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<td>31 Aug 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECURITY

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MAJ42-SU (8 Sep 66)
SUBJECT: After Action Report - 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Operation Fillmore (Aug 33 - 77)

TO: AGOFS, J3 FROM: AGOFS, J4
DATE: 21 Oct 66 CHM 2
MAJ Ferguson/xw/60936

1. The attached report has been received and matters of interest to it have been noted.

2. Although no significant logistical problems developed during the operation, two items, dry cell batteries and grease, were reported as being difficult to obtain or as being in short supply (para 2a(2) & (3), Incl 4). There are no known or reported shortages of these items at the present time. No shortages of these items which would affect combat operations are anticipated.

3. The report contains a recommendation that medical evacuation helicopters be provided a reliable winch or hoist capability for extraction of casualties where landing zones are not available (para 16). Twenty litter devices, used in conjunction with the UH1D helicopter equipped with a hoist, are now being evaluated in-country by ACTIV. If proved satisfactory, this will provide a capability for extracting casualties where no landing zone is available.

4. The report also contains a statement that PE 75 generators should be replaced (para 3, Incl 6). PE 75 generators are being replaced as a part of the generator standardization program. The replacement generator is the 3 kW 60 cycle mil std generator. None of these generators are in stock. Thirteen hundred are programmed in, however, no anticipated delivery date is available at this time. This quantity includes requirements for the replacement program, maintenance float and depot stock.

5. These comments relative to reported logistical problems and equipment recommendations have been provided as a matter of information.

1 Incl No
DOWNEY AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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After Action Report - 1st Brigade
101st Airborne Division

In Turn

1. The attached after action report is forwarded for action deemed appropriate. Your attention is invited to paragraph 16 of the report.

2. Request J4 return the attached report to J34 for file.

John C. F. Tillson III
Maj Gen, USA
ACofS, J3
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1966
SWUTC: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE
TO: Commanding General
USARV
COMMANDING GENERAL, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
17 August 1966
TO: Commanding General
USARV
COMMANDING GENERAL, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
THRU: Commanding General
2/327 INFANTRY REGIMENT, 2/327 INFANTRY

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FILLMORE.

2. (U) Date of Operations: 25 March - 31 July 1966. The entire Brigade was involved in phase I of the operation covering the period 25 March through 8 April. Beginning 9 April, the Brigade (-) was withdrawn from the operation and TF 2/327 Infantry continued on Operation FILLMORE under the divisional control of 2/327 INFANTRY. This report covers the period 25 March through 6 April 1966.

3. (U) Location: Isthmic Province, Vietnam.


6. (C) Task Organization:

1/25 Inf
A, 3d BN

2/327 Inf
A, 2d BN

3/327 Inf
A, 3d BN

2/327 Infantry:
A, 3d BN

3/327 Artillery
A, 2d BN

4. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/327 Infantry: Deployed in a direct support role.

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17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FULCRUM

b. 5/27 Artillery: Provided general supporting fires during the operation.

c. 1/30th Artillery (FROST): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

d. 6th Bn, 2nd Plt, B 25 Artillery (Stokes) (FROST): Provided effective on-call illumination from several locations during the operation.

e. 10th Armored Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lifts and combat service support lifts to maneuver and fire support units. 2nd-47 helicopters were provided on a mission support basis for use in dispensing and resupplying supplies.

f. 4th Air Div, USAF: Flew 80 Tactical Air missions totaling 197 sorties. Of these missions, six immediate strikes requested through the Air Force Direct Air Recon Aid (ADARI). Average response time for immediate strikes was twenty minutes from the initial request until time over target. The total of the above missions accounted for 72 structures destroyed, 31 structures damaged, and 31 secondary explosions. In all instances the Tactical Air Support rendered was responsive and accurately delivered.

g. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew one B-52 mission in support of the operation.

h. 457th MAD Det (Airmobile): Provided responsive, rapid execution support to the 2/327 throughout the operation.

6. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam directed that the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division secure and protect the rice harvest north and northwest of TUY NO, while continuing to locate, fix, and destroy the remaining elements of the 32nd NVA Regiment, 3d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, and local Viet Cong forces.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: The concept of the first phase of the operation was to have one battalion secure and protect the rice harvest, while two other battalions conducted searches and destroy operations in the area.

11. (C) Exception: Operation FULCRUM began without interruption, following the termination of Operation HIJACK. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area. The 1/327th Inf continued operations east of 32.60 N., while the 2/327th Inf and 2/302nd Inf continued operations in the central 32.60 N., rice crop area and in the mountains south of 32.60 N. On 26 March, one company from the 2/327th Inf and one battery from the 2/302nd Inf conducted an immediate attack over the mountains from the south. The 1/327th Inf moved by tactical motor march to TUY NO, South Airfield on 27 March and resumed a mission as the Brigade and I Field Force Reserve. The 2/327th Inf continued movement patrolling in the central rice crop area, and began exploitation of the B-52 strikes in the southern mountains with one company (Company B, 2/327th Inf). The 2/302nd Inf continued to operate in the mountains north of the B-52 strikes, and remained prepared to assist in the exploitation. Company B, 2/327th Inf completed the exploitation operation on 26 March when it offloaded link-up with elements of the 2/302nd Inf after having completely traversed the mountain range from south to north without enemy contact. The 2/302nd Inf then began operations through the mountains south of TUY NO, with the aim of searching villages and key points. On 31 March, the 2/327th Inf moved north by tactical motor march on Highway 1.
CONFIDENTIAL

July 23, 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PHUOC X

(CCI: 1301-66-00)

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1. Operational area near Tuy Hoa, north of Tuy Hoa, and began search and destroy operations. The 1/327 Inf began deployment from Tuy Hoa

South airfield to its next operational area near Khe THQ, with the aim of moving one company by CV-2 aircraft during the night of 2 April. During the day, the 2/327 Inf moved by helicopter to an area north of Tuy Hoa, to conduct patrols and search and destroy operations to protect the rice harvest in that vicinity. The 2/327 Inf, after completing its sweep to Highway 1, conducted a tactical motor march to Tuy Hoa South airfield where it assumed the mission of Brigade and 1 FAKRAN reserve from the 1/327 Inf. A second company from the 1/327 Inf conducted a night air movement to Khe THQ by CV-2 aircraft on 3 April and immediately deployed to the south east toward the mountainous plateau. On 4 April, the 2/327 Inf conducted an airborne assault with one company, South to Saline positions encircled by elements of the 1/327 Inf and then swept toward the 1/327 Inf with no enemy contact. Then one company from the 1/327 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company south east of Khe THQ on 7 April, the remainder of the 1/327 Inf was committed to the area of the engagement by helicopter assault in an attempt to encircle the Viet Cong forces. The engagements lasted throughout the day until the Viet Cong force withdrew suffering heavy casualties. The Brigade, minus 2/327 Inf, deployed to the south of Tuy Hoa on 7 April and 8 April. On 9 April, the 2/327 Inf was detached from the Brigade and continued on Operation PHUOC X under the operational control of 1 FAKRAN.

12. (C) Results:

(a) The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission to locate, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces in the Tuy Hoa area and was successful in protecting the rice harvest north of Tuy Hoa.

(b) Losses inflicted on the enemy during Phase I of Operation PHUOC X included the following: 122 VC KIA (146), 37 VC WIA (29), 12 VC KIA (185), 15 VC MIA, 1 killed, and 32 Individual and crew served weapons captured. In addition, large amounts of supplies and equipment were captured or destroyed. (See Inclosure 4).

(c) Friendly losses during the period included the following: 8 KIA, 67 WIA.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

(a) Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 4, Personnel and Administration.

(b) Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: In one battalion, each of the companies formed air assault teams that were able to function well and execute air movements.

Commander's Analysis:

(a) Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of slings and nets in helicopter resupply was effective and reduced the time the helicopters were required to spend on the ground.
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1.966
SUBJECT Operations After Action Report, Operation PHILIPPE
(RCS: LCV J5-54)

(2) Periodic spraying of the area with DDT, utilizing a modified 13860 vehicle, was effective in suppressing insects.

b. Highlights of Operations

(1) In an effort to obtain maximum effectiveness with psychological warfare, wounded IV. captives were given immediate medical attention. They were fed, given cigarettes, and were well treated. Photographs were taken of the prisoners while they were receiving this treatment with the intention of distributing the photographs throughout the operational area and among the civilian populace. In addition, psychological literature tracts were developed using themes based on interrogations and discussions with the captives. The photographs were never reproduced and still had not been delivered when the brigades departed in November. The tracts were ineffective when finally broadcast because of the altitude of the broadcast aircraft and insufficient amplification. Psychological warfare can be a powerful tool for the commander, but in order for its full potential to be realized, the psychological detachment must be responsive to the commander's requirements.

(2) In some areas units encountered extreme difficulty in extracting casualties because of a lack of suitable landing zones. Construction of landing zones was impractical in terrain where the jungle canopy frequently reached 100 feet or more in height. A solution, which met with success, was the use of USAF rescue helicopters which had a hoist capability. It was easier to locate or construct a gap in the jungle canopy, large enough to allow extraction with a hoist from a hovering helicopter, than it would have been to construct landing zones large enough to accommodate a UH-1D aircraft.

16. (c) Recommendations

a. That medical evacuation helicopters be provided with a reliable winch or hoist capability to enable extraction of casualties from areas where landing zones are not available.

b. That supporting psychological warfare detachments be provided an increased capability in broadcasting and photograph reproduction equipment.

VILLAGER PERSON
Brigadier General, USMC
Commanding

Inclusions:
1. Personnel and Administration
2. Intelligence
3. Operations Schematic
4. Logistics
5. Civic Action
6. Communications
7. Artillery

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27 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PHILIPPINE

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington, DC 20316
1 - CINCPAC (ATTN: G732-40)
1 - SECNAV (ATTN: N4C 03-32)
1 - SECNAV (ATTN: N4E 03-32)
2 - USJFR
1 - USNAV (ATTN: ANH Historical Division)
2 - IPERCH
2 - 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, KY
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - HQ
1 - JRO
1 - JRO
1 - JRO
1 - JRO
Inclosure 1 (Personal and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

1. (C) Unit Strength:

   a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the start of Operation Fillmore were:

   | Authorized Augmented (MTOM) | 4408 |
   | Assigned                     | 4632 |
   | Present for Duty             | 4293 |
   | Not Present for Duty         | 712  |
   | Airhead                      | 3389 |
   | Base Camp                    | 924  |

   The assigned strength was 102% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 97% of the augmented authorized strength.

   c. Of the Not Present for Duty strength, 19% were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, CTS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in hospitalized status, rifle company strengths were reduced during the period. Additional rifle company strength was obtained by the end of the operation by returning personnel assigned to provisional units to their parent units, reducing Base Camp strength to the minimum, and through receipt of replacement personnel.

   The Brigade received 6 ARVN NCO interpreters during the period; 20 interpreters and 2 LIO's were also attached to the Brigade.

2. (C) Casualties:

   Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502d</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/326th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/326th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Personnel Program: Various personnel programs were initiated during this operation.

   a. Safety Program. "Stay Alert and Stay Alive" Messages were disseminated to all units summarizing each accident in the Brigade. The purpose of the program is to reduce loss of lives and material damage.

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Inclusion (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd)

caused by carelessness. Each message contains a "lesson learned". These messages are widely disseminated and are discussed at commanders conferences. Units involved with the accident are designated in the message. The messages are distributed in T42 format to gain attention.

b. Pay Program: A letter was published and disseminated on "Monthly Pay". The intent was to encourage the use of savings bonds and savings allotments by Brigade personnel. This program was intended not only to provide an added service to the troops (by saving the cost of money orders and speeding delivery of the funds) but also was designed to remove surplus funds from the forward area, thereby reducing the possibilities of loss, theft, etc. Commanders were requested to encourage all personnel to use this service. This program coincided with the savings bond drive.

Personnel Services: To provide necessary personnel services to troops in the field, ST teams continued to periodically visit units—normally once a week—"to sell money orders, rectify any discrepancies, provide legal assistance, and to keep personnel records current. Red Cross representatives also accompanied the ST teams to offer assistance in personal matters. In addition, a "Personnel Services Center" was established in the forward area on a permanent basis to provide services throughout the month.

d. Immediate Recognition for Valor: A program of citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat progressed during the period. Purpose of this program is to provide immediate recognition of valorous acts, thereby boosting morale and providing greater incentive. Copies of these orders are provided to individuals, placed in their official files, and serve as a check list on the subsequent submission of awards. The program was well received by the unit commanders.

l. (U) Personnel Planning. Planning was initiated during the period in the following areas:

a. Centralized administration of officers' and noncommissioned officers' messes at the Base Camp area under the supervision of the Deputy Installation Coordinator.

b. Establishment of a formalized program of activities to be conducted by the three newly arrived Red Cross girls. Program will include crafts and hobbies activities and visits to units for distribution of literature.

c. Comprehensive water safety program.

d. Compilation of a Command Statistics Book which indicates, by month, statistical data covering various areas of personnel interest such as savings program, IG complaints, criminal offenses, MCLs, courts martial, reenlistments, malaria, etc.

e. Personal letters to be sent to the next of kin of all newly assigned personnel within the first seven days of arrival. These letters will be signed by the commanding general and include a picture of each man.
Inclined to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation PHU GONG (contd),

1. Personal letters from the commanding general to be sent to personnel of the command wounded in action.

2. (U) Problem Areas. Problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Recommendations for awards of the Purple Heart submitted as long ago as October 1965 have not been acted upon. Merits files have been screened and the necessary data provided to USARV. To overcome this difficulty in the future, the "Purple Heart" study and obtained authority to award the Purple Heart.

b. Recall of orders on personnel evacuated through medical channels are seldom received timely. As a result, personnel continued to be maintained on strength there after departure from Vietnam. USARV appraised of problem and it is under study.

c. Morale. Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

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Inclusion 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation PHILIPPINE

1. (C) Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations consisted of heavily jungled mountains in the west around DUNC SE, and flat sandy land and sandy beaches along the coast. Numerous LST's were available throughout the area. Observation and fields of fire were generally limited or non-existent in the mountainous jungle, but ranged from fair to poor throughout the remainder of the area. Power and concealment varied from good to excellent in the jungle, but only from fair to poor elsewhere. Principal avenues of approach were the MILR River from the northwest, the CAL River and Highway 1 from the north. In general, the predominately open terrain prevented the enemy from missing and restricted his movement during daylight hours. Terrestrial movement was possible only in the first hours and was further restricted to the existing road net. Fast movement was possible in all areas but was restricted by the jungle and the flooded roads.

2. (C) Weather: The weather in the area of operations was characterized by the transition from the 40- to 80-millibar. There was very little ground fog, and cloud cover occurred only during early morning and late evening. Weather had little or no effect on enemy operations. The relatively clear weather favored the use of helicopters and visual sorties reconnaissance.

3. (C) Enemy Dispositions: Initially the 3rd Inter-Provincial Headquarters and the 6th BN, 89th RN Regt were located west of TUY AH and two (2) unidentified, unconfirmed battalion's were reported to be in the vicinity of OOK SE. The 4th and 5th Battalions of the 89th RN Regt were reported in the area in the vicinity of TUY AH and in the area of the 6th BN. No significant enemy displacement was noted as a result of US operations around the DUNC SE, TUY AH and TUY MAI terrain areas.

4. (C) Results:

a. Order of Battle:

(1) Units identified by US:

18th Co Sig Co, 89th RN Regt
19th Co Med Co, 89th RN Regt
21st Co 11th BN, 89th RN Regt
377th En, 87th BN, 69th Provincial En
308 En A. M. BN Co, 35th Provincial En
"1st BN" SA, Son Hie Dist.
P Co, Son Hie Dist.

(2) No new units were identified by documents during Operation PHILIPPINE.

(3) WC reported that the 89th RN Regt was at approximately 50% strength with very few weapons.

(4) One squad of SNN HCM District local guerrillas surrendered with weapons.

b. WC equipment losses:

(1) Weapons captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shells, 75 mm</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shells, 105 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shells, 155 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, 1.5 &quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, 2.5 &quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, 3.5 &quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, 4.5 &quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Notes:

(a) United States Manufactured:

(b) United States Manufactured:

(c) United States Manufactured:

(d) United States Manufactured:

(e) United States Manufactured:

(f) United States Manufactured:

(g) United States Manufactured:

(h) United States Manufactured:
AVBD-B
CONFIDENTIAL
27 August 1956

Inlosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report.
Operation FIUAD

(b) German Manufactured:
Rifle, Kar 98, cal 7.92mm
20
(c) French Manufactured:
Rifle, MAS 1948, cal 7.5mm
2

(2) Food:
Nico destroyed
34 tons
Corn destroyed
4 ton

(3) Camps or Buildings Destroyed (unless noted):
Structures
69
Structures damaged
17

(4) Signal Equipment (damaged beyond repair):
VHF-1
3
MIC-6
1
Loudspeaker
3

(5) Munitions and Equipment:
Grenades (various types)
600
Grenade launcher
2

(6) Miscellaneous:
Figurals
22
Living items
3
Documents

5. (c) Significant VC Personnel and Impact:

a. 273810H Hour via C34623 - captured 3 wounded VC. On VC
was from 19th Div, Co. 654th INF. Tent, the infantry were the 6th and 9th
and had moved into the battle lines.

b. 203310H Hour via C=346238 - 252 VC tons jade contact with esti-
nated VC Geo resulting in 23 VC KIA. During extraction.

c. 191950H Hour via C4 327722 - 242 VC tons jade contact with esti-
VC Geo resulting in 3 VC KIA (26) prior to extraction.

d. 080500H Hour via C496977 - 2/227 Ind patrol make contact with
15-20 VC, was forced to extract.

6. (c) Combat and Reinforcing Viet Cong Units in the Area of

(a) Combat and reinforcing Viet Cong units in the area south
of east-west grid line 60 to north of east-west grid line 60 consisted
of approximately 2,000 personal casualties with an additional 500
personnel casualties with a total of four Miit Police
battalions, one Miit battalion, two National Force battalions, two security
companies, and two security platoons.

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17 August 1966

Inclusions: 2 (Intelligence) & Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "LUSK"

b. Viet Cong unconfirmed reinforcing capability consisted of two Regular Force battalions with a total strength of 750 personnel.

c. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Confirmed):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LEGEND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th BN, 227TH INF REGT</td>
<td>VIC 07-06-01</td>
<td>21 Mar 66</td>
<td>300 (Orig)</td>
<td>4-02 mort, 2-DKZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85TH N</td>
<td>CCC 24755</td>
<td>26 Mar 66</td>
<td>400 (Orig)</td>
<td>1-60 mort, 1-120, 1-125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown

Legend:

- 6th BN, 227TH INF REGT
- 85TH N
- Vic 07-06-01
- 1/25 (Combined)
- 12-15, Unknown
Inclosure 3 (Operation Overlay) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation VII NORTH

TRENTON
CONCORD
LEXINGTON
BUNKER HILL

SOUTH

BULL DOG

GRANITE

2 KOM

FORT

FORT

FORT
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Inclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After-Action Report, Operation FALLSCHIRM. 

1. (c) ORG/HQ V-10110-DEP SUPP 7:

a. Support Battalion.

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into a command, operations, communications, and movements control section.

(2) Supply Detachment: It was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a parachute repair section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive and signal equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and a contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment, 1st MAW Support Command: Provided area logistics support for all units participating in the operation. This element was extremely efficient and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) 135th Aviation Company: Provided CH-47 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area.

(3) 147th Aviation Company (Aircraft) provided three CH-47 helicopters.

(4) 479th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. (c) FOOD AND WATER:

a. Supply: Forward Support Detachment, 1st MAW Support Command provided supply point distribution to Support Battalion, which in turn, provided supply point distribution to Brigade units.

(1) Class I: "J" ration meals and meal, combat, individual were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "J" ration, consisting of fresh meat, bread, and canned vegetables were issued daily. A five day stock level of meal, combat, individual was maintained by the 1st MAW Forward Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point. There were 200 short tons of "J" rations and 37 short tons of meal, combat, individual issued.

(2) Class II & IV: The Support Battalion (Forward) 1st MAW provided class II & IV items. 15 short tons were issued during the operation. Certain dry cell batteries remained difficult to obtain.

(3) Class III: The 1st MAW Forward Support Detachment provided all types of class III items. 90 short tons of FOG were issued during the operation. 13,000 gallons of water, 5,935 gallons of diesel, and 7,455 gallons of fuel. Oils were plentiful; grease was in short supply, but did not affect Brigade operations.

(4) Class V: 232 short tons were issued. The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. The Forward Support Detachment, 1st MAW Support Command, maintained a 15 day stock level. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support Detachment, 1st MAW Support Command received, stored, and issued all ammunition. The
Inclosure 1 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FALLLINE

Entire basic load for one infantry battalion and one artillery battery was hauled and palletized in the Brigade Class 1 supply point for immediate deployment with the Brigade reserve.

(5) Water: Company 4, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point via TUY area.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment processed 27 automotive, 67 signal, 77 ammunition, 33 instrument, and 25 mechanic job orders. All but 4 automotive, 3 signal, 1 instrument, and 1 mechanic job were completed.

c. Transportation:
   (1) Ground Transportation: The 2½ ton trucks of Support PA mobile were used on 181 missions.
   (2) Air Transportation:
      (a) Fixed Wing: The two CH-21's supporting the Brigade flew 113 sorties and carried a total of 928 PDA and 127 short tons of cargo.
      (b) Rotary Wing: (Helicopter resupply)
         1 UH-1D helicopters were used extensively to resupply committed forces.
         2 Use of slings and nets was a particularly effective method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for loading and off loading to a minimum.
         2 Helicopters lifted a total of 112 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade. Attached as Inclosure 1 is the daily helicopter resupply tonnage by class of supply.

d. Other Services:
   (1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company.
   (2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit via TUY area.
   (3) Laundry: 148th Quartermaster Company provided laundry service.

   3. (c) Sanitation:
      a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Unit areas were sprayed with a mixture of 60% by 133120 vehicles, converted for spray purposes, to suppress insects.
      b. Patients treated:
         (1) U/A 61
         (2) Non-Battle Injury 95
         (3) Disease 457 (33 malaria)
         Total Treated 613
         (4) L/CW 1

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Inclusion 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Comando VN

(5) Returned to duty 412
(6) Evacuated to hospital 194
(7) Remain in holding 6

The hospitalized personnel are categorized by wounds:

(1) Head 5
(2) Chest 7
(3) Abdomen 2
(4) Upper extremities 21
(5) Lower extremities 21
(6) Back 5

(c) OBSERVATIONS: No significant logistical problems developed during the operation. The Forward Support Detachment, MA. 1463, Support Command provided excellent support.

(c) CONCLUSION: Slings and nets provide the best and most rapid aerial resupply.
Inclosure 5 (Civic Action) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FILLIA E

1. (U) In the category of Health and Sanitation a total of 1,910 Vietnamese were treated by Brigade medical personnel. The conduct of the 1st Brigade during the two prior operations seemed to convince the people that we were there to help them, and explains the large attendance at Brigade sponsored sick calls.

2. (U) Repairing roads and bridges turned out to be the major project during the operation. A total of 88 kilometers were repaired along National Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 7 by Co A/326 Engr.

3. (U) Transportation continued to be provided for the rice harvest, along with transporting workers to and from the harvest, the 1/327 Inf gave food and medical treatment to approximately 100 refugees and assisted in their relocation to the District Headquarters.

... (U) In the "Back to the Village" campaign, designed to return refugees back to their former homes after clearing the road of Viet Cong, the 1st Brigade assisted by repairing roads and bridges, and by providing security for the movement of the refugees.

5. (U) On 7 April, thirty-two US weapons, captured from the Viet Cong and restored, were presented to the province Chief for use in RF/FP units.
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Enclosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation PILLBOX.

1. (C) Background:
The Brigade Signal Elements had the mission of providing internal
communications in support of Brigade tactical operations. The signal
elements installed, operated, and maintained the Brigade Communication Center,
For and All Net Control Sections, the Brigade Switchboard and wire system,
Voice circuits were installed, when possible, to subordinate units within the
Brigade, primarily to the Infantry Battalions trains area.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Provided 4 telephone circuits to the 2/329 T.C
CP and telephone circuits to the 2/327 T.C CP, tying these lines in with both
Brigade Headquarters and the Brigade Area System.

b. Communications Center Section - Terminated one secure teletype
circuit from 1 FAC-20V and provided all messages received by supporting RF
radio teletype terminals. Provided non-critical service to the T.C CPs.

c. Switchboards and Wire Section - Provided non-critical support including
lines to both the battalion forward and rear elements, all subordinate sup-
porting, and adjacent units. The switchboard terminated all non-critical user
subscribers.

d. Radio Section - Operated automatic retransmission relay station
on Hill 991 for Brigade Operations Intelligence Net and Brigade Admin-
istration Logistics Net. There were no difficulties encountered.

e. Maintenance Section - FE-75 Generators required considerable
maintenance.

3. (U) Lessons Learned:
Need replacements for FE-75 Generators.

FLASH:
Brig Gen

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Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MILLARE

1. (G) Background: The 2d En, 320th Artillery (105 mm) (Airborne), attached to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, provided direct support to the 2/327 Inf En in all phases of Operation MILLARE. Reinforcing fires were furnished by Btry "B", 1st En, 30th Artillery (105 mm towed).

2. (G) Summary of Operations:

a. Initial deployment in this operation was that of Btry "B" to room Tornado, coord CQ161440, to furnish support to the 2/327 Inf En operating in area TUNNOE and along axis ORUN. Btry "B" displaced to room TORNADO by CH-47 helicopter with movement commencing at 2015 hrs Mar 66 and closing at 2230 hrs Mar 66. The En (-) and Btry "C", 1/30 Artillery remained in firing positions via coord CQ0835 with the En Bravo camp at Tuy Hoa. Artillery coord CQ1285. On 29 Mar Btry "D" rejoined the Bn at coord CQ3535, again moving by CH-47 and closing 231755 hrs Mar 66.

b. While in the above positions the Bn fired extensive HAI fires nightly to assist in the day warfare and surrender program conducted by the Brigades. A recapitulation of missions fired, explanation expanded, and results achieved is at Inclosure 2.

c. On the 7/902 Inf pushed east, Btry "C" was displaced to coord CQ199340, closing 311135 hrs Mar 66 to insure continuous support to the Infantry.

d. On 1 Apr Btry "C" was displaced to Tuy Hoa North Airfield, coord CC 153485 closing at 011515 hrs Apr 66 in preparation for movement by CV-2 lift to Dong Tra, coord B-917603, and closed there 021250 hrs Apr 66. From this position Btry "C" furnished direct support to 1/327 Inf En and CIDG Forces (Dong Tra) during joint Bn operations conducted in Dong Tra area.

e. On 2 Apr 66, the En (- Btry (C) accomplished displacement to firing positions via coord CQ135655, Tuy Hoa. Btry "B" 2/320th Artillery and 1 pl of Btry "C" 1/30 Artillery furnished fire support for this unit movement from firing positions via coord CQ136583. The En (-) and Btry "B" 1/30 Artillery were closed Tuy Hoa in loc by 031530 hrs Apr 66 where continuous direct support was furnished to 2/327 Inf operating in area DA NANG and in extensive HAI program carried out. The attached aerobill target section was replaced via coord CQ135583 with Btry "C" but had very limited use due to lack of suitable targets.

f. On 7 Apr 66 the En commenced movement to close back in Tuy Hoa area in preparation for movement to per OPORD 80-66.
Inclosure 1 (Positions Occupied) to Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation PILLOR

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1-7-1
Inclosure 2 (Summary of Missions Fired) to Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

MISSIONS FIRED

1. Total No of missions fired: 1314.
2. Total No of rounds expended: 9364.
3. Total No of registrations conducted: 33.
4. Total No of HA missions fired: 1091.
5. Total No of rounds expended on HA's: 5346.

Incidence:
- 57 VC KIA (Killed in Action)
- 2 VC WIA
- 16 VC or snipers silenced
- 1 building destroyed
- 1 village left burning
- 1 secondary explosion

On 29 Mar 56 Major General Critz fired the Bn's 75,000 rd at "A" Bty location.