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31 aug 1978, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, ATTN: J343, APO 96243

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ACSFOR-AD File

66X125

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66X125
25 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J5-23)

TO: Commanding Officer
21 Brigade
25th Infantry Division
APO: AVDSD-T
APO U.S., Bangkok 89225

Y. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation XERO (MODE)

Z. DATE OF OPERATION: 24 July 1966 - 23 July 1966

3. LOCATION: Loc Nau Mission (XK 6122), K. K. H. Sector East (XK 6122) and Trung Lap and west (XK 5924), Pak Wan Province, Viet Nam

4. FRENCH HEADQUARTERS: 1st Bn (Main), 5th Inf.

5. FRENCH STAFF: Lt Col Victor F. Ding

6. FRENCH STAFF: 1st Bn (Main) (-) 3rd Inf, Lt Col Victor F. Ding, Commanding

Recon Plato, Lt J. D. Haggard

2nd Bn Plato, Lt L. E. Hiebman

Company A, Capt J. A. Robinson, Commanding

Company B, Capt R. D. Janzen, Commanding

Company C, Capt W. A. Nealy, Commanding (Attached to 4th Inf until 27 July 1966)

7. VII. AMERICAN FORCES

a. 6 Army, 5th Army: 1G

b. 12th Army (-) and 3/12th Army (-): 03

8. VIETNAMESE

a. 21 July 1966: On 21 July 1966 the TF SW received information from the village chief concerning the tunnel and approximate location of the VC north of Ap Than (a reported VC guerrilla). The chief also furnished two guides to point out the tunnels. The guides were D. Nguyen and a Chieu Hoi and were picked up by C-13 crews in the area on 21 July. It was determined that the VC were probably crossing the tunnel and unit operations in that area. The tunnels were located in TK 9113b and TK 9210c. Both were unoccupied and destroyed by 03 L. A further search of the wooded area discovered a tunnel covered with leaves at XT 707109. A tunnel was also discovered. A small VC base camp was found in TK 9210c, and four tunnels and a tunnel were destroyed at XT 707109. A small cache of documents
found in the tunnel were ten rounds. It is notable that this area was cleared by bulldozers at one time and vegetation has since regrown and is quite dense in many spots. The VC base camp consisted of six huts made with bamboo and tree trunks that were knocked down into a horizontal position. The horizontal huts were used for the roof. Undefended was placed against the huts. This formed a very well camouflaged shelter underneath. Trafficability in the area was good. As in the past, close cooperation between the village chief and the 1st SF resulted in the specific location of VC installations in the Tan Thau Trung area.

b. 27 to 30 July 1966: Intelligence received from IIc, 2d Me indicated a possible build up for an attack on Trung Lop or Trung Luy in the near future. There was also a suspected supply and infiltration route (north-south) somewhere in this area. Army reports had been received indicating that elements of the VC 27th and 22nd Regiments were located in the Nui Lei Trach along the north edge of the AO. The Nui Lei Trach is also known to be the base area for the 300th VC Div. In the two week period prior to the operation, elements of the 1st Bn, 160th Regt were also active in the AO. A thorough search of the area was made with the following results: The VC came with carbines were killed by an ambush at NT 506633. A total of 43 VC were killed, most of which were found waiting in the fields. Information had been received that the village of Loc Huy (NT 518364) was a VC hideout. Coordination was made with an RF outpost at NT 506633 and 20 RF troops aided in the search. Once the village was surrounded, all exits were opposed by the RF soldiers and 10 were captured as VC. The terrain in this area was trafficable, but may also provide cover for RF's to areas. The AO is characterized generally by wet ploughs with scattered clumps of weeds and brush.

c. In the two weeks prior to the operation, Intelligence reports from Nds 3d We and other divisional units indicated that elements of the 2nd Bn, 160th Regt had been found frequently in the AO via NT 4646 and NT 62-60. Elements of the 7th Bn, 160th Regt were reported in the Phuoc Khe Division via NT 6322. A VC reserve training center was reported via NT 7525 via NT 5526. Radio communications and reports indicated that elements of VC were and east areas were located via NT 562556, NT 572297, NT 562237, NT 592503, NT 269 and NT 592997. A new VC company was reported to be located near NT 5936. During the actual operation the VC units of any size were encountered. All actions involved more than a VC squad and usually consisted of the three to five-man cells operating within and covering small and/or buddy-trapped areas.

d. Significant Intelligence Find:

(1) NT 635277. A base camp was found with a cache of 1,500 pounds of rice, normal maps of the Sihanouk area showing details of the locations of U.S. and ARVN positions along roads, numerous written ARVN outposts and friendly barracks, and a sketch map of the CMG base camp. This area was heavily mined and buddy trapped.

(2) NT 612227. This area was heavily mined and buddy trapped, and defended by a three-to-five-man cell. The VC were placed into a tunnel funnel rumored located on 61 or 62 meter hill west of the 2d Bn, 14th Inf. when discovering a 10 meter company (a company about 1 km, about 6 hours west straddling the hill with five six-man pockets). The unit was later identified as a tunnel company, with the 7th Bn, 160th Regt. After the leader and company chief were captured by a team which had entered the tunnel, a tunnel mouth of the center further back into the tunnel. A highly placed man and a second tunnel entrance was located on 69 meter hill (due to existing indications in the heavy underbrush a helicopter was called to the area and located the second tunnel entrance, marked by smoke earlier). The six men were also located and blocked. After six hours of attempting to remove the
VC from the tunnel, both entrances and the two air vents were blown. The result was a collapse of the tunnel (traceable on the surface).

(3) XT 646236 to XT 647234. Indications of a VC base camp were found with several hidden houses, one small concrete anti-aircraft bunker, several new bunkers, camouflaged huts and building materials. At this location two VC were killed. Several pieces of documents, training manuals and three weapons were captured. All installations were destroyed.

(4) XT 636240. Three VC were engaged. Two escaped and one was captured. The captured VC spoke good English and was armed with a Chi-Com (type 55) assault rifle. It was found that he was a member of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, 330 Section, H2 HQ. This is a reconnaissance and intelligence unit subordinate to the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Region. The unit's mission is reporting friendly unit dispositions throughout the Nha Bea District and Binh Duong Province, including the 1st Co NVA andpill-box Plantation. It also indicated that the 1st Co, 165A Regt coordinated with anti-aircraft from G06VN during the 25-27 July air attack on the GI Chi base camp. He gave his unit HQ location on XT 635230. An additional check of this location was made by the 2/4 7th RIF and a concrete tunnel complex was destroyed.

(5) XT 649229. Three bunkers were in the 1 August 1965 B-52 strike had created large craters in a heavily mined and badly trapped area. These were unexploded, uncured or dumped. Electrical wires to command detonated mines had been removed. A bunker and tunnel complex was also destroyed by the bombs. It is noteworthy that a bunker and three-level tunnel found at this location had a 713 cargo hatch at the bunker top and an M13 commando hatch on a trap door between levels. On 4 August 1966 a VC raider stated that his unit (2nd Squad, 211 Platoon, 1st Company, 7th Co, 165A Regt) had been under direct attack by 5-52s at Nha Beong (XT 643230) and were ordered to break up immediately into small groups and move out of the area.

(6) XT 642217. E/4/3rd Hth located and destroyed an extensive bunker system with two three-level tunnels that contained 7,000 rounds of .50 cal armor piercing ammunition (AP) and three quantities of mines and grenades. At this same location a unit probing the B-41 and A-10 destroyed by a command detonated mine with enough U.S. kills. In that same tunnel personnel was through drafts of the area. On returning to the area it was found that the ATs on the beach were unexploded and still had many 40cm round mines (fragged) scattered in the vicinity.

(7) XT 645234 to XT 649234. Two concrete bunkers, four dirt and log bunkers and one three-level tunnel were destroyed. Ammunition, medical supplies and propaganda material were captured.

(8) XT 645234. Four rows of barbed wire, approximately 50 foot long with each row constructed in a different manner were located. This indicated some type of training area.

(9) XT 653224. Two bunkers from the B-52 strike had destroyed a VC company CP. A tank, bunker, sound and several huts were destroyed. There were two dead VC, a company leader for 1st Co NVA and two NVA, 60 black uniforms, three boxes of black cloth, and U.S. carbines, one Chinse M16 assault rifle and miscellaneous documents.

(10) XT 653225. A rifle cache of 500 pounds was found in a hut.

(11) XT 646235. A rifle cache was found buried in a 55 gallon
from with 2000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(12) XT 621236 and XT 622249. Many recently travelled trails were found. At the latter coordinates were indications (ie, water containers with dead, feed scrap, several firings—some of which were still unexploded, cooking utensils) that a large (possibly company size) VC force had spent the night.

(13) XT 623226. A large bunker complex and many booby traps were destroyed.

(14) XT 620224. Five steel reinforced bunkers and a 30 meter tunnel were destroyed. Equipment for making grenades and 25-30 pounds of lead (in rods) was captured. This area had many booby traps.

(15) XT 672261. The area was heavily mined and booby trapped, with many holes. The bunkers with interconnected tunnel were destroyed; two weapons were recovered and two VC were presumed killed when the bunker was destroyed.

(16) XT 643212. In a large hole (similar to a well) 400 pounds of explosives in 1/4 pound blocks, one Chinese shovel, one Chinese pistol and miscellaneous equipment were found.

(17) Incur patrols were initiated each night during the operation. On some nights as many as eight were used. No contact was made, nor any VC movement observed.

2. Terrain: The ground in the vicinity area was firm and provided excellent trafficability. Moward in rice paddies was generally good, with some exceptions. All uphill areas had a large amount of undergrowth that limited visibility but not trafficability.

9. EXECUTION: 2nd BN (Task (-), 5th Inf) conducted 100 operations in 2d Aug 40 and order provides mechanical expansion force on order.

10. CONTACT OF CONTINUATION: No contact (Task (-), 5th Inf) while 4th Inf conducted local 100 operations, until relieved 13 Aug. 10th and 1st Inf regiments are on order for employment as tank reaction force on order.

11. EXECUTION:

21 Aug 1966

The battalion (--) conducted patrols. Maintenance...

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AVDCRRA-6

25 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After-action Report (Base: HACV J3-32)

25 July 1966

The battalion (-) conducted retraining, maintenance and convoy security missions to Base Camp (XY 5204). Co B was attached to the 2/27th Inf.

27 July 1966

Eight daylight ambushes were established. One radio contact via KT 516509 at 1425 hours, resulting in one VC killed (13) and one U.S. carbine, one Chinese carbine, three hand grenades, 50 rounds small arms ammunition and miscellaneous documents captured. The battalion (-) departed at 2000 hours to conduct SSD operations north of the Dak Lak River via KT 5159 (Task 1, Operation Everest). Company A operated in Obj 3201 and Obj 3202 approaching eight VC suspects. Co B was relieved from the 2/27th Inf and joined the battalion (-) enroute to the AO. They then operated in Obj 3202, 3201 and Obj 3204. Several ambushes were set along the southern edge of the Dak Lak and at 1630 hours C2 were killed (13) and the rifles captured. The Team Platoon infantry opened fire on Co B on Obj 3201 then conducted operations via KT 5159 where 19 VC suspects were approached. Eight of the suspects approached were confirmed as VC by the 20th Inf FID team. The battalion (-) established a base support base via KT 5157/01 and Eat C (-). 1/2/27th Inf (Co F) was established in to support the battalion (-). Co C relocated to C1 over base camp at 1830 hours commencing their attachment to the 4/27th Inf.

23 July 1966

Eight ambushes were established during darkness 23-25 July. One radio contact and all returned at first light. The battalion (-) established by the local HP platoon, captured the village of Loc Hau (XY 5205) and approached 19 VC suspects, of which five were confirmed to be VC Co.

26 July 1966

Seven ambushes were established during darkness 25-26 July. One radio contact at 2000 hours via KT 5160. The C2 were unable to gain contact were confirmed. The radio contact to the BN liaison unit during operation returned at 2130 hours, fire support in to local HP platoon (-) at 2140 hours. In the AO (Task 2, Operation Everest) which moved via road to support the battalion CP in place to support the 2/27th Inf attached to the only battery. By 0200 hours the battalion had returned to base camp.

29 July 1966

Battalion activities included maintenance, conduct of small arms operations at Tan Hau Young (XY 5209) and escort of an artillery convoy from Duc Bao (XY 4405) to base camp.

13 August 1966

Lt Col Victor F. Dias assumed command of the 1st Co (Marl), 27th Infantry while Lt Col T. U. Green. The battalion conducted maintenance and prepared for future operations.

21 August 1966

The battalion departed base camp at 0745 hours on a mission to exploit and determine the effectiveness of a B-52 bomb strike via KT 640243 - KT 665220. In conjunction with this mission the battalion conducted SSD operations in the AO (Task 3, Operation Everest).
AVSCDA-C

25 August 1966
SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MAGY 33-32)

Company A:

The company, with Bataan Platoon attached, established blocking position X-RAY, then exploited the bunk strike. Upon the exception of three AT mines, the company had no enemy contact. An extensive bunker-tunnel complex was discovered via XT 642229. Another tunnel complex was found via XT 644227. There was little or no evidence of the B-52 strike in the objective area.

Company B:

The company moved to clear and hold Obs 1 until passage of Company A, then conducted a detailed search via XT 662219. A bunker-tunnel complex was discovered via XT 642217 which contained an en suite cache of small arms, grenades and AT mines. After completing the search the company moved to Obs 13. At 1600 hours two hours were found via XT 642266 containing a rifle, 15 artillery rounds, 2 AT mines, documents and evidence.

Company C:

The company departed base camp at 0725 hours moving through 60 Aum Harvest along Axis WHITE to conduct S20 operations to Obs 3, XT 642219. The company arrived in the AO at 0900 hours and between 0917 hours and 0925 hours found and destroyed five bunkers via XT 621220. Indestructible small arms fire was received throughout the morning but no casualties were sustained. Found and destroyed via XT 621267 was an extensive tunnel complex with new punji pits around the entrance. Feared inside the complex were fresh foot on a table and recent signs of much activity. At 1335 hours an element found a letter containing North Vietnamese money via XT 621277. Also found in the same area were one container, a hoist and miscellaneous small arms ammunition. At the same time elements via XT 619223 destroyed one 105mm ML and two 100mm G, both rigged for canal detonation and buried in a tunnel in the area. Three VC were located in a bunker-tunnel complex via XT 619239 at 1210 hours. In the manner against the bunker two KIA were sustained resulting from detonations detonated mines at 1331 hours. Another KIA was sustained at 1405 hours from another wounded detonated mine in the area. All attempts to force the VC from the complex failed and the complex was destroyed with demolitions. Found via XT 621207 at 1404 hours were one U.S. 1917 M1903 rifle. Found via XT 619223 at 1600 hours were eight homemade hand grenades and miscellaneous field equipment. At 1600 hours the company returned the top floor a bunker in the area and found him hand grenades and miscellaneous small arms ammunition. At 1700 hours the company departed enroute to the battalion perimeter.

2 August 1966

The battalion established two embasures during darkness 2-2 August. No contact was made and all returned to细致 Light. The battalion repeated the mission of exploiting the northern half of the 2/20th Inf objective area and departed at 0715 hours. Co A maintained the blocking position until 1000 hours then joined the battalion via XT 642256. Co B covered the eastern flank via XT 642257. Several new tunnels, bunkers, and salines before were located and destroyed via XT 642279. Co C was detached to via XT 642279 after reaching small arms fire from a house. The area was thoroughly searched and one VC captured. Several maps and documents were also found in this barren area. The 2/27th Inf was relieved of the mission and at 1420 hours Co C was dispatched to assist in their return to Trung Hop. The 1/5th Inf then assumed responsibility for the entire AO.

2 August 1966

Eight embasures were established during darkness 2-3 August, none of which made contact and all of which returned at first light. The battalion
Conducted an extensive search in the objective area (Incl 4, Operation "Jury"), which showed several indications of recent use by the VC. Co A killed two VC in a tunnel and dragged their bodies out; a third VC refused to come out and the tunnel was destroyed. Co B found extensive tunnel-bunker systems in their objective area along with ammunition, medical supplies, and large amounts of propaganda material. 60mm mortar firing positions and containers were also found in the area. Co C also discovered an extensive tunnel-bunker system in its area which was rigged with CQB booby traps. Uniforms and gas masks were found in the tunnel. Two Recon Platoons encountered an extensively booby trapped area which was defended with command detonated mines. Two VC were encountered in a tunnel, one of which was killed and extracted. The other was buried when the tunnel was destroyed.

4 August 1966

The battalion established nine ambushes during the hours of darkness 3-4 August. None made contact and all returned at first light. Throughout the day the battalion conducted post-strike analysis in the AO immediately after the B-52 air strike (Incl 2, Operation "Jury").

Company A:

The company departed the battalion perimeter at 0715 hours enroute to the AO. By 0827 hours the company had arrived in the AO and at 0839 hours elements found one VC claymore, miscellaneous small arms ammunition and several miscellaneous documents, including a company roster (possible unit designation: E-33) via XT 653274. At 1045 hours a cave containing approximately 60 black uniforms and several boxes of foodstuffs was found via XT 651291. Four slight MIA were sustained and an APC was damaged extensively when the vehicle hit an AT mine via XT 653275 at 1220 hours. Found in the same area were two VC bodies—an apparent result of the morning's B-52 strike. Recovered with the bodies were two U.S. carbines and one Russian assault rifle. Continued search of the AO revealed a heavily booby trapped area containing several houses via XT 652253. After completion of CID operations the company returned to the battalion perimeter.

Company B:

The company departed the battalion perimeter for the AO at 0715 hours, arriving at 0920 hours, and began its CID operations. At 0923 hours 600 pounds of loose rice was found via XT 653232. Two extended detonated mines were not off and small arms fire was received via XT 653232 at 1020 hours. There were no casualties. An old carbine, in unusable condition, was found in a hole via XT 657261. At 1130 hours two VC with one weapon were trapped in a bunker-tunnel complex via XT 657281. The weapon, a German carbine, was captured, but all attempts to enter the VC from the tunnel were unsuccessful and the VC were killed (nec) when the complex was destroyed with demolitions. At 1230 hours one APC hit an AT mine via XT 657284. There were no casualties. At 1355 hours another APC hit an AT mine in the same location. One minor WIA was sustained. At 1700 hours the company completed its CID operations and returned to the battalion perimeter.

Company C:

The company departed the battalion perimeter at 0715 hours and enroute to the AO several recently tunnelled, heavily used tunnels were found via XT 621249 and XT 621260. The tunnels were destroyed at 1000 hours via XT 653249. At 1035 hours two VC with small arms fire were received via XT 653274. One VC was killed in and the VC bodies removed. There were no casualties. At 1105 hours one friendly WIA and one company MIA resulted from an exploding booby trap via XT 653279. At 1132 hours one KIA
and three WIA were sustained during the investigation of a booby trapped tunnel via XT 66B20. All casualties were evacuated. At 1514 hours a blood trail, as well as a pair of sandals with bits of flesh in them and a handkerchief of 7.9cm exsag were found near a sapang via XT 66D26. The sapang was sunk in the river where the blood trail ended. The company finished its SOD operations at 1700 hours and returned to the battalion perimeter.

Recon Platoon:

At 0745 the plateau departed for Trung Lap, escorting the battalion's damaged vehicles. The escort mission was completed at 0900 hours, at which time the plateau started its return movement to the AO. Between 1425 hours and 1532 hours the plateau screened the northeast flank of the objective area. After the completion of the mission the plateau returned to the battalion perimeter.

3 August 1966

The battalion established eight ambushes during the hours of darkness 4–5 August. Enemy made contact and all returned at first light. The battalion executed maintenance during the early morning. At 0625 hours the battalion commenced a reconnaissance in force in areas DUT and RAVEN (Inlay 6, Operation Overlay). The battalion CP was moved to via XT 559241.

Company A:

At 0934 the company began its movement to Area RAVEN (Inlay 6), searching along Axis JAH in areas 3, 7 and 2. Indestructible small arms fire was received at 1000 hours from via XT 591265. A heavy volume of automatic weapons fire was returned and the VC broke contact. Ten VC were spotted in a column via XT 597287 at 1145 hours. The VC were pursued but all attempts to make contact were unsuccessful. At 1300 hours the company arrived at the battalion CP.

Company B:

The company began its movement at 1025 hours moving to Inlay 10, searching along Axis PAG in areas 5 and 1. One 250 pound bomb and a house were destroyed via XT 612266 at 1105 hours. Another house and two booby traps were destroyed via XT 614247. The area was a warm fire site in the area. One male VC was apprehended via XT 614222 at 1614 hours. The suspect was seen in the company of a VC with a rifle; however, the VC escaped. At 1700 all elements returned to the BN CP.

Company C:

At 0935 hours Company C began its movement to Area RAVEN (Inlay 6) searching along Axis LI A to areas 5, 12, 15 and 4.要素, at 1014 hours, an element found a 55 gallon drum of water and civilian manufactured (shell), in a U.S. type drum marked "CAStable" via XT 62429. Also found in the area was a trail with fresh footprints and one booby trapped C4I bomb. A small sized assembly area was found and destroyed via XT 612020 (1135 hours). The area appeared to have been used three days prior. At 1230 hours a large booby-trapped complex was found and destroyed in a heavily booby trapped area via XT 622926. After the completion of its mission the company returned to the battalion CP (1800 hours).

Recon Platoon:

The plateau departed the battalion CP at 0932 hours and moved to Area RAVEN (Inlay 6). At 1135 hours two bunkers (one rock reinforced) were found and destroyed via XT 620747. Also destroyed were a 50 meter tunnel and one 250 pound bomb. The area was found to be heavily booby trapped and miscellaneous hand grenade parts, 25–50 pounds of lead rode and 200 pounds of
22 AUGUST 1966

25th Infantry Division

AUGUST 25, 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RE: MACV J-5-22)

polished rice were found in the vicinity. At 1201, in the same area, the
platoon destroyed five hand grenades, the butchers. During this period seven
rifles grenades were fired into the area. There were no casualties. The
search continued with the platoon destroying three more steel and log reinforced
bunkers and eight hand grenades. 200 pounds of polished rice was also
found. At 1638 hours the platoon returned to the battalion perimeter.

6 AUGUST 1966

No ambushes were established. The battalion, participating in a 2d
Bn "raid and search" operation, established blocking positions vicinity
grid squares X5 5521, 5524, 5526, 5529, 5519 and 5519. The operation was
completed at 1940 hours. All units closed Cu Chi base camp at 1700 hours.

Company A:

The company departed the battalion perimeter at 0600 hours and moved
to X5 592219. Company conducted S&G operations in the immediate area. The platoon remained in position until 1140 hours after
which the company began the extraction of deceased vehicles and returned to
base camp at Cu Chi.

Company B:

Departing the battalion perimeter at 0600 hours, the company moved to
X5 592220 and established blocking positions. The company then con-
ducted S&G operations in the immediate area. Throughout the day numerous
civilians were questioned and released. At 1230 hours the company consolidated
and returned to Cu Chi base camp.

Company C:

The company departed the battalion perimeter at 0600 hours and moved
to X5 591119. The platoon established blocking positions and conducted S&G operations
in the area. Several civilians were detained and questioned, however, all
were released. At 1230 hours the company departed the area and returned to
base camp.

Rear Platoon:

The platoon established a BW Collecting Point via X5 591119. Throughout
the day several civilians that were detained were questioned and released.
At 1230 hours the platoon departed, escorting the battalion CP and all deceased
APC's to Cu Chi.

Battalion Command Group:

The battalion command group departed the area at 0800 hours following
the major elements deploying to X5 592220. During the day, the
battalion operated APC hit on X5 592220. The vehicle was damaged beyond repair and later destroyed by soldiers. Three WIA were
sustained, of which two were treated and returned to duty and one was evac-
uated. At 1410 hours the battalion CP held other units admittance to the general
by a man or it lifted near a bunker ledge approximately 5 feet in the air
(X5 592221). The aircraft was extensively damaged and never evacuated.
In the area the Battalion Command, Battalion S3 and the platoon were
attacked. The Battalion Command was evacuated and the Battalion S3 and the platoon were
controlled and returned to duty. The Boy Scout Truck traveled with the Battalion
command group and had one APC hit on X5 592220 at 1700 hours. The vehicle was extensively damaged and four WIA were sustained. Three were
evacuated; one was treated and returned to duty.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVNCEA-G
25 August 1965

SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: HAGV J3-32)

12. RESULTS.

a. Friendly: 610 personnel started the operation and 532 completed, of which 33 were WIA returned to duty (Task 7, Casualty List). Nine carriers, NI13; one carrier, CP, K577; and one mortar carrier, N106, were damaged by AT mines. Five carriers were repaired in the field and continued the operation. The K577 was unrecoverable and destroyed in place. All others were evacuated to base camp. One helicopter, CH 23, was severely damaged by a mine blast and also evacuated to base camp.

b. Enemy.

(1) Killed: 6 VC (4 B3, 2 est).

(2) Captured: 13 VC
2 Chicom carbines
3 U.S. carbines
1 U.S. rifle
1 U.S. G3
1 French GP
2 Russian assault rifles
1 rifle (assumed)
30,000 rounds and 10 Chicom ammunition
1 12mm mortar sight
1 flare pistol
3 VG gas masks
275 tons rice
5 bolts cloth
55 gallons engine oil
Miscellaneous medical supplies
Miscellaneous maps and documents
Training manuals

(3) Destroyed: 1 rifle
6 AT mines
69 local grenades
11 C3I hand grenades (booby trapped)
17 rifle grenades
5 AP mines
1 claymore weapon
18 105mm rounds rigged for command detonation
2 105mm rounds (booby trapped)
1 155mm round (booby trapped)
7 WP grenades
2 250 pound bombs (booby trapped)
6 60mm grenades
2073 rounds small arms ammunition
383 rounds 7.62mm ammunition
2 base camps
43 bunkers
17 tunnels
8 houses
64 VG uniforms
1 excavator
400 pounds explosives
Miscellaneous VC field equipment.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTES.

a. Supplies: All resupply was accomplished by CH3D helicopters flying from base camp at Cu Chi to the forward CP area.

(1) During the operation, 124 sorties delivered the following supplies:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIXSBA-C  25 August 1965
SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MAGY J3-32)

(a) Class II: 42,100 pounds.
(b) Class III: 2,600 pounds.
(c) Class III: 33,500 pounds (6,660 gallons).
(d) Class IV: 2,000 pounds.
(e) Class V: 18,600 pounds.
(f) Miscellaneous: 42,830 pounds (includes 7,800 gallons of water).
(g) Personnel: 6,650 pounds.

(2) The battalion expended the following ammunition and demolitions during the operation:

(a) Ctg, 5.56mm, ball 16,480 rounds
(b) Ctg, 7.62mm, ball 10,030 rounds
(c) Ctg, 7.62mm, ball and tracer 16,000 rounds
(d) Ctg, cal .45, ball 1,950 rounds
(e) Ctg, cal .50, ball and tracer 11,420 rounds
(f) Ctg, 40mm grenade, HE 664 rounds
(g) Ctg, 40mm, shotgun (XM-177) 1,002 rounds
(h) Ctg, 60mm, HE 994 rounds
(i) Ctg, 60mm, illumination 11 rounds
(j) Ctg, 60mm, smoke, WP 223 rounds
(k) Ctg, 4.2" HE 712 rounds
(l) Ctg, 4.2", smoke, WP 223 rounds
(m) Grenade, hand, fragmentation 455 each
(n) Rocket, 663, heat, (FM1) 27 each
(o) Mace, AP, M13 28 each
(p) Signal, illumination, red and parachute 7 each
(q) Signal, illumination, red and cluster 22 each
(r) Signal, illumination, green cluster 46 each
(s) Signal, illumination, white cluster 4 each
(t) Flares, surface, trip, M2 64 each
(u) Ctg, dense blast, M76 1 round 220 pounds
(v) Ctg, dense blast, comp G 750 pounds
b. Maintenance: The battalion started the operation at 0000 strength on truck vehicles. During the operation, nine (9) vehicles, HIDs, were damaged by AT mines. Two (2) of these vehicles were repaired in the field and continued the operation. The other seven (7) vehicles were towed back to base camp where they were declared not mechanically repairable. The total of the nine were as follows: 14 7100, 10 6500, and 15 6520. Thirty carriers, HICs, became inoperable due to mechanical failures. Twelve (12) were repaired in the field and continued the operation. The other eight (8) were evacuated to base camp for repairs. Seven of these vehicles were repaired and returned to the battalion before the termination of the operation. Seven of the mechanical failures were due to the operation of the 100% of the vehicles. The repair of which was accomplished by the 1st Unit. One (1) 1977, caused by a cable, was damaged by an AT mine at XT 5425. This vehicle was so badly damaged that it was destroyed in place. Three other 1977s had mechanical failures, two of which were repaired in the field. One was returned to base camp and is being repaired and joined the battalion before the termination of the operation. One 1930, mortar carrier, was damaged by an AT mine at XT 5525. It was later declared not mechanically repairable. Ten 1930s had mechanical failures; however, they were repaired in the field and completed the operation.

c. Treatment of Casualties: Evacuation and Hospitalisation: A total of 161 patients were seen and treated in the battalion forward aid station during the operation. Of the 161, 53 were due to direct-induced casualties, of which 2 were evacuated; 27 were admitted as a result of battle wound, and 21 received non-battle injuries. Of those injured, 25 were evacuated and 33 were returned to duty. Evacuation of wounded was good throughout the operation, but in one case a patient was evacuated on an urgent basis that it could have been considered priority. Because of the difficulty in finding suitable landing areas, too seriously wounded patients had to be evacuated to the forward aid station.

d. Transportation: The battalion required a total of 10,410 gallons of 100/15 during the operation.
communications: During Operation ENTRAPMENT, 23 July 1966 through 6 August 1966, the primary means of communications used by this unit was HI radio. Wire nets were used at all times in the OP area and when the company was in a defensive posture during the hours of darkness. At this time, HI radio remained an effective offense. The battalion maintained HI contact with brigade. The battalion RFT radio was damaged enroute to the objective area and could not be repaired at the field locations. There was no wire communication between battalion and brigade because of the distance involved.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.

15. COMMISSION ANALYSIS:

a. Mechanized battalions can move at will throughout the VC controlled areas opposed by only minor harassment by the VC.

b. Some of the assets (i.e., shock action, mobility, etc) of a mechanized battalion are dissipated when the battalion is employed in purely dismounted operations such as detailed searching of tunnels, bunkers, and trench systems.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. A rifle company should be attached to a mechanized battalion to perform purely dismounted tasks and/or:

b. An infantry battalion be given the mission to follow and support the mechanized battalion, thereby allowing exploitation of the mechanized advantages and strengths.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

James C. Merritt
Capt., 1st
Adjutant
Indoensue 5 (Operation Camden) to Mr. Mc; 2nd En (invol) 5th En, and
Combat After-action Report (RCS: H/LG 55-52), dd 23 Aug 68

CONFIDENTIAL
Operation Crusader to Nov 21, 1941 (27th Div) 5th July, 1941,
Combat After-Action Report (1941-11-24), and 26 Aug 43.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>Co A</td>
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Incluodel 7 (Casualty List) to Over 60, 21st Mar (1941) 3rd Rid, and Gortet

After-action Report (435; 6.35-2.5), 23 Aug 43
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<td>5 Officers 150 En Referred</td>
<td>Co-G</td>
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<td>7 MIA</td>
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Page 2 to indicate 7 (Cavalry List) to Dty Bn, 1st En (incl) 4th En, 2nd En, 4th En, 7th En, 3rd En, 5th En; 24th En, 25th En, 26th En.