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Section I. Operations: Significant Activities

1. (U) General: The 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) consists of a headquarters and headquarters battery, service battery and three howitzer batteries. (Incl 1)

2. (0) Intelligence: With the movement of A/3/6 to Artillery Hill for the period 14 May - 26 July more emphasis was placed on targeting in developing targets within the Pleiku Defense area for interdiction targets. Targets were also developed for 155, 8in and 175mm in order to be able to employ these weapons should they be available on Artillery Hill. Targets were also developed for QL lHN in coordination with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). These targets were used by A/3/6 on hip shoots to provide artillery coverage for convoys moving on QL lHN.

Pattern analysis has been started on rocket and mortar attacks and mining incidents in order to provide information for targeting purposes. It is hoped that from pattern analysis, resulting interdiction and acquired fires will deter the enemy in his planned attacks and road interdiction programs.

Extensive use is made of aircraft in target acquisition and planning. The battalion normally has two O-1 aircraft made available to it by 52d Arty Group. The battalion has two observers on orders who do most of the flying. However, the limitation of two aerial observers in the battalion does not allow for an adequate number of observers. Three O-1 aircraft are often made available which requires additional aerial observers. These observers are normally provided by this battalion from its own resources, resulting in non-rated personnel flying a significant number of hours per month. Currently one well qualified NCO is on orders as an air observer and has performed in an outstanding manner.

3. (C) Operations and Training.

   a. Operations.

(1) References:

   (a) Artillery SITREP 1 May to 31 July.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RGCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) Daily Staff Journal (Operations/Intell).

(2) Attachments and detachments:

(a) Attachments: One Platoon, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery was temporarily attached to the battalion during the period 19-21 June 1968.

(b) Detachments:

(1) Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery was detached from the battalion and temporarily attached to the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery on 10 March 1968 for a period extending until 14 May 1968.

(2) Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery, was detached from the battalion and temporarily attached to the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery on 26 July 1968 for a period of 30-60 days.

(3) The battalion was assigned the following missions for the periods indicated.

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PERIOD

20 - 24 Jul 68
Battery B, GSR 2d Bn, 9th Arty, 1st Inf Div.

20 - 21 Jul 68
Battery C, GSR 2d Bn, 9th Arty, 1st Inf Div.

21 - 24 Jul 68
Battery C, DS 2d Bn, 8th Inf, 1st Inf Div.

26 - 31 Jul 68
Battery A, DS 2d Bn, 8th Inf, 1st Inf Div.

24 - 31 Jul 68
Battery B, DS 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 1st Inf Div.

26 - 31 Jul 68
Battery C, Temporarily attached to 7th Bn, 13th Arty with mission of GS US, RVNAF, and FIDAF.

(h) 1 May found the battalion operations section split between two locations. The operations center was located at Artillery Hill (ZA2253) with forward operations center located at the Oasis (ZA1127). The S3 controlled the primary operations center while the forward operations center was under the control of the assistant S3. The battalion also had a liaison officer with 1st Battalion, 12th Artillery, 1st Inf Div at the forward operations center. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery were located on Artillery Hill with the mission of general support US, RVNAF and FIDAF. On 1 May the forward operations center was returned to Artillery Hill to assume the tactical and technical fire direction control of all US artillery firing in the Pleiku Defense Area. On 15 May the battalion committed a LMO with the 3d Armored Cav Regt (ARVN). This was the first of many steps taken by the battalion to coordinate activities with the 3d ACR (ARVN) which have helped to improve relations and increased coordination between US and ARVN in the Pleiku area. On 21 May the battalion initiated fire supports north along Highway 14N to extend light artillery coverage along this critical route. The battalion initiated an operations plan to coordinate artillery activities along the highway and effected direct coordination with all ARVN and US elements in the area. Preplanned targets were coordinated with the 3d ACR (ARVN) senior advisors and issued to all firing units within range. This close coordination paid dividends on 1 June when Battery A, 3d Arty, 6th Arty was located in a forward firing position firing preplanned targets when the north bound convoy on Hwy 14N was ambushed by an estimated company-size force of NVA. Results of the action was a completely unsuccessful enemy ambush, with 15 NVA KIA, six of these credited to artillery. On 3 July the battalion CP was moved from Artillery Hill (ZA2253) to the Oasis (ZA1127) in order to improve fire control for all 52d Artillery Group support operations in the area west of Pleiku. LTC Kratzor, the Bn CO, moved with this element to assume the additional duties of fire support coordinator for 52d Artillery Group units in this area.
On 16 July this headquarters participated in 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div Operation Bold. A forward CP, including CO 3/6 Arty, was dispatched to vic Duc Co (YA8325) to coordinate all 52d Group artillery fires in support of the task force. This forward headquarters assisted in coordinating the preparations which were fired into the objective area and was prepared to coordinate artillery support in case of contact or counterbattery fire. For the 15 hour period of this operation two 8" howitzers from A/6/14 and two 175mm guns from C/5/22 were under 3/6 Arty operational control, as well as C/3/6 Arty which was the DS battery for the operation. The forward headquarters returned to the Oasis upon completion of the operation at 2100 hours 16 July. On 19 July the battalion assumed temporary control of all US artillery in what was then the 2d BDE AO when the 2d Brigade Headquarters departed the area enroute to Ban Me Thuot. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div arrived at the Oasis (ZA1027) on 19-20 July, and fire support coordination responsibilities were assumed by the 2d Bn, 9th Arty on 20 July 1968.

(5) From 1 - 14 May, Battery A was in position at BR262472. The battery was temporarily attached to 2d Bn, 17th Arty with mission of GSR 2d Bn, 17th Arty during this period. The battery provided convoy coverage for Highway 193 through the Mang Yang Pass. On 6 May Battery A received a mortar attack at 1800 hours. There were six members of the battery wounded in the action and minor damage was done to several vehicles. Although one of its M108 howitzers took a direct hit on top of its turret during the attack with an 82mm mortar, only very minor damage resulted. On 14 May the battery departed the Mang Yang Pass area (BR262472) and returned to Artillery Hill (ZA2253). The battalion also closed down its FO post overlooking the Mang Yang Pass and its radio relay station at Camp Enari.

(6) From 1 May 68 to 19 Jun 68, Battery B had the mission of direct support, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cavalry, 4th Inf Div.

(a) On 1 May 68 Battery B was located at ZA121671. On 2 May they fired on a VC platoon at ZA154272 resulting in two VC KIA and one small secondary explosion. On 3 May they attacked a bunker complex at ZA0419699, resulting in several bunkers damaged.

(b) On 5 May Battery B moved from ZA121671 to ZA112765. They fired on an estimated VC company which was observed by a Special Forces unit at ZA072737. On 7 May they attacked a bunker complex with 66 rounds of HE. A sweep of the area found 15 NVA packs and numerous documents. During this period they also fired on numerous intelligence targets.

(c) On 16 May Battery B displaced to ZA073747 and on 17 May fired on lights observed by a LRRP and extinguished the lights. They also fired on movement throughout that day around the same LRRP's position; however, they were not able to gain surveillance because the LRRP was extracted soon afterwards from the area. On 18 May the battery fired 270 rounds on escape routes out of the area of a B-52 strike and another 167 rounds on ZA022815 when the bomb assessment team was fired on while checking the area. On 19 May at ZA021817 the battery again fired on an area where
Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

aircraft received ground fire. On 21 May an FO observed lights at 2A180745. This grid was taken under fire and the lights were extinguished.

(d) On 22 May the battery fired the first 144 rounds fired by the battalion at 2A020770. A LRRP via L.0277 observed numerous lights and heavy movement all around his position. The team commenced the mission at 2030 hours adjusting with HE, smoke and white phosphorous. When adjustment was completed the battery fired 9 rounds of firecracker within 100 meters of the friendly position. The LRRP team was extracted next morning with an incomplete surveillance of the area, however, they did confirm 2 enemy KIA within 100 meters of their location. Four individuals wounded by conventional artillery surrendered the next day over 4 kilometers from the contact point. After the firecracker was fired, the LRRP reported lights were extinguished and movement ceased.

(e) Also on 22 May the battery fired on campfires at 2A992718 and extinguished the campfires. On 23 May the battery was adjusted on a bridge at 2A082838 and destroyed the bridge. At 2A988732 they fired on 40-50 VC with the results 1 VC KIA (confirmed), with 4 prisoners taken. The battery also engaged VC at 2A008271 but checked fire in favor of heavier artillery because of heavy canopy. On 25 May a LRRP had contact at 2A982705 and was supported by Battery B. After the contact a sweep of the area found numerous blood trails but no casualties.

(f) On 28 May Battery B moved from 2A073147 to 2A120483 continuing their mission of direct support to 1/10 Cav. On 30 May the battery fired on 8 bunkers at 2A082859 destroying the bunkers.

(g) On 3 June Battery B displaced to 2A080218 to counter a possible enemy buildup south of the Oasis. This buildup did not materialize, and no significant firing was done from this location.

(h) On 11 June the battery again displaced, moving to engage the 953 NVA Regiment at BR007388. On 11 June the battery fired on bunker complexes at BR007090, 066295 and 065293 and killed 2 NVA while heavily damaging the bunker complexes. On 13 June the battery again attacked a bunker system at BR17313 but was unable to gain significant surveillance. The battery also fired on a recoilless rifle spotted by a LRRP but again no significant surveillance was obtained. On 14 June the battery again fired in support of a LRRP who heard voices and detected movement. The battery fired 11 rounds which caused the movement to cease.

(i) On 15 June Battery B moved from BR007338 to 2A120403. They remained at this location until 19 June firing on intelligence targets, and firing interdictory fires near Pleiku. On 19 June the battery temporarily assumed the mission of DS 2d Bn, 8th Inf (Mech), 1st Inf Div.

(7) On 1 May 1968 Battery C, 3d Bn, 6th Arty had the mission of General Support-Reinforcing the 4th Bn, 2d Arty, 1st Inf Div. Battery C was located
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at the Rock Quarry at ZA065311. Battery C completed a monsoon base camp at
this location and remained at the Rock Quarry until 20 July. Significant
firings for the battery took place on 16 May when the battery supported a
LPRP in contact at ZA053229, allowing the LPRP to break contact. On 26 May
the battery fired in support of Edap Enang when the village was probed by
an unknown-sized enemy force, assisting the RF - PF forces in beating back
the attack. On 2 June the battery attacked a bunker complex at ZA086333
and damaged 3 bunkers. On 2 July the battery supported C Company, 2d BN,
8th Inf in contact at ZA115399. Throughout the entire period Battery C
fired on numerous intelligence targets north of the Oasis vic ZA0637. Battery
C also provided convoy coverage for convoys moving on Highway 19W from the
Oasis to Polei Ujerang. To cover these convoys Battery C conducted hip
shoots with three howitzers west on Highway 19W. Battery C maintained the
capability to hip shoot on 15-minute notice, and on one occasion moved to
support a contact south of the Oasis, accomplishing the movement and prep-
paration to fire within one hour of receiving the order to move. On 16 July
Battery C displaced to the west of Duc Co (ZA775221) in order to support
Task Force Gold. The battery fired over 4,000 rounds in preparations to
support the infantry company conducting the raid. The battery returned to
the Rock Quarry at 1930 that day.

(a) On 14 May Battery A moved from their position near the Mang
Yang Pass (322621972) to Artillery Hill (ZA2252) to assume the mission of
Pleiku defense. They provided artillery support to the Pleiku area defense
from this location until 26 July 1968.

On 14 May Battery A (-) moved from their position near the Mang
Yang Pass (322621972) to Artillery Hill (ZA2252) to assume the mission of
Pleiku defense. They provided artillery support to the Pleiku area defense
from this location until 26 July 1968.

(b) On 15 May the battery assigned one of its forward observers
as a liaison officer with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). The
battalion conducted liaison with all ARVN elements in the area to coordi-
ate Battery's participation in defense of all units in the Pleiku area. On
22 May Battery A (-) with three guns conducted the first of many hip shoots
north on QL 11n. This hip shoot was to a firing position in the vicinity of
ZA189641, and several intelligence targets in the area were fired upon. On
27 May the battery fired on an area where an aircraft received ground fire
at ZA223642. The firing ceased. On 28 May the battery fired in 12 de-
fensive targets for the village of Minh Duc (44165604).

(c) On 25 May the battery fired 24 rounds on a mortar position
firing at the Montagnard Training Center. On 29 and 30 May the battery fired
on 11 acquired targets, helping to prevent an anticipated attack on Pleiku.

(c) On 4 June Battery A with 3 guns moved on a hip shoot to
ZA1689641. While at this location they began firing on intelligence targets
provided by LNO with 3d ACR (ARVN), expending 20 rounds in the vicinity of
ZA071. At approximately 1000 hours the north bound convoy security detected
an ambush at ZA203720. The battery initiated fire within one minute on this
area and continued to fire throughout the morning in a well-coordinated effort
in which three US and ARVN artillery batteries and gunships were employed in
the ambush area. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) reacted immediately
and averted a major ambush on the highway. The battery received a sniper
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A rocket attack while in position but continued its mission with two guns while the
other gun directed beehive and HE fire at suspected sniper positions. The
battery was credited with 5 of the 15 known NVA killed in this action. (See
Incl h)

(d) On 5 June a rocket attack was made against the Pleiku area.
The battery initiated counterbattery fire and fired on several acquired tar-
gets expending 219 rounds. A later sweep of the rocket firing position
discovered several bloody rag and bloody trousers. Each day during the
period 6 - 13 June the battery conducted one day hip shoots north on Highway 1N.
On 6 June the battery fired a heavy counterbattery program to
counter a mortar attack on Camp Holloway (AR7816).

(e) On 15 June Battery A fired on ZA215537 where a ARVN out-
post was receiving small arms fire, resulting in the small arms fire being
suppressed. On 16 June the battery fired on moving lights at AR816565 and
put out the lights. Also on 16 June a patrol operating from Artillery Hill
contacted 30 - 35 NVA via ZA715253. Battery A fired 117 rounds in support
of the contact and on exfiltration routes, in addition to providing con-
tinuous illumination for the patrol. Again on 17 June a patrol was in con-
tact at ZA715523. Battery A fired 11 HE in support of the contact and 83
HE on exfiltration routes. A sweep of the area found numerous blood trails
and abandoned equipment. Throughout the remainder of June the battery con-
tinued to fire on acquired targets, and to fire interdictory fires in order
to assist in preventing attacks on the Pleiku area.

(f) On 28 June another patrol from Artillery Hill came in
contact with a small enemy force at ZA206560. Battery A fired 21 rounds in
support of the contact and 72 HE into the area, however, a later sweep of
the area turned up nothing. Engineer Hill received a mortar attack on the
night of 2 July with Battery A supporting with counterbattery fire into the
area with unknown results.

(g) On 5 July Battery A conducted a hip shoot north on High-
way 1N to cover an engineer work party repairing the road to Plei Mrong.
There was no significant activity encountered during this operation. On
11 July and 12 July Battery A also conducted hip shoots north to fire in-
telligence targets and to support convoys along Highway 1N.

(h) On 14 July the new ASP in Pleiku received a mortar attack
at 0131 hours. Battery A responded by firing its countermortar program and
then by firing on the mortar position as determined by a radar plot. The
mortar fire ceased during the countermortar fire, however, no other sig-
nificant results were obtained.

(i) Battery A with three guns assumed the additional
mission of direct support to 1st BN, 2d Inf (ARVN). This operation lasted
until 21 June.

(a) Battery A moved to AR810190 arriving at 0900 hours. The
Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSF/R-65 (R1) (U)

Battery fired a preparation for 2 companies of ARVN infantry making a combat assault. On the night of 18 June they fired a heavy interdiction program at the request of ARVN personnel at Phu Nhun sector headquarters. On 19 June they fired on an acquired target requested by ARVN FOs, firing a total of 13 HE rounds. Again on the night of 20 June a heavy interdiction program was fired for ARVN personnel in Phu Nhun sector to prevent exfiltration of VC elements from the 1/42d Inf area of operations. On 21 June the three guns returned to Artillery Hill (Z2253) and were relieved of the mission of direct support 1st Bn, 42d Inf (ARVN).

(b) During this operation the 3/6 Arty furnished 1 FO and 1 LNO to the 1/42d Inf (ARVN). Also 52d Arty Group supplied an additional FO. The forward maneuver companies each had an American FO as well as an ARVN FO. The entire operation netted several tons of rice and improved the coordination between US and ARVN elements.

(10) On 21 June Battery A with three guns was again assigned the mission of direct support 1st Bn, 42d Inf (ARVN).

(a) The battery (-) moved to AR8521H9 to support a two company combat assault via AR910. The battery fired 5 preparation missions, for a total of 79 rounds, into the assault area. On 25 June the battery fired acquired targets for the 1/42d Inf (ARVN). They also fired the interdiction program requested by the ARVN commander nightly throughout the operation in addition to several intelligence targets in the area.

(b) The battalion again furnished FOs and an LNO for this operation. Continued improvement in coordination with ARVN was made on this operation. An "After Action Report" was forwarded to I FFORCEV Arty on 1 July concerning the results of both operations with the 1st Bn, 42d Inf (ARVN). (See Inc 3)

(c) On 26 June Battery A (-) moved from AR8531H9 to AR896117 to give better support to the 1/42d Inf forward companies. On 27 June the operation was completed and Battery A (-) returned to Artillery Hill, thus terminating their mission of direct support 1/42d Inf (ARVN).

(11) On 19 June Battery B moved from ZA12H03 to YA8575H0 to assume the mission of direct support 2d Bn, 8th Inf, 4th Inf Div. They fired three preparations on 20 June for elements of 1st Bn, 12th Inf which were conducting combat assaults into the area. On 21 June Battery B was relieved in place by Battery B, 4th Bn, 42d Arty and reassigned the mission of direct support 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav.

(12) On 21 June Battery B moved from YA8575H0 to ZA0515H5 to an area known as VC valley, in order to support 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 4th Inf Div.

(a) On 21 June they expended 92 rounds in preparations for 1st Bn, 22d Inf, 4th Inf Div who were being lifted into the area.
(b) On 22 June Battery B moved from 21051245 to 21076475, and on 23 June further displaced to 21076475.

(c) On 23 June Battery B moved from 2106530 to 2107322 in order to support operations designed to destroy the NVA 95P Regiment. On 26 June at 21100390 Battery B engaged an enemy force sniping at A/LNA. The small arms fire ceased after the battery expended 12 rounds.

(d) On 27 June Battery B displaced to 21067372 to give more effective coverage of VC Valley. The battery fired an extensive program on acquired intelligence targets in VC Valley on the nights of 27-28 June. On the 27th the battery also engaged camp fires at 21098388 with undetermined results. On 28 June the battery supported C/1/22 and A/1/22 in contact. The battery fired a total of 10 rounds, but the mission was terminated upon the arrival of gunships. On 29 June the battery again supported C/1/22 in contact with 19 HE. There was no significant surveillance resulting from this firing.

(e) On 1 July Battery B moved to 21065330. While en route Battery B conducted a true hip shoot when elements of 1/22 Inf made contact at 21103384. The battery fired 119 HE in support of the contact with no known results.

(f) On 2 July Battery B displaced from 21065330 to 21152336 to support operations near Duc Co. The battery did no significant firing during this period.

(13) On 6 July Battery B moved to 21169065 to assume the mission of General Support US, RVNAF, F/FMAF in the Plei Ne area. The battery did not significant firing while in the Plei Ne area.

(14) On 13 July Battery B moved to the Oasis (21103277) and received the mission of GS 4th Inf Div. The battery conducted a hip shoot on 20 July to 21169339 to support elements of the 4th Inf Div making a sweep of the division TACR.

(15) On 20 July the mission of Battery C changed from GSR 1st BN, 2d Arty to GSR 2d BN, 9th Arty. This change was caused by the departure of the 2d BN, 9th Arty along with 2d Bde, 6th Inf Div from the Oasis area and the movement of 2d BN, 9th Arty along with 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div to the Oasis.

(16) On 20 July the mission of Battery B, 3d BN, 6th Artillery was changed to GSR 2d BN, 9th Arty. The battery displaced to 21090145 on 21 July.

(17) On 21 July Battery C, 3d BN, 6th Artillery was assigned the mission of DS 2d BN, 8th Inf, 4th Inf Div.

(a) On 21 July Battery C moved to Plei Mrong (211167) to support operations in that area. They displaced from that position to a new position via 21126166 on 23 July in order to support operations by 3/8 Inf.

Confidential
(b) On 25 July Battery C received word to prepare for movement to 1st Arty Group control. They were released from the mission of DS 2/7 on that date and commenced movement to the coast, passing to 1st Arty Group.

(18) On 27 July Battery E, 3rd Battalion was assigned the mission of DS 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 1st Inf Div. The battery moved to Vic YA89636 that same day, and remained there through the close of the period.

(19) On 26 July Battery A, 3rd Bn, 6th Arty was assigned the mission of DS 2/8 Inf and departed Artillery Hill for a position at ZA199202. On 27 July the battery moved to ZA168336, on 28 July to ZA180160, and on 31 July to AR832180. All moves were to support 2/8 Inf. There was no significant firing from any of these locations.

(20) On 27 July Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery and Battery A, 6th Battalion, 1st Arty Group, 1st Arty Group came under the operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Arty Group. This move was done in order to facilitate the control of 3rd Artillery Group units located west of Pleiku and is for a definite period.

(21) During the reporting period the battalion completed a tube change for twelve of its howitzers.

(22) On 6-7 May Battery C fired in defensive targets for the village of Ngaap Ang and conducted instruction for the local garrison on the techniques of artillery adjustment.

(23) On 19 May the battalion initiated the policy of conducting daily reaction tests to improve the responsiveness of the firing batteries. By the end of the reporting period, the batteries had been able to reduce their reaction times to under two and a half minutes from the receipt of the fire mission.

(24) On 23 May one man from C/3/6 drowned while crossing a river via YA9872 while serving as RTO on an FO mission with CSF elements from Plei Mrong.

(25) During the month of May the Battery Test and Evaluation team conducted a test of all firing battery sections throughout the battalion.

(26) On 3 June Battery B had one bunker collapse which injured three men. One man required medical evacuation for minor injuries.

(27) On 14 and 15 June all howitzers in the battalion were calibrated using charges 6 and 7.

(28) At frequent intervals during the reporting period the battalion committed FOs to operations with ARVN and CSF elements. Also Battery C periodically committed one assistant Executive Officer as a forward observer to Ngaap Ang to give better artillery support to this installation.
SUNRISE:

SUNRISE:

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The battalion was host to B/6/84, C/6/84, Hq/6/84 and 13/7/15 when these units passed through Pleiku to the Polei Klang area and to B/7/15 when it returned through Pleiku on their way back to lst Arty Gp control.

On 22 June the battalion established a forward radio relay station at Camp Enari to improve radio communications with batteries A and B. This relay station was terminated on 8 July when the battalion forward OP moved to Oasis.

On 1 July the battalion received an inspection from the I FFO'CEV Arty inspection team. All units in the battalion were inspected.

On 23 July A/3/6 fired 30 firecracker in service practice.

The battalion operated in MacArthur AO for 92 days. A total of 52 days of troop movement occurred during the reporting period. Training was conducted by elements of the battalion each day. 92 days of training were completed. 23196 rounds were expended during the reporting period.

b. Training: The following significant training was conducted during the reporting period.

1. Five newly assigned officers attended the I FFO'CEV Artillery Fire Direction school.

2. Seven E2 attended a special Fire Direction course conducted by the 52d Arty Group FDO school.

3. The bn furnished one fire direction instructor to the 52d Arty Group to assist in conducting fire direction classes to Special Forces personnel.

4. Recently the bn's three howitzer batteries and a portion ofSvc Arty exchanged their M-14 rifles for M-16's. An 8 hour block of instruction was conducted for those personnel. The instruction included care, cleaning, assembly, disassembly, serving and familiarization firing of the weapon.

5. Unannounced reaction tests were conducted periodically by the commander and his staff. The average reaction time was 2 minutes, 20 seconds.

6. Section evaluation was administered to all sections within the battalion.

7. Crew-served and small arms weapons firing were conducted at least bi-weekly to insure that all personnel were familiar with their assigned weapons.

8. Direct fire exercises were conducted periodically using both HE and BH ammunition.

Confidential
Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

1. (C) Personnel.
   
a. In-Country R&Rs:

   (1) OBSERVATION: Unit personnel should be fully briefed as to transportation routings and procedures prior to their being sent on in-country rest and recuperation leave.

   (2) EVALUATION: Personnel sent on short duration in-country R&Rs have experienced time delays in both transportation and processing at the R&R center. Personnel have experienced many hours of waiting in the "wrong lane" or going to the wrong place in areas that are unfamiliar to them within the centers resulting in an excessive amount of time being spent in transit to and from R&R, sometimes causing a man to have an abbreviated stay at the R&R center. A thorough briefing on the best routes to travel and proper administrative procedures to follow upon arrival at the center should be given each man prior to his leaving the unit.

   (3) RECOMMENDATION: That units insure personnel are properly briefed prior to departing their units on the best route to travel and on what administrative action will be required of them at the R&R center in order to insure that the maximum amount of time spent away from unit on R&R is spent at the R&R center and not in a travel status.

   b. Alternate Mail Clerks.

   (1) OBSERVATION: Mail should be delivered to personnel by the safest and most expedient means available.

   (2) EVALUATION: Isolated fire bases at times are receiving mail only during a scheduled convoy resupply. These convoy resupply runs are often infrequent due to weather and enemy situation. This unit has designated staff officers as alternate mail clerks so that mail may be delivered during frequent helicopter visits to isolated bases by those staff officers.

   (3) RECOMMENDATION: That other units designate staff officers as alternate mail clerks so that they can carry mail with them in accordance with current army regulations dealing with mail handling when making staff visits via helicopter to isolated fire bases.

2. (C) Operations.

   a. Artillery Fire Support Coordination.

   (1) OBSERVATION: During the conduct of operations in the Pleiku area of defense the battalion has committed a liaison officer with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). The 3d ACR (ARVN) is tasked with securing Highway QL 1HN between Pleiku and Kontum.
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AVCC-BV-4P

2 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, NCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(2) EVALUATION: On 15 May the liaison officer was placed with the regimental headquarters to coordinate the battalion's fire support along Highway QL 141. This liaison officer had the responsibility to coordinate the activities of all US artillery supporting the 3d ACR (ARVN) along the highway. He had the additional responsibility for clearing artillery fires through the regimental headquarters within the 3d ACR (ARVN) AO. This liaison proved highly effective in countering VC attempts to interdict traffic along the highway by bringing responsive artillery to bear rapidly on any ambush attempt.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Each unit should place a knowledgeable American artillery officer at each major ARVN operational headquarters within a unit's area of interest. This will facilitate rapid artillery response to all subordinate ARVN elements in the area.

b. Communications between US and ARVN elements.

(1) OBSERVATION: An interpreter should be furnished to each liaison officer, and if possible with each forward observer, when these personnel are committed with indigenous forces.

(2) EVALUATION: The battalion conducted several operations with local ARVN units, all of which were fairly successful, the measure of success achieved partially due to the fact that the elements had no major contacts with enemy forces. The observers spoke a little Vietnamese and the ARVN's spoke some English. However, in critical situations it is believed these fragile communications links would have broken down and the forward observers would have had to rely on their own understanding to work with the local commander. Therefore, it would not have been possible to adequately advise the commander on how to properly employ his artillery support.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: At least one qualified interpreter should be assigned to assist American artillery liaison officers, and if possible, forward observers, when US elements are supporting indigenous operations. This could be accomplished by placing a limited number of interpreters with each US artillery battalion on a full-time basis. This battalion now has one full-time interpreter assigned.

c. Reaction time.

(1) OBSERVATION: There is often an excessive amount of delay in engaging targets due to lack of responsiveness in the firing battery.

(2) EVALUATION: There have been many instances in which artillery has been too slow in responding to enemy attacks by fire and contacts with friendly troops. This is in part due to a lack of training within the firing battery. To reduce this problem this battalion has initiated a program of reaction tests to improve the responsiveness of its units. In the Pleiku area CSFC gives a daily reaction test to the battery firing in the Pleiku Defense Area, also the Battalion gives reaction tests nightly to each of its batteries.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) Concur in the basic report and the recommendations in Section 2, Lessons Learned.

JESMOND D. BALMER JR
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVGG-LA-OP 2 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Higher headquarters should give frequent reaction tests to all subordinate firing units to determine how rapidly their firing units can react to immediate fire requests. These tests should be given at least weekly. Each test mission should be sent to the firing unit as a fire mission. Requests for fire should be varied to call for different shell-fuze combinations to be fired. Proper procedures in the fire direction center should be stressed to improve the responsiveness of the firing battery.

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (C) Logistics:

a. OBSERVATION: The helicopter flying time required to resupply Class V to an artillery battery was excessive in an area not accessible by wheeled vehicles from the base camp.

b. EVALUATION: Although the firing battery in question was in an area inaccessible by road, there were nearby secure FSB's located along good all weather roads where Class V could be prepositioned for immediate air lift. Class V in airlift configuration could be loaded into 5T cargo trucks at the battalion trains area and dispatched to the nearest secure location to the battery area that could be reached by road. From this forward location, the loads could be picked up with a significant reduction in flying time for a multi-sortie requirement.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible pre-load Class V in airlift configuration in 5T trucks. Utilizing existing roads to secure locations to the maximum extent possible, preposition the loads at the nearest practical point to the battery. At least the normal requirement per resupply day, plus a backup for use in case of tactical emergency requirements, should be on hand at the forward location at all times.


7. (U) Other. None.

Incl ALONZO S. KRETZER
as LTC, Arty Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CINCPAC ATTN: GPO-DT
3 - CG USARV ATTN: AVHGC (DST)
6 - CO 52D Arty Group
15 - CO 3d, 6th Arty
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Total ammunition expended by type:
   a. He 21,660
   b. Illumination 729
   c. White Phosphorous 137
   d. Smoke 788
   e. Bocheive 23
   f. Propaganda 4
   g. Heat 18
   h. Firecracker 39

2. Ammunition expended by type mission by btry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
   a. Confirmed | 429 | 1707| 190 |
   b. Acquired   | 306 | 277 | 1859|
   c. Counterbattery | 567 | 230 |
   d. Preparation | 433 | 949 | 439 |
   e. Interdiction | 4255| 1119| 267 |
   f. Special Purpose | 1913| 1501| 1132|
   g. Other      | 250 | 57  | 64  |

3. Number of Enemy killed by artillery
   a. Battery A - 6
   b. Battery B - 10
   c. Battery C - 0

Incl 2
AVGO-BA-OP

30 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (C)

THRU: Commanding Officer
52d Artillery Group
APO 96318

TO: Commanding General
I FFORCE ARTILLERY
APO 96350

1. Identity: Operations of A/3/6 with 1/42 Infantry (ARVN) near Pleiku.


3. Location: Vicinity AR 8h0190 and 8511h9.


5. Reporting Officer: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery.

   3d Platoon, A Battery, 37th Artillery (ARVN).
   A Battery, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (-).

7. Intelligence:
   a. Enemy situation prior to operations:
      (1) 1 platoon operating in the area.
      (2) VC infrastructure in control of most villages.
   b. Enemy disposition prior to operations unknown.
   c. Enemy situation prior to operations:
      (1) Platoon was believed moving south to conduct an ambush on Highway 7B.
(2) Local villages were storing rice and arms for the Viet Cong.

(3) The area was being used as an infiltration and supply route from Cambodia to the east.

d. Enemy capabilities prior to the operations:

(1) Enemy had the capability to harass friendly troops, interdict roads, and supply food and ammunition to enemy troops infiltrating through the area.

(2) Enemy had the capabilities of introducing large infiltration groups into the area.

e. Enemy capabilities after the operations:

(1) Enemy has the capability to harass friendly troops, interdict roads, and has a limited capability to supply food and ammunition to enemy troops infiltrating through the areas.

(2) The capability to introduce infiltration groups into the area has been reduced but not eliminated. This capability can increase rapidly with no friendly units in the area of operations.

f. Summary of operations: 1/42d Infantry (ARVN) conducted two operations south of Pleiku. The object of these operations was to seize caches in the area. They found several rice caches (approximately 17 tons) and an ammunition cache.

9. Missions:

a. Mission of A/3/6 Arty (-) for the first operation was DS 1/42d Inf for a four day operation in vicinity of AR 8-19.

b. Mission of A/3/6 Arty (-) for the second operation was DS 1/42d Inf for a three day operation in vicinity of AR 9-15.

10. Concept of operations:

a. References:

(1) Operations Order 1, Hq 3d Bn, 6th Arty.

(2) Operations Order 2, Hq 3d Bn, 6th Arty.

(3) Operations Order 1/42d Infantry (ARVN).

b. A Battery (-), 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery supported the 1st Battalion, 42nd Infantry (ARVN) on two operations south of Pleiku.

c. The initial operation commenced on 18 June 1968. Headquarters 1/42nd Inf with A/3/6 (-) and C/2/21 Artillery established a fire base vic Incl 3.
AR 880190 at 0800 hours. A/3/6 (-) fired preparations for combat assaults by two companies, one from the 1/12th Inf and one RF company. The first assault was initiated at 0900 hours at grid AR 888198. The second assault commenced at 1000 hours at AR 940210. The units conducted operations in the AO's shown on map for four days. During the operations three rice caches and a small ammunition cache were found. The operation ended on 21 June 1968.

d. The second operation was initiated on 24 June 1968. Headquarters 1/42nd Infantry with A/3/6 (-) and A/3/37th Artillery (-) established a fire base vic AR 851149 at 0800 hours. A/3/6 fired preparations for combat assaults by two companies of the 1/42nd Infantry. The assaults went in at 1030 and 1100 hours. On this operation several rice caches were discovered and several suspects taken into custody. The operation lasted four days. The operation was completed at 1800 hours 27 June 1968.

o. Lt Lyons, 1/92nd Artillery and Lt Milan, 3/6 Artillery were the American FO's for the operation. A thorough debriefing of these individuals revealed the following information on the ARVN operations:

1. Due to the passage of time Lt Lyons was unable to give specific details on the first ARVN operation. Lt Milan had additional comments on both operations.

2. In the village of Plei Quak Kla (2) AR 857127 a youth 17 to 18 years old was found hiding from the ARVN. He later pointed out the location of a rice cache.

3. In the unnamed village at AR 759119 a search was conducted with negative results. One ARVN was lost near this village but later returned to the company after firing several rounds into the air. These rounds were initially reported as sniper fire but this proved incorrect.

4. Village shown on map at AR 973117 does not exist.

5. Three men were detained at AR 963115 when they followed the company out of Plei Quak Kla.

6. The vicinity of AR 970115 is heavily farmed and yet there is no village in the area. There were few other signs of people and there were no animals, hooches or other signs of inhabitance. A close search of the area produced one rice cache vic AR 976117.

(a) The entrance to the rice cache was 2' by 2' and was covered with leaves. Its location was near the base of a tree in such a location so that it could not be seen from the air. The cache had a large underground cavern 6' x 10' x 7' deep. Inside was a large straw matted bin filled with rice. The rice was loose in the bin and the bin was completely full. There were on distinctive trails loading to the cache. During the entire operation five rice caches were found. All were built in the same way and all were located at the base of trees in such a manner that they could not be seen from the air.

Incl 3
(b) The second rice cache was located 200 meters north of the

(c) The third rice cache was located at AR 973116 and a fourth

was found a day later near this location.

(7) The first prisoner was induced to describe the location of a
fifth rice cache. The cache was discovered exactly where he described it.
He also indicated the location of four more rice caches in the area but
these were not located by the ARVN prior to extraction. They did not search
for them. Also he described the location of a small arms cache but this was
not located for the same reason.

(8) Another rice cache was discovered by the second company at AR 973
118. The ARVN burned over 2 tons of rice at this location because it could
not be extracted. From the other caches they extracted over 2 tons of rice.

(9) Another VC suspect was detained at 980807. This individual
was thought to be a VC Lieutenant. He was dressed as a Montagnard, however
he spoke fluent French and Vietnamese, he had a pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals
in the basket he carried on his back and his feet were not callused. He also
answered questions put to him in the language he was questioned in. He had
a little boy with him who he claimed was his son.

(10) There is a village not shown on the map at AR 980122. From this
area a Caribou received small arms while flying from east to west and on 26
June troops received sniper fire from that general vicinity.

(11) Several caves were found in the river bank at AR 945166 and
ran to AR 945166. These caves had been used as evidenced by straw mats in
the caves. The villagers indicated they used these caves to hide from
artillery fire. This is unlikely because usually there is no artillery which
can fire into this area. Nothing was found in the caves except the straw mats.

f. The initial planning coordination for both operations was done by the
senior sector advisors and the S3 section of the 3/6 Artillery. The initial
preparations were planned prior to an aerial reconnaissance of the area by
the senior sector advisors. After the reconnaissance the landing zones were
altered, however, the 3/6 was not notified of the changes until the firing
battery commander was given an overlay at the linkup point. As a result the
preparations were incomplete on two occasions because rounds had to be ad
justed into the new area instead of the preplanned program being fired. On
all occasions the preplanned data was available long before the scheduled
preparation time.

g. The ARVN published an operation order but this was not given to the
artillery LNO prior to the operation.

h. The ARVN made adequate preparations for the use of aircraft, aerial
observers and helicopters and had satisfactory support in these areas.

i. There was a preplanned target list published by the ARVN for the

Incl 3
second operation but they had no target list for the first operation. The
preplanned target list they published was not given to the firing battery
until their arrival in the firing position. The preplanned targets were
never used by any observer.

j. The ARVN had FOs with all companies. Those FOs were augmented by
one US FO with each company.

k. On the second day of the second operation the ARVN decided to ex-
tend the AO to the southeast. This extension put the units operating in this
area outside the 105 range fan. One company moved into this area the same
day and found three rice caches. Because of these caches this unit remained
overnight in this area outside the 105 range fan. The US LNO did not know
of the AO extension until late in the day although the decision to extend
the AO was made much earlier. The 105 battery was not moved to cover this
area until the next day. The ARVN did plan a tentative nap shoot for the
second day but it was not initiated.

l. The US FOs worked closely with the ARVN FOs. Both prepared defensive
targets and then compared targets. On all occasions they discovered that
their defensive targets closely corresponded. Therefore the forward observers
put the same defensive targets to both the US and ARVN artillery units. Both
FOs had a copy of the locations of the targets and were capable of calling
for fires from either the ARVN or US artillery batteries. The ARVN FOs
could also call for defensive fires from either unit. The ARVN ground
commanders, both battalion and company, elected not to fire in defensive
targets. In some cases they felt the firing of defensive targets would give
away their position, however, in other night locations their positions would
have been well known to any enemy in the area. On those occasions defensive
targets should have been fired but were not attempted.

m. Both ARVN forward companies moved as sound tactical units. When
it was wise to split the companies into platoons this was done such as when
approaching a village or a likely ambush site. The consensus of opinion
of the ARVN was that both forward company commanders were highly professional
skilled soldiers who acted competently on all occasions.

n. The ARVN set out ambushes nightly around all positions to include
the battalion command post. Patrols were sent out daily from all locations.
The locations of the patrols and ambushes were always known at the battalion
CP and this information was given to the US liaison officer whenever they
changed.

o. The ARVN operated around the clock. All CPs were constantly manned
and operational.

p. The ARVN showed a great deal of skill in their utilization of
Artillery, with the exceptions already mentioned. They coordinated the fire
planning so that the ARVN 155s were concentrated primarily in the more dis-
tant AOs while the 105s were given responsibility for fires near the battalion
command post and for interdiction fires throughout the entire area.
Their interdictory program showed imagination and planning. Target sets contained logical points on enemy activity and were based on current intelligence.

The forward observers had communications difficulties because they were in a deep river valley. No thought was given to establishing a forward relay station near the edge of the valley.

Headquarters 3/6 published an operations order for A/3/6 Art' which was given to the ARVN's just prior to departure. This was inadequate time for them to integrate it in their operations plan. The battalion operations order should be published earlier to allow for proper integration into the A/3/6 operations plan.

The US advisors published no operations order.

There were no language difficulties experienced by any of the ARVN personnel because there were ARVN's in each unit who spoke English; however, if any serious contact would have developed the lack of an interpreter with either the FOs or the LNO would have made adequate US fire support difficult. On the first operation the FO was furnished an interpreter.

One ARVN FO planned targets along his route of march and sent them into the ARVN 155 battery. The US 105 battery did not receive these pre-planned targets. In their original fire plans the ARVN's did include targets along the route of march. The ARVN observers read maps well and were always able to locate their position accurately.

Countermortar targets were planned around the battalion command post area and were distributed to the US and ARVN batteries. However, no counter mortar targets were planned around the forward companies.

The choice of the position area for the howitzer in the first operation was not good. They were surrounded by high trees which at points were no farther than 50 meters from the guns. However, this was one of the few accessible areas which would allow 105 coverage of both landing zones. This was the reason for its selection. There was no reconnaissance made further east to determine if there was a better position in that location. The position occupied on the second operation was excellent.

The ARVN's provided excellent security for the firing battery. Each position contained barrier wire and numerous warning devices. The battalion commander moved to the hip shoot position with the 105's moving first and getting into position and then the 155's were moved. Both batteries had one company for security.

The ARVN's maintained a complete fire capabilities overlay at all times in their command post. They disseminated this information to both batteries.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

11. Recommendations:

a. ARVN units should fire in defensive targets for night locations.

b. An interpreter should be furnished each FO.

c. Preparations should be coordinated after the aerial reconnaissance and prior to the finalization of plans for operation.

d. US FOs should fire in defensive targets using ARVN batteries and ARVN FOs should fire in defensive targets with US artillery. This will give both FOs added confidence in all the artillery support available to them.

e. A fire coordination line should be established by the ARVN headquarters in case of any contacts. This would allow the firing of both artillery units into an area of contact and would allow the continuance of artillery fire while gunships and airstrikes are employed. (If ARVN personnel do not establish a fire coordination line, the US LNO should recommend this line be established).

f. No village overlay or no fire zones were furnished the battery. An overlay showing villages and no fire zones should be obtained by the ARVN headquarters and given to the artillery units prior to the operation.

12. Evaluation: Both operations ran smoothly due to the lack of any heavy contact. However, if contact would have developed, there would have been several serious difficulties. The ARVN commanders were very good and controlled their troops well, however, they were not able to utilize artillery to its best advantage. With added training and confidence in the ability to properly utilize artillery better results will be obtained. On several occasions defensive targets were not planned along movement routes. On future operations the US Liaison Officer should insure that preplanned targets are planned along all routes of movement. He should also insure that both US and ARVN artillery elements have these targets on call. Other units within supporting distance should also be given these targets. The US LNO should aggressively propose added uses for artillery and should make recommendations for improved employment techniques.

ALONZO S. KRETZER
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

ANNEXES:
Annex A - Operations Map

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CC, I PFORCEV Arty
2-CC, 52d Arty Gp
1-US Sector Advisor, Pleiku
2-CC, 3d BN, 6th Arty

A TRUE COPY
AVGG-BA-OP

SUBJECT: After Action Report

1. Btry A, 3d Bn, 6th Arty assumed the mission of Pleiku defense on 14 May 1968. In addition it has assumed the role of providing additional fire support along QL 14N in support of the 3d Armd Cav and security of the Highway 14N. Since 22 May, a portion of the firing battery has been conducting hip shoots occupying firing positions along QL 14N. As of 1 June, Btry A has been conducting daily hip shoots, coordinating very closely with 3d Armd Cav. Coordination is affected through the US advisor and the Bn LNO colocated with Hq, 3d Armd Cav.

2. On 4 June 1968, NVA attempted to ambush the morning convoy enroute from Pleiku to Kontum on Highway QL 14N. The timely and decisive delivery of artillery fire and the immediate reaction of the 3d ARVN Cav to the ambush site were instrumental in foiling this ambush attempt. Two US artillery batteries, an ARVN 105mm platoon, and an ARVN cavalry squadron were involved in the action on 4 June:

a. Battery A, 3d Bn, 6th Arty (105 SP) located at Artillery Hill, grid ZA242253.

b. Battery C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty (8"-175) located at grid AR78389h.

c. 3d Armored Cav Regt (ARVN) located at grid ZA235557.

d. 1st plt, Btry B, 221st Arty (ARVN) located at grid ZA234758. This platoon responded out of the Kontum area.

3. Battery A, 3d Bn, 6th Arty departed Artillery Hill at 0406H and occupied a predesignated position on QL 14N, grid ZA154964h. The air observer from 3/6 Arty was over the area, and observed A/3/6 firing twenty rounds on preplanned intelligence targets. At 0930H when the ambush was discovered at grid ZA20714h A/3/6 received the call for fires at grid ZA20713, which corresponded to one of the preplanned targets that had been received from the Senior US Advisor to the 3d ACR. Battery A responded within one minute and fired a total of 123 rounds in the ambush area. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) provided an immediate response to the ambush, resulting in three enemy KIA and three weapons captured. The artillery liaison section with 3d ACR (ARVN) coordinated with the ARVN artillery and Battery C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty to fire preplanned targets on the west side of QL 14N. Commanding Officer, 3d Bn, 6th Arty, with his S3 and Asst S3, arrived at 3d ACR Hq and assisted in the coordination of fires. The position area of A/3/6 Arty came under small arms and mortar attack at 1000H.

One Beehive and nine HE rounds were expended in defense of the position. These direct fire missions caused minimum interference with its fire support.

Incl 4
SUBJECT: After Action Report  

role. Coordination with the ARVN forces resulted in an immediate response from the security force.

4. CO, A/3/6 conducted reconnaissance of the area around the battery position and discovered some spent ammunition cases; and a NVA ammunition pouch. Elements of the 3d ACR conducted a sweep of the ambush area and discovered nine additional enemy KIA, giving A/3/6 Arty credit for six.

5. Lessons Learned: Prior coordination between artillery units and maneuver forces, when coupled with violent execution on the part of both forces, is a time-tested antidote for even the best laid enemy ambush.

ALONZO S. KRETZER
LTC, Arty
Commanding

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Incl 4  

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