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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(THE WOLFHOUNDS)
APO US FORCES 96225

AVISEE-T
2 Aug 66

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS-170V-J3-98)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: IBE-T
APO US FORCES 96225

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVLIGA-MH
APO US FORCES 96225

Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, The Wolfhounds
(2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division)

ATTN: IBRD-T
APO US FORCES 96225

ATTN: AVNH-A
APO US FORCES 96243

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US FORCES 96243

References:

a. OPORD 28-66 (Revised) (Operation X/A), Headquartres, 2d Brigade, 5 July 1966.

b. OPORD 8-66 (Operation X/A), Headquarters, 1st Battalion 27th Infantry, 7 July 1966.

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR SYM OF OPERATION
   Operation X/A


1 DOWNGRADED 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

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4. CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS: The control headquarters, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, directed that TF/27 Inf conduct an air mobile assault on Obj 1 (XT3207), commencing 030630 hrs July 1966 to establish a battalion base. A second air mobile assault was directed on Obj 2 (XT2808) with one (1) company prepared, in order, to conduct a search and destroy mission on Obj 3 (XT2706). Elements to be airlanded on Obj 2, and possibly Obj 3, were to be extracted NLT 091500 July. Further, TF/27 Inf was directed to conduct eagle flights in the assigned AO from 9-17 July.

5. PREDICTING OFFICER: Lt Col Alvin L. O'Neal.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:
   a. 1/27 Inf (Capt Mayone)
      Demo Team, B/65 Engr
      1 National Police
      1 Interpreter
   b. 1/27 Inf (Capt Garrett)
      Demo Team, B/65 Engr
      1 National Police
      1 Interpreter
   c. 1/27 Inf (Capt Leask)
      Demo Team, B/65 Engr
      1 National Police
      1 Interpreter
   d. Battalion Control
      Recon Platoon
      AT Platoon
      Mortar Platoon
      Elem 125 Sg
      Elem, 25 MM
      Btry A (-) 1/8 Arty

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
   b. How and when artillery employed: On 7 July the 1/8 Arty (-), consisting of: control element, 1/8, 3/13, 3/13 (three (3) 155mm howitzers), and D3/13 (two (2) 8" howitzers),
were prepositioned vicinity Ap Dong Hoa (XTL 4067). On 7 July, Btry A (-) 1/8 Art, was attached to TF1/7 Inf and established a fire support base within the TF1/27 Inf BN defense perimeter on 8 July. The arty battery accompanied the En into the AO by airlift, remained within the battalion defense perimeter throughout the operation, and was airlifted back to its Cu Chi perimeter base upon termination of the operation. Throughout the operation, 1/8 Art supported with preplanned and on-call fires.

c. Results of Artillery:
(1) Artillery defensive concentrations were plotted to encompass the battalion defense perimeter.
(2) After completing a precision registration, the registration piece was adjusted by an aerial observer onto three different targets. The data for re-plot established by the adjustments aided in identifying landmarks by coordinates on an aerial photo that were not portrayed on the battalion.
(3) Co-location of the 4.2'' mortar section end 105mm How battery FDC's, provided a mutual control in the processing of firing data. This close working summary resulted in economy of fire support and massing of fires as the situation dictated.
(4) Artillery preparations on landing zones and objectives gave the helicopter assault force the advantage of moving into areas that were partially neutralized by the fires.
(5) HE fires were employed throughout the AO and were delivered by all caliber, from both fire support bases, into areas formally inaccessible to artillery due to range.
(6) The use of 4.2'' mortars assisted patrols in land navigation to and from ambush sites during the hours of darkness.
(7) Concentrations plotted in support of ambushes were employed with success. On 10 July 1966, artillery and 4.2'' mortar fires served as an effective blocking force when a US ambush engaged a ten-man VC patrol. The VC were engaged with small arms. The 81mm mortars were called close-in and howitzer and mortar fires sealed off escape routes for the Viet Cong. This action proved extremely rewarding and netted a total of 6 VC KIA (BC), 2 KIA (posa) and one captured VC (WIA).
(8) Enemy automatic weapons firing hampered free movement of the C&C helicopter during a two (2) company sweep along the densely folioted area near the Oriental River. The firing was silenced after artillery was employed against it.

d. Army Aviation:
(1) How and when Army Aircraft used:
(a) Command and Control Aircraft for ground operations.
(b) Airlift of troops and equipment to and
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(2) Results of Army aviation: Army air support was a decisive factor in accomplishing the mission in operation EMA. The helicopter support provided TF1/27 Inf with a high degree of flexibility and mobility. The 1st Aviation Company (Airmobile) was in direct support of TF1/27 Inf throughout the operation, and presented the battalion with a quick reaction capability. The availability of choppers also enabled TF1/27 Inf to execute a maximum number of missions throughout the operation over a very large assigned AO. As a result, the VC were continually harassed throughout the day by forces ranging from rifle fire teams to company sized elements.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy situation prior to operation: The assigned area of operation has long been the operational area of the 267th and 269th Main Force Battalions of the Dong Thap 2 (DT2) Regiment, the 506th Local Force Battalion, the C2 Local Force Company, and the C120 Local Force Company. Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces were also known to be located in the area. The 267th and 269th battalions had established a pattern of operating in close proximity to the Oriental River unless forced to withdraw to the Cambodian Border area due to the pressure of US or ARVN operations. The 506th battalion has generally operated in and around the "Horseshoe Area" of the Oriental River (XS5693). The C2 company had a past history of operating along the West side of the Oriental River and it has been generally believed that this company has provided security for movement of VC supplies into and around the "Horseshoe Area" of the Oriental River. Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces operated out of the many villages and hamlets in the area. Numerous VC supply and infiltration routes were reported to traverse the entire AO. Secret VC bases were reported within and in close proximity to the river. On 25 June 1966, two S&R reports originated via XS568923. The area in vic XS49070 revealed intense S&R activity during the early part of June. A VC headquarters was believed to have been situated in this area. During the month of April, a VC declared to his captors that four ammunition caches belonging to the ICNG VN Provincial Force were located west of the Oriental River vic XS548013, XS60889, and XS550960. These caches were supposed to be located in graveyards and measured 1-5 meters deep and 1.5m on each side. Supposedly, wooden covers were placed over the graves with a layer of sand and cement on top. The cache was camouflaged to appear as a grave. A VC captive reported in early July that the DT O (XT2808) was the site of a VC camp where four US and several ARVN POW's were being held. Other recent reports of VC activity in the area were sixty (60) VC reported to have moved on 8 June from vic XS545382 to XS538923, evaluation F-3; VC platoon
reported to be located vic XX480015 on 16 June, evaluation F-2; AR fire received on 18 June from vic XX505025 and XX480018; VC ammunition point with forty (40) cases located vic XX548923 on 19 June, evaluation F-3; unidentified VC battalion reported on 20 June to be located vic XX538910, evaluation F-3; 506th battalion supply section reported moving five sampans of rice and amm on 21 June to location vic XX537910. On 22 June, a 5th SPG agent reported a VC interzone committee had established a supply base near the Oriental River with an economics and finance office located vic XX484952 and a food store area located vic XX1949.

b. Enemy Situation During the Operation: The VC evaded US forces during the period the operation was conducted. Usual guerrilla tactics (employment of booby traps, mines, harassing/sniper fire) were not used extensively. Information from a male detainee indicated that the US and ARVN POW's reported to be at THO ID vic XT2808 were taken to Ba Thu vic XT250035 on 30 June 1966. The THO ID (XT2808) and Coc Ring (XT2806) areas were confirmed as being VC bases or rest areas along a reported supply and liaison route as evidenced by: (1) documents and medical supplies indicating medical facility, and (2) the large number of fortified bunkers, foxholes, trenches, tunnels, hasty lean-to's, outdoor fire pits, and camouflaged huts. The many bunkers found had no firing ports, could house 5-10 men each, and had an overhead mud cover approximately 1 foot thick. The bunkers and tunnels were located on small wooded and elevated areas of land throughout the rice and reed fields. Numerous bunkers were also found at DUC HUE vic XT3208. The 269th En, D2 Rgt, also reported located at THO HO-Coc Ring area, was reported to have moved to HOA KHAN near canal 3 vic XX489795 on the same day US operations commenced. On 10 July an ambush patrol from Co B/27 Inf made contact with 10 VC. Interrogation of VC WIA from this engagement revealed that the 10 VC were from the C120 Company located at DUC HUE. The VC left their company at HT THUAN hamlet (XT375098) for the 1/27 Inf Base Camp. Their mission was to find the 1/27 Inf CP, locate possible VC mortar positions, and determine US defenses in the area. After completing their mission the 10 VC were directed to join the company at HT THUAN DONG (XT450048). The C120 Company was reported to be composed of 120 men divided into three platoons and armed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-81mm mortars, 2-B40's, 1-57mm RR, 3-30cal MG and assorted rifles. Also, on 10 July, section officials reported that the 506th Local Force BN and the 269th BN D2 Rgt were located in vic XT4503. An operation conducted on 11 July in the area where the 2 battalions and the C120 company were reported to be located produced no significant contact. On 11 July, documents found at DUC HUE (XT327079), indicated a VC induction and recruiting facility in the vicinity for the entire DUC HUE District. On
12 July, a VC unit captured by 1/27 Inf, disclosed that the
BANH HOA TAY village (XT3050) guerrilla unit, consisting of 70
men, was located via XT3050, and that a VC medical training center was reported to be located at XT3276. An operation on
12 July along the RACH TRON river from XT39130 to the Cambodian
border via XT32133, a reported VC infiltration and supply route, uncovered a large number of sampans indicating a well-utilized
waterway. However, no trenches, bunkers, or foxholes, were dis-
covered along the river. After the operation, an interrogation of
VC captured revealed that a VC Labor Force Platoon composed
of 3 squads and one guerrilla squad operated in GIONG PHO (XT3099),
and that a 30 man VC militia platoon was located at GIONG PHO
Ftlet, vic XT3614.

e. Terrain and Weather: The terrain is typical of the
Delta Region of South Vietnam. There are numerous canals, rivers,
streams, and flat rice fields. Many of the rice fields are
presently overgrown with weeds, and where the water level is higher,
fields of reeds predominate. The water level in the rice fields
varies from a few inches to waist deep. Floated areas of land
are dispersed throughout the rice and reed fields. The water level
in the eastern portion of the AO is lower, and larger areas are
devoted to farm crops. However, due to the constant afternoon and
evening rains, even the elevated areas of land are wet and muddy.

f. Civic Action/Secure Evolution of the Population:
Civic action conducted during this operation consisted primarily
of the evacuation of refugees. Throughout the operational area,
units of 1/27 Inf found civilians who desired to be evacuated to
areas under SVN control. A total of 264 such personnel were evac-
uated to Duc Ho (XTA307), where control and responsibility for
the refugees passed to SVN authorities. A small number, approxi-
ately 20, requested evacuation, but only if their water buffalo
were also evacuated. Due to tactical requirements and a lack of
suitable transportation for these water buffalo, it was not possi-
ble to meet this requirement and the people remained in the area.
The attitude displayed by this small group of civilians was consid-
erably different from the vast majority of refugees, who were
quite willing to leave all their possessions in order to reach the
security of SVN control. Leaflet drops were executed throughout
the AO.

9. MISSION: TF1/27 conducts air mobile assault into C:\
NAIKKI (XT3050), commencing 080630 July 1966 to locate and dest-
roy VC forces, supplies, and base areas in AO. 0's mission will
include eagle flights, reconnaissance, retabling, and heliborne
reaction forces to locate and destroy elements of the 267th, 269th,
and 506th VC battalions.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. PHASE I: Bl/27 Inf conducts airmobile assault into OBJ I (W.I.KIKI) at 080630 Jul to seize the old French fort area via XT326079, and to establish a security perimeter for the artillery battery firing position. At 080645 Jul, Btry A, 1/8 Arty, will be airlifted by Chinook helicopter to OBJ I (W.I.KIKI), and will quickly report to support TF1/27 Inf units in the conduct of combat operations. OBJ W.I.KIKI will become the battalion base.

b. PHASE II: Cl/27 Inf conducts airmobile assault into OBJ 2 (TRIPLET) via XT235085 at 080715 July. Company force will conduct S&D operations in OBJ 2 (TRIPLET) to locate and destroy VC forces, installations, and supplies. Company forces will be extracted by helicopter lift NIT 081500 July and moved to Bn base (W.I.KIKI).

c. PHASE III: Al/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base at 080715 to W.I.KIKI - TRIPLET Objective area. Company will be prepared to be airlifted on OBJ TRIPLET to assist Cl/27 Inf in its mission, or be airlifted to OBJ 3 (SUNSET) to conduct S&D operations against VC forces. If Al/27 Inf is airlifted to an objective area other then W.I.KIKI, the company will be extracted and airlifted to W.I.KIKI NIT 081500 July.

d. PHASE IV: HHC 1/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base to OBJ W.I.KIKI. LZ time 080800 July. HHC 1/27 Inf will assist in establishment of battalion defense base.

e. PHASE V: TF1/27 Inf conducts daily scale flights, reconnaissance patrols, S&D operations, and fast reaction force operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC forces.

f. PHASE VI: Operation TA terminates and 1/27 Inf is returned by helicopter lift.

1l. EXECUTION:

8 JULY 1966

TF1/27 Inf began OPERATION TA. All elements of TF1/27 Inf were airlifted from Cu Chi to the operational area during the early morning. Bl/27 Inf and HHC 1/27 Inf were airlifted into OBJ W.I.KIKI (Obj 1) to clear the area and establish a base camp. Al/27 Inf was airlifted into OBJ TRIPLET (Obj 2) to conduct S and D operations. They were later extracted by helicopter and airlifted to battalion base at W.I.KIKI. A Btry, 1/8 Arty, was airlifted into OBJ W.I.KIKI to provide fire support during the operation.

At 0610 hours, Bl/27 Inf, Bn Command Group, elements of HHC 1/27 Inf, and Al/8 Arty advance party, were airlifted from Base Camp
Cu Chi to OBJ WAIKIKI loc vic XT324081. The base camp was established without enemy contact. A1/27 Arty airlanded at Base Camp Waiiki at 0650 hrs and established an artillery fire support base.

At 0700 hrs, C1/27 Inf was airlifted from Cu Chi to OBJ TRIPIER loc vic XT287076. No enemy contact was encountered and C1/27 Inf began search and destroy operations in northern half of OBJ TRIPIER. During the sweep C1/27 Inf found a camp site for 12-15 VC which had been used 6 or 7 days before. A small cache of medical supplies containing aspirin and penicillin were found. One VC was captured and evacuated to BAO TRM. Eleven refugees were evacuated to DUC HUE. At 1502 hrs, C1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopter to battalion base at WAIKIKI.

A1/27 Inf was airlifted to OBJ TRIPIER at 0739 hrs, and began search and destroy operations in the southern half of the objective. A1/27 Inf found two small camp sites containing two loose 50 caliber rounds and two black pajama tops. A family in the area related their belief that 65 VC were operating in the area. One camouflage sampan was found and destroyed. Twenty-one (21) refugees were located and evacuated to DUC HUE. A1/27 Inf called in a helicopter gunship team to investigate a report of several VC in the area. The gunships located several lean-to structures and fired several bursts of M6 fire into them with negative results. At 1520 hrs, A1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopters to battalion base at WAIKIKI. The Recon platoon swept the battalion base area perimeter and located several holes which were marked to be destroyed the following day.

At 1526 hrs, one platoon B1/27 Inf departed the battalion base by helicopter lift to investigate a suspected cache located vic XT262060. Recon platoon located the cache and destroyed the following: four (4) tons of rice, 1800 lbs of fertilizer and one cart. The helicopter gunships had made the original report of a suspected cache to the battalion command group. The location of the cache was believed to be a VC stopover point. Huts were of a temporary construction and were well camouflaged.

T1/27 Inf established six night ambushes within 500 meters of the outside perimeter of the battalion base. All ambushes reported negative enemy contact.

During the day's operations, helicopters were used extensively for aerial recon missions throughout the AO. Constant surveillance was placed over all suspected VC locations in order to keep the VC on the run. Additionally, the helicopter pilots were able to locate targets which were considered to be lucrative in future operations.
Two company and two platoon sized operations were conducted on 9 July. A1/27 Inf was ordered to return to OBJ SUNSET, Obj 3, to continue searching for VC holdings while B1/27 Inf was to conduct a series of eagle flights utilizing two platoons. C1/27 Inf conducted a platoon eagle flight into the area south of the battalion base during the early afternoon. The Recon platoon continued to sweep selected areas close to the battalion base for the purpose of destroying VC tunnels, bunkers, and known VC houses.

At 0825 hrs, A1/27 Inf was airlifted to OBJ SUNSET vic XT285056 by the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile). Co A made a thorough search of the area. No VC contact was made but A1/27 Inf found numerous articles indicating the presence of the VC. Medical supplies, VC documents, plastic gas masks, expended 30 and 50 cal rounds, and a clay model of a UH-ID helicopter were among the items found.

While on OBJ SUNSET, A1/27 Inf destroyed twenty VC structures, one and a half tons of loose, unhusked rice, ten gallons of gasoline, and one large sampen loaded with a large supply of cooking sauce. The sampen had been hidden and well camouflaged. It was found near a location believed to be a food preparation area for the VC. One woman and two children refugees were found on the objective. These people were airlifted to the refugee center at DUC HUE. Ten bags of rice were evacuated with the family. A1/27 Inf was extracted from OBJ SUNSET and airlifted back to battalion base at 1440 hrs.

B1/27 Inf conducted two platoon sized eagle flights into objectives YANKS loc vic XT3210 and X-RAY loc vic XT3311. B1/27 Inf airlanded on OBJ YANKS at 0921 hrs. No VC contact was made. Forty refugees were found and evacuated to DUC HUE. The platoon found and destroyed eighteen tons of rice on site and evacuated two tons of rice to battalion base.

At 1258 hrs, both platoons were extracted from the two objectives and airlifted to the northeast to OBJ ZULU loc vic XT2910. Here B1/27 Inf (-) swept across an area thought to be a VC route of march. No contact was made, but the company found and destroyed 61 VC structures, one sampen, four sampens, and two 105mm duds. Twenty refugees were found and evacuated to government controlled territory. This was accomplished by aircraft. B1/27 Inf was airlifted back to battalion base at 1535 hrs.

C1/27 Inf manned the base perimeter until 1530 hrs. At that time a platoon eagle flight was conducted into an area south of the battalion base loc vic XT3305. No contact was made on two landings in that vicinity.
The first VC contact of the operation was made at 2100 hrs by one of three ambushes which had been positioned outside the battalion perimeter. At that time, ambush firing personnel observed nine VC moving in a group to their front. The patrol leader waited until the VC were well within his designated killing zone at which time he proceeded to cut down the VC with devastating fire. The leader fired the first rounds into the VC group, one of which detonated a rifle grenade carried on the VC's belt. In turn, two other grenades exploded. While firing, and N-79 rounds were being fired, mortar fire was called in on the group. The VC were unable to return single round of fire. At first light, the patrol located two Chicom carbines, one US carbine, two US M-1 rifles, one US Thompson sub MG, two rifle grenades launchers, two cartridge belts and 300 rds of 5.45 ammo. The VC lost six KIA (BO) and two KIA (poss). One VC (MIA) was captured by Recon the following morning. The Commanding General of the 25th Inf Div personally decorated the patrol leader the following morning.

10 JULY 1966

Operations conducted on 10 July were executed as a result of intelligence gained from VC sources by higher headquarters. Two VC battalions were reported to be located on the west side of the ORIENTAL RIVER vic X450435. This information was received on the afternoon of 9 July. The Battalion Commander immediately began planning for the new mission.

At 0630 hrs, the 116th Avn Co (airmobile) lifted two Platoons of B/27 Inf and two Platoons of C/27 Inf into four platoon landing zones loc vic X450434. The two companies landed without enemy contact. The helicopter fire teams received only sporadic small arms fire. Platoons from B/27 Inf and C/27 Inf were on immediate "standby" at the battalion base as well as the helicopters to lift them. In addition, Platoons from A/27 Inf were on thirty minute standby. During the morning, B/27 Inf and C/27 Inf swept from the LZ's to the Oriental River, searching for VC forces. No VC contact was made. Gunships continued to conduct recon by fire over all canals in the area without contact. The two companies destroyed thirty VC identified huts, four bunkers and two AP mines in the objective area. Both companies were extracted by air and returned to battalion base at WAKIKI. Artillery preparatory fire and a preplanned air strike hit the objective area prior to the air mobile assault.

A/27 Inf remained at battalion base and served as the battalion security and reaction force.
Recon platoon resumed the mission of maintaining surveillance over the VC bodies at site of ambush Tiger. These were the VC killed the night of 9 July. Recon platoon was also to conduct another search of the area for evidence of VC losses during the engagement of the previous night. Recon platoon found one VC WIA from the ambush engagement. Under interrogation, the VC revealed that at approximately 091800 Jul, he had led a ten-man squad from MT THAN hamlet (XT375088) to the 1/27 Inf base to make a recon. At approximately 2000 hrs, his squad was ambushed by US troops. He stated he was the assistant platoon leader of the 1st Platoon, C1, Duc Hue Company. Subsequently, much valuable intelligence information was obtained from this VC. The TC stated that his company was located near XT450048, and that he was to have returned to that location after the recon of 1/27 Inf base. This information was fleshed to the battalion commander and 1/27 Inf checked out the area prior to extraction. No sign of the VC company was found. Recon platoon continued to search ambush area and found and destroyed two sampans and five bunkers.

1/27 Inf conducted six night ambushes vicinity battalion base. Two of the ambush patrols made enemy contact. Ambush Dodge (XT324080) received some probing fire from an estimated 5-10 VC. The patrol leader reported he believed the VC did not know of his location. The leader called in 81mm mortar fire with unknown results. Area was searched at first light on 11 July with negative results. Ambush Coronet loc via XT322080, detected noise to their front and observed an estimated 15 VC far to their front. Since the enemy was not in their ambush killing zone, 81mm and 4.2" mortar fire were called in. A search of the area at first light revealed negative results. Ambush Coronet destroyed two sampans when returning to base from ambush site. Gunship teams of the 116th Avn Comany continued to conduct recon and surveillance missions over the AO during the afternoon and evening.

New angle flight targets were located and marked for operations on succeeding days. At 2100 hours, a "starlight" mission was flown over the east-west river connecting the Cambodian Border and the Oriental River. This river also marked the north boundary of the AO. The mission involved battalion personnel and three helicopters from the direct support air-mobile company. One ship was used as a control ship and carried two persons utilizing the M-16 rifle with starlight scope. Two gunships followed behind. During the one hour flight, the troopers using the starlight located and marked two VC sampans. One sampan was sunk and one possibly sunk by the gunships.

11 JULY 1966

1/27 Inf conducted three platoon sized combat assaults by
helicopter into three objectives along the Rach Tran River. The river connects the Cambodian Border (XT321133) and the Oriental River (XT394139). LZ's were located at XT36138, XT324133, and XT372147. The concept of this operation was to land the three rifle platoons at locations along the river and have each platoon sweep to the first covering both sides of the river. Since there were numerous sampans and "lern-to" type huts along the bank, and the fact that virtually no people were seen in the area, substantiated the belief that this river was a major location for the VC. Sampans were seen moving on the river at night, and the area had been hit virtually every night with H&I fires.

The air landings began at 0805 hrs and were completed at 0818 hrs. Troops made no enemy contact. A thorough search of the river line was conducted. Rubber boats were used to check inlets and under overhanging growth along the banks. Gunsights were used to provide constant surveillance over friendly troops and to locate suspicious ground positions. At 0847 hrs, approximately thirty civilian personnel were noted moving north from the river. They appeared to be heading for the village of Ap Chnh loc vic XT3418. At 0907 hrs, a standby platoon from 01/27 Inf was airlifted to XT332147 where a sketch was executed. Twelve of the fast moving civilians were arrested, loaded aboard the aircraft and returned with the platoon to the battalion base for interrogation. A1/27 Inf located and destroyed ninety-five (95) VC identified houses, ninety-two (92) sampans, nine CBU's and two Chicom grenade booby traps. One sampan had a load of raw meat stored in it which was destroyed. Several VC documents were found. A1/27 Inf was extracted by aircraft and returned to "MKIKI at 1314 hrs.

3B1/27 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation several hundred meters to the South of "MKIKI between 0830 and 1100 hrs. At loc XT319083, eight shelter bunkers, four VC identified houses and one concrete bunker were destroyed.

Recon platoon conducted a sweep West-Southeast of "MKIKI between 0730 and 1100 hrs. At XT27079, the platoon located and destroyed four VC identified houses. Also found at that location were one US pistol belt, two ammo pouches (one contained VC documents and the other contained two hand grenades), one school bag of VC documents, one bag of medical supplies, one flashlight, and a bundle of bloody clothing. At XT32088 the platoon destroyed eleven bunkers. At XT321086, two tons of rice were found in an abandoned hut. The rice was extracted.

101/27 Inf conducted a sweep due West of battalion base. The platoon located and destroyed two bunkers, eight tunnels, three houses and three sampans. This sweep began at 0800 and was completed at 1130 hrs.
At 1600 hrs, a "snipe hunt" was conducted vic XT28/100. A squad from the Recon platoon was mounted on two helicopters. A CAC aircraft was used as control and spotter. The concept of the "snipe hunt" was to conduct air surveillance over a rice paddie, locate suspicious people, and drop a squad down and snatch two to four individuals for interrogation. At approximately 1610 hrs, four persons were seen running across a paddie. The squad was landed and a total of four persons were snatched. Gunships escorting the three helicopters flushed several VC in the paddies. Most were armed. Three VC, all armed, were killed (BC). One body and a rifle were recovered. The snatch was made at XT262073. Prisoners were evacuated to rear area Cu Chi.

A starlight mission was conducted in conjunction with the 116th Avn Co but was aborted due to inclement weather. 1/27 Inf established three night ambushes. No enemy contact was made.

12 JULY 1966

One company and three platoon sized operations were conducted on 12 July. A1/27 and C1/27 Inf manned the battalion base, and provided platoon reaction forces for the company sized eagle flights conducted by B1/27 Inf in the SE section of the T0RC. A1/27 Inf and C1/27 Inf also conducted platoon sized sweeps from battalion base 2000 meters to the S' and N respectively. The recon platoon swept the southern portion of the battalion base in search of VC tunnels, bunkers, and VC houses. A1/27 Inf (-) together with C1/27 Inf (-) manned the battalion base, and 1 platoon from A1/27 Inf was positioned at the battalion chopper pad on 15 minute alert in the event B1/27 Inf eagle flight needed rapid reinforcement.

At 0805 hrs, A1/27 Inf departed battalion base and swept 2000 meters along a trail to the S'. A thorough search of the area was made and two empty sampans were destroyed. The sampans had been well hidden and camouflaged, and it was obvious that they were being utilized to transport VC supplies. No enemy contact was made during the sweep and the platoon returned to the battalion base at 1115 hrs. At 1600 hrs, a squad from A1/27 Inf conducted another "snipe hunt," utilizing the same technique which had proved so successful in the past. At XT281242, "snipe hunt" noted a suspicious group of men crossing a rice paddie. The UH-1D's swooped down on the surprised men and picked up a total of 5 individuals. Upon interrogation, one turned out to be a VC, 3 were VC detainees, and 1 was released.

B1/27 Inf conducted the major operation of the day. The Pn S-3 and B company commander selected, in the SE portion of the T0RC, 3 objectives in close proximity to one another which appeared to be lucrative eagle flight objectives. Shortly before lift-off, the entire area was hit by airstrikes and artillery. At 0805 hrs, one platoon from B1/27 Inf was airlifted into O': 1, 28/18962. Nec
enemy contact was made, but the platoon destroyed 3 bunkers and 14 VC houses. A total of 47 refugees requested to be evacuated. UH-1D helicopters from the 116th Avn Co (Harmobile) airlifted these people to Duc Hue - the SVN refugee collecting point. At 0845 hrs, a second platoon, 2B/27, was airlifted into Obj 2, XS435985, and immediately encountered VC sniper fire. A squad from the B1/27 Inf standby platoon was called to reinforce the element on Obj 2, and gunships poured the entire area with devastating fire. Enemy losses totaled 2 KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 14 VC houses, 50 VC houses, 1 VC cart, 20 bunkers, and 2 bags of documents. At 1124 hrs, the platoon at Obj 1, was airlifted into Obj 3, XS399994, where 12 sampans, 3 bunkers, and 14 VC houses were destroyed. 23 refugees were evacuated to Duc Hue. While the search was being conducted, the platoon received sniper fire from a position approximately 200 meters west of Obj 3. The platoon deployed to the area, killed 3 VC (BC), captured 1 Mauser rifle, and 1 wallet with documents. At the conclusion of the operation, all B1/27 Inf elements were airlifted back to the battalion base, and closed at 1435 hrs.

At 0832 hrs, 1 platoon C1/27 Inf departed battalion base and conducted a 2000 meter sweep to the north, while the balance of the company, together with A1/27 Inf (-), provided battalion base security and a platoon reaction force for the B1/27 Inf operation. At XT312104, the platoon found a plastic bag filled with VC documents; and at XT316101, 9 VC bunkers and two sampans were destroyed. The platoon returned to battalion base at 1245 hrs.

At 120800 hrs, Recon platoon departed the battalion base to make a thorough search of the southern portion of the perimeter. Recon platoon was unable to locate any additional VC bunkers, sampans, or tunnels, and returned at 1110 hrs.

A "Lightning Bug" operation was conducted in the AO between 111231 hrs and 120015 hrs. One sampan was engaged and sunk at XT429072. A secondary explosion was observed in the vicinity of the sampan.

The operation conducted on 12 July is noteworthy in that the operation was controlled by the Company Commander himself. The Company Commander was provided a C&C ship, and sufficient aircraft assets to move his platoon or reinforce as the tactical situation dictated. This allowed the Company Commander to gain a great deal of experience in command and control and also provided the battalion command group with added depth in controlling assets.

13 JULY 1966

TF1/27 Inf terminated Operation EVA on 13 July. The airlift
back to Cu Chi was to begin at 0730 hrs but a low cloud ceiling prevented the helicopters from landing at MAWIKI until 0830 hrs. The first flight of helicopters to land at MAWIKI reported receiving ground fire west of Cu Chi which slightly damaged one chopper. The airlift began at 0830 hrs. The order of extraction was supplies, HHC 1/27 Inf, B/27 Inf, A/27 Inf, and C/27 Inf. The UH-ID helicopters extracted the personnel while the CH-47 helicopters extracted A Btry, 1/6 Arty, the Bn Heavy Mortar Platoon; ammunition, and supplies. No difficulties were encountered during the extraction, and the last element of TF1/27 Inf closed Cu Chi perimeter at 1355 hrs.

12. RESULTS:

a. VC Losses: 14 VC KIA (SC), 3 KIA (pass), 8 WOC, 17 WOS. Captured and destroyed enemy equipment and material included the following.

- Chico carbines
- US carbine
- M-1 rifles
- 1917 Winchester 303 rifle
- Thompson Sub MG
- rifle grenade launchers
- rifle grenades
- grenade booby traps
- GBU
- cartridge belts
- pistol belts
- gasmasks

- 2 105mm duds
- 1 gals gasoline
- 2 flashlights
- 1 wallet/papers
- 1 bundles of documents
- 2 bags of medical supplies
- 6 houses
- 2 septms
- 3 bunkers
- 2 outboard motors
- 1 Tons of rice
- 2 lbs of fertilizer
- foxholes
- cotts

b. Friendly Losses: 2 WIA (returned to duty)

13. ILLUSTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply

(1) General - All resupply on Operation 337A was by air utilizing both CH-47 and UH-ID aircraft.

(a) Class I

1. Breakfast and dinner - "C" rations
2. Supper - "A" rations

(b) Class III

Battalion established a Class III refueling point for aircraft at forward defense base. Bladders were airlifted in by CH-47 on the third and fourth day of the operation. Empty bladders were extracted by UH-ID. The airborne company supplied pumps, hoses, and personnel to operate the refueling point. A total of 5000 gallons of JF-4 was exended.

(c) Class IV

1. Battalion was resupplied with the
following items:

1. Concertina - 1500 meters
2. 8" stakes
3. Sandbags - 43,000

2. All Class IV items were extracted on the last day of the operations by helicopter.

(d) Class V Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ctg 5.56 Ball</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ctg 7.62 Ball</td>
<td>2140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ctg 7.62 Ball 5/clip</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Grenade, Hand smoke, red 138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine - Anti-Pin Claymore M8/1</td>
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<td>Flare Surface Trip M8/1</td>
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<td>Ctg 105mm HE</td>
<td>2201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ctg 105mm Smoke VP</td>
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(e) Water

1. Battalion was resupplied at the rate of 2 gallons per man per day.
2. Total resupply of water - 5000 gallons

b. Maintenance - Normal maintenance of weapons and equipment was conducted prior to, during, and after the operation.

c. Medical - There were no serious casualties during the operation. All Medevac was by air. No serious casualties were evacuated by resupply ships during normal operations. There were no friendly battle casualties.

d. Transportation - Movement of personnel and supplies was done by air. The DS 116th Avn Company (Airmobile) adequately met the transportation requirements of TF1/27 Inf.

e. Communications: During Operation "Ar," TF1/27 Inf utilized the normal FM communications available to the battalion as supplemented by AM and VHF means. FM communications were effective within the AO. However, it was necessary to establish a retransmission station at the Duc Hue Sugar Mill loc via XT435072. This
retransmission station provided the battalion with the capability for communicating between the forward defense base and Cu Chi base camp, a distance of 30,000 meters. AM communications were provided by the use of U.S. radio, the AN/PRC 47. This capability was utilized on several occasions at night when atmospheric conditions contributed to very poor FM communications over great distances. A VHF capability was provided by the division 125th Signal Battalion. The AN/PRC 69 was modified in number of channels and sized to fit on the bed of a 3-4 Ton truck and trailer. This VHF equipment provided the battalion with solo-user, common-user, and landline teletype means. By modifying the VHF equipment to the 3-4 Ton truck, the entire equipment was air transported to the objective area by the CH-47 helicopter. In addition to radio communications, the normal landlines were established within the battalion forward defense base.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The battalion utilized the small "ten-necked three men rubber boat extensively during Operation Duk. These boats weighed approximately fifteen pounds and were usually issued to each infantry squad for a given tactical operation. The boats provided an excellent means for the infantrymen to gain access to deep canals where they could successfully conduct searches for hidden camps and caches of VC supplies. Small air tanks were carried in order that the boats could be inflated wherever needed.

b. The battalion, in close coordination with the supporting airmobile company, developed a method of "snatching" suspected personnel off the ground through the use of an infantry squad mounted aboard a UH-ID helicopter. It was soon learned that shortly after the battalion began to close into the forward defense base each afternoon that indigents personnel began to roam the rice paddies in small groups. These people gave the appearance of working in the paddies. Since the area of activity was one of questionable loyalty, it was determined that these people, if caught, might be of some intelligence value. A hunt was organized consisting of a command and control helicopter carrying the ground commander and the air team commander and two UH-ID's, each carrying an infantry fire team and a helicopter fire team. The concept of this operation was to have the CIC aircraft orbit the snatch area to locate suspects. Once the suspects were located, the fire team land on either side of the suspects. The suspects are then brought aboard and returned to base. The fire team provides surveillance and suppressing fire if necessary. This concept was executed on two occasions at around 1700 hrs in the afternoon. On the first attempt, four suspects were apprehended and three VC, all armed, were killed. On another day, five suspects were apprehended. Of these five, one confessed to being a VC, three were held as suspects.
and one individual was cleared and released. The 1/27 Inf has coined the term "snipe hunt" to this concept. The snipe hunt is extremely effective in the type of "open country" terrain found in the AO. It is also imperative that the unit get to know the area well and that locations for "snipe hunts" be carefully selected.

a. For the first time, the battalion utilized a Starlight scope from a helicopter. The AO contained many streams and canals which were suspected locations for the VC. The great number of sampans found in the area left no doubt that supplies were being moved throughout the area. The battalion and the direct support air mobile company executed two starlight missions at night. The first was successful in that two large sampans were sighted, one destroyed, and one possibly destroyed. The second mission on a succeeding night was not successful due to inclement weather conditions. One UH-1D was utilized as a starlight ship. 1/27 Inf personnel used the starlight scope mounted on the M-16 rifle to locate the enemy, then opened fire to mark the target. Trailing the starlight aircraft was a helicopter fire team that engaged the target after the marking was accomplished. This concept is good and works well, especially in areas where there are numerous canals and rivers.

15. COMBINED ANALYSIS:

The provision of a direct support air mobile company to the Infantry battalion for the entire period of an operation afforded the commander an unprecedented opportunity in developing his operations. Having aircraft at his disposal enabled him to launch a maximum number of air mobile operations varying in size from fire team to company over a very large operational area. Flexibility was also materially increased since the battalion was able to rapidly hit targets of opportunity throughout the AO, and reinforce rapidly as the situation dictated. Aerial resupply of the entire battalion took place was successfully integrated into the overall plan for effective usage of the air mobile company. During the six days of actual operations, plus the planning time prior to the first dry, the battalion commander, the staff, and personnel of the air mobile company were able to develop the finest professional working relationship.

16. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That whenever possible, consistent with available aviation assets, an air mobile company be placed in direct support of the infantry battalion when that battalion is operating in an isolated area and far removed from its home base. The same air mobile company should remain in DS during the period.

b. That an infantry battalion and preferably the 1/27
Inf conduct future operations in the same area of operations from time to time.

c. That a VHF radio mobile package, which is capable of being airlifted by available helicopter assets, be made available to the battalion when operating from a fire support base in an isolated area for several days.

d. That GVN civic action teams be trained in the handling of refugees and made available during operations in isolated areas where GVN influence is virtually unknown. Those trained Vietnamese people would actually handle the evacuation of refugees utilizing US transport. The entire effort would thus be less of a US show.

ALVIN L O'NEIL
Lt Col, Infantry
Commanding

Annexes:
A- Operations Overlay