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<td>OCA; Aug 10, 1980 IAW Document Markings</td>
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AUTHORITY

OAG D-A-A via Ltr; Apr 29, 1988

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION  
APO SF 96317  

AFDD-3  
10 Aug 66  

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUBIARD  
(EAGLE BAIT)  

THRU: Commanding General  
I Field Force Vietnam  
APO US Forces 96210  

TO: Commanding General  
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
ATTN: J3L3  
APO US Forces 96213  

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation BEAUBIARD (EAGLE BAIT).  
3. (U) Location: K'OT'U Province.  
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.  
6. (U) Task Organisation:  
   a. The task organisation of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation BEAUBIARD (EAGLE BAIT) was as shown below. This organisation  
      remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation.  

      TF 1/327  
      1/327 Inf  
      A 2/320 Arty  
      12 Tm, A 326 Engr  

      TF 2/502  
      2/502 Inf  
      12 Tm, A 326 Engr  

      2/320 Arty  
      B 1/30 Arty (OPCO)  
      Spt Bn (-)  

      Bde Troops  
      HHC (-)  
      A 2/17 Cav  
      A 326 Engr (-)  
      HP Plt (-)  
      1/101 Avn Sec  
      20 Chm Det  
      HE 342, 245 Psy Ope Co  
      131 VI Pet  
      3 RRU  
      75SP  
   
b. During the operation, three CIDG companies operated with the Brigade through mutual coordination with the Commanding General. Two  
      CIDG companies (DAX TO) with USSF Tn A 2Li worked with TF 1/327 and TF  
      2/502 respectively. Also, one CIDG company (11NO BUS) with USSF Tn A  
      2Si worked with the Brigade troops. These units and one Regional Forces  
      company served as maneuver elements, protected radio relay sites, pro- 
      tected artillery batteries, protected Brigade base camp and screened  
      flanks of attacking units. Also CIDG elements (DAX FEX) with USSF Tn A  

UNITED STATES  

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21-2 screened the LAOTIAN/OM-1 border and D.K. TOKO River north of the Brigade area of operation. Long range reconnaissance Apache Patrols were also employed to obtain information of enemy locations.

e. TF 2/27 Inf remained detached from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airborne) in N.V. for operations.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

b. B 1/30 Arty (SP) (W): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 15th Army Aviation Bn: Provided two light airborne companies plus six UH-1D and four OH-13 aircraft in general support. In addition, two operational CH-47 aircraft were provided from the 1st Cav Div.

d. 120th and 122th Avm Co's: Provided a total of four O-1 aircraft in direct support.

e. 265th Pay Op: Co: Provided two loudspeaker and leaflet teams in general support.

f. 5th Air Support Squadron: Provided airlift support for Pay War Ops.

g. 299th Engr Bn (Combat): Provided one company in general support.

h. 7th USF: Flew ten Tactical Air missions totaling twenty-five sorties. Of these missions, nine were preplanned and one was immediate. The immediate strike was requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request list and the response time from the initiation of the request until time-of-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 5 VC KIA (BC), 21 VT KIA (CET), 3 structures destroyed and 19 structures damaged.

i. 151st Med Det (Ammobiles): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

j. 10th and 11th Adv Teams, 30th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) provided liaison and coordination with AW, RF, PP and CID forces in the area of operations.

8. (C) Intelligence: Seq Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct surveillance of the LAOTIAN/OM-1/MV/OM border; block and ambush VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fix and destroy enemy in zone.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Initially, the concept of the operation was to screen the area east of the D.K. TOKO River and to employ deception measures to bait the enemy from suspected hiding places into terrain favorable to friendly forces. Following the first seven days of the operation, the concept was to move west and conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations between the D.K. TOKO River and the LAOTIAN Border. Later in the operation, the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations to exploit intelligence indications and contacts made with the enemy by reconnaissance forces.
11. (C) Execution: On 21 June, Operation PLUNDER 3D (Eagle B.U.T) began with the infiltration of reconnaissance elements and attached CIDG forces to the east of the D.K. KOKO River. (See Inclosure 3C, Operation Schematic, Period 21-30 June). These forces scanned all known and suspected enemy infiltration routes. In addition, one rifle company was moved into each of the battalion areas of operation as an immediate action force capable of exploiting any major enemy contact. All possible measures were taken to deceive the enemy as to the presence of friendly forces and to entice him to disclose his presence. Aerial reconnaissance and resupply to the forward elements were severely restricted. Because of little contact, reconnaissance elements and battalion reaction forces moved west of the D.K. KOKO River on 2 July. (See Inclosure 3D, Operation Schematic, Period 1-7 July). The 1/327 Inf (-) moved by helicopter to conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations in the north, while elements of the 2/502 Inf infiltrated on foot to screen infiltration routes in the south. On 5 July, when reliable intelligence sources indicated that two "T" companies were moving toward the L/2/17 Border, the Brigade immediately reacted by placing two rifle companies of the 1/327 Inf, one platoon of 2/502 Cav and a battery of 2/297 Artillery into blocking positions along the D.K. KOKO and D.K. BLOC Valleys. On 7 July, the 2/502 Inf (-) conducted an air mobile assault on Objective JIN to conduct search and destroy operations in exploitation of a contact made by the Brigade Reconnaissance elements with the enemy. (See Inclosure 3E, Operation Schematic, Period 7-11 July). The 2/502 Inf suffered four killed and six wounded from mines located in the vicinity of one of the landing zones near D.K. KOKO. Parachute mine clearing teams were rapidly lifted into the area and worked diligently in marking the mine field and destroying a portion of the mines. Having received only one minor enemy contact in the D.K. KOKO and D.K. BLOC Valleys, the 1/327 Inf (-) conducted an air mobile assault to Objective FRANCO, east of the 2/502 Inf (-). Both battalions converged on the suspected enemy from opposite directions. Following the link-up between the two battalions on 11 July, the 1/327 Inf (-) continued its search and destroy operations to the south. The 2/502 Inf (-) conducted an air mobile assault to the east on Objective FRANCO and swept south to Objective LOBI. (See Inclosure 3F, Operation Schematic, Period 11-15 July). When intelligence reports indicated an enemy build-up along the D.K. KOKO Border, elements of the 1/327 Inf rapidly executed an air mobile assault to Objective NIGHT and established a blocking position there. Having made no significant enemy contact, all units returned to D.K. TO II Airfield on 14 July and 15 July in preparation for deployment to TUY III.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting surveillance of the L/2/17, C/2/17 and R/17 Borders; blocking and encompassing VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fixing and destroying the enemy in the zone.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 18 VC KIA (3C), 5 VC KIA (3C), 21 VC KIA (3C), 36 VC WIA and 6 and 8023. In addition, nine individual and crew served weapons were captured and large quantities of rice and barley were destroyed.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 6 KIA, 39 WIA.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 1, Logistics.
12. (c) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Detection Techniques: Had additional helicopters been available to the Brigade, detection missions would have been flown to areas in which operations were not being conducted. Such techniques might have been effective in locating the enemy.

b. CH-47 "Piggy-back" Loads: The technique of sling loading ammunition under the helicopters in an artillery displacement saves time and eliminates the time a helicopter requires on the ground. A minimum of four CH-47 helicopters must be provided for displacement of the artillery to assure responsiveness where it appears that major enemy forces will be encountered.

c. Psychological Warfare: The complete saturation of a target is not the answer to a successful psychological warfare campaign. To be most effective, the leaflet program must be introduced into an area where strong tactical pressure has been applied. A four to six week psychological warfare campaign is considered to be the time frame required to procure lucrative results.

15. (c) Commander's Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

1. The importance of having interpreters available who are familiar with the local dialect was reconfirmed. CIDG personnel familiar with the local language were effective in obtaining valuable intelligence information from the natives. This information could not be obtained by the intelligence personnel without the interpreters' assistance. The need for qualified interpreters will continue to be an important requirement.

2. The effects of the then approaching monsoon season were felt during the operation. At times aircraft and helicopter support was ineffective due to inclement weather. However, there were no periods in excess of five hours which precluded the use of helicopters.

3. The individual soldier must be impressed with the fact that although there are cases of isolated mines, the detonation of a single mine may well indicate a mine field.

4. In dense jungle terrain, where few natural helicopter landing zones exist, small engineer clearing teams must habitually be provided to each battalion. These teams can build or improve landing zones for use by helicopters conducting medical evacuation, resupply and troop lifts.

5. The use of allied and indigenous forces is a valuable asset which will conserve or augment the forces available to a US unit commander. In this operation, Apache reconnaissance forces were invaluable extension of our resources.

b. Highlights of Operation:

1. Throughout the period, CIDG units worked in mutual cooperation with the Brigade. The CIDG personnel enjoyed working with the US troops and performed in an enthusiastic manner. The troops of the Brigade gained additional confidence in the local CIDG units. The cooperation and performance of duty of the CIDG and their USST advisors in KMT II Province was the best and most professional that this Brigade has experienced in the past six months.
August 1966

Si3JC?

Co~pat ior~~ Ins 4te Ati~ Ro~ort, Operation WARRIORD (EAGLE BAY) (270-4596-A-12)

(2) Twice during the operation, mine fields were located by our forces. Upon locating a mine field the tactical forces stayed clear of the area, and mine sweeping elements from the Engineers were immediately deployed with a small security force. The mine fields were marked and/or destroyed depending upon the extensiveness of the mine field network.

(3) Although no significant contact was made during the operation, it is believed that the techniques of deception and employment utilized would have been extremely successful if there had been greater numbers of enemy forces in the area.

20. (c) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting Artillery must be moved by an air LCC.

b. That the use of Artillery Mobile Training Teams be considered by other US tactical units as a means to improve Artillery techniques of Vietnamese units and to foster a better understanding and relationship between US and Vietnamese forces.

c. That steps be taken by higher headquarters to rigidly enforce the proper reporting and recording of mine fields as prescribed in current doctrine.

d. That organic and supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.

e. That provisions be made for medevac helicopters with a more effective hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.

WILLIAM PEACOCK
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures:
1 - Personnel and Administration
2 - Intelligence
3 - Operations Schematics
4 - Logistics
5 - Communications
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Pay
8 - Artillery

UNCLASSIFIED
1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

   a. Beginning of Operation KMURG'ND

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation KMURG'ND were as follows:

             Authorized 4490
             Assigned 5677
             Joined not Assigned 93
             Present for Duty 4269
             Not Present for Duty 1289
             Air Head Strength 221
             Base Camp 1300
             Tuy Hoa 593

      (2) The assigned strength was 128% of authorized strength, the present for duty strength was 100% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were hospitalized personnel.

   b. Conclusion of Operation KMURG'ND

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation KMURG'ND were as follows:

             Authorized 4490
             Assigned 5558
             Joined not Assigned 186
             Present for Duty 4269
             Not Present for Duty 1289
             Air Head Strength 221
             Base Camp 1300
             Tuy Hoa 593

      (2) The assigned strength was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were hospitalized personnel.

2. (C) Casualties:

   a. Casualties for Operation KMURG'ND were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC-DRP</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Cav</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Total Casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>236</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (c) Personnel Services:

a. Utilization of in-country rest and recuperation facilities on a 24-hour basis. During this operation, 7 personnel a day were given the opportunity to utilize the facilities of the MCVC compound in Pleiku. In addition, 25 men a day were flown to Kontum for an 8-hour visit.

b. MG, Finance, SJ, and American Red Cross Representatives visited the forward area and provided assistance.
1. Terrain:

a. Terrain was mountainous, covered with dense foliage. The ridges were high with the ravine sides steep. Bamboo and broad leaf tropical plants dominated the lower regions with evergreens showing at higher elevations.

b. Observation and fields of fire were limited by dense undergrowth and the rugged terrain; however, cover and concealment were enhanced by the same factors. Highway 14 is the principal north south route of approach, while the bridge (K3 91620) and by pass site (K3 91622) between Dak To and Dak Sut are keys to the logistics to the area.

c. Vehicular movement was restricted to the main avenue and a few smaller roads. Generally vehicular overland movement is impossible due to the terrain. Foot movement is slow and difficult.

2. Weather:

a. The weather was dominated by the southwest monsoon with the cloud conditions and rain being as expected. Visibility was sharply reduced during the early morning, late afternoon and evening hours due to fog, ceilings and ground fog conditions. Visual air reconnaissance was impossible at times because of obscuring of the ground by fog. Scattered thundershowers were frequent, causing hazardous flying conditions over some areas. These thundershowers generally shifted within an hour or two, increasing visibility and bettering conditions. Particularly violent thundershowers would cause small storms to rise sharply for two to three hours within a small area. Best times for visibility were generally between 1000 hours and 1530 hours.

b. Winds were generally west to east and of negligible to moderate intensity. Heavy winds were not experienced.

c. The temperature was cool with variations from 73°F - 97°F at night to 83°F - 87°F during the day. Humidity was generally high.

3. At the beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD the following information was available concerning enemy activity.

a. Trails used for infiltration from Cambodia and Laos crossed the operational area.

b. Total strength in Kontum was believed to include 3800 NVA personnel, eight to ten local guerrilla companies with a strength of 550 personnel and 2100 militia.

c. The 630th NVA Division was believed to have been located in the Chu Prong Biso Area (SW Paidu) and could have been deployed to the Kontum area as a reinforcement. The 403rd, 407th and 409th Main Force battalions were also available for reinforcement from Binh Dinh province.

d. Indications show that the 12.7cm AA MG was being employed in the area.

e. Extensive fortifications in the area indicated a war zone type complex that took a great deal of time to prepare (est more than 6 months).

f. The 4th BN, 21th NVA Regt was believed to be withdrawing to a rest area in the vicinity of Dak Sut (K3 9262), along Highway 14. The 5th Battalion was withdrawing to an unknown rest area.

g. Interrogation reports indicate a mission of the 4th Battalion, 21th NVA Regiment was to attack Dak To and then Tan Canh during monsoon season.
2. Interrogation reports place the last resupply to the 4th Battalion at 2 June for ammunition and 31 May for food.

3. During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through:

a. Information obtained from VCS produced only data such as the status of hamlet or village population, names of VC sympathizers were recorded. VCS did not have knowledge of NVA units or any other Order of Battle information.

b. Visual Reconnaissance: VR was flown an average of 9.5 observer hours per day for the past operation and revealed fortifications, heavy trail activity and several radio antennae. VR confirmed several SPARs and checked Red Haze activity within the Bdo CIN. A total of 6 photo missions and 2 Red Haze missions were requested and flown in support of the operation. VR A/C found many LMG weapons, and A/C received 2 .50 caliber hits on one occasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>RESULTS/ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XB 992195</td>
<td>Circular clearings in bamboo thickets near Bdo Base area.</td>
<td>SHAR rptd VC unit in area. Further ground check revealed diggings in clearing were friendly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 778420</td>
<td>Must-like object in field, poss radio antennae.</td>
<td>Fired 01-D rockets, results unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 901151 &amp;</td>
<td>A/C found 50 cal AA MG, and drew fire w/mortars. Weapon fired at many A/C in area.</td>
<td>Arty fired, was moved to new location, fired again, results unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 9625</td>
<td>Well used trail running into jungle, showing signs of recent heavy use.</td>
<td>Rod Haze revealed heavy use of trail at night. Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB 796238</td>
<td>20 foxholes w/overhead cover.</td>
<td>Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZB 135564 to 60-70 anti-helicopter stakes in rice paddies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZB 125585</td>
<td>V/C trenches and foxholes on ridge line.</td>
<td>Arty adjusted and 75% of fortifications destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZB 016552</td>
<td>15 new foxholes, camouflaged, with fields of fire cleared in undergrowth.</td>
<td>Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS 820400</td>
<td>Area shows signs of heavy activity, many huts, cultivations and well used trails.</td>
<td>Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 868943</td>
<td>Large number of elephants, appear wild, but may be pack elephants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: VR listed above does not include all missions, but is merely a listing of more significant sightings.

e. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilised extensively for the detection of enemy locations, movements, and/or supporting activities.

(1) 1 July - The LRRP reported mortar fire via ZB 063444 and noted heavy recent trail activity moving to the north out of general area ZB 0940.

(2) 3 July - The LRRP discovered a wallet (ZB 065396) lost by a member of the 2/502. The wallet had been lost during a battle with the 4th BN, 24th NVA Regt at a point farther east. Conclusion: The 4th BN, 24th NVA Regt withdraw through ZB 065396 and subsequently north.
(3) 6 July - The LRP received small arms and automatic weapons fire from TB 923502, TB 963569, TB 993573, TB 995563 and TB 907561.

(4) 7 July - The LRP contacted a small VC element at TB 957517.

(5) 10 July - The LRP sighted 17 VC moving SE at TB 764269.

(6) 11 July - The LRP contacted an estimated VC platoon at TB 762270.

d. Through coordination with Special Forces, Apache teams were made available as an additional reconnaissance means.

e. Liaison with the 42nd ARVN Regt, CIDG companies in our AO, and 24th SIE Headquarters was augmented intelligence sources.

f. The location of large quantities of rice and barley were utilized as indicators of VC activity in the area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>QUANTITY AND TYPE (TONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TB 920420</td>
<td>2 1/2 (rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 923404</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 912445</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 927435</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 951318</td>
<td>3 (barley)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 920411</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 950560</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 958424</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 960567</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB 955564</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior to the following is a listing of known units in this area of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NOTICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200th Arty Bn</td>
<td>TB 93638</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>19 Jun</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407th Mf Bn</td>
<td>BR 1685</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th AA Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt</td>
<td>Dak To</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approximate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Order of Battle Summary: During recent operations no new or additional information has been compiled, constituting no change to the present Order of Battle.

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6. (C) Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) Because of the losses suffered during Operation HANTHORNE, the elements of the 24th NVA Regt appeared to be avoiding further contact with US forces.

(2) Local enemy forces continue to operate as a deterrent force in those areas where food supplies exist. Although incapable of sustained defensive operations, their presence is sufficient to make CIDG and ARVN surveillance difficult if not impossible.

(3) The terrain in the operational area is of such a nature that both VC and NVA units will continue to have virtually freedom of movement as long as their operations are conducted at the individual and small unit level.

(4) Much of the support of the local populace has been lost as indicated by the high refugee rate at the end of Operation EAGLE BA富贵

b. Lessons Learned: The LEF is an intelligence collection agency and by virtue of the nature of its operations it is often subject to enemy contact. Since enemy contact is of such a positive intelligence nature, it has been deemed necessary to have a reaction force available in conjunction with all LEF operations. The force need only be of sufficient size to maintain contact with an enemy force (e.g. - platoon) until an adequate size force is mustered for employment.

12. (C) Details:

a. The brigade was successful in deploying units in those areas considered to be occupied by the enemy. However, Operation EAGLE BA富贵 was characterized by a distinct lack of significant contact due to the purposeful evasive tactics of those NVA units in the AO.

b. The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during Operation EAGLE BA富贵 (EAGLE BA富贵):

(1) Weapons Captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Country of Manufacture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chicom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm Maadi Magnum</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm F.N., Model 1953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chicom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 gauge Stevens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shotgun</td>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 cal Thompson SMG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal carbine, MG</td>
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(2) Ammunition:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm (short)</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm (long)</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>.45 caliber</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 gauge shotgun</td>
<td>16</td>
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(3) Food:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>28½ Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure 2A (Operation Schematic, Period 24 - 30 June) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SHERIDAN (EAGLE BAIT)
(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at TAN CANH using a 1500 GPH Eductor which provided excellent service throughout the operation.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion Maintenance Detachment received 37 automotive, 80 signal, 70 ammunition, 20 instrument, 63 quartermaster and 47 engineer job orders.

c. Surface Transportation: 212 - 2 1/2 ton truck transportation requests were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

   (1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 38 sorties for a total of 353 passengers and 26.1 short tons of cargo. 12 - C130 sorties were flown for 74 passengers and 25.75 short tons of cargo.

   (2) Rotary Wing: Both CH-47 and UH-1D continued to prove invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D's were placed in direct support of each Infantry Battalion and provided extremely efficient tactical and administrative support to the committed units.

   (3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 58.52 short tons of supplies into the forward area. Attached at Appendix 1 is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait).

e. Other Services:

   (1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, and elements of U.S.C., QUINH.

   (2) Both: 148th Quartermaster Company provided excellent service throughout the operation.

3. (c) MEDICAL:

   a. There were no major problems encountered in the areas of field sanitation and personal hygiene. Engineer LZ clearing teams and a single medevac helicopter without winch proved adequate for the relatively small number of casualties generated by the operation.

   b. Patients Treated:

      (1) WIA
      (2) Non-Battle Injury
      (3) Disease

      Total Treated 306

   c. Returned to duty 96

   d. Evacuated to hospital 210

   e. Remaining in holding 0

f. Hospitalized personnel (Battle Injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

   (1) Head
   (2) Chest
   (3) Upper extremities
1. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

   a. Support Battalion:

      (1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). The Detachment was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control sections.

      (2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for receiving, storage and issue of all classes of supply and provided a parachute rigger section.

      (3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer and automotive items. The detachment was organized into a shop office and a recovery/contact team.

      (4) Medical Company: Provided Brigade level medical service. It was organized into a company headquarters section, a surgical section, a holding section, a medical evacuation section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

   b. Supporting Forces:

      (1) FSA, USASC, QUI NHON (TF Stinson) supported 1st Bde 113th Abn Div. FSA was collocated with Supply Detachment, Support Battalion. It was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units.

      (2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided 2 light air mobile companies, plus 6 UH-1D and 4 UH-1B aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations.

      (3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 117th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

      (4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided Medical Aeromedical evacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

   a. Supply:

      (1) Class I: A total of 164 short tons of "B" rations and 62 tons of Meals, Combat, Individual, Type "C" were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" rations was received and "A" ration meals were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement all but 5 "B" ration meals. However, fresh vegetables and bread issue were extremely limited.

      (2) Class II and IV: Class II and IV supplies were shipped from the Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and QUI NHON and CAN RANG BAT Area Support Commands. However, jungle fatigues and boots were in short supply throughout the operation.

      (3) Class III: 211 short tons of Class III and III were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 39,500 gallons of AVGAS, 9,500 gallons of DIESEL, and 13,900 of AW-4 (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 204,250 gallons of JP-4 (392 short tons).

      (4) Class V: 119 short tons of Class V were issued during the operation. The following items remained in short supply during the operation:

         (a) White Star Cluster
         (b) Green Star Cluster
         (c) White Star Parachute Flares
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation MEAURICORD (Eagle Blitz)

(4) Lower extremities 31
(5) Abdomen 2
(6) Neck 0
Total 42

2. (U) SUPPORT:

a. Supply operations continued to be simplified by collecting
the FSA, USASC, QM, and the Brigade Support Battalion, Common Supply
Points were used for Classes I, II, and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne Division provided Class I, II, and IV supply.

b. Helicopter knots: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily
forested terrain continue to necessitate fitting medevac helicopters with a
winch capability.

3. (U) CONCLUSION:

a. Duplication of effort is reduced by collecting the Forward
Support Area with the organic Forward Support Element.

b. Medevac helicopters equipped with wind capability are a necessity
when operating in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Class I Pounds</th>
<th>Class I Tons</th>
<th>Class V Pounds</th>
<th>Class V Tons</th>
<th>Misc &amp; Water Pounds</th>
<th>Misc &amp; Water Tons</th>
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<td>15 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>91,670</td>
<td>45.82</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1. (c) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters and Headquarter Company Communications Platoon and the 1st FSSP had the joint mission of continuing the communications support of the Brigade Headquarters as initially established for Operation MAJOR BATTLE.

2. (c) Operation:

a. VHF Service: Not continued.

b. Communications Center Section -- Provided motor messenger service and secure teletype service to a FRCOMN.

c. Switchboard and Section -- A two-position switchboard was operated terminating 74 current lines. Additional lines installed increased the wire in use in the area 50% to 60%.

d. FM Radio Section -- Two 121-motion was established for operational traffic. The traffic is divided during peak periods. A C1 relay when in operation allows semi-automatic transmission.

e. Maintenance Section -- Continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

f. AT 4-170 Section -- Continued to operate a secure H2 net between LAX TO, PHM 320, and NIA TRX.

g. Corps Signal Support -- 5th Signal Battalion provided AN/90 circuits into the Corps area system and secure H2 to FRCOMN, and operate a Single Side Band Phone Patch at LAX TO, PM 320, and NIA TRX.

3. (c) Problems Areas:

a. Personnel shortages -- Shortages in skilled NDS's are becoming critical, especially 32HP, 712HP and 72HSP, affecting communication center operations and repair capability.

b. Equipment shortages -- 12 3K/AC generators were requisitioned on "O2" priority in November 1965 as a replacement for the PE-75 generators, which have proved unreliable. Only one has been received.

c. T-41 typewriters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational machine.

d. T-39 Transmitters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient maintenance floats are available to maintain a continuously operational system, even though all AT Radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

e. FM communications between the Brigade and Battalion TAC Command Posts were not reliable. This can be improved by the use of ground-located AT/Radio, 44 radio sets and Remote Control Unit AT/44-39, and training of TCO's.

f. Several units laid wire through the Brigade Command Post area using unsatisfactory wire laying techniques. Units should review PT 24-40 with changes.

g. Telephone subscribers often did not use directory numbers. Asking for parties by name constitutes a security violation in some cases and is in all cases delaying the operation of the switchboard. Directories are available from Strike 15.

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Enclosure 3 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation TURNKIDE (11/29/67)

1. (C) During Operation TURNKIDE (11/29/67) this Brigade's Civil Affairs Clique Action program was directed mainly at assisting the RI TO District Chief in his efforts to reestablish the missions assigned to him as part of the Revolution Development Program. Because the Brigade remained in the same area that it had been in for Operation TOLL, the Civil Affairs effort was primarily a continuation of earlier programs designed to lessen the friction between this Brigade and the people of the area.

2. (C) In an effort to support the Revolution Development Program objective of the RI TO District, this Brigade worked closely with the Sub-Sector Adviser, Capt Dugan, and the USID representative in Sarakh. A list of projects, in order of priority, was drawn up and as time, man, and equipment became available the projects were undertaken and completed. Some of these projects were:
   a. Grading and improving the Central Market Place in RI CI.
   b. Road and bridge repair, 31 mi road, 3 bridges.
   c. Grading ground for a new school in RI CI.
   d. Cutting timber for District use.
   e. Clearing the growth along the sides of Route 50.
   f. Donating school supplies and furniture to the schools in RI TO and RI CI.
1. (U) Psychological Objectives: To promote native civilian support, to induce civilian consent with and in support of the Brigade's mission, to dehumanize the enemy and promote military and resistance.

2. (U) Psychological Charges Used:
   a. Demonization of VC and VC cadre.
   b. Rally to GVN/Allied Forces.
   c. China Mai.

3. (C) Target Audiences:
   a. IW:
      (1) 60th Regiment.
      (2) 24th Regiment.
   b. Viet Cong cadre.

4. (C) Statistics:
   a. Total Spotter hours: 41 hours
   b. Total Leaflets: 13,451,000
   c. Special Leaflets dropped: 3
   d. Rollers: 63
   e. Special types produced: 3

5. (C) Lessons Learned:
   a. That the effectiveness of a tactical "War of nerves" campaign depends on the use of military force in the operations area. Military pressure is necessary to insure response in the target audience.
   b. That complete saturation of a target with leaflets is only a partial solution for an effective "War of nerves" campaign. It must be the combined effort of leaflets and tactical pressure.

6. (U) Conclusions:
   a. That the results of the War of nerves effort in Operation THUNDER would have been more effective if strong military contact had been made.
   b. That the long range results of the War of nerves effort cannot be determined, but that it has been the rule in the past that the full effects take 4-6 weeks after a War of nerves campaign.
Task Type 2 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation KNOCKOUT (CNC 774)

1. (c) Battle Plan: 32th Airborne Division, 50th Artillery as of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. 77th Infantry, 1st Bn. 50th Division reinforced by 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 527th Artillery.

2. (c) Operation: 26 - 27 June. All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued to maintain equipment. A service practice was conducted on 26 - 27 June to familiarize the Forward Observers and Leavenworth Artillery with the problems of artillery adjustment in jungle.

3. 1 - 5 July: 1 July 1/2/026th Artillery deployed to 2970 hrs from 27/03277 to 27/03315 to support screening mission of the 1/27th Infantry. 27/03269 was born in 2970 hrs to 30/03230 at 1200 hrs to support screening mission of 2/310th Infantry. Both units closed at 1500 hrs.


5. (c) Supply and Administration: There were adequate supplies to provide the required resupply of the battalions during the operation.

6. (c) Problem Areas:

7. a. Displacement by two (2) Co's 6-7kts. Artillery battalions can be deployed by utilizing only the 6-7kts in order. This places definite limitations on timely support of the infantry. A factor in the initiation of ground operations by supported elements. Dependent on distance of displacement, the move takes from six to nine hours. During this period the battery is operating in two positions with minimum support. Additionally the security force for the battery is divided and some instances two forces will be required, one to secure the forward position and one to remain in the present position until displacement is complete.

8. b. Positioning of Radio Relay: The battery, during the latter phase of the operation, experienced difficulty in communicating with forward batteries because of the location of the Brigade radio relay.

9. (c) Comments:

10. a. The battalion for the first time deployed utilizing the "plow-boat" system. By closing an airfield under the heaviest possible time in an hour on the ground by the 6-7kts is minimized. The battalion has the capability of moving nine horses by "plow-boat" and by 6-7kts will be capable of moving over 500 horses in this manner.

11. b. In 5kts was placed in support of the DZ/12 Special Forces Camp during the operation. The 5kts provided instruction in firing techniques, fire direction procedures, and maintain the 105's. Maintenance procedures and the employment procedures of maintenance. Additionally, the 5kts maintenance was performed on the horses and the direction forms and records were provided to the artillery element of the 24
ONCE COMPANY was provided as a security force for 1/7/3rd Inf. This force proved adequate and performed its mission in an efficient and willing manner.

6. The 6-4 Company's (HHC) was positioned at E101313 for the entire period of the operation. The primary sector of responsibility was the 6-4 Company Operations Center and the adjacent helicopter pad with secondary sectors being one of the firing batteries. From 21 June to 14 July, the sector was non-operational for 12 hours. Operating periods for the sector were from 0600 hrs to 1800 hrs daily, this being the most likely period of mortar attacks.

6. Recommendation: A minimum of four (4) CH-47s be placed in support of the battalion during future airmobile operations.
Enclosure 1 (List of Positions Occupied and Ammunition Exchanged) to
Enclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation TUNNEL #3 (Cont'd)

Table: POSITIONS

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<th>Command</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 June - 1 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>2964234</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July - 5 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>2964234</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July - 9 July</td>
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<td>2791221</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 July - 12 July</td>
<td>2691226</td>
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Total Shells Fired: 42

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<td>20</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>HG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surveyed all batteries: 1 sniper site & 1 creeping artillery position destroyed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Conducted</th>
<th>Total 6 Man's Fired</th>
<th>DoF Cone</th>
<th>12/lb</th>
<th>Swo Practice</th>
<th>Iff</th>
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**UNCLASSIFIED**