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**AUTHORITY**

28 Feb 1979, DoDD 5200.10, per document marking; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Leslie R. Grade, Jr., Director, Operations
Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Division

KENNETH C. WICKHAM
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J-3-32)

To: Commanding Officer
   1st 36th 25th Inf Div
   APO San Francisco 96225

1. Name and Type of Operation: FAIREIL - Pacification.
3. Location: BEN CHinh Dist, CL. BENH Prov - In Hqs at BENH CHinh.
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Inf Div at Hq 9th Inf in coordination with BENH CHinh Dist Chief.
5. Reporting Officer: LTC Herbert V. White, CO 4th Bn, 9th Inf (HANCEO)
6. Task Organization:
   a. US Forces
      1st 36th Inf (MACRO)
      1st 11th 1st Bn (Period 10 Nov thru 31 Jan 67)
      1st 11th 1st Bn (Period 1 Dec thru 10 Dec 66)
      1st 11th 1st Bn (Period 1 Dec thru 12 Jan 67)
      636th LGR Co
      WIP Team, 123rd, 124th, 125th
      Scout Dog Team, 30th Recon Co, 2nd Co, 2nd LGR Co
      Elements of 636th LGR Co
      Elements of 1st 11th 1st Bn, 2nd 11th 1st Bn
   b. Vietnamese Forces
      In BS
      National Police (Prov)
      PW Interrogation (Prov)
      BENH Artillery (2 Tubes 105 How Loc, 30th CHinh Dist Artillery)
   c. Periodically in BS
      Elements 3rd 25th Inf (ARVN)
      Elements 4th Inf (ARVN)
      17th (3rd Co, 3rd BN) (ARVN)
      39th RIVN/2 (ARVN)

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7. Supporting forces

US Army, 55th (Logistics Support) 5th Army
US Navy
FF 8th Plt (B) USN

8. Intelligence

a. Background Info:

(1) In early 1969, the VC began a determined effort to control Binh Dinh Prov. This was contributed to a lack of friendly force activity. VC activities included reconnaissance, overrunning of outposts, and the destruction of pic and bridges. VC objectives in Binh Dinh included destruction of the 33rd BN and Lang (205th) and the launching of a new on 205th BN. AFP and portions of Saigon from Binh Dinh.

(2) Order of battle: VC forces consisted of main force units and guerrilla forces. Those secretly operating in the area included the main force units, two guerrilla units, 16 guerrilla units, and 1000 known VC or VC sympathizers. Units and locations were as follows:

a. 11th BN, 11th Plt in Binh Dinh.

b. 6th BN, 1/5th Plt in Binh Dinh.

c. 1st BN, 1/5th Plt in Binh Dinh.

d. 1st BN, 2/5th Plt in Binh Dinh.

e. 2nd BN, 2/5th Plt in Binh Dinh.

f. VC in Saigon.

(3) VC units reported attacks against Binh Dinh units.

a. VC in Xuan Loc.

b. VC in Phuoc Tuy.

c. VC in Dalat.

(4) VC activity:

a. VC activity is predominantly upriver.

b. VC activity is predominantly upstream of the main division of the Long Binh sector.

9. 3rd Plt in Xuan Loc.

a. VC in Binh Dinh.

b. VC in Phuoc Tuy.

c. VC in Dalat.

10. VC activity:

a. VC activity is predominantly upriver.

b. VC activity is predominantly upstream of the main division of the Long Binh sector.

11. Command:

a. VC activity is predominantly upriver.

b. VC activity is predominantly upstream of the main division of the Long Binh sector.
with local officials and with U.S. advisory staff. Coordination with the Dist Chief, U.S. Mission, actor and subactor 3-2, CMBU staff, 1st Int, and Intelligence Section of 5-2, 25th Inf Div. Little office at Prov Q3 and 5-2 25th Div 23rd Inf at B.P. 110, the joint intelligence, provided a fairly reliable picture of BPH CASH VC activity. But it did not provide the commander with a hard target.

C. Organization of the Intel System:

1. District 2-2, police chief, and 25th combined Intel center was not at the outset in the dist suspend. The capabilities of this center were limited and provided inadequate support. Rq, CID provided: a complete interrogation center staffed by CID intel Follow and a senior intelligence officer was capable of quickly processing the large influx of business apprehended during raids and search ops. Direction of the center was by an ORDER officer who was directly responsible to the dist Chief. Supervision of the combined intel was the joint responsibility of the 2-2 of dist, 3rd Int Bn (AMCPE) and 4-9th Inf. 4-9th Inf intel cell and officers. 25th Dist N.I. personnel assisted in interrogating and 25th, activities and classification. While little results during the eight weeks period an most successful for or interest intel center was discontinued.

2. Info was channeled into a combined intel chamber and was coordinated with info provided by all contributing agencies. The intel officer was instructed to have Security Coordination Briefings.

D. Intel Sources:

1. 4-9th Inf: The 2-2 and 3-2 base with an attached MI team was organized to furnish a steady flow of intell to support ops. The comprehensive files proved to be helpful in planning ops, particularly during the week when dist and ARVN 3-2 were not available.

2. Intel:
   a. Provided intel data primarily from bodies SCAN reports.
   b. Provided intel data to primarily from daily SCAN reports. Coordination photo requests, CID, R.3, and finally, dist, R.3, R.4.1., and need to keep and track these

3. Problems encountered: 4-9th Inf from BPH intelligence efforts within the western portion of BPH and Dir. This info to the Intel base needed enemy movement and possible contact with nearby a threat.

4. 3rd Abn Bn (ARNW) coordinatived with 4-9th Inf daily at ASCC meetings but contributed very little to the intel effort since no internal intel system was established. Reactant to react to info provided by combined intel center.

5. Dist officials relied primarily on higher Hq for intel support.

6. Disc maintained no intel files but establish a network of eight fairly reliable agents. Reactant to react to enemy info provided by combined intel center.

7. Disc maintained no intel files but establish a network of eight fairly reliable agents. Reactant to react to enemy intel network. Extremely beneficial in providing terrain, minefield, barrier and miscellaneous.

8. Local Police maintains an agent network of 6 unreliable agents.

9. Primarily concerned with local problems. Fail to inspect contents of truck or cargo containers that have previously been passed through checkpoints with contention that only strange vehicles are used by VC.

10. Local Police maintains an agent network of 6 unreliable agents. Primarily concerned with local problems. Fail to inspect contents of truck or cargo containers that have previously been passed through checkpoints with contention that only strange vehicles are used by VC.

11. Conclusively drawn from ops:

12. VC face es unguaranteed units. VC face small arms to match VC weapons, high to heavy uses of various calibers. Rocket and grenade launchers, and all mortars in their hands. VC face no, and no weapons are used by VC.

13. The majority of VC mortars were to or semi-auto in mm. Howitzers, rocket launchers, rifles were rarely encountered in U.S. Chemical rockets. On the contrary, VC mortars are always supported by cm., and holes of this type weapon.

14. Upon capture, the VC suffer no, and holes. They are capable of delivering a continuous volume of fire from all weapons systems.
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1. VC and VC fire, although generally intense, is usually inaccurate. Significant new sites were confirmed only when the US force was engaged in an attack.

2. VC machine guns are well trained; their fire is normally accurate and effective. Mortar fire is particularly accurate. Mortar fire is generally on target with initial bursts.

3. VC mortar or artillery fire not engaged or when their sites of withdrawal have been cut, then the VC fire successive retreating cycles, and fragment into smaller units as they withdraw.

4. During close combat, VC positions are well armed and strongly fortified. Protection from any mist can be normally provided.

5. Fortifications have been constructed throughout the VC positions. In one case, a 10-year-old girl was positioned outside 750 meters from the probable VC positions.

6. VC field fortifications are of the formations of detached houses. These would be marked "high ground" or "fired on". No fire, heavy or light, was extensively used as a line of defense.

7. VC road and rail site lines have been launched from a range of 1 to 2,000 meters.

8. VC personnel usually employ close body troops for its areas, except for VC personnel. The US fire forces would not move troops or rifle troops, but fire from the periphery for early warning.

9. VC have employed children as scouts during cannon engagements. In one case, a 10-year-old boy was observed to have been observed in the area of VC positions.

10. Fortifications in the village vicinity were extensive and well camouflaged. The VC have reinforced the fortifications. Some fortifications are dug in village houses.

11. VC personnel support is not detected at ranges exceeding 150 meters. Targets have been 2 to 3,000 meters in the past, but seldom directly into the GIs.

12. VC personnel should be engaged by 5.56 mm rifle and 15-meter first 5.56 mm rifle, and 1.4 meter for 12.7 mm machine gun.

13. The VC have no automatic weapons.

14. The VC personnel support is not detected at ranges exceeding 150 meters. Targets have been 2 to 3,000 meters in the past, but seldom directly into the GIs.

15. VC personnel support is not detected at ranges exceeding 150 meters. Targets have been 2 to 3,000 meters in the past, but seldom directly into the GIs.

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22. VC personnel support is not detected at ranges exceeding 150 meters. Targets have been 2 to 3,000 meters in the past, but seldom directly into the GIs.

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10. Concept of Op

Phase I Preparation (Aug 30-Nov 1)

This phase, begins at 7 XMW with the establishment of the "Two Security Coordination Center (TSC)," at Bien Hoa. If the 4th LST-4232, the District Chief will select a few new intelligence officers from 1st and 25th my.battalions. Representing the 3rd battalion on the ASCC, during this period the ASCC will have conducted several attacks which were unreported. The ASCC will conduct several visits with the ASCC. During the week prior to deployment of the battalion, company size units supported by artillery will move to HCM CHU, assist in preparation of the ASCC during daylight hours and during the night conduct photo recon patrols in 01-11.

Phase II: Operation (Oct 3-31 Dec)

1. On 30 Nov, co B will initiate a photo recon of the battalion to HCM CHU. During the rest of the year, they will conduct one recon per week. By the end of November, they have been directed to let US/USAS presence be known and facilitate US personal with the area of operation. During this period prior to deployment of the battalion, company size units supported by artillery will move to HCM CHU, assist in preparation of the ASCC during daylight hours and during the night conduct photo recon patrols in 01-11.

Phase III Operation (Dec 9-Dec 10 Pha)

1. Co A, established in their company base, the units will initiate a steady stream of combat patrols to clear the area of hostile forces. This will be done by conducting in clear helo lines around their bases. Civic action will be coordinated in line with the area of operations.
support of the Royal Navy will be conducted during the phase. All operations will be coordinated with the USN and RCAF in a joint effort. It is expected that USN platforms will operate with USN air forces and USN land forces initially. The Netherlands will operate und to 2000 m-2. It is anticipated that 200 USN personnel will be withdrawn from NATO personnel will serve security responsibilities for the remainder of the phase. In this phase, vessels will be required to provide access to NATO forces for conduct of combat operations against the VV as well as for conduct of normal business for the NATO forces.

It is anticipated in this phase that the reliability of combat intelligence will be improved to such a degree as to specify combat operations against the VV. Operations will be extended to VV and VV, particularly on the eastern border area.

11. Actions: In operations, list A below in chronological order.

In addition to the above, actions discussed in this part, routine or SE actions were employed regularly. These actions are discussed initially to provide continuity to the OPs.

- Single on land initially, any 4 and other ships were engaged. Two or more ships of the same "category" were never previously engaged. "All ships by this will be seen by the op's own visual observation, except on new or unusual engagement." A new category was made with all ships engaged. "Shadow" was used on all ships at ready position at all times.

During the initial phase, 6000 tons of miscellaneous equipment was used in an irregular chase. The entire vessel was cleared using nine survivors. This resulted in 12 losses of personnel throughout the entire operation period of 200-600 tons visited. At least one of the PTs was destroyed at 10-day intervals.

- Before arrival of the PTs at Landmark, the PTs were employed from 8 to 1000 m-2, rapidly reaching 900 m-2, and beyond this range. In 3 engagements, the PTs were engaged to capture vessels within range of 8 to 100 and were engaged by vessels. If a vessel could limit the use of "surveying" firing, the PTs were not able to launch a successful attack.

- Vehicles of PTs were engaged. Captured documents indicated US-7 or 10000 tons for mining vs. PTs. Vessels under oil and gas poses by PTs and others were engaged. Vessels at sea were engaged. Implementation was by foot, vehicle and helicopter on an irregular schedule.

Colombia conducted a daily sweep of 10000 tons in the area around their forward bases to check for mines, booby-traps and other USN activity.

a. 8 Nov 65
   (1) 66-6222 at 19th and 31st
   (2) 66-6223 at 31st
b. 9 Nov 65
   (1) 66-6223 at 31st
   (2) 66-6222 at 19th

c. 10 Nov 65
   (1) 66-6223 at 31st
   (2) 66-6222 at 19th
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conducts a search of MILN CIV IL hostages.

a. Co. 3 arrived at 1530 and moved to 4530. 4 Co. will move to 1933 and 1 Co. will move to 0333. 1st Co. will move to 7030. 2nd Co. will move to 9030. 3rd Co. will move to 1133. 3r Co. will move to 1333.

b. 1st Co. will move to 0333. 2nd Co. will move to 1333. 3rd Co. will move to 7030. 4th Co. will move to 9030.

c. Co. 3 sectioned at 1333. Co. 4 sectioned at 1533. Co. 5 sectioned at 1733. Co. 6 sectioned at 1933.

d. (a) Convoy Co. 3 moved to 0333 at 1510. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0530 at 1540. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0730 at 1610. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 0930 at 1640.

e. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0730 at 1530. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0930 at 1540. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 1130 at 1610.

f. Convoy Co. 3 moved to 0333 at 1510. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0530 at 1540. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0730 at 1610. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 0930 at 1640.

(1) Convoy Co. 3 moved to 0333 at 1510. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0530 at 1540. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0730 at 1610. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 0930 at 1640.

(2) Convoy Co. 3 moved to 0333 at 1510. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0530 at 1540. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0730 at 1610. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 0930 at 1640.

(3) Convoy Co. 3 moved to 0333 at 1510. Convoy Co. 4 moved to 0530 at 1540. Convoy Co. 5 moved to 0730 at 1610. Convoy Co. 6 moved to 0930 at 1640.
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On 13/7 Form 1-12, 4th 12th unit of 12th Division. The 3rd section searched for its officers for further interrogation. 1st moved to the 4th. Due to a number of events,

b. 1st (-) continued normal activity.

c. HQ continued at circ. 900.

d. 3rd prov round trip.

1. 25 Oct 44

Work details of the 2 traveled to Nishi, CAU by 11th as both of those days to initiate field work. Details returned to 4th at 1200.

1. 26 Oct 44

(1) Detail (a) continued normal activity.

c. HQ continued at circ. 900.

d. 3rd prov round trip.

2. 27 Oct 44

(1) Information was received that the 4th unit occupied the 25 Oct 44 area.

c. HQ continued normal activity.

d. 3rd prov round trip.

3. 28 Oct 44

(1) Information was received that the 4th unit occupied the 25 Oct 44 area.

c. HQ continued normal activity.

d. 3rd prov round trip.

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1. Co is continuing night support at the Co is continuing night support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

2. Operations:
   a. Co is conducting 6 a.m. - 9p.m. activities at Co is conducting 6 a.m. - 9p.m. activities at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

3. Civil Affairs:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

4. Mechanized:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

5. Civil Affairs:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

7. 3A-71 Artillery:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

8. Civil Affairs:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.

9. Mechanized:
   a. Co is conducting at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
   b. Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv. By day Co is conducting daylight support at the 109th AEv.
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2. Operations:
   a. Co A (-) departed base 0735 for area search via X578792. At 0855, 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. Checkpoint was held in conjunction with security mission.
   b. Co B departed base at 0615 for search of Obj Vicker via X5705790. At 0855, 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. The unit conducted 2 checkpoints at X578792; 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. The unit proceeded to X5771788, W/Spacial police.
   c. Co C conducted a daylight air search at X5737090, X5707900, and X5707790. The platoon attached to X5707790 spotted 3 W/Spacial police at X5707790. The unit conducted 2 checkpoints at X578792; 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. The unit proceeded to X5771788, W/Spacial police.
   d. Co D (-) departed base at 0645 for search of Obj Vicker via X5705790. At 0645, 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. The unit conducted 2 checkpoints at X578792; 3rd platoon, six special police and a PF sqd were attached. The unit proceeded to X5771788, W/Spacial police.

3. Civil affairs: 20,000 312-b. leaflets a. were dropped via X57279, X5772, X57279, and X57218.

4. Civil affairs: 20,000 312-b. leaflets were dropped in the area bounded by X57279, X5772, X57279, and X57279. For further details for 3rd Co Civil affairs, 4th platoon, 2nd Co, 47th Inf. Battalion.
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AIC & ZINR

Situation part of ambush and regular units continued immediately for the night patrol. The unit employed plan night ambush at 071036hr. The search was conducted with 1 SP tank, 6 SP artillery, and 3 PB artillery. The search continued at 071036hr. The unit employed 3 SP and 4 SP ambush at 071036hr, 3275790, and 3176790.

b. Co D departed 1230 for X916790, the convoy moved in that area without incident arriving at 1330. Preparation commenced immediately for the next patrol. The unit employed plan night ambush at 071036hr. The search was conducted with 1 SP tank, 6 SP artillery, and 3 PB artillery. Four rats of next search were also located but fire was halted. VC casualties were not confirmed. One platoon ambush was recalled for 1st base security. A Bastette for VC was 1201. A flare ship and a light fire were on area over 3-4hr. This was a co-ordinated action, taken to with 3-4afe, attack a PB and patrol via 31770604. Clear, short,}

1. Concept: Co A will continue in its role as an infantry company, continue support of the 4th Infantry Division and the 21st Infantry Brigade. Co A will employ its platoons and sections to support the attack, providing fire support and direct fire support as needed. Co A will also coordinate with the 3rd Battalion, 1st reconnaissance unit for additional support if required.

2. Operations:

a. Co A continued to prowl for enemy at night vision at 071036hr. The search was conducted with 1 SP tank, 6 SP artillery, and 3 PB artillery. The search continued at 071036hr. The unit employed 3 SP and 4 SP ambush at 071036hr, 3275790, and 3176790.

b. Co D departed 1230 for X916790, the convoy moved in that area without incident arriving at 1330. Preparation commenced immediately for the next patrol. The unit employed plan night ambush at 071036hr. The search was conducted with 1 SP tank, 6 SP artillery, and 3 PB artillery. Four rats of next search were also located but fire was halted. VC casualties were not confirmed. One platoon ambush was recalled for 1st base security. A Bastette for VC was 1201. A flare ship and a light fire were on area over 3-4hr. This was a co-ordinated action, taken to with 3-4afe, attack a PB and patrol via 31770604. Clear, short, on.
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4/9 SS received a L.t. in QM noting that SS w. no. to be attacked by enemy of the 506th VC main force B. The attack was expected from 134747509. Co G performed its mission. The unit engaged 2-3rd attack at 124747999. The attack was very heavy.

b. SS engaged very heavy for the 5-3rd VC main force B

c. SS received a L.t. in QM noting that SS w. no. to be attacked by enemy of the 506th VC main force B. The attack was expected from 134747509. Co G performed its mission. The unit engaged 2-3rd attack at 124747999. The attack was very heavy.

d. SS engaged very heavy for the 5-3rd VC main force B

e. SS received a L.t. in QM noting that SS w. no. to be attacked by enemy of the 506th VC main force B. The attack was expected from 134747509. Co G performed its mission. The unit engaged 2-3rd attack at 124747999. The attack was very heavy.
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escort for Co B once assured of terminating area for the hostile
phases of ops. The ops were only for up to one Air and all Air ptl escorted
only to GVCT at 1140. Bat ght 02 C CTG at 1300.
B. PT 7/11 3.14 1 Lh and 10 LC in at 5/49.
C. 2. Heli. 26th Helicopter Asst Co, 25th Avn Sq, and
the 1st RF 14th Avn sq.

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1. Civil Affairs

a. On 1100, via XS707767, 01 4/9 and last OIC for 11/4 GTM

had a 2 plt night ambush to 1210 on it GTM. Numerous local
people att tailed and good will was evident that the C OIC was
a constant of 3/4 plt was present. The last OIC was flown to
a helo. 1210 to 02 4/9. LRRP attempted to take 14 26th Avn
elements and needle making at civil affairs was held at CRTA
Prov Hq. and quick contact was est at 02 4/9 by VC ambush of
8 men.

11 Dec 66

1. Concept: On 1140 Dec, Co A will conduct 4 eagle flights to XS702767,
XS707767, XS712767, and XS767767. The 26th Helicopter Asst Co will prov lift
acts and a C & C act. Recon will be deployed against the 1st tgt. All 4 hcs
are pt lts where VC elements are suspected to be operating.

2. Operations:

a. Co A marshalled on strip at 1210 to conduct raid at XS707767. The
Co (-) landed by 1400 and surrounded the obj. Co A (-) completed the search
by 1140, and extracted by 1400. It closed base camp at 1425. The opn produced
no results. Co A employed 1 night ambush ptl at XS707767.

b. Co B employed 2 ptl at XS757773 and XS711777. Co B marshalled the
Bn strip at 1210 with 3 act loads. A pt (-) moved on to obj XS711777. At
1150, act (-) took off and linked up with pt (-) which moved overland. The plane
surrounded the obj and made a thorough search utilizing the VC to aid the search.
By 1400, Co B had apprehended 3 male VCs and engaged one Vietnamese male with 3
who was observed escaping from the obj. The man was hit but he escaped although
fresh blood was found. Co B terminated search at 1450 and returned to base. A
stay behind ptl was left at XS711777. The ptl closed base at 1535.

C. Co continued with base const. A LRRP pt was employed at XS76777.
The LRRP mission was to report to 4/9 enemy activity in that area. At 1005,
LRRP apprehended 1 role who happened on their pan. At 1010, the 1st ptl reported
1 with a wsp moving towards site from XS76777. At 1030, the 2nd ptl reported that 1
armed VC was approaching his pan and he felt that his site was compromised.
He called for immediate extraction. The patrol engaged VC with SA and then
received heavy Air fire from the N. Army was called and extraction was off.
Suppressive fire was prov by guns. The extraction was off by 1055 and the
ptt arrived Binh Chanh at 1104. The detainee was brought back by the LRRP.
Co C employed 2 ptl of the night of 11 bc at XS757773 and XS76777.
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6. As I am in pr v 2 ptc to sec. 367 at end and
analyzed 2 eq. of the night of 11 Dec to 2373373 and 2373383. The
first analysis O/00 was x-consid. to valida to it if it was from 0800-1000.

3. CIVIL AFFAIRS: 100,000 no 153-66 bfr were declared
in KASTU to 2373373 and 2373383. As 800 v/2 2373373, two
ptc were x-consid. by the sec. It was reqd. that it be
repaired from sec 2373373 to 2373383. Set in place.

12 Dec 66

1. Symbol: 0 12 Dec 66 Go 1 will el och Rhe 2
3007-760 with the of 1000 fl. 0 fl. cum on 23733111,
then 12 Dec will 

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2. Operations:

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2. Operations:

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1. By 12z your position at the 54-5, at 1712, please report to the 3rd Co. at 1720. Alas Co. will be near this area. Please report your

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3. Civil Affairs: A 4-lb GB HEDP Incendiary, 2200 ft, was dropped by a B-1B and ignited an area of 10 acres at 0800. The fire was extinguished by a B-52 drop of B-52

4. Operations: The 34th Bt returned to Cu Chi on the 4th. Problems were encountered during the 3&4 pln each as we det and the daily Vietnamese militia incidents. The pln plans to determine number of civilians who were

5. Civil Affairs: A 4-lb GB HEDP Incendiary, 2200 ft, was dropped by a B-1B and ignited an area of 10 acres at 0800. The fire was extinguished by a B-52 drop of B-52

6. Operations: The 34th Bt returned to Cu Chi on the 4th. Problems were encountered during the 3&4 pln each as we det and the daily Vietnamese militia incidents. The pln plans to determine number of civilians who were
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b. t 0233, the plt, formerly located at XS799798, on 16 Dec relocated to XS789763 because of possible enemy action. At 0953 the plt received sniper fire which was silenced by mort fire. The patrol closed down at 1530 with 2 WIA's; the 2nd was evacuated at XS781764, at 1430 3 mort crps were directed to the plt site. All returned to duty. The unit spent the remainder of the day in base rest and preparation for night activities. The unit employed night ambush plt at XS704763 and XS725768.

c. At 0800, the plt located at XS772802 on 16 Dec sustained 1 AKB. WIA from a boat team. Dustoff was off at 0825. At 0845 the plt received a sniper shot and was moved to silence the sniper. The plt closed at 0944. Co C spent the remainder of the day in local activity, base rest and preparation for plt. The unit employed night ambush plt at XS763767 and XS764761.

d. HHC prov air drop spt. Recon prov spt for ri ckr opn by 0630. At 0857 recon prov spt for the pick-up of the ptls from Co A and the 25th cnn plt. Ri prov spt for the OVT convoy from 0700-0900 and from 1230-1430. HHC prov air drop spt to a fund to prov clothing as a Christmas gift for the children of the 25th cnn.

e. -7/11 sni. fired 3 111 and 6 HE rds in spt of trek force opns.

f. The 173rd fields Helicopter Co prov left spt for the 39th. Resupply was off by the 173rd fields Helicopter Co.

g. 3rd plt prov spt for the 25th cnn. 1st prov spt for the 39th cnn. 2nd prov spt for the 25th cnn.

3. Civil affairs: EMBASSY relieved at BEC 0800 base transit. 17 25th cnn convoy. Hospital Convoy was given to wounded 2 soldiers of 25th cnn.
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2. Operations:
   a. Co A plat conducted an eagle fit at XS705706 and XS705703. No contact was made. Pts at XS705777, XS705706, and XS705799 made no contact.
   b. Co B plat on sweep received sniper fire at 0715 from XS733777. Fire was suppressed with OA. At 0748 Co B received fire from XS803758 and XS707799. Two men were wounded and evacuated by dustoff at 0815. Sniper fire was suppressed by OA. At 0930, 15 rds 7.62 Russian ammo and 1 lb mae supplies were found in a structure at XS803757. Plat left behind eqpt and conducted search 1215. 1h detainees were apprehended.
   c. Co C continued base coast and made preparations for night ambush ptls. Unit employed eqpt pts via XS754773 and XS754779.
   d. H/D prov admin/log pts. Recon plat secured 7Z for eagle fit opn, prov escort for eng'r rd clearing from 0730-0832 and secured 7Z for eagle fit extraction 0900-0946. At plat prov escort for convoy from AMI and WRT.
   e. A/3-11 fired 12 HE, 2 HP and 2 ILL rds in spt.
      Trooplift UI-1D 10 Sorties
      Gunships UI-1B 4 Sorties
      Resupply CH-47 1 Sortie
   g. 3rd Abn 'n conducted a co search at XS768577. No contact was made. Unit employed and ambush ptls at XS723038 and XS707799.
   h. Engr 1 A/39th Engr coast bunkers at Bien CHAM and Co B fwd base, swept MSR for mines and placed laterite on MSR and within arty area.

3. Civil affairs: 120,000 OPNS PL leaflets were dropped over Bien CHAM Dist. A ceremony and presentation of gifts to personnel wounded during Opn FAIRFAX was coordinated and finalized with BDE LAC Dist Chief. ARVN cultural drama tm played at TAIN CH. NEXACF conducted at TAM QL TAI. NEXACF conducted at TAM QL TAI treated 196 patients and dist 15K scrination kits. NEXACF announced US PA appearance at Bien CHAM this morning.

20 Dec 66
2. Operations:
   a. Co A continued base dovcl and prepared for night ambush ptls at XS706501, XS706592, and XS717777.
   b. Co B stay behind ptl at XS802761 made contact with 15-20 VC at 1800. Fire, mortar and arty fire forced the VC to break contact. Rescission force was committed and conducted a search of the area. There were no US casualties. VC casualties unk. Pt1 relocated to XS7079-79 at 2001. Another ptl set off booby trap at XS781765 resulting in 1 US KIA. Casualty was evacuated to Fd WRT and following morning to Cu Chi. Ptl relocated to XS782761. Co B continued base coast and employed bushmaster ptl at XS96756.
   c. Co C conducted a plat search nm at XS776798 from 1330-1355. No contact was made. Unit employed and night ambush ptl at XS7160-03 and XS773302.
   e. A/7-11 Artillery fired 12 HE and 8 HP rds in spt. Artillery credited with 1 VC KIA (70-80).
   f. Asks: The 118th Assault Helicopter Co prov spt to the Brm and 3rd Abn. Resupply was effected by 118th Spt Asslt Helicopter Co.
      Trooplift UI-1D 12 Sorties
      Gunships UI-1B 4 Sorties
      Resupply CH-47 1 Sortie
   g. 3rd Abn Brm conducted 3 eagle fits to XS750303, XS7895-815, and XS764005. No contact was made.
   h. Engr cleared MSR to B Co fwd base, dist 7 loads of laterite around Bien CHAM bskrs. worked on MSR in 3rd Abn sector and conducted body count in 3rd Abn AO.

3. Civil affairs: 120,000 rice tax leaflets and 50,000 info leaflets were dropped from soft NE of AO. A NEXACF conducted at Bien CHAM Hospital treated 57 patients.

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21 Dec 68:

1. Concept: CA-4 employs 6 sqd ambush plts, 3rd 2ln conducts 2
    ambush plts which were dispatched to X5791789, X5792799 and X5711-
    772.

2. Operations:
   a. Co - continued with full base patrol and prepared for sqd
      ambush plts which were dispatched to X5791789, X5792799 and X5711-
      772.
   b. Co B conducted plt bushranger with casualties at 2500, ensuing fire
      Engagement from 1421-1432, resulted in 6 VC KIA
   c. Co C plt conducted ambush opn with 2500 KIA against suspected
      VC Unit 147th (BC) and 2 US KIA. Any fire accounted for 5 VC KIA
      (POSS). Unit employed 2 sqd ambush at X5796739 and X5797759.
   d. Co C prov admin/log opn. Becon prov-initial rcw clearing op
      and escorted Co H for ftrp presents to US OFs. 2nd plt prov acty for the
      CO G1 at cpwy from 0714-1530.
   e. 2/4 plt prov initial 72 HE and 6 WP rds in opn.
   f. 2/4 Co conducted co scrch at X5720855 without contact;
      conducted 13 sqd ambush.
   g. Sett: The 25th vn in prov actv opn. 2nd plt prov acty was
      off by 147th Spcl Helicpter Co.
   h. Co G C constitutional 1 sortie
   i. Gunships
      4 skts-18
      4 skts-1
   j. C1 C L 6-1 sorties
   k. Civil affairs: A contingent at G24-1455 at 47545476 for further
      presentation at 1435.
   l. 3/458 Prov prov admin/log opn. Prov prov initial 2 sorries
      secured for sqd plts. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov acty.
   m. 3rd 2ln conducts 25 1st in base, 1st plt prov initial 25 1st in base
      conduct local plt prov in OPs. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov actv.
   n. 2/4 3rd 2ln conducted 2 sqd night ambush plts at X5791789 and X5792799.
   o. 2/4 3rd 2ln conducted 2 sqd night ambush plts at X5791789 and X5792799.

22 Dec 66

1. Concept: CA-4 employs 6 sqd night ambush plts. Co A conducts
    plt/gle opn at X5794729. 2/4 and Co C conduct local plt prov in OPs.
   a. Co G C constitutional 2 sorties
   b. Gunships
      2 skts-13
      1 skt-4
   c. 1st 2ln prov admin/log opn. Prov prov initial 2 sorties
      secured for sqd plts. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov acty.
   d. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov acty.
   e. Co G 1st plt prov initial 25 1st in base, conducts joint multi-
      ln 6 & 10 omn with 3rd 2ln at X5793250 conducting 0715. Co 3 lands 8 of
      10R5 TM Co: 3rd 2ln waves for 10R5 TM Co: Lands 3 of tanks. 2/4 3rd plt
      prov 3rd 2ln and 3rd 2ln prov initial 25 1st in base, conducts 1st plt prov
      initial 25 1st in base.

2. Operations:
   a. Co - continued with full base patrol and prepared for sqd
      ambush plts which were dispatched to X5791789, X5792799 and X5711-
      772.
   b. Co B conducted plt bushranger which contained 650 Bt at 2500, ensuing fire
      Engagement from 1421-1432, resulted in 6 VC KIA
   c. Co C plt conducted ambush opn with 2500 KIA against suspected
      VC Unit 147th (BC) and 2 US KIA. Any fire accounted for 5 VC KIA
      (POSS). Unit employed 2 sqd ambush at X5796739 and X5797759.
   d. Co C prov admin/log opn. Becon prov-initial rcw clearing op
      and escorted Co H for ftrp presents to US OFs. 2nd plt prov acty for the
      CO G1 at cpwy from 0714-1530.
   e. 2/4 plt prov initial 72 HE and 6 WP rds in opn.
   f. 2/4 Co conducted co scrch at X5720855 without contact;
      conducted 13 sqd ambush.
   g. Sett: The 25th vn in prov actv opn. 2nd plt prov acty was
      off by 147th Spcl Helicpter Co.
   h. Co G C constitutional 1 sortie
   i. Gunships
      4 skts-18
      4 skts-1
   j. C1 C L 6-1 sorties
   k. Civil affairs: A contingent at G24-1455 at 47545476 for further
      presentation at 1435.
   l. 3/458 Prov prov admin/log opn. Prov prov initial 2 sorties
      secured for sqd plts. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov acty.
   m. 3rd 2ln conducts unprov acty.
   n. 2/4 3rd 2ln conducted 2 sqd night ambush plts at X5791789 and X5792799.
   o. 2/4 3rd 2ln conducted 2 sqd night ambush plts at X5791789 and X5792799.

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granade at XS705765. Unit employed night ambush pt. at XS706793 and XS717-802.

b. 3 Co conducted search in same from 0900-1555 at XS690950 and XS714385. At 1201 a VC WIA was captured at XS694655. Co destroyed 27 bunkers at XS688339-XS692951. Unit destroyed 36 1-win and 2-wm pans an-
1 bunker at XS689766-XS692681. 12 nine destroyed at XS686224. Unit employ-
ed 1 sqp pl at XS705773.

c. Co C conducted local sety sweep from 1500-1700. 1 US and 1 A/36 NIN resulted from body trap at XS777778. Dust off 1645. Unit employed night ambushes at XS706793 and XS717777.

92. 3rd pl employed 9 night ambushes. 32nd Pl occupied at XS686951. Unit destroyed 36 1-war and 2-one pan pt. a bunker at XS708877.

b. 3 Co prov admin/log ppt. Recon plt prov 72 sety and
secured MSR cbr party. 4 Tt plt escorted convoy from CU CBI and rri.

a. 2-7/11 arty fired 100 MI in sety.

b. Left 173rd A/33 Helicopter Co prov sety ppt. Re-supply
soft prov by 147th 3rd A/33 Helicopter Co.

Trop lift UE-19 42 sorties

Cnbaby UE-19 10 sorties

C & G UE-19 1 sortie

Re-supply UE-19 3 sorties

Re-supply CH-47 1 sortie

2. 3rd plm employed 10 night ambushes. 33rd Co occupied:
blocking point XS715382 at 0739, 33rd Co landed at XS697562 at 0723 and
continued search. At 0300, 33rd Co radio contact with unk no VC at XS67-856. Arty and gunships employed. Search of area resulted in 7 VC KIA, 5 were captured in 1 US pl, 2 Baneo, 1 Thompson SMG, and 1 KIAB. Co
covered. Two VC WM were apprehended. Casualties 2 KIA and 1 DOW. Unit destroyed 2 bunkers and re to by boat.

b. B Pts chaser XU 0300-0800, discovered and destroyed 3
gran body traps at XS700978. Inc.; at 0815 AM completed.

24 Dec 66

1. Concept.: in continuous observation of troops by employment of
sety defensive ambush pl, and daylight sety sweeps. 3rd plm en stabbed
out 10 sqd and ambushes.

2. Operations:

a. 3rd A/33 pl at XS706793 and XS717922 closed base by
0735 without incidents. Unit continued FM base improvement and prepara-
tion for night ambush at XS717939, XS727799 and XS717689.

b. 3 Co assisted cbr the MSR. Security plt dispatched to
XS717393.

c. 3 Co pl at XS676765 and XS717777 closed at 0704. Unit
assisted in cbr the MSR. School choral group visited the C Co FM base
at 0920 and entertained the troops with Christmas carols. The choral group
departed at 1230. One plt secured at 1202. SQD 1445 dispatched to
XS764778 and XS770798.

d. HHC continued adm/log plt. Recon pin. assisted cbr
MSR linking up with elements of C Co.

b. 15/11 fired 37 NS and 2 VP rds.

f. The 25th plm in and the 1st plm in Det prov sety ppt
for 4/9. Re-supply was off by the 147th A/33 Helicopter Co.

C & G UE-19 3 sorties

C & G H-23 1 sortie

Re-supply CH-47 1 sortie

g. 3rd plm employed 10 sqd ambush pl.

b. B Pts chaser by recon plt cleared the MSR. Stock-
piled 6 loads of Inters for reo repair.

3. Civil affairs: GL: HHC new Campttda and school choir pre-
cented a Christmas show for BHCOS at 200 CRI in the village. Gifts were
presented to all members of the 2. Freshmen were prepared and served by
US forces. Christmas party was held in the Dist compound for 67 co-
 polluted 17/17 children.

25 Dec 66

1. Concept.: in employs securitypl., observes Christmas cease
fire, prepares for future ops.

2. Operati plt.

a. 3rd Co pl at XS717393, XS7779, an. XS717850 closed by
0740. Unit maintained eqpt. prepared for night security plt and observed
the Christmas holiday. SQD plt dispatched to XS707953, XS717689, and XS-
717958.

b. 3 Co pl via XS777863 closed 0950. Unit assisted Recon
plt cbr the MSR. The Christmas holiday was observed. SQD plt dispatched to
XS797778 and XS714767.

c. C pl at XS767778 and XS770789 closed 0930. Unit

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assisted recon plnt C-2C. The 3rd plnt continues to LOC Brig refly.

Christmas holiday secured. C2 plnt dispatched to X79799 and X79789.

C-30, prov escort for again convoys. X7 plat escorted convoy from CI CH

C30. prov escort for again convoys. X7 plat escort convoy from CI CH

and ret.

C-30 prov escort for again convoys. X7 plat escort convoy from CI CH

and ret.

a. 25th Arm Div and 3/4 Cav prov C-30

1 sortie

OH-47

1 sortie

b. Resuply

2 sorties

OH-47

1 sortie

f. 3rd plnt in employ of 10 sqd petrols.

e. X7 plat prov escort for again convoys. X7 plat escorted convoy from CI CH

and ret.

f. 3rd plnt in employ of 10 sqd petrols. C30 prov escort for again convoys. X7 plat escort convoy from CI CH

and ret.

26 Dec 66

1. Concept. 3rd continues situation ambush plnt. A Co relieves

C Co plnt of futy commitment at 0500-0630. B Co conducts check-

mate on Hwy 4, e famed C30. B Co conducts search at X79779 commencing

0715. Recon plnt prov escort and security as required.

2. Operations:

a. 27 Dec 66 plnt at X791705, X791780, 2nd X791780. One plnt observed to 0105 via X791780. 0 fcidents reported.

The 2nd plnt escorted cavplnt at X791780 commencing 0105. OH-47 with negative

results. C-4 C30 and OH-47 of its futy commitments at 0800. B Co prov escort at 0800 via X791780 and

X791777.

b. C Co prov X797777 and X797677 had no contact and escorted C-30 plnt at X791777 and X791780. OH-47 prov escort at X791777. 1st plnt prov escort at X791777.

The 2nd plnt has reembarked at 0500 via X791777. 2 body trms detected at X791780. 2nd plnt C30 and OH-47

escorted cavplnt at X791780, OH-47 with negative results. 

C-30 prov escort at X791780, OH-47 with negative results. OH-47 prov escort at X791780.

C Co prov escort at X791777. 2nd plnt prov escort at X791777.

to X791777. 2nd plnt prov escort at X791777. 2nd plnt prov escort at X791777.

C Co prov escort at X791777. 2nd plnt prov escort at X791777. 2nd plnt prov escort at X791777.

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27 Dec 66

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(1) Concept:

3rd Abn. moves 1 Co by foot to arrive at A XS669916 at 0700; moves sqd force to Pt B to interdict canal traffic and seals off AO to south with Co (-) on order. Search area south of ESN IAC river. Provides 1 Co (-) on strip alert at 3d Abn base camp. C Co (-) lands LZ 1 and 2 X568316 and X593216 to 10 UHID soft at 0715; scales and searches area north of YAN IAC river. 2nd Pt Al/P O Grave of C/Co, lands LZ 3 X701817 in 10 UHID soft. At 0730 conducts local search, secures the northern flank of C Co. Units extracted from original AO on order.

(2) Operations:

(a) A Co ptls had no contact and closed 0830. 3rd pit remains asqty for LAC Bridge; 1st ptl under order of "C", landed LZ 3, X5701317, at 0800. No enemy contact was made. Plt man was to secure flank and rear of C Co during search opn. The opn terminated at 1225 and the ptl was extracted by helicopter at 1300. One sqd from the 2nd ptl secured the bn strip with recon ptl at 0645 and 1200. One sqd adv to recon ptl for clearing HSR at 0700. The Co employed 2 sqd ambush patrols tonight at X7718203 and X7701793.

(b) B Co Sumbulater at X8303775 continues. Plts at X7972755 and X8007277 had no contact and closed 0730. B Co cleared its portion of HSR by 0730. At 1045-1150 conducted a HEDCAP at its 1st base. The Co will dispatch 1 sqd size ptl to X7911666.

(c) C Co ptls at X577971, made contact with 20-25 VC enroute to its ambush site at 2000. The ptl receiving fire from 3 sides called arty and the enemy broke contact. At 2010 the ptl relocated at X771616. At 0701, the Co (-) landed LZ 1 and 2, X568316 and X596316. No fire was received. Plt of A Co under cover of C Co landed LZ 3 X701817 at 0600; no fire received. At 0606 C Co made contact with elements of the 3rd Abn on approaching to the S. At 0620, C Co requested additional dono by aerial resupply to drop 35 bunkers at X576915. At 1025, C Co dropped h donots at X576915. The search was completed by 1225. Both US and IVA were extracted from 5 30g at 1300. C Co will dispatch 2 sqd ambush patrols to X3751863 and X3701766.

(d) Med continued admn and log op. Recon ptl secured Bn LZ, FE and resupply pad. At 1300 escorted convey from Cu Chi.

(e) Arty: 1/7-11 fired h2 105, 3 WP 105, and 2 illum in spt of opns.

(f) 156th Avn Co, provided:

Telegram 

1x10  

1x6  

1x12  

1x7  

2x2  

(g) 3d Abn Bn ambush ptls had no contact and closed by 0630. At 0702 1st Co departed for blocking pm at X569116 and at 0717 2nd Co landed LZ 4 X5961692 with no enemy contact. The bn (-) linked up with elements of C Co at 0600. The Abn employed 20 mile dateline. The unit was extracted 1300. On the night of 27 Dec, the Bn will dispatch 10 sqd ambush ptls.

(h) 1/665th Engr cleared Bn HSR by 0900, working on the bridge at X5710766 on the 2/14th MSR to HCI KHEI. Road opened: HCI KHEI to HCI GUM. Bridge on route 226 is 53% complete.

3rd Abn: HEDCAP at HCI KHEI treated 10 patients. HEDCAP at HCI GUM hospital treated 70 patients. Bridge at X5715285 10 feet in length and 11 feet wide relocked and placed; open to traffic.
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28 Dec 45

(1) Concepts:
1st LK conducted single flight to XS7777. Co conducted Co (-) opn. XS795187, commencing 0900. Co prepared for double opns on the night of 28 Dec. 2nd plt continued until 1200 EST to clear Co (-) pit. 3rd plt continued to conduct local pit from 1200 EST. Engr plt continued to work on 2/14.

(2) Operations:
(a) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 28 Dec. 1st plt was conducted into underside of Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(b) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 28 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(c) 3 Co (-) and 2 Co (-) opns were conducted on the night of 27 Dec. Co (-) pit was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(d) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 27 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(e) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 27 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(f) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 27 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(g) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 27 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.
(h) Co conducted 3 sing. opns on the night of 27 Dec. 1st plt was conducted against Co (-) pit. 2nd plt was prepared for 3rd plt but no contact was made. Co deployed a field column pit to XS7777 and XS7789.

(3) Civil Affairs:
25,000 24G. 100 leaflets dropped X7552-8161. 150 American History comics given to the school at XS02. 150 American History comics given to the school at XS02. Foot bridge at XS72532 dropped by Engr plt 30 ft wide by 20 ft long. 150 American History comics were given to the school at XS02. Additional info received from 717th Co (-) at XS04. 22K Village, guerrilla camps compiled and fed to 25th representative at 35 for printing of a special leaflet.
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B Co occupies ambush pen at X578777 on the night of 20 Dec. At 0100 B Co occupied 1 ambush pen X57776, 2/56 occupies blocking pen 3

then II via X578777 at [illegible] Hour. The 31st RF Co occupies blocking pen J & K via X579777 at 11 Hours. All Co and C Co 3d Abn land LZ 2 & 3, and h via X580775 at H Hour and H Hour plus 10, conduct search in some, and extract to find bases via X581772 by air. Seab Co h6s move by foot to conduct search of X1 and 22.

A Co lands at L2 X580776 at 12 Hour establishes obsevations on river. Helicopters and PAC on sta.

(2) Operations:

(a) A Co employed two heliborne emplaced ambush pts at X578799 and X578789. One RF approached at X578791. One sqd assisted in clearing MSR to B Co then secured 12 at 0700 and at 1130. The 3d plt continued sety mission at all LG Bridge. The 3d plt participated in the combined opn by haliborne landing LZ 1 and establishing river checkmate at X580776. 2d plt WCP to C Co 1230, no contact resulted. Plt was extracted 1715 with C Co. Ambush pts were employed at X578778 and X578780.

(b) B Co employed 2 night ambush pts which had no contact, they were joined by 2 additional pts to block E and N end of A2 plt contact resulted in 3 VC KIA (2) and capture of 2 wpns. All 5 pts returned on foot to B Co for base at 1115. 10 man demo team was provided to 131st RF Co to destroy booby traps in that unit sector. One man recovered WIA from mine. Dustoff was effected at X580776. Ambush plt employed at X5791766 & X5782785.

(c) C Co night ambush pts had no contact and closed field base by 0626. Forces involved in opn conducted combat assault in 2 lifts, 120mm were brought out with the extraction at 1755. Ambush plt employed at X5807791 and X5787866.

(d) HRG rocon plt cleared rts to C and B by 0650 and secured the FZ SW of HLONG CHIFF for the hill lift and CHIFF resupply mission. The plt also performed convoy escort missions within the BN. At arocted the convoy from CU CHIFF was rts.

(e) 2d-11 Artly fired 24 WP, 39 HE, 21 Spt missions, and 2 HE missions. All missions were in spc of 4-9.

(f) 12th Bttn Avn Co supported opns with 75 sorties.

(g) 3d Abn BN Forces in 2 lifts landed unopposed LZ, at 1030 and at 1055. At 1032 the 31st Co made contact X580759. A booby trap caused 5 WIA who were evac. Dustoff. On extraction of the 2 1st w 1st Air and mort fire was received from X580767.

(h) 131st RF Co moved to pens J & K but a mine caused 2 WIA (RF) who were over. The Co stayed in blocking pens until 1615. It closed base area at 1950.

(i) 1/5-65 Engr cleared and graded road to HLONG KI. A swing net was completed for a school in HLONG CHIFF. Barreneys were built for C Co and lumber was cut for the 400 LG bridge.

(j) 2d BN 165th Rct occupied blocking pens S of the river and moved westward. A report of VC at X580753 did not materialize. No contact was made and the BN closed CHIFF GND at 1850.

(k) LRRP of 3/1 Cav continues to operate from initial loc. Reported sampan with 3 VC armed with SIGHS rifles at 1030. At 1030, 2 sampans with VC in uniform and armed with M1. At 1040 arty was called on 2 notorized sampans; no surveillence on targets. Lightning bug at 0335 engaged 3 VC 1 VC KIA (20) resulted.

3. Civil Affairs: 105 lozflts were dropped. 210 calendars printed by 215 PSYOP Co distributed in villages. Solitium payment made to Vo Van Son who was injured by helicopter fired rocket. 2 health and comfort packages given at G50 Med hop to civilians injured in opn.

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(a) 1 Co pltn at XS707785 and XS7052801 had no contact and closed 0730. 3d pltn continued cty mission at AN ICO Bridge. The Co (-) performed normal base camp activities and maintenance of equip. Co will dispatch 2 sqd pltn to XS717779 and XS7096801.

(b) 3 Co pltn at XS717185 and XS719766 had no contact and closed by 0830. Co unit cleared its portion of the radar by 0729. At 0900 3 Co sent a pltn on a search mission at XS71166. Pltn had no contact and closed 1700. The Co (-) continued improvement of the base camp facilities and facilities. A NEDCAP conducted inside of the base camp treated 65 plus civilian. NEDCAP completed 1210. Co will dispatch 2 sqd pltn to XS805765 and XS7177801.

(c) 3 Co pltns at XS771791 and XS776791 had no contact and closed by 0835. At 0727 the Co cleared its portion of the radar by 0729. At 0900 3 Co sent a pltn to search at XS771800. The pltn had no contact, apprehended 1 male detainee and closed 1100. Between 1000 and 1200 3 Co medics conducted a NEDCAP and treated 15 patients. The Co (-) continued 2d base improvement. Co will employ 3d sqd pltn to XS777693 and XS7778701.

(d) UH-1C provided airlift and log support. Recon pltn commanded ISR clearing, at 1720 and concluded it by 0030. At 0730 Recon sent a set east to the bridge in the 3d Jan LO, XS733835, as sety. One pltn of the 3d pltns accompanied Recon. Mission was completed 1200. At pltn escorted convoy out west and returned.

(e) 17-18 battled 10 res. in this period in sat of l-9.

(f) Actn: 25th Avn Bn provided: 1CC 5 Service, UNID

(g) 3d pltn conducted normal base activities and provided 1 sqd pltn to assist in cty bridge at XS733835. On the night of 3 Jan the Bn will dispatch 10 sqd pltn in its AO.

(h) The LFRP was extracted 1130 by UNID left from XS 610858 after going to that area since 27-30 Dec. The pltn gained valuable intel on VC movement and activities in the Pineapple area.

(i) 1/4-65 swept EN SSR to C Co without incident, delivered benches to C Co and constructed benches in unit banks. Feeding was added to 300 KCT Bridge #3. The bridge is 90% complete. Elements of the pltn swept the SSR to KCTK AEXN and continued work on this site.
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Civil Affairs: MEDCAPS conducted by BN one at TAM QXII TAK treated 118 patients another at TAM LGII treated 85 patients. A swing set was erected by C Co at TAM CIX XII primary school and is receiving much attention by the children of the area. At a ceremony in the MANSII Hse, the Dist Chief and 3d Abn BN CO were honorary members of the MANSII and presented plaques and distinctive unit insignia.

31 Dec 66

(1) Concept:

BN prepares to observe the New Year's 48 hr truce commencing 310700 Dec. NATION SAKS and C Co will break establish saturation day and night local area ambush fire. Special rules of engagement for the truce apply.

(2) Operations:

(a) A Co plas at XS717779 and XS722804 had no contact and both closed by 0740. The area then placed CONTO to Recon plot for the purpose of clearing NSF. Mission was complete at 0030. The 2nd plas contained securing the HN IDT Bridge. At 1330 the Pla conducted a spew of the NMI OAHUS perimeter with no contact. The plas closed at 1515. A Co will employ two local plas via XS705792 and XS177799.

(b) B Co employed 2 night ambush plas at XS757572 and XS778772. The first plas executed to its ambush site made contact at XS957765. The patrol received 2nd fire and engaged the VC with fire from morts and N. The reaction force was committed at 2310. At 0210, the reaction force linked up with patrol. An M1 rifle was exchanged at XS707755, N.E. of the location of initial engagement, the VC released one of their own booby traps. Scraps and men's were heard. At 0145, elements of B Co heard a motorized men's on the river at XS297575 heading N. Artillery fire was used. Fire and anti-ming were observed at XS297575. The reaction force closed base at 0745 and the plas re-routed to XS705792. B-5 plas closed base by 0600. At 0610 Go had cleared its portion of NSF. Co will employ 2 night ambush plas at XS705792 and XS776785.

(c) C Co plas at XS72200 and XS776796 had no contact and closed by 0930. At 2210, the 3rd plas commenced its route to conduct a night r/s on a temple at XS772480. Scraps were found in the temple. There was no contact and the plas closed base at 0040. C Co will employ night ambush plas at XS705792 and XS747797.

(d) HHC continued to provide r/m and log sp. Recon plot with C Co attached provided r/m for clearing of 12% commencing 0700. Recon secured the BN E for the G-47 resupply site at 1400. At plot escorted convoy from BN E to r/s.

(e) 501st Avn Bat: provided:

* A-10 - 520 Sorties
* A-4C - CHK4

(f) A-7s, fired 70 rds NS and 6 rds VP in spt of A-9 opns.

(g) 3rd Abn connected normal base activities and local opn daylight ambush patrols around its fire base.

(h) Figs: 1 A-7s, 2 M4s cleared the BN NSF 0700-0900.

(3) Civil Affairs: MEDCAP conducted for EP dependents at TAM CHAM base; treated 32 patients. MEDCAP at TAM CHAM Internment Hosp treated 22 patients
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1 Jan (7)
(1) Convo to English sety during three-week period by defensive means: 2 light sety same.

(2) Operations:
(a) Convo to English sety: 2 sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(b) Convo to English sety: 2 sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(c) Convo to English sety: 2 sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(d) Convo to English sety: 2 sety to NS 873792 and 873779.

Daylight sety:
(a) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(b) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(c) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.

Daylight sety:
(a) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(b) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.
(c) No contact to NV sety, sety to NS 873792 and 873779.


(2) Operations: 1 Jan (7)
(a) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(b) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(c) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(d) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(e) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.

(3) Civil Affairs:
(a) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(b) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(c) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.

(4) Civil Affairs:
(a) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(b) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.
(c) No contact to NV sety sety to NS 873792 and 8737776.

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Club containing clothing

3 Jan 67

(1) Actions: 4th conduct an air search of 001 AOC 3 and 240-765 using 2 Co and Co. 3rd Jan 240 conducts a 34th. Six ambushes will be conducted this night.

(2) Operations:

a. 2 Co engaged night ambush near at XST7070 and XST7080. Patrolling 3200 lbs of gunship was withdrawn at 0015. A Co on 15 min alert and continued to work on an sf ambush.

b. 2 Co engaged in 2 night ambush. One ambush was north and then to continue north on the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700. The second patrol resulted in the search of 160 lbs. 2 Co was withdrawn at 0015. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 2 night ambushes at XST7177 and XST7568. At 0200 C Co moved to 2 Co b and then to continue north on the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0700. The first ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700. The second patrol resulted in the search of 160 lbs. 2 Co was withdrawn at 0015. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.

b. 2 Co engaged 3 night ambushes. One ambush was south of the S of 001 AOC 3 and 0300. The second ambush searched for men and胺地; in the omni and search is, 0125. A Co moved to continue action and used air search of one and search to 0700.
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5 Jan 67

(1) Concepts: 4/9 conduct 6 night ambush plrs. Co conducts sweep of area via XS70779; continues work on low areas. 3 Co conducts search at XS70779. 5 Co conducts search at XS746813.

(2) Operations:

a. A Co employed night ambushes at XS71730 and XS70792. A Co searched at XS707977 resulted in 1 x 16.5-in. mine, 2 x 7.62-mm rounds, and 1 x 5.56-mm ammo. A sis ptl remains. In the area a rad was run at 1700.

b. B Co employed night ambushes at XS70792 and XS77680 which resulted in 1 x 7.62-mm rounds and area searched at XS779755. "L" Co searched to the 3 Co fire base with no contact.

c. C Co employed night ambushes at XS77779, XS77680, XS77972, XS77775. Search from fire base to XS758780 resulted in 1 grenade with 5000 anti-personnel charge. Co then moved to attack post at the 3 Co fire base.

d. A & B Co continued "laying wp". Bn plr charted an 5 x 3 Co sbr, prov sry for several sbrs. C & D Co conducted a checkride at XS763850 which resulted in 19 persons being apprehended. 17 sbrs (-) prov sry for several sbrs.

(3) Civil affairs: 246-962 leaflets (wms) were dropped and 147th Spc Unit continued to coord pth for 4/9. Itos supply was affected by the 147th Spc Unit and an emp complication and on registration.

(4) Supply:

a. Jnl 3rd Lnd Co employed 15 night ambushes; conducted 3 x 3 Bn at XS775627-4777730-4777772-127756779 "m. 57107014. Ops resulted in 2 sbrs apprehended at XS755812.

b. 146th Iagr swept 15x1 Co fire base; supervised the clearing of twin LQ's at thm. 3 Co fired limits, and continued fire base control. Two wpd convs returned to Co fire base.

c. A&GC continues "laying wp". Bn plr charted an 5 x 3 Co sbr, prov sry for several sbrs, and conducted a checkride at XS763850. 246-962 leaflets (wms) were dropped and 147th Spc Unit continued to coord plrs for 4/9. Itos supply was affected by the 147th Spc Unit.

(5) Operations:

a. A Co employed ambush plrs at XS728800-97707799 and XS717302. Commanding at XS5200 "C" Co relieved the 2d squad of 3 Co CH-47s 3 & 4 in prep for sbrs. Kit police conducted the sbrs; apprehended 36 convs. Two pts from C Co and the Recon ptl were under the 0000 12:00 Co for thm.

b. B Co employed ambushes at XS78779-27873773 and XS70776. Kit CH-53s at 0615, conduct work on ISr. continued B of 3 Co fire base. 3 Co prov sry for 3 unit depl to XS790768.

c. C & D Co employed ambush plrs at XS775792-775630 and XS775806. Pts reported 3 body convs and 1 pressure release mtn at XS707792. One ptl was apprehended at XS746813. One ptl stopped at 4:00 for con of 3rd CH-47s; prov sry to whld bld convs in the area. 34 sbrs (-) prov sry for veh convs. 42 nos. Int fbrd 2 nos HE in ap of 21-9 acps by Co continued wp emp complication and

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1. 7/11 Army fired 53 HE rls. and 3 HE Tnls.
2. 16th Helicopter unit Co prov: C & 0
3. 7/11 Army 0-25

4. Heli in attack 16 night refuel ptls at 0136, 2
5. 7/11 Army fired 53 HE rls at 23:30
dt. 23:45 in search of NE half of 3rd line and 1st line
6. Co prov: C & 0
7. Co prov: C & 0

8. 7/11 Army fired 53 HE rls in search of NE half of 3rd line and 1st line
9. Co prov: C & 0

10. 1st Helicopter unit Co prov: C & 0
11. 7/11 Army fired 53 HE rls at 23:30

12. Confidentially

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10. 1st Helicopter unit Co prov: C & 0
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12. Confidentially
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tage of a lot of upper The 2nd eagle fit landed on the island at X6710795, but there were no results. The 3rd fit was at X5731779 and approached 6

dramatic. The op. was done to return to the SCB for duty for C-IV-11 duty.

b. 2nd fit was a 2-antennal and Lancaster ambush pass at
X6732962, X671043, X671990 and X701393, at 2100, the fit at X701925

by their ambush meeting in 4 VC B (16) and 3 rifles. The retrol

suffered 2 VC hits. Despite the SCB, the fit lost 103.3 km from its former

side. At 2130, the fit was 15 VC under long range fire with no results.

The 4 VC bodies were beware by an officer to claim for Identi. At 2200 10
VC were observed at X5711250 by the 2nd fit. Before 4 "fire men" could be

affected one VC disappoect, of X5730 0 VC exist from the machine line and were

taken under fire results in 1 VC ok (028). At 2135, the 1st fit entered

1 VC snap at X5719650. At 2130, the 3rd fit moved to the 2nd plot pen

and was quickly, had 1 hit on ation at 1200 and made 3 firing

passage at X6719792. At 1040, the 1st fit received 11th First from 3 VC
X712960. 4.2 mount each fired a gun at the WU without surv.

c. 2nd fit was made (no tag), then 2nd fit the 3rd fit to

Co and proved for the 2nd plot area), a plot (-) was placed

under 0008 of a new plot. At 2200 a plot fired 2 VC in each area 6 Co.

d. 2-2 hit the WU in to the 6 Co.

e. 0 VC only hit the WU in to the 6 Co.

.. .

From 0730-1700.

36 sorties

from B-12, B-24 & B-25.

-4-1-1

1 sorties

13 sorties

19 sorties

30-4-1

2 sorts

11 spots S & D were not hit.

Our report and our sorties 50 firing passes at 3 Co and

base and cut G.I. at 12 (here board 1). 2

(2) Service:

2. 3 sorties, 3 night ambush may at X5719650, X5732-

60, and X571972. One sort was sent to 301 OFF and for the S Co. The

plot area at 100 2-9 were for shoot to De for 10-19 (see). The plot

continued to a sort to Co (1) gran at X5719750.

2. 6-2 killed at Co. 1 kill continued to em-

ploy 1-brut-resistant a at X5731937, X5732954, X6719254, and X6719197. at

10-20, a fire of 100-2000, the 1st fit was C1 (028) and X701393 which involved in 3

VC 1-1700 and 1 Chines crew, or search. At 1040, a plot at X701925

recovered 1.2 from 10-20, the fit was not with marks results.

by 2030, the fit was at X5719650. To new, at X71129, X5719750

8-0-1, and X701925. At 1100, the 2nd fit took 2 killed VC under fire.

8-0-1, a search of the scene was done.

d. 2-2 mount 13th item to the. B-20 plot pens area and

assess for nearby VC - 39 sorties. Support to was given at 32 Co. at X71129.

e. 2-1 only 2-1 fired a gun at X5719750. Results were

1 VC killed, (028) and 1 sorties.

(1) Co. only 6-1 fired a gun at X5719750. 1300 a supply of 1-18

of the area of X71129, X571927, - X571965, X5732954, and X6719750

by 2-9 were for shoot to De for 10-19 (see). The plot

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by 2-9 were for shoot to De for 10-19 (see). The plot

Continued to a sort to Co (1) gran at X5719750.
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and a Vintenovr. small arms set was received.
(2) Civil Affairs: BBG KAI COI 1B conducted a MEDEP at T31 QUI
TAY. Breech and household items were treated. Consul to prove assistance in
opening the market in the C Co had been on
10 Jun 67

(3) Conduct: Per employees of night ambush patrols, C Co continues
the ambush op with 2 close-in can and 1 DZ. Following LZ prep by
T26 min., open and assist helicopter. 1st and 2nd are in LZ 4 at X37787
and "A" at X37787. The 1st is C COI 1B, 4 at 6 am, and 2507 at 2000.
Units conduct a ambush in area. The 1st and 2nd locate in LZ 3 at X37787
and 12 at X37787 at 0700 to form a
black 3. The 27 extracted by air on completion of search, Army opt
proy by A/7-11 Arty. Calv prov T6-16.

(4) Search/Arms
- 1. 1st and 2nd night ambush wells at X377797 and X377797.
With 1 platoon of C Co ambush / to the north of 2 DZ at X377797 and
X377797, separated by 1 1/2 miles on the north of the RAKC HT River and the 2nd side
of the RAKC HT River to the 1st 1000 River resulting in 25 hours of patrol,
2 detaines, and 1 lb of documents captured. A 1-2 detached elements at
X377797 these several caches were found recently relocated. 15 or more
barrels or cans had been removed from the ground. 21 of the 35 that had
been civilians in the area, it is felt that the car was commercial. One
and attached to A/7-11 Arty for security of T28. The unit prov 12
man reaction force.
- 2. C Co employed 3 ambush wells at X377797, X377797, and
X377797.
- 3. C Co employed ambush patrols at X377797 and X377797.
- 4. The platoon of C Co ambush 4th platoon of the south resulting in 1 1/2
flak (16).
- 5. B continued admin opt. 1st platoon prov escort for
search op and secured the LZ at X377797 for the initiative op. A plan
escorted the convoy to COI CHI to DHH CHINH and return. A not got a
continued opt of C Co op.
- 6. A/7-11 Arty fired 121 rds H8 and 11 rds MP for LZ prep and
2 rds H8.
- 7. A/7-11 Arty remained in op of C Co.

Ammunitions

- A/7-11 Arty proved 7th Arty 107 mm, 11th Arty 107 mm, and the 15th
Ammunitions

- 1. 1st and 2nd Arty prov: 1st and 2nd Arty prov.
- 2. 1st and 2nd Arty prov: 2nd night ambush wells. One 1-2 made
an op of 2 DZ at X377797 and X377797, separated on both sides of the RAKC HT River and
the 2nd side of the RAKC HT River to the 1st 1000 River resulting in 25 hours of patrol,
2 detaines, and 1 lb of documents captured. A 1-2 detached elements at
X377797 these several caches were found recently relocated. 15 or more
barrels or cans had been removed from the ground. 21 of the 35 that had
been civilians in the area, it is felt that the car was commercial. One
and attached to A/7-11 Arty for security of T28. The unit prov 12
man reaction force.

(5) Civil Affairs: In conjunction with the AH op, 4th KAI COI
1B and 2nd KAI COI KAI COI ambushed and killed 2 rodents at X377797 to X377797.

(6) Conduct: Per employees of night ambush patrols at X377797, X377797,
and X377797. 1st and 2nd night ambush wells at X377797, X377797,
and X377797. These 3 ambushed wells received 9 ambushed wells.

(7) Operations
- 1. C Co employed night ambush wells at X377797, X377797,
and X377797. 1st and 2nd night ambush wells at X377797, X377797,
and X377797. These 3 ambushed wells received 9 ambushed wells.

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C. 6 Co employed reinforcement and ambush patrols at X752797 and X752794. 6 Co patrol at X829794, received fire at 1515. Fire was returned by arty, area, and choppers. OS net & C, at 1650, return fire received at 16. While assisting the battalion, VC came out into heavy fire.

d. 6Co continued main/log area. Becon patrol provided convoy escort. 1 plt escorted the convoy from CU CH to 33Rt CH and returned. 1st Mortar patrol remained in ES of 6 Co operations.

e. L7/11 arty fired 3 rds HE in spt of 4/9 operations.

f. C-7/11 arty fired 1 plt HP and 25 rds HE in spt of 6 Co operations.

g. 69th Helicopter Assault Co provided:
   1) C & C: 30L-1D
   2) Troop lift: 15C-1D
   3) Gunships: 15C-1D
   4) Mes-Hy: 30L-1D
   5) CX/AAC: 15C-1D

h. 3rd plt employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

i. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

j. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

k. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

l. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

m. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

n. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

o. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

p. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

q. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

r. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

s. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

T. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.

U. L7/11 arty continued helicopter and guard work on Bev 231. Six places of 5 rcs were used. Fine was 75% complete (X752793 to X752796).

V. Civil Aff./... HC/PAC treated 16 patients at 1 Med. 6 Co employed 5 night ambush patrols, conducted single flight at X752797. Initially, the flight received killing fire and did not land. Gunships struck the area and the flight landed on the 2nd attempt. The return fire landed, and joined the 1st lift. Main rsc, still has 2 coys, and 420 enemy, equipment discovered in the VC base, while securing a LC, 3 m-18s were fired by a troop at X752804. The unit was extracted at 1000.
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j. Mapollunarous: 1n Co requested H-55s quaf 50 IS of to-
days 111 ops. Div'ry states the wing system must be employed in pirs. Two systems are at C Co bushmaster base, 1 system 3 and mounted, the other mobile. Request to employ the mobile system in JS 4/9 convoy was denied.
(3) Civil affairs: an airborne broadcast was made to residents of Tri 600 7 telling them to move out of the village and urging sur-
round.vd VC too surrender. 10,000 SFY 131, 10,000 256 and 20,000 F01364
lives were air dropped at X58579, X58579, and X58579. OCCF to be con-
ducted 13 Jan at Tan Qui TAY was announced.
13 Jan 67
(1) Concept: W employed 8 ambush pts in the DiNH CHIII area. 
C Co continues bushmaster opns, a Co conducts single file in JS. 3 Co 
sure the JSR for eng work, secures C Co fire base and ests bushmaster 
base at X507095. Z. 3rd line conducts opns at X579549.
(2) Operations:
a. a Co employed night ambush pts at X579805, X557350, and X567355. Conducted 6 sorties into 3 LZ's at X5631839. Heavy ga. fire 
was received going into LZ a. C & C aircraft received several hits and 
landed at X568055. Command ship was secured by a force from B Co and 
Inter extricated by CH-47. D Co reaction force was conlled at 1030 and 
ended on the N side of the objective. The situation was developed with 
heavy fire, and 2nd helicopter. All elements lined up to save 
the area. Results were VN VC (316), 10 VC KL (7035). 1 Thompson BMG 
captured, 30 bunkers destroyed, and 114 capt captured. All elements were 
extracted by LZ at 1815. Bty sqd. for C-711 JSR fire base at Tan 
DIIN returned to DiNH CHIII at 1330. A Co suffered 2 KIA and 3 WIA one 
of whom WM.
b. 3 Co employed night ambush pts at X573079 and X509-
706g prw reaction force for JS 11 ops. Reaction force was extricated 
1030 hrs, suffered 1 WIA, extricated at 1305 hrs. The unit continued to 
prov success for C Co 4 fire base and 9th 3d at JS 10. C. Bushmaster opns 
delayed due to insufficient of reaction force.
C. C Co employed 4 bushmaster pts at X573924, X572937, 
X529497, and X57932. Opns ceased with C Co returning to Tan Qui TAY at 
1350 hrs.
d. HHC continued adm/lg opns. Rrn ptv prw JS secty and 
vava extr. JS ptv escorted the convoy from GHI ChH and mt. Key 
actor sect. in sect of C Co at Tan Qui TAY returned to Tan Qui TAY.
e. 4/11 JSR fired 2 rds 155 and 25 rds NCI.
f. C-711 JSR returned to GHI CHH at 1350 hrs.
g. The 11th Asst Helicopter Co prw support for opns. 
69th Asst Helicopter Co assisted in extrication. C & C Bty./on at 
X560830 extricated by CH247 at JS 11.
C & C
US-LD 1 sortie
Trop lifts US-LD 52 sorties
Guns 116 sorties
Resupply CH47 1 sortie
RESERV
US-LD 2 sorties
T. C air strike 1600 hrs frm X569253 to X570103, ordi-
ance expended was 2-750 lb bombs, 4-500 lb bombs and 6-720 lb napalm 
bombs.
8. 3rd Bn 145 deployed 15 night ambush pts wirh no con-
tact. C Co were airlifted into LZ b at X570103 and X570512 and moved 
SR along the Dinh CHIII Canal. Two additional companies moved SR to meet 
the airlifted forces. The opn resulted in 19 kills approached.
19. 1-165th Engn bty. VN from Dinh CHIII to 3 Co. Re-
pair continued on LZ 149 from X573773 to X509754 utilizing bulldozer 
and gradcr to spread 3 loads of laterite.
(3) Civil affairs: 1ECCF at Tan Qui TAY treated 67 patients.
The 30th CHIII to conducted 52065 at Tan Qui TAY.
14 Jan 67
(1) Concept: Eo employs 8 ambush pts in the DiNH CHIII area. 
B Co moves to a bushmaster site at X552773, establishes multiplie ambushes. 
C Co secures 2 fire base with 1 plot. A Co continues base development.
(2) Operations:
a. a Co employed 8 ambush pts at X572775, X580799; 
prov HCCF and HCCF syst. HCCF conducted at Dinh CHIII hospital.
b. B Co prw rear cen security opns conducted sweep opn 
near fire base. Secty units received several rds of ga. fire at X580775, 
VC fired when fire was returned with Sa and C5397. Unit established 
bushmaster 114 and proved forces frn X552775. Bty sqd. bushmaster vs X5-
81265, X552773, X534799 and X583755. Bushmaster at X582683 ceased
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sawmen at 2350 resulting in 4 VC KL-(30) and one sawman destroyed.  
c. Co employed night bushwhack platoon at 0723Z and 0723Z-
8020, proved 1 platoon forency of 11th and east, local sety around base, 1 platoon
secured. Co fwd base.
d. NBC prov sandbag log spo. Secured 1st row sety of BMG
convoys. At platoon covered convoy from Co, CHI and rear. 1st row sety (-)
continued sety of rear base.
e. 01/11...tried 85 sety of HB and 2 sety WP. Artillery fire
resulted in 1 VC KL-(30) 2 VC KL-F058). 1 sawman destroyed at 0600Z.
f. 11th Helicopter Assault Co prov C & C ship from 0515-
1330. Resupply off by one CHI at.
g. 3rd platoon employed 12 night bushwhack platoon; conducted
3 & 9 sety at 10 support locations w/ results.
h. 1/4/5th reg required 2 sety 231, 1 sety helicop. courier, and 5 loads of
Litter, opening road to Jet Hq Sety. Completed backup to
Co, fwd base.
(3) Civil Affairs: 1 He. Co prov hospital leaves 56
patients, 6600 patients were prov to 11th CHL for info leading to capture
of sety. The 6th SFAS Co prov 100,000 MGM. Med Hq leaves. The 10th
OMA-Co in prov 6,000 MGM. Med Hq leaves for the Hq (blank 1).
15 Jan 017.
(1) Concepts: 1 Co conducts 6 night bushwhack in the 11th CHL area. Co
continue bushwhack 30, return to base. C Co prov sety
C Co prov return sety for 2/14th sety. C Co secure 3 Co fwd base.
(2) Operations:
a. 1 Co employed night bushwhack at 0737391, 07371700, and
0737791.
b. 3 Co continued bushwhack op, returned to fwd base at
1100.
c. C Co prov night bushwhack platoon at 0723Z and
0723737.
d. NBC prov sandbag log sety, 1st row sety return for
supply op. Platoon secured convoy from Co, CHI and return. 1st row
return to C Co fwd base.
e. 1-11/12 fired 33 sety of HB, 1 sety of WB, and 10 sety W & H
I fire.
f. 3rd platoon employed 12 night bushwhack platoon; conducted
search and destroy op, 3 sety, located by 0737922. 072322, 0737100,
23117737, 07371724, 1117373, 0737100, and 0737736. Negative
contact.
gh. 1/1-5/5th reg continued supply sety from 0737762, to
0737764. With 1 sety helicop. and 3 loads of litter, continued improvement
of fwd base.
(3) Civil Affairs: Reportings were made to G-2 ops
sety with 1 sety conduct sety, and identify superior HB fire zeros.
16 Jan 017.
(1) Concepts: Following on 12 reportings by S-2, atty. and
radio helicopters, 3rd platoon 1 Co in 11 and 2 Co in 1114, 6th
KCUSC and Co...(-) in 112 and 3, established fire base, re-supplying with
ammunition and suitable medical supplies, conduct extensive bushwhack op.  
(2) Operations:
a. C Co prov night bushwhack at 0737737, 0737737, 07371700, and
0737791, proved a division helicopter, rejected,sety from 12 CHL, and
resume security of the Co, rear base.
b. NBC prov sandbag log sety. 1st row sety secured the 12
convoys. 3rd platoon loaded veh convoy to 3rd platoon as
for convoy liaison.
c. 1/7/11 fired 11 sety WP and 22 sety WB. Surv
reported 8 VC KL-(20531).
d. 25th op 1 sety and the 69th Helicopter Assault Co prov:
Trooplift and CAC MEAD.
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5th Platoon, Co A

By 0700, 3rd Platoon, Co A, was airborne and had located 2 VC at XB090674, 3rd Platoon also had 2 VC at XB090674. Both platoons attacked these enemies.

1100 AIR Cav repelled a Viet Cong attack near 2 VC at XB090674. 1st Platoon, Co A, was engaged in a heavy firefight with 2 VC at XB090674. It is believed that 2 VC were killed.

1500 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1600 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1630 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1700 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1800 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1900 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2000 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2100 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2200 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2300 3rd Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

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5th Platoon, Co A

By 0700, 5th Platoon, Co A, was airborne and had located 2 VC at XB090674. 5th Platoon had 2 VC at XB090674. Both platoons attacked these enemies.

1100 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1500 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1600 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1700 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1800 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

1900 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2000 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2100 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2200 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.

2300 5th Platoon, Co A, reported that they had killed 2 VC at XB090674.
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(2) Operations:

a. Co employed 3 and 7 companies to dig 100 yards of trench near the front line and ambush platoon. Ambush platoon conducted a sweep opn. at 1530 from X665880 to X665902 to X665887 to X665909. Plt lay behind platoon at X665922. After dark the platoon withdrew to a 1000 yard rearward position. Ambush platoon moved to a 1000 yard rearward position and was ambushed. The co (-) closed base at 1830.

b. CO employed ambush platoon at X5721300 and X5720795.

c. Co conducted an ambush platoon at X5721300 and X5720795. The platoon engaged and was ambushed by a company at X5721300. The platoon conducted a sweep opn. from X665880 to X665909 upon extraction. Platoon lost 1 killed on a second sweep from X577472 and returned toward the source of the fire. The twin ambushed the fire. One man of the platoon was apprehended and extracted by air at 1600. Return fire remained on strip alert during the operation.

d. E.O. provided security for the ambushed platoon at X5721300.

(3) Civil affairs:

Co conducted a 5th and 9th Civil Affairs Brig for the 3rd BD Co dependents and local residents. A total of 25,000 persons were visited. The 5th Civil Affairs Brigade, 9th Civil Affairs Brigade, and 3rd Civil Affairs Brigade conducted a combined operation at X5721300. The units were directed toward the 5th Civil Affairs Brigade.

19 Jan 67

Concept: Co only continues fire base core, conducts night ambush ops. Co prov ambulance to the 5th Civil Affairs and 9th Civil Affairs, conducts search ops. from X765872 to X765900, conducts search ops. from X765902 to X765930, conducts search ops. from X765930 to X765960. Ambushed platoon was returned to X765960. After dark the platoon was ambushed. The co (-) closed base at 1830.

(2) Operations:

a. Co employed ambush platoon at X5721300 and X5720795.

The co (-) conducted a sweep opn. at 1530 from X665880 to X665902 to X665922 to X665930 to X665909. Plt lay behind platoon at X665922. After dark the platoon withdrew to a 1000 yard rearward position. Ambush platoon moved to a 1000 yard rearward position and was ambushed. The co (-) closed base at 1830.

b. CO employed ambush platoon at X5721300 and X5720795.

c. Co conducted an ambush platoon at X5721300 and X5720795. The platoon engaged and was ambushed by a company at X5721300. The platoon conducted a sweep opn. from X665880 to X665909 upon extraction. Platoon lost 1 killed on a second sweep from X577472 and returned toward the source of the fire. The twin ambushed the fire. One man of the platoon was apprehended and extracted by air at 1600. Return fire remained on strip alert during the operation.

d. E.O. provided security for the ambushed platoon at X5721300.
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Resupply
1 sortie

Sub-LD
1 sortie

CS-67
1 sortie

C & G
1 sortie

UH-1D
1 sortie

The 3rd BN employed 13 sqd ambush plts. At 0030 the 23rd Co conducted an eagle fit at X376/650 and X270/365. Approximately 100 foxholes with overhead cover and 2 mines were found via X376/65951. Unit apprehended 2 VC sects via X570/663. Interaction completed at 1012.

b. Engrs: 2/-/65th Engr air at 231 to May 51. Coaler work performed on the 64th Inf (RDN) NFR. 2 loads of litter were dist on the turn around road via X376/702. Repair on the bridge at G14 TW. 605 complete.

(3) Civil affairs:

a. RDCs: Conducted at 06 00 T.Y treated 32 patients. RDMR tm showed propaganda films, dist prop, leaflets, and explained GVN programs and goals to the population. A ceremony was conducted at T/U on T.Y to officially open At 231 from DNDN Chinh to GVN JUC. US forces represented by in rdd Jl C O. GVN represented by Dist and rvt Chiefs. Following the ceremony the party drove the r. Eng materials furnished to Henry Chief of GVN JUC for const of > 60 foot bridge. Bridge will be const by residents of the Pathu uncr supervision of US engrs. An overload on the ferry at X351/775 resulted in 2 G14 trucks lost, the ferry destroyed, and three persons drowned.

20 Jan 67

(1) Concept: A Co leave stay behind pl at X361/622. Co (-) conducts normal brr activities. 3 Co prov reaction force for O Co eagle fit and sety for HMPOR at 09-9-9 fro b-wm. 3 Co continues sety of 2 sqd b-wm, conducts night ambush plts. C C and conducts eagle fit on tgt of opportunity. Recomp plat secures NAA and prov vch escort. Eng pl continues brsd and H1 repyr at G14 TW and A/-/3016.

(2) Operations:

a. A Co employed 2 sqd ambush plts via X56/5035 and X3-690/36 and 1 plat pl at X56/622. At 1539, the plat returned at 1539 with 4 pla c sety. 3 Co employed sub sqd plts at X369/721 and X56/726. 3 Co secures a HDU-H held at 2111 on T.Y with 1 squad. Unit conducted a reinforced plat sweep So of c-barr. Stay behind pl remained at X56/776.

b. B Co employed 2 sqd ambush plts via X56/5017 and X3-667/772; plat returned with no contact. The co (-) conducted a heliborne raid via X56/4-26, securing an obj via X56/426, moved 2 to a stream jet via X56/524 then B to X56/706. Documents and b-wm were found at X56/706. 11 bunkers with over head cover and 1 new post patji stakes were destroyed via X56/7025. All elements extrd by air at 1321.

c. JDC continued admin/log apt. Recomp plat dispatched 2 vch in pursuit of men fleeing from C Co patrol. One man boarded a bus, the other continued by bicycle. One scout vch halted the bus and apprehended 7 rcle setymen. The other ran over and apprehended. Recomp NFR cut 12 rd and 72 sety. 1 plt used the convoy from C0 Knock and rtn.

d. 2-7/11 fired 51 rds Ho and 2 pl jams.

e. 113th helicopter assault Co prov: Tn-10 lift US-1D 23 sety

Guns
UH-1B 3 sety
Resupply
CH-1B 1 sety
Resupply
US-1D 1 sety
C & G
US-1D 1 sety

f. 3rd man in continues. To improve 2 fc Area b-wm, conduct normal sety man, and sec r and night ambushes. The 3rd man 3rd Co conducted local plat sweeps around their brass.

g. Engrs: 2/-/65 cleared the LSG, furnished 4 prov-stb bunker kits to 3rd & 1st Co and completed G14 TW. Instr repyr.

(3) Civil affairs: 1200 co conducted at 231 from T.Y treated 102 patients. 124th RDMR t showed propaganda films and dist posters and prop. A/0.

21 Jan 67

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a. A Co employed 2 sqd ptls at XS680354 and XS768566. At 1040, the FAC reported a VC at XZ663777. The VC were engaged with quad 50 fire from A Co brake with no surveillance.

b. B Co employed 1 sqd ambush at XZ797320, XZ777359, and XZ757772. Provided 3 sqd to assist L Co the MSR, conducted brake activities and continued to secure both bases on Rd 231.

c. C Co employed 3 sqd ambush ptls. First enemy hit landed at XZ661831 at 1015 w/o contact. 60 bunkers and 12 shelters with overhead cover were destroyed. At XS664293, a 50 cal box containing 3 lbs of documents was found. Extraction completed 1400 hrs.

d. MIC prov ambient/sp. Recon pt prov security for the MSR and secured an area at 0930 for brake/frnd resupply craft. At ptl escorted convoy from CU CHI and rtn.

e. A-711 arty fired 5 WP and 27 HE rds. Fire called for by A Co PO reported 1 VC KIA(TDS).

f. Arm: 116th Assault Helicopter Co and the 1st Inf Det:

- Troop lift: UH-1D: 13 sorties
- Gunships: UH-1D: 4 sorties
- Re-supply: GH-11: 1 sortie
- Re-supply: UH-1D: 2 sorties
- C & C: UH-1D: 2 sorties
- C & C: H-23: 1 sortie

- FAC's in station from 0910 to 1100 directed quad 50 fire on 4 VC at XZ683377, with unk results.

g. 3rd Abn: Units continued development of fwd bases. The 21 employed 14 sqd ambush ptls. 32nd Co covered 8 & 51 mm vic XZ75-76, XZ75-74, and XZ75-75. 2nd 33rd Co covered the Bu Hg and base.

h. Engrs: 2-145th Engr air ISM, pulled 4 loads of lateral to 2nd CH KIAF and erected 2 bunker kits for 3rd Abn.

3rd Abn: Units continued development of fwd bases. The 21 employed 14 sqd ambush ptls. 32nd Co continued S & D mtn vic LS74-2, XS75-4, XS75-77, and XS75-77. 33rd Co secures th. Bn Hq and base.

3rd Abn: 2-4/65th Fgr clr MR, ruled 4 loads of lateral to CH KIAF and erected 2 bunker kits for 3rd Abn.

4th Abn: None

(2) Concept: A Co continues fwd base improvement and ptl

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II Co continues Bushmaster opns. C Co prov secy for III Co fuel brs and conducts an Eagle Flt at X5670920.

(2) Operations
a. C Co dispatched 2 plts to X565520 and X565521. These returned by 0930 w/o contact. Spent the remainder of the day in base development and local opns.

b. III Co continued Bushmaster opns with 1 plt at fuel base 1 plt and the Co QM at X5767757, and one plt at X5767756. At 2120, the Bushmaster silenced sniper fire at X5767753 with 4.2 mortar fire. At 0119 the Bushmaster nmt at X5767760. Artillery was called in and 5 VC KIA (FOSS) resulted. At 1340, the Bushmaster received sniper fire at X5767752. Artillery silenced the fire. At 1720 via X5767752, the Bushmaster received 51 and provoked 60mm mortar fire. Fire was returned with 5 and arty. Artillery called in.

c. C Co plts at X5766780, X5767792, and X5768200 returned by 0720 with no contact. C Co conducts 3 Eagle Flts at X5670920, X5670929, X5670914, X5670913, and X5670955. Two detainees were apprehended at the second LZ and 3 detainees were apprehended at the fourth LZ. At the final LZ, an est 7 VC were encountered. They were taken w/sk fire by gunships and 5.5 inch. Results of the opns were 24 VC KIAs, 4 VC KIAs, 1 chun carbine captured, 60 rds carbine cast captured, 21 C's destroyed, 2 camouflage screens destroyed, assorted webing captured and 1 lb of documents captured.

d. HHC prov admin/log spc. Recon W/plt prov NR and LZ security at X5765773, the plt was guard d to a claymore mine generator by an elderly Vietnamese. The individual was brought in, questioned and rewarded for giving the info. At plt prov convoy escort from CU CHI and rtn.

(7/11 Artillery fired 69 HE rds and 4 M rds, resulting in
5 VC KIAs (FOSS).

f. 173d Airslt Helicopter Co prov:

- Troop Lift UR-10 30 sorties
- Gunships UR-18 30 sorties
- Resupply UR-19 2 sorties
- C & C UR-10 1 sortie
- Resupply CH-47 2 sorties

A Plt, on station at X5670920 prov WR of the 404 for C Co Eagle Flt.

g. 3rd Abn 10 plts employed 14 and ambush plts. All returned w/o contact.

h. Engr cleared the area. Co net 4 bunkers sites for the 3rd Abn to at X5763220, delivered 6 tons of laterite to X5762762, performed grading and laying from X5762753 to X5762762, prov 6 men for a Co brs from 1st C, and effected recon at X5769633.

(3) Civil Affairs: W/plt at X5670920 treated 274 patients. Patrols to the N. 5 VC roadblock was destroyed at X5316757.

21 Jan


(2) Operations:
a. C Co Bushmaster made contact with an est 10-15 VC at X5767750 from 1700-1900. The Bushmaster received 24 and 60mm mortar or rifleremote fire. The reaction force was comitted and arty, gunships, and 5.5 inch were utilized against the VC resulting in 2 VC KIAs and 5 VC KIAs. 1320 the Bushmaster received sniper fire which was silenced by arty fire. 17 bunkers and 2 60mm troops in the area were destroyed. The Bushmaster returned to the fuel base at 1930 with no further contact. At 1333, C Co was approached by a VC nmt who stated that a VC nmt was lost at X5679720. A plt dispatched to the area made no contact.

b. C Co plts at X5763230 and X5767792 returned w/o contact.

C Co conducted 2 Chucbate at X5767753 from 1315-1647. Four persons were det. for further questioning.

c. HHC prov admin/log spc. Recon plt prov secy for NSA and 3 C's prov move to fuel base. At plt prov secy for the daily convoy from CU CHI.

d. 7/11 Artillery fired 25 HE rds and 2 M rds. The Nmy was credited with 5 VC KIAs (FOSS).

e. 3rd Abn 10 plts and 1st Bn Abn pct prov:

- C & C UR-10 3 sorties
- C & C UR-10 1 sortie
- Resupply CH-47 2 sorties
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1. 3rd platoon employed 13 sqd ambulances. All returned w/o contact.

2. B Co. rained 1,000 lbs of rice, 8 mins of latrines at 0500 hrs., and
   began the road from 1804 to 2002.

3. Civil official: 50,000 rice on 6 mins of rice delivered to
   2037, 2037, and 2037. Joint US/THY P. EDEV. 13 patients
   at 0600 hrs. 14th US/THY 9 mins caused all 6. 100 lbs of rice to 30
   local security ops.

4. Bushes by 0700 hrs.'vent10 a plane of the NC in the
   area. Provisions and local security ops.

5. Co conducts a combined road air and search op.

6. Co continues fuel development, local security sweep, and
   bush, and local security ops. 13 Co conducts local security sweeps and ambushes.

7. Operations:
   a. Co patrol at 0800 hrs. and X560/485 returned by 0900 hrs.

8. Co dispatched 1 sqd of 1807 to 2037/65, and
   2037. At 0018 hrs. the platoon's ambush on 2 VC
   resulted in 1 KIA (C) and 2 VC KIA (2005). The platoon returned to
   2037/65. All pts returned by 0932 hrs. Co spent the
   remainder of the day in local security ops.

   and search ops along the MSR to 2037. No contact was made.

10. Co patrol at 2037/65 resulted in 3 casualties.

11. Co. 14th US/THY 14 sqd ambushes. 3 pts returned w/o contact.

12. Support consisted of air and trucking to 2037, planning
   ambush on 1335 hrs. planning ambush on 1335 hrs. and 2037.

13. Civil official: 14th US/THY conducted at 1300 hrs. 26
   patients.


15. Co. continues to secure 2 1/4 hrs. Co patrols to conduct search ops.

16. Operations:
   a. Co patrol at 0800 hrs. at 1600/653, 1600/655, and
   1600/657. Co dispatched 1 sqd of 1600/656, 1600/657, and
   1600/658. Co patrol at 0800 hrs. and 1 1/4 hrs. of 1600/658.
   The platoon ambush on 2 VC resulting in 1 KIA (C), 1 KIA (C)
   and 2 VC KIA (2005). The platoon returned to 1 1/4 hrs. Co
   patrol at 0800 hrs. and 1 1/4 hrs. of 1600/658. The platoon
   was fired on by the other 2 pts. and began run to the Co tile base. At 1155 hrs.
   the unit received a
   three sniper fire from an east 20 VC at 1600/658. The fire was silenced
   with 3-P, 10mm, antitank, and artillery. 1 US OIA was sustained
   and one by ambush at 1200 hrs. 3 VC KIA (2005) resulted. The Co returned
   to 1400 hrs.

b. 2037 patrol at 2037/65, 2037/67, and 2037/67 returned by 0700 hrs. Co
   patrol at 0700 hrs. Co spent the remainder of the day in
   local security ops and search ops to 2037. Co patrol at 0700 hrs.
   and search ops. Co patrol at 0700 hrs. Co patrol at 0700 hrs.
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   and search ops.
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1. A Co pts at 223802 and X569037 returned by 0730 w/o contact. A Co spent the remainder of the day in base level and prep for future ops.
2. 3rd Bn Bn employed 19 ambushes. All returned w/o contact. B Co pts at 223802 and X569037 returned by 0730 w/o contact. From 1500-1630 a plt conducted a search for a cache reported by Chieu Hoi at X575780. Nothing was found.
3. A Co dispatched 3 sqd pts to 281575, 281576 and 281577. At 2000 the plt at 281577 accidentally detonated a 20mm. No casualties resulted and the plt was relocated to 281575. All pts returned by 0730 w/o contact. From 1100-1600 C Co conducted an Eagle Plt at 281577 resulting in 15 detainees.
4. HCC prov adm/log opt. Recon plt prov MSR and LZ acct. AT plt prov sety for the daily convoy from 90 CHI.
5. 1-7/11 Arty fired 20 HD rls.
6. 69th Asslt Helicopter Co and 147th Asslt Spt Helicopter Co prov:
   a. Troop Lift US-LD 24 sorties
   b. Gunships US-LD 2 sorties
   c. A A C US-LD 2 sorties
   d. Resupply US-LD 2 sorties
   e. Resupply CH-LD 2 sorties
   f. 3rd Bn Bn employed 13 ambushes. All returned w/o contact.

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1. 3rd Plm Bn employed 13 sqd ambushes. All returned w/o contact.

b. Engrs cleared the ISAR and continued east in the BN base.

29 Jan 67

(1) Operations:

a. A Co employed 2 sqd ambush ptls at X6590852 and X6590829. One half of the ptl at X6590852 returned to base with an injured man and the other half joined with ptl at X5690829. There was no contact and all classification by 0200. A Co continued base activities with one ptl from 0200-0500 in prep for phase out and future ops.

b. B Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X7707799, X7737777, X7717899, X7707805, and X7757777. The pl at X7707805 received sniper fire from X7727799 at 1912. A heavy ambush w/o any w/o results. Close to front veh. hit by 0532. The remainder of the day consisted of local enemy in phase or combat ops.

c. C Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X7707799, X7707805, and X779803. One at X779803 cleared at 0700, 0800 by 0532. C Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

d. RNFRD adv/air/2000, got to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at 0500. A few firing pans was held for ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

(2) Operations:

a. A Co adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

b. B Co adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

c. C Co adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

d. RNFRD adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

29 Jan 67

(1) Operations:

a. A Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 A Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590802 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

b. B Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 B Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590902 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

c. C Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 C Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590802 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

d. RNFRD adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.

(2) Operations:

a. A Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 A Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590802 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

b. B Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 B Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590902 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

c. C Co employed 1 sqd ambush ptls at X6590837 and X768036. Neither had contact and closed base by 0300. At 0815 C Co landed in Lz 6 at X6590802 w/o contact. At 1245 vsc X6590908 closed the Co discovered 950 lbs of med supplies which were stripped to RNFRD. At 1250 the Co continued to maintain its fwd bias on the RNFRD and keep an eye out for the RNFRD.

d. RNFRD adv/air/2000 to the BN and commenced the initial phase of prepld ops at X6590869 with the 1st Sqd, the 3rd Sqd, Colson, and the 2nd Sqd Co. After closing, two ptls are set up for ops for the ISAR. The remainder of the day was spent in prep for future ops.
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gun were captured. At 10:05, 25 firing pans reported destroyed. At 1535
a 35-gallon drum of G. were captured. At 1545, the Co destroyed 2 I-16
Bombers. G. were captured. At 1600, the unit found a Thompson .45 cal. sub-machine
and a US M1 Carbine at X3634990. During extraction from PZ at
XS63990, the extraction area received sporadic sniper fire. The unit
also moved to Cu Chi by 1800.

a. C Co ptt at X3702789, X3720736 and X3721801 had no
contact and closed base by 0500. C Co was relieved of the responsibility
of securing the BINH CHAI base at 0600 by Combat Spt Co 3/7. Following
an airstrike, C Co landed on LZ 2 at 0739 w/o receiving fire. The Co
succeeded in ams at 0730 via X2625897 and approached a command PZ. The unit
had no enemy contact, was extracted by air at 1619 from X363990 and closed
Cu Chi by 1800.

d. HDR prov administered and continued to phase out escort
and para for BHNI CHAI. Recon pt moved PZ at X3777992 to offset the
closing of Co-3/7 by air into the fuel base on the BINH TIN Canal. Recon
pt performed numerous armed veh escort missions. Pt pt escorted a 4/9
convoy from Cu Chi by 1100.

a. A try from DUH HO. fired 5 WP rounds. 110 HG 155mm rds.

b. From a US FID at DUH DW, fired 12 .50 and 600 HE 105mm rds.

c. US FID, the 145th Helicopter Del Co, the 145th Path
Finder Co, the 1st Bde. Det. and the 147th Helicopter Co from
PHU DO prov:

Hy Bomber B-52 Stratofores 12
CIS reft 17
Trmpt lift 272
Darnair 16
PSYWAR Broadcast 2
Resupply 2
TR SUPPLY 2
Resupply & Cargo Lift 3
Total 395

g. 3rd Bn employed 33 gd ambush pts on the night of
29 Jan. The 34th Co conducted normal base activities. The 32nd and 33rd
Co continued their security mission via COO DHU. The 31st Co, after a support
fighter reft strike on LZ 4 at X2633990, was mistightly lifted into
LS at X2633990 at 0710 w/o contact. At 1200 the Co landed at X2633990
and continued its search in area. At 0900 at X363990 the
31st Co found 1 VC KL (BG). At 1300 via X2639904, 3 VC were engaged and
captured. US .45 cal pistol, US M1 carbine and US 9mm pistol were cap-
tured at X2639904. 47 indiv foxholes, 6 shelters, 6 flares, 4 rpm land
were destroyed. Extraction from X2633990 completed 1620 w/o incident.

h. 2-65th engs cleared the area with spt prov by
B-3/7 at 0700. The pt continued the runup in the BINH GHA base
and completed the orchery in front of the compound.

3 Jan 67

(1) Concept: End op (-) depots the BINH CHAI base O000 by
armed convoy to Cu Chi. Pln assumes local pln and spt missions in its
area. Opn Fairfax concludes.

(2) Operations:

a. C Co reconst the Div bw clst force off 1300 and assumed
the pln responsibility in the 2nd Bde 2/7.7.

b. Co B responsible for OP as rgrnt and the laterite
pln. Co G would not accept responsibility for the laterite until area
was brought up to a satisfactory sta of police.

c. Co C prepared to move to R J TRM, attached to 2/34th
armor.

d. HDR continued admin/log opt. HDR (-) moved from BINH
CHAI to CU CHI, closing the Div base at 1015. Recon ptt escorted the
convoy from BINH CHAI to CU CHI.

e. L-7/11 moved from DUH HO. to CU CHI and reverted to
Div control.

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12. Results

45

VC KL (BG) 92
VC KL (POSS) 110
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(A) Doubtful Cases</td>
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<td>(B) Chiu Ho</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>(C) Civil Defendant</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>(D) POW</td>
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<td>Weapons Captured (Small Arms)</td>
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<td>Explosives Captured (Gren &amp; Mines)</td>
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<td>Documents Captured</td>
<td>121 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies Captured</td>
<td>1,279 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bankers Destroyed</td>
<td>437</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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13. Administrative Matters:
A. Classes I,II and V were drawn from CU CHI, Class III from BAXDAN
and Class IV from LOC TR. Difficulty was experienced in establishing a
Class IV account with PA&E initially; once this was solved, subsequent re-
quest were processed in positive manner. The only other problem area
was the AAR on 177 and 118A1 ammunition. Detailed observation of quantities on
hand and restraint of use by the individual soldier was requested. A con-
solidated mess was operated at Binh Chanh supplying Class I to as many as
5 locations simultaneously. On several occasions "C" rations were consumed
due to operations after "A" rations had been drawn for the period. These
meals were dropped in accordance with proper meal accounting procedures.
During the initial phase of the operation hundreds of detainees were held for
days at a time in which case meals were provided for these people. While
engaged in joint US/ARVN operation, it became apparent that the Vietnamese
units had no capability to resupply needed items for sustained combat. On
several occasions it was necessary to provide US commodities in order to
complete the operation. This was especially true in regards to Class I and
V supplies.
B. Supplies were transported to Binh Chanh by convoy and cir. Per-
ishable class I, emergency cargo and repair parts were flown in by CH-47
aircraft. A total of 128 tons of Class I was utilized during the operation.
This figure includes approx 2000 lb of ice daily. The bulk of resupply was
filled and bags which totaled 268,000. 2000 of these were sling loaded
from Cu Chi to a forward company bivouac utilizing 2 CH-47 sorties. Class III
was handled with two 600 lb trailer mounted pods organic to the unit. A
total of 35,000 g111 Hgwas expended, during operation Fairfax. Class
IV included pickets, FPR, lumber, concertina, broom wire, nails and roof-
ing paper. A total of 145 tons of Class IV was transported into the operational
area. Rations were raised in from CU CHI from L700 during the operation.
Class II was transported from CU CHI upon request for a total of 11 tons. Class II was handled by the person-
nel at Cu Chi and shipped forward by requesting unit or battalion controlled
transportation.
C. Units carried their basic load of Class V. The 3rd forward mait-
tained a roll under of the battalion basic load. One problem encountered
was rats eating wires on claymore mines. 1065 were counted by the troops. The section of the 4.2 inch mortar was deployed and the 1065R
was used for convoy security.
D. Maintenance was accomplished in the forward area for ordnance items
and signal items were evacuated to Cu Chi. A visit from 725th Hnct con-
tact team for small arms helped the battalion maintain weapons in a ready
state. Maintenance support for the entire operation was outstanding through-
out the period.
E. Casualties were evacuated from the operational area by Dustoff. The
3rd surgeon was at the field aid station.
F. Transportation was provided by organic vehicles, US-10 and CH-47
aircraft. US-10 were also used extensively for transportation. These
boats were especially useful in transporting bulky cargo.
G. Communications were provided by organic FM and RT's. BN provided
VHF communication.
H. Radical evacuation was accomplished with Dustoff.
11. Special Techniques

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a. In accomplishing interdiction of VC LOC night ambush sites were initially larger than required to insure success on contact. We were to maintain excessive patrol strength but soon covered twice and three times the area by using squad patrols. This decision was reached after being in the AO four weeks and was predicated on VC strengths, armament and habits.

b. Stay behind patrols from platoon night ambush patrols or from bushmaster operations proved highly effective. They were used only occasionally but usually with success.

c. Troops were periodically transported to the vicinity of the ambush site by helicopter.

d. A thorough briefing of pilots, using aerial photographs, precluded the more time consuming smoke marking of LZ. The few minutes edge provided often allowed effective surprise against the VC.

e. Eagle flights were very effective especially when a small reserve of 2 or 3 slicks were kept aloft to capitalize on capturing fleeing VC who escaped the initial landing. Thorough briefing is required for troops who remain aloft.

f. Hiding VC in water and in densely vegetated adjacent areas was countered by dropping C3 programs from ships. While this technique was not employed long enough to verify its value, it has definite promise.

g. Large scale company, battalion, operations alerted the VC of impending action and consequently they were less fruitful in terms of body count. Nevertheless the detention count was always high. An efficiently operating interrogation center can maximize exploitation of information provided through the interrogation process.

h. Artillery should always be employed in the more open areas in conjunction with BDE operations especially when troops will enter the assault objective area immediately after the strike. The time lapse between bomber passes allows time for VC to clear target area.

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15. Commander's analysis

A. The Mission and Command Emphasis

Basic understanding of the complex assigned mission is best achieved by a thorough appreciation of doctrine and techniques in FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, 1963. Additionally, this emphasis reflects the sequence in which such operations are most apt to occur.

Command emphasis, (issued by the CG, 25th Infantry Division [US]) and by Command, prior to development of troops into the area was a welcome catalyst which irrevocably influenced the enthusiasm of the lowest ranking participants toward successful mission accomplishment, continued interest by high ranking military commanders and from other governmental representatives resulted in sustained interest and in strong motivation for all members of the battalion. This, in turn, generated news media interest whose releases helped to raise spirit of the unit by soldier realization that he was doing something more than ordinarily worthwhile. Needless to say, this command emphasis ensured a high priority in combat and combat service support which was enjoyed throughout the operation.

B. Intelligence

FM 31-16 reaffirmed that intelligence is the key to the bag of tricks in such operations. Introduction of the battalion intelligence section, reinforced by Division Military Intelligence personnel and interpreters three weeks prior to troop deployment into the area was immensely worthwhile. This groundwork in addition to providing a background of intelligence, also served to allow a basis for mutual appreciation and understanding between US and Vietnamese personnel. The lack of adequate intelligence, also in the district headquarters related to the necessity for compiling such a reference for use by units which might be rotated through the area proved of great value. The training of participating Vietnamese Police Agency personnel increased gradually. Satisfactory operation was not achieved until a corps center team was placed in support of each rifle company. A mutual understanding of techniques of operation in the center must be reached early to produce friction among participants. For example information gleaned by police interrogators in their routine documentation of detainees must be routed to the military intelligence team. While the solution to this may appear simple, the importance attached to a piece of information by recorders, the subsequent reading by district intelligence personnel, translation and posting of the information, appear to be petty factors but together they are time consuming. It does require a considerable period to reach desired technique of operation. Nor should US personnel in their desire to get the job done by direct initiative and impatient reaction to the more calibrated Vietnamese, offend those allies, as this serves to further complicate on urgency sensitive situation. Cajolling, tact and time are needed. The interpretation center is highly worthwhile but a detailed and combined SOP is required for mutual understanding and efficiency. Agents, employed by the district 3-2 and those of the police forces were too few. This incentive means of giving information must be expanded, must be controlled in a joint effort and must have easily dispensable funds. Over the period of FM 31-16, agent information did increase in volume and validity.

Dilute over increasing success and being gained in the Chieu Nho program I feel that greater benefit to Ho Chi Minh, more extensive use of leaflets and aerial psychological broadcasts in support of the program are necessary. Information of crimes, routes, assembly areas etc. Provided by Ho Chi Minh become increasing reliable and lucrative. Increased attention must be given to the others wanted to desert the VC ranks but they were afraid of consequences or they did not know how to go about surrendering.

Success in operation of the Area Security Coordination Center can be gained by patience and understanding of the other fall-side problems. The success which this unit enjoyed is in large part attributed to a mutual agreement of troop units. The concept, approved by all members of the ASOC before troops were deployed into the district was allowed throughout the operation. Within that agreed upon framework, operations for a subsequent week fell naturally into place without difficulty. For it was necessary to disclose FM 31-16 plans to those meetings. Request for clearance in advance for air strikes or artillery in other districts of previous increases caused possibility as more individuals receive the advance information.
The successful denial of the night to the VC resulted in their frustration and in attacks to move during daylight. When observed, this was equally disastrous as its allowed artillery or air to be used against them and it increased the contact rate and the success of eagle flights.

The most effective form used throughout the operation was, as an objective the rapid sealing of small, relatively inaccessible areas wherein VC were reported to live or operate.

The frequent use of tactical air and helicopter gun ships pointed out the absolute necessity for habitaul, ground troop use of marking panels.

Contact with the VC in reinforced company and larger operations was infrequent, when it occurred the WLC sought to defend base areas of caches. In such rare instances all huts must be shot to destroy the defensive position to allow capture of caches. VC survivors of the defensive action usually rush their way to clear by streams and canals where they hide until the Marines withdraw. In such instances three courses of action are open. Vertical 60, 75mm cannons, bombs and napalm can be directed at the target area after the troops are withdrawn to a safe distance. Gunships using 40mm rounds, machine guns and rockets can increase his vulnerability to aerial fire power. A blanketed area of the area without employing this fire power is time consuming and not often is productive. A reinforced battalion heliborne operation into a VC base area immediately following a B-52 strike is the most effective means of using non-delayed fuses as the greater portion of the area is under control. Marines who apparently absorbed by the saturating of very nearly-occupied soil. While this operation was highly successful in planning and execution a greater Viet Cong body count would have been attained by firing 75mm artillery around the periphery of the target from the outside of the circle until the landing of troops, at which time gunships could be given a free fire zone around the outer edges and beyond the target area. In hind sight the use of 75 artillery during the air strike is obvious as there is usually a week between the wave of attacks.

Combined operations, which have a teaching or example setting objective reflect unity of purpose and are usually if conducted at squad level over a relatively deceptpid of time by the same units, instilling the offensive spirit of the US Army into Vietnamese ranks is a long term task which requires a better trained Vietnamese junior officer and noncommissioned officers corps.

D. Police Operations.

Population and resources control measures principally used were curfews and road and railway check points. US troops were habitually sent out with police forces on check points missions. Vietnamese efficiency was thought to be poor on it appeared first questions; individuals were usually able to talk their way out of being searched. When searches were made the large majority were curfew and route checks.

E. Influencing the Population.

The security provided by US troops, presence and the repair of roads and bridges were the critical factors in favorably influencing the local population. This opening of routes included in results maintenance of bus service, opening of rice mills and the return of a large portion of the people to their homes. MILICIA, cultural civic teams, school milk programs, leaflet drops and other such actions helped to influence the people. While respect for the aged and other nobilities of society are easily gained in the more populated areas and along secure inhabited roads, small unit soldiers are not inclined to be so receptive, out in the distant paddies and away from the beaten track. The treachery of uncertainty follows him until a reasonably firm control over that area has been established. The volunteering of information by the population progresses so once passed and as they become aware that our forces intended to stay.

F. Fire Support.

In combined operations with Vietnamese forces, impending operations must be concerted sufficiently in advance to allow for preparation of food, water and SC boxes must be provided to keep harmony and to derive maximum benefit from the operation.
While the seeking for increased efficiency in the Vietnamese logistics system is of paramount importance to the overall schema, use of it is avoided and US procured supplies are requested. If the ARVN logistical system is to be employed, operational plans must be announced early to allow for logistical reaction time. This is not desirable as plan compromise is more likely to occur during their relatively extended period.

The universal acknowledgment of speaking the language influences people faster than all the others combined. Troops need learn only a few phrases to achieve success in this area. Soldiers must be made to learn a few of the most often used phrases. Additionally, all officers in the battalion were required to wear ARVN rank insignia on the jacket front. Seeing the familiar brass brought immediate signs of recognition and a smile.


a. That for such pacification operations the highest echelons of command in the theater provide the necessary emphasis, as was the case in this operation.

b. That the pacification mission continue to be accomplished at battalion/district level.

c. That where it is humbly possible allow a single battalion to remain in an area for at least six months.

d. That quad 50 machine guns and dual 40s be attached to the infantry battalion as opposed to being placed in a support role.

e. That attention be given to the establishment of SOPs for combined use in interrogation centers and possibly in ASCCs.

f. That agent networks be expanded.

g. That police advisory personnel devote more training to search procedures.

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