FOR OT

5 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 504th Military Police Battalion (Army)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

100 100 100

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion (Army) for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding General
  - US Army Combat Development Command
  - US Continental Army Command
- Commandants
  - US Army Command and General Staff College
  - US Army War College
  - US Army Air Defense School
  - US Army Artillery and Missile School
  - US Army Armor School
  - US Army Chemical Corps School
  - US Army Engineer School
  - US Army Military Police School
  - US Army Infantry School
  - US Army Intelligence School
  - US Army Medical Field Service School

100 100 100  
100 100 100

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
INCLOSURES

4(3)

(Continued on page 2)

**SECRET**

R43  
2708 100

THIS document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, and the transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**SECRET**

9  
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Ordnance School  
US Army Quartermaster School  
US Army Security Agency School  
US Army Transportation School  
US Army Signal School  
US Army Special Warfare School  
US Army Civil Affairs School

**Copies furnished:**

Assistant Chief of Staff for  
Force Development

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

⑥ *Learned*

~~HEADQUARTERS, 504TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION (ARMY)~~  
HEADQUARTERS, 504TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION (ARMY) [ ]

AVBGF-K-0

⑨

⑪

14 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report, for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966.  
(RCS CSFOR 65)

⑫ 20p.

THRU: Commanding Officer  
16th Military Police Group  
ATTN: AVBGF-B  
APO 96240

⑬ OACSFOR

⑭ OT-UT-660420

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA)  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

A. Command Section.

1. (U) During the past quarter the Battalion continued to provide military police support through out the II Corps area of South Vietnam.
2. (U) On 26 September 1966 the 18th Military Police Brigade and 16th Military Police Group became operational. The Battalion came under control of the 16th Military Police Group.
3. (U) The 66th Military Police Company and the 40th CID were released from attachment to the Battalion during the quarter.

CONTROL  
944

Reproduced From  
Best Available Copy

*Group 4*  
DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

FOR OT UT  
660420, J

1

**SECRET**

003 650

4. (U) Key personnel assignments and significant changes within the unit were as follows:

a. Lt Col Getz	Battalion CO	27 Sept 66
b. Major Hewitt	Interim BN CO	24-27 Sept 66
c. Major Hewitt	Bn XO	27 Sept 66
d. Captain Hallihan	Bn Adj	1 Nov 66
e. Captain Johnson	A Co, CO	1 Nov 66
f. CWO Smyth	Bn Pers Off	4 Aug 66
g. SGM Rowe	Bn SGM	7 Aug 66
h. MSG Giroux	Bn Opns Sgt	7 Aug 66

5. (U) The military police detachments in Hue and Danang were withdrawn on order of PM USAFV. This returned a total of 1 officer and 55 men to "B" Company control in Pleiku. Detachments closed in by 12 September 1966.

6. (U) A TO&E squad of 11 military police was attached to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in Tuy Hoa for Operation "SEWARD". Upon termination of "SEWARD", 24 October 1966, the squad, augmented by two more squads for a total of 33 military policemen, remained in Tuy Hoa as a permanent military police detachment in direct support of the Tuy Hoa Sub-Area Command.

7. (U) The Annual General Inspection of the Battalion was held during the period 19-24 August 1966. The following comment was received from the USAFV IG Inspection Team:

"The assigned missions of the 504th Military Police Battalion were being accomplished with a high degree of efficiency. Spirit and morale were considered exceptional. All personnel appeared to be professionally competent and were enthusiastic in their desire to perform assigned duties in an outstanding manner. The overall appearance and condition of facilities and equipment and the positive attitude exhibited by all personnel was indicative of a high degree of professionalism and devotion to duty".

B. Personnel, Morale and Discipline.

1. (U) During this period the Battalion did not have any cases of malaria. Continued emphasis on use of malaria pills, mosquito nets and insect spray has served to reduce the hazard. One confirmed

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# CONFIDENTIAL

2  
case of hepatitis was exposed in Company "C". All personnel in the HHD, Company "C" and 66th Military Police Company were immunized immediately with gamma globulin shots.

2. (U) There were 16 cases of VD reported. Command emphasis at all echelons has been effected to reduce the rate. Particular emphasis has been placed on the responsibility of the individual NCO to guide, counsel, and set the example for his men.

3. (U) Approximately 65% of allotted R&R spaces were used. Instructions have been published to insure maximum participation in program. The small amount of literature available on the subject has been procured and distributed.

4. (U) There were ten traffic accidents during the quarter. During this period a total of 758,289 miles was driven. Continued emphasis on safe driving has assisted in reducing the number of traffic accidents. Eight personal injuries were sustained.

5. (U) One man was killed in Nha Trang when a terrorist threw an explosive into the cab of the 3/4 ton truck he was driving. One man was killed in a traffic accident in Danang while on military police duty.

6. (C) Battalion strength as of 31 October 1966 was 635 officers and men. This is 34 above authorized strength. Projected 90 day losses of 178 opposed to projected gains of 60 will result in unit understrength.

7. (U) One congressional inquiry was received concerning the status of radios within the unit.

8. (U) All of Company "C" and 80% of HHD moved into wooden barracks constructed under the "self help" program during this period.

## C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

### 1. (U) Intelligence:

a. Daily intelligence reports are received from MACV Intelligence Advisor and ROK Division G-2.

b. Frequent contacts are made with MACV S-2 Advisors for intelligence information pertaining to areas where military police are operating and to furnish same to them.

c. Military police patrols are instructed to report any hostile or unusual activities within their area of responsibility.

2. (U) Counterintelligence: There were 67 security actions taken during the period. This included 52 security clearance validations and 5 clearance requested. No revocation or denial actions were requested.

# CONFIDENTIAL

9.

**SECRET**

**D. Plans, Operations and Training.**

**1. (S) Major Operations Supported:**

a. Military police provided support for the following major operations during the period.

(1) Operation "THAYER/IRVING" involving support of 1st Cavalry Division search and destroy operations from 13 September 1966 to a time to be announced. Supported by elements of B and C Companies.

(2) Operation "ROAD RUNNER" involving traffic control and convoy escort support in operations to open up main supply routes in II CTZ at will. These operations are on a continuing basis and to date "A" and "B" Companies have provided support.

(3) Operation "SEWARD" involving support of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during protection of rice harvesting from 1 September to 25 October 1966. "A" Company elements supported this operation.

(4) Operation "ROBIN" involving the movement in country of the 4th Infantry Division from 26 July to 10 October 1966. Elements of "A", "B" and "C" Companies furnished traffic support during troop movement.

(5) Operation "STABLE" involving the movement in country of the 9th Infantry Division (White Horse) ROKA. Elements of "A" Company furnished traffic support during troop movement.

b. Support for these operations consisted of:

- (1) Convoy escorts and convoy security
- (2) Traffic control and regulation points
- (3) VIP security
- (4) Traffic and law and order patrols
- (5) Evacuation of P.W. to ARVN P.W. Camp

c. Units of the Battalion supported major combat operations for a total of 103 days during the quarter. "THAYER/IRVING"; 48, "SEWARD"; 55.

2. (U) Effective 6 October 1966 the Battalion was assigned the mission of P.W. evacuation from division or separate brigade P.W. collecting points to the ARVN Combat Captive (PW) Camp II CTZ in Pleiku.

4

**SECRET**

## CONFIDENTIAL

5

In the absence of specific directives at this level, the Battalion published a Letter of Instructions on P.W. Evacuation based on experience gained in the first two evacuations. The major problem encountered throughout was the difficulty of arranging truck and aircraft transportation of the P.W. A total of 222 P.W. were evacuated during the quarter. Elements of "A", "B" and "C" Companies were involved.

3. (U) A "Traffic Control in Tactical Operations" SOP was established to preclude issuing complete operations orders for less than company size support missions. Items included in it were:

- a. Establishment of armor plated  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles armed with M60 machine guns for highway patrols and convoy escorts.
- b. Establishment of three man, radio equipped TCPs to provide instant communications and individual protection.
- c. Provisions for daily briefing and debriefing of details by the OIC/NOIC to include road and enemy intelligence, tactical support and reporting procedures.
- d. Recommended minimum uniform, vehicle and equipment list.

4. (U) On direction of Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, on 14 October 1966 a study was made of the military police support being furnished to area Provost Marshals. A "Minimum essential" and "maximum effective" strength figure was established for each area to determine how many personnel could be relieved from routine military police duties for tactical support. If the Battalion filled the "minimum essential" figures it would have the equivalent of three full platoons, three additional platoon headquarters and three additional squads to support tactical operations. Approval of the study is pending.

5. (U) Preventive maintenance has been stressed especially on  $\frac{1}{2}$  tons and radios. This has been necessary due to the wear and tear evidenced by heavily armored and sandbagged vehicles traveling unimproved roads in tactical areas.

### E. Communications Activity.

1. (C) A radio teletype net has been established by 19th Military Police Brigade to include stations at Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade in Saigon, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group in Nha Trang and Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion in Qui Nhon. The AN/SPB 46 configuration is used and transmissions

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

average nine hours daily. ~~When dispatch is available~~ expedited transmissions of information and queries which formerly had to be relayed by courier or on the overloaded telephone system.

2. (U) The new AN/VRC 46 and 47 type radios started to arrive during the quarter. "A" Company completed mounting of authorized radios on 6 October 1966. The remainder of the Battalion's radios were available in the depot in Qui Nhon, but could not be installed due to the nonavailability of installation kits at the end of the quarter.

3. (U) Instructions were issued to the unit commanders to reduce the amount of radio traffic being broadcast on tactical operations. This resulted in less transmissions, more clarity and more observance of security requirements.

4. (U) AN/PRC 25 radios, on loan from units equipped with them, have been used as radio relays on operations "THAYER" and "ROAD FUNNER" as the AN/VRC 10s were not capable of the desired ranges.

5. (U) A planned system of radio relays to establish contact between "B" Company in Pleiku and Battalion Headquarters in Qui Nhon was recommended during this period. It is felt with the AN/VRC 46, the plan will work with a minimum of two relay stations, one of which is already established at the An Khe Military Police Station.

## F. Logistics.

1. (U) Supply Management. During this reporting period, three supply management technical inspections (pre IG) were conducted by the S-4 on units assigned to the Battalion. Those inspections indicated that all units were performing their supply mission in a satisfactory manner. During the period 22-26 August 1966, the USAFV Inspector General conducted the annual General Inspection and indicated all units were conducting supply management in a commendable manner. Due to rotation of all but one experienced supply sergeant, a critical shortage of trained supply personnel continues to exist. With no anticipated gains, an OJT program is being initiated at least three months prior to the DEROS of key personnel.

2. (U) Maintenance Management. During this reporting period, the Battalion S-4 and Motor Officer conducted a pre-annual General Inspection on all units in the Battalion. The results of these inspections indicated that all units were in a satisfactory condition. During the week of 22 August 1966, the USAFV Inspector General conducted the annual General Inspection and found all units performing their missions satisfactorily.

3. (U) Organizational Clothing and Equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

7

## CONFIDENTIAL

a. (U) During this reporting period a critical shortage of  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks continue to hamper the mission of this unit. As of 31 October 1966 the Battalion was short 11  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks. With the increase in operational missions and administrative requirements, it is imperative that this unit be kept up to TO&E strength in vehicles.

b. The AN/VRC 46 and 47 type radios were issued to Company "A" through USAASC CRB during October and have been installed. The radios for HHD, "B" Company and "C" Company were in the depot at USAASC Qui Nhon at the end of the quarter. Insufficient installation kits were available at this time.

### SECTION II

#### COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

###### A. Personnel:

###### Item: Intra Theater Rotation of Key Personnel

Discussion: 18th Military Police Brigade has a plan to rotate key personnel within the Brigade to a different duty assignment after six months in the command. This will provide the individual concerned with a broader knowledge of the military police role in Vietnam and train him in two aspects of that role.

Observation: The program as laid out has not been received favorably by commanders who wish to remain with their units for a year to gain and give their full experience. Also, staff officers and NCOs prefer to remain in the same Battalion for a complete tour rather than being transferred after six months duty. Another apparent short coming, based on a one time incident, is the reassignment of a key member of the staff without providing either a replacement or the time to orient one.

###### B. (C) Operations:

###### Item: Evacuation of P.W.

Discussion: The mission of evacuating P.W. from separate brigade or division P.W. collecting points to the ARVN Combat Captive (PW) Camp II CTZ in Pleiku was assumed by the Battalion. The mission was assigned effective 4 October 1966 and the first commitment filled on 6 October 1966 with the evacuation of 30 P.W. from 1st Cavalry Division forward CP on Operation THAYER to Pleiku. Implementing instructions for the evacuating unit (s) have not been issued as of this date. Fragmentary messages concerning documentation required, reports to be rendered and suggested methods of obtaining transportation have been received.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

These messages plus experience in handling the first shipments resulted in the Battalion publishing its own Letter of Instruction for Evacuation of P.W.. Through 31 October 1966 222 P.W. have been evacuated to the ARVN PW Camp by the Battalion.

Observation: Although the evacuation mission had been discussed at higher headquarters level prior to actual assignment to the Battalion no implementing instructions have been published which establish a positive authority and reference to use when trying to resolve documentation requirements with capturing units, standard reporting procedures and who is responsible to obtain and furnish air or land transportation. The publishing of a Battalion LOI was accomplished as an interim measure.

### Item: Securing P.W. for Air Transportation

Discussion: P.W.s can be transported in cargo aircraft with or without the troop seats in position up to a maximum number of 120 P.W. in a C-130 aircraft. Due to the possibility of an escape attempt or panic brought on by persons not used to flying, the P.W. should be strapped in securely during the flight.

Observation: When using troop seats each individual can be seated with his forearms resting on his thighs and the seat belt securely fastened over them. Any attempt to get loose and the resulting struggle can be noticed by the P.W. escort. When using a cargo plane with out seats the P.W. are seated on the floor, legs out in front, and a cargo tie down strap is run front to rear over five to ten individuals. This is cinched into place immobilizing the P.W.s. Any such method must be discussed with and approved by the aircraft commander prior to flight.

### Item: Pedestal Mounts on $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Vehicles

Discussion: Highway patrol and convoy escort missions during tactical operations demand a capability for thwarting and containing enemy ambushes and sniper fire. Battalion SOP requires dual vehicle patrols with the rear vehicle armed with a pedestal mounted machine gun. TO&E 19-35F does not authorize pedestal mounts and authorizes only (3) M60 machine guns per company.

Observation: Pedestal mounts have been fabricated from steel pipe and mounted on  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles. Salvaged tripods with the legs removed are used to mount the M60. Sharp edges are taped to preclude injury to the machine gunner. Each unit has (or has on requisition) eight M60 machine guns drawn on the ratio of one per fifteen men for use in a ground defense role. When not being used in that role they give an increased capability to the motor patrols.

CONFIDENTIAL

9

## CONFIDENTIAL

A modified TO&E is being ~~staffed to authorized~~ six pedestal mounts and eight machine guns per military police company.

Item: Extra Radios AN/PRC 25 per Military Police Squad

Discussion: TO&E 19-35F does not authorize the AN/PRC 25 radio. Each military police company is authorized 6 AN/PRC 6 radios which are unreliable both from a performance and serviceability standpoint. The use of AN/PRC 25 radios on loan has enabled units of the Battalion to establish radio relays, defile control, TCPs and other commo needs where a vehicle is not required. It has released vehicles for road patrols and traffic control and other mobile requirements. This is important when it is realized that each 52 man platoon has only 11 1/2 tons assigned to it although its' sole reason for being is to control traffic. This item is being staffed for submission as a modified TO&E to the current TO&E 19-35F.

Observation: The AN/PRC 25 radio should be issued on the basis of four per platoon, (12 per Company) to give each platoon the capability for manning traffic points, radio relays and military police stations without immobilizing vehicles.

### C. (U) Training and Organization:

Item: Furnishing Personnel for PM Detachments

Discussion: Although two TO&E 19-500 Provost Marshal Detachment teams have arrived in the Battalion area of responsibility there is still a requirement to furnish vehicles and personnel to augment these detachments. These augmentations of personnel and equipment are not TO&E and detract from the units capability to perform its mission.

Observation: PM Detachment Commanders should review their resources with the aim to better utilization of existing equipment and personnel or additional TO&E 19-500 teams should be requested.

Item: Speciality Platoons

Discussion: Company "B" has organized speciality platoons tailored to fit specific continuing missions. They have established a Combat support Platoon which handles convoy security on Highway #19, a Discipline, Law and Order Platoon which performs the town patrol missions in Pleiku and an Installation Security Platoon that mans gate posts on two installations.

Observation: This allows the Commanding Officer to tailor his equipment and personnel to the mission. To provide varied experience 25% of the personnel are rotated every 60 days.

## CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

This rotation also breaks the monotony and gives everyone a chance at the preferred duties.

## D. (U) Intelligence:

### Item: Clearance of Indigenous Personnel

Discussion: Indigenous personnel hired as KPs, laundresses etc. are required to have a Military Security Service Clearance issued by Vietnamese authorities through Civilian Personnel Office.

Observation: Although Battalion personnel have kept constant check on progress of clearances it takes up to five months to receive one completely processed. It appears to be a case of understaffed offices and governmental bureaucracy.

## E. (C) Logistics:

### Item: Motor Vehicle Maintenance:

Discussion: Military police commitments are twenty four hours daily. During this reporting period "B" Company vehicles were totally committed every day. To allow for daily maintenance and repair the unit established a night motor pool shift from 1600-2400 to handle the vehicles being driven during the day.

Observation: All vehicles have received scheduled maintenance on time and immediate corrections of minor faults made vehicles available for the next duty shift.

### Item: Armor Plating and Sandbagging of $\frac{1}{2}$ Tons

Discussion: Twelve  $\frac{1}{2}$  tons in each company are equipped with armor plating (weight 600 lbs) and sandbagged flooring (weight 400 lbs). These vehicles are used in support of tactical operations and on highway patrol using unimproved roads. The crew consists of from two to three military police and in some cases M60 machine guns.

Observation: The extra 1000 lbs of weight coupled with poor roads are having a detrimental effect on the life span of shocks, springs, and tires. When the  $\frac{1}{2}$  tons so equipped are not being used in an area where hostile fire can be expected the armor plate and sandbags are removed.

### Item: Replacement Parts for Vehicles

Discussion: All units and detachments operate on a 24 hour-per-day basis with a requirement for continuous vehicle utilization; therefore many of the M151,  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles are being driven in excess

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

of 4,000 miles per month. Under such operating conditions, the rate at which parts must be replaced is frequent. This item was discussed in the previous operational report and as of yet replacement parts are still not readily available. This problem continues to cause excessive headline time for vehicles and reduces the overall operating efficiency of the unit. The Battalion Motor Section makes daily trips to the direct exchange facility to ascertain the availability of various spare parts, but sufficient spare parts are not on hand.

Observation: There is a shortage of the following vehicle parts:

- a. Hot patches
- b. Spark plugs
- c. Oil filters
- d. Wheel bearings
- e. Voltage regulators
- f. Ignition system
- g. Batteries
- h. Fuel pumps

Cannibalization of deadlined vehicles is not the solution to this problem; however, detachments may be forced into this practice if they are to accomplish their mission. To avoid this practice, necessary parts replacements must be made available at Ordnance direct support units.

Item: Shortage of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Vehicles

Discussion: The 504th Military Police Battalion, since arrival in Vietnam, had been given the responsibility of providing military police support in tactical operations, POW escorts and law and order in several built-up areas throughout II Corps area. The Battalion, in accordance with its TO&E, is basically organized and equipped to fully support tactical field operations assigned. With the ever increasing number of operations and commitments placed on this Battalion, it is felt a shortage of (11)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks is detrimental to the successful accomplishment of the Battalion's mission. Realizing this, the unit should receive at least an O2 priority, if it is to successfully support combat operations. The unit has submitted requisitions with appropriate follow-up action. In the last five months, the Battalion has received only (3)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles as replacements.

## CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Observation: ~~requirements for~~ of  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles are not arriving in country for replacement purposes. 12

## Part II, Recommendations

A. (U) Personnel: That intra theater transfer of key personnel be made only if the individual desires or a greater need for the individuals skills exists elsewhere.

### B. (U) Operation:

1. That implementing instructions which establish authority and references for P.W. evacuation be published.

2. That the modified TO&E for issue of six machine gun pedestal mounts and eight M60 machine guns per military police company be approved when submitted.


3. That the modified TO&E for issue of twelve AN/PRC 25 radios per military police company be approved when submitted.

4. That additional PM detachments, TO&E 19-500, be assigned to II CTZ to man Provost Marshal Offices currently operating with Battalion personnel.

5. That USARV Civilian Personnel Office initiate a procedure to expedite MSS Clearances through Vietnamese government channels.

6. That heavy duty shock absorbers, springs and tires be issued for armor plated  $\frac{1}{2}$  tons or increased replacement parts be stocked for estimated future demands.

7. That support commands review their equipment and parts replacement procedure to insure a more responsive support to user units.

  
WILBUR D. GETZ  
LTC, MPC  
Commanding

# CONFIDENTIAL

# SECRET

AVRGE (14 November 1966) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, APO 96240, 24 November 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 of the 504th Military Police Battalion is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (U) I feel that this report is generally adequate and the recommendations valid. A summarization and specific comments regarding areas of nonconcurrency are contained in the following paragraphs. All comments are keyed to specific sections, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the basic report.

a. (Section I, para A1) The 504th Military Police Battalion was assigned to the 16th Military Police Group on 26 September 1966. No official relationship existed between these two units prior to that date.

b. (Section I, para B6) If the command overseas replacement program continues as in the past, this battalion will not experience a personnel shortage.

c. (Section I, para F1) This unit is authorized five supply sergeants and presently has seven assigned, three of which are 90 day losses. If replacements do not arrive as scheduled in February 1967, a shortfall will exist.

d. (Section II, Part I, para A; Section II, Part II, para A) Nonconcur. The intent of the Intra Theater Transfer Program is to adjust the DEROS imbalances within the units to preclude rotational humps and the loss of a majority of key personnel during the same month. The entire headquarters of one brigade, one group, and two battalions arrived in RVN within the short span of thirty days. This infusion program is an effort to maintain staff continuity at all times and at all levels of command.

e. (Section II, Part I, para B; Section II, Part II, para B1) Concur. Directive type TWXs with implementing instructions regarding the evacuation of Prisoners of War have been published by the 18th Military Police Brigade. The implementing data which has been provided the battalion has been based on guidance received from brigade during the interim period of development pending publication of a current revision of USARV Regulation 190-3, Military Police Evacuation of Prisoners of War. This headquarters continues to coordinate with the Provost Marshal, IFPV, in an attempt to require conformance with existing regulations by the capturing units regarding the necessary documentation of PWs. The problem

Incl 1

SECRET

20110410  
13

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

UNCLASSIFIED

AVBGF (14 November 1966) 1st Ind 24 November 1966  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

of arranging air transportation for PW evacuation will not be resolved until definite priorities are established. Definite guidance is also required in the handling of PWs in medical channels.

f. (Section II, Part I, para E, Item: Shortage of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton Vehicles) Nonconcur. Based on the theater requisitioning procedure, which was not fully understood by the unit, follow-up action on requisitions of O2 priority which had been passed to Okinawa was neither complete nor effective. Requisitions previously submitted have been reviewed by the S-4 of this headquarters and appropriate priorities have been established. Follow-up actions are now being directed to the supporting 2d Logistical Command Depot as appropriate.

g. (Section II, Part II, para B2, 3) Concur. Requests for authorization to procure additional M60 machine guns, machine gun pedestal mounts for  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles, and AN/PRC-25 radios will receive favorable consideration by this headquarters providing requests are consistent with the mission requirements of the unit.

h. (Section II, Part II, para B4) Concur. This headquarters has directed the submission of Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment for all existing Provost Marshal detachments.

i. (Section II, Part II, para 5B) Concur. The current policy under which Military Security Service Clearances are issued by Vietnamese authorities to indigenous personnel through the Civilian Personnel Office should be studied in an attempt to expedite the process.

j. (Section II, Part II, para B6) Concur. Recommend heavy duty shock absorbers, springs and tires for  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles which use armor plating and sandbagging be introduced into the logistical system in this theater. Based on experience gained over the past sixty days in the use of armor plating and sandbagging of vehicles used for MP escort, recommend that those units utilizing armor plating be authorized a 30 day PLL stockage instead of the current 15 day authorization.

k. (Section II, Part II, para B7) Concur. The shortages of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles and the accompanying lack of spare parts within this battalion have great impact on the unit's ability to successfully support combat operations.

14


UNCLASSIFIED

15

# UNCLASSIFIED

AVBGF (11 November 1966) 1st Ind 24 November 1966  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

3. (U) The Commanding Officer, 504th Military Police Battalion, has been provided with a copy of this indorsement for his planning and guidance. A thorough explanation of all nonconcurrences has also been provided.

  
LOUIS J. KLEKAS  
Colonel MPC  
Commanding

RECEIVED

15

RECEIVED

# UNCLASSIFIED

17  
**SECRET**

AVBGF-K-0 (November 1966) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October  
1966, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96307 22 December 1966

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966, of the 504th Military Police Battalion is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the report and the first indorsement, considers them adequate, generally concurs with observations and recommendations and adds the following comments:

a. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph B3, page 3. Concur. This headquarters has forwarded a recommendation to Headquarters, USARV requesting that R & R promotional material be made available in larger quantities. The Brigade newspaper prints a monthly column concerning R & R sites.

b. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph B6, page 3 and paragraph 2b, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

c. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph E2, page 6. The new AN/VRC 46 and 47 type radios have been installed as of 5 December 1966.

d. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph F1, page 6 and paragraph 2c, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. This headquarters has submitted required personnel requisitions to USARV.

e. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph A, Item: Intra-Theater Rotation of Key Personnel, page 7, Section II, Part II, paragraph A, page 12 and paragraph 2d, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

f. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, Item: Pedestal Mounts on  $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Vehicles, page 8, Item: Extra Radios AN/VRC 25 per Military Police Squad, page 9. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. Unit has been advised to prepare and forward, concurrently, USARV Form 47 and a revised Section III (Equipment) to the MTC submitted by the 504th MP Battalion on 17 May 1966.

g. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, page 7, Section II, Part II, paragraph B1, page 12 and paragraph 2e, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. USARV Regulation 190-3, now under revision will

REGRADED, Confidential  
when separated from  
~~inclusion base letter.~~

16

ARVd

HQ USARPAC

S-67-1238

4413

**SECRET**

Incl 1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

18

AVBGF-K-0 (14 November 1966) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October  
1966, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65

elaborate on documentation requirements for capturing units, standard reporting procedures and the responsibility for land or sea transport of PW's. It will provide definite guidance for handling of PW's in medical channels. Although no priorities for PW air evacuation have been provided, the regulation provides that transport of 50 or more PW's by aircraft will be provided within 72 hours of the request.

h. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E, Item: Shortage of  $\frac{1}{4}$ -Ton Vehicles, page 11 and paragraph 2f, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

i. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B2, 3, page 12 and paragraph 2g, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.


j. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B4, page 12 and paragraph 2h, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. The objective is to release the maximum number of operational military police personnel from administrative duties.

k. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B5, page 12 and paragraph 2i, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

l. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B6, page 12 and paragraph 2j, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

m. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B7, page 12 and paragraph 2k, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. Spare parts and critical shortages are reported weekly by this headquarters to USARV on the Periodic Logistics Report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CLAUDE S. OWEN  
CPT, MPC  
Adjutant

17

**CONFIDENTIAL**

19  
**SECRET**

AVHGC-DH (14 Nov 66) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 22 FEB 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion (Army) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph B, Part I, Section II, Item: Evacuation of Prisoners of War, Page 7; and Paragraph B1, Part II, Section II, Page 12; USARV Regulation 190-2, Evacuating, Processing and Accounting for Prisoners of War, dated 20 January 1967, has been distributed to company level. The above regulation established responsibilities and procedures for the evacuation, processing, and custodial accounting for prisoners of war captured by or delivered to US Military Forces.

b. Reference Paragraph D, Part I, Section II, Page 10; Paragraph B5, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 2i, 1st Indorsement:

(1) The problem of obtaining security clearances from Military Security Service (MSS) has been studied on numerous occasions and has been presented to MACV and the Ambassador's Civilian Manpower Committee on at least three different occasions. The Government of Viet Nam (GVN) is steadfast in its requirement for the two sponsors for clearances of direct-hire Vietnamese employees of the US Forces. They claim their offices are understaffed and there are great difficulties involved in running the equivalent of National Agency checks due to the great migration of people as a result of the war.

(2) The Office of the Civilian Personnel Director (OCPD) has added personnel to the staffs of most regional MSS offices in an attempt to expedite clearances. The time required to obtain clearances has improved considerably in the last 18 months. In most instances the delay in obtaining clearances has been caused by the individuals themselves not taking their sponsors to the MSS offices. It is difficult to believe that it takes 5 months to receive a clearance if the individual is prompt in taking his sponsors to the MSS office.

Incl 1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

**SECRET**

SECRET

20

AVHGC-DH (14 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Action to improve the MSS clearance system is a continuing priority item of OCPD.

c. Reference Paragraph B3, Section I, Page 3; and Paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: It has been emphasized to all commands that 100% utilization of R&R allocations is essential. An aggressive program has been initiated, through promotion and command emphasis, to improve the utilization of all authorized R&R areas. Additional promotional material has been obtained from R&R areas and has been provided to all units.

d. Reference Paragraph E, Part I, Section II, Item: Replacement Parts for Vehicles, Pages 10 and 11; Paragraph B6, Part II, Section II, Page 12; Paragraph 2j, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2l, 2d Indorsement:

(1) The overload spring kit is authorized only for truck  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton M151A1C. This headquarters has previously requested modification of the truck  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton M151.

(2) The problem of obtaining adequate parts supply is appreciated. This is a continuing problem that requires time and experience to rectify. Heavy demands eventually result in greater stockage by supporting supply activities. Increase of the unit PLL to 30 days as proposed will not provide the desired results but only further spread already scarce assets. The appropriate interim solution to this problem is the Red Ball Express Program.

e. Reference Paragraph E, Part I, Section II, Item: Shortage of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Vehicles, Pages 11 and 12; Paragraph B7, Part II, Section II, Page 12; Paragraph 2k, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: Theater receipts on replacement  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks have not been adequate to satisfy all requirements. However, recent receipts have alleviated most priority requirements for this vehicle. Follow-up actions noted appear appropriate to resolution of the problem experienced by the 504th Military Police Battalion.

19

Incl 1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

SECRET

21

**SECRET**

AVHGC-DH (14 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

f. Reference Paragraph 2f, 2d Indorsement: The action stated  
is the appropriate action to be taken. Referenced MTOE was forwarded  
to USARPAC on 8 June 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt. AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

20

201

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

**SECRET**