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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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10th Combat Aviation Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

   a. (U) General.
      (1) Mission: The mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion did not change during this reporting period.
      (2) Organization: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was organized as follows on 31 July 1966:

         Headquarters and headquarters Detachment
         130th Medical Detachment Dispensary
         339th Aviation Support Detachment
         48th Assault Helicopter Company
         390th Transportation Detachment (ChFb)
         279th Signal Detachment (Avionics)
         286th Medical Detachment
         92nd Assault Helicopter Company
         617th Transportation Detachment (ChFb)
         732d Signal Detachment (Avionics)
         155th Assault Helicopter Company
         165th Transportation Detachment (ChFb)
         208th Signal Detachment (Avionics)
         8th Medical Detachment Dispensary
         255th Quartermaster Detachment
         192nd Assault Helicopter Company
         607th Transportation Detachment (ChFb)
         65th Signal Detachment (Avionics)
         198th Medical Detachment Dispensary

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, HLS CSFOR-65 (RL) (L)

281st Assault Helicopter Company
483rd Transportation Detachment (CMH)
499th Signal Detachment (Avionics)

243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company
620th Transportation Detachment (CHSM)

(3) In accordance with General Orders 49, Headquarters 17th Combat Aviation Group, dated 20 May 1968, the 198th Medical Detachment was assigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, and further assigned to the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company in accordance with General Orders 11, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(4) In accordance with paragraph 1, General Orders 18, Headquarters 17th Combat Aviation Group, dated 4 June 1968, the 18th Assault Helicopter Company with its supporting elements and the 155th Assault Helicopter Company with its supporting elements were reassigned from the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion and 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, respectively, to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, effective 1 June 1968.

(5) In accordance with paragraph 1, General Orders 18, Headquarters 17th Combat Aviation Group, dated 4 June 1968, the 61st Assault Helicopter Company and its supporting elements and the 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company and its supporting elements were reassigned from the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion to the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, effective 1 June 1968.

(6) Changes in battalion command and primary staff were as follows:

(a) In accordance with paragraph 1, General Orders 18, Headquarters 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, dated 30 June 1968, LtCol William H. Walker assumed command of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion from Colonel R. England.

(b) Major Bobby H. Sinclair, O5109662, assumed the duties of Battalion S-1 from Major Earl H. Talley, O63017, effective 30 June 1968.

(c) Captain James Covey, OS420130, assumed the duties of Battalion S-4 from Major William J. Poole, O77317, effective 24 June 1968.

(d) Major William J. Poole, O77317, assumed the command of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company from Major Walter Urbach Jr., O73908, effective 24 June 1968.

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Physical Security: Continuous improvements of the defensive posture at all locations within the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion marked this reporting period. In view of the increased emphasis placed on base defense by higher headquarters, all units have been directed to survey
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (hl) (u)

their defensive perimeters in an effort to upgrade the effectiveness of such defenses.

(2) Intelligence and Counterintelligence: During this quarter attacks on friendly installations have been initiated mostly by local forces VC. There have been 8 attacks on the 155th HC installation at Ban Me Thuot during this period: 5 mortar, two 122mm rocket, and one 75mm recoilless rifle attack. At times these attacks have been accompanied by small arms fire. A moderate amount of damage has been done by these attacks. The latter portion of the reporting period has been accompanied by a reduction in enemy attacks. This is mainly attributed to more effective utilization of fire ships. In the Ban Me Thuot area the arrival of a brigade of the 4th Infantry Division has resulted in a decrease of enemy activity of this sort. The enemy is still capable of small scale harassing and stand-off attacks around all areas and continues to collect taxes and rice and spread propaganda in the respective areas.

c. (C) Operation and Training activities.

(1) Plans: At the close of the reporting period the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) is commanding and coordinating the missions of assigned units from its base camp at Dong Ba Thin, RVN. The Forward TOC returned from LZ English near Bong Son on 1 June 1968. On that date the 10th CAB was organized into five AHHC's and one AHNC and assumed aviation control of the southern portion of the II Corps Tactical Zone. On 20 July 1968 the Forward TOC returned to Bao Loc to coordinate the activities of the 92nd AHHC, 192nd AHHC, and the 243rd ASHC in support of a task force of the 173rd/101st airborne. On 16 July 1968 the Forward TOC returned to Dong Ba Thin.

(2) Operations: The units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continue to provide aviation support throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. Support has been rendered to the 101st Air Cavalry Division, the 173rd airborne Brigade, the White Horse ROK Infantry Division, the 22nd/23rd RVN Division, 5th Special Forces, and Bn. II Corps. Operations Cochise, Bolling, and Walker terminated for the 10th CAB on 1 June 1968 when the 10th CAB T.O.C was changed. On 17 May 1968 the 192nd AHHC displaced from Phan Thiet to Phan Rang. Returning to Phan Thiet on 27 May 1968, the unit then displaced again on 8 June to Dalat; from Dalat to Bao Loc on 19 June and Bao Loc to Phan Thiet on 22 June 1968. On 27 May 1968 the 92nd AHHC displaced its entire complement to Pleiku in support of the 4th Infantry Division and returned to Dong Ba Thin on 10 June 1968. A platoon of the 243rd ASHC returned from supporting the 52nd CAB on 16 June 1968. During the period 20 June to 16 July 1968, the 10th CAB operated a forward TOC in support of a joint US and RVN operation in the Bao Loc area. The task force consisted of two battalions from the 173rd airborne Brigade, 2nd Bn, 44th Infantry Division, a mobile strike force battalion, and an RVN Ranger Bn. The aviation support was provided by the 10th CAB and "B" Troop, 7/17 Air Cavalry. The mission of the task force was to find and
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destroy elements of the enemy 5th-6th headquarters unit. Although many base camps and supplies were found, large scale engagements were not anticipated nor realized.

(a) Operations of the 46th Assault Helicopter Company: The 46th AHC continued to support the 9th ROK Infantry Division in all activities, to include daily resupply, combat assaults, final extractions, administrative troop movements, transporting VIP's, convoy cover, reconnaissance missions, and various tactical emergencies. Becoming a part of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 June 1968, the 46th AHC is the only company within the 10th CAV with a purely direct support role. A division-sized combat operation "Baek Ma 6," began on 5 May 1968 with the first phase ending on 17 May 1968. The second phase began on 28 May and ended on 7 June. During the two phase operation, the 46th AHC completed two large insertions and extractions. On these two occasions 1105 troops and 1254 troops were airlifted into combat, respectively. Results of the operation were as follows: 305 VC killed and 4 captured. Seized during the operation: 128 small arms, 10,775 rounds of small arms ammunition, 109 hand grenades, 82 artillery shells, 362 documents, 155 pounds of TNT, and 4,614 pounds of food. On 6 July 1968 the 46th AHC planned and executed two regimental sized combat assaults 80 miles apart with the help of elements of the other units in the 10th CAV. The 28th Regiment, 9th ROK Division, located in the Tuy Hoa area, conducted an assault on the mountains near Yung No Bay which resulted in 10 enemy killed and the capture of 6 small arms, 17 hand grenades, and 10 kgs of rice. The 30th Regiment conducted an assault on the mountains located to the northwest of Phan Rang, which resulted in 44 enemy killed and the capture of one radio, 11 weapons, 5 mines, 80 pounds of TNT, 85 documents, 503 kgs of food, plus small arms ammunition, grenades and mortar rounds. On 7 July 1968 the 29th Regiment, 9th ROK Division, conducted an operation to the mountains west of Nha Trang. During the two phase operation a total of 1332 troops were lifted into the operational area. On 15 July the second phase of the operation began with a final extraction and reinserion of the troops into the second phase position. Results of the operation which ended on 19 July were as follows: 129 enemy killed, 2 enemy captured, 35 small arms seized, and 54 hand grenades found.

(b) Operations of the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: The primary mission of the 92nd AHC during this quarter remained general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone. The unit participated in two major operations during the period. These two operations required the bulk of the unit's assets be displaced from its fixed base at Long Binh. The first operation was in support of Task Force Matthews in the Dak To-Dak Phak area from 24 May through 7 June 1968. The second operation in support of Task Force South was conducted in the Bao Loo area and continues at the end of the reporting period. Task Force Matthews, comprised of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division, engaged in offensive operations to counter the growing NV threat in the border area west of Dak To and Dak Phak. The 92nd AHC flew combat assault and resupply missions out of Camp Holloway at Pleiku.
The main body of the unit moved from Dong an Thin to Pleiku in two days. The warning order was received on 23 May 1968, and the unit was fully operational at Pleiku on 24 June 1968. During the operation the unit flew 1,192 hours, 3,845 sorties, hauled 175 tons of cargo, lifted 6,113 troops, and Medevaced 5 personnel. Task Force South, comprised of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (101st Air Cavalry Division), the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (173rd Airborne Brigade), and elements of the 23rd RVN Division, began on 4 July 1968 with the mission of destroying the enemy in the lower II Corps Tactical Zone. Eight lift ships and 4 gunships were committed daily in their support and began with the insertion of 1,500 troops into the mountainous area to the southwest of Bao Loc. Daily missions included troop resupply, LRAP operations, snoopy operations, and company sized combat assaults. On 19 July 1968 most of the elements were extracted from the area of operation near Bao Loc. On 22 July 1968 a new area of operation was established and the troops were reinserted. During this period of the operation the 92nd AH has flown 1,412 hours, 3,836 sorties, performed 1,352 tasks, hauled 105 tons of cargo, lifted 5,692 troops, and Medevaced 5 personnel.

(c) Operations of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company: the 155th .HC's primary mission during this quarter has been the support of the 22nd and 23rd .RVN Divisions. Since joining the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 June 1968, the 155th AH has flown 570 hours and company sized missions in Phu Bon, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Binh Dinh, and Darlac Provinces. In addition to the support given to .RVN divisions the company has provided a daily sector aircraft to Quang Duc and Darlac sectors and has flown 35 platoon-sized combat assaults for the 5th Special Forces. During this quarter a total of 132 combat assaults of both platoon and company size have been conducted. Ammunition expended has been 367,400 rounds of 7.62, 1,408 rounds of 40 mm, and 2,601 rounds of 2.75" rockets. On 11 June 1968 an airmobile operation was conducted by the use of pathfinders and minimum lighting in the landing zone, a total of 500 troops were helilifted into an area 16 kilometers to the north of Ban Ho Thuc.

(d) Operations of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: The primary mission of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company remained direct support of the 3/506th (101st Air Cavalry Division) with 9 lift ships and 4 gunships. The remainder of the daily allocation was utilized in general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone. During the month of July the unit's initial operations were mainly concerned with combat support missions in support of the TF 3/506 Infantry in the mountains 30 kilometers northwest of Phan Thiet. On 17 July an advance party was established at Phan Rang Air Force Base. The unit assaulted the TF 3/506 Infantry from the staging area at Song Hao airstrip into multiple LZ's in the southern Phan Rang pass. This area of operation concluded on 27 July 1968. Preparations were made in early June for the unit to move to Dalat to participate in operation Banjo Royse. The unit moved to the field on 8 June via US. F
circuit and established a base camp at Cam Ly airfield while simultaneously assaulting elements of the Task Force into an area 20 kilometers southwest of Da Lat. On 18 June 1968 an element of the 173rd Airborne Brigade met heavy resistance in an area 10 kilometers to the south of Bao Loc. A gigantic night move was conducted which resulted in the area of operations being shifted to Bao Loc. On 19 June 1968 a Task Force Headquarters was established in the Bao Loc area and comprised the elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and 3/506th Infantry. On 23 June 1968 the 3/506 Infantry along with the 192nd AHC was released from the Bao Loc area and returned to Phan Thiet. Operations with the 3/506 Infantry continue in the Phan Thiet area.

(e) Operations of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company: The 281st AHC continued in its primary mission of general support to the II Corps Tactical Zone. A secondary mission during this reporting period was the direct support of the 5th Special Forces (Project Delta). That operation, named Samurai V, was conducted in the Hue/Phu Bai area from 18 April to 19 May 1968. During that operation the unit flew 988 hours, performed 716 tasks, flew 1603 sorties, lifted 2130 troops, hauled 32 tons of cargo, and killed 15 enemy. The 281st AHC performed many small operations in support of ground units in the II Corps Zone. On 21 May 1968, 8 UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's were in support of General Westmoreland and several ROK VIP's in the Ninh Hoa area. On 26 May 11 UH-1H and 2 UH-1C were in support of the White Horse ROK Infantry Division on a combat assault and flew 94 hours, 271 sorties, and hauled 835 troops. On 6 June 1968 4 UH-1H and 2 UH-1C again supported the White Horse Division on a combat assault in the Ninh Hoa area and flew 43 hours, 139 sorties, and lifted 231 troops. On 9 June 1968 6 UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's supported the 14th AHN Division in the Song hau area and flew 37 hours, 75 sorties, and lifted 171 troops. On 10 June 1968 5 UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's supported the 22nd AHN Division in the Tuy Hoa area and flew 51 hours, 156 sorties, and lifted 462 troops. On 16 June 1968 5 UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's were sent to Bao Loc to support elements of the 3/506/101st Air Cavalry Division on a combat assault. On 24 June 1968 3 UH-1H's and 3 UH-1C's were sent to Ban Ho Thiet to participate in a combat assault with B-23, 5th Special Forces, and flew 38 hours, 96 sorties, and lifted 277 passengers. On 4 July 1968 6 UH-1H's and 3 UH-1C's supported the 3/506th Infantry in the Phan Thiet area for two days. During that time a total of 128 hours were flown, along with 420 sorties, and 574 troops were lifted into and out of landing zones. On 12 July 1968 support was rendered to B-23, 5th Special Forces, in the Ban Ho Thiet area. On that operation there were 67 hours flown, 151 sorties, and 234 troops lifted. The same support was rendered again on 19 July with the following results: 69 hours flown, 152 sorties, and 443 troops lifted. On 31 July 1968 5 UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's again supported the 22nd AHN Division in the Ninh Hoa area and flew a total of 106 hours, 287 sorties, while lifting 805 troops. During this quarter the 281st AHC also provided the majority of support to the MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang, as they performed numerous combat assaults in that support.
Operations of the 23rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: The 23rd Assault Support Helicopter Company supported the 4th Infantry Division at Pleiku with five aircraft in a general support role, and the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Air Cavalry Division, with two aircraft during the first portion of this reporting period. The five aircraft in support of the 4th Infantry Division moved with complete maintenance elements to Pleiku on 26 April 1968 and performed at that location until the termination of the operation on 16 June 1968. Throughout the second portion of the reporting period the unit supported Task Force South comprised of the 3/506th (101st Air Cavalry Division) and the 3/503rd (173rd Airborne Brigade) with a daily commitment of 6 aircraft. Occasional support was rendered to the White Horse ROK Infantry Division and the 5th Special Forces Group. During the month of June one aircraft was committed daily to support of the 97th Artillery Group for the Fire Bee Drones.

(g) Organisational Chart and Station List (see Inclosure 1).

(h) Aircraft Status as of 31 July 1968 (see Inclosure 2).

(i) Operational results for period ending 31 July 1968 (see Inclosure 3).

(j) Training:

(a) 46th Assault Helicopter Company: Training activities for this unit have continued as required, meeting all normal requirements. The unit engaged in training in part or totally every day of the reporting period. Subjects stressed included on-the-job training for newly assigned personnel, weapons familiarization and zero, CBK, Command Information, character guidance, safety, and escape and evasion.

(b) 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: Aviation training has been conducted on a continuous basis during the period. A total of 129 hours of flight training was given, including in-country orientation rides, 90 day standardization rides, and gunship transition training. Safety instruction was conducted on a monthly basis, with emphasis placed on information passed out at the battalion safety briefings. In response to emphasis by USARV, the unit reorganized its H-16 training program. All personnel assigned the weapon received closely supervised instruction on care and cleaning and weapon firing. Flight crews attended a class on escape and evasion given by personnel from the Pacific Air Forces Jungle Survival School, Clark AB, P.I.

(c) 155th Assault Helicopter Company: During this quarter 92 days were spent in training. Subjects stressed included document and weapons security, flight safety, crash rescue, first aid, local security, and CBR. Flight crews received an escape and evasion class delivered by an instructor from the Jungle Survival School at Clark AB, P.I. Training
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was also conducted by members of B-29, 5th Special Forces Group, for the unit's mortar squads. Flight training to include standardisation rides, continued to receive the most emphasis.

(d) 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: Scheduled classes to meet the requirements of directives issued by battalion and brigade have continued throughout the period. In May, aviation training, survival, CBR, and escape and evasion classes were conducted. First aid, field sanitation, CBR, and prevention of heat injuries were presented in June. Scheduled classes for July included survival, ground safety, and CBR Convention. Additionally, the weekly training on weapons familiarization and zero have been scheduled at the regular intervals.

(c) 281st Assault Helicopter Company: During this quarter the majority of the training emphasis has been placed on flight training and flight safety, to include survival, escape, and evasion. Incoming personnel, as well as veteran aviators, have been given extensive training in the use of the McQuir Rig and in the art of rappelling and hoist work. Classes have been given on S.W.A.T. and a classified class on Escape and Evasion was presented by an instructor from the Air Force Jungle School. Range firing has been conducted for individual weapons.

(f) 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: This unit received some excellent training in overwater recoveries of external loads in June while working with the 97th Artillery Group on Fire Bee Drone recoveries. During this reporting period the 10th CBR Instrument Examiner administered checkrides and renewed one Standard R/W Instrument Ticket and one Tactical R/W Instrument Ticket. Flight crews attended a class on escape and evasion. The unit also conducts weekly training of all assigned personnel in H-16, M-79, and H-60 weapons. Other subjects stressed include aviation safety, emergency first aid, and heat treatment.

(4) Chemicals: None.

(5) PSYOP: None.

(6) Other: None.

d. (U) Logistics: During this period routine maintenance problems accounted for most of the maintenance effort. Three significant projects were accomplished which should improve the quality of maintenance and increase the mission ready rate of 10th Battalion aircraft.

(1) Aircraft Organizational Maintenance Standdown: This program was initiated in accordance with 17th Group directives, and has by all indications improved the organisational maintenance by allowing the crew chief time to work on the minor problems before they become major. One unit was allowed to test a system of holding the aircraft down 24 hours during
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Each intermediate inspection rather than the system of 24 hours each week. The initial results indicate that a 24 hour down time after each 25 hours of flight time allows more flexibility in scheduling, as the standdown is on a flying hour basis rather than a calendar basis. A detailed evaluation of this study will be made.

(2) Aircraft Intensively handled Items: The constant problem of insuring that all RDD items are in fact scheduled for installation has been solved by requiring all units to maintain an RDD register and tag the items with the aircraft tail number.

(3) Time Spread of UH-1H: In an effort to eliminate the loss of aircraft availability in any particular unit due to the 100 hour FE, several aircraft have been literally transferred within the battalion. The results have been good.

(4) The major efforts of the S-4 during this period have been directed toward:

(a) Eliminating excess equipment on hand in units.
(b) Reduction of conex inventory.
(c) Improvement of motor maintenance and supply operation.
(d) Providing for the establishment of POL and rearming points.
(e) Ensuring property accountability.
(f) Support of outlying units.

(5) POL: Two each 21,000 gallon tanks have been procured for refueling purposes at Dong Ba Thin, one of them to be located at Flanders. This action should alleviate the many transportation refueling problems that now exist. Provisions have also been made for replacement of these tanks.

(6) Assistance Visits: Assistance visits have continued to be a primary means of ensuring close coordination of all supply matters.

(7) Normal requisitioning channels for technical supply have been totally inadequate. Aircraft availability has been continuously hampered by the delays caused by lack of parts. Input quills have been extremely difficult to obtain. The supply of fuel servo filters is so limited that they are changed at each periodic inspection instead of each intermediate inspection as required. Aircraft ammunition parts have been almost impossible to obtain, and have forced the units to go to the air Force for spare parts for minigun systems. Much of the EDP supply has arrived without the necessary paperwork, which causes additional delays.

(8) Quarterly Summary of Maintenance Data and Flying Hour Program (See Inclosure 5).
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RL) (U)

a. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) During the past quarter two orphanages and two public schools received continuous support from units assigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) The 18th HHC performs basic activities for several montagnard villages west of Duc by. The program consists mainly of immunization to Cholera, Plague, Diphtheria, plus various medications for the children.

(3) The 281st HHC has undertaken the task of developing a construction program to build and repair the facilities of a Nha Trang Public School damaged during the Tet Offensive. Assistance has been in the form of material, classroom supplies, and supervision of the construction.

(4) The 243rd HHC supported the Sai Khi Orphanage in Ba Ngoi with contributions of food and clothing and classroom supplies.

(5) The 192nd HHC supported the Children's Orphanage in Phu Nhan with contributions of food, clothing, and classroom supplies. Members of the unit have also assisted in building and repairing the present school structures.

f. (U) Personnel.

(1) During this reporting period a change in the battalion structure was affected. This headquarters has learned that by sending a personnel and finance team to the location of the newly assigned units, the personnel processing time can be reduced by one half.

(2) A widespread infusion was initiated throughout the battalion at the end of the reporting period. This infusion will even the October-November hump in all assault helicopter companies in the battalion; however, the overall loss during the October-November period is as follows: Officers 41%, Warrant Officers 33%, and Enlisted Personnel 37%.

(3) Unit Strengths as of 31 July 1968. (See Inclosure 4).

g. (U) Artillery. None.

h. (U) Other.

(1) Information Officer.

(a) The 10th Battalion Public Information Program continues to provide active coverage of events occurring at the Dong Ba Thin complex and the forward areas.

(b) A summary of the battalion news releases is as follows:

Feature articles-------------------------------18
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Pictorial Releases---------------------------------------------200
Hometown News Releases----------------------------------------124

(c) A bi-weekly command publication, "The V-g-bond Voice," was initiated in July. This publication is designed primarily to assist in the dissemination of command information.

(2) Signal.

(a) This battalion received three AN/URC-119's, each of which consists essentially of high frequency and \( \frac{1}{4} \) ton truck. To date these systems have been used sparingly, but they are expected to enhance our communications structure significantly. These have been dispatched to the outlying areas of the battalion. This expansion of the HF radio net should quicken the responsiveness and reaction time of the forward elements.

(b) During this period, radio teletype facilities were established at Ban he Thout and at Phun Thiet. Previously it took an average of three days for a priority message to reach the 155th LH and the 192nd LH. The newly established point to point HATT system enables these units to receive transmissions immediately.
2. Section 2, Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. Doorknurmers.

(1) OBSERVATION. Personnel extending for HOS 67-1F should be fully qualified to perform such duties.

(2) EVALUATION. It has been found on several occasions that personnel who have extended their tour in Vietnam are to become doorknurmers in an assault helicopter company are either unqualified medically to perform such duties or disqualify themselves because of a fear of flight.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That all personnel requesting assignment in a 67-1F HOS in an aviation environment be given an introductory evaluation and ride in an aircraft, and that they pass a Class III Flight Physical before being allowed to extend in the above HOS.

b. (G) Operations.

(1) Employment of the E-158 Gas Dispenser.

(a) OBSERVATION. The E-158 gas dispenser should be dropped from an altitude of 100 feet below that required by manual when delivered over jungle terrain.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been found that the E-158 gas dispenser activates itself within 50-100 feet of the altitude setting. When this unit is deployed over jungle terrain, most of the gas is released on top of the canopy and has negligible effect. By dropping the canister from an altitude of 100 feet lower than normally required, the canister will penetrate the canopy, explode, and give good coverage of the target area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That units which utilize the E-158 gas dispenser incorporate the above employment over jungle terrain as standard operating procedure.

(2) Landing Zone Reconnaissance.

(a) OBSERVATION. All key personnel should participate in the reconnaissance of the selected landing zone and surrounding terrain.

(b) EVALUATION. During the support of Task Force Cleland, a landing zone reconnaissance was normally made the afternoon prior to the assault. The reconnaissance was made by the flight leader, the fire team leader, the airmobile force commander, and the lifted unit commander. The subsequent combat assaults were characterized by a minimum of confusion.
CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That standard operating procedure require all key personnel, especially the aviation arm, to participate in the landing zone reconnaissance.

3. Conduct of Combat Assaults.

(a) OBSERVATION. The use of the countdown method for the initial assault into an area has proven highly successful.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been found that a ten minute countdown initiated by the aviation arm has greatly enhanced the coordination between the aircraft and supporting fires. The flight leader determines when the flight is ten minutes out of the LZ and informs the aircraft force commander of that time. The countdown begins and the supporting artillery and air support arrive at the exact time in the sequence of events. This system alleviates the problems encountered with late take-offs, etc., and retains the flexibility that is required in airborne operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the ten minute countdown method be reviewed with a view toward accepting this method as standard procedure.

d. (U) Training. Instructor Pilot Training.

(1) OBSERVATION. Instructor Pilots should be trained in CONUS prior to arrival in the theater as replacements, or that Instructor Pilot training should be consolidated at group or brigade level.

(2) EVALUATION. Due to the heavy operational commitment requiring the use of all experienced aviators on a continuous basis, and due to the lack of available aircraft for aviation training purposes on a regular basis, the current policy of units having to train their own Instructor Pilots is cumbersome at best and lacks standardization between units. No orderly or regular training program can be carried out under these circumstances.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That specific personnel designated to arrive in country as individual replacements be trained as unit IP's prior to arrival in country, or that IP training be consolidated at group or higher level with the individual units levied for aircraft and support personnel and equipment to support the program.

d. (U) Intelligence. None.

e. (U) Logistics.

(1) Limitation on Quarterly Droppage.
AVGD-nA

10 August 1968


(a) OBSERVATION. The dollar limitation imposed on each company and detachment is impractical and unfeasible.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been found that the present system of dollar limitation as required in 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 735-12 is cumbersome and impractical. For example, when dropping TA-50-901 or station property it is impractical to maintain three separate property books for these items (Company, TC Detachment, and Signal Detachment) or to maintain three separate accounts. All equipment of this type should be controlled on one account by the parent unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the dollar limitation be allocated to the major or parent unit to be utilized at the discretion of the unit commander and that a change to that effect be placed in the brigade regulation.

(2) Control of Supply Records.

(a) OBSERVATION. Unit supply records should be hand carried as yellow T&T during a change of station for the unit.

(b) EVALUATION. During this reporting period the 198th Medical Detachment was attached to the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company for administrative and logistical support. The unit supply records could not be located and were presumed lost. However, most of the records were located with another unit that had arrived in country at the same time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all supply records be hand carried as yellow T&T by a responsible unit during change of station.

(3) Location of hRO's for Unit Pickup of Class II Supplies.

(a) OBSERVATION. Presently there is no consolidated pickup area for class II supplies ordered in hRO's.

(b) EVALUATION. Most hRO's for Class II supplies for unit pickup are presently being forwarded by stock control (CRBAD) to each warehouse that has the responsibility for storing the items. A unit supply representative must go to each warehouse to determine if supplies or equipment are available for pickup.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a copy of all Class II hRO's be forwarded to the Class II shipping yard. This would enable a unit supply representative to visit only one location to determine what warehouse or location has supplies for his respective unit.

f. (u) Organization.

(1) Semi-field Hess Operation.
10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION. There is presently inadequate mess staffing to provide proper food service to personnel operating in the field and to maintain a fixed mess site at the same time.

(b) EVALUATION. Combat aviation unit mess personnel staffing is based on a normal days operation, normal mess hours, and normal time for preparation and serving. It has been found that aviation units must maintain almost a 24-hour mess operation. This type of operation places an extreme burden on the mess personnel and decreases the effectiveness and efficiency of that vital section.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That properly trained personnel in MOS 94B20 be provided to the mess section, and the TOE be adjusted as follows: 1-E7, 1-E6, 2-E5, 3-E4, 2-E3. This adjusted TOE would allow three men per shift, and two men to work after the normal hours of the mess.

(2) Armed Platoon Organization.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a shortage of qualified personnel to perform required jobs in the present armed platoon organization.

(b) EVALUATION. The armed platoon, as a functional part of the assault helicopter company, must of necessity be mostly self-sufficient. The present TOE is solely lacking in this regard. For example: aircraft care, to include first echelon maintenance; weapons care, to include first echelon maintenance; weapons care, to include third echelon maintenance; and ammunition allocation and disbursement, to include proper records and storage; are not allowed for sufficiently in the present structure of the armed platoon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the TOE be expanded to include, under the command of the armed platoon commander, an armament section capable of third echelon maintenance, consisting of an armament officer and four school trained armament specialists. That the maintenance of the weapons PLL become the direct responsibility of the armament section utilizing the present Tech Supply for resupply. That the weapons PLL be expanded to include all items for normal preventative maintenance replacement, and to include a minimum of one float unit per system type maintained by the unit. That an ammunition logistics section be added with the responsibility of procuring, storing, and disbursing ammunition. This section would consist of one officer and three enlisted personnel.

(g) (U) OTHER.

(1) Field Expedient Protection of Main Rotor Blade Grip Seals.

(a) OBSERVATION. Blade grip seals on the Uh-1D and Uh-1H are found to be leaking excessively when exposed to sandy and dusty conditions.
AVG-24
10 August 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (v)

(b) EVALUATION. It has been found that leaking blade grip seals have accounted for approximately 20% of some unit's unscheduled maintenance when operations are conducted in areas of sandy and dusty conditions. This included changing seals or main rotor heads, excessive oil being pulled into the engine (dirty engine inlet) causing loss of power or compressor stalls, and top of the aircraft becoming oily and causing an unsafe condition for crew personnel. Using two-inch engine tape folded over so as to make a one inch double tape, make two wraps around the yoke assembly and tie. Then push tape up tight against the blade grip seal. The tape is then removed and reinstalled every 50 hours of aircraft operation. Excellent results have been obtained in this fashion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units be alerted to this method of protecting the main rotor blade grip seals.

(2) Allocation of additional HC-292's to HC's.

(c) OBSERVATION. Assault helicopter companies should be authorized a minimum of two HC-292 antennas in the Flight Operations Section.

(b) EVALUATION. In view of the over increasing mobility and displacement of portions of the assault helicopters away from their fixed bases, it is necessary for more and better communications facilities to be organic to these units. Since communications is the key to the effective control of these aviation assets, the use of the HC-292 to boost the range of radio sets now organic to the units is required. Two such sets are required to maintain a forward operating base as well as a fixed base capability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the TOE of assault helicopter companies be modified to authorize two HC-292 antennas in the Flight Operations section.

(3) Allocation of RA 91-C Rectifiers.

(a) OBSERVATION. Two rectifiers, RA 91-C, are required for sustained operations of radios authorized to the unit.

(b) EVALUATION. Assault helicopter companies frequently operate in whole or in part at locations other than their fixed base. Additionally, field or forward locations are most often small enough to permit the establishment of auxiliary power sources instead of relying on vehicular power. The use of rectifiers are ideal for the purpose of providing power to radios on a sustained basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the Com Section of assault helicopter companies be authorized by TOE, two (2) onch, rectifier, RA 91-C.
AVGD-iw

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, HCS CSR-65 (AL) (U)

5 Incl
1. Organizational Chart
2. Aircraft Status
3. Operational Results
4. Unit Strengths
5. Flying Hour Program

DISTRIBUTION (U)
1 cy thru: 17th C.G
through: TFORC&V
through: 1st Avn Bde
through: USARV
through: US ARP C

to: ACSFOR, DA

2 cy thru: 17th C.G

to: ACSFOR, DA

3 cy to: USARV
2 cy to: USARP C
2 cy to: 1st Avn Bde
1 cy thru: 17th C.G

to: TFORC&V (file)
to: 17th C.G (file)

WILLIAM A. WALKER
LTG, Infantry
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-6C (10 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RL) (U)

Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 August 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic letter from the 10th
Combat Aviation Battalion. Pen and ink corrections of errors have been
inserted.

2. (C) This headquarters submits the following comments and recommenda-
tions.

a. Section 2, Lessons Learned.

(1) Reference paragraph 2a, Doorgunners, page 12: Concur. Recommend
that 1st Aviation Brigade establish criteria listed below for acceptance
of requests for reassignments from other USARV units for duty MOS 67A1F,
Doorgunner. This headquarters has directed the following actions prior
to forwarding a request for extension and reassignment in MOS 67A1F.

(a) Applicant will complete a Class III Flight Physical.

(b) Unit commander will provide written evidence of successful comple-
tion of an orientation ride, indicating observations by an aviator of
the applicant's tendencies toward apprehension or airsickness.

(c) Applicant will satisfy the requirements of AR 611-201 for award-
ing MOS 67A10.

(d) Unit commander will provide a statement identifying the applicant's
shortcomings compared to the criteria in AR 611-201, and will indicate
whether or not the shortcomings can be eliminated during a 90 day OJT
period.

(2) Reference paragraph 2b(1), Employment of the E-158 Gas Dispenser,
page 12: Concur.

(3) Reference paragraph 2b(2), Landing Zone Reconnaissance, pages
12 and 13: Concur. Paragraph 3, Section II, Chapter 3, page 3-2, and
paragraph 2b, Section II, Chapter 4, page 4-2, 1st Aviation Brigade
Operations Manual, contain guidance for landing zone reconnaissance.

(4) Reference paragraph 2b(3), Conduct of Combat Assaults, page 13:
Nonconcur. The method outlined in basic letter is an effective means
for coordinating supporting fires, but not the only effective method.
Paragraph 3, Section IV, Chapter 3, page 3-3, 1st Aviation Brigade Operations Manual, contains guidance for fire support coordination.

(5) Reference paragraph 2a, Instructor Pilot Training, page 13: Concur that higher headquarters conduct Instructor Pilot training. The 1st Aviation Brigade has initiated such a program.

(6) Reference paragraph 2a(1), Limitation on Quarterly Droppage, pages 13 and 14: Nonconcur. Dollar limitations are fixed Army wide. The present system as outlined in 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 735-12 is feasible. Losses in excess of amounts shown in that regulation can be accounted for using methods outlined in AR 735-11. Many signal and TC detachments within the 1st Aviation Brigade maintain their own property books on TA 50-901 and station property and do not desire to change this system.

(7) Reference paragraph 2a(2), Control of Supply Records, page 14: Concur. The procedure recommended in the basic letter is already established for units which are preparing for overseas movement.

(8) Reference paragraph 2a(3), Location of MRO's for Unit Pickup of Class II Supplies, page 14: Nonconcur. The forwarding of MRO to the warehouse enables warehouse personnel to verify that requisitioned items are available for issue, and to centrally locate items for issue from one point. Over 800 units draw supplies from Cam Ranh Bay Depot. The present system is feasible and can better serve all units.

(9) Reference paragraph 2a(1), Semi-field Mass Operations, pages 14 and 15: Concur, with exceptions. The commander's observation and evaluation are valid. However, a TOE change is not necessary to correct the situation. Some unit messes must feed four meals per day because of the workload and mission of the unit, which places an undue burden on mess personnel. This burden is increased because units are short of mess personnel. Presently, this group has 90 percent of authorized mess personnel, 50 percent of whom are not school trained. The problem could be reduced to an acceptable level by bringing units up to TOE strength on mess personnel, increasing the percentage of school trained personnel, and intensifying the supervision provided by unit Mess Stewards.

(10) Reference paragraph 2a(2), Armed Platoon Organisation, page 15: Nonconcur. The present armed platoon has sufficient TOE positions to perform required tasks. Each Assault Helicopter Company is authorized three
AVOD-SC (10 Aug 68) 1st Ed 25 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

MOS 45J20, Armament Repairman, and each TC Detachment is authorized one. The Crew Chief and Gunner maintain the weapons system on their assigned aircraft. Unit Armament Repairmen are called on only when a malfunction in the system occurs. Repairmen at unit level are restricted to organizational maintenance because of the availability of repair parts and test equipment in the unit, and because the Organizational Operator and Maintenance Manual authorizes unit repairmen to perform only organizational maintenance. There are insufficient armament systems for replacement of combat losses, and consequently none available for float equipment. The organizational PLL is not large enough to justify additional armament personnel. Each company is authorized sufficient personnel to properly allocate and distribute ammunition.

(11) Reference paragraph 2g(1), Field Expedient Protection of Main Rotor Blade Grip Seals, pages 15 and 16: Nonconcur. The method described in the basic letter appears to be an authorized permanent fix rather than a field expedient. Wrapping tape around the yoke can cause an unbalanced blade condition. If the tape works loose, it could cause an obstruction to free control movement. Recommend immediate discontinuance of this practice pending submission and approval of an Equipment Improvement Recommendation.

(12) Reference paragraph 2g(2), Allocation of Additional RC-292's to AHC's, page 16: Concur. Unit should submit recommended change to MTCE.

(13) Reference paragraph 2g(3), Allocation of RA 91-C Rectifiers, page 16: Concur. Unit should submit recommended change to MTCE.

b. Section 1, Operations. Reference paragraph 1d(7), pertaining to normal requisitioning of aircraft parts, page 9: Units have been instructed to requisition armament repair parts on an O2 priority EDP, and immediately provide this headquarters with the direct support unit document numbers. This headquarters then telephones the document numbers to its liaison officer at Saigon for followup action. There is no shortage of armament repair parts in country. Units must follow proper requesting procedures so that usage factors and demand data can be accurately determined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERALD M. COOCH
LT, AGC
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96375

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 and forwarding indorsement and nonconcurs with the following paragraphs of the basic document for the reasons given in the 1st Indorsement:


b. Paragraph 2e(1), pages 13 and 14, Limitation of Quarterly Droppage.

c. Paragraph 2e(3), page 14, Location of MRO’s for Unit Pickup of Class II Supplies.

d. Paragraph 2f(2), page 15, Armed Platoon Organization.

e. Paragraph 2g(1), pages 15 and 16, Field Expedient Protection of Main Rotor Blade Grip Seals.

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD

Igf, AGC

ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
17th CAG
AWAC (10 Aug 60) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1960, AR 600-65 (II) 

To: HEADQUARTERS, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 309

From: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96376

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, APO 96556

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. ( ) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as informed except for the following:

a. Paragraph 10(1), page 9, the statement made by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion concerning due the incorrect. The correct date is 20 June 1960.

b. Paragraph 20(1), page 14, the paragraph 20(1), 1st Ind. concur. Paragraph 20, c(1), AR 611-201 requires installation commanders to establish maximum dollar limitations on quarterly requests. The 1st Aviation Brigade, 73-12 establishes the maximum dollar limitation and the unit maintains a property book. The policy regarding the 73-12 establishes the maximum dollar limitations on the property for reconciliation to detachments is not considered by this headquarters as an adequate control procedure. Quarterly drop-page is to be used only to drop non-expendable items valued at less than 25 dollars. The present established limits are considered adequate and necessary to prevent misuse of the quarterly drop-page procedures.

2. ( ) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 12(7), page 9, and paragraph 21, 1st Ind. In the past, the supply system has lacked a positive program for reconciliation of outstanding requisitions both between the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and between the BSU and USA:::C. 1st Aviation Brigade units can carry out their responsibility in this program by assuring that reconciliations of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, AR 611-201 for award of 10S 67A10 currently exist in USA:::C Reg 60X-20. This headquarters will request by separate correspondence to USA:::C that additional criteria be established as follows:

22
(1) Unit commander will provide written evidence of successful completion of all orientation ride, indicating observations by an aviator of the applicant's tendencies toward apprehension or air sickness.

(2) Application will contain a written statement by unit commander that applicant should or should not be able to successfully complete flight for 17th AAB.

e. Paragraph 2a(1), page 13, and paragraph 2a(9), 1st Ind. Establishment of a 17th Aviation Brigade I school is under consideration at this time. Identification of qualified I's upon arrival and subsequent assignment to units requiring I's will insure maximum use of these individuals. A consolidated I school will have the effect of standardizing unit I's.

d. Paragraph 2f(1), page 14 and paragraph 2a(9), 1st Ind. This board recently took every possible effort to fill 17th group to 100% of authorized personnel.

e. Paragraph 2h(1), page 15 and paragraph 2a(11), 1st Ind. This board recently directed the 17th Combat Aviation group to take action to discontinue the practice of using tape to cover the grip area for reasons cited in 1st Indorsement.

J. D. Segal
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C) MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 10 OCT 68

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters,
10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning instructor pilot (IP) training, page 13,
      paragraph 2c; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a(5); and 3d Indorsement, para-
      graph 2c: Concur. DA was notified of this problem in a message from this
      headquarters in June 1968, listing USARV IP requirements by type aircraft
      for FY 69-70.

   b. Reference item concerning normal requisitioning channels, page 7,
      paragraph 1d(7); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b; and 3d Indorsement, para-
      graph 2a: Concur with 3d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W.C. Arnitz
C, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 10th CAB

CONFIDENTIAL
GPO-UT (10 Aug 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 10th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS OSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Act AG
### Aircraft Status - Operational Report Ending 31 July 1968

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CONFIDENTIAL
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243rd LSAC Aircraft Damage: 2 CH-47
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**CONFIDENTIAL**
### Quarterly Summary of Maintenance Data and Flying Hour Program (Inclosure 5) (4)

**May thru July**

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* Lost from Battalion on 1 June 1968
** Gained by Battalion on 1 June 1968

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**OPERATIONAL REPORT**

**RCS OCMOR-65**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**July 1968** (4)
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68**

**CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

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SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

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