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<th>AD394060</th>
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CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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<th>TO:</th>
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LIMITATION CHANGES

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<th>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</th>
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AUTHORITY

28 Feb 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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Section I. Significant Organizational Activities


a. Mission: The mission of this unit is to perform reconnaissance and to provide security for the 4th Infantry Division or its major subordinate combat elements to engage in combat as an economy force unit to provide limited air and ground defense for the division.

b. Station Plan: The 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry is stationed at Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain, RVN and is commanded by LTC Lawrence H. Johnson Jr. Subordinate units are stationed as follows:

   (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop - Camp Enari, RVN
   (2) A-Troop - Camp Enari, RVN
   (3) B-Troop - Camp Enari, RVN
   (4) C-Troop - Chu Lai, RVN (attached to Americal Division)
   (5) D-Troop - Camp Enari, RVN
   (6) 40th TC Det - Camp Enari, RVN

c. Type aircraft authorized and on hand as of 31 Jan 68: (For the purpose of this entire report, C/7/17 is excluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) OH-6A 20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) UH-1C 27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Section I

1. (C) Operations and Training Activities

a. Training

(1) During the initial period of this report, the entire squadron conducted the required in-country indoctrination, orientation and training. The advance party which consisted of the Commanding Officer, principal staff members, troop commanders, a supply representative from each troop, squadron tech supply officer, property book officer and 22 enlisted personnel, arrived in Pleiku 142000H Oct 67. Coordination with the host unit, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav, was begun immediately for the arrival of troops, reception of equipment, messing facilities, housing and the required in-country training program. Formal in-country training was conducted from 10 Nov 67 thru 27 Nov 67 and included local area orientation, range firing, administrative in-country indoctrination and field exercises. Field training exercises, supervised by personnel of D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav was conducted at platoon and troop levels on a 3-5 day period. Additionally, selected personnel from each air cav troop participated in combat operations with units of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cav, 1st Air Cav Division for a 3 day period. The 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cav became operational on 27 Nov 67.

b. Operations:

(1) The first mission assigned to the Squadron was to support TF 22 from the Oasis. A jump CP was established at the Oasis 27 Nov 67 and both air cav trps were employed in the assigned AO. D-Trp, who had completed in-country field exercises with 1/10 Cav, was already located at the Oasis was used as the squadron reaction force. The squadron operated in the AO for a two day period without significant activities or results.

(2) On 28 Nov 67, squadron received the mission to support the 2d Bde at Ban Blech. Another jump CP was established and on 29 Nov 67 two air cav Trps and elements from D-Trp were employed. Several AO's were assigned west of Ban Blech. Only significant activities were cordon and search missions conducted with the assistance of an armed propaganda team from Ban Me Thout. Nineteen returnees from two villages were transported to Ban Me Thout. New AO's were developed in the E sector of Ban Blech and on 8 and 9 Dec one VC base camp uncovered and some 30 refugees evacuated to Cheo Reo.

(3) During the period 10-17 Dec 67, Squadron (-) conducted visual reconnaissance in various AO's in support of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Significant activities included the insertion of D-Trp and A and B ARP's into the Chu Phong Mountains and the sweep to the north and northwest. The lack of contact indicated the VC/WP were not occupying the mountains in any great numbers as believed. The capture of 2 VC males indicated movement from west to east thru the valley north of the Chu Phong. The capture of documents indicated the presence of WP.
of the 200th Arty Bn W of Pleiku City. Results of the entire operation included 4 KIA, destruction of 1500 lbs of rice and the capture of a packet of documents were significant.

(4) During the period of 18 thru 23 Dec 67, the squadron (-) conducted visual reconnaissance in the Dak To area in support of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div. Some new foxholes, bunkers and L-shaped trenches were found, however no other significant results.

(5) 24 - 26 Dec 67 - Squadron (-) conducted VR approximately 15 Kms east of base camp (VC Valley), 3 base camps, cave complex, and rice storage areas were uncovered. Approximately 1000 lbs of rice evacuated, 7 KIA (VC) and CS used to deny enemy use of cave complex.

(6) During period 27 Dec thru 08 Jan 68, Squadron (-) operated in AO Bat-an in support of TF Powerhouse (173d Bde). A detailed visual reconnaissance coupled with the insertion of ARP's and D-Trp produced 14 NVA KIA, 3 VC KIA and 1 VC PW, 300 lbs rice, 2 wpns, 6 B-40 rockets, 7 anti-tank mines and 2700 rds of S/A ammo. From the 200 documents captured, unit identification included 95-B Regiment, 280 RCN platoon and an OPLAN for Dec and Jan in the Pleiku area.

(7) During period of 09 Jan thru 11 Jan 68, one troop supported 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div and 1 troop in support of TF Powerhouse (173d). Visual reconnaissance in 1st Bde AO uncovered foxholes, trenches, caves, heavily traveled footpaths, A/W pens, mortar and rocket pens, and sightings of NVA troops. Results included 32 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 11 each 75MM rocket rounds, 6 wpns and 22 NVA packs.

(8) 12 Jan - 15 Jan 68 - two air cav troops provided visual reconnaissance in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div. Uncovered A/W pens, mortar and rocket pens. Total results includes 17 NVA KIA

(9) 16 Jan - 22 Jan 68 - One air cav troop in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div and one air cav troop in support 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div - conducted general visual reconnaissance in two AO's, sightings A/W pens, mortar/rocket pens and NVA personnel. Results included 20 NVA KIA, 1 PW and 1 small arms weapon captured.

(10) 23-25 Jan 68 - Two air cav troops in general support of 1/22 Inf Bn. Provided a screen around the Chu Phong Mountains while 2 Co's of 1/22 made sweep to the north. No significant activity.

(11) 26 Jan - 29 Jan 68 - Two air cav trps and D-Trp in general support within AO MacArthur. Missions included convoy cover, reaction force missions and visual reconnaissance total results - 1 NVA KIA.

(12) 30 - 31 Jan 68 - 7/17 Cav (-) reinforced w/one company 1/22 Inf conducted an air assault in support of the 24th STZ in Kontum. Insertion completed at 1310H and sweep to W and SW toward Kontum City. Ground elements of 7/17 Cav became OCP to TPI/22 on 31 OROO Jan 68. Results included 9 NVA KIA and 33mm mortar rounds captured (Operation continuing).
2. (C) Intelligence. The Squadron S-2 Section publishes a daily INTSUM which is distributed to Hqs, 4th Infantry Division, 1st and 2d Bde, 4th Infantry Division, and the 173rd Airborne Bde Task Force.

a. Enemy activity in the 4th Infantry Division's AO has been light to moderate for the entire period. In November, there was heavy enemy activity in Northwestern Kontum Province (Dak To). Throughout the period, enemy contact in the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division's AO remained light and was characterized by increased infiltration and unit movement. This activity was culminated by the TET offensive which started throughout the area during the last two days of this reporting period. It is expected that the TET offensive will continue through the first half of February and will be directed against the Military installations and airfields located around Pleiku, Kontum, and Dak To. Convoy ambushes at the intersection of Hwys 14 and 18 should be expected.

b. Ground to Air fire was reported on 68 occasions resulting in 29 aircraft hit, 2 crew members killed and 12 crew members wounded. Of the aircraft hit, 15 were UH-1C's and 14 were OH-6A's. Altitudes of aircraft receiving hits varied from 20 feet to 200 feet.

c. Major activities of the S-2 Section during this period were orientated toward the initial intelligence indoctrination and briefings for the Squadron. The section made initial liaison with various intelligence agencies and Hqs of the 4th Infantry Division. The basic loads of maps were procured and distributed. The SOP's for Alerts, Perimeter Defense, and Security Patrols were written and implemented.

3. (U) Weather. The entire 4th Infantry Division AO was in the dry season during this reporting period. Cloudiness was at a minimum with ceilings above 5000 feet or nonexistent. Visibilities were generally good. Occasional early morning ground fog formed along rivers and mountain regions within the AO but dissipated between 0400 and 0900 hours. Cooler temperatures were predominant throughout the period. Winds were predominately out of the Northeast 7 to 10 knots.

4. (C) Aircraft Maintenance

a. Maintenance Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Rate (Avg):</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORM Rate (Avg):</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORS Rate (Avg):</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During this reporting period this unit introduced the OH-6A into Vietnam and specifically to the 17th Combat Aviation Group. The unit had problem areas in the repair parts and the depreservation of new issued aircraft.

c. The area assigned to the unit for the aircraft maintenance and parking.
together with the non-existence of a maintenance working area combined with a "Throw-Together" Maintenance Detachment as a supporting field maintenance unit, have presented serious drawbacks to aircraft availability. Rather than delay the attainment of an operational capability, the decision was made to initiate operations and concurrently develop the maintenance facility and capability. While an outstanding operational capability was attained, the maintenance area as well as the entire squadron heliport is unsatisfactory. Primary deficiencies lie in inadequate engineer planning of the heliport, revetments, and maintenance facilities. Additional obstacles have been experienced in competing for engineer work priorities and provision of adequate dust control materials (PENE PRIME).

d. The above factors in conjunction with a critical parts shortage has made maintenance operations more of a nightmare than a mission. In spite of the above, the Squadron has flown over 8,926 hours in combat operations in the last 60 days. Based on the availability % listed above this equated to 104+ hours per OH-6A and 141+ hours per UH-1 during the month of January. At no time has the unit's mission been jeopardized in spite of the poor facilities and supply support. It must be realized, however, that this method of operation cannot be sustained for an indefinite period. A sound flying hour rate plus adequate functional maintenance facilities must be provided.

5. (c) Personnel

b. PIO Activities during the period November - January 1968

(1) Feature stories submitted - 0
(2) Hometown news releases submitted - 50
(3) Television Feature Story - 1

(4) During the period covered by this report the PIO operations of this unit were in an organizational phase. The general operation has smoothed out to some extent, however many problems are being experienced in this area due to lack of facilities, equipment, and experienced personnel. The PIO personnel of this organization are assigned PIO functions as an additional duty. Much needed PIO support is being obtained from 4th Division Signal Battalion, and the 17th Aviation Group Headquarters.

b. Special Services Activities for the period November - January 68.

(1) During the reporting period a total of 71 out of country R & R quotas were received, of these 71 quotas were filled. A total of 4 in-country R & R quotas for enlisted personnel were received and 4 were filled. Three quotas were received for officer personnel and 3 were utilized.

(2) Recreational facilities within the squadron area are limited. A 16MM motion picture film account has been established and a projector issued. Branch officers, NCO, and EM clubs of the 4th Division Main Clubs are in the planning stages. erection of volley ball courts and Horse Shoe pits have already started. Personnel of this unit are authorized to use any and all facilities provided by the 4th Division Special Services Office.
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c. Awards and Decorations

(1) Total number of awards and decorations submitted during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARDS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of awards and decorations approved and returned during this period: 10

d. Personnel Problems during the period November - January 1968.

(1) During the period covered by this report the squadron personnel section was in the organizational phase. This unit had to be augmented with a personnel section from 17th Combat Aviation Group.

(2) Principal Problems encountered:

(a) Lack of proper office equipment: This is the result of a squadron TOE which does not include a Personnel section. This problem was partially solved by requisitioning equipment thru normal supply channels. The requisition for typewriters was unable to be completely filled and the section continues to operate with one typewriter.

(b) Personnel Shortages: Personnel requirements for a unit operating essentially independently differ from a similar unit operating as part of an established division. Although it would seem from Personnel Information Rosters that this unit is at an acceptable level of authorized strength, we are actually short personnel required to complete assigned tasks most effectively. To effectively overcome this deficiency, it is recommended that the mission and location of a deploying unit be carefully reviewed prior to leaving CONUS, and if the situation dictates, an MTOE initiated and approved prior to departure. This is especially recommended when the operating unit must operate independently.

(c) Attached personnel: Upon arrival in country, this unit was augmented with aircraft maintenance personnel from the 14th Transportation Battalion. Initially these personnel were not augmented administratively, however the parent unit (14th Trans Bn) forwarded the Service Records and Allied Papers (SRAP) of the personnel, and at the same time retained promotion authority, replacements, reassigned instructions and AOR reporting. Having the parent unit retain promotion authority is a definite disadvantage to the attached personnel. Dispersion of units by this headquarters would involve further attachment of personnel. This would further dilute the administrative support of the attached personnel unless all administrative functions are initially centralized within this headquarters. This headquarters stands ready to accept full administrative responsibility for all personnel augmentations. This procedure would greatly simplify this headquarters' effort to give proper administrative support.

e. Gains and Losses
(1) The following gains and losses occurred during November - January 1968.

(a) GAINS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>FM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) LOSSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>FM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) At present the squadron is 6 OFF, 10 WD, and 35 FM below TO&E strength.

f. Command Changes

The following new commanders assumed command during November - January 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Robert A. Inglett</td>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>28 January 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Anthony X. Hoyer</td>
<td>D Troop</td>
<td>26 November 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Robert Hefford</td>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>17 December 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Religious Activities during the period November - January 1968.

(1) During the reporting period the squadron had both Protestant and Catholic services conducted within the squadron area. A converted barracks is utilized as a chapel. Services are conducted at such times that adequate church coverage is provided every personnel. There is no chaplain assigned this unit, chaplain support is provided by the 4th Infantry Division.

h. Military Justice during the period November - January 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE 15's</th>
<th>SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL</th>
<th>SPECIAL COURT MARTIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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- 7 -
Section II

1. (C) Operations

A. Item: Advance Parties of New Arrivals

Discussion: The organization and numbers of personnel composing the advance party of any new unit must be at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, to include the time the advance party should arrive in-country.

Observation: The composition and size of the advance party was not conducive to the material production of facilities, etc. for the arrival of the main body. There was insufficient time to complete the desired in-country processing and training prior to the unit becoming operational.

B. Item: Employment of the Air Cav Squadron

Discussion: The organization of the Air Cav Squadron is designed basically as an intelligence gathering agency, organized to perform visual reconnaissance by aerial platforms, to recon by fire those areas of suspected enemy positions, and to insert aerial rifle Platoons to exploit those areas of suspected positions gained by either visual reconnaissance or by reconnaissance by fire. Additionally, the Squadron, by virtue of its mobility, has the ability to rapidly react to other intelligence sources, to either develop the situation or disprove the source information. These capabilities are best accomplished by an entire Squadron effort under command of the Squadron Commander.

Observation: The general employment of the squadron has been one of allotting the Squadron to provide a weapons capability to a supported unit, generally a Brigade, without regard to troop organization concepts. The Brigade concert then appears to be one of diverting the gunships to areas of known enemy locations. After having received automatic weapons fire, the gunships then called in artillery and airstrikes. Following this, an assessment of the target area is made. This process continues until automatic weapons fire is no longer received. This does not in fact mean that the position was destroyed, however, no follow up by the infantry of the supported unit is attempted.

Additionally, this unit has been tasked to conduct combat assaults, reposition infantry units and equipment, provide convoy cover and other airmobile support activities. In accomplishing these tasks, the material value of intelligence gathering is nullified.

On several occasions, the squadron has been given an AO in which to uncover and develop situations worthy of follow up action. In most cases, however, the division has either been unable or unwilling to commit a force based on our intelligence. By the same token, the division has committed units based on agent reports, snoopy readings and communications intercepts, all of which seems to have doubtful reliability in that few, if any contacts were made.

However, forces so located in the squadron, early in January 68 have as a result of such actions outlined above, gone free to later haunt the division in such places as Kontum and Pleiku City. The deterioration in use of the squadron as the division's primary intelligence collecting capability continues. Seldom is the
squadron commander or his staff consulted in regards to the squadron's use. Specific jobs for specific units are dictated by the division commander and his staff. Platoon sized units are withdrawn from the squadron for use in other areas with no knowledge or concept for their employment available to the squadron. UH-1H lift ships are withdrawn from the ARP's destroying their integrity and ability to function as designed. Like wise, gunships and scouts are piecemealed. The unit is rapidly becoming like a pool of aircraft and people more aptly termed "The odd job group" than a reconnaissance squadron. The squadron commander has initiated action to present the problem to the division commander. Initial staff efforts have not been productive. A conference with the commanding general is now being scheduled.

Use of the squadron as outlined above does not provide the result attainable or desired. True, some successes are attained; however much goes undone, or "overkills" in requirements or commitments exist. One reason for the unit's flying hour rate for January was a direct result of such programs i.e. improper utilization, fragmentation of effort, divisionary missions.

Section II

2. (c) Intelligence

A. Item: Procurement of detailed combat intelligence.

Discussion: The requirement for an Air Cavalry Squadron to support a divisional size unit anywhere within the divisional AO with both its organic aircraft and ground elements creates a requirement to maintain detailed enemy intelligence over the Division's complete AO. This requirement exceeds the capabilities of a Squadron size S-2 Section. Augmentation of the section is required.

Observation: To perform the mission of providing timely detailed combat intelligence, the Air Cavalry Squadron's S-2 Section should maintain the following:

1. General enemy situation.
2. Anti-Aircraft capability.
3. Aircraft "Shot at" information.

The Squadron S-2 Section must provide detailed combat intelligence for the Squadron's assigned AO. The detailed background information for newly assigned AO's must be provided by the Division's G-2 Section. Due to operational concepts discussed in para 1 B above, the division G-2 seldom if ever is able to provide any intelligence pertaining to squadron missions or operations. So rapidly are air cav units shuffled about the gaining brigades, T.F., etc., seldom know that they are coming to their area for an operation or can react to present accurate and timely dates.

3. (c) Maintenance

A. Item: Reinstallation of Aircraft Armament Systems.
Discussion: Upon arrival in-country of the units aircraft, the
restoration of the armament systems became a minor problem due to missing hard-
ware or misplacement of small attaching items and incomplete parking list.

Observation: It is felt that caution is required in packing of aircraft
armament subsystems at home stations and at Sharpe Depot for further overseas
shipments. It is possible Sharpe Depot could provide a pre-packed hardware
support package to each deploying unit. Kit should include all hardware straps
and other small expendables appropriate to the units type gun sub-systems which
are easily lost or misplaced.

Item: T-53-1-13 Engines

Discussion: Upon arrival at the Pleiku area and within one month of air-
craft operations, it was noted that an excessive amount of dirt was detected in
the engine oil during the scheduled maintenance periods. The Pleiku area is
noted for the dirt and blowing sand which has its effects on the helicopter
ingines.

Observation: A Squadron policy was established that all crew chiefs
remove and clean the oil filters after each daily operation and change oil every
12½ hours of operation. An immediate decrease was noted throughout the Squadron
on dirt in the engine oil systems. However, this will never replace proper
dust control measures, such as Peneprim and hardstand.

Item: Repair parts (Aircraft)

Discussion: It is very difficult to receive repair parts on a timely
basis in the Pleiku area. Those aircraft which are grounded due to a lack
of repair parts (NORS) usually are down an average of 14 to 25 days. This
forces the units to participate in a cannibalization program which will have
adverse effects on unit aircraft, if one aircraft down for parts constantly.

Observation: It has been noted that a transportation problem exists
between the Saigon Depot (58th Trans Bn (AMMC)) and the supporting direct
support maintenance unit at Holloway AAF. On many occasions, it has been
necessary to fly organic aircraft to the Depot (AMMC) at Saigon to pick-up
badly needed parts. A complete review should be conducted to determine if
USAF transport aircraft are required to fly repair parts on a required basis
to supporting Direct Support units or if other means could be used to improve
the flow of aircraft repair parts.

Item: FOD in T63-A5A Turbine Engines

Discussion: During receipt of the new OH-6A aircraft in country by this
unit, it was noted that three engines had sustained FOD in the compressor
stages. Further investigation revealed that aircraft had undergone modification
work in the "dog house" area prior to arrival in-country and the area had not
been throughly cleaned of loose safety wire, rivet ends, etc.

Observation: Upon receipt of new OH-6A aircraft, all receiving units
should conduct a very thorough inspection of the engine inlet area. It will be
necessary to remove the barrier filter to insure a satisfactory inspection.

II. Aircraft Maintenance Facilities

Discussion: Upon arrival in-country this unit was assigned a base camp area with no maintenance area incorporated in it. Although the unit was new in country, consideration should have been given by host unit or unit responsible for design or construction of the area, of the type and number of aircraft assigned. Mission accomplishment has been seriously hampered due to the lack of good maintenance areas and facilities.

Observation: Those units or personnel who have responsibility for planning and coordinating construction of airfields and related aviation facilities should research the type unit they are working with to insure all requirements of the unit are accomplished so the unit can perform its mission upon arrival in country.
Section II Part II  Recommendation

1. (C) Recommend the size and composition of the advance party be at the discretion of the Commanding Officer of the unit and that the advance party depart CONUS so as to have as a minimum of 30 days in-country prior to the arrival of the main body.

2. (C) Recommend that the Air Cav Squadron be employed as an intelligence gathering agency, to find and fix the enemy; that the supported unit be prepared to react to the enemy forces uncovered; that the ground Cav Troop be employed within the Squadron to complement the capability of the Air Cav Troops and not as a separate infantry type organization; that the Air Cav Squadron be employed as a Squadron, on a mission type order.

\[\text{Signature}\]

Lawrence H. Johnson Jr
LTC, AR
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68

HEADQUARTERS, 17th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240  24 Feb 68

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) The 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968 is forwarded for information and action as necessary.

2. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed this ORLL and concurs with the report as modified herein.

3. (C) Reference Section I, para 5d (2) (a), item concerning lack of office equipment. Typewriters continue to be a critical item, however, five typewriters were transferred to the 7/17th CAV from 17th CAG resources to relieve the situation.

4. (C) Reference Section I, para 5d (2) (c), item concerning attached personnel. Concur. Conditions of the attachment dictate the stated arrangement. 17th CAG has requested of 1st Aviation Brigade the attachment of these personnel to include full administrative responsibilities.

5. (C) Reference Section I, para 5e (2), item concerning gains and losses. Nonconcur. The statement that the 7/17th CAV is understrength is incorrect. This organization operates on a manning level as do other aviation units. By actual MOS, the unit may be 35 EM short, but not by overall strength. Unit is currently at 108% of authorized strength.

6. (C) Reference Section I, para 5g, item concerning religious activities. 7/17th CAV now has a chaplain assigned.

7. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, para 3a, item concerning T53-L13 engines. Eleven hundred (1100) bundles of M8A1 matting is being obtained by IFFORCEV for the 7/17th CAV helipad. 17th CAG has requested of G-4 IFFORCEV for priority of prime shipments from QNSC Depot to the Pleiku area.

8. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, Para 5a, item concerning aircraft maintenance facilities. The 4th Infantry Division was sponsoring unit for 7/17th CAV. Facilities provided, although inadequate in certain areas, were above average as compared to other incoming units. 7/17th CAV base developments requests are channeled through 4th Inf Div with
CONGIDSTIAL

AVGD-SC

24 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 68

no information copy to 17th CAG. 17th CAG is unaware of any request for
maintenance facilities by the 7/17th CAV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

ROBERT R LOVELY
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant
CONFIDENTIAL

AVER-30-CF (7 Feb 68)  21 Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 HIs 05 FOR-65 UDC WAMMA 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96358  10 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96375

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES P. GASTON
Command, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
no

Copy furnished:
17th Cbt Avn Gp

COPY OF UNCLASSIFIED WHEN COMPLETED WHEN REASSIGNED FROM CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
AVANC (7 Feb 68) 3d Ind
RCS CSFOR-65 (UIC WAZNG)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96334

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPPO-7T, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (ACSFOR DA),
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 7th
Squadron, 17th Cavalry, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with
the contents as indorsed with the following additional comments.

2. (C) 1st indorsement, para 4, page 13: Concur. This headquarters
does not have the authority to accomplish the recommendation. It is
recommended that United States Army Vietnam accomplish this action
which would improve the status of the personnel affected by this attach-
ment.

3. (C) Sec II, para B, page 8: Concur. This headquarters' position
on the employment of the air cavalry squadron is in agreement with the
comments in the referenced paragraph. Only under the most unusual
circumstances should a troop be detached from the squadron. The primary
functions of reconnaissance and security cannot be realized when air
cavalry assets are fragmented. The air cavalry squadron is a major
maneuver element of the headquarters which has operational control.
It is not an aviation unit per se since this headquarters frequently
receives planned employments of all three air cavalry squadrons which
include a great deal of fragmentation. Request United States Army
Vietnam strongly consider such employment as a reduction of combat
power, therefore inappropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LEWIS T. TURNER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68) 4th Ind (U) CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
RCS GSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 APR 1968

TO: Commanding General, I FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. This headquarters requests your comments on item concerning employment of the Air Cav Squadron, page 8, paragraph 1B; page 12, paragraph 2; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 3.

2. Request your reply NLT 22 April 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
nc
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. In general terms the philosophy concerning the employment of an air cavalry squadron as a complete tactical entity is doctrinally sound. There are, however, occasions when tactical requirements in the mind of the commander may outweigh the normal doctrinal approach. Such was the case when one troop of the 7/17 Cavalry Squadron was deployed not only away from its parent squadron but from II CTZ to I CTZ in order to provide support to the newly formed Americal Division. The problem of squadron integrity versus tactical requirements was discussed at length among COMUSMACV, CG IFFV and CG 1st Infantry Division before the decision was made and it was fully agreed by all concerned that, under the circumstances, it was the best thing to do. It should also be pointed out that although the employment of the entire air cavalry squadron appears doctrine-wise, there is but limited precedent upon which to base such judgment, eg, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

2. With respect to Sec II, lb, there can be little disagreement with the concept propounded therein, but I take a very dim view of the manner and tone in which it is stated. It is replete with distortions and misrepresentations to the point that it cannot be accepted. The undersigned was the CG of the 1st Infantry Division (under whose operational control the 7/17 Air Cavalry Squadron had been placed) during the initial period of the squadron's operations. At no time was the squadron assigned a mission with less than the squadron minus the one troop deployed to I Corps. Neither was there proliferation of its assets as cited in the report. It is true that the squadron was a new tool to the division and its brigades and this undoubtedly resulted in some learning and experimentation but, in the same sense, it should be noted that the tool itself was new, untested and sometimes erratic. I have discussed this matter with General Stone, the current commander of the 4th Infantry Division, and found that his experiences during the latter month covered by the report were quite comparable to my own. There was no diversion of assets. No follow on operations were conducted since no enemy group or target was located by the unit which could not be exploited within its own means.

3. To set the record straight, there are some insinuations and statements in the report that should be clarified. For example, the advance party composition and maintenance facilities—it was a good, well balanced advance party; the reception and available facilities for this unit were outstanding (this was substantiated in correspondence to the division and the host unit); and, although there were no maintenance structures for the unit, neither were there any available at the time for the aviation elements of the 4th Infantry Division which had been in country for over one year.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

4. I experienced more than a little difficulty with the commander of this unit and was sorely tempted at times to have him replaced, but I thought I saw operational possibilities in him. Despite all that had been done for his unit, subconsciously he refused to join the team and at one time instructed his air crews to ignore the Hensel Army Airfield operating instructions and to abide by those he had developed. Needless to say, there were several near misses with fixed wing aircraft. I had a couple of discussions with him and thought he had just about joined the team when I left the division; however, from the tone of the subject paragraph (ie, "A conference with the CG is now scheduled") it is apparent that his attitude carried over for at least another month.

5. It should be added that the above cited conference did in fact take place. He was advised in very certain terms how his unit was to operate. Since that time, due to improved operations and esprit and intensified enemy activities, the squadron has performed outstandingly and operationally speaking the unit is held in high regard by General Stone.

6. The point of this rather lengthy dissertation is that what is stated in the report must be tempered by knowledge of the character of the author and the time frame covered by the report. He has a good tactical mind and is doctrinally sound, but he is not a team player, tends to be temperamental and has limited horizons in that he refuses to accept other than his own thoughts. I would hazard an opinion that the next ORLL of the unit will express a much brighter picture.

Incl. W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Acting Commander
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 68) 6th Ind (C) CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 APR 1968
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning attached personnel, page 6, paragraph 5d (2)(c); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4; and 3rd Indorsement, paragraph 2. The reduced direct support maintenance for air cavalry squadrons is recognized. Efforts to relieve this situation resulted in temporary attachment of maintenance personnel. There are units scheduled for arrival in RVN to provide this required maintenance support for each troop. This maintenance package will be attached to the troop and will be responsive to the troop commander in every respect.

   b. Reference item concerning advance parties, page 8, paragraph 1a; and page 12, paragraph 1. This headquarters dictates neither the size nor the composition of the advance party of a deploying unit. It is recommended that advance parties contain sufficient commanders and logistical personnel to insure the orderly preparation for, and reception of the unit. Size of advance parties is determined by Department of the Army. Time of arrival in RVN is scheduled by CINC'TRIKE. The present policies concerning size of advance parties and time of arrival in RVN have been agreed upon by this headquarters, Department of the Army, COMARC, and the movement agencies concerned. In practice, these policies have allowed for rapid integration of units into operational and logistical systems without posing excessive problems to movement agencies or excessive cost to the US Army. One of the principles of a sponsorship program is to provide sufficient assistance to a deploying unit so that a minimum number of key personnel are required to be absent from their unit the least period of time necessary. Nonconcurs in the recommendation that the size and time of arrival of advance parties be at the discretion of each deploying unit commander. Provisions do exist for sponsor units to request changes to advance party policies when an adequate reason exists. It is understood that a similar course of action is available to a deploying unit through CONUS channels.

   c. Reference item concerning repair parts (aircraft), page 10, paragraph 3. The opening of an additional aviation depot at Qui Nhon has improved the not operationally ready supply (NORS) rate and the receipt of other aviation repair
PARTS IN THE PLEIKU AREA. SUPPORT IS NOW RENDERED IN APPROXIMATELY 7 DAYS. FURTHER, AVIATION INTENSIVELY MANAGED ITEMS (AMI) ARE POSITIONED AT THE QUI NHON DEPOT FOR TIMELY SUPPORT TO THE NORTHERN AREAS.

3. (U) A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
CAPTAIN, AG
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

1 INCL
NC

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HQ 7TH SQD, 17TH CAV
HQ 1ST AVN BDE