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30 nov 1979, DoDD 5200.10; per OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6a and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
Army Attache, US Embassy, London (Thru ACSI)
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96266

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UK - DHI - HS) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO 96266

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHERC-DH
APO 96507

THRU: Commander in Chief
US Army Pacific
ATTN: GPCP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

In compliance with AR 1-19, dated 26 May 1966, Subject, Operational Reports - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65), this headquarters' Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 May - 31 July 1967 is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CONSTANTINE C. CARANITAS
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

For ORD FILE
L70785

C.E. 6-7-1967

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
QUARTERLY FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD Dir 5200.10
SECTION I - Significant Organizational Activities.

A. Administration/Personnel

During this reporting period, there were several changes in command of II FFORCEN Artillery. On 10 May 1967, Colonel George R. Allin, Jr., the Deputy Commander, assumed command from Brigadier General W. D. Crittenden, Jr. Colonel Ralph K. Jones assumed command from Colonel Allin on 23 May 1967. Brigadier General Raymond P. Murphy, arriving from CONUS, assumed command of II FFORCEN Artillery on 1 June 1967.

The current organizational structure of II FFORCEN Artillery is at Inclusion 1.

The Force Artillery Headquarters did not move during this period.

The morale of this unit continues to be outstanding and the following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel during the periods: Bronze Star Medal - 33; Army Commendation Medal - 30; Air Medal - 10.
The stationing plan for artillery was completed as all artillery units programmed for Calendar Year 1967 arrived in the Republic of Vietnam. Continued emphasis was placed on increasing the accuracy of artillery and assistance to ARVN.

2. Stationing and Missions of II FFORCEN Artillery Units.

The current and approved stationing plan is at enclosure 2. Battery B, 7th Battalion; 8th Artillery, is not at the station indicated in the plan because of operational requirements. The battery is currently located at BIEN HOA. The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm T) and 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm T) are under the operational control of Task Force OREGON in I CTZ, and since their date of return is unknown, they do not appear in the current stationing plan.

a. Secret message 15794, COMUSMACV, dated 1312COZ May 67, Subject, General Support Artillery for TF OREGON, diverted the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, programmed for the Third Corps Tactical Zone, to I CTZ for attachment to TF OREGON. This battalion joined the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, another II FFORCEN Artillery Battalion, which previously deployed in April with TF OREGON.

b. The advance party of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175mm SP) arrived in-country on 20 June 1967. The main body arrived on 28 June. The battalion, assigned to the 54th Artillery Group, became operational on 7 July 1967 with one battery deployed at BEN LUC, in LONG AN Province; one battery at BEAR CAT in BIEN HOA Province; and a third battery, which was scheduled for deployment to DONG TAM, in DINH TIC Province (IV CTZ), at BIEN HOA to meet present operational commitments. The deployment of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery into LONG AN and the IV Corps area will provide the first heavy artillery support to US and ARVN Forces operating in these areas.

c. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery previously located at BEAR CAT, relocated to HAM TAM on 10 July 1967. This move was made possible as Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery became operational at BEAR CAT. The deployments discussed in paragraph b, above, and the relocation of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery completed the stationing plans for heavy artillery during Calendar Year 1967. Present heavy artillery coverage of the III CTZ and IV Corps is shown at enclosure 3.

d. Previous stationing plans indicated the intent to attach two 105mm T battalions directly to US divisions. Upon arrival of the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm T) in May 67, the battalion was assigned
to II PPORCEV and attached to the 25th Infantry Division. Secret message, COMUSMACV, dated 311225Z Jan 67; Subject, Artillery Mix in RVN, diverted the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm T) from I PPORCEV to II PPORCEV. The battalion arrived in May 67, was assigned to II PPORCEV and attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

e. The present standard missions of artillery units under II PPORCEV Artillery are at Inclosure 4.

3. (C) Assistance to ARVN.

a. Emphasis continues to be placed on assisting ARVN Artillery. During this period, CG II PPORCEV Art, the Deputy Commander and subordinate commanders maintained command liaison by making visits to ARVN, RP/PF and CIDG unit commanders and advisors. II PPORCEV Artillery's ARVN Liaison Officer visits III Corps Headquarters daily, providing an interchange of information; and the III Corps Senior Artillery Advisor frequently coordinates with this headquarters. Closer cooperation is evident throughout III CTZ.

b. FSC personnel from this headquarters assisted in training RP/PF personnel in observed fire procedures. To broaden this program, instructor teams have been formed at the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups. These teams will be replaced by ARVN Artillery Teams as the latter are organized.

c. Through coordination with this headquarters, the Senior Artillery Advisor, III Corps Artillery and 18th ARVN Division Artillery, efforts to simplify and expedite requests for fire from RP/PF outposts were devised by fabrication of 100 target indicators. This device aids in identifying the coordinates and/or azimuth to any target threatening an outpost. (See Inclosure 5)

d. During the reporting period, over 1,200 missions were fired in support of ARVN with an expenditure of approximately 9,000 rounds. Mutual fire support is planned on a daily basis whereby ARVN initiated targets are included in the US H&I programs. During this reporting period, about one hundred (100) H&I missions were fired on ARVN initiated targets.

e. One indication of progress made in assisting the training of ARVN Artillerymen is the significant ARVN support provided the US 1st Infantry Division during Operation Billings. The 3d Platoon, Battery C, 35th Artillery (155mm T) (ARVN) fired over 2,200 rounds in support of the 1st Division.

f. One factor which limits ARVN's ability to engage in independent offensive operations is the lack of organic artillery support. Although artillery is assigned, it is normally required to remain in fixed locations to provide defensive fires for military installations, hamlets, villages, and static RP/PF outposts. Through close coordination and fires

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planning, US artillery was able to take over ARVN artillery defensive fires for a period of time, thus permitting ARVN Artillery to displace and support their maneuver forces. In early May, a battery of the 5th ARVN Division Artillery displaced to support the 7th ARVN Regiment while US batteries at PHU LOI, LAI KHE, PHUOC VINH, and QUAN LOI assumed ARVN defensive missions. Also in May, artillery of the 54th Artillery Group assumed the mission for artillery defense of XUAN LOC and adjacent RF/PP outposts, permitting the ARVN battery to displace in support of Operation WHIRLWIND. Two US Forward Observer Parties, one LMO, and an aerial observer were also provided.

4. (c) Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.

a. Artillery Ballistic Meteorology (METRO).

With the arrival of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175mm SP) and concurrent repositioning of Metro sections, near ideal Metro coverage has been established. The current stationing of Metro Stations is shown in Inclosure 6.

b. Calibration of Artillery Pieces.

During this reporting period, 238 of 423 US/FWMAF artillery pieces and 20 of 14 ARVN artillery pieces were calibrated. Increased coordination between the calibration team, this headquarters and artillery units, enabled them to calibrate more units this quarter than ever before. Calibration is a continuing program.

c. Survey.

Since the II FFORCEV Artillery survey program was initiated, control has been extended to all US/FWMAF base camps and to all Special Forces camps requiring control in the III CTZ. Survey control has also been placed at or near all ARVN artillery platoons in III CTZ, and to five ARVN platoons in IV CTZ. Future plans include, establishing survey control at Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts, with priority to those near hamlets having Revolutionary Development Teams; assisting the artillery groups/division artillery as required; and furthering the extension of survey in III and IV CTZ. The current status of survey control in III CTZ is shown at Inclosure 5.

5. (c) Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) Program.

a. During this reporting period, coordination was made with US Special Forces Detachments, located in remote areas, in order to establish procedures for programming H&I fires. Because of their intimate knowledge of enemy activity in these areas, Special Forces Detachments are able to furnish timely intelligence data for programming targets. Twelve to eighteen targets are provided by each Special Forces Camp for daily inclusion in the Force H&I program. The heavy artillery batteries located at
TAY MINH, SOUW DA and QUAN LOI fire in support of the Special Forces Camps.

b. To further establish indications of the effectiveness of the Hal program, all available IPW reports are being screened. Since this headquarters initiated a Special Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) on the subject of artillery effectiveness, including Hal's, questions are included in prisoner interrogation on this subject. There have been comments with specific reference to Hal fires in IPW reports. The general indication is that Hal fires have been inflicting damages and casualties causing enemy personnel to rally.

6. (3) Aircraft for Artillery Units.

Inadequate organic aviation continues to have an adverse effect on the artillery operations of II FFORCEV Artillery. This is particularly true with regard to helicopter support.

a. In May 1966, DA announced a policy that all combat support units would be deployed without aviation support. As a result, one artillery group headquarters and five artillery battalions deployed to RVN minus their organic aviation assets. Additionally, the 5th Bn (AM) (SP), 2d Artillery, OPGCN to II FFORCEV Artillery, and HNB, 8th TIB, attached to II FFORCEV Artillery are not authorized any aircraft.

b. Due to the counterinsurgency environment in RVN, artillery units of the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups and the 5th Bn (AM) (SP), 2d Artillery, are deployed in widely dispersed locations, which have insecure routes of communication. Conducting normal command and control, and administrative and logistical functions, require commanders and their staffs to rely primarily on air transportation. Insufficient aircraft support prevents commanders from exerting timely and effective supervision on subordinate unit activities in the areas of operations, training, discipline, maintenance and other functions of command. In addition, route and position reconnaissance, and visits to other headquarters in order to coordinate the employment of batteries is severely hampered. All of the above factors create extensive command and control problems; the solution of which rests with the use of helicopter aircraft. To meet these additional requirements, MTGEC's were submitted by artillery units outlining the additional aviation support required; however, due to a DA moratorium, approval of these MTGEC's has been delayed.

c. To reduce the aviation support problems for combat support units, II FFORCEV Artillery allocates aviation assets to subordinate units from present II FFORCEV assets; however, this is an interim measure and does not fulfill all aviation support requirements. Experience gained thus far in RVN indicates that fully effective artillery operations are not feasible without adequate aircraft organic to groups and battalions. Approval of requested MTGEC action appears to be the best solution to obtain the required levels of aviation support for artillery units.
7. (B) Requirements for Additional Counter-Mortar Radar Sets.

a. The need for additional counter-mortar radars in the III CTZ has been stressed in all previous operational reports. This headquarters previous report indicated an increase in mortar attacks. This reporting period saw another increase in mortar attacks and for the first time in III CTZ the introduction of rockets by VC/NVA Forces.

b. Currently, there are two major airfields and seventeen major base camps in III CTZ, and for ideal coverage there should be four counter-mortar radars at each major airfield and three at each major II PPCEC base camp. At present, there are two AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radars each at Tan Son Nhut AB and Bien Hoa AB; ten radars located at base camps throughout III CTZ, and one AN/MPQ-4A at Dong Tam in the IV CTZ.

c. Based upon an evaluation made by subordinate elements of II PPCEC, it is estimated that twenty-seven (27) additional counter-mortar radars are required for units under the operational control of II PPCEC. Headquarters USARV was notified of this in Confidential message AFB-PAB 70654, CG II PPCEC, dated 27 July 67, Subject, Counter-Mortar Radar (CMR). This message recommended that twelve (12) AN/MPQ-4A Radars available in CONUS, (Depot and Reserve sources), be allocated for immediate use in RIV prior to consideration of AN/MPQ-10 or 10A Radars. As an interim measure, the remaining fifteen (15) radar requirements be filled by allocating AN/MPQ-10 or 10A Radars pending availability of AN/MPQ-4A Radars. These numbers were derived from consideration of information provided in Secret message, CG USARV, dated 10 July 67, Subject, Counter-Mortar Radars.

8. (C) Introduction of Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer.

a. A FADAC orientation team arrived at Headquarters, II PPCEC artillery on 11 June 67 for the purpose of coordinating the introduction of FADAC equipment to artillery units in II PPCEV. A week of briefings were scheduled to give commanders and supervisors an orientation on the capabilities of FADAC. Also discussed was the expected date and program of issue. All US Artillery units through battery level are scheduled to receive FADAC, and it is expected that a period of one year will be required to complete the program.

b. To date, the 25th Infantry Division Artillery received the initial issue of FADAC equipment, and their equipment was received on 23 July 67. Concurrent with the issue of this equipment, a five day training period was conducted for all users on the operational aspects of FADAC. Additional back-up maintenance equipment was issued to the divisional and non-divisional maintenance battalions in order to provide the logistics base for the FADAC program. To date, firings have demonstrated the effectiveness of the system.

9. (C) Publications.

The following significant publications aimed to further the
effectiveness of II FFORCE Artillery were distributed:

a. Regulation 525-1, Subject, Uniform Concentration Designation System, dated 28 April 67, classified Confidential, with Change 1 dated 25 June 67, was published for all artillery units in III CTZ. The new Regulation provides a uniform concentration designation system for all artillery units and is expected to insure rapid identification of targets and assist in the coordination of all artillery fires. (Inlosure 8)

b. Letter of Instructions 2-67, Headquarters, II FFORCE Artillery, Subject, Airmobile Operations, dated 25 June 67, classified Confidential, was published to promote aggressive use of light artillery. This Regulation prescribes procedures for conducting air mobile operations of independent artillery task forces comprised of 2-4 guns. Security forces are furnished from assets of the tasked unit. This provides the Force Commander a capability to respond with increased flexibility in meeting emergencies, an additional means to exploit available intelligence and to otherwise influence the course of battle. (Inlosure 9)

c. II FFORCE Circular 525-1, Subject, Employment of 105mm Beehive Ammunition, dated 10 August 67, classified Confidential, has been written to provide uniform guidance and implementing instructions for handling, storage, and employment of 105mm Beehive Ammunition XM546. (Inlosure 10)

d. Regulation 525-10, Subject, Harrassment and Interdiction, dated 28 July 67, classified Confidential, was published to facilitate the coordination of air and ground H&I programs throughout II FFORCE. Emphasis was placed on the acquisition of targets by using the entire II FFORCE intelligence system, rapid dissemination of information and lateral exchange of information. Increased emphasis was also placed on a continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of the program in view of the large ammunition expenditure. (Inlosure 11)

10. (U) Civil Affairs.

During the reporting period, significant changes occurred which have had a direct bearing on HQ II FFORCE Artillery’s Civil Affairs program. On 28 June 67, staff responsibility for this program was assigned to the S2. On 13 July 67, the 19th AA Civil Affairs Platoon, consisting of 2 officers and 2 EM, was attached to HQ II FFORCE Artillery. Civic action performed by HQ II FFORCE Artillery included MEDCAP programs, English instruction, distribution of commodities, transportation of potable water to an orphanage, construction of two sets of playground equipment and furnishing edible garbage to a pig farm. Future projects include continuation of the above and construction of a four classroom school building in TAN LAP Hamlet, BUI TIEH Village.
C. (C) Logistics.

1. (C) A more responsive system for delivery of repair parts to the using unit would reduce deadline time. This is particularly true for the M115 sight and M117 sight for the 175mm Gun and 155mm Howitzer respectively. These float sights are available in-country, however, they are being stocked at general support maintenance units. Stockage of these float sights at direct support maintenance units would allow for immediate direct exchange by using units, reducing unnecessary deadline time.

2. (C) There is an existing in-country shortage of repair parts for the M42 twin 40mm Duster. It is understood that the factory production of M-42's stopped about ten years ago and assets from all available sources in CONUS were used to provide Duster vehicles and PLL/ASL for units deploying to Vietnam. Stockages of repair parts should be established in-country.
SECTION II, PART 1 - OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations:

   **COMMUNICATIONS**

   **Item:** Installation of Speech Security Equipment T/SEC-KY-8.

   **Discussion:** During this reporting period, the communications platoon installed a secure speech (FM) link between this headquarters and the two subordinate groups, using Speech Security Equipment T/SEC-KY-8. This equipment provides direct secure communications between the SM Sections of the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups. Two precautions to observe during the installation of Speech Security Equipment T/SEC-KY-8 are:

   a. Insure the proper Adapter Card is installed. The Adapter Card used for all configurations of the AN/VRC-12 family of FM radios is the 0020399-1.

   b. To make the Receiver Transmitter RT-524 compatible with the KY-8, place the X-MREE -NORMAL switch, (S-400 t) located on the back of assembly A4000, in the X-MREE position. Switching or changing filters as described in TM-11-5020-20 is not required.

   **Observation:** Proper utilization of Speech Security Equipment insures a rapid, direct and secure means of communications between units.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (U) Logistics: None.

6. (U) Other: None.

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SECTION II, PART 2 - RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (U) Operations:
   Item: Aircraft for Artillery Units.

   Discussion: As stated in Section I, paragraph B6, and recommended in other previous Operational Reports, the full effectiveness of the artillery in II FFORCEN will be impaired until adequate aircraft support is provided.

   Recommendation: That all MTOE's submitted by units of II FFORCEN Artillery be approved to provide required organic aircraft.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.

4. (S) Intelligence:
   a. Item: Counter-Mortar Radar Sets.

   Discussion: In Section I, paragraph B7, the need for twenty-seven (27) additional counter-mortar radar detachments was explained. Additionally, the II FFORCEN message referenced in this same paragraph outlined the requirements of II FFORCEN.

   Recommendation: That twenty-seven additional counter-mortar radars be provided for II FFORCEN. Twelve (12) available AN/MPQ-9A Radars (Depot and Reserve Stockages) should be sent for immediate use in RVN and fifteen (15) AN/MPQ-10, or 10A's should be allocated as an interim means until AN/MPQ-4A's are available.

   b. Item: Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battalion.

   Discussion: In view of the increased number of enemy mortar/rocket attacks as mentioned in Section I, paragraph B7, and the fact that the most difficult task of Artillery in Vietnam is to locate suitable targets, a Target Acquisition Battalion should be deployed to RVN under the operational control of II FFORCEN Artillery. The present Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 6th TAB provides only survey and metro capabilities. The additional radars, sound ranging and flash ranging equipment and survey sections, organic to a Target Acquisition Battalion would provide II FFORCEN with a needed capability to counter mortar/rocket attacks and would also provide additional means of acquiring more lucrative targets.

   Recommendation: That future Force Development Programs consider the inclusion of a Target Acquisition Battalion for II FFORCEN Artillery.

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5. (C) Logistics

a. Item: Maintenance Support of 23 Inch Xenon Searchlights.

Discussion: Under current procedures defective sub-assemblies of this searchlight are sent to Granite City Arsenal to be repaired. According to 1st Logistical Command, the turn-around time at Granite City is supposed to be 72 hours, under current Granite City Arsenal SOP. Experience indicates that a turn-around time for some sub-assemblies approaches 60 days. This excess turn-around time, coupled with the spare parts shortage, has resulted in excessive down-time periods for searchlights and is unacceptable.

Recommendation: Recommend that a repair facility for sub-assemblies be organized in-country to eliminate the delay in sending the sub-assemblies to the ZI for repair, and that adequate stockage of in-country spare parts be provided. This recommendation has been discussed with 1st Logistical Command.

b. Item: Float Sights (M115 and M117):

Discussion: As mentioned in Section I, paragraph C1, the stockage of float sights at general support maintenance units rather than direct support maintenance units increases deadline time of artillery weapons.

Recommendation: That consideration be given to stockage of float sights (M115 and M117) at direct support maintenance units. This recommendation has been informally brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command.

c. Item: Shortage of Repair Parts for the M-42.

Discussion: As mentioned in Section I, paragraph C2, there is a shortage of required repair parts in-country for the M-42 Twin 40mm Duster.

Recommendation: That in-country stockage levels of repair parts for the M-42 be established, so as to be responsive to the using units repair parts requirements. This recommendation has been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command.

6. (U) Other: None.

Raymond P. Murphy
Brigadier General, USA Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, 31 July 1967

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 23 AUG 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (U) Reference page 10, Item: Field Artillery Target Acquisition Bn. The addition of this type unit within II FFORCEV Artillery would definitely enhance target detection capability of the units concerned.

3. (U) Concur with the other comments, recommendations and actions taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AG
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

27 SEP 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, II Field Force Artillery (WDHKS) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning aircraft for artillery units, paragraph 56, page 5 and paragraph 2, page 10: Concur with the requirement for aircraft for artillery units; however, current DA policy is that non-di

b. Reference item concerning requirement for additional counter-mortar radar sets, paragraph 4a, page 10: Concur with the recommendation contained in section I, paragraph 7b, and section II, paragraph 4a. Twenty-

c. Reference item concerning target acquisition, paragraph 46, page 10. One TA Btry is programmed for RVN which will have two flash ranging platoons and two sound ranging platoons. Availability date is unknown. Additional assets are not available.

d. Reference item concerning repair facility for Xenon searchlight subassemblies, paragraph 5a, page 11: Comment: A repair and return program for the 33" Xenon searchlight was established by the night vision project manager at Granite City Army Depot in February 1967. This is an interim program to provide maintenance support pending parts procurement. Direct support units have been instructed to requisition maintenance float items at 15 percent of density. During 2d quarter FY 68 a repair capability will exist in-country.

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AVHC-G-DST
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

   e. Reference item concerning stockage of float sights, paragraph 5b, page 11: Nonconcur. However, a message is being dispatched to 1st Logistical Command tasking them to conduct a study of this program and provide recommendations to this headquarters.

   f. Reference item concerning shortage of repair parts for M42, 40mm AkhSP Weapons System (Duster), paragraph 5c, page 11: Concur. A message is being dispatched to 1st Logistical Command tasking them to evaluate this problem and recommend solutions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT AGC
Asst AG

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GPOP-DT(undtd) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 from HQ, II Fld Force Vn (Arty) (UIC: WDHIHS) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGO
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc
ORGANIZATION OF II FFORCEV ARTILLERY

1. The following units are attached to II FFORCEV Artillery:
   a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion.
   b. 19th AA Platoon, 2d Civil Affairs Company.

2. The following units are under the Operational Control of II FFORCEV Artillery:
   a. 23d Artillery Group.
      (1) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery.
      (2) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.
      (3) 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. (Presently Ocon TF Oregon).
      (4) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.
      (5) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.
      (6) 17th AA Platoon, 2d Civil Affairs Company.
   b. 54th Artillery Group.
      (1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery.
      (2) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery.
      (3) 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. (Presently Ocon TF Oregon).
      (4) 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery.
      (5) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery.
      (6) 18th AA Platoon, 2d Civil Affairs Company.
   c. 5th Battalion (AV) (SP), 2d Artillery.
      (1) Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery.
      (2) Battery I (S/LT), 29th Artillery.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>AS OF 30 APRIL 67</th>
<th>AS OF 31 JULY 67</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEAR CAT</td>
<td>7/9th Arty (105mm T)</td>
<td>7/9th Arty (105mm T)</td>
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<td>Btry B, 1/83d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>Btry C, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
<td>Btry C, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
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<td>1 Plt, Btry I (SILF), 29th Arty</td>
<td>HE, Svo, Btry C, 7/8th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>BEN LUC</td>
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<td>Btry A, 7/8th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>CU CHI</td>
<td>Btry A, 2/32d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>Btry B, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
<td>Btry B, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
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<td>1 Plt, Btry I (SILF), 29th Arty</td>
<td>1 Plt, Btry I (SILF), 29th Arty</td>
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<td>DAU TIENG</td>
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<td>Btry C, 1/27th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
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<td>LOCATION</td>
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<td>AS OF 31 JULY 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>DONG TAM</td>
<td>1 Plt, Btry H (SLI), 29th Arty</td>
<td>1 Plt, Btry H (SLI), 29th Arty</td>
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<td>(SEE NOTE)</td>
<td>Btry B, 7/8th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>HAM TAM</td>
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<td>Btry B, 1/83d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>LONG XIMH</td>
<td>HHB, 8/25th Arty (TAB)</td>
<td>HHB, 8/25th Arty (TAB)</td>
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<td>Svo, 6/27th Arty</td>
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<td>Svo, 2/35th Arty</td>
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<td>HHB, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
<td>HHB, 5th Bn (AWSF), 2d Arty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HQ, Btry I (SLI), 29th Arty</td>
<td>HQ, 1 Plt, Btry I (SLI), 29th Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUI DAT</td>
<td>Btry A, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
<td>Btry A, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
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<td>HHB, Svo, Btry A, 1/83d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>HHB, Svo, Btry A, 1/83d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>LOCATION</td>
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<td>AS OF 31 JULY 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>HHD, 23rd Arty</td>
<td>HHD, 23rd Arty</td>
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<td>2/13th Arty (105mm T)</td>
<td>2/13th Arty (105mm T)</td>
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<td>1 Plt, I Btry (SLT), 29th Arty</td>
<td>1 Plt, I Btry (SLT), 29th Arty</td>
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<td>Btry A (AWSP), 5th Bn, 2d Arty</td>
<td>Btry A (AWSP), 5th Bn, 2d Arty</td>
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<td>HHD, Svc, Btry A, 1/27th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POCU VMH</td>
<td>HHD, C/6/27th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>HHD, C/6/27th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>Btry A, 6/27th Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUOI DA</td>
<td>Btry B, 2/32d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>Btry B, 2/32d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAY NHK</td>
<td>HHD, Svc, Btry C, 2/32d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>HHD, Svc, Btry C, 2/32d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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<td>Btry B, 1/27th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
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### LOCATION

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AS OF 30 APRIL 67</th>
<th>AS OF 31 JULY 67</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>XUAN LOC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>HEB, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>HEB, 54th Arty Gp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry C, 1/63d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
<td>Btry C, 1/63d Arty (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEB, Btry B, C, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
<td>HEB, Btry B, C, 2/35th Arty (155mm SP)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** To meet operational commitments, one PB, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, scheduled for DONG TAM, deployed to BIEN HOA. Further consideration is now being given to the stationing of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery.
ARTILLERY COVERAGE AS OF 31 JULY 1967

ADDITIONAL PLANNED ARTILLERY COVERAGE

Note: The range capability circles shown are those of the 175mm GUNS. The shorter range weapons' circles are included within those of the 175mm and therefore are not shown here.
MISSIONS OF II PPORCEV ARTRILLERY UNITS

1. 23d Artillery Group - General Support II PPORCEV and III ARVN Corps.
   a. 2d Bn, 13th Arty - GSReinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.
   b. 2d Bn, 11th Arty - Opoon TF 25BQQN.
   c. 1st Bn, 27th Arty - GSReinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
   d. 6th Bn, 27th Arty - GSReinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.
   e. 2d Bn, 32d Arty - GSReinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

2. 54th Artillery Group - General Support II PPORCEV and III ARVN Corps.
   a. 7th Bn, 9th Arty - GSReinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
   b. 2d Bn, 35th Arty - GSReinf 54th Artillery Group.
      (1) Battery A - GSReinf 1st Australian Task Force.
      (2) Battery B - GSReinf 18th ARVN Division.
      (3) Battery C - GSReinf 18th ARVN Division.
   c. 3d Bn, 16th Arty - Opoon Task Force O8HQQN.
   d. 1st Bn, 83d Arty - GSReinf 54th Artillery Group.
      (1) Battery A - GSReinf 1st Royal Artillery Regiment.
      (2) Battery B - GSReinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
      (3) Battery C - GSReinf 18th ARVN Division.

3. 5th Bn (AV) (SP), 2d Artillery - General Support II PPORCEV
   a. Battery A - Attached 1st Infantry Division.
   b. Battery B - Attached 25th Infantry Division.
   c. Battery C - Attached 9th Infantry Division.
   d. Battery D - General Support II PPORCEV.
Method of Operation: The target indicator is positioned in azimuth towards North using a permanent indexed reference. The rotating arrow is then positioned toward the direction of attack. Azimuth to target is obtained and a rough range estimation is made. To aid in estimating range and calling for fires, terrain features and defensive concentrations are sometimes indicated on the target indicator with a rough distance scale.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SCHEDULED BROADCAST TIMES (LST)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1st Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>0430--1030--1530--2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 9th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>0200--0800--1400--2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 25th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>0230--0830--1430--2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1st Bn 27th Arty</td>
<td>Dau Tieng</td>
<td>0415--1015--1615--2215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 6th Bn 27th Arty</td>
<td>Quan Loi</td>
<td>0200--0800--1400--2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 7th Bn 8th Arty</td>
<td>Ben Luo</td>
<td>0215--0815--1415--2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 8th Bn 25th Arty</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>0400--1000--1600--2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 8th Bn 25th Arty</td>
<td>Han Tan</td>
<td>0415--1015--1615--2215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 2nd Bn 32nd Arty</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>0030--0630--1230--1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 2nd Bn 35th Arty</td>
<td>Xuan Loc</td>
<td>0215--0815--1415--2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 1st Bn 83rd Arty</td>
<td>Hui Dat</td>
<td>0400--1000--1600--2200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadcast frequency for all metro sections is 2,575 MC.

For further information concerning meteorological data contact the
Meteorological Quality Control Team: Telephone Hurricane 214.
II FORCEV REGULATION NUMBER 525-1

COMBAT OPERATIONS

UNIFORM CONCENTRATION DESIGNATION SYSTEM

Confidential INCLOSURE 8 Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of LII 2-67 is to provide guidance to subordinate units of II Field Artillery for the development of aggressive airmobile programs oriented towards an artillery task force concept.

2. (U) OBJECTIVE: To provide II Field Artillery with the capability of deploying small independent 105mm artillery task forces for short periods of time for the purpose of attacking targets of opportunity throughout the III CFZ.

3. (C) CONCEPT: Due to terrain, tactical requirements and the limited range of 105mm guns, frequently it is desirable to airmobile 105mm artillery fire power. This concept has proven successful and extremely valuable in furthering the effectiveness of II Field Artillery; however, the additional external resources required for airlifting complete 105mm batteries precludes widespread employment of this technique. To exploit to the fullest the capabilities of this light weight weapon, II Field Artillery 105mm artillery battalions will develop the ability to airmobile small artillery forces (2-4 guns) on short notice for independent operations of limited duration. All forces required, less aviation, will be provided from organic assets. Training programs and operational procedures will be developed which implement this "Shoot and Scoot" concept for small artillery task forces.

4. (U) EXECUTION:

   a. The 105mm artillery battalions will develop training programs to insure proficiency in the following phases of airmobile operations:

      (1) Organization for movement.
      (2) Loading operations.
      (3) Movement of artillery task force to and security of position area.

INCLOSURE 9
AVFB-FAC
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI-2-67) Airmobile Operations (U)

(4) Occupation of Position area and completion of mission.

(5) Extraction of artillery task force.

b. Battalions and batteries will develop SOP’s in sufficient detail to insure rapid execution of an independent airmobile operation employing two to four 105mm howitzers.

c. Sufficient training exercises will be conducted to insure proficiency in all phases of this airmobile operation. Due to continuing tactical requirements, maximum use will be made of routine displacements to exercise, evaluate and refine unit SOP’s.

5. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Artillery Groups:

(1) Task light artillery battalions with the requirements necessary to accomplish the objective outlined in paragraph 2 above.

(2) Forward to II FFORCEV Artillery copies of approved SOP’s required by paragraph 4b above.

(3) Monitor training programs to insure proficiency is maintained and to provide guidance and assistance as required.

b. Artillery Battalions: Establish air mobility training programs in order to meet II FFORCEV Artillery objective in paragraph 2 above.

c. Artillery Batteries: Through training programs develop and maintain proficiency necessary to meet II FFORCEV Artillery objective in paragraph 2 above.

6. (U) IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Operations envisaged in paragraph 3 above will be from four to eight hours in duration. In executing this "Shoot and Scoor" concept, task forces will be drawn solely from organic resources. For planning purposes 300-500 105mm rounds will be considered adequate for accomplishment of the assigned mission.

b. II FFORCEV Artillery will provide assistance in obtaining aviation support necessary to implement the concept outlined herein.

c. Programs of intelligence will be intensified with the view of developing suitable targets against which these artillery task forces might be profitably employed.

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AVFB-FAC

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI 2-67), Airmobile Operations. (U)

d. Operations of the type envisioned by this LOI will be conducted only on approval of this headquarters.

OFFICIAL:

S/TURNER
TURNER
S-3
CIRCULAR NUMBER 525-1

10 August 1967

Effective until 10 August 1968 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Employment of 105mm Beehive Ammunition, (XM546) (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: This circular provides guidance and implementing instructions for handling, storage, and employment of 105mm Beehive ammunition XM546.

2. (U) GENERAL: The 105mm Beehive ammunition is highly effective when utilized by artillery units in attacking large concentrations of personnel. Because of its experimental nature, spread in coverage and high lethality, utmost care must be exercised in the handling, storage and employment of this ammunition.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES: US/FRG artillery commanders under the operational control of this headquarters will use the following guidelines in establishing operational procedures with respect to this ammunition.

   a. Handling and Storage.

      (1) At least six rounds per tube of Beehive ammunition will be located at each 105mm position.

      (2) A minimum of two rounds of Beehive ammunition will be removed from the issued fiberboard container and available for immediate use at each 105mm howitzer position. To prevent deterioration of propellant and to prevent damage during transport, units will fabricate waterproof containers for these two rounds. Experience has shown that wet fiberboard containers become unsatisfactory as storage containers.

      (3) All Beehive rounds received from an Ammunition Supply Point will be immediately inspected to insure all rounds are serviceable and that the fuze is set on muzzle action. The fiber containers on all but the ready rounds will be resealed.

      (4) Beehive ammunition will be safeguarded against capture and an emergency destruction plan will be prepared for each weapon location and unit ammunition dump containing Beehive ammunition. The destruction materials must be readily available at or near the location of the ammunition.

   b. Employment.

      (1) Beehive ammunition with Fuze MT, XM563E1 and XM563E2 may be used for defensive direct fire.

INCLOSURE TO CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Local artillery commanders will coordinate plans for firing Beehive ammunition with supporting infantry and armor security forces to preclude injury to friendly elements. All defensive bunkers surrounding the artillery position should have sandbag protection to the rear to preclude injury to friendly troops if Beehive ammunition is utilized before the withdrawal of these elements within the artillery perimeter.

(3) Local artillery commanders will assign sectors of fire to each 105mm howitzer in a fire support/patrol base, coordinate with the maneuver unit commander and clearly establish responsibility and authority for employment of Beehive ammunition.

(4) Beehive ammunition will not be used for indirect fire.

c. Training and Inspection.

(1) A detailed training program will be established to insure that all personnel within firing batteries are familiar with the handling, storage and firing of the Beehive round. This program will include imaginative and convincing demonstrations for new personnel to familiarize them with the characteristics and effects of this ammunition.

(2) Artillery commanders will make this item a matter of their personal attention during routine unit inspections.

4. (U) REFERENCES:

a. Mag 60217, Secret, AVFED-8, HQ II FFORCENV, 090625Z Jun 67, subject: Distribution of 105mm Beehive Ammunition C513 (U).

b. Mag 11294, Confidential, MACJ43-AM, HQ MACV, 051252Z Apr 67, subject: Distribution and Safeguarding of Beehive Ammunition (U).

c. Mag 45938, Confidential, AVKED-AM, HQ UBAHV, 071101Z Jul 67, subject: Indirect Firing of XM566 Beehive with X6632 Fuse (U).

d. Mag 825031, Confidential, DA, 252049Z Jul 67, subject: Request for Increased Limited Production TF Cartridge 105mm: Antipersonnel XM646 (U).

(AVFB-AT)
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HEADQUARTERS
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

22 July 1967

CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Harassment and Interdiction (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To establish coordinated air and ground harassment and interdiction (H&I) programs to be conducted at force, division, and brigade levels by elements of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEN).  

2. (C) GENERAL: In order to bring and keep under fire known Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) formations, supporting installations, facilities, and lines of communication, H&I programs will be conducted by the divisions and separate brigades of II FFORCEN, using all available fire support means.  In addition, an H&I program will be conducted at Field Force level so that participation by strategic air, tactical air, Army aviation, naval gunfire, and artillery will be considered for appropriate targets. Participation of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAV) in H&I programs will be included to the maximum extent possible.

3. (C) CONSIDER:

a. Harassment and interdiction programs will be developed to cover areas known to be used and occupied by the VC/NVA. All major VC forces (regiments, battalions) will be harassed on a sustained program for their locations or appropriate locations become known. These programs are intended to be a continuing, coordinated effort to disrupt enemy activities, and harass enemy movement.

b. All means available will be employed around the clock to include US, Free World, and RVNAV capabilities. During periods of reduced visibility and inclement weather, specific attention should be given to the use of "SKY SPOT" (radar controlled bombing) in the tactical air portion of the H&I program.

c. The success of these programs depends on the acquisition of targets by the entire intelligence system and the rapid dissemination and exchange of information laterally, and to higher and lower headquarters.

d. In order to hamper the enemy's operations and to force his continuously to change his routes of communication, camps, and supply areas, plan the attack of targets so that no set pattern is established.

*This regulation supersedes II FFORCEN Regulation 525-10, 12 May 1966.

INCLOSURE II

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DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL

Reg No 525-10, HA, II FFORCENV, APO San Francisco 96266, 22 July 1967

e. The most economical means of fire support which can accomplish the mission will be used.

f. Every effort will be made to avoid inflicting friendly military or civilian casualties and to minimize damage to civilian property. All H&I fires will be cleared in accordance with Annex D, II FFORCENV Letter of Instructions (LOI 7-66) (II FFORCENV Campaign Plan for 1967).

4. (c) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Overall Responsibilities:

   (1) Division and separate brigade commanders will:

      (a) Establish, control, and coordinate the development and execution of an H&I program to include elements of the RVNAF when appropriate.

      (b) Develop target lists as required, concentrating on major base areas, known or suspected unit locations, supply areas, command and control installations, and infiltration routes within Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOIs).

      (c) Coordinate with adjacent commanders as required in the development and execution of the program.

      (d) Be prepared to brief CONUSMACV, DEPCONUSMACV, and CG, II FFORCENV on the status of the program during visits.

   (2) Fire Support Coordination Centers will:

      (a) Monitor development and execution of the program.

      (b) Recommend changes or modifications to the program.

      (c) Assist subordinate headquarters in problems that may arise.

b. Specific Responsibilities in Headquarters, II FFORCENV:

   (1) G2 develops target lists to include location, size, permanence and recuperability.

   (2) G3 provides the G2 and Assistant Fire Support Coordinator guidance on areas of command interest for the H&I program. Specific note will be made of those planned operational areas that could be adversely influenced by this program.

2

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DISTRIBUTION:
- CG, 1st Inf Div - 30
- CG, 9th Inf Div - 30
- CG, 25th Inf Div - 30
- CG, 173d Abn Bde - 8
- CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde - 8
- CG, 1st ATF - 6
- CO, 23d Arty Op - 10
- CO, 54th Arty Op - 10
- AVFBC - 2
- AVFBD - 1
- AVFBD-808 - 1
- CG, II FORCEN Arty, ATTN: 83 - 15
(3) The Fire Support Coordinator, through coordination with 03, allocates resources available to attack targets as their known or suspected locations become available.

5. (C) COORDINATION:

a. The II FFORCEV Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCCE) will be requested to assist in obtaining clearances if adequate communications do not exist between the requesting and approving units.

b. H&I targets developed by a headquarters to which the appropriate attack means are not available will be reported for inclusion in an H&I program at a higher echelon. Target reports to this headquarters will be made to the FSCCE of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and will include the following information.

(1) Target location (encoded) and description.
(2) Recommended fire support means.
(3) Preferred time(s) of firing.
(4) Priority among targets reported.
(5) Status of clearance. (Identify the H&I H which granted clearance or state that clearance has not been obtained).

c. Headquarters conducting H&I programs will encourage the submission of targets by H&I commanders. Such targets will be accepted whether or not appropriate attack means are available to the receiving headquarters. The provisions of paragraph 5b above apply.

d. FSCCE, II FFORCEV TOC will keep current information on naval gunfire support capabilities.

e. Requests for strategic air strikes will be addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: AVFSC. Requests will include information on target description and justification as specified in II FFORCEV Regulation No 525-15.

f. In view of the large ammunition expenditures resulting from this program, continued emphasis will be placed on evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Particular emphasis should be placed on prisoners of war (PW), MAC CHLAS, and visual reconnaissance as sources for this information. When significant results are known to have been achieved in the execution of the H&I program, these results will be reported in daily situation reports (SITREP).
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Hq No 525-10, H1, II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266, 22 July 1967

5. Division and separate brigade requests for preplanned M-142 M411 VAI missions will be forwarded directly to II FFORCEN G3 Air.

h. M411 fires programmed for artillery that require reporting as high altitude artillery warnings will be passed to PARIS Control in accordance with II FFORCEN Regulation 385-2, 2 July 1967.

6. (U) REFERENCES:

a. MACV Directive 525-10, (C).


FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. FORBES
Brigadier General, G3
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

LAWRENCE L. LEE
Colonel, AOC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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20 - CG, 23d Arty Gp
20 - CG, 54th Arty Gp
15 - CG, 11th ACR
25 - DA, III Corps
5 - 3A, Rung Sat Special Zone
5 - CG, Co A, C-3, 5th SFG
5 - CG, USAV

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