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22 July 1964

Master Operation: MACV Operations Report, Operation "CHIEF-WAR" (Chubu-War) 7-19-64

3. The United States Army (USA) and the ARVN Army (ARVN) had planned and executed attacks against the NVA Brigade throughout the month. On 2 August, the USA Action Team, 3rd Battalion, 53rd Infantry Division, attacked the NVA at 1330. The ARVN infantry soldiers were effective in the attack, and the NVA 30th Regiment was destroyed. The ARVN units served to protect friendly forces, provide security, protect friendly forces, and provide security. The 3rd Battalion, 53rd Infantry Division, and the ARVN 30th Regiment were integrated into the intelligence network throughout. These units served as a powerful element, protected friendly forces, and screened friendly units from attacking units. It is believed, the NVA reports that the provision of long-range supplies conducted in the USA.

4. OPF-327, the main element of the 1st Brigade, was transported to the 1st Div (ARVN) in MACV on Operation "CHIEF-WAR".

7. (a) Air Support

1. The 155th Div (ARVN) in direct support role.

2. 3/30 (G-230): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

3. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

4. The 1/350 (G-320) provided aerial reconnaissance with the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Infantry Division, and the ARVN 30th Regiment were integrated into the intelligence network throughout. These units served as a powerful element, protected friendly forces, and screened friendly units from attacking units.

5. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

6. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

7. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

8. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

9. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

10. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

11. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

12. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

13. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

14. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

15. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

16. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

17. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

18. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

19. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

20. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

21. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

22. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

23. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

24. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

25. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

26. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

27. 1/350 (G-320): Provided direct support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.
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SUW 217: Conduct operations after invasion Force, Operation "Tunisia" (411/5040)

22 July 1943

1. The situation (...)

2. The plan of operations is: (...)

3. The plan of operations is: (...)

4. The plan of operations is: (...)

5. The plan of operations is: (...)

6. The plan of operations is: (...)

7. The plan of operations is: (...)

8. The plan of operations is: (...)

9. The plan of operations is: (...)

10. The plan of operations is: (...)

11. The plan of operations is: (...)

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22 July 1965

SUBJECT: Rocket Operations After Action Report, Operation "GEGI" (MAF/604/2)

Hillwater Safety Zone. An attempt to utilize the Hillwater support plan was developed to keep the enemy under control through 3 June 1965. The plan involved the employment of 4 rockets per day, which were dropped into the middle of the Hillwater safety zone, at a rate of one rocket every 4 hours. Between 0000 on 9 July 1965 and 15 June 1965, the 2/26th Inf. was released gradually from combat. Following the withdrawal of the 1/26th Inf. on 23 May, the 9/26th Inf. 1/26th Cav, 1/26th Field Artillery, and 1/26th elements temporarily deployed to effective fires in the vicinity of the main base. The 9/26th Inf. was then held in reserve until 19 June 1965, when it was released to the 2/26th Inf. for combat. In the final hours of the operation, the 2/26th Cav relocated the valley northwest of the airfield and then moved southeast to pick up enemy stragglers. On 28 June 1965, the 1/26th Inf. was released from combat, and the 1/26th Inf. was returned to the 2/26th Inf. with expectations of being returned to combat in early August. Further operations produced no significant contact.

13. (c) Results:

a. The 1st Platoon, 1st Airmobile Battalion succeeded in its mission to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces in the Hillwater, 9/26th Inf, and 1/26th Inf. areas.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation "GEGI".

(1) Personnel losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Killed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<td>209</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</table>

(2) Weapons Captured:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
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Total 112

(3) Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm</td>
<td>3000 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm</td>
<td>35 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm</td>
<td>3 rds</td>
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22 July 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

(4) Main Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(5) Clothing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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(7) Tools:

<table>
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<th>Quantity</th>
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(8) Medical Supplies:

<table>
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(9) Miscellaneous:

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<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

(10) Corps Dispatches:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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J3-Jz1) 7: July '91

13. (c) ADMINISTRATION

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclusion 1, Personnel and
   Administration.

b. Legislation: See Inclusion 1, Legislation.

14. (c) ESTIMATES AND ANALYSIS

a. 3.9X79 cartridge round: The conventional high-velocity 1.969 round
   was found to have limited value in the high-threat situations, since
   the round could not penetrate the target. The 3.9X79 cartridge round
   for the M99 grenade launcher, however, proved to be highly
   effective in penetrating the target. The shot pattern at 100 yards
   provided an extremely high number of first-round hits. The use of
   this round to deal with the M99 is effective in eliminating hard-to-target
   targets at close or long range.

b. 3.9X29 tracer cartridge: When used in conjunction with the 3.9X79
   round, the tracer rounds enabled the sailor to correct aim and
   adjust fire before the shot was fired. The accuracy of the tracer rounds
   was crucial in maintaining the maximum number of enemy
   casualties and equipment. Pilots may be required to use these
   rounds under certain conditions.

c. Ballistic effects: Extended effective range was more effective than
   2.7 or 0.4的故事
   for the destruction of ground, underwater targets and cables. Although
   extended effective range was noted, and not really necessary under the
   conditions, the effectiveness of the tracer round is very stable and can be
   delivered to a target by employing special techniques from a helicopter.

15. (c) ARMAMENT INSERVICE

a. LESSON LOST

1. Rolled-up magazine: The initiation of a rolled-up magazine to the
   3.9X79 grenade launcher is gaining popularity in the fleet. Although
   the design may seem a little complex, it can simplify and
   standardize the magazine, providing a safer and more
   effective delivery mechanism.

2. Supply of standard 3.9X79 tracer cartridges: Standard 3.9X79
   tracer cartridges should be provided for all fleet ships in the future.
   These cartridges can be loaded directly into the magazine and
   delivered to the blast radius of the target. This technique
   removes the need for special loading of weapon.

3. Helicopter gunship: Many missions require the use of
   helicopters with a helicopter-mounted 3.9X79 grenade launcher. The
   hand-on gunship must be modified to incorporate the weapon. The
   load of the CH-47 is adequate, but is the slow for normal
   operations. For the load of the Marine Corps CH-46
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "CONFIDENTIAL" (Battalion 1-164th Infantry) - 22 July 1966

in that our efforts are aimed at the "OEE" in the area. Due to the extensive size of the area and the need for rapid and efficient movement, our primary objective is to exploit the "OEE" in the area. The main battle line is the East-West ridge line north of the village. The artillery fire is being directed on the enemy positions to the north and east of the village. The main objective is to establish a bridgehead and secure the area.

(4) Artillery support to the Infantry Battalion: It has been determined that the 105mm howitzers are not effective against the enemy positions. The 155mm howitzers are being used to provide indirect fire support to the infantry battalion. The use of the 155mm howitzers will provide the necessary flexibility for the infantry battalion to conduct operations in the area. The artillery fire is being directed on the enemy positions to the north and east of the village. The main objective is to establish a bridgehead and secure the area.

(5) Improved logistics support: The provision of supplies to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The supply lines are being threatened by enemy actions. The provision of supplies to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional support elements to the area.

(6) Improved medical support: The provision of medical support to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of medical support to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional medical elements to the area.

(7) Improved communications: The provision of improved communications to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved communications to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional communication elements to the area.

(8) Improved intelligence: The provision of improved intelligence to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved intelligence to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional intelligence elements to the area.

(9) Improved logistics support: The provision of improved logistics support to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved logistics support to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional logistics elements to the area.

(10) Improved medical support: The provision of improved medical support to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved medical support to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional medical elements to the area.

(11) Improved communications: The provision of improved communications to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved communications to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional communication elements to the area.

(12) Improved intelligence: The provision of improved intelligence to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved intelligence to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional intelligence elements to the area.

(13) Improved logistics support: The provision of improved logistics support to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved logistics support to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional logistics elements to the area.

(14) Improved medical support: The provision of improved medical support to the infantry battalion is a major concern. The provision of improved medical support to the infantry battalion is being addressed by the deploying additional medical elements to the area.

b. 164th Infantry

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16. (c) Organizations:

a. That consideration be given to establishing and publicizing a U.S. or MC Officer of the Service.

b. That the manufacturer's instructions for the MK3A7 and the one-shot plane forever be requisitioned.

c. That the O-10 and O-147 helicopters be modified to increase reliability and speed of operation.

d. That personnel courses be included in the 30" at Brigade level for all psychological operations and investigations.

e. That the Brigade be provided with one school-trained Psychological
CONFIDENTIAL

22 July 1965

SFC OT: Special Operations 2nd Pktn, Operation LYNCHFIELD (SDF)

Commander, Naval Forces, Alaskan Area (SDF)

1. Introduction: The purpose of this message is to provide guidance and instructions for the assigned tasks.

2. Objective: The primary objective is to ensure the successful execution of the assigned activities.

3. Procedures:
   a. Procedure 1: Detailed steps and procedures to be followed.
   b. Procedure 2: Additional steps to be considered.

4. Resources:
   a. Resource 1: Required for completion of task A.
   b. Resource 2: Essential for task B.

5. Timeline:
   a. Phase 1: 10 days
   b. Phase 2: 15 days

6. Contact Information:
   a. Contact Person: Mr. Smith
   b. Contact Phone: 123-4567

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Inclosure 1 (Personal and Administrative Reports, Operation "HARIKIRI")

1. (C) HARIKIRI

a. Beginning of Operation HARIKIRI

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HARIKIRI were as follows:

| Personnel | Authorized | Authorized
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<td>5749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>4723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Head Strength</td>
<td>2731</td>
<td>2731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 110% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 33% were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HARIKIRI

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HARIKIRI were as follows:

| Personnel | Authorized | Authorized
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>4723</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Head Strength</td>
<td>2731</td>
<td>2731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 42% were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, when, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

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Inclusion 1 (cont.)

2. (C) Casualties:
   a. Casualties for Operation HAMMERHEAD were as follows:

      | UNIT | 1st | 2nd |
      |------|-----|-----|
      | 1/35 | 135 |
      | 2/35 | 135 |
      | 3/35 | 18  |
      | 4/35 | 23  |

   b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

      | KIA | WIA | MIA |
      |-----|-----|-----|
      | 292 |
      | 150 |
      | 2   |

3. (C) Personnel Losses:
   a. A total of 251 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakdown of replacement to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

      | 1/35 | 2/35 |
      |-----|-----|
      | 150 |

   b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical skills were assigned to follow:

      | Flat Ets | Flat Sgs | Locs | Aid & Sup | Med & Sup |
      |--------|--------|-----|--------|--------|
      | 11     | 17     | 17  | 7      | 3      |

   c. Accuracy requirements for placing critical LOS shells were submitted for C-17 mission support, tanks, medical specialists, mechanics, communication personnel, and legal clerks.

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Inclusion 1 (contd)

4. (U) Personnel Services, Finance, SIA, and American Red Cross representatives visited the hospital area and provided assistance. The hospital has received an additional Red Cross representative who will provide extended services.

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Inclusion 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUMMINGBIRD

1. (C) ANALYSIS: The weather report predicted a maximum terrain rising to heights of 3,000 feet. The weather conditions varied between open forest, rocky undergrowth, and rough terrain with a dense jungle canopy, limited observation and fields of fire, while providing excellent cover and concealment. Highway 16 was the principal route among areas of conflict, while well defined trails (TD 100610 to TD 100660, TD 100660 to TD 100690, TD 100790 to TD 100820) provided the principal footpath routes. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing concealment from aerial observation and restricted our operations with a lack of landing zones.

2. (C) METEOROLOGY: The southwest monsoon dominated the weather, although there was less rain and mist than expected. High winds occurred infrequently, but low cloud conditions and rain began late each afternoon and lasted until early the following morning. The weather limited aerial activity and restricted visibility during a short turning hour when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and increasing our reduced aerial observation.

3. (C) At the beginning of Operation HUMMINGBIRD, the following information was available regarding enemy activity:
   a. Major VC infiltration routes crossed the Cambodian and Laotian borders in this area.
   b. The NVA 24th group reported at TD 767, 10 miles west of TD 100, and repelled their with 27 rounds from a reconnaissance element at TD 100 (18 May 1966) preparing for an attack on that village.
   c. A raider from the 4th BN 24th NVA Regiment reported his battalion at TD 021502.
   d. A captured diary disclosed VC plans of another group... and... NVA somewhere in the Highlands, with the main axis in MOOTI Province.
   e. Other information led to the belief that the battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment was north of TD 123334 (2B 113534) and two battalions were southwest of TD 100 (2B 1225).
   f. COMCINCH had received reports of small arms, antitank weapons, and mortar barrages, as well as from the north from 22 May to 28 May 1966.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through front line contact:
   a. Enemy prisoners and documents gave the identification of engaged units as the 24th, 3rd, and 6th Battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment.
   b. The enemy was located by moving units into the TD 130000 area after an artillery output had been halted on the evening of 7 June 1966. This front line sent it was the principal source of information about the enemy's location from 7 June until the end of the operation.

5. (C) RESULTS:
   a. Initial Order of Battle:
      (1) Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the TD 767 area, it was believed that two NVA Regiments were preparing for an attack in the TD 100610 area.
      (2) Raillers and prisoners indicated that these units were the 24th and 88th NVA Regiments. Raillers indicated that the 24th was located in the immediate TD 100600 area and the 88th was located in June.

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Inclined 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation INHERIT

(3) The only action in the area of interest was estimated to be 4000 SVN personnel and also about 150 NLF area for guerrilla personnel.

(4) Initial enemy dispositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt Vic</td>
<td>11-33</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1st Bk 25th Regt</td>
<td>10-33</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Co.</td>
<td>11-33</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Unconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th NVA Regt Vic</td>
<td>12-33</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304th BN (IV)</td>
<td>12-34</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-19 LP Co.</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. OB Summary and Findings:

(1) Units identified by photo:

(a) 24th NVA Regt, South SBV Div
- 5th BN, 6th BN, 7th BN, 8th BN
- 5th BN, 6th BN, 7th BN, 8th BN
- 5th BN, 6th BN, 7th BN, 8th BN
- 17th BN, 23rd BN, 24th BN
- 10th BN, 20th BN
- 21st BN, 22nd BN

(2) Units identified by documents:

- 5th BN, 8th BN, 10th BN, 11th BN
- 24th BN, 25th BN, 26th BN
- 27th BN, 28th BN, 29th BN
- 30th BN, 31st BN
- 32nd BN
- 33rd BN
- 34th BN

(3) NVA's stated that a major base complex and the 304th Div HQ was located in Tanbec, 300 yards where the regiment stayed for approximately one month before entering South Vietnam.

(4) The mission of the 24th Regt was to attack DAK TO and TOU MOAHS and some NVA Hoi Minh forces. NVA's from the 24th and 86th Regts stated that the 86th was to coordinate with the 24th Regt in these attacks.

(5) In engagement with the 24th NVA Regt in the TOU MOAHS vicinity between 9 and 13 June 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division discovered this NVA Unit in position as a combat force. Casualties to the 24th Regt were 211 killed by enemy small arms and artillery fire. It is probable that it will be several months before the unit can obtain replacements and again become effective as a combat unit.

(6) Casualties of the NVA troops is reported to be low as a result of the extreme difficulties encountered during infiltration, lack of medical supplies, lack of food, high mortality rate, and fear of friendly air attacks and artillery fire.

(7) Inclined 1 thru Inclined 2 lists the final order of battle of enemy forces in SOUTH PHUC. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Include 2 (Intelligence) in Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HURRICANE

(6) Include 2 in Intelligence given on operation, disposition
and strength of the 24th RN Co.

c. VC personnel and equipment losses are shown in paragraph 1.0 to
the basic after-action report.

6. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) The 24th RN, 200 A.A., and 12th area is a VC base
area as indicated by the number of casualties and nature of defenses found.

(2) The VC launched a major offensive in the BON, JAL 4528, and
Bln Sur area as indicated by their active attacks of 7 June 1968 as well as
the aggressive action of their units on 9, 10 and 11 June.

(3) The VC plan in the BON, JAL 4528, and Sur area has
been set back as indicated by the fifty percent or more casualties taken by
the 24th RN Regt.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Immediate deployment of 110 teams to points of VC capture,
enhances the timeliness of information gained and negates the possibility of
false or misleading information gained by inaccurate interpretation.

(2) Enemy troops in the area are better supplied and better than
those encountered in other parts of the II Corps area. They are more prone
to steady and fight and will readily reinforce and engaged unit. This was
demonstrated when 6/2/102 encountered a reinforced VC platoon which was subsequent-
ly supported by a battalion size force.

(3) South Vietnam, has a large number of the operational area should
be provided to II Corps and front line battalions. Frequently captives can
read their own units when they cannot read ours.

(4) Trail studies verified by ground reports should be developed
for the Brigade's own use and other RN, A.A., and 12th, units.

(5) Aggressive visual reconnaissance flown by the 299th Avn Co
provided significant information on enemy activity throughout the FRP. In 126 hours of
visual reconnaissance flown, 240 significant sightings were reported to the
S-2. This has proved to be an excellent method of gathering intelligence
information while units are in major conflict.

/5

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In September 1950, the 24th Infantry Division of the United States Military Forces was deployed to Korea. This document contains information on units and their operations, as well as a table detailing their movements and actions.

## Table of Operations

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<td>200</td>
<td>14 Jun</td>
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This document contains sensitive information and is marked as confidential.
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Include 2 (Composition, Disposition, and Strength of the 24th NA Regt)
1. (C) Composition

24th Regt - Code name - COONG THANG 6
24th Div - Code name - COONG THANG 6 DIV

1st BN = K-4
2nd BN = K-5
3rd BN = K-6

Prior to infiltration 24th Regt, designated
24th Division; 24th Regt, 24th Division

2. (C) Disposition: 24th Regt, located in Kentun Province, with one battalion north of Tou Ming and one battalion southwest of Tou Ming via ZE 2213.

3. (C) Strength: The 24th Regt, 304th NA Div (K.I.) has an actual TME strength of about 2000 personnel. It is estimated to be approximately 1000 personnel at present. Total NVA losses as a result of Operation Thruke were approximately 1000.
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4. (c) To achieve the objective of wiping out the strategic value, to cut economic tie into supplied the town of Dy Hi (Bak To - Ba Rong).

Phase I. To neutralize the Chua chau village and strategic roads, to cut economic tie into Dy Hi, to provide ambushes along Hwy 714 (Bak To - Ba Rong).

Phase II. To neutralize enemy forces by co-ordinating with friendly units of the VNA, Troop B under Further Young (1) to clear the enemy Bak To (4) and (5) to attack the defensive force by keeping constant presssure on them, forcing a withdrawal, and thus prepare the attack at the remaining column.

Phase III. When the material parts before the enemy for the Air force to last, by the command, the VC will close in and co, take Bak To.

5. (c) Training:

a. VC training - area local, YA 962616.

b. Training of the North Vietnamese soldiers:

(1) Infantry training: The basis of all instruction for the NVA soldier is infantry. Personnel of units receive infantry training, including guerrilla and infiltration tactics. Emphasis is placed upon mental and physical toughness, and effective individual marksmanship. Experimentation is encouraged for solving tactical problems.

(2) Artillery training: Both tactical and technical training is covered. Men are considered artillery. Due to the limited technical training there is limited.

(3) Technical services training generally is performed "OJT".

6. (c) Logistics:

a. Installations:

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<td>Prob st / rice area</td>
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<td>YA 69775</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. For transportation and lack of resources constitutes a slow system of supply and consequently the troops receive a minimal amount of food and clothing. Armanent lacks the necessary condition upon the supply services.

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a. NVA Casualties:

- 25th: 11 m.s. (killed)
- 1st Co.: 12 n.m. (killed)
- 1st Co.: 2 m.s. (killed)
- 1st Co.: 5 m.s. (killed)
- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.
- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.
- 1st Co.: 3 m.s.
- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.
- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.
- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.
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- 1st Co.: 1 m.s.

7. (C) Combat Efficiency: Results are low due to personal losses, lack of feed and medicine, and poor combat. Combat effectiveness at 24th NVA Depot can be considered ineffective until replacements or reinforcements can be attained.

8. (C) Miscellaneous:

a. Infiltration: 24th Regiment acts as a SOEC CSU Group. This infiltration group was divided into numerous small segments. The time lag between each element was two days. On 30 November 1975, departure company was held and the first element departed, and arrived in Kham. Province 23 June 1976. Main positions were held to locate infiltrational position.

1st Element: 4th Bn, medical company, 19th Transportation
Company and 10th Platoon.

2nd Element: 5th Bn, make-up subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters element.

3rd Element: 6th Bn, remaining subordinate units and Regimental
Headquarters.

b. Personalties:

Capt CO

Capt XO

4th Bn CO

4th Bn XO

5th Bn CO

5th Bn XO

6th Bn CO

6th Bn XO

10th Co CO

10th Co XO

11th Co CO

11th Co XO

12th Co CO

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176th Co CO
INCLOSURE 3 (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE 1, 2-6 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.
INCLOSURE 4 A (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 7-10 JUNE 1939)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HANTHORNE.
NCLOSURE 4  (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 10-15 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.
1. (C) Support Detachments:
   a. Support detachments provided the command and control of support action (forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and support control sections.
   b. Supply detachments were responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a repair section and an explosive ordnance disposal team.
   c. Maintenance detachments provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineering, medical, and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and contact team.
   d. Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment (T P XXY) The Trang Supply Support Command accompanied the Brigade from G20 N2O to DAO 12. It was replaced by Forward Support Detachment (T P XXY) QUI NICN Support Command. This Forward Support Detachment (CSD) was collocated with Supply Company, Support battalion, and was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units. The FSD was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation even though the personnel were stretched to the extent that 50% of the personnel were assigned to support the operation. The supply was extremely responsive to the needs of the units, and overland re-supply was effected promptly and efficiently. The Deputy Commander, QUI NICN Support Command, visited the support action (FSD) almost daily, and was instrumental in providing the excellent support received.

(2) 10th Aviation Detachments: Provided two armable companies and 16-2 aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations. The 16-2 aircraft were used to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions due primarily to large numbers of replacements and returnees transported to and from the forward area.

(3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 117th Aviation Company (Armable medium) and 1st Cav Div (Armable).

(4) 198th Aviation Company: Provided medical aero evacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 107 short tons of 9 rations and 70 tons of field ration individual Type C were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" ration meats were received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement every meal of 8 rations. However, fresh vegetables, milk, meat, tea, spices, fresh fruit and bread were extremely limited.

(2) Class II & III: Class II & III supplies were shipped from Brigade Support Detachments to T P XXY and QUI NICN area Support Command. The following items were replaced in larger quantities than
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normal: Satchels (24 106, 24 30), concertina wire, sand bags, poncho liners, and insect repellent.

(3) Class III: 1,066 tons of Class III and IV were issued during the operation (excluding JP-5), to include 36,000 gallons of JP-5, 8,750 barrels of gasoline, and 7,100 pounds of NAP (12/40). Supporting aviation units used 22,000 gallons of JP-4 (95 tons).

(4) Class V: 1,175 short tons of Class V were issued during this operation of which 60 short tons were issued to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne). The following items were in short supply during this operation:

(a) Hand-held Flares
(b) White Star Clusters
(c) Green Star Clusters
(d) White Star Parachute Flares

Tactical emergency resupply was used during the battle to bring in the required supplies to maintain the brigade basic load of 105mm howitzer and 155mm Howitzer ammunition. The brigade requested and received an increase in the Available Supply Date from 20 rounds to 60 rounds for 105mm Howitzer ammunition during the period 6 - 12 June 1966. Two lots of 105mm Howitzer ammunition were suspended. The 3rd and 5th Forward Support Detachments, 2/309th Artillery Support Command had a total of 4,000 rounds of ammunition on hand that were suspended.

(5) Support Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at Tan Gia Nh on one 600 GPH helicopter initially, replacing it with a 1500 GPH airlifted ashore from Tan Juan.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 50 automotive, 117 signal, 9k armament, 16 instrument, 2 quartemaster and 97 Rosary job orders. All but 3 signal, 1 engine and 2 quartermaster jobs were completed. The shortage of spare ors fa r generators noted in previous reports still exists.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of one hundred and seventy 21/2 ton truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 73 sorties for a total of 1,215 passengers and 166.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Throughout the operation aircraft CH-47 helicopters proved invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two CH-47 were placed in direct support of the Infantry Battalions and proved to be an extremely efficient method of providing tactical and administrative support to the units. The use of the CH-47 reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the UI-10 and released the UI-10’s for support of tactical operations.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 392.18 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at inclosure I is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation HATHCOE.

c. Other Services:

(1) swore registration was provided by 115th Quartermaster Company, an element of the QM NICH Area Support Command.

(2) Support Company provided 6 units in the NICH area.

(3) Motorpool (infantry) was initially deployed to the area of operation. Used receipt of secondary repair.
parts, the unit was repaired and the Brigade received excellent service for the remainder of the operation.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and units areas required command emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards, however, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. Two medical evacuation helicopters, not equipped with winches, were made available to the Brigade. These proved unsatisfactory for extraction of seriously wounded personnel from mountainous or heavily forested terrain. Therefore, a request was made, and honored, for two Air Force CH-47 (Chinooks) and two Marine CH-46 helicopters for this purpose.

b. Patients Treated:

(1) MIA 212
(2) Non-Battle Injury 172
(3) Disease 311 (7 malaria)

Total Treated 715
c. Returned to duty 120
d. Evacuated to hospital 202
e. Remain in holding 13

f. Hospitalized personnel (battle injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head 30
(2) Chest 10
(3) Upper extremities 68
(4) Lower extremities 81
(5) Abdomen 6
(6) J oint 17

TOTAL 212

4. SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Command, II Corps Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I, III, and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.

b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-54 helicopter for resupply. It proved a substantial increase in carrying capacity over that of UH-1D and therefore reduced time required for aerial resupply.

c. Water supply in the DiPG area was a problem initially because the 600 GPH Centrifuge did not function properly. A truck mounted 1500 GPH Centrifuge was dismantled, brought forward from HANANG and reassembled. This equipment proved to be trouble free, completely adequate supply of water.

d. Hoist helicopters. Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain has placed increased reliance upon medical evacuation aircraft with a hoist capability.

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5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Duplication of effort reduced by collocating the Area Forward Support Detachment with the organic forward support element.

b. Plans for provision of HSEHC helicopters with a hoist capability must be made prior to an operation.

c. CH-47 helicopters are invaluable in serial resupply operations.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Organic and supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.

b. Provisions be made for HSEHC helicopters with a hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.

c. CH-47 Helicopters be made available for resupply missions during future operations.

Air Resupply Data - Operation HAWTHORNE

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Inclasure 1 (Air Re-supply Data - Operation J.A.T. J.N.E) to Inclasure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report Operation J.A.T. J.N.E

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<td>.60</td>
<td>72,700</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>.75</td>
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<td>21.96</td>
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<td>2.92</td>
<td>33,750</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<td>5,050</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>33,750</td>
<td>16.77</td>
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<td>4.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**TOTAL**

95,375 47.70 607,850 302.84 61,260 11.60
Operation K. Timid was conducted in the area north of KIA 10, to disrupt and destroy NVA elements believed to be in the area. The Brigade Signal elements provided the forward communications for the Brigade and terminated the system provided by the Corps Signal units.

2. **Operations:**

a. **WFP Section** - The Brigade WFP was not committed until 12 June, when one system was installed to the Artillery Forward FDC. This system provided telephone communications to the forward artillery elements and also to adjacent infantry units.

b. **Communications Center Section** - A secure teletype circuit was operated between the Brigade and F PCR 5. This was supplemented by secure radio teletype circuits to the TAC, TAC HQ, I Corps FDC; and during the initial phases of the operation, MP and RAR.

c. **Switchboard and Wire Sections** - The wire section laid a total of 66 miles of wire, 12 miles in the Brigade Operated Post complex and 44 miles in long lines. All 40 Fort lines were underground and 60 long lines overhead. The switchboard terminated 6 28 common user circuits and 232 solo user circuits were installed. This system provided telephone service to all units and facilities in the area and long distance trunks to the Corps area system.

d. **FM Radio Section** - Operated two FM plots to reduce the traffic on the Operations Intelligence B. Used automatic retransmission FM relay station at RAR WFM S. Relay coordinates 2D 18857.

e. **Maintenance Section** - The number of FM-4 teletypewriters in support maintenance was below critical.

3. **Problems/Types:**

a. Shortage of replacement personnel in the Wire, Switchboard, and Communications Center Sections is a serious problem. Communication Center personnel are especially critical because of the security clearance requirements.

b. Power surges on FM equipment burned out assemblies of the J/ 100-C-5 Teletypewriter Carrier Terminals and burned out several complete sets of tubes in the J/100-C-68 Terminals. The unreliability of the J/28 Generators on hand is causing many problems. Only one of the twelve J/28 Generators placed on a priority requisition in November 1965 has been issued.

Improper siting of the WFP terminal at the forward artillery location caused several system outages. Closer coordination with supporting units operating the importance of proper siting will be made on future operations.

4. **Lessons Learned:**

a. When there are a large number of attachments to the Brigade, a second Operations Intelligence B will reduce traffic on the primary Operations Intelligence B and be removing problems. This second B can be operated on the General net frequency.

b. When an automatic retransmission FM relay station is being used during an operation and it is located in a central location, it should remain at this location through operations in the area to insure adequate communications to the combat elements.
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Attachment 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "WATTLE"

1. (Confidential Item)

2. The following civilian news correspondents visited the Brigade:

(1) David Snow - ABC News Team.
(2) Ron Bartlett - BBC News Team.
(3) Frank Hyde - ABC News Team.
(4) Kayes Beach - Chicago Daily News.
(6) Al King - Associated Press.
(7) LR Young Snow - BBC News.
(9) Max Henery - CBS News.
(10) Leon Black - UPI.
(11) Udo Roach - CBS News Team.
(12) Bill Stout - CBS News Team.
(13) Claude Billinger - CBS News Team.
(14) "William J. Cook - Newsweek.
(15) Ian Dredge - London Daily Express.
(16) Steve Van Meter - UPI.
(18) Howard Tuner - NBC News Team.
(19) Yo Huyah - NBC News Team.
(20) Vy Giro - NBC News Team.
(21) Bill Kelly - UPI (radio).
(22) Art Zieh - Time Magazine.
(23) Paul Maydell - Atlanta Journal.
(24) Bill Rorick - Charleston News and Courier.
(25) Nick herman - JP.
(26) Bob Green - JP.
(27) Neil Miley - TV Europe.
(28) Francis Trullier - UPI.

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Inclusion 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "ATTENTION":

(30) Bob Dowdell - WBC News Team.
(31) Schiesser - WFB News Team.
(32) Simpkins - WWO News Team.
(33) Vo Sun - WBC News Team.

b. The following military correspondents visited the Brigade:

(1) Sgt. Isadore - IV.
(2) Sgt. Wallace - 11G7-10.

a. Major mobility was obtained concerning the Brigade's activities to include all television networks, wire services, and news networks throughout the Free World.

d. "Hard Just" (Washington Post) was wounded by grenade fragments while with the 1/327th Parachute and was evacuated to N.E. THP.

b. The Information Office obtained electrical lighting and a press tent during this operation.

c. Photographic processing was improved through the use of the NSW dark room.

d. (U) Current Information.

c. The receipt and distribution of current information newspapers continued to be generally favorable. This is a problem under continuous study for improvement.

b. The Diplomat & Warrior was published by letterpress for the first time during Operation "ATTENTION".

3. (U) Security. Public exposure of the Brigade continued to improve with a significant increase in the percentage of copy released and subsequently printed.

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Inclousure 8 (Psychological warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report. Operation NIT '47.

1. (a) Psychological Objective: Psychological warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units in the operational area.

1. (c) Psychological warfare

3. Leaflets: A total of 6,615,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>C-47</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Safe Combat Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>20th Special</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>Circle Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Weapons Reward</td>
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<td>15,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>120,000</td>
<td>M-1</td>
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<td>30th Sept Special</td>
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<td>6 June</td>
<td>U-10</td>
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<td>Chieu Nai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>L-15</td>
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<td>U-10</td>
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<td>Torlo Strike</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>660,000</td>
<td>Chieu Nai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>U-10</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Air Superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Weapons Reward</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Chieu Nai</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Decredization</td>
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</table>
### CONFDENTIAL

Inclusions (Re: Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations "Operation Prompt, Operation U-10"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Strike/Action</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>U-10</td>
<td>Da Co Poen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>Chieu Voi</td>
</tr>
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<td>15 Jun</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>Volo Strike</td>
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<td>16 Jun</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>Do Co Poen</td>
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<td>17 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Jun</td>
<td>C-47</td>
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<td>Da Co Poen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>Da Co Poen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Psychological: A total of 35 hours 45 minutes of psychological PSYOP leaflet drops were made by B-26 U-10, and C-47 aircraft on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20th of June. The level of all leaflets was Chieu Voi and demoralization. A total of three special trips were made during the operation.

6. Summary: The psychological, special, and Locational leaflets and three special trips were directed toward enemy units in the operational area (Inclusione 1 and 2). It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing day of the operation, a total of four officers and five surrendered themselves to Brig. General,

7. Lessons Learned:

1. "New psychological procedures, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included as main material of course. These copies will be used as handouts to the visitors.

2. In order to defeat as well as resist against psychological warfare, one should be prepared with an effective resistance strategy; i.e., resistance, etc.
Inclusion of (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "BACON"

(3) An up-to-date list of contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the current and current classification (Chiou-tei, declassification, round, etc).

(4) The Psychological Operations Officer should have a comprehensive up to date catalogue of leaflets available to him.

(5) An enumeration to the Brigade of one Pay "N" school trained officer and two "N" has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expedited basis.

(6) The H-10 aircraft should be stationed at the Brigade CP.
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Imperial G (Artillery) to GHQ Operations / Gen. Action Report, Operation "TUNPO".

1. (C) Situation: 2d Artillery (Airborne), 20th Artillery of 1st Division, 10th Infantry Division. 11th Infantry, 1st Division (Tow). 20th Artillery: 11th Artillery (Airborne), 7th Artillery.

2. (C) Situation:

a. On 2 June 15/10 Artillery destroyed from 32040229 at 1000 hrs to 104000 closing at 1515 hrs in support of operation by 1/377th Inf. It 0025215 was 31/210th W.W. received 1114th (ED) post at 1435 hrs. The 1000 hrs to 1515 hrs closing the 1515 hrs closing.

b. On 3 June 15/10 Artillery destroyed from 32040229 to 1135 hrs. It 0023494 was 1134th W.W. received 1114th (ED) post at 1435 hrs. The 1000 hrs 1515 hrs closing the 1515 hrs closing.

c. On 4 June 15/10 Artillery destroyed from 32040229 to 1135 hrs. It 0023494 was 1134th W.W. received 1114th (ED) post at 1435 hrs. The 1000 hrs 1515 hrs closing the 1515 hrs closing.

d. On 5 June 15/10 Artillery destroyed from 32040229 to 1135 hrs. It 0023494 was 1134th W.W. received 1114th (ED) post at 1435 hrs. The 1000 hrs 1515 hrs closing the 1515 hrs closing.
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Enclosure 6 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "UNT CHA"

3. (C) Supplementary Observations: Originally the batteries deployed with (3) days rations and 50% load of shells, batteries were resupplied both by convoy and helicopter in about 5 days due to the tactical situation.

4. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Security of Main Supply Routes: In the initial phase of the operation, 27 Artillery (Airborne), 92nd Artillery was formed and consisted of 3 25mm Artillery (Airborne), 122mm Artillery (Airborne), 155mm Artillery, 2 Engineers (Airborne). The mission of the attached elements was to provide security for the battalion firing position on the prearranged route from Duk to the battalion firing position. After a firing incident on the prearranged route it was decided to pul all of the security elements in around the battalion firing positions every night and to secure the road at night with a heavy program of VT, Puma ICARS movements. This scheme worked to be very effective for it not only prevented future firing incidents, but also allowed for greater security of the firing positions.

b. Security of Battery FIR: Positions: It was found during this operation that a very close perimeter defense was essential to battery security. The perimeter should be far enough from the firing positions to prevent head winds from reaching the gun crews and yet close enough to permit a high degree of control of the perimeter forces in order to facilitate direct artillery fire against the enemy. During the NVA attack on B 2nd Artillery (Airborne), 92nd Artillery, the inability to locate the infantry security elements prevented the use of the "booby" round. It is recommended that the infantry security elements with the artillery be placed under the operational control of the artillery commander.

c. Fuz War, Artillery, infantry Coordination: As in past operations of the early days of this operation, unnecessary falls in the firing of artillery and Fuz War occurred. This can be attributed to many factors, some of which are: lack of control by the ground forces commander, poor timing of the part of the artillery "booby" round, mission execution of the artillery "booby", and communication difficulties. Upon completion of this operation all artillery LDI's, RDI's and the artillery "booby" were assembled in this problem and this problem was discussed in detail. A detailed list of causes and recommended solutions is being prepared for discussion with all personnel concerned.

d. Misfiring of Artillery Ammunition: This is a subject that requires constant control. All handlers, if not properly supervised, will cause misfiring. Helicopter lifts to rear base firing batteries are particularly damaging to ammunition because of the speed with which loading and unloading must be accomplished. Damaged ammunition could be the cause of some of the mortar bursts that have occurred in NVA.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

e. Pull all of the security elements in and around the artillery firing positions at night and secure the area around the positions with heavy ICARs.

f. It was found that by covering main supply routes with VT on the road and direct (Q) on the sides of the road, main supply routes were more rapidly opened in the morning.

g. Surface Movement: Only one battery displacement during the entire operation was made by helicopter. All other displacements were overland routes. It was found that by using the available few vehicles within this battalion, Support B atillement, 32nd Unit, and the attached 155 atillement -

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation KATORI:

that all batteries could be moved onward expeditiously and without incident.
The conclusion is that it is not necessary for this battalion to have prime
rovers for each battery as it was originally believed.
## Confidentia|l

**Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:**

### A Battery

**30 May - 8 June 1966**

**Position:** ZBO1227  
**Total No Misses:** 63

- **Conducted:** 55 Misses
  - 2 Reg
  - 13 Hz/rd
  - 3 Targets of Opportunity

**1 June - 20 June 1966**

**Position:** ZBO090346  
**Total No Misses:** 256

- **Conducted:** 185 Misses
  - 3 Reg
  - 10 Hz/rd
  - 30 Targets of Opportunity
  - 6 II/III Misses
  - 6 Props
  - 9 DC Cones
  - 1 Screening Man

### B Battery

**30 May - 3 June 1966**

**Position:** ZBO12418  
**Total No Misses:** 135

- **Conducted:** 112 Misses
  - 3 Reg
  - 13 Hz/rd
  - 7 Targets of Opportunity

**4 June - 20 June 1966**

**Position:** ZBO09347  
**Total No Misses:** 430

- **Conducted:** 367 Misses
  - 3 Reg
  - 13 Hz/rd
  - 13 II
  - 15 Prep
  - 16 DC Cones
  - 3 Screening Man's
  - 38 Targets of Opportunity

### C Battery

**1 June - 7 June 1966**

**Position:** ZBO12038  
**Total No Misses:** 79

- **Conducted:** 66 Misses
  - 3 Reg
  - 9 Hz/rd

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39
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Inclusions 1 to Inclusion 9: Report of Operations accounted and missions fired.

7 June - 20 June 1956

POSITION: 3700828

Conducted: 295 launching
3 HOrs
15 31/12s
3 1111s
13 60 Cts
19 Prop
30 Targets of Opportunity

Expend: 2,752 1111
14 12 177
77 177
20 1111
26 "
11 Yellow Smoke
1 Green Smoke

8/0/56

20 Nov - 4 June 1956

POSITION: 2300277

Conducted: 67 launching
Expend: 329 1111
12 177
4 "
2 1111

4 June - 5 June 1956

POSITION: 23099309

Conducted: 50 launching
Expend: 103 1111
1 177
7 Smoke

7 June 1956

POSITION: 2300432

Conducted: 20 launching
Expend: 199 1111

7 June - 8 June 1956

POSITION: 2300032

Conducted: 7/1
Expend: 375 1111
3 "

8 June - 20 June 1956

POSITION: 2300024

Conducted: 219 launching
3 12
13 Prop
3 1111
13 Targets of Opportunity
Expend: 4,534 1111
12 177
3 "
48 1111

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