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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (17 Apr 67) FOR OT ✓

21 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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(Continued on page 2)

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
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OPERATION REPORT FOR
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
31 JANUARY 1967

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION



DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

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①
Pearson's Warrent, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (US) (S)
APO 95347

AVBD-C-Hist

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution

⑩ 21 Apr 67

⑪ OACFOR

⑫ 53 p.

References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 870-2 dtd 19 July 1966 and IFFV Reg 1-3 dtd 29 September 1966.

⑬ OT-RD-670225

SECTION: I (C)

Significant unit activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 5 Dec 66 and 20-25 Jan 67. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future missions.

A. Combat Operations. A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade's Operations is given below.

1. Operation GERONIMO

a. Dates: 31 October - 4 December 1966.

b. Missions: Conduct search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA force in the PHU YEN Province.

c. Location: PHU YEN Province, RVN.

d. Commander: BG Willard Pearson.

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. HL/30th Arty (OPCON) 5/27 Arty (GS).

(2) Others: 47th Regiment (ARVN).

f. Concept and execution (See Inclosure 1, Combat After Action Report, GERONIMO).

2. Operation PICKETT

a. Dates: 6 December 1966 - 19 January 1967.

b. Missions: Conduct search and destroy operations adjacent to the CAMBODIAN Border and north and east of KONTUM City.

c. Location: KONTUM Province.

d. Commander: BG Willard Pearson.

e. Forces involved

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. P1/30th Arty (OPCON) FOB-2, 5 Special Forces group KONTUM, provided 2 recon Bts and one intelligence platoon for screening and security missions.

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(2) Other: 42d Regt (ARVN), 24th Special Tactical Zone, RF/PF Forces and CILG Forces.

2. Concept of operations: See Incl 2, Combat After Action Report, PICKETT.

3. Operation FABRAGUT.

a. Dates. Commenced on 25 Jan 67 and will be covered in the next quarterly operations report.

b. Missions: To conduct search and-destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the BINH THUAN Province.

c. Location: BINH THUAN Province, RVN.

d. Commander: BG S. H. Matheson.

e. Results to 31 January 1967:

Losses (Enemy)

23 VC KIA (50)
1 VC KIA (30)
1 VC
1 detainee
16 small arms
4 grenades
6 rucksacks
2 Bull horns
10 transistor radios
1 camera
2 typewriters
1 microscope
6.3 tons of rice
2.5 tons of corn

B. Training. Most of this reporting period was spent in the conduct of tactical operations. During brief periods of refitting and preparation for new phases of combat operations, training was oriented towards those areas which needed improvement as was noted during previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small units tactics, the following training was organized at Brigade level:

1. All incoming personnel continued to be processed through the Brigade replacement detachment at PHAN RANG, where they received 6 days of rigorous training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling, enemy mines and booby traps, enemy sniper techniques, and physical conditioning. The training period also served to acclimate personnel to the hot, humid climate of Vietnam. On 7 January 1967 an inspection team from the Brigade S3 was sent to PHAN RANG to revise and update the instruction program.

2. In each area of operations, firing ranges were immediately coordinated for the local units. Free fire zones were established and ranges were scheduled for maximum utilization during periods when the units were preparing for new operations.

3. Helicopter rappelling training was again conducted, as was training in the use of metal and rope ladders to increase the proficiency of personnel in the techniques of helicopter entry into dense jungle terrain. The training was oriented towards training brigade and battalion reconnaissance elements and Engineer Landing Zone clearing teams.

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1. On 4 December 1966 and 15 January 1967 Driver Training Classes were conducted prior to the Brigade's moves from TUY HOA and KONTUM. Training was oriented towards on-loading and off-loading aircraft from a front or rear pintle. The classes resulted in the expeditious utilization of aircraft, and was a primary factor for the Brigade's record move from TUY HOA to KONTUM of 199 sorties in 49 hours.

5. Airborne ground training with simulated combat jumps was completed at KONTUM while still conducting combat operations. Training was conducted 26 - 30 December 1966, 3 - 7 January 1967, and 15 - 16 January 1967. The modified POI consisted of two days of ground training with one day for the jump. Several attached unqualified personnel were qualified pending final approval from CG, USARV. Heavy drops were made. A TAG CP was dropped, set up and briefly assumed control of brigade operations.

6. The Brigade Chemical Officer conducted a two day school on the Manpack Portable Detector (Chemical) 7 - 8 December 1966 at the rear base, PHAN RANG. Forty-two personnel from the Brigade attended; 12 from each battalion and 6 from A2/17 Cav.

On 28 and 29 December 1966, 6 pilots from the 117th Aviation Company were trained in the techniques of dropping the E 158 and E 159 CS/Clusters.

Flamethrower training was conducted from 23 December 1966 to 1 January 1967. A total of 27 personnel were trained (3 A2/17 Cav, 3 A/326 Engrs, 3 Security Plat 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 7 personnel from each battalion. The 20th Chemical Detachment flew to battalion CP locations in the field to conduct training.

7. Effective 23 December 1966 the name of the Combat NCO Academy was changed to The Combat Leaders Course to more accurately reflect the type personnel in attendance. On 7 Jan 67 an inspection team from the Brigade S3 was sent to PHAN RANG to revise and up date instruction being taught.

8. The 2/320th Artillery (Rein) continued its mobile training team concept.

The team conducted classes for aviators from the artillery branch who were not currently working in an artillery MCS. The same type instruction was conducted concurrently, in separate classes for ARVN artillery personnel, advisors, and selected Special Forces personnel. Classes stressed the latest changes in the artillery techniques as well as current methods of employment. Live fire demonstrations of the XM 546 (Beehive) ammunition were fired on 8 January 1967 at KONTUM for all personnel.

During the early part of November, an orientation course for the 1st Brigade and 1th Infantry FC's, LNO's, chief of firing batteries and radar was conducted. Emphasis was directed to the employment of artillery in RVN based on the Brigade's experience in-country.

From 24 December 1966 through 6 January 1967 a survey section surveyed a compass course for the Special Forces Camp at KONTUM.

9. On 2 January, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division established a 3 day Pre-Recon School consisting of: 12 hours of formal map reading and 4 hours of practical work to include a compass course. The initial levy for the Pre-Recon School is for twice the quota the Recon School requires; after a three day school, the top individuals are selected; the remainder are returned to their units.

10. Communications on-the-job training was continually conducted by the Brigade to increase the efficiency of the radio/telephone transmissions as well as communications security. All ROT's before being assigned in the Brigade are

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trained in the methods of operation, SSI's and SSI's.

11. Artillery seminars were conducted after Operations GERONIMO and PICKETT. Efficient methods of artillery employment, as well as problem areas were discussed; recommendations were agreed upon and published throughout the Brigade.

12. The Staff Judge Advocate conducted classes in military justice to include the duties of the trial and defense counsel. Training was also conducted for legal clerks.

All incoming replacement personnel were lectured on the provisions of the Geneva Convention and disciplinary problems under the Code of Military Justice as applicable to the Republic of Vietnam.

13. A class on the Trace Metal Detector Kit was conducted at PLAMU for personnel from 52 sections of the Brigade as well as the 181st MI Detachment.

14. A special 4 hour course in administration was given to all First Sergeants, personnel NCO's, and company clerks within the Brigade with the objective of increasing the efficiency and operation of administration throughout the Brigade.

15. On 20 December 1966, a special two hour class was given by the Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergeants, Battalion and Unit Mail Clerks concerning special mail handling and postal regulations.

16. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specialized training in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) and sniper techniques.

17. Tactical air training was continued to familiarize all units with proper air request procedures, types of air support and selection of targets.

C. OPLANS - OPOBDS. The following OPLANS and OPOBDS were published during the reporting period. The Brigade was not called upon to execute any contingency plans.

1. OPLAN 184-66 (FERRAGUT) dated 9 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south of PHAN RANG. This operation was based upon numerous intelligence reports of enemy activity in the proposed area of operations. Postponed due to the decision to reenter HAZOI area on GERONIMO I.

2. OPOBDS 187-66 (GERONIMO I) dated 24 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations in the HAZOI area west of TUY HOA and south of CUNG SONG. This operation was proposed and initiated because of the rapid increase of enemy activity as indicated by intelligence sources. The area of operations was later shifted northwest of TUY HOA due to the presence of enemy units in that area. GERONIMO I was terminated early due to the intelligence buildup in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN border in the PICKETT area of operations.

3. OPOBDS 190-66 (PICKETT) dated 8 Dec 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations west of KONTUM City near the CAMBODIAN border. The operation was based on the buildup of intelligence reports of enemy activity near the border.

4. OPLAN 2-67 (PAUL REVERE V) dated 12 Jan 67 covered the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to reinforce the 4th Infantry Division along the CAMBODIAN border west of PLEIKU. The plan was not executed because contact with the enemy diminished and the 4th Infantry Division did not require reinforcement.

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5. CORD 6-67 (FARRAGUT III) dated 19 Jan 67 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south and southwest of PHAN RANG. This operation was the reaction to the intelligence reports which prompted the original plan FARRAGUT (OPPLAN 184-66).

6. CORD 7-67 (ROAD RUNNER) dated 24 Jan 67 covering the overland movement of TASK FORCE MAGLIN from KONTUM City to PHAN RANG. This operation was conducted to demonstrate the progress in clearing and securing the overland routes from the central highland to the coast (KONTUM to PLEIKU to QUI NHON) and along the coast (QUI NHON to PHAN RANG).

D. Organization. See Inclosure 1, 2 and 3 for Task Force Organization.

E. Intelligence.

1. The following is a list of losses inflicted on the enemy during the reporting periods:

PERSONNEL	GERONIMO I *	PICTMAP *	FARRAGUT *
VC/NVA KIA (BC)	149	63	23
VC/NVA (POSS)	12	4	3
VC/NVA KBAF (BC)	1	0	1
VC/NVA KBAF (POSS)	0	0	0
VCC/NVAC	34/12	15/3	2/0
RALLIERS	0	4	0
DETAINEES	65	14	0
WEAPONS			
INDIVIDUAL	104	49	16
INDIVIDUAL (Cache)	8	59	0
CREW SERVED	31	1	0
CREW SERVED (Cache)	0	0	0

2. Intelligence Problem Areas:

a. Problem Area: Pictomap - Incomplete Area Coverage.

b. Discussion: The value of pictomaps is being realized more every day. The maps provide an excellent supplement to topographic maps, and aid navigation while giving the user a more comprehensive picture of the terrain. However, complete coverage of an area is not always available, leaving undesirable gaps.

c. Action Taken: This Brigade is presently requesting pictomap coverage of an AO prior to the commencement of the operation. Additionally, followup requests are submitted in an attempt to complete the requested series. * Source document: Entries number 2, 3 and 4 Daily Journal S2 HQ 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division dated 5 February 1967.

F. Personnel.

1. Unit Strengths:

a. Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4510
Assigned	4791
Present for Duty	4597
No Present for Duty	194

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E. Subordinate Element Strength of January 1967:

	OP	W	IN
HHC BDE	10	7	100
501 SIG	1	0	100
101 MP	0	0	0
161 MI DET	6	1	20
20 CGL DET	1	0	0
22 MIL HIST DET	1	0	0
HHD SPT BN	18	1	220
ADMIN Co	10	1	100
REFL Co	26	1	200
MAINT	6	3	170
SUP	5	0	100
AES	1	1	0
MED	7	0	0
17 CAV	4	0	100
326 ENGR	5	0	100
1/327 INF	36	1	700
2/327 INF	34	1	700
2/502 INF	33	1	700
2/320 ARMY	27	1	100
BDE TOTAL	201	71	1000

c. The assigned strength was 100 percent of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 100 percent of the authorized augmented strength.

d. Considerable improvement has been made in strength accountability and alignment of present for duty strength to authorized strength. During the last reporting period this command has reduced the not present for duty strength by 403 personnel. Principal reasons for this reduction are:

(1) Hospitalized Personnel: The number of hospitalized personnel in the Holding Detachment prior to evacuation to the level of the personnel assembly evacuated beyond the Brigade Medical Clearing Station. This system has reduced considerably the number of personnel listed as "hospital" on unit reporting reports.

(2) Intransit Personnel: A noticeable decrease in intransit "In" personnel has been effected since the last reporting period. This was attributed to timely actions on the part of reporting reports to identify personnel who are diverted or AWOL enroute to this command. The total command intransit "IN" was reduced from 260 to 56 personnel.

e. Casualties:

(1) As a result of Hostile Actions:

Killed	36
Wounded	190
Missing	0
TOTAL	226

(2) As a result of non-hostile actions:

Killed	7
Injured	93
TOTAL	100

(3) Total casualties sustained during reporting period: 326.

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* Friendly Losses broken down as follows:

	GERONIMO	HENNETT	FARRAGUT
KIA	16	20	2
WIA	75	95	20
MIA	0	0	0

*Journal entry number 4, S-1, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 18 February 1967

(4) Total casualties to date are as follows:

Killed, hostile action	356
Killed, non-hostile action	60
Wounded, hostile action	1873
Injured, non-hostile action	406
Missing	2
TOTAL	2697

2. Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiated and or continued during the reporting period:

a. Memorialization: The memorialization board convened during the reporting period and proposed a number of facilities for memorialization. Dedication of these facilities will be in the near future. Moreover, the command instituted a program whereby it memorializes members of the Brigade who were killed as the result of hostile action. Basically, each unit will have their own honor roll consisting of a hardwood plaque of dark finish, engraved with a fitting motto and followed by individual bronze plated bearing the name, rank, and date of death of each member killed as a result of hostile action.

b. Operation Streamer: An "Operation Streamer" award program was initiated during the reporting period to recognize superior performance in combat operations. The streamer is awarded to the battalion or separate company with the best overall performance during an operation. The unit is also recognized in a Brigade General Order.

c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: Continued emphasis was placed on accuracy of personnel records. During this period, 212 officers and 3467 enlisted personnel were afforded the opportunity to personally review their military 201 file and make changes in emergency data cards.

d. Awards and Decorations: In addition to citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat, the following number of awards and decorations were presented:

	DSC	SS	LCM	DFC	SM	BS (V)	BS (M)
OFF	2	17	1	0	0	37	24
WO	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
EM	1	11	0	0	3	87	122
	AM(V)	AM	ACM(V)	ACM	PH	CIB	CMB
OFF	1	31	13	5	7	19	3
WO	0	20	0	0	0	0	0
EM	1	17	161	221	98	348	29

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(RGS CSFCR-65) (C)

e. Enlisted Promotions: During the reporting period, this command utilized the following number of enlisted promotion allocations:

	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
November	215	45	34	27	7	2
December	224	56	52	7	0	0
January	200	69	27	1	1	0

f. Postal Activities:

(1) Mail Services: During this period, due to the holiday season, an increased volume of mail was handled, both in incoming and in outgoing. The postal section was appropriately augmented by special duty personnel from organic units to insure fast and continuous flow of mail to addressees. During the holiday season the postal system handled an average of 2.8 tons of mail daily.

(2) Money Orders and Stamp Sales: Money order sales average \$355,000.00 monthly during the reporting period. Monthly stamp sales averaged \$8,600.00.

(3) 46th APU: Although the 46th APU was attached to this command on 1 October 1966, actual fillers for this unit began arriving on 5 January 1967. At present, the eight enlisted personnel are present for duty, with the Postal Officer due in-country on or about 28 February 1967.

(4) The quarterly postal course was conducted on 28 January 1967 with attendance by all unit mail clerks and postal officers.

g. Projectionist School: In an effort to improve the operation of sound movie projectors, a four hour course of instruction on the 16mm sound movies projector was sponsored by the Brigade Special Services Office. Twenty-six enlisted personnel, representing all units within this command having movie projectors, were trained and licensed by the USARV Instructor Team.

h. USO Shows: Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the reporting period. Martha Raye performed at TUY HOA South and TUY HOA North and spent one full day with the Brigade. The second show "Fun Time" was held in PHAN RANG at the Red Cross Recreation Center, and consisted of 3 male and 2 female performers.

1. The PHAN RANG Beach Area: The beach area is 90% completed. The unfinished area is the bath house which will have locker and shower facilities. Action is being initiated to obtain necessary funds to complete this area. Although not fully completed, the beach area is operational and ready to be dedicated. The club house is in operation and open for daily use. Life guard and trained medical personnel are on duty daily.

j. Red Cross:

(1) The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued in their visits to the forward area to distribute literature and serve in the mess line. During the Christmas period the Red Cross unit organized distribution of a "Ditty Bag" Christmas gift to each member of the Brigade. They also distributed over 5,000 Christmas cards and 750 individual letters addressed to the Brigade.

(2) Following is a breakdown of services rendered by the Red Cross during the period:

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	Nov 66	Dec 66	Jan 67	TOTAL
Cases served	268	203	279	755
Leaves & Extensions	28	26	44	98
Discharges & Gov't Benefits	27	22	26	75
Reporting	171	132	151	454
Family Problems	38	19	31	88
Personal Problems	16	15	36	67
Wires Transmitted & rec'd	215	182	258	655
Correspondence in/out	467	326	369	1164
TOTAL	1290	932	1111	

3. Personnel Planning: Coordination and planning was initiated to spread the officers rotational hump early summer 1967. A plan was submitted to USARV on 14 December 1966; however, a recent directive by RA disapproved our request to extend a select number of officers. The Brigade still plans to curtail a select number of officers.

4. Problem Areas: The command was short shipped some 600 enlisted personnel in grades E-1 through E6 during December 1966. The predominate shortages were combat type MOS which caused a drop in "fox hole" strength of in-determine the cause of short shipment.

5. Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPLE STAFF

6. Brigade Headquarters:

SG	Salve H. Matheson	Bde CG
COL	Chester B. McCoid	DCO
LTC	Harry A. Buckley	XO
LTC	John M. Tatum Jr	S3
MAJ	John M. McDonald	S1
MAJ	John W. Gilboux	S4
MAJ	Thomas F. Bligh Jr	S5
MAJ	Harold P. Austin	S2

7. Battalion Commanders:

LTC	Joseph E. Collins	CO, 1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC	Donald E. Rosenblum	CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC	Frank L. Dietrich	CO, 3d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
LTC	William R. Madden	CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 320th Arty
LTC	Edmond P. Abood	CO, Spt Bn

8. Separate Companies:

CPT	Dale N. Wagner	CO, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17 Cav
CPT	David K. Salles	CO, Co A, 326th Engr Bn (Abn)
CPT	Lloyd K. Gardner	CO, HHC, 1st Bde

G. Logistics

1. GENERAL. There were no significant changes in the concept of logistical support during this reporting period. The Brigade's base camp at PHAN RANG continued to draw all classes of supply from both the PHAN RANG Sub Area of the US Army Support Command at CAM RANH Bay and the CAM RANH Bay area itself. Logistical support was provided to sustain operations near TUY HOA in PHU YEN Province and KONTUM, in KONTUM Province.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT.

a. Support Battalion: Provided a Forward Support Element (FSE) to sustain activities in the Brigade's area of operations. The FSE consisted of the following elements:

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SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
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(1) Headquarters Detachment executed the command and control functions and was organized into command operations, communications, and movement control sub elements.

(2) Administrative Detachment provided personnel actions, pay, and mail service.

(3) Supply Detachment was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigging capability.

(4) Maintenance Detachment provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, equipment, automotive, signal, and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, recovery, and contact teams.

(5) Company D, 226th Medical Battalion (Abn) provided clearing station facilities with a surgical section, holding section, emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Laundry and Bath Services. The TUY HOA Sub Area Command of US Army Support Command, CAM RANH Bay provided laundry and bath support to the Brigade during operations in PHU YEN Province. Such support in the vicinity of KONTUM was provided by Task Force Barron a Forward Supply Area from the US Army Support Command, QUI NHON.

c. Water. Potable water was obtained in PHU YEN Province from both the organic engineer company's 1500 gallon erdaler supporting elements of the TUY HOA Sub Area Command. A 600 gallon per hour water purification unit sustained activities in the vicinity of DONG TRE Special Forces Camp during operations conducted there in the month of November.

d. Gravel Aggregation. Support in PHU YEN Province was provided by the TUY HOA Sub Area.

3. MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I: "B" and "C" rations formed the bulk of Class I supplies consumed by the forward or committed elements of the Brigade. "B" ration supplements were available in greater quantity than ever before any Class I supplies throughout the reporting period. Support received from US Army Support Command, QUI NHON during the period 9 Dec 1966 to 20 Jan 1967 was excellent. Fresh fruits, vegetables, and ice cream were available nearly every day while the Brigade was operating near KONTUM.

(2) Support Battalion continued to provide the majority of Class II and IV supplies. Such supplies were obtained primarily from the US Army Support Command, CAM RANH Bay and then flown to the Brigade's field train area by C7A and C-130 aircraft. Of major importance during the reporting period was the turn in of equipment deemed excess by the Brigade as a result of its experience over a 15 month period. The reduction in equipment included major items such as chemical apparatus, crew served anti-tank weapons and vehicles, as well as numerous minor items. The quantitative reduction in equipment insured a corresponding qualitative rise in the Brigade organic maintenance capability, since far fewer items of equipment required maintenance.

(3) Class III: During operations in PHU YEN Province, all POL products were drawn through the TUY HOA Sub Area Command, USASC QUI NHON provided POL during operations in KONTUM Province. A total of 776.6 short tons of POL products was consumed during the period. This amounted to 236,120 gallons.

(4) Class V: A new ASE system, controlled by I FFORCEV headquarters was imposed in mid November. In spite of the stringent controls placed

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such items as pyrotechnics, Class V stocks were sufficient to support all operations. A total of 535 short tons was consumed during the reporting period.

(5) Maintenance: The maintenance program continued to receive strong command emphasis. Particular emphasis was placed upon a system of roadside spot checks designed to diagnose maintenance deficiencies in the Brigade's vehicles. US Army Vietnam also provided a team of small arms experts who provided instruction on maintenance of the M-16 rifle to subordinate units. The overall equipment deadline rate remained remarkably low. The following job orders were received and completed during the reporting period:

	RECEIVED	COMPLETED
Automotive	206	203
Armament	477	477
Signal	1065	1041
Engineer	152	150
Instrument	234	234
Quartermaster	36	32

b. Transportation.

(1) Vehicular. The primary means of moving supplies from CAM RANH Bay depot to the base camp at PHAM RANG remained land transportation. During the reporting period, the forward elements received the bulk of supplies by land LOC. The only exception was Class II and IV supplies. Aside from barrier materials, Class II and IV supplies continued to arrive in the forward area at the end of an Air LOC originating in PHAM RANG. Approximately one fourth of the vehicles organic to the Brigade were committed for support in the forward area.

(2) Air, USAF C7A and C-130 aircraft provided virtually all fixed wing support to the Brigade. Air transportation carried primarily mail, Class II and IV supplies and passengers. Of particular interest was the utilization of C-130 aircraft to airdrop supplies to a forward supply point established near DONG TRE Special Forces Camp northwest of TUY HOA. Air drops were conducted on 3 separate days utilizing heavy drops and container delivery system techniques. Heavy ground winds caused some scattering of loads on the drop zone. Nonetheless loads up to and including full 500 gallon bladders of JP4 fuel were successfully dropped. Sorties and tonnage flown in support of the Brigade were as follows:

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Cargo Short Tons</u>	<u>Passenger</u>
November	200	325	3,001
December	138	365	2,664
January	64	231	1,579
Totals	422	921	7,244

(3) Helicopter Resupply: UH-1D helicopters continued to provide the bulk of supplies to committed units. CH-47 helicopters retained the task of displacing and resupplying artillery units.

H. Civil Affairs.

1. General: During this reporting period elements of the Brigade operated in three provinces: PHU YEN, PHONTUK, and NINH THUAN. Since the

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Brigade has just recently arrived in NINH THUAN Province, the majority of the Brigade's civil affair/civic action activities were about evenly divided between PHU YEN Province and KON Tum Province. Previous efforts in NINH THUAN Province, where the Brigade Rear Area is located, were directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local GVN officials their counterparts and providing some limited support to local civic action projects.

2. Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs activities during this quarter were centered on price and wage controls to preclude a violent impact on the local economy and to assist in the Brigade's plaster control program. Prior coordination was made with local GVN officials and their counterparts in KON Tum Province and NINH THUAN Province. Price lists were prepared and distributed, and enforced in cooperation with the National Police.

3. Civic Actions:

a. Civic Action Project Reported:

Health and Sanitation	46
Public Works	28
Transportation	10
Agriculture and Natural Resources	19
Education and Training	30
Public Affairs	7
Community Relations	22
Psychological Warfare and Communi- cations	13
Refugee Assistance and Public Welfare	64

TOTAL REPORTED PROJECTS 241

b. Medicine Show operations were continued and refined. These are high impact combined civic action, psychological warfare and intelligence gathering operations which are conducted jointly by US and Vietnamese forces. These operations attempt, while performing civic actions to enhance the image of the GVN and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure.

(1) Problem areas: These operations have all too often been on a one-time basis only.

(2) Discussion: The problem developed both as a result of the Brigade's constantly changing locations and as a result of having members of the Brigade primarily responsible for organizing the shows.

(3) Action taken: A special effort has been made by the Brigade to encourage GVN initiative and responsibility to an extent that insures perpetuation of these operations in an area.

c. One of the most significant civic action projects in terms of GVN participation was a joint US/Vietnamese bridge repair. The Brigade initiated a joint effort to repair the footwalks on the main bridge in KON Tum city.

(1) Problem area: The project was nearly scuttled.

(2) Discussion: Further investigation by ARVN Engineers led to a decision to repair the entire bridge. With the Brigade's imminent departure from KON Tum, the project was nearly cancelled.

(3) Action taken: The project was begun nevertheless, and with the turnover of lumber procured by the Brigade for the bridge repair, the ARVN Engineers assumed complete responsibility. This was a valuable,

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much appreciated project which reflected very favorably on the image of ARVN with the local population.

d. Another joint project was conducted with GVN participation: the priest in TRUNG NGHIA, KONUM Province requested assistance in constructing a building to serve as a day nursery and school. Members of the Brigade erected the metal framework and ARVN troops stationed there completed the building when Operation PICKETT was terminated.

e. The Brigade completed several valuable projects at KONUM's Montagnard Hospital which vastly improved the facilities serving the local population.

(1) A shelving system was constructed in the hospital warehouse and the medical supplies were organized and shelved in an orderly, useful system.

(2) A fish pond was constructed and stocked to provide a constant source of protein.

(3) The hospital's vehicle was overhauled and put into working order again.

(4) The steel framework for a permanent building was erected and roofed. When completed it will serve as a tuberculosis ward.

f. (1) Problem area: To assist the DONG TAC Refugee Center near TUY HOA, PHU YEN Province with self-help civic action projects.

(2) Action Taken: In conjunction with the HIEU XUONG District Chief and in cooperation with local PF, Province USAID and IVS representatives, Province Refugee, Health, and Agriculture officials, the Brigade undertook the project of improving the DONG TAC Refugee Center. The project was undertaken step by step, with each step being explained and "sold" to the people and showing some tangible result.

(a) A Health and Farm Show was presented to approximately 1000 of the refugees. Members of a Revolutionary Development Cadre Team band entertained, a Refugee Center official spoke explaining the self-help irrigation project underway and announcing a contest to choose the cleanest dwelling at the Center. Finally VIS films on health, sanitation and refugee camps were shown. The cleanup contest gained the interest and participation of most of the refugees, generating enthusiasm for all of the self-help projects underway.

(b) A latrine, four wells and irrigation system, and a community center were built by the refugees with Brigade technical and material assistance.

(c) USAID officials participated in all phases of the project in order to insure continuity of effort. When the Brigade left TUY HOA, this project was turned over to US units remaining in the area.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. Brigade civic action projects, unless they are of very limited scope and duration, should include local GVN officials and troops for at least two good reasons: (1) the essence of civic action involves Vietnamese participation; and (2) to insure continuity of effort when the Brigade leaves the area.

b. When entering a new area, the Brigade should not assume that

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locally stationed personnel have the situation well in hand. By taking the initiative and setting the example, the brigade can rouse the local effort from its torpor and stimulate its activity.

c. Before visiting a backward village, it is wise to contact the local priest or missionary, as he is usually the most informed person on local village activities. He is not only the religious leader of the people but very often he is the unofficial commander of several villages and is respected and obeyed by members of his flock. His support and advice on civic action projects will do much to insure their success.

d. To be successful, these civic action projects involving a change in routine must first be sold to the people. This often requires a massive educational effort prior to initiating the project.

- I. Chemical. No significant activity during the period.
- J. Engineer. As noted in Incl 1.
- K. Signal. No significant or unusual activities during the period.
- L. Psychological Warfare.

1. Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Report Operations After Action Report, Operation CROMWELL I (U). (Inclosure 1 to this Operational Report).

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SECTION 2 (C)

Command. Observation and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. General.

During the past three months the Brigade has used stealth, wherever possible when entering the battlefield. Additionally, the production of timely combat intelligence has improved and proven a valuable asset to the small unit commander. Counter-intelligence techniques, strict adherence to the basic principles of cover and concealment teams, and excellent fire discipline have added materially to the overall efficiency of the Brigade's fighting team.

B. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Med-Evac

Discussion: At the onset of the reporting period, Brigade Medical Units were afforded the opportunity to operate in an entirely new configuration which proved highly successful. The AO for this operation was some 60 KM distant from the Brigade Trains Area, wherein the Brigade Clearing Station was established. This great distance combined with the rugged terrain and marginal weather prevailing in the area demanded a medical facilities closer to the engaged maneuver elements. This was accomplished by airlifting the Clearing Station into the DCNG 1st Special Forces Camp in the center of the AO by CV2 aircraft, while the 563d Medical Company (Clearing) located adjacent to the trains area assumed the coverage for the remainder of the Brigade forward elements. The placing of the Clearing Station right in the center of the AO provided a proximity of medical treatment facilities to the combat unit never before seen within the Brigade. This was made possible to a great extent by the availability of a non-organic medical unit in the trains area which was quickly and effectively integrated into the Brigade medical organization. Extraction of the Clearing Station was accomplished after all combat elements had withdrawn using CH-47 helicopters. This late extraction insured complete medical coverage right up until the last trooper left the AO.

Observation: Integration of locally available non-organic medical facilities into the Brigade medical facilities coupled with displacement of organic medical facilities into the operational area provide outstanding medical coverage when operating over extended distances.

2. Item: Use of Scout Dogs in Combat Operations.

Discussion: After four months of utilizing scout dogs with rifle companies in combat it is evident that the dogs have been a valuable asset in detecting and surprising the enemy. Although they require special treatment and rations, the results achieved appear to be worth the care and extra effort required.

Observation: The practice of employing trained scout dogs in combat operations has been successful thus far. Scout dogs should continue to be programmed for use in combat operations.

3. Item: Technique of Using Knowledgeable Detainees as Guides.

Discussion: This technique continues to complement our intelligence capability in pinpointing VC locations and cache sites. It eliminates the confusion resulting from correlating map coordinates to prisoner testimony and avoids the problem of distinguishing which of several hamlets bearing the same name is the one in question.

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Observation: Use of detainees as guides is an effective way to gain intelligence, and should be exploited whenever possible.

4. Item: Vietnamese Language Barrier.

Discussion: Conducting language training can increase a unit's intelligence collecting capability. Emphasis is placed on learning a few important phrases well and with proper accent, rather than memorizing a large number of phrases which, because of poor accent, are meaningless to Vietnamese.

Observation: Language training, because it is now limited in scope, will increase a combat unit's ability to collect intelligence.

5. Item: Counterintelligence. Using stealth to enter the battle field.

Discussion: On 31 Oct 1960, the 2d Ln (A Co), 327th Inf conducted a night airmobile assault in an area (EQ8335) south of the SONG DA RANG (River). The success of this night entry into a battle area, followed by five days of uninterrupted clandestine operations, confirmed an essential concept - the noise of a helicopter assault of battalion size, if executed properly and followed by appropriate measures to insure secrecy, deception, and surprise, need not compromise an operation. The nature of the contacts that followed plainly demonstrated that if the enemy knew US troops were in the area, he did not know where, and in what strength.

Observation: The noise of a night airmobile assault or even a daytime assault need not negate the secrecy or deception of an operation. If followed by clandestine activities, complete surprise can be achieved against the enemy.

6. Item: Attachment of a Trained Interrogator to the Infantry Battalion.

Discussion: This Bde has had considerable success with its attached interrogators. This was vividly pointed out during the period 10-12 Nov 66 when 36 PW's were captured by the 2d Ln (A Co), 302d Infantry. By having a trained interrogator available to question these PW's near or at the FOB much information was gained that would otherwise have been lost if the PW's were evacuated to the rear. Another area where it's advantageous to have a trained interrogator at Bn level is when large numbers of civilians are in the area of operations. The interrogator at Bn can screen the personnel detained by rifle companies and release individuals of no intelligence value, thus avoiding flooding Bde with these people.

Observation: Interrogators attached down to Bn level increase a units intelligence collecting capability, and relieve much of the pressure imposed on Bde by having to process large numbers of detainees.

7. Item: Several disadvantages result from using only one LZ for an airmobile assault by one or more battalions.

Discussion: When only one LZ is utilized for a unit as large as a battalion, the terrain initially covered is very limited, and observation by the enemy is better able to determine the size of the force and amounts and types of equipment brought into the area of operations. As the companies and smaller elements move off the LZ, their movement tends to push the enemy away from the main body of friendly troops instead of blocking or containing him.

Observation: Battalion size airmobile assaults should utilize multiple LZ's with the subsequent movement of sub-elements directed toward the center to contain the enemy.

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8. Item: Night airborne assaults are feasible and desirable.

Discussion: During this warbling period, battalion size units conducted several night airborne assaults. These tactics permitted clandestine entry into the battlefield and decreased enemy intelligence of the operations. Interrogation of prisoners taken previously shown to LZ's indicated the noise of the helicopters was easily heard by the enemy, but they were not aware that a landing had been made in their vicinity.

Observation: Night airborne assaults further deceive the enemy of the location, size and intentions of friendly forces entering the battlefield.

9. Item: Dummy foxholes.

Discussion: The enemy often made probing attacks at night to determine the location of positions along a friendly defensive perimeter. On one occasion deception and increased security was achieved by digging several dummy foxholes forward of the actual perimeter. During the night these dummy positions were preaded without injury to friendly troops. Had the positions been occupied, casualties undoubtedly would have resulted.

Observation: Dummy positions will deceive the enemy as to the actual disposition of friendly troops and enhance overall security.

10. Item: The buckshot round for the M-79 may not be as effective as desired.

Discussion: Test firing a limited number of buckshot rounds indicated that the shot pattern remains concentrated in a small area until the pellets slow to below lethal velocity. At one hundred meters the normal pattern for these rounds was confined in an area seven inches wide and two inches high. Greater dispersion can be achieved by deliberately ricocheting the pellets off the ground.

Observation: There should be further testing of the M-79 shotgun round.

11. Item: Surprise encounters with the enemy require marksmanship.

Discussion: The characteristic close-in firing experienced in the jungle has emphasized the need for rapid and accurate firing by the individual soldier. Often, the only contact with the enemy is a sudden, brief encounter offering little time for careful aiming and firing.

Observation: The natural ability of the individual soldier to fire accurately without deliberately aiming his weapon can be enhanced by a conscientious training program.

12. Item: Rapid reaction to targets of opportunity.

Discussion: A unique opportunity to exploit our superior mobility and flexibility exists in areas with numerous LZ's and where enemy contact is with small units (3-10 VC/NVA). By positioning one command and control, two troop carrying and two armed helicopters at the battalion forward command post domination of the battlefield can be increased. The speed and flexibility of response to enemy activities as enhanced by the mobile command and observation post, the gunships provided a mobile blocking force, and the troop transports can insert an immediate action force to engage the enemy before he has an opportunity to escape, hide weapons or employ booby traps.

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Observation: An immediate action force permits economy of force and greater coverage of the battlefield.

13. Item: Artillery fires.

Discussion: In many occasions a squad or platoon will make contact with the enemy and immediately require artillery support before the size or disposition of the enemy force is known. The enemy, realizing the supporting power confronting him, will immediately attempt to break contact. On one occasion, however, a battalion was able to surround and destroy an enemy unit by withholding artillery fires while the friendly forces were moving into position.

Observation: The infantry commander should consider withholding artillery fires until the enemy force is deeply committed and cannot easily break contact.

14. Item: Nonportable loudspeaker units on jungle terrain.

Discussion: The enemy often finds it easy to detach himself from appeals made from aircraft because the aircraft is hidden from view and the thick foliage tends to interfere with transmission. However, when a ground mounted loudspeaker is used the jungle canopy appears to contain the sound and extend the range. At the same time, a more positive touch can be added by a trained broadcaster right on the spot or by personnel who have been properly briefed and encouraged.

Observation: A loudspeaker team on the ground is more responsible to any change in the psychological warfare picture and can reinforce the efforts of the infantry commander.

15. Item: Deception planning.

Discussion: Conscious efforts must be made to deceive the enemy of our true intentions. To counteract the effect of any possible compromise two or more plans can be written for the same goal area. The cover plan will account for the preparatory and other activities normally associated with combat operations. Feints and diversionary attacks can further conceal our true intentions from the enemy force in the objective area. Another measure is the use of night airborne operations.

Observation: Cover plans, diversionary attacks and night airborne assaults increase the security of friendly forces and deceive the enemy.

16. Item: Ground communications for utility and light helicopters while in the static position.

Discussion: Commanders and helicopter crews on alert have frequently experienced difficulty in maintaining communications with units when shut down. There is presently no feasible method to monitor radios while the engine is not running (operating).

Observation: A system could be established that would authorize additional PRC-25 radios for this purpose. In addition flag systems, flares and other visual means could be partially substituted.

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Part II Recommendations:

NONE



- Incl:
- 1 - After Action Report,
Operation GERONIMO
 - 2 - After Action Report,
Operation PICKETT
 - 3 - Operations Report
Support Battalion, 1st Bde
101st Airborne Division

S. H. MATHESON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVFA-GC-IT (31 Jan 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January
1967 (RCS CSFOR-55) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 8 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report of
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of 1st
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part I - Commander's Observations.

a. Reference paragraph B6: The attachment of a trained in-
terrogator to a battalion would be of doubtful value at that level.
If the interrogator is bilingual (Vietnamese - English) he will be
valuable in questioning PWs and screening detainees. However, such
bilingual interrogators are rare, therefore it is necessary to pair
interrogators with interpreters.

b. Reference paragraph B8: The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne
Division pioneered the conduct of battalion size night airmobile assaults
in II CTZ. In coordination with the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion,
which conducted special training for night operations and developed
techniques for formation flying, navigation and aircraft control at
night; the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division proved the feasibility
of such operations. A detailed summary of planning considerations and
operational techniques developed by both the brigade and the supporting
aviation battalion would be useful to other organizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls
w/d


CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.