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SECURITY MARKING

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAH-P (H) (8 Sep 67) FOR OT RD 670251

21 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: 

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
US Army Intelligence School
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Chief of Communications-Electronics
The Provost Marshal General
Commanding General
US Army Weapons Command
Commanding Officer
1 Field Force Vietnam Artillery
Joint Action Control Office
Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
ATTN: Office of Defense Affairs
SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General:

   a. Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (Target Acquisition) completed deployment of its six AN/MPQ-10A radar sections and two meteorological sections during early February 1967. The AN/MPQ-10A sections are employed primarily in static positions in the defense of critical installation. The three survey sections of the battery are extending survey control rapidly through the II CTZ and a corps survey information center was established at CAMP TOWNS, QUI NHON.

   b. Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) received the 23 inch Xenon searchlight on a two for one basis for the old 30 inch carbon-arc lights. The new lights are jeep mounted and have an infrared capability. Conversion of all searchlight sections was completed in the field by the middle of February.

   c. The 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery (155mm howitzer towed) arrived in-country and was attached to the 52nd Artillery Group for employment in the central highlands. The advance party arrived on 26 February 1967 and established the battalion base camp at Artillery Hill, PLEIKU. The main body arrived at QUI NHON aboard the HISS AMERICA and off-loaded on 11 March 1967. Since becoming operational in March the battalion has provided artillery support to the 4th Infantry Division and ARVN elements in the highlands.

   d. Also arriving at QUI NHON on the HISS ANERCA was the 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery AISP, (twin 40mm) with its attached Battery E, 41st Artillery (quad 50 cal MG). The 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery first established its base camp at PHU CAT Air Force Base but later moved to CAMP TOWNS near QUI NHON. Since becoming operational, the battalion has supported all major US maneuver forces in every major US operation in II CTZ. It is the only AV battalion in II CTZ and though attached to 41st
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Artillery Group supports operations throughout II CTZ.

e. The 6th Battalion, 32nd Artillery (8 inch SP) arrived during
March 67. The advance party closed on 10 March with the main body following
on 15 March. Unit equipment and insignia were received shortly after and
the battalion was operational by 1 April 1967. The battalion base camp was
established at TUY HCA and its firing batteries were employed along the
coastal region of II Corps primarily in support of the Capital ROI Infantry
Division and 9th ROI Infantry Division. Command and control has been re-
tained by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

f. An artillery evaluation team was organized on 13 March 1967
by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. The team members were drawn from
in the field and were specifically chosen for their experience in par-
ticular procedures and techniques. Evaluation of battery size units included
fire direction, observed fire, firing battery and communications procedures.
Various trends of weak and strong points were uncovered and evaluated
allowing appropriate action to be taken to improve the degree of training
of artillery units and to decrease the number of artillery incidents.

g. Battery C, 30th Artillery (Howitzer) arrived in-country
in March and was preparing for deployment when it was diverted by CINCPACV
to II CTZ. On 18 March 1967 the battery went under COMUS of III MFR and
moved its base camp to TUY HCA.

h. On 23 March 1967 Colonel Jerry F. Dunn assumed command of
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery from Brigadier General E. Edna J. DeChambeau
Jr.

i. On 2 April 1967 the 7th Battalion, 17th Artillery; 4th Bat-
talion 60th Artillery; and Battery B, 51st Artillery began relocating
their base camps from HU C of Air Force Base to CBI 1 and near PHNOM.

j. Effective on 9 April 1967 in accordance with orders
taken place between Battery E, 1st Battalion, 36th Artillery; and Battery E, 6th Bat-
talion, 16th Artillery. Battery E, 1st Battalion, 36th Artillery, which
had been attached to the 1st Brigade, 10th Airborne Division for some
time, became Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery, a support battery,
was detached from the 1st Cavalry Division (A), redesignated Battery G, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery and returned to its parent unit for employ-
ment in the KIAHNG AO.

k. Effective 13 April 1967, the 3rd Battalion, 16th Artillery,
minus Battery A was detached from I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and at-
tached to Task Force CINCPACV for employment in Operation PAGAD. Battery
A, 3rd Battalion, 16th Artillery was attached, in place, to the 1st Battal-
tion, 30th Artillery and continues support of Operation PAGAD.
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1. On 20 April 1967, Colonel William O. Quigley assumed command of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery from Colonel Jerry F. Dunn. A change of command ceremony was held at the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Quadrangle, Nha Trang. Massed colors from the 52nd Artillery Group and the battalions attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery were in attendance. Captain Herbert D. Wells, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery was commander of troops.

m. On 22 April 1967 the I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Fire Support Element (FSE) became operational, the FSE operates on a 24 hour basis and is located in the I Field Force Vietnam, Tactical Operations Center.

n. The 41st Artillery Group arrived in-country during April 1967 and was attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. The Group became operational effective 280001H April 1967 when it relieved the Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Forward, Qui Nhon, which was disbanded. The 41st Artillery Group established its base camp at C.I.F. Tong Tre, Qui Nhon and took over the facilities and communications of the forward headquarters it replaced. The Group, with 3 battalions and 4 separate batteries attached, has a mission of general support of US, RVN and FRC in II CTZ and is generally employed in the north-eastern, coastal portion of the Corps zone.

o. On 30 April 1967, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery lost operational control of two of its four AN/TPQ-4 radar detachments. The 235th and 238th Radar Detachments (countermortar) moved by Air Force C-124 to Qui Nhon and went under OPCON of the III M.F for employment in I CTZ.

2. (U) Intelligence: NONE

3. (C) Operations and Training: Statistics for artillery assigned, attached, or under operational control of I Field Force Vietnam during the reporting period are as follows:

   a. Missions fired:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>55,322</td>
<td>51,372</td>
<td>55,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>8,834</td>
<td>19,593</td>
<td>22,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSERVED</td>
<td>5,630</td>
<td>8,463</td>
<td>9,105</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOBSERVED</td>
<td>58,526</td>
<td>62,502</td>
<td>68,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64,156</td>
<td>70,965</td>
<td>77,465</td>
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#### b. Ammunition expended:

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<th>F-2B</th>
<th>F-2R</th>
<th>APR</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) 2.75</td>
<td>8,013</td>
<td>24,198</td>
<td>26,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 105 HE</td>
<td>153,043</td>
<td>176,093</td>
<td>135,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 ILL</td>
<td>9,505</td>
<td>5,098</td>
<td>6,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 HP</td>
<td>12,554</td>
<td>50,856</td>
<td>45,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 SIR</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 OTHER</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1,983</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>181,960</td>
<td>237,555</td>
<td>195,035</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) 155 HE</td>
<td>30,295</td>
<td>19,775</td>
<td>20,413</td>
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<tr>
<td>155 ILL</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>847</td>
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<tr>
<td>155 HP</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>3,537</td>
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<tr>
<td>155 SIR</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 OTHER</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33,656</td>
<td>22,437</td>
<td>25,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 8 inch HE</td>
<td>11,738</td>
<td>13,634</td>
<td>13,432</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) 175mm HE</td>
<td>12,094</td>
<td>21,603</td>
<td>23,294</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### 4. (U) Logistics: NA/RE

#### 5. (U) Civil affairs: NA/RE

#### 6. (U) Personnel:

a. Personnel and Administration: Strength figures of Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam Artillery on 30 April 1967 were:

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<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
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b. Rest and Recuperation Program:

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<tr>
<td>Quotas Received</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn Backs Received</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas Utilized</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Utilized</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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c. Awards and Decorations: The following awards and decorations were presented during this period.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Morale and Discipline: The morale and discipline have continued to be excellent throughout the reporting period.
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SECTION II (C) CONCLUSION OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I, OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

1. (C) Operations:


      Discussion: In many areas of Vietnam clearance of fires, for other than support of troops in contact, is often a lengthy, time consuming process. Close contact with the liaison officer that fires are cleared through and with the Vietnamese clearing agency (Sector/Sub-sector) will often assist in maintaining precleared areas and free fire zones. These precleared areas allow shorter delivery time on targets in the area and assist in the scheduling of H&I fires, training missions, registrations etc, and in the coordination of observation aircraft for these missions.

      Observation: Aggressive action to obtain precleared areas and the use of free fire zones will reduce clearance time and allow maximum efficient use of critical aircraft assets for scheduled missions.

   b. Item: Firing Safety:

      Discussion: An analysis of firing accidents has revealed the following factors as having caused or contributed to many incidents:

      (1) Misorientation of observer.

      (2) Failure by the observer to consider range and deflection probable errors.

      (3) Possible errors in map reading.

      (4) Observers calling for the initial round too close.

      Observation: As a general rule, when available, first round smoke in adjustment should be used to avoid inflicting friendly casualties through possible observer error.

   c. Item: Effectiveness of the Starlight Scope in conjunction with infrared light source.

      Discussion: Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight), conducted tests using the infrared beam of the 23 inch Xenon Searchlight. Conditions varied from a clear moonlit night to cloudy nights with no moonlight. Results were the same in all cases. Infrared light was detected at distances up to 400 meters when the searchlight was on focus beam. Ambient light nullified effects of the searchlight on spread beam and greatly reduced the effectiveness of the focus beam.
Observation: Test results indicate that the detection capabilities of the Starlight Scope are not improved by the use of infrared light.

d. Item: Aviation Support.

Discussion: This headquarters requires immediately responsive aviation assets to exercise command and control over widely separated artillery groups and battalions and for target acquisition. The situation is made even more critical by the fact that the organic aviation sections of the attached groups and all but three battalions have been deleted. This degrades seriously the non-divisional artillery fire control capability as nearly all registrations must be conducted by air observers due to the type terrain. Aircraft provided on a mission basis are not responsive sufficiently to the habitual artillery needs for aviation.

Observation: Immediately responsive organic aviation assets are vital to the accomplishment of the artillery's mission.

2. (c) Training and Organization:

a. Item: Composite 8-inch howitzer/175mm gun battery.

Discussion: An innovation of this headquarters to help alleviate the shortage of heavy artillery was the development of the composite 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun battery. This allowed the accuracy of the 8 inch and the great range of the 175mm to be spread, in platoon strength, through six locations for only two battalions, while still maintaining battery composition and integrity. Additional advantages are the conservation of the 175mm gun tube by using the 8 inch howitzer for the shorter ranges and the capability of close in and destruction type missions with the more accurate 8 inch howitzer. The conversion of weapon calibers within a battery does require some retraining of personnel and initial logistics problems but these were found to be minor in view of the results. An additional justification of this type of organization is the observation that very few targets are developed which call for more than one platoon of heavy artillery. As additional heavy artillery assets arrive in South Vietnam this organizational concept may not be required as it has been during the past period of shortage.

Observation: The composite 8 inch howitzer/175mm gun battery has proven very satisfactory for employment in Vietnam. This organizational concept will be continuously evaluated as heavy artillery assets increase to determine if the tactical requirements can be met by returning to a more conventional single caliber battery organization.

b. Item: Firing Battery Evaluation Teams:

Discussion: Due to the nature of the war in Vietnam, firing batteries often operate independently of and at a great distance from the
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Employed at fire support bases are often inaccessible by air. Thus the batteries do not receive constant supervision or guidance from the Battalion Commander and staff. This fact, coupled with the relative inexperience of many battery officers, has created a situation in which erroneous procedures and lack of safety checks sometimes have been found. The result of such malpractices is a rise in the number of artillery incidents/accidents.

Observation: This headquarters instituted a firing battery evaluation team which proved very effective in uncovering erroneous procedures and weak points for evaluation and appropriate corrective action.

3. (c) Intelligence

a. Item: Radar AN/FPS-10A Employment.

Discussion: In I FORCEN the AN/FPS-10A is used in a static position in the defense of critical installations. This releases the more mobile AN/FPS-4A, for high burst registration and for defense of fire support bases and forward CP's.

Observation: In Vietnam, where most tactical movement is by air, the lighter, more compact AN/FPS-4A is more suitable for mobile employment while the AN/FPS-10A is employed in the static defense of critical installations.


Discussion: The large land area of responsibility in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) when compared with the linearly defined corps area of the conventional war concept, precludes the satisfactory accomplishment of the traditional corps survey mission unless the traditional corps survey plan is modified greatly. An attempt is being made to solve this problem in II CTZ by:

(1) Development of an overall corps survey plan by the I Field Force Vietnam Artillery Survey Officer.

(2) Completion of the corps survey plan in various phases as directed by survey operation orders published by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

(3) All I Field Force Vietnam Artillery units with fourth-order survey capability are being assigned phases of the corps survey. This includes a target acquisition battery, division artillery headquarters, and artillery group headquarters.

(4) In I Field Force Vietnam, artillery groups are presently performing fourth-order survey by using survey personnel from battalions attached to the artillery group and equipment assembled from various sources, both from within and outside the group headquarters.

(5) Starting control for each phase is either provided by the recovery of USASMFS third-order or higher survey control points, by
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the TOPO Engineer Unit with II CTZ, or from the completion of previous phases of the corps survey.

(6) The CTZ is systematically subdivided into smaller areas by completion of phases of the corps survey, as directed by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery Commander. This provides subordinate units with fourth-order survey control in relatively close proximity to position areas so control may be carried where needed by the unit.

(7) All fourth-order field work is submitted to the I Field Force Vietnam Artillery Survey Information Center for editing and publication of a II CTZ Trig List.

Observation: The corps survey problem in II CTZ can best be solved by using all available assets. Centralized control at the I Field Force Vietnam Artillery Headquarters offers the most expedient solution to the survey problem. A recommendation is being prepared by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery that the TIE of any artillery group headquarters assigned to I Field Force Vietnam be modified to provide fourth-order survey capability.

c. Item: Use of UH-1D in survey reconnaissance.

Discussion: The UH-1D is extremely valuable as a reconnaissance vehicle for survey in RVN for the following reasons:

(1) It may be armed.

(2) It provides a rapid means of ground reconnaissance for long range surveys (30 to 60K).

(3) Reconnaissance of the survey plan can be made before the initiation of survey operations.

Observation: Survey officers and key SCOs responsible for fourth-order survey be trained in aerial reconnaissance for survey purposes.

d. Item: Artillery survey field notes.

Discussion: Several instances have occurred in II CTZ where it has been necessary to declare fourth-order surveys of 100,000 to 150,000 meters invalid because:

(1) Inaccurate or incomplete field notes were maintained.

(2) The field work was lost or destroyed.

(3) Location of SCPs had been made in relation to man made objects or areas (such as an Arty Btry position) which had subsequently moved.

(4) SCPs were located by driving a wooden stub or a 105mm shell casing into the ground. Those SCPs usually were lost.

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Observation: Increased emphasis should be placed on survey personnel on maintenance of complete, accurate field notes as prescribed by FM 6-2. The importance of using permanent landmarks as reference points for SCPs also should be stressed. In addition, SCPs should be made by using a cross (+) in a large boulder or bridge abutment or by using concrete markers with a minimum of brass. These have the best probability of remaining intact in Vietnam.

4. (U) Logistics

a. Item: Logistical and Maintenance Support (AN/FPQ-10; Radars).

Discussion: The first radars AN/FPQ-10; arrived in RVN in January 1967 with the 8th TAB, 26th Artillery from CONUS. Since that time logistical support has been a major problem.

There were no radar sets AN/FPQ-10; in I Field Force Vietnam prior to the arrival of this unit. Only limited repair parts were in the supply system, and the support units were not equipped to maintain the equipment. During the normal waiting period for requisitions, the sections have almost depleted stocks of repair parts brought from CONUS.

Observation: All units deploying with the Radar Set AN/FPQ-10; should bring as many repair parts, including major sub-assemblies and recorder paper for the RD-54/TP Recorder, as are available. Recorder paper is one of the critical items not in stock in RVN. The target acquisition battery has averaged one roll per section per week during normal operations.

b. Item: Generators for AN/FPQ-10; Radars.

Discussion: The field sections, 8th TAB, 26th Artillery were issued the military standard, 10kw, 60 cycle, air-cooled generator as the power source for the radar set AN/FPQ-10; In less than three months of operation, each generator has failed at least twice. Failures included burned out magnets, burned out valves, thrown rods, and ineffective battery chargers. In an effort to reduce the sporadic failures, the battery has requested a temporary loan of one generator for each section. Unsatisfactory equipment reports have been submitted on the faults noted.

Observation: The standard 10kw, 60 cycle, air-cooled generator does not withstand usage in South Vietnam.

c. Item: Water-proofing material for bunker roofs.

Discussion: T47 airfield membrane is an excellent material for use in water-proofing artillery, personnel and ammunition bunkers. One supporting engineer group recently authorized this membrane for issue for this use. It was previously authorized only for airfield construction.

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Observation: The 175mm Gun tube life should be authorized throughout Vietnam for issue for water-proofing of bunkers and information to this effect should be disseminated.

d. Item: 175mm Gun tube life.

Discussion: The short tube life of the 175mm gun tube has created a burden on the supply system and considerable down time of the guns due to frequent tube changes. One attached battalion alone changed 37 tubes during the reporting period.

Observation: The 175mm gun has proven to be an extremely valuable artillery weapon in Vietnam, however, the short tube life condemnation criteria, particularly when firing zone three, remains a serious shortcoming.

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Existing criteria which deny aviation assets to combat support units be reviewed with a view toward at least partial fill of non-divisional artillery aviation requirements.

2. The short tube life criteria, of the 175mm gun tube be examined for possible extension beyond the present 300-400 rounds or development be started on a gun tube of greater tube life expectancy.

3. 175mm membranes be authorized, throughout Vietnam for issue for water-proofing of bunkers.

Organizational Structure

WILLIAM O. QUINLEY
COL, Arty
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CICUSMAC, ATTN: OPOP-4H, APO 96558
3-DOG, USAV, ATTN: AVC-HIST, APO 96307
4-CC, 2 IFORDEV, ATTN: AVPE-06-02, APO 96350
2-FILE
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AVFA-GC-OT (25 May 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967(U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  2 JUN 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the contents of IFFORCEV Artillery operational report for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 3c - Intelligence: Concur. Use of helicopters to conduct accelerated surveys has particular application in RVN, as well as transporting survey personnel and equipment. Training need not be a formalized program of instruction but merely an orientation on basic aerial observation techniques by the supported unit.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II - Recommendations.

   a. Reference paragraph 1: Concur. Most separate artillery units and control headquarters deployed to RVN without TOE aircraft because of a shortage of light observation aircraft. These units are provided support on a mission basis by non-divisional aviation resources. Support on a mission basis carries with it an inherent delay in response and lack of certainty of availability of aircraft. If light observation aircraft are not available as a result of this continuing shortage, it is recommended that consideration be given to issuing UH-1 helicopters to these artillery units as an interim measure.

   b. Reference paragraph 2: Concur. IFFORCEV Artillery has been informed to compile statistics and requirements, and to initiate action under the ENSURE program in accordance with DA, Letter, subject AGAM-P (H) dated 3 January 1966, and MACV Directive 705-2, dated 24 December 1965.

   c. Reference paragraph 3: Non concur. T-17 membrane is a relatively expensive material designed and used primarily for facing forward support airfields. Blanket authorization for T-17 membrane to be used for waterproofing artillery bunkers throughout RVN should not be given. Each requirement should be carefully reviewed before authorization. There are other less expensive and more readily available waterproofing materials such as roofing paper.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHAEL D. SUNSHINE
ILT, AGC
ASST AG

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AVNOC-DST (25 May 67)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS GSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 7 J

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-O1, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning aviation support, paragraph 1d, page 7: Concur; however, this headquarters has no assets with which to fill stated requirements. The policy established by DA to deploy Combat Support and Combat Service Support units to RVN with aviation sections at zero strength, the present DA moratorium on submission of 1TOE's to fill requirements of these units, and the existing shortage of aircraft preclude action at this level to alleviate the problem. Recommend DA review existing criteria for aviation sections of Combat Support units with a view toward a partial fill of non-divisional artillery aviation requirements.

b. Reference item concerning force artillery survey planning, paragraph 3b, page 8: Accurate survey has been a problem area in RVN for the following reasons:

   (1) Difficult terrain to traverse and in jungle areas a lack of identifiable terrain features.

   (2) Poor quality of maps.

   (3) Lack of established survey control.

   (4) Lack of security for survey parties in a counter-insurgency environment.

   (5) Expanded areas of operation not normally encountered by FA units in a conventional war.

Centralized control of the survey effort is a practical approach to the problem. A fourth-order survey capability within the artillery group headquarters will also be of assistance. Project WAYSIDE which successfully tested a concept of obtaining survey control through photogrammetry will aid in areas that are inaccessible for conventional survey procedures.
c. Reference item concerning maintenance support for AN/MPQ-10A Radar, paragraph 4a, page 10: Concur in observation that a shortage of repair parts for AN/MPQ-10A radars has existed in RVN. However, if units deploying with AN/MPQ-10A radars bring excess stocks of parts, subassemblies and expendables, the draw down on CONUS stocks would perpetuate the problem. Intensive search in-country is being made, with representatives of USAECOM and the assistance of USAMC, to locate repair parts packages shipped to RVN. Concurrently USAMC is taking action to air ship additional packages of critical parts and to replace in-country radar with completely overhauled sets.

d. Reference item concerning generators for AN/MPQ-10A Radars, paragraph 4b, page 10: Concur that additional generators are required. Early this year, 8th TAB, 26th Artillery requested authority for one additional 10KW, 60 cycle generator per AN/MPQ-10A radar section. The request was returned by this headquarters without action because of a DA moratorium on TOE's. Since that time this headquarters has forwarded to DA requests for change to TOE to authorize additional generators for counter-mortar radar AN/MPQ-10A. This change of policy has not been announced to the field. Unit will be advised to resubmit request for emergency change to TOE.

e. Reference item concerning 175mm gun tube life, paragraph 4d, page 11, section II, part 2, paragraph 2, paragraph 3b, 1st Indorsement: Tubes have been evacuated to COMUS for test firing to destruction in an effort to relax the condemnation criteria. AMC is studying the problem and it is recognized by all. No firing data has been set to extend tube life criteria.

f. Reference item recommending that consideration be given to issuing UH-1 helicopters to artillery units as an interim measure, paragraph 3a, 1st Indorsement: Nonconcur. The substitution of UH-1 aircraft for observation aircraft would serve to deprive combat aviation units of required assets and/or cause aviation units approved for deployment to RVN to be deferred. Until such time as DA makes additional observation aircraft available, support must continue to be provided on a mission basis from non-divisional aviation resources. The continuation of priority assignment of aircraft missions within existing resources appears to be the most immediate solution to meet existing requirements. Aviation assets and aerial observers of supported units should be utilized when possible to adjust artillery of supporting non-divisional artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. J. FENNEDY
CPT. .:.;.:
Asst Adjutant
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GPOP-DT (25 May 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, I Field Force, Vietnam, Artillery (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 25 AUG1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report, as indorsed, and particularly supports the comments contained in paragraph 3c, 1st Indorsement, concerning the use of T17 membrane.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: G. L. McMULLIN

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Artillery units attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery during the reporting period,

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery (Forward) (DONG HA)

51st Artillery Group

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105m T)

6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8-inch SP)

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175mm/8-inch SP) **

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm T)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8-inch SP)

1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm SP) *

1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (155mm T)

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm T)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8-inch SP)

1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm SP) *

1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (155mm T)

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm T)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8-inch SP)

1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm SP) *

1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (155mm T)

Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm T)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (Target Acquisition)

Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (175mm SP)

(attached to 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery) *

Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)

Battery G, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) *
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Battery E, 41st Artillery (NG), (attached to 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery)
Battery G, 65th Artillery (NG), (attached to 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery) *

77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
235th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) *
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
239th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) *

NOTE:
* OPCON III Marine Amphibious Force
** Attached to Task Force OREGON

17
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