**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

AD393908

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**

31 Aug 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (31 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683366 6 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Army Representative, COMSEVENTHFLT
Air University Library
CG, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD)
Commanding Officers
   US Army Limited War Laboratory
   US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
1. (C) Section I, Creations: Significant Activities.


B. There were two changes of command during the period 1 May to 31 July 1968. On 10 July LSC Carl Leishman arrived from CCUS and took command of the 6th Bn (3CA.) 44th Arty. On 3 July, the Deputy Brigade Commander, COL Armand A. Kolesar, returned to CCUS. He was replaced by COL Marshall F. Keen Jr., who arrived on 4 July 1968.

C. On 29 May 1968, the Brigade established a Command Inspection team. This team is headed by the Deputy Brigade Commander and consists of a representative from each of the staff sections, the Signal office, and the Surgeon office. To date, seven of the Brigade's thirty-two sites have been inspected. Each unit receives both an oral debriefing and a formal written report concerning the inspection results.

D. On 30 May 1968, after an intensive evaluation of the critical RCS structure of the Brigade, Eighth Army requested an immediate TDY fill in the following categories and grades:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RCS</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>E6 &amp;/or E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52D</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>E5 &amp;/or E6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21F</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>E6 &amp;/or E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22J</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>E6 &amp;/or E7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DR 5200.10
1. In June, the Brigade had received 36 enlisted men in the above NS's on 90 day T/A assignments. Three were later returned to OCSUS. At the end of the reporting period, 33 of those originally requested are still assigned to units throughout the Brigade. Of the 33, only 10 are in grade E6 and E7. Thus the shortage in terms of senior NCO strength has not been completely filled.

2. During the evaluation of the HAAK battalion critical NS structure of the Brigade, the need for more warrant officers in NS 223C, Air defense missile systems technician, was noted. Based on the Brigade's recommendation, the first week in August, Eighth US Army directed that the Brigade submit an NCO change which would authorize an additional warrant officer in each of the HAAK firing batteries and HQ Battery in the operating column and delete one commissioned officer in the operating column for each of these NS's. This change was submitted to Eighth US Army on 11 July adding a 223C to each Battalion Headquarters and a 223C to each firing battery.

F. During the last week of July CUSA informed the Brigade that 325 men were to be reassigned from the 38th Artillery Brigade to the 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions. The personnel reassigned possess various NS's which were surplus to the needs of the Brigade.

G. On 1 April the 38th Brigade was given responsibility for its own direct support for missile peculiar equipment. In taking over this function from HACCK, the ground work was set for making in-country support more responsive to the Brigade's HAAK and Hercules peculiar needs.

Each HAAK Headquarters Battery has a direct support platoon, which includes the following sections:

- Technical Supply
- HAAK Ground Guidance
- HAAK Power-Air Conditioner
- HAAK Fire Distribution

To aid the organization and training of these sections, four supply technicians were sent T/A from OCSUS. In three training classes conducted in
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (MD) for Period ending 31 July 1966, A/C CSPR-65 (H.1)

PREPARATION FOR OPENING THE TECHNICAL SUPPLY SECTIONS OF THE DSF's, OVER 100 MEN HAVE BEEN TRAINED. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN SECURING ADEQUATE REAL ESTATE, SHOP FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT, THE FOUR AFX DSF WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL ON 1 AUGUST 1966.

THE ABSORPTION OF THE HERCULES DSF REQUIRED PREPARATION AND TIME. THE BSI, SPLIT INTO TWO LOCATIONS, AT CAMP PUMPHREY AND DWIGHT, 4TH BN (HERE), 4TH ARTY, IS FULLY OPERATIONAL. UNLIKE THE NA 30 CONSOLIDATION, IN WHICH THE BRIGADE HAS HAD TO SECURE MUCH OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES, MOST OF THE HERCULES DIRECT SUPPORT CAPABILITY WAS TRANSFERRED COMPLETELY TO THE BRIGADE.

II. THE 500/400 CYCLE GENERATORS REMAINED AT AN OPERATIONAL RATE OF OVER 80% FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD. THESE GENERATORS ARE THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF TACTICAL POWER FOR THE BRIGADE'S MISSILE SYSTEMS.

I. MATERIAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS CONTINUED IN THE BRIGADE AREAS AS INDICATED:

1. ESK

2. IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON MATERIAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS, THE BRIGADE WFE CAPABILITY WAS GREATLY ASSISTED WITH A MAJOR "TURN AROUND" IN SYSTEM RADAR. THE EFFECT OF THIS INFUX OF EQUIPMENT TO THE BRIGADE, TOGETHER WITH HIGHER FLOAT LEVELS AT SUPPORT UNITS, SHOULD BE SEEN IN HIGHER OPERATIONAL LEVELS IN FUTURE MONTHS.

THE FOLLOWING REBUILT AND/OR REFURBISHED EQUIPMENT WAS RECEIVED BY THE BRIGADE DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pulse Acquisition Radar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range Only Radar</td>
<td>6 + float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Control Console</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Fire Command Console</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Powered Illuminator Radar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(R1)

(b) The newest HAWK program is Project Davinci, a program for replacing unmodified (without "Beam Feed-Thru") HAWK missiles on site, with modified missiles from Depot stock. The project commenced on 17 June with a scheduled completion date of 1 August. A total of 278 missiles will be exchanged during this program.

(c) The HAWK Sweepdown program provides modification work orders (MWO) to the HAWK system. Performed by contractor teams in Korea, 75 MWO's have been applied in four separate Blocks. The latest, Block IV, was completed in June 1968 and consisted of 9 MWO's. Block V, with a new series of modifications to the HAWK system, has already begun. The program will continue as long as necessary to maintain our HAWK systems in the latest configuration.

(d) The contractor-conducted refurbishment program, in both Korea and CONUS, was originally scheduled to end this June after having refurbished 91 major items. The program has been valuable enough to warrant its extension to July 1969 and has been expanded to cover 144 major items. It is expected that the program will continue to be extended as required.

(e) The High Power Illuminator Built In Test Equipment (HIPI-BITE) program commenced as scheduled in May with the initial intention of modifying 2 BITE radars per month. This program has been greatly accelerated by placing the BITE modification program in the Closed Loop support program. Modification is accomplished in CONUS rather than in country. To date, ten BITE modified radars have been placed on-site. The completion date for all Brigade HIPI's is currently scheduled for December 1968. This program also provides for cabling and connections in the radar for a new HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY (HVPS).

(f) Because of unreliability of the present High Voltage Power Supply (HVPS) in the HIPIR, a newly designed HVPS will be installed in the Brigade's illuminator radars. Estimated completion date for the project is late February or March 1969.

(2) Nike Hercules

(a) Fewer material improvement programs are required for the more reliable Nike Hercules, a second generation missile system. At the present time, the Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) Program is the major improvement being made in the Hercules systems in Korea. The ABAR gives each battery improved AASM capability and is an additional acquisition radar. Tower installation began in May and has been largely completed.
Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (L) for Period ending 31 July 1968, #55 CSFOR-65(N)

At a rate of one battery per month, installation will take place from August of this year through January 1969.

(b) The Hercules Sweepdown Program is similar to the M-17 Sweepdown Program - Block IV, consisting of a total of 14 modifications, commenced in July 1968. This program, as the M-17 program, will be continued as required to maintain the system in the latest configuration.

With the greater attention focused on Korea since the Fusan Phase and the Pueblo incidents, the spare parts situation has gradually improved in the Brigade for most types of equipment. Although fill times for certain missile chassis are slow due to world-wide shortages, the implementation of the Stovepipe Supply System with the M-17 Missile Supply System is contributing significantly to missile readiness system.

The Brigade has continued its efforts to reconcile all outstanding requisitions with support units. The results of this vigorous program show substantial improvement. In the September - October 1967 reconciliation, 55% of all requisitions were invalid because of cancellation by the support unit or lack of any record at support level. During the May 1968 reconciliation, this invalid requisition percentage had dropped to 34%. As with previous reconciliations, new requisitions were accordingly submitted to replace these which were invalidated.

c. C-11 results again indicate that the Brigade C-11 team is giving very thorough inspections in preparing units for Eighth Army inspections. During this period assistance visits were also provided, when requested by battalions. The following is a compilation of C-11 results received by units within the Brigade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Army Satisfactory</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Army Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Brigade Satisfactory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Protective structures for storing eight Mike-Hercules missiles are being constructed at each of the Brigade's six Mike-14 rocket batteries.
structure (two per battery) is capable of storing four missiles. Varying by site, these protective structures are now 70-90% complete. Construction of fences for the Hercules Maximum Security Areas (MSA's) is also about to begin. Tentative plans for this MSA fence construction at sites 1 thru 4 have been approved by Brigade and Eighth Army.

2. (c) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel

(1) Critical FCS Shortages

(a) OBSERVATION: The key problem lies in the shortage of senior grade NCOs.

(b) EVALUATION: The steps taken to alleviate the critical FCS shortages have definitely aided the overall mission capability of the Brigade. The shortages will become more serious again when the 90 day TDY period expires. FCS replacements have been received and steps are being taken to encourage the 33 men on TDY to apply for FCS assignments in Korea, but when the TDY period expires, new shortages will appear.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The TDY period be extended to 179 days for each of the thirty-three positions that cannot be filled on a FCS basis.

(2) Change to HAWK/NTCS

(a) OBSERVATION: Because of the unique support and maintenance requirements in Korea more warrant officers 223C and 251C are needed in the HAWK battalions.

(b) EVALUATION: Both the Eighth U.S. Army and the 38th Artillery Brigade concur in the need for this change.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the HAWK/NTCS submitted to Eighth United States Army on 11 July 1968, be expedited and approved as soon as possible.

B. Misc

C. Training

(1) Missileman Training:

(a) OBSERVATION: A continuous requirement exists for fire units to
conduct CJT on site while maintaining a scheduled alert status. The conduct of such a program has a detrimental effect on normal unit operations.

(b) EVALUATION: While much of the CJT program at fire unit level is required to train inexperienced missile personnel; senior or experienced personnel also require additional training. Though air defense tactics and techniques are basically the same in all air defense commands, there are specific areas which differ in each location or command. Examples of such areas are local security, crew drill, GSN activities and communications and authentication procedures. In addition, the specific equipment authorized missile units vary in different commands and frequently within a command. In short tour areas such as Korea, it is imperative that assigned personnel become fully qualified in their assigned position as quickly as possible to insure their maximum utilization. To assist firing batteries in attaining an improved status of training, evaluation teams were assigned the task of conducting on-site "operational" training at each unit. This training included coverage of several areas, such as equipment maintenance, crew drills, basic security requirements, and communications/authentication procedures. The training served as a thorough indoctrination and introduction for personnel untrained in air defense or with only very basic training in air defense. It served as a command orientation for personnel experienced in air defense. This program has resulted in improved crew performance and equipment maintenance as noted in subsequent evaluations and in increased utilization of assigned unit personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That newly assigned personnel, regardless of experience, be given a brief intensive training indoctrination based primarily on tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment peculiar to the command to which assigned.

D. Intelligence

(1) Identification of CI's and Illumination Flares.

(a) EVALUATION: Because of the increased number of agents operating within the Republic of Korea and the possibility of a Korean National being shot by a roving patrol or CP/LP during the hours of darkness, additional procedures were necessary to facilitate the identification of intruders.

(b) EVALUATION: The rules of engagement prohibit sentries from engaging intruders unless they are actually observed committing a hostile act. Sometimes the local Korean Nationals will disregard a sentries instructions to halt and, some measure must be taken to preclude them being brought under small arms fire. Further restrictions in the rules of engagement would only serve to negate the value of the CI's/LP's and roving patrols.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI)

Therefore, in order to further facilitate the identification of U.I.'s, illumination flares were requested. Message, ZAAB-6-83-IN, requested permission to establish an operational load of M27A1 hand-held illumination flares. Because the Hercules sites already have 81mm mortars with illumination rounds authority was requested, and approved, to fire 81mm illumination rounds as the tactical situation dictates. After an illumination round is fired, the enemy can identify the UI and will not engage unless he is identified hostile.

(c) :SECURITY: That the request for hand-held illumination flares be approved in order that the HAM units be provided an aid to identification during the hours of darkness.

(2) Site Security Surveys.

(a) :SECURITY: An Eighth Army Security Survey Team inspected each site within the Brigade and made recommendations to improve the defenses of each site.

(b) :EVALUATION: The Eighth Army Team recommended an increase in the number of defensive positions, amount of ammunition, the use of hand-held illumination flares and the deployment of fragmentation grenades.

In accordance with these recommendations, this headquarters submitted a request to authorize an increase in the basic and operational load of ammunition, illumination flares and fragmentation grenades. An operational load of three grenades per individual will be authorized and these grenades will be prepositioned on stationary posts throughout the site.

(c) :SECURITY: That these requests to establish authorization for munitions, as recommended by the Eighth Army Security Team, be approved.

2. Logistics

(1) Long Term Effect of Sustained High Operational Rate of Missile Systems:

(a) :OBSERVATION: The Blue House and Pueblo incidents required brigade firing units to maintain higher than average status for sustained periods of time.

(b) :EVALUATION: The higher operational levels caused depletion of spare
Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65(P1)

Support unit facilities were strained by the added work load. Missile system profiles for Brigade units were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2d Ctr FY 68</th>
<th>3d Ctr FY 68</th>
<th>4th Ctr FY 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWK</td>
<td>Green Amber</td>
<td>Green Amber</td>
<td>Green Amber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>06</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>04</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIKE HERCULES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Hercules drop is largely due to new reporting criteria for Target Ranging Radar.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: High, short term operational requirements for missile systems should be employed with the realization that long term operational performance may be degraded.

(2) HAWK Missile Support Element Funding Restrictions

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Unlike other "Stovepipe" systems, Eighth US Army's HAWK missile Support Element must operate within Eighth Army's tight budget constraints in procuring missile equipment to support Brigade operations.

(b) EVALUATION: MISE's ability to provide expensive missile chassis to Brigade batteries and DSP's is sometimes limited by funding restrictions.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Funding of MISE support should be completely separated from Eighth US Army's normal funding channels.
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFCTR-65(R1)

F. Signal

(1) Signal Enlisted Personnel

(a) OBSERVATIONS: VHF communications personnel assigned to the 38th Brigade the past three months were inadequately trained in their MOS. Considerable time is spent, therefore, in retraining them prior to their assignment at an isolated radio relay site.

(b) EVALUATION: Greater demands for school trained personnel of 3120 MOS have evidently resulted in hurried instruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the signal schools place more emphasis on the type of instruction and the precision required in conducting equipment line-ups and checks prior to qualifying personnel.

(2) AN/TC-24 Equipment Modifications

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Several AN/TC-24 transmitters, receivers and power supplies have been received from Perimian Signal Depot by the 38th Brigade which were not compatible with organic connecting cables.

(b) EVALUATION: Some modifications of these items of equipment are apparently being made at Perimian Depot. Power outlet connectors were three-pronged and do not mate with two-pronged cable connectors on hand.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That quality control procedures be established to insure equipment and cable connector compatibility.

1 Incl

as

Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AGCof S for Force Development, Department of Army, Washington, D.C. 20310, through 31st Army, USFPAAC
2 - ACSFCTR, Department of Army, Washington, D.C. 20310, through Eighth Army
2 - CICGUSAFPAC, ATTN: GFCO-DT
2 - Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: MACO-T, AFO 96301

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

EAP0-WH (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(II)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301  7 SEP 68

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTH: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following
comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference item concerning shortages not being completely filled
by TDY personnel, page 2, para 1D. Concur. The facts are as stated.
No specific inquiry was made to DA on the matter. Subsequent assignment
of PCS personnel to those duty positions have been, for the most part,
filled with lower grade personnel. Projected name fill assignments for
PCS are also in the lower grade personnel. This further indicates short-
egages of personnel in senior grades and air defense maintenance MOSCs
throughout the Army.

3. (C) Reference item concerning change to WAG HTOE, page 2, para 1E,
and page 6, para 2A(2). Concur. Changes were forwarded to USARPAC on
9 Aug 68, and are currently pending DA action.

4. (C) Reference item concerning critical MOS shortages, page 6, para
2A(1). Nonconcur. Conversation with the S1, 38th Arty Bde indicates
that a request for extension of TDY was not made and that they did not
intend to make such a request. Although personnel in requested super-
visory grades have not been provided by DA for PCS assignment to the
38th Arty Bde, three digit MOS shortages have been reduced to the point
where TDY is not deemed necessary. The following action has been taken
to improve the status of critical MOS's within the Brigade:

a. A message has been prepared for dispatch to CINCUSA: PAC requesting
assignment of air defense personnel made excess by inactivation and re-
deployment of units within USARPAC.

b. A message has been sent to CG 38th Arty Bde requesting that his
headquarters analyze the current personnel situation and provide this
headquarters with detailed comments and recommendations.

5. (C) Reference item concerning identification of UI's and illumination
flares, page 7, para 2D(1). Concur. Headquarters, Eighth Army has
approved request for issue of hand held illumination flares to Hawk units.

CONFIDENTIAL
6. (C) Reference item concerning Site Security Surveys, page 8, para 2E(2). Nonconcur. The unit has been requested to re-evaluate its defensive plans in accordance with recommendations made by the Eighth Army Security Team and resubmit request for munitions. The first request was considered to be excessive because of a misinterpretation of the security team recommendations.

7. (C) Reference item concerning long term effect of sustained high operational rate of missile systems, page 8, para 2E(1). Concur. All concerned must understand that higher operational levels cause more rapid depletion of repair parts and operational float equipment. Operational personnel must coordinate with logistics personnel in order for them to program for increased demands due to increased operation.

8. (C) Reference item concerning HAWK Missile Support Element (HMSE) funding restrictions, page 9, para 2F(2). Concur. Eighth Army and "DA PAC, with concurrence by DA, intend to buy out HMSE stocks and transfer them to OMA funding, once stockage levels are firm and OMA funds are provided. This action will relieve restrictions currently experienced due to stock fund obligation authorities.

9. (C) Reference item concerning M7 TRC-2h Equipment Modifications, page 10, para 2F(2). Nonconcur. Information available to this headquarters indicates that the three prong connectors were removed by 5761st Signal Maintenance personnel and replaced with two prong connectors. Items are functioning correctly at this time and no further problems are anticipated.
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 38th Arty Bde (AD) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed except for the following item.

2. Reference paragraph 8, 1st Indorsement: Contrary to the statement in reference paragraph, this headquarters has given no official concurrence to approve a buy-out of HMSE stocks and transfer to OMA funding. This headquarters nonconcurred in that proposal in FY 68. No funds have been programmed in FY 69 or FY 70 OMA budgets for that requirement. Recent severe reductions in FY 69 OMA funding eliminate a capability to absorb HMSE requirements within current OMA availability.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Cy furn:
CG USAEIGHT
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CG, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD)
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

** FOR OT RD #

***PAGE #

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.