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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

TO:
COMMANING GENERAL
1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

FROM:
COMMANING GENERAL
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
APO 96222


1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation HOOD RIVER
3. (U) Location: QUANG NAM Province.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Salvio H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (U) Task Organization:

   1-327 Inf
   Engr LZ Clearing Tm
   FAC Tm

   2-327 Inf
   5th SF Mike Force Co (DS)
   Engr LZ Clearing Tm
   2 Set Dog Tm
   FAC Tm

   2-502 Inf
   5th SF Mike Force Co (DS)
   Engr LZ Clearing Tm
   2 Set Dog Tm
   FAC Tm

   2-320 Art (DS)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 2-320 Artillery: Employed in a direct support role.

FOR OT RD File
AvD-G

Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER (MACV/RCV 53/52)

11 September 1967

a. 3/18 Artillery (155 Towed, 8-175 SP): Provided general support reinforcing fires.

d. Marine Provincial Battery (8-135 Gun): Provided general support.

e. 176 Assault Aviation Company: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

f. CIDG Camp, HA THAH: Provided two CIDG companies in direct support of Brigade operations.

3. 5th Special Forces: Provided two Mike Force companies in direct support of Brigade operations.

b. 26th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

G. QUANG NAI Province: Provided one platoon of National Police Field Forces in direct support.

j. 7th US Air Force: Flew tactical fighter missions totaling 75 sorties. Five of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 23 minutes. In addition, 27 Combat Spotter sorties, 3 flareship (AC-130) sorties and 59 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flew 65 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

k. Two infantry battalions from the 2d ARVN Division and two ARVN Ranger battalions operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation to the southeast of the Brigade AO.

l. Two battalions of ROK Marines operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation to the northeast of the Brigade AO.

m. 1st Logistic Command: Provided logistical support.

3. (C) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) MISO/Headquarters, Task Force Oregon directed the 1st Brigade, 70th Airborne Division to conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in VUNG TAU AO (western portion of Base Area 121) in coordination with ARVN, ROK and CIDG forces. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: Operation HOOD RIVER consisted of a four pronged allied attack converging on Base Area 121. Two battalions of the 2d ARVN Division conducted an overland assault from QUANG NAI west across the lowlands; two battalions of ARVN Rangers conducted airmobile assaults into the high ground south of the base area and commenced search and destroy operations north; two battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade conducted an overland assault southwest toward the base area from positions northwest of QUANG NAI, two battalions of the Brigade conducted airmobile assaults into the high ground west of the base area and commenced search and destroy operations to the east. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 37th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations 20 kilometers south of the base area concentrating on likely avenues of enemy egress from it. Two CIDG companies from HA THAH CIDG Camp provided direct support to the Brigade by blocking the south to the southeastern portion of the Brigade AO.

11. (C) Execution:

3. Operation HOOD RIVER was characterized by small unit actions and sporadic contact with small enemy force. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night ambush and night movement. The terrain over which operations were conducted consisted of mountainous jungle and cultivated lowlands.

2

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11 September 1967

A-247G

EXHIBIT Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOCH RIVER (MAUI/HER/ 1/76)

Operation HOOCH RIVER was initiated immediately upon the completion of Operation White Star. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an overland move in the northern portion of 502d Division. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were at CARSTAN Base (the Brigade base camp west of Duc Pho). On 30 July one battery from the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an overland move from CARSTAN Base to QUANG NGAI in preparation for the assault. Additionally, C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery conducted an air mobile displacement from firing positions in 502d Division to Quan Chau, Camp from which 60 on provided general support. On 31 July, a second battery of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry established a TAC CP at NUI TINH AN, a monitory northeast of QUANG NGAI, where both the 2d ARVN Division and the REA Marine Brigade also established TAC CPs.

The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted air mobile displacements from Duc Pho to staging areas at QUANG NGAI Airfield. Operation HOOCH RIVER commenced on 1 August 1967 with the air mobile assault of the 2d Battalion (Airborne). 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, each with one Mac Force Company in direct support, into the western portions of their respective AO's. Landing zones were pre pared by both artillery and tactical air. Their was also placed on known and suspected enemy locations and on suspected routes of enemy movement toward the landing zones.

Concurrently, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented to the north and commenced screening along likely enemy escape routes south from the TRIEN AO. One light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in the capture of 9 individual weapons. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US KIA, 5 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual and 6 crew served weapons. On 3 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual weapons. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 6 individual weapons. On 5 August, one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in the capture of 1 wounded detainee. The Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry observed and called in artillery fire on an unknown site VC force resulting in 2 US KIA. One other contact by the battalion resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in the apprehension of 11 detainees. On 5 August two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 5 individual weapons. Four contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 detainees and 3 individual weapons.

On 7 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 US KIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons. On 7 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US KIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 2 individual weapons. Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 8 detainees and 2 individual weapons. On 8 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) while seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 6 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 5 detainees and 3 individual weapons. On 9 August one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 6 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 3 detainees and 5 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had six contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 6 detainees. On 10 August the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The battalion subsequently conducted air mobile extractions to QUANG NGAI and an overland displacement to CHU Lai in preparation for future operations. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and the capture of 9 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had three contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees.
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September 1967
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Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation HOOd RIVER (MACV/CS/01/32)

On 11 August the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one contact resulting in capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 31st Infantry had three contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. On 12 August one light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in the apprehension of 7 detainees. Operation HOOd RIVER terminated 130730H August 1967 as the 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th and 922d Infantry conducted airborne assaults from field locations to CHU AO (Base Area 117), initiating Operation BENTON. During the conduct of Operation HOOd RIVER a Brigade TAC CP was established at CHU LAI for the purpose of controlling Operation BENTON.

c. During Operation HOOd RIVER Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had primary responsibility for the security of CARENTAN Base. The patrols and ambushes conducted by the Troop for the period resulted in capture of 5 detainees.

12. (C) Results:
   a. The lst Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in VIEKHLAO.
   b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation:
      1 VC/NVA KIA (C), 1 W/O, 1 NVAC, 6 crew served weapons, 37 small arms, 21.3 tons rice and 3.2 tons of salt.
   c. Friendly losses during the operation were 2 US KIA and 24 US WIA.

13. (U) Administration Matters:

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: During Operation HOOd RIVER the Brigade established a TAC CP as part of an ARVN, ROK and US tripartite Command Post. The close proximity of all headquarters allowed maximum coordination to be accomplished in minimum time and contributed to the smooth functioning of all forces involved in the operation.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:
   a. In planning an operation consideration must always be given to the evacuation of refugees. Although no effort was made to pick up large numbers of people, groups attached themselves to maneuver elements, asking to be taken to safe areas. As this occurred, airlift was diverted to the location to evacuate the refugees resulting in minimum delay to the movement of maneuver elements.
   b. The time frame in which the operation was conducted precluded a thorough search of the AO. The maneuver elements concentrated their efforts along the high ground to the west during the first half of the operation and on the low-ground to the east during the latter half.

6 Inclosures
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operation Schematic
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Civil Affairs
6 - Artillery
Closure I (Intelligence) Coibat After Section Report

- The area is predominantly rural with some small towns and villages. The main areas of contact were the SNN Valley and KH Valley, with a dense forest in the eastern part. The hills rise to about 500 feet, and the area is covered with a heavy growth of evergreen forest.

- To the east, the hills rise gently with a few small valleys. The main avenues of approach are the SNN and KH Valleys (east-west), Route 30 (east-west), and a dirt surface road running north-south from B349578 to the SNN KH. Numerous small trails and streams afford north-south movement in the western portion of the area.

- The prevailing weather for the period of Operation had been partly cloudy skies except for the period 9 to 11 August when the major portion of the rainfall was received. The total precipitation was .54 inches of which .51 inches fell during 9 to 11 August. The temperature averaged from a maximum of 94 degrees to a minimum of 79 degrees. Average relative humidity was 70 percent. The weather was generally favorable to military operations.

- Most of the contacts were with small units, the largest of which was a 12-man. The weapons captured were varied but mostly semi-automatic types such as carbines and very few automatic weapons. The foregoing items coupled with the lack of significant contact leads us to believe the area's enemy forces consists of guerrillas and local force units.

- It is possible that the area had been a base area but is apparently now abandoned and should be dropped from the active base area list. The limits should be moved more to the west than as outlined in the CICV Base Area studies. The preponderance of facilities found were west of the stated area.

- Communication Security: During Operation, the Radio Research Detachment monitored 5,933 FM Radio Transmissions and 1,126 Telephone transmissions. There were no violations observed.

- The enemy continues to secure his base areas with local force units.

- The enemy continues to utilize mutually supporting draws, characterized with a water supply and dense foliage, and fortified positions guarding access to base areas.

- Personnel
  - Killed (Body Count) 63
  - Killed (Estimated) 11
  - Captured Viet Cong 12

  **Note:** The area was vacated at three-year intervals.

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Section 1 (Intelligence) Combat After Action Report Operation
(M-72 RUTCH) (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total In Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured NVA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA Defendant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Defendants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>132*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Since 1 January 1967


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-3 36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locatin Magnum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AK-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PSTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thompson SMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chatterault</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57 caliber recoilless rifle</td>
<td>9 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW</td>
<td>1 round</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>250 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Food Stuffs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Stuffs</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>23 tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>2 tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned milk</td>
<td>150 pounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cooking oil               | 50 pounds    |       |
| Yeast                     | 200 pounds   |       |

e. Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base areas complex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Miscellaneous Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>For Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>73 gallons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Wire</td>
<td>1 mile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous radio tubes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bicycles                | 100 each      |       |
| Penicillin              | 30 bottles    |       |

I. Inclosure

iv A - Order of Battle
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31st (Okinawa) 12th (Intelligence) 1st (Operation Makinen) (1)

(1) VC/NAVY UNITS

a. VC/Navy Units

(1) Elements of the 1st VC Regiment, 2nd VC Division, composed of the 40th, 60th, 70th & 90th Battalions, and supporting units were thought to be operating in the area from Box 118. It was thought however, that the entire unit was located to the west.

(2) The 1506th Engineer Battalion was reported to be operating in the area during the week of July, but its exact location was unknown. The unit provides engineer support to the 4th and 5th Force Units in the area, and was not reported to have a combat mission. This unit normally operates in small groups which are widely dispersed and generally accompanied by laborers.

(3) Elements of the 409th Main Force Engineer Battalion were reported to be operating within the tactical area of responsibility in possibly two or three company strengths. The remaining companies were spread throughout Quang Binh Province.

(4) The 22nd Main Force Battalion was believed to be operating throughout the tactical area of responsibility with a primary mission of transportation and logistical movements, and possessing a limited combat capability.

b. Base Areas: There are two base areas reported near or within the tactical area of responsibility: base area 121, vicinity BT 0318; and base area 118, vicinity BT 0318. Both base areas are considered safe and secure areas in which to treat, rest and regroup for combat.

2. (C) COURSE OF BATTLE FINDINGS AND SUMMARY IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA

a. Elements of the 1st VC Regiment and other Main Force Battalions were not contacted during this operation. Due to the lack of contact, Intelligence results were insignificant.

b. Small resistance groups (usually one to 10 personnel) were contacted within the tactical area of responsibility with insignificant Intelligence results.

c. Final Disposition of VC/Navy Units.

(1) 1st VC Regiments, 2nd VC Division

(a) Regimental Headquarters vicinity BT 0318
(b) 40th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0318
(c) 60th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0318
(d) 70th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0223
(e) 90th Battalion 1st VC vicinity BT 0218

(2) 1506th Engineer Battalion vicinity BT 0376

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Calc a (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat
Operation after Action Report (Operation HOOD RIVER) (4)

(1) 409th Main Force Saipur Battalion

(a) 20th Company (Headquarters Company) vicinity BS 6135
(b) 30th Company vicinity BS 6135
(c) 40th Company vicinity BS 3377
(d) 50th Company vicinity BS 6135
(e) 60th Company vicinity BS 2713

(4) 100th Montagnard Main Force Battalion located vicinity
BS 3548

(5) See Tab B to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) Combat after
action report, Operation HOOD RIVER for information
pertaining to the organization and strength of the
Main Force Battalion.

Due to the short period of time in which Operation HOOD RIVER
was conducted, little contact was made with the enemy, as
a result of this limited contact, casualties could not be
accurately assessed to the units. Prisoner of war
interrogation reports and documents captured revealed little
with regard to unit locations and strength. In general,
intelligence gathered was insignificant.
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409TH MAIN FORCE Sapper BATTALION

ALSO KNOWN AS

CONG 11
D-20
X-409
BAC H SON WORKSITES
X-20
575TH BATTALION
L-58

LETTER BOX NUMBER PERSONALITIES
20,142,001
20,142,002
B.C. Kien
B.C. Kien Forward
COMANDER NUYEN TAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER: NUYEN XUAN BINH
POLITICAL OFFICER: NUYEN BINH

STRENGTH

595 men, Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

LOCATION

20th Company BS 6135
30th Company BS 6135
40th Company BS 8135
50th Company BS 8135
60th Company BS 8135
70th Company BS 2713

Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967

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1506 MAIN FORCE ENGINEER BATTALION

ALSO KNOWN AS

LEFT HAND BOX NUMBER

PERSONALITIES

571 1289

COMMANDER NGUYEN HUY KIENH
EXECUTIVE OFFICER MA. LT. D.O.
POLITICAL OFFICER SR. LT. THANH

STRENGTH


LOCATION

Vicinity 85.1676 Source: III Marine Amphibious Force 6 August 1967
STRENGTH


LOCATION

Victorly RN 3548 Source: Task Force Oregon 9 August 1967
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Appendix J (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HOOD RIVER

A. (5) PERSONNEL

b. Beginning of Operation HOOD RIVER:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HOOD RIVER were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>4128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Duc Pho</td>
<td>3673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 116% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 54 were in transit, 105 were on TDY/SD status, 158 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 3 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation HOOD RIVER:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HOOD RIVER were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>4328</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Duc Pho</td>
<td>3719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 119% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 110% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 38 were in transit, 143 were on TDY/SD status, 182 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 10 AWOL.

c. Replacements received during Operation HOOD RIVER were assigned subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF BN</th>
<th></th>
<th>OFF BN</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/127</td>
<td>1 9</td>
<td>2/300</td>
<td>1 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/127</td>
<td>4 44</td>
<td>Sep Un</td>
<td>1 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>4 37</td>
<td>Sep Co</td>
<td>4 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Total replacements received for Operation HOOD RIVER were 183.

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C. PERSONNEL PLANNING: During the period of Operation HOOD RIVER, 2 August 1967 thru 12 August 1967, 106 personnel completed their Foreign Service Tour and were rotated to CONUS; 18 replacements were received during the same period.

2

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Inlosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation Hue (U)

2. (L) Organization for Support

a. This section of the Logistics Inlosure deals with the support provided for the maneuver elements of the Brigade and does not deal with support provided in the Carentan Base area.

b. Supporting Forces

(1) 15th Spt Bde, TFO coordinated and controlled all supply and services support provided at the Quang Ngai Forward Support Activity. The support consisted of the following elements:

(a) Distribution point for all classes of supply.
(b) Shower unit from the 221st S & S Company.
(c) 163 Light Truck Company (-).

(2) The 11th Arm Brn Chu Lai provided UH-1D, MH-47 and CH-54 aircraft in support of tactical and logistical operations.

(c) Support Bn (FSE) 2nded a Forward Supply Point Team at Quang Ngai that included a headquarters element which commanded and controlled the Forward Supply Point and D/326 Medical Company (-) which established a forward Clearing Station at Quang Ngai Airfield. The Quang Ngai FSP supported the maneuver elements of 3 Infantry Battalions and one Artillery Battalion.

2. (C) Material and Services

a. Supply: Accomplished by point distribution for Carentan Base and by a Forward Supply Point at Quang Ngai.

(1) Class I: Meal Combat Individual formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. "A" rations and condiment supplies, to include ice cream, were served whenever possible. Ice cream was not available through the Quang Ngai FSA. Fresh vegetables and extra ice were available throughout the operation. A total of 27,581 rations were issued during the operation from the FSP, 36894 from Duc Pho to Phan Rang.

(2) Class II and IV: The Quang Ngai FSP drew all Class II and IV items from the TFO, FSP at Quang Ngai. Shortages of Class II and IV items during the operation included small fatigues and some sizes of boots. A total of 45.54 short tons of Class IV and II were used.

(3) Class III: JP-4 accounted for the majority of JP-4 consumption during the period. Two artillery Batteries were deployed by road in preparation for the operation but the short (26 mile) moves accounted for the Little increase in MOGAS consumption. No shortages of Class III were noted. A total of 131,247 gallons of Class III were issued during the operation.

(b) Class V: All types of munitions continued to be available. No shortages were experienced. A total of 198.1 Short tons of Class V items were issued during the operation.

(5) Water: Potable water was supplied from Quang Ngai for the maneuver elements by A/325 Eng who established a 1500 gal per hr water point at Quang Ngai Airfield.

b. (U) Maintenance: The Support Battalion's 601st Maintenance Company received and repaired the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In preparation for the operation, 2 Artillery batteries were moved from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai using organic vehicles and the 11th Artillery. At the termination of the operation, 1/27 Inf and 1 Arty Btry moved from Quang Ngai to Chua Lai using (20-ton) trucks. The 163 light truck company provided 1 platoon in direct support at Chua Lai Base Camp and 1 platoon (-) at the Quang Ngai PFP.

Airlift: USAF C130, C141 US Army CH-54 and UH-1D aircraft provided airlift support for the entire operation. Of primary interest was the airlift conducted over a two-day period, to Quang Ngai. The quartering parties, FOB teams, medical clearing station, and the 5-4 Liaison team were moved on the first day in 5 C130 sorties, 1,400 troops and 900 lbs of cargo, 2 Infantry Battalions were moved on the second day in 13, C-123, and 9, C-130 sorties. The troop move on the second day was accomplished in 5 hours. C-123 aircraft provided a Phan Rang to Duc Pho and return and Duc Pho to Quang Ngai and return air shuttle for cargo and passengers. The Phan Rang bases (C-123) continued to be more reliable than previously scheduled air support.

Sea: No sea transportation was used during the operation.

Other Services

(1) Graves Registration Service was available through Chua Lai and Qui Nhon during the operation.

(2) Quartermeter Laundry and Shower services were available at the Chua Lai Base Camp or Chua Lai.

(3) Shower services were available at Quang Ngai.

Medical:

a. General. Brigade level medical support was provided for a two battalion task force in the Quang Ngai Province Area, as well as the Brigade (-) located at Duc Pho.

b. Organization. To accomplish the mission of supplying two ARVN regiments to this degree, it was necessary to echelon one half of the medical company's capability to Quang Ngai as a forward clearing element.

c. Hospitalization and evacuation:

(1) Hospitalization. Casualties evacuated from the Brigade area of operations were categorized as serious and routine. Serious casualties were evacuated, in most cases, direct from the pick-up site straight to the Second Surgical Hospital in Chua Lai. Minor casualties were evacuated to the forward clearing section for treatment and subsequently evacuated to the holding section located at Duc Pho. Non battle casualties were evacuated in the same manner as minor EPW personnel.

(2) Evacuation. Evacuation of patients from the Brigade AO was carried out in a smooth, efficient manner through the outstanding support provided by the 328th Air Ambulance Company. Fixed wing aircraft were available at Duc Pho airfield for evacuation of non-battle medical patients to the 6th and 86th Evacuation Hospital at Qui Nhon.

d. Medical Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Hood River</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>Malaria</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation Hood

1. Logistics, Medical supplies were provided by the forward
    medical station co-located Quang Ngai air strip with the FSP.

2. Lessons Learned:
   (1) Organisation and control of Brigade level Medical
       facilities is difficult with a split configuration.
   (2) Dust-off support with three (3) aircraft at Quang
       Ngai proved to be more than adequate since enemy contact was minimal.
   (3) High turnover individual medical items carried by the
       individual soldier such as salt pills, water purification tablets, and
       Dapsone tablets should be stocked and regulated at FSE II by
       the Medical Company's TOE. Back up generators must be
       readily available to ensure constant refrigeration of biologicals
       and blood.

   (4) The Medical Company's TOE should be augmented with
       an additional microscope. This would facilitate diagnosing FSG case
       without delay.

3. Conclusion
   a. The present concepts of logistical support are valid.
   b. Authorized stockage levels of TA 50-901 have been most
      difficult to properly maintain at the FSP level causing shortages
      in valued items and undue delays in providing supplies to the troops.

4. Recommendations:
   a. The present system of support be continued.
   b. FSP's should be designed to handle only high turnover
      items, 50-901 items and should not stock TA 50-901 items. The
      TA 50-901 items should be issued from the FSE II and IV supply
      activity to the S-4 in the forward base area. The S-4 will
      then be responsible for resupplying the companies in the field.
2. (C) Operation HOOD RIVER took place in QUAN CLUAN Province from 2 August 1967 to 12 August 67. The Brigade operated primarily in four districts: TRA BONG, SON TH, SON TII, and TU CHIA Districts. The primary missions of the Brigade were: Refuge Movement and Control, Food Extraction, and MEDCAPS.

2a. Refuge Movement and Control:

Although there were no plans for mass refugee movement, the Brigade expected to generate a small number of refugees due to the tactical operation. A total of 840 persons were relocated to District Headquarters within our area of operations. Before the operation got underway coordination was made with the MACV Sub-Sector advisors at SON TH and TU CHIA Districts, and also with the Special Forces advisory teams at TRA BONG and SON TII Districts. The concept of the operation was that the districts would receive only those refugees actually generated by tactical operations. During the ten day period of this operation SON TH District received the largest number of Refugees. Supplies for these additional refugees were received by District Headquarters from Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support. These commodities included food and other supplies necessary to help the refugees make a quick and satisfactory transition. In all a total of 23 sorties were flown in this operation for refugee evacuation.

2b. Food Extraction:

Primary emphasis was placed on this mission during operation HOOD RIVER. The procedure for the accomplishment of this mission was the same used during operation MANGIEN. When a food cache was found the Battalion would notify the Brigade S. After the decision was made by the ground tactical commander as to whether the cache would be extracted the Brigade would provide the Battalions with the needed rice bags. The Battalion would then proceed to the cache site with our aircraft. After the cache was bagged the food would be extracted along with the workers to the appropriate District Headquarters. During this operation a total of 21.5 tons of unpolished rice and 15 tons of salt were returned to government control. U.S. aircraft flew 11 sorties in extracting these food commodities.

2c. MEDCAPS:

For this operation MEDCAPS were held in NO BONG and NO PHO Districts. The MEDCAPS were conducted for the Refugees that were taken to these districts during Operation HOOD RIVER. The districts have dispensaries, but they are not adequately provided with medicine or trained personnel. The purpose of the MEDCAPS conducted during this operation was to aid the districts that received refugees during the last operation. A total of 335 persons and 157 domestic animals were treated medically during these MEDCAPS.

2. (U) Recapitulation of Activities During Operation HOOD RIVER

a. 840 Refugees relocated.
b. 54 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
c. 21.5 tons of unpolished rice extracted and returned to government control.
a. 15 tons of salt extracted and returned to government control.
e. 335 persons treated medically.
f. 157 domestic animals treated medically.
In the conduct of Operation NORD RIVER, the same techniques of artillery employment that have proven successful in the past were employed. The radar was not employed in the area of operations and remained in support of the DIV HQ Base.

b. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was given the mission of establishing a combined Fire Support Coordination Center in conjunction with the 2d ACR Division and the 1st Marine Brigade. Purpose of the facility was to coordinate fires within close proximity (500 meters) to FAC boundaries and to provide additional fires to Free World Military Forces as requested. Additionally the battalion operated an air traffic control station to all FOG aircraft operating in the NORD RIVER AO. The Battalion S-2 section operated the artillery advisory station on a 24 hour basis and passed information to the Air Force control party located in the FSCC. Once established the FSCC functioned smoothly and the flow of artillery information between the participating forces was timely and effective.

c. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OPCON to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery by Task Force Oregon on 4 August 1967. This battalion assumed control of firing and coordination of aircraft allocation for resupply of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. All functions inherent to the mission of reinforcing were accomplished by Battery C. Although the initial burden was imposed on the battalion S-2 section, the overall control and command supervision of the battery was improved.

d. The battalion operations section displaced to Buddha Mountain vicinity QUANG NGAI and relocated with the Brigade Tactical CP and the combined FSCC. A tactical daylight road march was conducted to Buddha Mountain on 1 August 1967, and a night march moved the element from Buddha Mountain to QUANG NGAI Airfield on 9 August 1967. Communications with all battalion elements were satisfactory and coordination with ARVN and RVN Marine elements was facilitated because of the close proximity to the combined FSCC.

e. Batteries B and C were road marched from DIV HQ to QUANG NGAI in preparation for insertion into the AO by CH-47. Battery C continued to road march to positions vicinity TRA NORD, however, enemy action prevented closing as scheduled and the battery was airlifted from a field position. No major problems resulted during the march. It was necessary to augment the battalion with vehicles from neighboring units to complete the move because sufficient battalion vehicles were not available in the forward area.

3. (b) Executions:

a. Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) A Battery continued to support 1st Battalion (Airborne), 527th Infantry from ZON AO vicinity B5971320.

(2) On 100830Z August, A Battery displaced by air to QUANG NGAI Airfield vicinity BS544739. Unit closed 1300 hours. At 1300 hours the battery road marched to CHI LAI in preparation for future operations.

b. Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacements:

(1) On 310930Z July, B Battery displaced overland to QUANG NGAI
Airfield vicinity BS66739. Unit closed 1130 hours. Further displaced by CH-47 airfield vicinity BS631799. Unit closed 1145 hours. Priority of fires to 3d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

CO Battery continued to support Operation HOOCH RIVER from vicinity BS662937.

Battery C, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacement:

(1) On 010930 August, C Battery commenced displacing overland to the TA C battery vicinity BS66739. Because of intense sniper fire and extensive road mining activity, the unit was unable to complete the road march. One MP escort vehicle detonated a mine resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. The battery returned approximately 5 miles along route and set up for the night vicinity BS658871. Continued preparation for future operations.

(2) On 020645 August, C Battery displaced by air to BS638869. Unit closed 0845 hours. Priority of fires to 3d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

(3) On 02030 August, C Battery displaced by air to BS411816. Unit closed 1431 hours. Priority of fires to 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

Battery C, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displacement:

(1) On 010930 August, TAG CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to Buddha Mountain via BS66739. Unit closed 1157 hours. Mission to support Operation HOOCH RIVER.

(2) On 02030 August, TAG CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to HA THANH Airfield via BS66739. Unit closed 1940 hours.

(3) On 010932 August, TAG CP 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery displaced overland to BS411816. Unit closed 1235 hours. Mission to support Operation BEITCN.

Reappraisal of Missions Fired:

a. Number of missions fired: 303
b. Total rounds expended: 3838

e. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. On 1 August, C Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Artillery fired into a C-7A aircraft as it made its final approach into the NA THANH Airfield. As a result of this serious incident, positive steps were taken to control both artillery firing and aircraft in close proximity of the NA THANH Airfield. A land line was installed from each firing battery to the airfield control party (US Air Force). All missions were reported to the control party prior to firing and aircraft landing or taking off from the field were reported to the battery. With close coordination between the control party and the batteries this system worked satisfactorily.

b. A security force was formed from battalion resources to conduct a heliborne combat assault and secure a battery position for Battery C, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery when enemy action prevented occupation of the position by road. A 30 man force was formed from survey and communications personnel and inserted into the LZ using seven UH-1D aircraft. The assault was successful and the LZ was ready for occupation within 30 minutes. The battery was established...
Commanders' Analysis:

a. The overstrength status of the battalion allowed for the formation of an infantry element from battalion resources which was successfully used to conduct a combat assault into a potentially hostile area to secure a landing zone for follow-on firing elements (C Battery). Although an acceptable solution when assets permit such action, it is not recommended, in that artillery battalion personnel are not equipped or trained for such a mission.

b. A tragic but valuable lesson was learned in the accidental shooting down of the C7A aircraft by C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. The Battalion Standard Operating Procedures has been modified accordingly, incorporating provisions for the US Air Force Combat Control Team and firing elements whenever artillery is located in close proximity to airfields.

The establishment of a combined Fire Support Coordination Center to coordinate the fires of the various Free World Military Forces units enhanced the coordination considerably. This function was performed by the Battalion Operations and Intelligence section. Due to the imposition of such a function on existing coordination systems, it was necessary to colocate the Battalion Tactical Coordination Center with the Fire Support Coordination Center. Should this function become Standard Operating Procedures on future combined operations, it may be necessary to augment the battalion's communications capability.

d. Whenever multinational forces are employed in combined operations, it is mandatory that the headquarters directing the operations establish adequate control and liaison with the member forces in order to ensure proper coordination and direction of fire support and maneuver elements. This is particularly desirable in view of language difficulties inherent in such an operation.

e. When operating in relatively small Areas of Operation, care must be exercised in the selection of colocated Artillery - Infantry Command Post to insure that adequate fires can be placed throughout the area of operation, including those close in to the battalion Tactical Command Post.