<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
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<td>FROM:</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1979, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
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OPERATION REPORT FOR
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
31 JANUARY 1967

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS
Significant unit activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 5 Dec 66 and 20-25 Jan 67. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future missions.

A. Combat Operations. A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade’s Operations is given below.

1. Operation GERMINO
   b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA force in the PHU YEN Province.
   c. Location: PHU YEN Province, RVN.
   e. Forces involved:
      (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. ML/30th Arty (CPCON) 5/27 Arty (CB). Other Forces Group, 27th Division (ARVN).
      (2) Others: 17th Regiment (ARVN).
   f. Concept and execution (See Inclosure 1, Combat After Action Report, GERMINO).

2. Operation PICKET.
   b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations adjacent to the CAMBODIAN Border and north and east of KONTUM City.
   c. Location: KONTUM Province.
   e. Forces involved:
      (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. ML/30th Arty (CPCON) FOB-2, 5 Special Forces Group KONTUM, provided 2 recon Platoons and one intelligence platoon for screening and security missions.
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(RCS OC/G-65) (2)

(2) Other: 12th SSG (26th), 21st Special Tactical Zone, RF/FF Forces and CINCPAC Forces.


3. Operation PARADISE.

a. Dates. Conducted on 26 Jan 67 and will be covered in the next quarterly operations report.

b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the KDHN THUAN Province.

c. Locations: KDHN THUAN Province, RVN.


e. Results to 31 January 1967.

B. Training. Most of this reporting period was spent in the conduct of tactical operations. During brief periods of refitting and preparation for new phases of combat operations, training-in-service towards these areas which were noted during previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small units tactics, the following training was organized at Brigade level:

1. All incoming personnel continued to be processed through the Brigade replacement detachment at PHN RANG, where they received 6 days of rigorous training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling, enemy mines and booby traps, enemy sniper techniques, and physical conditioning. The training period also served to acclimate personnel to the hot, humid climate of Vietnam. On 7 January 1967 an inspection team from the Brigade S3 was sent to PHN RANG to review and update the training program.

2. In each area of operations, firing ranges were immediately coordinated for the local units. Five fire zones were established and ranges were scheduled for maximum utilization during periods when the units were preparing for new operations.

3. Helicopter rappelling training was again conducted, as was training in the use of metal and rope ladders to increase the proficiency of personnel in the techniques of helicopter entry into dense jungle terrain. The training was oriented towards training brigade and battalion reconnaissance elements and Engineer Landing Zone clearing teams.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

1. On 4 December 1966 and 15 January 1967 Driver Training Classes were conducted prior to the Brigade's moves from HCB II and KONTUM. Training was oriented towards on-loading and off-loading aircraft from a front or rear pintle. The classes resulted in the expeditious utilization of aircraft, and was a primary factor for the Brigade's record move from TTY RD to KONTUM of 199 sorties in 59 hours.

2. Airborne ground training with simulated combat jumps was completed at KONTUM while still conducting combat operations. Training was conducted 28-30 December 1966, 3-7 January 1967, and 15-19 January 1967. The modified P01 consisted of two days of ground training with one day for the jump. Several attached unqualified personnel were qualified pending final approval from CG, USAV. Heavy Crops were made. A P05 was dropped, set up and briefly assumed control of Brigade operations.

3. The Brigade Chemical Officer conducted a two day class on the Mannpack Portable Detector (Chemical) 7-8 December 1966 at the rear base, PHN RAN. Forty-two personnel from the Brigade attended, 12 from each battalion and 6 from A3/17 Cav.

4. On 28 and 29 December 1966, 6 pilots from the 117th Aviation Company were trained in the techniques of dropping the E 150 and E 159 CS/Cluster.

5. Flamethrower training was conducted from 23 December 1966 to 1 January 1967. A total of 27 personnel were trained (3 A3/17 Cav, 3 A3/30 Engr, 3 Security Flak 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 7 personnel from each battalion).

6. Effective 23 December 1966 the name of the Combat NCO Academy was changed to The Combat Leaders Course to more accurately reflect the type personnel in attendance. On 7 Jan 67 an inspection team from the Brigade was sent to PHN RAN to revise and update instruction being taught.

7. The 2/320th Artillery (Rtn) continued its mobile training team concept.

8. Communications on-the-job training was continually conducted by the Brigade to increase the efficiency of the radio/telephone transmissions as well as communications security. All N01's before being assigned in the Brigade are
CONFLICT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

trained in the methods of operation, skills and drills.

1. Artillery seminars were conducted after Operations GRENADE and PICKETT. Efficient methods of artillery employment, as well as problems, were discussed; recommendations were agreed upon and published throughout the brigade.

2. The Staff Judge Advocate conducted classes in military justice include the duties of the trial and defense counsel. Training was also conducted for legal clerks.

All incoming replacement personnel were lectured on the provisions of the Geneva Convention and disciplinary problems under the Code of Military Justice as applicable to the Republic of Vietnam.

12. A class on the Trace Metal Detector Kit was conducted at FDLIC for personnel from 52 sections of the Brigade as well as the 101st Airborne Division.

13. A special 6-hour course in administration was given to all First Sergeants, personnel NCOs, and company classes within the Brigade with the objective of increasing the efficiency and operation of administration throughout the Brigade.

14. On 30 December 1966, a special two-hour class was given by the Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergeants, Battalion and Unit Mail centers concerning special mail handling and postal regulations.

15. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specialized training in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) and sniper techniques.

16. Tactical air training was continued to familiarize all units with proper air request procedures, types of air support and selection of targets.

C. OPERATIONS. The following OPLANs and OPORDs were published during the reporting period. The Brigade was not called upon to execute any contingency plans.

1. OPLAN 181-66 (FALUNIT) dated 9 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south of PAN NON. This operation was based upon numerous intelligence reports of enemy activity in that area of operation. Postponed due to the decision to redeploy HARRI area on GHQ.

2. OPORD 187-66 (GERENOC I) dated 26 Nov 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations in the HARRI area west of TMY NON and south of CONO NON. This operation was proposed and initiated because of the rapid increase of enemy activity as indicated by intelligence sources. The area of operations was later shifted southeast of TMY NON due to the presence of enemy units in that area. GERMNO I was terminated early due to the intelligence buildup in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN border in the PICKET area of operations.

3. OPORD 193-66 (GRENOC I) dated 15 Dec 66 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations west of KONTUM City near the CAMBODIAN border. The operation was based on the buildup of intelligence reports of enemy activity near the border.

4. OPLAN 7-67 (PAUL REEVES V) dated 12 Jan 67 covered the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to reinforce the 4th Infantry Division along the CAMBODIAN border west of PHINN. The plan was not executed because contact with the enemy diminished and the 4th Infantry Division did not require reinforcement.

Incl 1  

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5. CORPD 6-67 (FARRAGUT III) dated 19 Jan 67 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations south and southeast of PHN RANG. This operation was the reaction to the intelligence reports which prompted the original plan FARRAGUT (PLAN 121-66).

6. CORPD 7-67 (ROAD RUNNER) dated 24 Jan 67 covering the overland movement of TASK FORCE MAKELIN from KOTON city to PHN RANG. This operation was conducted to demonstrate the progress in clearing and securing the overland routes from the central highland to the coast (KOTON to PHN RANG) and along the coast (PHN KRONG to PHN RANG).

D. Organization. See Inclosure 1, 2 and 3 for Task Force Organization.

E. Intelligence.

1. The following is a list of losses inflicted on the enemy during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GERMING</th>
<th>PICKET</th>
<th>ARRIVAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NA XIA (GC)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NA (POSS)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NA KIA (GC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NA KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NA KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>15/72</td>
<td>15/72</td>
<td>2/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GERMING</td>
<td>PICKET</td>
<td>ARRIVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLLERS</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETAINED</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL (Cache)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM SERVED (Cache)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Intelligence Problem Areas:

a. Problem Area: Pictoraps - Incomplete Area Coverage.

b. Discussion: The value of pictoraps is being realized more and more every day. The maps provide an excellent supplement to topographic maps, and aid navigation while giving the user a more extensive picture of the terrain. However, complete coverage of an area is not always available, leaving unacceptable gaps.

c. Action Taken: This Brigade is presently requesting pictorap coverage of an AO prior to the commencement of the operation. Additionally, followup requests are submitted in an attempt to complete the requested series.

*Source document; Entries number 2, 3 and 4 Daily Journal S2 HQ 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division dated 5 February 1967.

F. Personnel.

1. Unit Strengths:

a. Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>1510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>1791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Present for Duty</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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AVBD-C-1st
(105 CSFG-42) (U)

1. Friendly Losses incurred during the period:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNIDENTIFIED</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>356</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Journal entry number 1, 50, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 18 February 1967

(a) Total casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed, hostile action</th>
<th>Killed, non-hostile action</th>
<th>Wounded, hostile action</th>
<th>Wounded, non-hostile action</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>356</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Personnel Progress: The following programs were initiated and continued during the reporting period:

a. Memorization: The memorization board convened during the reporting period and prepared a number of facilities for memorization. Indication of these facilities will be in the near future. Moreover, the command instituted a program whereby it memorizes members of the Brigade who were killed as the result of hostile action. Basically, each unit will have their own honor roll consisting of a hardwood plaque of dark finish, engraved with a fitting obituary followed by individual bronze plates bearing the name, rank, and date of death of each member killed as a result of hostile action.

b. Operational Streamer: An "Operation Streamer" award program was initiated during the reporting period to recognize superior performance in combat operations. The award is awarded to any battalion or separate company with the best overall combat record in the Brigade. The unit is also recognized in a Brigade General Order.

c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: Continued emphasis was placed on accuracy of personnel records. During this period, 212 officers and 3467 enlisted personnel were afforded the opportunity to personally review their military 201 file and make changes in emergency data cards.

d. Awards and Decorations: In addition to citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat, the following number of awards and decorations were presented:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>LCM</th>
<th>IFC</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>BS (v)</th>
<th>BS (h)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN(V)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

O
e. Enlisted Promotions: During the reporting period, this command utilized the following number of enlisted promotion allocations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>E-1</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-8</th>
<th>E-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Postal Activities:

(1) Mail Services: During this period, due to the holiday season, an increased volume of mail was handled, both in incoming and outgoing. The postal section was appropriately augmented by special duty personnel from organic units to insure fast and continuous flow of mail to addresses. During the holiday season the postal system handled an average of 2.8 tons of mail daily.

(2) Money Orders and Stamp Sales: Money order sales average $355,000.00 monthly during the reporting period. Monthly stamp sales averaged $8,450.00.

(3) 16th APU: Although the 16th APU was attached to this command on 1 October 1966, actual fillers for this unit began arriving on 5 January 1967. At present, the eight enlisted personnel are present for duty, with the Postal Officer due in-country on about 28 February 1967.

(4) The quarterly postal course was conducted on 28 January 1967 with attendance by all unit mail clerks and postal officers.

f. Projectorist School: In an effort to improve the operation of sound movie projectors, a four hour course of instruction on the 16mm sound movie projector was sponsored by the Brigade Special Services Office. Twenty-six enlisted personnel, representing all units within this command having movie projectors, were trained and licensed by the USA Today Instructor Team.

h. USO Shows: Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the reporting period. Martha Raye performed at TUY Heli South and TUY Heli North and spent one full day with the Brigade. The second show "Fun Times" was held in FRAM RANG at the Red Cross Recreational Center, and consisted of 3 male and 2 female performers.

i. The FRAN RANG Beach Areas: The beach area is 90% completed. The unfinished area is the bath house which will have locker and shower facilities. Action is being initiated to obtain necessary funds to complete this area. Although not fully completed, the beach area is operational and ready to be dedicated. The club house is in operation and open for daily use. Life guard and trained medical personnel are on duty daily.

j. Red Cross:

(1) The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued limited visits to the forward area to distribute literature and serve in the mess line. During the Christmas period the Red Cross unit organized distribution of a "Ditty Bag" Christmas gift to each member of the Brigade. They also distributed over 5,000 Christmas cards and 750 individual letters addressed to the Brigade.

(2) Following is a breakdown of services rendered by the Red Cross during the period:

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ABD-C-Hist

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases Served</th>
<th>Nov 66</th>
<th>Dec 66</th>
<th>Jan 67</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaves &amp; Extensions</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges &amp; Gov't Benefits</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Problems</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Problems</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence In/out</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oases Served</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaves &amp; Extensions</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discharges &amp; Gov't Benefits</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Problems</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Problems</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence In/out</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>3323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Personnel Planning: Coordination and planning was initiated to spread the officers rotational dump early summer 1967. A plan was submitted to USARV on 14 December 1966; however, a recent directive by DA disapproved our request to extend a select number of officers. The Brigade still plans to curtail a select number of officers.

4. Problem Areas: The command was short shipped some 600 enlisted personnel in grades E-1 through E-5 during December 1966. The predominant shortages were combat type MOS which caused a drop in fox hole strength. The reason for the shortage is under investigation.

5. Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

COMANDERS AND PRINCIPLE STAFF

6. Brigade Headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BStaff</td>
<td>Salvo H. Matheson</td>
<td>BStaff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Chester R. McDade</td>
<td>COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Harry A. Buckley</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>John M. Tatum Jr</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>John M. McDonald</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>John H. Gilmore</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Thomas F. Blair Jr</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Harold F. Austin</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Battalion Commanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Joseph R. Collins</td>
<td>1st Inf (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Donald E. Rosenblum</td>
<td>2nd BN (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Frank L. Dietrich</td>
<td>2nd BN (Abn), 320th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>William R. Yattend</td>
<td>2nd BN (Abn), 320th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Edmond P. Aford</td>
<td>2nd BN (Abn), 320th Infantry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Separate Companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Dale N. Wagner</td>
<td>CO, 2nd Sqdn (Abn), 17 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>David K. Sallee</td>
<td>CO, 23rd Eng (Abn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Lloyd K. Gardner</td>
<td>CO, 26th, 1st Bde</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. Logistics

1. General: There were no significant changes in the concept of logistical support during this reporting period. The Brigade's base camp at PHAN RANG continued to draw supplies both from the PHAN RANG Sub Area of the US Army Support Command at CAM RANG Bay and the CAM RANG Bay area itself. Logistical support was provided to sustain operations near Tuy Hoa in PHU YEN Province and KONTUM in KONTUM Province.

2. Organization for Support:

a. Support Battalions: Provided a Forward Support Element (FSE) to sustain activities in the Brigade's area of operations. The FSE consisted of the following elements:
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SUBJECT: Operation report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

(US CORDS-65) (U)

(1) Headquarters Detachment executed the command and control functions and was organized into command operations, communications, and command control field elements.

(2) Administrative Detachment provided personnel actions, pay, and mail services.

(3) Supply Detachment was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigging capability.

(4) Maintenance Detachment provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, ordnance, automotive, signal, and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into small arms repair, recovery, and combat teams.

(5) Army C.22th Medical Battalion (Provisional) provided emergency medical evacuation to fixed station facilities in the brigade area. Hospital, medical, and casualty treatment section, and medical sections.

b. Logistic and Support Services. The TUY HAO Sub Area Command of US Army Support Command, and TUY HAO provided laundry and bath support to the Brigade during operations in PHU YEN Province. Such support in the vicinity of KONTUM was provided by the Force Barton a Forward Supply Area from the US Army Support Command, TUY HAO.

c. Water. Drinking water was obtained in TUY YEN Province from both the organic and local tap water.<sup>10</sup> Members of the Brigade, "F" ration supplies were available in greater quantity than ever before as any member of the Brigade throughout the reporting period. Support received from US Army Support Command, TUY HAO during the period 9 Dec 1966 to 20 Jan 1967 was excellent. Fresh fruits, vegetables, and ice cream were available nearly every day while the Brigade was operating near KONTUM.

(2) Support Battalion continued to provide the majority of Class II and IV supplies. Such supplies were obtained primarily from the US Army Support Command, TUY HAO and then flown to the Brigade's field trains area by C-130 aircraft. Of major importance during the reporting period was the turn in of equipment deemed excess by the Brigade as a result of its experience over a 15 month period. The reduction in equipment included major items such as chemical, armored, and anti-tank weapons and vehicles, as well as numerous minor items. The quantitative reduction in equipment insured a corresponding qualitative rise in the Brigade's organic maintenance capability, since far fewer items of equipment required maintenance.

(3) Applicants: During operations in PHU YEN Province, all POL products were drawn through the TUY HAO Sub Area Command, USARVN and KONTUM provided POL during operations in KONTUM Province. A total of 778,000 short tons of POL products was consumed during the period. This amounted to 2,360,000 gallons.

(4) Classes: A new ASR system, controlled by I FORCE, head- quarters was installed in mid-October. In spite of the stringent controls placed
such items as grenades, Class V stocks were sufficient to support all operations. A total of 535 short tons was consumed during the reporting period.

(5) Maintenance: The maintenance program continued to receive strong command emphasis. Particular emphasis was placed upon a system of roadside spot checks designed to enhance maintenance efficiencies in the Brigade's vehicles. US Army Vietnam also provided a team of small arms experts who provided instruction on maintenance of the M-16 rifle to subordinate units. The overall equipment deadline rate remained remarkably low. The following job orders were received and completed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>1054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Transportation.

(1) Vehicles: The primary means of moving supplies from CN RANH Bay depot to the base camp at FMN RANG remained land transportation. During the reporting period, the forward elements received the bulk of supplies by land LOC. The only exception was Class II and IV supplies. Aside from barrier materials, Class II and IV supplies continued to arrive in the forward area at the end of an air LOC originating in PHN RANH. Approximately one fourth of the vehicles organic to the Brigade were committed for support in the forward area.

(2) Air, USAF C-7A and C-130 aircraft provided virtually all fixed wing support to the Brigade. Air transportation carried primarily fuel, Class II and IV supplies and passengers. Of particular interest was the utilization of C-130 aircraft to airlift supplies to a forward supply point established near DONG THE Special Forces Camp northwest of TUY HOA. Air drops were conducted on 3 separate days utilizing heavy drops and container delivery system techniques. Heavy ground winds caused some scattering of loads on the drop zones. Nonetheless, loads up to 100,000 gallon bladders of JP-4 fuel were successfully dropped. Sorties and tonnage flown in support of the Brigade were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Passenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Helicopter Resupply: UH-1B helicopters continued to provide the bulk of supplies to committed units. CH-47 helicopters retained the task of displacing and resupplying artillery units.

H. Civil Affairs.

1. General: During this reporting period elements of the Brigade operated in three provinces: PHU YEN, NINHTH, and NINHTR. Since the
Brigade has just recently arrived in Ninh Thuan Province, the majority of the Brigade's civil affairs/civic action activities were about evenly divided between PHU THU Province and KONUN Province. Provine efforts in Ninh Thuan Province, where the Brigade Area of Operations is located, were directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local GVN officials and providing some limited support to local civic action projects.

2. Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs activities during this quarter were centered on price and wage controls to prevent a violent impact on the local economy and to assist in the Brigade's price controls program. Prior coordination was made with local GVN officials and their counterparts in KONUN Province and Ninh Thuan Province. Price lists were prepared and distributed, and enforced in cooperation with the National Police.

3. Civic Action:

a. Civic Action Project Report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Warfare and Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Assistance and Public Welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL REPORTED PROJECTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>211</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Medicine Show operations were continued and refined. These are high impact combined civic action, psychological warfare and intelligence gathering operations which are conducted jointly by US and Vietnamese forces. These operations attempts while performing civic actions to enhance the image of the GVN and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure.

(1) Problem area: These operations have all too often been on a one-time basis only.

(2) Discussion: The problem developed both as a result of the Brigade's constantly changing locations and as a result of having members of the Brigade primarily responsible for organizing the shows.

(3) Action taken: A special effort has been made by the Brigade to encourage GVN initiative and responsibility to an extent that insures perpetuation of these operations in an area.

c. One of the most significant civic action projects in terms of GVN participation was a joint US/Vietnamese bridge repair. The Brigade initiated a joint effort to repair the footwalks on the main bridge in KONUN city.

(1) Problem area: The project was nearly scuttled.

(2) Discussion: Further investigation by ARVN Engineers led to a decision to repair the entire bridge. With the Brigade's sudden departure from KONUN, the project was nearly cancelled.

(3) Action taken: The project was begun nevertheless, and with the turn-over of lumber procured by the Brigade for the bridge repair, the ARVN Engineers assumed complete responsibility. This was a valuable
much appreciated project which reflected very favorably on the image of ARVN with the local population.

d. Another joint project was conducted with GVN participation: the priest in TRUNG NGUYEN Province requested assistance in constructing a building to serve as a day nursery and school. Members of the Brigade erected the metal framework and ARVN troops stationed there completed the building when Operation FINEZ was terminated.

e. The Brigade completed several valuable projects at KOTUI's Montagnard Hospital which vastly improved the facilities serving the local population.

   (1) A shelving system was constructed in the hospital warehouse and the medical supplies were organized and shelved in an orderly, useful system.
   
   (2) A fish pond was constructed and stocked to provide a constant source of protein.
   
   (3) The hospital's vehicle was overhauled and put into working order again.
   
   (4) The steel framework for a permanent building was erected and roofed. When completed it will serve as a tuberculosis ward.

f. (1) Problem area: To assist the DZ:3 TAC Refugee Center near TUY HOA, PHU YEN Province with self-help civic action projects.

   (2) Action Taken: In conjunction with the HIEU XUONG District Chief and in cooperation with local FT, Province USAID and IVS representatives, District Refugees, Health, and Agriculture officials, the Brigade undertook the project of improving the XUONG TAC Refugee Center. The project was undertaken step by step, with each step being explained and "sold" to the people and showing some tangible result.

   (a) A Health and Farm Show was presented to approximately 1000 of the refugees. Members of a Revolutionary Development Cadre Team band entertained, a Refugee Center official spoke explaining the self-help irrigation project underway and announcing a contest to choose the cleanest dwelling at the Center. Finally, TVS films on health, sanitation and refugee camps were shown. The cleanup contest gained the interest and participation of most of the refugees, generating enthusiasm for all of the self-help projects underway.

   (b) A latrine, four wells and irrigation system, and a community center were built by the refugees with Brigade technical and material assistance.

   (c) USAID officials participated in all phases of the project in order to assure continuity of effort. When the Brigade left TUY HOA, this project was turned over to US units remaining in the area.

L. Lessons Learned:

a. Brigade civic action projects, unless they are of very limited scope and duration, should include local GVN officials and troops for at least two good reasons: (1) the essence of civic action involves Vietnamese participation; and (2) to assure continuity of effort when the Brigade leaves the area.

b. When entering a new area, the Brigade should not assume that
locally stationed personnel have the materials on hand, by
taking the initiative and setting the example, the people can raise the local
effort from its present level and complete the work of clearing.

c. Before visiting a newly captured village, it is wise to contact
the local priest or religious leader in the village and secure
local village assistance. He is a vital link in the community of the people
but very often he is the most respected member of the people
and is respected by members of the local civil action projects. The priest
often serves as an advisor on civic action projects and is well versed in
local traditions and customs.

d. To be successful, civic action projects involving a
change in routine must first be sold to the people. This often requires a
massive educational effort prior to initiating the project.

I. Chemical. No significant activity during the period.

J. Engineer. As noted in I. 1.

K. Signal. No significant or unusual activities during the period.

L. Psychological Warfare.

1. Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) in recent Operations after
Action Report, Operation Report 03-03-67 (D). (Inclosure 1 to this Operational
Report).
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

Operational fleper; for Quarter' Ly :peri-d, EndingE 31 January 1967

SECTION 2 (C)

Command: Observation and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. General.

During the past three months the Brigade has used stealth, whenever possible when entering the battlefield. Additionally, the production of timely combat intelligence has improved and proven a valuable asset to the small unit commander. Counter-intelligence techniques, strict adherence to the basic principles of cover and concealment teams, and excellent fire discipline have added materially to the overall efficiency of the Brigade's fighting team.

B. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Red-Clone

Discussion: At the onset of the reporting period, Brigade Medical Units were afforded the opportunity to operate in an entirely new configuration which proved highly successful. The AD for this operation was only 60 KM distant from the Brigade Training Area, wherein the Brigade Clearing Station was established. This great distance combined with the rainied terrain and marginal weather prevailing in the area demanded a medical facilities closer to the engaged maneuver elements. This was accomplished by airlifting the Clearing Station into the DDC FFE Special Forces Area in the center of the AD by CTV aircraft, while the 503d Medical Company (Clearing) located adjacent to the trains area assured the coverage for the remainder of the Brigade Forward Elements. The placing of the Clearing Station page, in the center of the AD provided a proximity of medical treatment facilities to the combat unit never before seen within the Brigade. This was made possible to a great extent by the availability of a non-organic medical unit in the trains area which was quickly and effectively integrated into the Brigade medical organization. Reconstruction of the Clearing Station was accomplished after all combat elements had withdrawn using CH-47 helicopters. This late extraction insured complete medical coverage right up until the last trooper left the AD.

Observation: Integration of locally available non-organic medical facilities into the Brigade medical facilities coupled with displacement of organic medical facilities into the operational area provide outstanding medical coverage when operating over extended distances.

2. Item: Use of Scout Dogs in Combat Operations.

Discussion: After four months of utilizing scout dogs with rifle companies in combat it is evident that the dogs have been a valuable asset in detecting and surprising the enemy. Although they require special treatment and rations, the results achieved appear to be worth the care and extra effort required.

Observation: The practice of utilizing trained scout dogs in combat operations has been successful thus far. Scout dogs should continue to be programmed for use in combat operations.

3. Item: Technique of Using Knowledgeable Detainees as Guides.

Discussion: This technique continues to complement our intelligence capability in pinpointing VC locations and cache sites. It eliminates the confusion resulting from correlating map coordinates to prisoner testimony and avoids the problem of distinguishing which of several hamlets bearing the same name is the one in question.
Observation: Use of trained men in an effective way to gain intelligence, and should be exploited whenever possible.


Discussion: Conducting language barrages can increase a unit's intelligence collecting capability. Frequently men can learn a few important phrases well and with proper accent. At this time summarizing a large number of phrases which, because of poor accent, are useless to Vietnamese.

Observation: Language training, not to be now limited in scope, will increase a combat unit's ability to collect intelligence.

5. Item: Counterintelligence, Using stealth to enter the battle field.

Discussion: On 31 Oct 1966, the 2d Plt (A), 307th Exp conducted a night airmobile assault in an area (RX135) a.k.a. the SOKO LA RANG (River). The success of this night entry into a battle area, followed by five days of uninterrupted clandestine operations, confirms the essential concept - the noise of a helicopter assault must be suppressed. Thus, if a secret mission is followed by appropriate measures to secure security, deception and surprise, need not compromise an operation. The nature of the contacts that followed plainly demonstrated that if the enemy knew US troops were in the area, he did not know where, and in what strength.

Observation: The noise of a night airmobile assault or even a daytime assault need not negate the secrecy of execution of an operation. If followed by clandestine activities, contact can be achieved against the enemy.

6. Item: Attachment of a Trained Interrogator to the Infantry Battalion.

Discussion: This Plt has had considerable success with its attached interrogators. This was vividly pointed out during the period 10-12 Nov 66 when 36 P.W.'s were captured by the 2d Plt (A), 306th Infantry. By having a trained interrogator available, to capture them in the rear or at the P.C. such information was gained that would otherwise not be lost if the P.W.'s were evacuated to the rear. This area where the advantages to have a trained interrogator at an level where large number of civilians are are the area of operations. The interrogator at an such in the personal obtained by rifle companies and return individuals of no intelligence value, thus avoiding flooding Beo with those people.

Observation: Interrogators attached down to an level increase a unit's intelligence collecting capability, and follow such of the pressure imposed on Beo by having to process large numbers of detainees.

7. Item: Several disadvantages result from using only one LZ for an airmobile assault by one or more battalions.

Discussion: When only one LZ is utilized for a unit as large as a battalion, the terrain initially covered is very limited, and observation by the enemy is better able to determine the size of the force and assists in types of equipment brought into the area of operation. As thecompanies and smaller elements move off the LZ, their movement prone to push the enemy away from the main body of friendly troops instead of locking or containing him.

Observation: Battalion size airmobile missions should utilize multiple LZ's with the subsequent movement of sub-elements directed toward the center to contain the enemy.
5. Items: Night offensive results are feasible and desirable.

Discussion: During the reporting period, battalion size units conducted several night ambushes. These tactics permitted clandestine entry into the battlefield and kept many participants of the operations, operations and other units in the main body that were not aware that a landing had been made in their vicinity.

Observation: Night offensive ambushes further deceive the enemy of the location, size and intentions of friendly forces entering the battlefield.

6. Items: Dummy positions.

Discussion: The enemy often uses dummy positions at night to determine the location of positions along a friendly defensive perimeter. On one occasion, an operational and increased security was achieved by using several dummy buddy positions forward of the actual perimeter. During the night these dummy positions were assessed without being fired by friendly troops. Had the positions been occupied, casualties predictably would have resulted.

Observation: Dummy positions will deceive the enemy as to the actual disposition of friendly forces and enhance overall security.

10. Items: The buddy's round for the M-79 may not be as effective as desired.

Discussion: Field firing a limited number of tracers indicated that the shot pattern has been concentrated in small area until the pellets close to below behind the nose. As the hand to hand combat and increasing security is essential for survival. The dummy buddy position forward of the actual perimeter. During the night these dummy positions were assessed without being fired by friendly troops. Had the positions been occupied, casualties predictably would have resulted.

Observation: Dummy positions will deceive the enemy as to the actual distribution of friendly forces and enhance overall security.

11. Items: Surprise encounters with the enemy require 'lick-fire' marksmanship.

Discussion: The characteristic characteristics of flickering are encountered in the jungle and emphasize the need for accuracy and accurate fire by the individual soldier. Often, the enemy contacts with the enemy in a sudden, brief encounter offering little time for careful aiming and firing.

Observation: The natural ability of the individual soldier to fire accurately without deliberately aiming his weapon can be enhanced by a conscientious training program.

12. Items: Rapid reaction to targets of opportunity.

Discussion: A unique opportunity to exploit our superior mobility and flexibility exists in areas where enemy contact is with small units (3-10 DDU). By positioning the command and control team carrying and two or three helicopters in the battalion forward element, post domination of the battlefield can be increased. The speed and flexibility of response to targets can be achieved by the mobile command and observation posts. The mandarins provided a mobile blocking force, and the troop transports can insert a mobile blocking force to engage the enemy before he has an opportunity to escape, hide weapons or trigger booby traps.

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SUBJECT: Operational Imagery - Field Training Exercise, 3 January (RBS 11/3/71) (C)

Observation: The immediate action force must achieve economy of force and greater coverage of the battlefield.

13. Items - Artillery Fires.

Discussion: It may seem at times in combat that artillery will make contact with the enemy and immediately receive fire support for the size or disposition of the enemy force in battle. The enemy, realizing the supporting power confronting him, will not allow artillery a free strike. On one occasion, I received a briefing on how to use ammunition and conserve an enemy unit by withholding artillery fires while the planning forces were moving into position.

Observation: The infantry commander should consider withholding artillery fires until the enemy force is well entrenched and cannot easily break contact.


Discussion: The enemy often finds it easy to detach himself from appeals made from aircraft because the aircraft is stationed from view and the thick foliage tends to interfere with target identification. However, a ground mounted loudspeaker is used to send the same message systems to sustain the attack and extend the range. At the same time, a more certain attack can be aided by a trained broadcaster right on the edge of the jungle who have been properly trained and encouraged.

Observation: A loudspeaker team on the ground is more responsible to any change in the psychological warfare picture and can reinforce the efforts of the infantry command.

15. Items - Development of Planning.

Discussion: Concrete efforts must be made to deceive the story of our true intentions. To counter this, the effects of any possible preparations must be considered for the jungle. Such areas, the enemy plan will account for the preparation and other activities normally associated with combat operations. Feint and dummy moves can further conceal our true intentions from the enemy while the objective area.

Another measure is the use of light airborne operations.

Observation: Light airborne, vernierary attacks and night air- mobile assaults increase the security of friendly forces and deceive the enemy.

16. Items - Ground Communications for Utility and Light Helicopters while in the Static Position.

Discussion: Commanders and helicopter crews on alert have frequently experienced difficulty in maintaining communications with units when shut down. There is proceeded to include radio systems which are ready while the engine is not running (operating).

Observation: A system could be established that would authorize additional PRC-25 radios for this purpose. It is thought that this system, flares and other visual signals could possibly with radio.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(REC OSFOR-65) (U)

Part II Recommendations: NONE

Incl:
1 - After Action Report,
   Operation CAYMEX
2 - After Action Report,
   Operation FICKEST
3 - Operations Report,
   Support Battalion, 1st Bde,
   101st Airborne Division

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2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part I - Commander's Observations.
   a. Reference paragraph B6: The attachment of a trained interrogator to a battalion would be of doubtful value at that level. If the interrogator is bilingual (Vietnamese - English) he will be valuable in questioning PAs and screening detainees. However, such bilingual interrogators are rare, therefore it is necessary to pair interrogators with interpreters.

   b. Reference paragraph B8: The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division pioneered the conduct of battalion size night airmobile assaults in I CTZ. In coordination with the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, which conducted special training for night operations and developed techniques for formation flying, navigation and aircraft control at night; the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division proved the feasibility of such operations. A detailed summary of planning considerations and operational techniques developed by both the brigade and the supporting aviation battalion would be useful to other organizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S/L.

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AG
A&H AG

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.