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<td>FROM: Controlling DoD Organizationn: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

31 Aug 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
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SUBJECT: Operational Lessons Learned

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. (U) Reference Paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement: The MTOE was
returned to USARV on 17 November for preparation of Section III, Equipment.

3. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section I:

   a. The unsatisfactory operation of the Army standardized air
cooled generator for counterinsurgency was reported to this headquarters
by Pacific Mobility Service Office (PMSO). Chief, PMSO, advised this
headquarters and USARV that the failure was due to the requirements for
reducing the noise level and that the generators were either sand
bagged or placed in buried CONEX boxes. In either case, insufficient
cooling is suspected or the contributing cause of failure and similar
operating conditions will lead to early failure of the liquid cooled
engines.

   b. Since the air cooled generator is the standard generator
in the Army supply system for 10KW and below, ordering from the Air
Force was necessary to obtain the liquid cooled models.

4. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section I: The Star Light Scope,
FSN 1090-688-9954 has been declared a critical item by Commanding
General, USARV, with distribution of assets under the direct manage-
ment of HQ USARV. The priority of distribution of the scope to Special
Forces units is determined by CG USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

G. L. McMullin
CPT, AG
Asst AG
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 20310

1. The unsatisfactory operation of the Army system of air-cooled generator for consumer power was reported to this Department by Pacific Mobility Service Center (PMSC). (1) PMSC, 6th Army Headquarter and PMSC that the failure was due to the requirements for reducing the noise level and that the generators were either not shipped or placed in unsound cases. In either case, insufficient cooling is required by the environment of storage and similar operating conditions will lead to early failure of the air-cooled engines.

2. Since the air-cooled generators to the unsound generator in the Army supplies system for lower and higher, extending from the Air Force was necessary to obtain the liquid-cooled model.

3. (c) Reference Paragraph 3, Section 1: The Maneuver Scope, PM 1000-550-1004, has been declared a critical item by maneuver Center, PMSC, with distribution of units under M.A. direct assignment of SG PMSC. The priority of distribution of the scope to Special Service units is determined by SG PMSC.

4. Reference Paragraph 3, Section 1: The Maneuver Scope, PM 1000-500-1004, has been declared a critical item by maneuver Center, PMSC, with distribution of units under M.A. direct assignment of SG PMSC. The priority of distribution of the scope to Special Service units is determined by SG PMSC.

G. L. McMULLIN
Col., SAC
Asst AG
INCLOSURES TO OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED (RCS CGPO-28 (R1))

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2. Intelligence (S-2)
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSCP0-28 (R1)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

TO:

Section I. Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

GENERAL:

During the reporting period Viet Cong forces did not initiate large scale assaults against any Special Forces camps, but numerous probes were launched against Forward Operating Bases. Rapid reaction by flareships, FAC, and airstrikes were decisive factors in our favor in most cases. The Viet Cong have shown great reluctance to become decisively engaged. Heavy losses have been inflicted on Viet Cong logistical bases. Tons of medical supplies, arms and ammunition have been captured and destroyed during the last ninety days. These losses, coupled with the flexible rearguard capability of airmobile US forces, have prevented the Viet Cong from massing large units. CIDG forces are cooperating with PMAF forces in I, II, and III Corps. They provide blocking forces, screen the flanks of PMAF units, and obtain intelligence through the technique of saturation patrolling. The platoon size patrol has proven to be the most effective size unit for medium and long range operations in search of the Viet Cong. Though company size operations are effective when the VC position is known and when operating in conjunction with PMAF units, the platoon provides a balanced capability for reconnaissance and combat if necessary. CIDG forces obtained a favorable kill ratio and a
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AVSP-C

10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CGRO-28 (M1)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

favorable weapons loss ratio during this reporting period. Three AN/PPS-5 radar sets, with operators, were deployed to camps Dak Pek and Duc Co in II Corps, and Camp Cai Cai in IV Corps. Excellent results were recorded from the set at Cai Cai. Large troop movements were monitored in Cambodian, and several squad size probes around the perimeter of the camp were detected prematurely. Detachment B-52 (Project Delta) was heavily committed in support of US units during the last 90 days. In addition to operational commitments, Long Range Recon Patrol training was conducted for members of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Division. The first CIDG camp to be opened inside a War Zone was Camp Trai Bi in III Corps. Located 10 km inside War Zone "C", this camp has made numerous contacts with the Viet Cong. The camp was subjected to an artillery (70mm Pack Howitzer) and mortar barrage on 23 July. Damage was not extensive and casualties were light. The VC did not follow up the shelling with an assault. Intelligence reports indicate a significant VC force in the camp's TAOR.

2. Intelligence

a. In order to improve the intelligence response at CTZ level, 5th Special Forces Group intends to augment each C Detachment with an Information Analysis Center. The Information Analysis Center (IAC) is a functional intelligence organization within the S2 section of an operational C Detachment. It is formed to receive, process, analyze and exploit information which is available at the C Detachment level, with the specific purpose of returning the information in usable form to the subordinate B and A Detachments. The IAC receives information from several sources. The primary source is provided by subordinate units, to include USSF/LLDB A and B Detachments in the field. Secondary sources are adjacent and higher headquarters, to include US advised RVN units, Free World Military Forces, special military intelligence collection agencies, as well as this headquarters. The IAC will emphasize three types of intelligence in support of the C Detachments' mission; Combat Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Internal Intelligence.

b. On 10 July, it was determined that a need for closer coordination between elements of the Group S-2 and S-3 Sections was needed. To this end, Order of Battle Specialists from each CTZ were married up with Area Study CCO's of respective CTZ's to form Area Specialist Teams. The new system has provided for a closer integration of operations and intelligence, with an added benefit of more rapid reaction to incoming information.


a. CIDG Program: The pacification of the areas around camps Buon En Yang and Plei Do Lin in II Corps, and Camp An Phu in IV Corps, and Camp An Phu in IV Corps has progressed to the point that conversion is imminent.
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The scheduled date for conversion to Regional Force units is 1 August. Total CIDG troop strength at the end of this period is 33,457*. There are 57 CIDG camps presently situated throughout the Republic of Viet Nam. Within the past three months CIDG units conducted in excess of 11,000 ambushes, including search and destroy operations and raids on fixed VC installations. Heaviest damage was inflicted on Viet Cong logistical cache locations. CIDG initiated offensive operations resulted in 620 contacts.

b. Training:

(1) During the three months reporting period 624 students graduated from courses presented at the Dong Ba Thin Training Center. 593 students are presently enrolled in either CIDG or LLDB courses.

(2) LLDB Class # 6, which started during the previous quarter, graduated 15 Officers and 89 Enlisted Men on 24 May 1966. Class # 7 began on 30 May with 25 Officers and 94 NCO's/EM. The basic course was completed on 16 July and specialized training is still in progress with the following breakdown:

(a) Officers Course 22
(b) Operations and Intell 20
(c) Weapons 18
(d) Demolitions 18
(e) Medics 21
(f) Communications 11

(3) LLDB Basic Training Class # 1 graduated 79 students on 4 June. Class # 2 commenced on 28 June with 21 students, and Class # 3 began on 25 July with 96 students.

(4) Classes # 13 and # 14 for Combat Recon Platoons graduated on 30 May (127 students), and 11 July (128 students) respectively. Class E 15 began on 19 July with 132 students.

(5) CIDG Leadership Class # 15 ended on 24 May with 120 graduates and Class # 16 graduated 119 students on 2 July. Class # 17 began on 12 July with 137 students.

* An increase of 72 companies is scheduled for FY 1967, bringing the total strength of CIDG companies to 260 companies, at 132 men per company.
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10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RGCS CSGPO-25 (RL)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

a. During the period 1 May 1966 through 31 July 1966, the 5th Special Forces Group has placed maximum stress on long-term, continuing CA/PSYOP Programs at every level of command. Efforts have been focused on achieving program continuity by assignment of trained CA/PSYOP Officers and NCOs down through "A" Detachment level insofar as possible. In each functional area, primary emphasis is directed at self-help projects, use of locally-procured building materials wherever practicable, and development of individual initiative among the populace of operational areas.

b. Substantial progress has been realized in the development of planned CA/PSYOP Programs within each detachment tactical area of responsibility. In coordination with LDMR counterparts, VIS, USAID, JUSPAO, plus representatives from any other interested agencies, USASF CA/PSYOP personnel have conducted surveys to determine local needs. Upon completion, these surveys are invaluable for annual planning, programming and budgeting. Detachment surveys and programs are established for two successive six-month periods. They are up-dated periodically to insure that all plans and projects are maintained current.

c. During the three month reporting period ending 31 July 1966, 5,091 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local civilians and to expand GVF area of control were completed in Special Forces operational areas. Included in this figure are the construction and/or repair of: 89 schools, 54 dispensaries, 13 hospitals, 72 bridges, 51 latrines, 15 fish ponds, 107 wells, 97 dwellings, and 55 VIS Information booths. Other projects included provision of 2,653,808 pounds of food for over 72,000 refugees which are located in detachment operational areas. USASF and VSF Medics, and Special Forces trained Village Health Workers treated 364,500 patients in camp dispensaries while conducting 1,155 CA medical patrols.

d. The CIDG Motivation and Indoctrination Team under the advisorship of nine USASF advisors has been expanded from 12 cadre to 59 cadre. Organized into 12 five man units, it is now capable of training 680 men per month. During this three month reporting period, 1,098 CIDG and 216 PF soldiers received motivational training from MIP Teams.

e. In order to increase protein content of the Vietnamese daily diet, numerous long range agriculture projects have been initiated during this reporting period. They include animal husbandry, family gardens, experimental farms, and fish pond construction/stocking. In animal husbandry prime breeding cows, bulls, hogs, goats, poultry, and rabbits have been purchased and issued to various operational detachments for breeding purposes. Selected families fed and care for the female animals until the young are born and weaned. At this time the family is given several...
of the offspring and the adult female is passed on to another family. Two 850 egg incubators were also purchased. They are being used as a pilot project to determine feasibility of hatchery production at the "A" Detachment level. Thirteen "A" Detachments have constructed fish ponds which are managed by CIDG or local civilians trained at USASP/USSF Fishery School in Nha Trang.

1. Motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG remains one of the primary tasks for all persons advising the CIDG. A new program to complement the MIP and the troop indoctrination and education program has been instituted. This program has received additional emphasis because the CIDG are the most valuable assets of the CIDG program. Overall effectiveness of camp operations and the very survival of the USASF personnel often depend on effectiveness of CIDG. Through the use of powerful public address systems and tape recorders, selected daily propaganda messages are delivered, interspersed with appropriate music appealing to emotions and attitudes of strike force members. The objective here is to develop and solidify the loyalty, dependability, and fighting spirit of these personnel. In turn, the CIDG soldier is made aware of his role in this war, the advantages of his position, GVN objectives, and VC/NAVA activities.

2. S-5 at SPOB Nha Trang, has published a PSYOP Guide for operational "A" Detachments. The guide, part of a handbook covering a wide variety of subjects pertinent to operations at the "A" Detachment level provides information for immediate implementation and emphasized operational aspects of PSYOP. It is expected that the PSYOP Guide will be of great assistance to those CA/PSYOP personnel who have already had experience at the "A" Detachment level.

3. Recent reports reflect the valuable contributions being made by the PSYOP companies throughout the four Corps in their support of Special Forces Operations. The May and June CA/PSYOP Monthly Evaluation Reports stress the contributions of these companies. In the recently published CA/PSYOP Guide for Operational "A" Detachments, CA/PSYOP personnel are urged to consult these PSYOP Companies for advice and support.

4. The recorders and loudspeakers have been distributed to most of the "A" detachments as of this date. Recorders and loudspeakers for the remaining detachments are currently in supply channels and distribution will be completed in the next two weeks. These units will be invaluable in support of local PSYOP efforts. They are lightweight, portable, and possess the capability for vehicular mount. Their many uses include: rallies, news broadcasts, propaganda speeches, indoctrination messages, and support of the CIDG Camp Commanders Information Program. Tapes of appropriate music have also been disseminated to be used in conjunction with the above operations.

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SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learnt (RCS CSGPO-29 (R)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

10 August 1966

j. For the three month reporting period, statistics reveal the following: 24,851,250 leaflets disseminated, 298 PSYOP rallies conducted, 391 airborne loudspeaker missions conducted, and 682 Chieu Hoi's or returns. Most significant is the fact that the Chieu Hoi returnees continue to increase. There can be no doubt that this program continues to be a most effective PSYOP effort within 5th SFGA.

k. Inclosures 7 and 8 provide typical examples of CA and PSYOP projects conducted during this reporting period.

5. Personnel Administrative Activities.

a. The only significant departure from previous personnel reports is the fact that TDY Detachments are no longer attached to the 5th SFGA for a six month period. All 5th Group personnel are PCS for the normal tour with the exception of a few engineer personnel.

b. The HTO&E submitted on 7 June 1966 is still pending final approval by DA.


a. General:

(1) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1966 the Logistical Support Center of the Special Forces Operational Base in Nha Trang continued to provide overall logistical support including supply, maintenance, movements, food service and construction to the Special Forces operational detachments and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group spread throughout the length and breadth of the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Plans continued for the decentralization of the logistical system down to the C detachment level in order for the C detachment to support the Special Forces Operational detachments in each Corps area as is currently practiced in I Corps. Decentralization will result in more responsive support to the supported units due to the closer proximity of the supply source and will allow for optimum utilization of available aircraft. It will also allow for continuity of the supply flow in concert with USARV OPLAN 79-66 should any logistical result in a temporary paralysis of the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang. Detachment C-4 in Can Tho has completed a warehouse facility and in now receiving supplies for the detachments in IV CTZ. Although their logistical support will be limited in scope because of the small area in which they have to conduct their logistical operation, they will be able to begin filling requisitions on fast-moving, high-demand type items by the end of August. It is currently planned to have Detachment C-3, Bien Hoa decentralized in September and Detachment C-2, Pleiku decentralized in November.

(3) 5th Special Forces Reg 00-1, "Logistics" was updated and revised. It is consolidated and replaced all previous logistical and supply regulations and filled in many information gaps previously existing because of the lack of written guidance. In addition, Reg 210-2, "Camp Construction" was updated and revised.
CONTRACT

SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CS070-28)
(R41) for period ending 31 July 1975

(4) Conversion of three CIDG camps to Regional Force has been planned. All property on the RF TO will be turned over to the RF. Arrangements are to be effected for reimbursement in kind of all converted items. All property declared mission essential is being turned over to the LACV Advisory Team for a period not to exceed 90 days, after which it will be returned to the CIDG program.

b. Supply:

(1) During the reporting period new equipment was introduced into the supply system. The "Bata Boot" which was unsuitable because of poor quality was replaced by an indigenous jungle boot procured in Japan which has a longer wear than the "Bata Boot". Also a lightweight, tightly woven nylon hammock and poncho were purchased for issue to the CIDG. Similar in texture and weight to a parachute canopy, easily carried on the individual soldier, and waterproof, these two items at approximately $2.00 apiece replaced the standard US poncho which alone cost $5.65. Starlight scopes were requested for each "A" Detachment, but except for a few provided by ACTIV, they have not as yet been received. Kerosene three burner stoves were received and issued to the field in order to supplement existing butane stoves which are intermittently out of butane gas in the field due to a bottle shortage.

10K 10K water cooled generators were ordered by the counterinsurgency support office through Air Force Channels based on recommendations from the field that the gas driven, air cooled 5 and 10K standard Army generators were not proving satisfactory for maintenance and life. Materials handling equipment totalling $637,000 was ordered for the decentralization program. 150 2½ ton multifueled trucks and 150 H-151 ½ ton trucks were also placed on order in addition to sufficient air items for a capability of dropping heavy loads from C-130 aircraft. 54 airboats have been ordered and are due-in during the next quarter.

(2) After analyzing the reasons behind periodic depletions of common stocked items it was determined that the Requisitioning Objective (RO) and the stock levels were too low. The Requisitioning Objective was raised to 90 days from the previous 60 days and an additional 50% of commonly stocked items was placed on request.

(3) Personnel of LSC worked during the evening hours to complete a 40' x 100' foot warehouse in order to store and maintain a reserve level of rice which is critical to the CIDG program. Periodic shortages of rice developed from transportation and procurement problems in Saigon.

(4) Maintenance:

(a) During the period 1 May to 31 July there has been a steady increase of work performed by the LSC Maintenance Facility. The work load has increased by approximately 5% over the previous period of time.

(b) A study was made to determine the necessary tools required for a B and C Detachment automotive repair facility. Requisitions for these items have been submitted. Further, one (1) shop van has been requested for this location.

(c) Construction of a new maintenance shop building with offices commenced in May. Target date for completion sometime in August.
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(d) In order to assist the Detachment's PLL's (Pre-ordred Load Lists) have been submitted to help facilitate the detachment repair parts program.

(5) Engineer Construction:

(a) During the reporting period four two story buildings within the Signal Complex were completed. The fifth building is 75% finished. A power plant building for the SFOB has been completed. The necessary equipment to provide the power has been ordered, however, it has not arrived.

(b) Six existing buildings have been enlarged. A four meter extension was added to five BC's providing additional living space for 10 officers. The Personnel Office was enlarged by erecting a roof, pouring a floor, and constructing and walls between buildings.

(c) Construction on the Group Officer's Club commenced with scheduled completion date by 4 September.

7. Air Movement.

a. Logistical Movement of Supplies - Tons:

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<td>Jan -</td>
<td>3,673</td>
<td>April -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb -</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>May - 5,098</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar -</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>June - 4,675</td>
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<td>11,498 Tons</td>
<td>14,139 Tons</td>
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During the 2nd Quarter of 1966 the Air Movement Section of LSC moved 23% more supplies, exactly 2,641 tons, than during the 1st quarter. Noteworthy was the amount of supplies moved during the month of May which totaled over 1 million pounds of all classes of supplies. This was the first time that the LSC has issued and moved over 1 million pounds of supplies in one month.

This achievement is due in part to a transportation system never before used by this group, namely Sealift. This section moved approximately 889 tons of supplies, to C-1 Da Nang and C-4 Can Tho by LST. This system proved very effective for everyone concerned for the following reasons:

(1) The LSTs were easily obtained through the Traffic Management Agency, T.A.

(2) Each LST was capable of hauling several million pounds of supplies at one time.

(3) Bulk supplies from LSC area were easily transported to the ship with a minimum of preparation, in comparison to the preparation necessary for airlift. Once the supplies arrived at the beach, the Alaskan Barge Company took on the responsibility of loading the LST. They were capable of loading/off loading 700 tons of supplies daily.

(4) Upon arrival of the LST at Can Tho, the supplies were off-loaded by an Army Transportation Co(Steveore) and transported by them to the C-4 location. The C-4 supply personnel had only to off-load the supplies from this company's trucks. At Da Nang, port personnel off-loaded the LST and loaded C-1's trucks. Both Sealift operations took between 4 to 5 days to complete and were accomplished in a very smooth and efficient manner by all concerned. The Sealift system is now considered an integrated part of the LSC movement plan and will be utilized whenever bulk supply requirements warrant its use.

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b. Logistical Aircraft Support:

(1) C-123 Aircraft - the group continued to receive a minimum of three C-123s in direct support on a daily basis during the quarter. There was an average of 3 sorties per aircraft daily, thus, the LSC could count on moving approximately 90,000 lbs of supplies per day by C-123. However, during the latter part of June an increased amount of aircraft maintenance resulted in a 20% cancellation of scheduled missions. Once a direct support aircraft goes down for maintenance, there is very little chance of a substitute being provided by the Air Force.

(2) C-130 Aircraft - as outlined in the previous quarterly report, these aircraft continue to make a tremendous difference in the logistical airlift capabilities of the LSC. During the first two quarters of 1966, these aircraft have averaged over 3 million pounds of supplies moved monthly. The C-130s have been used predominantly to move supplies in bulk to detachments C-1 and C-4. At these locations the bulk supplies are broken down and moved by smaller aircraft, i.e., C-123 and CV2s, to the "A" Campsites.

(3) CV2 Aircraft - each of the "C" Detachments continues to receive at least one CV2 Caribou in direct support on a daily basis. These aircraft provide the necessary airlift support to camps with short, unimproved airstrips. Here at the LSC, four CV2s continue to provide daily support to "A" Camps within II and III Corps. These 4 direct support aircraft averaged over 1½ million pounds per month during the quarter. These aircraft provide the group commander and the LSC with a flexible airlift capability, ready to react to rapidly changing needs.

(4) Lessons Learned - Utilization of Logistical Aircraft - the increased logistical support of the group country-wide, has dictated to a greater need of C-130 support. This increase, 45% more supplies airlifted to our detachments during the 2d half of FY 66, has verified the requirement for decentralization at the "C" Detachment level. There, the supplies are broken down for issue to the "A" and "B" detachments and airlifted by C-123s and CV2s. In essence, this system typifies the forward supply point concept normally utilized within a field army area by the Army Division located there. During the last two quarters of FY 66, the utilization of C-130 aircraft in support of the Special Forces logistical program, and in particular the decentralization program, has proved to be rapid, continuous and a very efficient method of getting all classes of supplies to the lowest echelon of command within the 5th Special Forces Group.

c. Airdrop capabilities:

The airdrop method of resupply under normal operating conditions amounted to approximately 7.1% of all deliveries made to the group's "A" camps country-wide during the 2d half of FY 66. This figure clearly indicates that the group's airdrop capability can still be considered a normal means of resupplying our camps. Presently, no "standard" army airdrop method is employed by the group because the majority of airdrops are made from the tighbor of the C-123 aircraft. The airdrop method employed by the group is a tactical method developed in Vietnam for use with the C-123 aircraft. Under this method clustered 0-13 parachutes were used on loads weighing up to 1500 pounds. The number of parachutes used on each load was based on the 500 lbs cargo carrying capability of the G-13 (1500 lbs load required 3 G-13 parachute clusters). This method has proved to be effective and economical as well as very accurate with a low malfunction rate.

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In April, the rigging platoon began using the T-7A Cargo parachute which was issued to the group in lieu of the G-13. At the outset several discrepancies arose while airdropping loads that had T-7A parachutes clustered on them. The principal discrepancy was the fact that many of the T-7A canopies were damaged during the opening shock, and approximately 5% of all parachutes malfunctioned, i.e. Mac West or Streamers during these airdrops. In order to maintain our airdrop capability using T-7A cargo parachutes, which have the same rated capacity as the G-13, several test airdrops were performed after several adjustments were made to the parachute and load. The test drops proved concretely that the T-7A parachute could be used with this tactical airdrop method, if the following adjustments or modifications are made.

1. Use a skirt hesitator on the canopy of all T-7A cargo parachutes. This hesitator is nothing more than a tie made around the lower skirt of the canopy using 30 lb cotton tape. This tie prevents the canopy from opening while it is still in the prop blast of the aircraft. (It delays opening approximately 1 second). It also enables all parachutes that are clustered to open simultaneously, thus reducing the canopy damage caused by one chute opening sooner than the others, which results in a total load opening shock on the one canopy.

2. The cargo carrying capacity of the T-7A parachute was reduced from 500 lbs to 400 lbs per chute for use within the group. Any load weight exceeding an increment of 400 lbs requires an additional T-7A, thus, a 1000 lbs load now requires 3 T-7As clustered.

3. In clustering T-7A cargo parachutes, their attachment to the load must be as close together as possible. This adjustment reduces the possibility of one chute opening sooner than the others.

4. All airdrop loads consisting of fragile items or easily broken containers, i.e. rice bags, cement bags or bottles, were rigged with a minimum of one layer of honeycomb. This honeycomb, and dissipator, absorbs up to 75% of the ground impact shock felt by the load. It is estimated that 25% of normal breakage caused by ground impact is reduced by the use of the honeycomb material.

5. Lessons learned in Airdrop:

The tactical airdrop method from the C-123 and CV2B aircraft continues to be normal means of resupplying the SF camps countrywide. Airdrop is required where no airstrip exist or where an airstrip has become unsafe for landing due to weather or enemy action. It is also the normal or planned method of resupplying any Special Forces Camp under enemy attack, therefore its operational use must be guaranteed at all times. During the past quarter a change in cargo parachutes available to the group (T-7A for G-13) temporarily reduced the operational capability of the airdrop method of resupply. However, by making several adjustments (outlined above) in the packing of the T-7A cargo parachute and the rigging of the airdrop loads within the group, which were tested on actual airdrop missions, the airdrop capability of the group is again fully operational.

The airdrop method employed by the group continues to allow airdropping of loads from a minimum altitude of 350 feet, at an airspeed of 130 knots. This method provides for impact accuracy which far exceeds the normal low velocity method of airdrop; a criteria that must be guaranteed when resupplying SF Camps that are under enemy attack.
CONFIDENTIAL

12 August

II. MEDICAL.

a. CIDG - Dependent dispensary and maternity ward: In June 1966 the LDB and 5th SFGA Surgeon's Section opened and presently are jointly staffing this 20 bed facility in the Nha Trang LDB medical compound.

b. CIDG Troop Dispensary: Plans have been finalized for this facility of 30 beds to be staffed jointly by the LDB and the 5th SFGA Surgeon's Section. Construction is programmed for August 1966. This facility will also be used as a training center for the LDB and CIDG medics.

c. Vietnamese phrase book for sick call: This booklet prepared by the 5th SFGA Surgeon and published by USAID and JUSP is being distributed to all medical personnel in their organization. A second printing has been made to fill requests from other US medical personnel.

d. Medical Civic Action: A new monthly high for outpatient treatment of indigenous personnel was reached in July 1966 with a total of 122,000 treatments. This represents 40% of the entire USARV treatment figure for the month.

e. Special Forces Hamlet Health Worker Training Course: The first cycle of this course has been successfully given to 11 students at Detachment C-1. A second course for 13 students will begin on 1 August at Detachment C-1. USAID has proposed to the GVN Ministry of Health that the Special Forces Hamlet Health training program be used as a basis for a national Hamlet Health Worker school with a training center at each C Detachment. USAID, MILPHAP, LDB Province Medical Chiefs and other civilian and military personnel would participate in the instruction.

f. IOY Medical Training Team: The first four training teams have completed their tour and returned to 1st SFGA and 155th Medical Detachment, Okinawa. Personnel trained included 168 US medics, 193 CIDG medics and 11 Hamlet Health Workers. Four 2 man training teams have been requested from 1st SFGA, Okinawa and will enter RVN on or about 1 September 1966 to continue this program.

g. Laboratory Support: The Army Medical Research Team - Vietnam (AMRT) has provided media to 5th SFGA for the collection of bacteriological specimens and will perform studies on material submitted to assist in the diagnosis of disease. This media and instructions for its use have been issued to all detachments.

h. Dapson (DDS) Malaria Prophylaxis: 5th SFGA personnel from Project Delta were part of a study group using this drug. During the study Project Delta operated in an area of high malaria endemicity and sustained no malaria casualties. During operations in the same area November 1965, 13 of 23 Delta Project personnel developed malaria.

I. SIGNAL.

a. Total traffic count again continued to increase during the reporting period with a gradual rise from an average total of 6,255 messages handled by the SFOB comm center whereas the com centers at subordinate headquarters handled an average total of 3,315 messages. The total traffic count is again expected to increase as more intelligence information is transmitted between Hqs and laterally between SFOB, C and B detachments due to the proposed establishment of an intelligence analysis center at "C" detachment level.
b. Co E, (signal) after conducting lengthy operations and tests concluded that the combined com/center transmitter and receiver antenna field did not provide satisfactory, interference-free communications to subordinate stations. This was due primarily to the close proximity of transmit and receive antennas and the operation of several different modes, i.e., radio teletype, single sideband voice and AH voice nets through the same antenna fields. A survey of possible antenna field sites was conducted by the Group Signal Officer and the decision was made to acquire a piece of real estate located at Chang Duc in the Dien Khanh District of Khanh Hoa Province. The property consisting of a 500 foot by 500 foot soccer field was formally acquired through the province chief on or about 15 July 1966. Current plans are to construct a transmitter building, power building and nine 50 foot antenna towers on this property. The signal complex receiver site will remain in its present location.

c. Long line circuit requirement for this unit have been submitted to USA/W, MACV. Hqs 5th SFDA is requesting point to point teletype and voice circuits from Co E, com/center, Wn Trang to each "C" Detachment and E-55 Saigon, these wire circuits would provide 24 hour a day full duplex teletype service and voice communications with immediate restoration priority in the event of circuit outage. The group radio-teletype net and the group single side band net would then become the backup communications system. It is anticipated that upon completion of the wire system the message handling capacity of SFDA and "C" detachments will be materially increased.

d. The requirement for radio frequencies in the high frequency band (2 to 12 Mhz) continues to increase as the group expands. Liaison visits by the Group Signal Officer to USA/W Signal Section and MACV J-6 during Jul 1966 disclosed the fact that additional solo user radio frequencies in the 2 to 12 Mhz range are just not available, due to congestion in these bands. The 2 to 12 Mhz bands are the most widely used frequencies at intermediate distance in Vietnam. The radio frequency Officer at MACV J-6 stated that if 5th SFDA could utilize high frequencies in the 12 to 20 Mhz range, authorization would not be a problem as sufficient frequencies are available for issue in this band. Experimentation is under way to determine if this frequency range can be utilized on short distance, AH, high frequency radio nets.

e. CIDG RF/PF Conversion: The camp conversion program of converting CIDG companies to RF/PF companies is currently underway in II CTZ as certain camps attain the requirements for change over. Some problems have arisen as to what type and how much signal equipment would be retained by the camps and how much would be removed. A permanent transfer loan program was initiated in II CTZ and the following equipment were made:

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</table>
Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-26 (R1)) for period ending 31 July 1966

Items permanently transferred because they are on RF/PF TOE. Items on loan will not impair installation of Ben Don and other camps as they will be returned prior to actual need at the new camps.

f. HL-6/TSEC Cryptographic: A study of present traffic volume of one-time and encrypted messages shows sufficient similarity in workload between B Detachments to justify allocation of the HL-6/TSEC (Mechanical One-Time Pad Encipher/Decipher Device) to all 5 detachments. If the HL-6/TSEC is to be utilized, allocation should be one per B Detachment.

(1) Introduction of the HL-6/TSEC will probably increase the amount of encrypted messages transmitted from B to A detachments since many messages now sent in the clear will be encrypted due to faster method of operation of the HL-6/TSEC.

(2) The more stringent physical security requirements of the HL-6/TSEC should not be disadvantageous since improvements in many "B" Detachments cryptographic facilities are planned and in some cases underway.

(3) The recommended operational requirement will be for 20 each HL-6/TSEC for delivery in FY 68-69. Allocations to be as follows:

| I CTZ  | 2 |
| II CTZ | 5 |
| III CTZ| 6 |
| IV CTZ | 3 |
| B-52   | 1 |
| C-5    | 1 |
| SPOE Float | 1 |
| Total  | 20 |

10. (5) CIDG Finance:

a. CIDG Finance prepared and submitted the Fiscal Year 1967 Command Operating budget thru IACV to USARPA on 3 May 66. FY 67 requirements were submitted as follows:

| In-Country | $44.7 million |
| Out-of-Country | |
| Okinawa (Okinawa) | 16.8 |
| PHIM | 32.7 |
| Total | 94.2 million |

b. Fiscal Year 1968 Command Budget Estimate was prepared and submitted thru IACV to USARPA on 5 Jul 66. On 2 June 66, CIDG Finance Officer and Group S-4 representative made a 10 day liaison trip to CISO in Okinawa for the purpose of preparing the out-of-country portion of the budget estimate. As a result of this trip FY 67 requirements as submitted in the FY 67 budget request were updated and included in the FY 68 budget estimate. FY 67 and 68 requirements were submitted as follows:

| In-Country | FY 67 | FY 68 |
| Okinawa (Okinawa) | 41.9 million | 48.2 million |
| PHIM | 19.7 | 21.3 |
| Total | 92.3 million | 99.3 million |
c. In June, President K. announced a pay increase for all Armed Forces personnel retroactive to 1 June 1966. Therefore it became necessary to raise pay and allowances for all CIDG paramilitary forces in line with this amount. This raise resulted in a 5 million dollar increase vs FY 67 requirements for pay and allowances.

d. On 23 June, CIDG Finance Officer was informed that the rate of exchange had been changed from 72.77 to 1.00 US, to a new rate of 79.27 to 1.00 US. This change resulted in a paper loss of 3150, 000 on the CIDG finance records as of 1 July 66.

e. 5th SRA R8 37-1 was revised effective 1 July 66. Included in the revised regulations are a new pay scale for AVN Force and Strike Force Personnel, the new subsistence rates for the Corps areas, and the expenditure limitations for supplies and equipment, camp construction, civil affairs/strategic, repair and maintenance, and intelligence.

f. CIDG Finance Office established a new cost code structure which will reflect more accurate data by type of expenditure. Basically the 37 cost codes previously used were consolidated into 20 cost codes, thereby significantly reducing the unnecessary recording of cost data and report preparation.

g. In Message 775955, dated 14 July 1966, established the FY 67 Switchback Annual Funding Program as follows:

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<tr>
<td>out-of-Country</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>536.0 million</td>
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In country fund allocation for the 1st quarter FY67 was 5.6 million dollars. This level of funding was not considered sufficient to cover the projected level of expenditures during the first quarter, primarily due to the recent pay increase in subsistence. Accordingly a request was submitted requesting an additional 52 million allocation. In Message 775995, dated 29 July 1966, increased the 1st quarter allocation by 5 million to a new total of 10.6 million dollars.

11. Future Plans:

a. A contingency assessment of all CIDG camps for possible conversion to RF is in progress. Detachment A-426 at Tri Ton is scheduled to be replaced by a USAV Advisory Team on 15 September.

A staff study is in progress to consider moving the "A" Detachment now located at Chau Doc, II Corps, to the Ca Nau peninsula, with an undetermined number of subordinate "B" Detachments.

b. Two new camps are planned at Ben Don and Duong Lp in western II Corps. A C-130 airfield will be constructed at one of these camps to assist conventional units in establishing a staging area for large scale PACV operations. The detachments for these camps will be assigned from Phu Do Linh and Buon Ma Thuot, which were converted on 1 August.
S U B J E C T: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RC: C3qPO-38 (R1)) for period ending 31 July 1966

An expansion of the Project Delta capability is being studied to enable F-35A/T units in II and III Corps to have permanent Delta-type unit available for their use. Anticipated date for operational readiness of the expanded concept is MLT 30 August 1966.

Harry C. Fisher Jr.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
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INCLUSION 1 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966
### COMPARATIVE CIDG/VC CASUALTY FIGURES

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ENCLOSURE 2 to SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RGS CSFPC-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966
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<td>BUON EA YANG</td>
<td>BQ92034</td>
<td>APR 65</td>
<td>CPT CHUNG</td>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>CPT DANIEL</td>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>5/599</td>
<td>2/691</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-234</td>
<td>AN LAC</td>
<td>AP865468</td>
<td>MAY 65</td>
<td>CPT KIM</td>
<td>2/10</td>
<td>CPT SINCEE</td>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>6/570</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>CIDG/SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-235</td>
<td>NHON CO</td>
<td>YU804250</td>
<td>MAR 66</td>
<td>CPT BO</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>CPT RICHIE</td>
<td>2/10</td>
<td>4/450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-236</td>
<td>LAC THIEN</td>
<td>AP971756</td>
<td>MAY 65</td>
<td>LT TRUNG</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>CPT JACKSON</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>3/535</td>
<td>2/820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIDG/SS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table contains information about missions involving dates, locations, and various codes and numbers associated with military operations. The abbreviations and codes are specific to the context of the operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lg</th>
<th>LOC</th>
<th>COORD</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>W/SP CO</th>
<th>NO. W/SP</th>
<th>NO. W/IFSP CO</th>
<th>USAGF</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>PF</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>WPNS</th>
<th>COUP</th>
<th>H/E</th>
<th>FORC</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A-237 | LUC Ng SO | 3H124384  | JAN 66    | CPT QUE | 2/12     | CPT SUBIGART | 2/9   | 4/418 |    |    |      |      |     |      |   20
| A-238 | BUON BLECH | BQ008594  | JUL 66    |         |          | CPT FOESTE  | 2/6   | 2/483 |    |    |      |      |     |      |   CIDG
| B-24  | KONTUM   | AR773889  | JAN 66    | CPT TUU | 4/17     | LTCOL ROSSI | 7/17  |       |    |    |      |      |     |      | CONTROL
| A-241 | POLE KLENG | ZAO31932  | MAR 66    | LT TRIEU | 1/11      | CPT MONROE | 2/9   | 4/557 |    |    |      |      |     |      |      CIDG
| A-242 | DAK PEK  | TB947684  | NOV 62    | CPT PHUONG | 2/12       | CPT SAIFORD | 2/9   | 5/751 |    |    |      |      |     |      |      CIDG
| A-244 | DAK TO   | ZBO13212  | AUG 65    | LT NGHIA | 2/4       | CPT WEIDFURTER | 2/9   | 4/536 |    |    |      |      |     |      | CIDG
| A-245 | DAK SEANG | YB903412  | (STAGING AT DAK TO) | LT TOAN | 1/5       | CPT CHANDLER | 2/10  | 4/500 | 411 | 298 |      |      |     | STAGING/CIDG
| B-25  | PLEIKU    | AR765475  | MAR 66    | LT KY   | 1/7       | LTCOL GALBA | 7/17  |       |    |    |      |      |     |      | CONTROL
| A-251 | PLEI DJERENG | YA8757531 | JUN 64    | MAJ HINH | 3/8       | CPT MOORE | 2/10  | 4/557 |    |    |      |      |     |      | CIDG/BS
| A-252 | PLEI MRONG | ZA113675  | NOV 62    | CPT BAD | 2/9       | CPT BUTTTMORG | 2/11  | 4/702 |    |    |      |      |     |      | CIDG/BS
| A-253 | DUC CO   | YABA1248  | JUN 62    | LT LAP | 2/7       | CPT CUNNINGHAM | 3/12  | 4/810 |    |    | 65   | 65   |     |      | CIDG/BS
| A-254 | PLEI DO LIM | AR885282  | APR 62    | CPT LIN | 1/11      | CPT JORD | 2/8   | 4/518 |    |    | 30   | 30   |     |      | CIDG
| A-255 | Plei Me  | ZA162059  | OCT 63    | LT HUYNH | 2/8       | CPT WARRIENBURG | 2/10  | 4/551 |    |    | 86   | 86   |     |      | CIDG
| B-50  | NHA TRANG | CP031518  | JUL 66    |         |          | MAJ GEANET | 5/5   |       |    |    |      |      |     |      | CONTROL
| B-51  | DONG BA THIN | CP040290  | APR 64    | CPT TAC | 49/182    | MAJ GRUENE | 5/18  | 3/405 |    |    |      |      |     |      | CIDG/TRAN
| B-52  | NHA TRAN | CP031518  | MAJ TAT | 2/109    | MAJ LIUHEL | 14/84  |       |    |    |      |      |     |      | PROP/USA
| A-501 | NGUYEN VAN TAN | CP031518  | SEP 63    | CPT LUU | 4/10      | CPT EARLYVIN | 2/8   | 3/430 |    |    | 68   |      |     |      | CIDG
| A-503 | NHA TRAN | CP031518  | JUN 64    | CPT CARTER | 2/16     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | MIKE
| TOTALS | 158/610 | 137/535 133/15501 53/1916 | 1662 1717 | 6/1093 |
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
FIRST MILITARY ZONE

PROVINCE     POPULATION
Quang Nam    629,000
Quang Ngai   701,000
Quang Tin    353,000
Quang Tri    292,000
Thu Thien    483,000

CHIEF TOWN   POPULATION
Hoi An       19,000
Quang Ngai    10,000
Tam Ky        11,000
Quang Tri     12,000
Hue           113,000
Da Nang       162,000

ESTIMATED AS OF JANUARY 1968
PROJECTED TO JULY 1965

LEGEND

NATIONAL BOUNDARY
REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
AUTONOMOUS CITY
PROVINCIAL CAPITAL
OR CHIEF TOWN
OTHER IMPORTANT COMMUNITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
AS OF AUGUST 1965
USOM / PUB. ADMIN. DIVISION
(UOFFICIAL)
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
SECOND MILITARY ZONE

PROVINCE

- Binh Dinh
- Binh Thuan
- Daklak
- Kontum
- Khanh Hoa
- Lam Dong
- Ninh Thuan
- Phu Bon
- Phu Yen
- Pleiku
- Quang Duc
- Tuyen Duc

CHIEF TOWN

- Qui Nhơn
- Phan Thiet
- Ban Me-Thuan
- Kontum
- Nha Trang
- Bao Lộc
- Phan Rang
- Hau 20,000
- Tuy Hòa
- Pleiku
- Gia Nghia
- Dalat

POPULATION:

- 862,000
- 262,000
- 149,000
- 93,000
- 309,000
- 68,000
- 150,000
- 51,000
- 349,000
- 183,000
- 34,000
- 75,000

- 52,000
- 62,000
- 33,000
- 25,000
- 11,000
- 25,000
- 15,000
- 3,000
- 3,000

ESTIMATED AS OF JANUARY 1965

LEGEND

- NATIONAL BOUNDARY
- REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
- AUTONOMOUS CITY
- PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OR CHIEF TOWN
- OTHER IMPORTANT COMMUNITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AS OF AUGUST 1965

USOM / PUB ADMIN DIVISION (UNOFFICIAL)
SPECIAL FORCES
1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

SPECIAL FORCES 96240

SUBJECT: Summary of Engineering Advisory Team Activities for Second Quarter 66

1. In the previous operational report on lessons learned covering the period 30 April 1966 the employment concept of the Engineering Advisory Teams from the 539th Engineer Detachment, 1st Special Forces Group was established. Team organization was also given as well as initial starting locations. The original construction schedule for the teams consisted of fifteen different locations requiring engineer assistance in some form. This original schedule is indicated below by camp with the ones receiving some engineer help so indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps Area</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ha Thanh</td>
<td>Airfield rehab</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Thang Duc</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Cung Son</td>
<td>Rehab road &amp; airfield</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Luong Son</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pocai Klong</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Tr. Seang</td>
<td>New camp assessments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ba Tay</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Xom Cat</td>
<td>Camp drainage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Duc Phuong</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Duc Hue</td>
<td>New camp assessments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Ba Xoa</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Phin Quan II</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Don Phoe</td>
<td>Reopen old camp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
<td>New camp const</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In addition to the locations designated on the initial construction program several other locations received direct engineer assistance and numerous sites were visited and received technical assistance or advice in various forms. The assistance offered to and received by the camps was quite varied and is an excellent example of the versatility of the Special Action Forces Engineering Advisory Teams capabilities in a counterinsurgency atmosphere. A list of some of the projects and a description of the work performed is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps Area</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Job Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Tan Rai</td>
<td>Airfield const</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Water adjustment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE 5 TO SECTION II to Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS G1PJC-23 (R1)) 31 July 1966.
3. From February to August the Engineer Teams completed fifty-five projects and more still remains to be done. A second construction schedule has been made by the 5th Special Forces Group to continue to enlarge and improve the CIDG program. To support this construction program Group has requested continued engineer support from MACV for the next six months. This request has been approved and the new team are scheduled to arrive in country in August.

4. The major problem areas encountered by the teams have been in procuring equipment, moving the equipment which has been received, spare parts, and limited delays in the procurement and shipment of construction materials. Action has been taken to expedite shipment of equipment to the teams, more detail planning should eliminate the logistical problem, and the lead time for spare parts has been absorbed by the replaced teams. Detail planning should help to eliminate the problems encountered in movement of equipment. With these problems solved considerable progress can be shown in the future.

INCLUSION 5 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS 5-66. 28 (R1)/31 July 1966)
SECRET

SUMMARY OF DELTA OPERATIONS

1. General: During the reporting period Project Delta worked as follows:
   a. Operational Days - 57
   b. Training Days - 35

2. Personnel:
   a. By direction of CO, 5th SFGA, a TUCR has been submitted to meet the expanding requirements of Project Delta. Implementation of this TUCR will not only allow the US portion of Project Delta to parallel the current Vietnamese organization but will also allow the operation of a small capacity LRP training school. This training school is currently being conducted by order of CO, CONUSMACV.
   b. By order of CO, 5th SFGA, this unit's Recon Section is being maintained with a 20% overhead.

3. Training: The following training programs were conducted:
   a. Refresher training for US/VN Recon Teams and the four Airborne Ranger Companies. This training ended with local operations in the Nha Trang area.
   b. Newly assigned US/VN Delta personnel attended a 21 day Long Range Recon Patrol training program designed to prepare them for assignment with this unit's Recon Section. The course further served to eliminate those not having the mental and physical stamina needed to perform the Delta mission.
   c. A total of 18 US personnel and 7 VN personnel from the 173d Abn Bde attended a 14 day LRP training program.
   d. A total of 33 personnel from the 25th Inf Div attended a 21 day LRP training program.
   e. A total of 11 personnel from the 1st Air Cav Div attended a 21 day LRP training program.
   f. A total of 26 VN CIDG personnel attended refresher airborne training and participated in small DZ airborne exercises.

4. Movement: All movements during the period were conducted by tactical aircraft with the only exception being one vehicular convoy.

5. Combat Operations:
   a. Four reconnaissance operations were conducted. Recon Teams were committed to find targets, verify intelligence, and conduct tactical air strikes on, or guide reaction forces to targets discovered. Recon operations were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CORPS AREA</th>
<th>TEAM CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-66</td>
<td>05 May - 12 May</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>VII Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-66</td>
<td>23 May - 19 Jun</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>VII Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-66</td>
<td>25 Jun - 02 Jul</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>VII Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-66</td>
<td>15 Jul - 29 Jul</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>VII Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLUSION 6 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS 03) No. 28 (R1) 31 July 1966.
The 123rd AFO/TS Team flew 166 hours, conducted 9 air strikes, comprising 166 sorties in direct support of Delta Operations.

CO, 123rd High Command redesignated the CIDG Roadrunner Teams, the 123rd Reconnaissance Commando Teams, (Short title LLDB Reconnoiter Team). The teams have the same general mission: infiltration into the area of population and heavy trail nets, outfitted as local force Cong. At present Project Delta has five deployable LLDB Reconnoiter Teams.

6. Research and Development: A special panel review concerning special material requirements for this unit was held during the month of July. The findings of this panel were that the fourteen items currently required by this unit to better accomplish its current mission were not either in US Army Supply Channels or are currently being developed. Necessary items of equipment have been requisitioned under special authorization, reference letter this HQ dated 2 Aug 66, Subject: Letter of Justification(U). (Subject matter of letter classified SECRET).

7. Commander's Recommendations:
   a. That Project Delta continue to be assigned missions at no lower than (two level), assigned AOs by Corps, and have Corps assets available.
   b. That Project Delta be issued the material items in the above referred letter as soon as possible.
   c. That Project Delta continue to be authorized a 20% overhead in its Recon section.

8. (U) Problem Areas and Recommendations: None.
DETACHMENT A-502
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRLIFT), 1st SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Dai Dien Four Development Program

TMU: Commanding Officer
Detachment B-50
ATTN: S-5
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding Officer
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96240

1. General. This report covers the three (3) month period 1 May 1966 thru 31 July 1966. It is limited to the Dai Dien Four Area of Dien Khanh District and the progress made in the fields of civil affairs and psychological operations.

2. Approach. The initial step for development was to provide security. Since January 1966, this step has been fairly well accomplished. Starting in March, a survey of the civic action and psychological operations situation was conducted. Based on this survey of basic needs, desires and support available, a logical priority of projects was developed.

3. Local Government. Continued progress has been made in developing a sound working relationship with the District Chief. His improved cooperation has been very helpful. Village and hamlet officials are taking an active part in the development of the area. There has been some question as to the effectiveness of the Political Action Teams assigned to the Dai Dien villages. Although they have not been the complete solution, they have made a definite impact on the area and have contributed to the general development. You can seldom distinguish PAT personnel from the surrounding population. Therefore, a cursory glance may lead to the conclusion that they no longer operate in the area. However, they are working effectively. Accomplishments of the Political Action Teams are incorporated into other sections of this report.

INClOSURE: 1 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCG 09190-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966
SUJEC: Success Story, Dai Bien Four Development Program 31 Jul 66

4. Health and Sanitation. The April survey showed an obvious need for improvements in both public and personal sanitation. Unerated sores, stomach aches and diarrhea were common disorders. Continuous medical patrols and sanitation lectures have led to a marked decrease in these and skin diseases and an improvement in the general health appearance of the children. The District Chief has selected fourteen villagers to attend the next Village Health Workers course in Nha Trang. Two dispensaries now operate in the area, one of which was opened with the assistance of NAV. The District Chief has hired two men to clean up the market on the approach to the Dai Bien bridge.

5. Education. Adequate schools and teachers are available. In January, all schools were closed. Prior to the end of the school year all schools were at least partially operational. This includes eleven (11) public and three (3) private schools. Several schools needed repairs and these were accomplished on a self-help basis during the vacation. The school damaged by terrorists was repaired immediately. School supplies and materials have been distributed. Materials for school furniture are being purchased with cost code 907 and revolving revolutionary development funds.

6. Agriculture. Maintaining security is the greatest aid to the agriculture program. The quantity and variety of crops raised is excellent. In July, the detachment acquired an 850 egg incubator. The baby chicks produced will be given to peasants to raise as a food supply and future breeding. The initial supply of eggs came from improved breeding stock in the United States. Thirty ducks are being raised by this detachment for breeding purposes. Presently, we have 45 cows that were captured from the VC and brought here to fatten prior to shipping them as a meat source to Special Forces detachments in isolated areas of Vietnam. The Province Animal Husbandry Chief was called upon to solve the worm problem in hogs. The Group Veterinarian made an inspection trip in early July to check for any diseases in animals. As security improves the fruit orchards in the foothills will be accessible for harvest.

7. Welfare and Refugees. There is no refugee problem in the Dai Bien Four area. Indemnification payments have been made to some but not all families with damaged homes. Many homes show evidence of recent repair work.

8. Transportation. Improved transportation facilities were considered to be one of the greatest needs in the April survey. It is in this field that the greatest progress has been made.

a. Every hamlet now has at least one main road which has been graded and ditched. The local population under direction of their hamlet Chief finished the roads and ditches after the rough work was done by road graders. Commercial transportation has moved into the area. Buses run three daily from Dai Bien to Nha Trang. Tri-Lambrotter interconnect the hamlets and Binh Xuyen.

DISCLOSURE 7 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RC3 CGPO-L2 (11)) 31 July 1966
SUBJECT: Success Story, Dai Dien Four Development Program

b. The PAT in Dai Dien Phu assisted the villagers in constructing a 65-foot long bridge across the tributary of the Song Cai River. Prior to this construction, 3/4 of the hamlet was isolated from the Dai Dien Four area. The village Chief estimates that 6,000 people use this simple bamboo bridge daily. Plans are being made by USAID engineers to build a permanent vehicular bridge. In the meantime villagers and PAT are busily preparing pilings.

c. The main bridge across the Song Cai River from Dien Khe to Dai Dien has been considered a major problem since the re-opening of the area. A US Engineer Company has just completed placing metal deckings and metal supports on the bridge. Access roads have been raised and the decking of the bridge was raised 5 feet. Recent rains have not completely flooded the area that it is doubtful if the bridge could have been used without the improvements made.

d. Commercial Development. Commercial development has progressed in direct relation to security. All old stores and several new stores have been opened. Two blacksmith shops have recently been opened.

10. Resource Control. Both PP and PAT are active in enforcing the 2000 hour to 0600 hour curfew. PAT personnel have moved from the Dien Phu area to more outlying villages. There is a National Police Representative (Deputy Hamlet Chief for Youth and Security) in each hamlet. Upon recommendation of the CA/FSOC Officer, the District Chief has implemented the family census book. Books have been completed for Phu Loc. Once the books for a particular hamlet are complete, raids are conducted to detect any extra or missing persons.

11. Psychological Operations. The District VIS is fairly active within Dien Khanh. In the Dai Dien Four area, Assistant Hamlet Chiefs for Propaganda have displayed many pro-GVN posters and health information posters. The PAT has put up many posters and held group discussions concerning the GVN.

12. Summary. There has been a very obvious re-development of the Dai Dien Four area. The homes are all re-occupied and as the farmers prepare for a new season, land which has remained unused for several seasons is being replanted. New crops and livestock are apparent throughout the area. The population has boomed, and along with it village and hamlet officials are accepting more of their duties and responsibilities. There is little evidence that this area was ever contested. The greatest improvements have been in the area of transportation facilities. Fourteen schools have been re-opened. Pagodas and Catholic Churches have been re-built. The overall impression of the area is that of prosperity and contentment.

ENCLOSURE: 7 TO SUCUETO II: to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RC5 0314-29 (R1)) 31 July 1966
DETACHMENT A-109
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96337

27 July 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Thuong Dao

TO: Commanding Officer
5TH SF GP (Abn), 1ST SF
APO US Forces 96240

1. General:

a. Operation EDSTRAEC was conducted at Det A-109, Thuong Dao, 22-24 June. The purpose of this combined CA/PSYOP-Medical operation was to extend the area of influence of the 062 in the Thuong Dao area by providing much needed medical treatment, food supplies and selected propaganda to the population in the A-109 operational area.

b. The following military units and civilian agencies participated:
Det C-1, Det A-109, 5th SFCA; Det A-153 LDD; Det 168, 41st CA Co;
244th PSYOP Co; Public Health Division USAID; VIS; US Navy; SVN National Police; and International Rescue Service.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. Six days prior to the operation, medical and CA supplies were assembled at Detachment C-1 for shipment. Supplies for 5,000 people were assembled, with a reserve for an additional 3,000 people remaining at Det C-1.

b. A two-man PSYOP team from the 244th PSYOP Co arrived at Det A-109 and began broadcasting loudspeaker messages and showing public health movies.

c. During the next two days necessary supplies were moved into the detachment area, along with a number of pre-planned leaflets for hand distribution and airdrop.

INCLUSION: 30 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS G00PSG-26 (R1)) 31 July 1966
SUCCESSION STORY, CAMP THUON: DUO (CONT) 27 JUL 66

d. The day preceding the operation most of the personnel to participate arrived at Thuong Duo. They included: Dr. William Grimaldi, Public Health Director, USAID Region I; Lt (USN) William Adams, 3rd MA Surgeon; and Captain Donald Lucas, C-1 Surgeon plus medical personnel from Detachment C-1. A Navy lab technician was also in the group with a portable field lab.

e. On 22 June in a field at the edge of the district town of Thuong Duo in three large tents made from cargo parachutes, the operation began. Prior to commencement of treatment, the district chief made a short speech explaining the purpose of MEDSTRAC and asking for full cooperation of local residents.

f. During the morning loudspeaker aircraft flew the entire area announcing the event.

g. At the entrance to the treatment area, which was cordoned off for control purposes, the team medics from A-109, along with the CIDG medics and an interpreter, examined the local residents and sent them to one of the three tents for treatment.

h. They sent the most seriously ill to the first tent where the three doctors, a medical assistant, and two interpreters worked.

i. In the second tent, medics from C-1 and the 41st CA Co, treated minor ills and dispensed medicine as prescribed by the doctors. Here also the Group Dental Surgeon worked. During the three days he pulled more than 500 teeth. The portable lab was also in the area.

j. CA/PSYOP supplies, including bulgar wheat, candy, leaflets and comic books, were distributed in the third tent. Also in a corner of this tent, each person was interviewed by intelligence personnel.

k. The operation continued in this manner for the three days. On the final day at 0215 an estimated company of VC mortared Camp Thuong Duo and attacked an FOB. They adjusted mortar rounds to within 13 paces of either end of the tent where CA and medical personnel were billeted. Friendly casualties were light, but 6 VC were killed and 5 wound 1 near the FOB. As an interesting sidelight, candy that had been given out during MEDSTRAC was found in the pockets of some of the dead VC.

l. Following the three days of the initial phase of MEDSTRAC, A-109 medics with their LLDB and CIDG counterparts continued medical treatments on a regular basis concurrently with long-range CA projects.

DISMSLACK 8 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS 00030-28(R)) 31 July 1966
SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Thuong Duc (cont) 27 Jul 66

3. Summary

During the three days over 2,100 villagers were treated. Desire to come under government control was exhibited in that the VC issued warnings for local inhabitants to stay away from the clinic. Crowds were larger the last day of the operation, even after the VC had mortared the treatment area early the same morning. Thuong Duc has taken a giant step towards GVN control.

4. Conclusions

Operations of this type can be invaluable if well planned and executed. Using the combined resources of military and civilian agencies leads to increasingly greater cooperation and more effective treatment. Even greater emphasis should be placed on GVN participation in future operations of this type.

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CC, Det A-109

3

ENCLOSURE 8 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (HC 00-00-26 (91)) 31 July 1966
Operation "Blue Star", a recovery and burial operation of casualties during the battle of Camp A Shau (VC 494834), was initiated on 18 May 1966 consisting of 31 USASF from Det C-1, Da Nang. Under the command of LTC Fays, C Det Commander, the Special Forces troops were helilifted by 7 UH-1D and 2 HU-1D helicopters provided by the 163rd US Marine Helicopter Squadron from Hue Phu Bai to Camp A Shau. Approximately thirty-two minutes were spent on the ground clearing the area of booby traps, burying the remains of indigenous personnel and retrieving the remains of the 5 USASF killed during the battle. This operation resulted in the recovery of the remains of 4 USASF and the burial of 24 indigenous personnel found in the open. An intense ground search was conducted to locate the remains of the remaining USASF soldier but to no avail. Only scattered enemy groundfire was received during the return flight to Hue/Phu Bai which put one or two holes into the aircraft with no damage or casualties. Operation Blue Star was successful in that it was accomplished proficiently and without the loss of additional lives.

INCLUSION: 9 TO SECTION II to Operational Report c Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-26 (R1)) 31 July, 1966.
CIDG PARTICIPATION IN "OPERATION NATHAN HALE"

The coordination and effectiveness of Joint Operations involving CIDG troops and conventional units are described in this operation.

The 254th CIDG Company, from Cong Dong Tre, 6-222, Phu Yen Province, while performing a routine road security mission between the La Hai FOQ and Dong Tre was overrun. On 180623 June, a Viet Cong Battalion attacked and overran the 254th CIDG Company, which was occupying three outposts vicinity 6-222. Friendly forces, although sustaining heavy casualties during the assault and subsequent withdrawal, killed ten VC and captured three AK-47 assault rifles, one M-2 carbine, two M-1 carbines, and several hand grenades.

At first light, 6-222 dispatched a relief force into the area, contact was made on 180615 June at the outpost with an estimated ninety VC. An airstrike, called upon by the friendly patrol, forced the enemy to flee in disorder. Tactical aircraft continued to deliver ordinance on targets and suspected enemy locations throughout the area. In order to exploit the tactical situation developed through CIDG efforts and react to the intelligence thus gained, elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st Air Cavalry Divisions arrived at Dong Tre for subsequent deployment. On 23 June, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division were helilifted into vicinity 6-222, where they were immediately engaged by units of the 18-B North Vietnamese Regiment. As a result of the fierce fighting which had developed, the entire battalion was deployed in support of the companies in contact. These units in turn were reinforced by four battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division, CIDG Companies from Dong Tre, the Mike Force from Pleiku, and Delta Recon Teams. Due to heavy contact had been maintained. In an attempt to find, track and destroy the IVA forces, which threatened Dong Tre and its surrounding area, the 1st Air Cavalry Division deployed an additional Brigade to the Dong Tre area, thus dubbing the entire endeavor "Operation Nathan Hale". U.S. advised CIDG participation in this operation, as well as all joint operations with conventional units, included small range Apache Recon Patrols, Security Platoons, Long Range Recon Patrols, Special Patrols and Company size Patrols. On 26 June, following the detection of a Viet Cong buildup in Phu Yen Province, Detachment B-22 moved a Forward OP element to Phu Hon to co-locate with the Forward OP of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), maintaining formal liaison with them. From this posture the A Detachment Commander controlled "A" Detachments at Phu Hon, Cung Son, Dong Tre and Van Canh, and one company of the Mike Force while conducting joint operations with the first Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division. The size and mission of the CIDG were as follows: one company of the Mike Force (177 CIDG and 5 U.S.A.P.) conducted saturation patrols in the Kylo Valley; three CIDG companies with 7 U.S.A.P. conducted screening missions, additional CIDG from Dong Tre provided artillery security; conducted Apache Recon Patrols; Camp Cung Son provided one company for road security and provided a perimeter for an Artillery Battery. Twelve Delta Recon Teams were also employed on Long Range Reconnaissance patrols, which were very effective in locating large VC/IVA movements, and in which case conventional forces were notified and employed in the area. On 30 June, ten
The advisors of Project Delta with one Airborne Ranger Company conducted an air assault in the vicinity of 0905025, continuing on with the mission to search and sweep southeast and to leg to a reported enemy force consisting of two companies plus some one hundred workers. "Operation Action Hole" began on 1st July with a total of three hundred and thirteen V/C/Vs confirmed. An additional two hundred and sixteen estimated as having been killed due to small arms and artillery. One hundred and twenty-nine were captured, forty-one suspects detained and one hundred and forty-one weapons were captured in action.

"Operation Action Hole" not only proved to be a tactically successful operation, but also demonstrated the effectiveness of close relations, coordination, and deployment of UNDO forces with conventional forces.
III Corps activity for this period centered in Binh Long Province.

Intelligence nets, interrogation of captured VC, and captured VC documents indicated that the VC would concentrate its Monsoon Campaign in the province. On 3 May a CIDG company on an operation east of Loc Ninh (XM72507) came in contact with a VC company size-unit, resulting in an one hour fire fight, in the vicinity of XM810074. During the encounter certain documents were captured indicating that the VC would attack Loc Ninh CIDG camp and District Headquarters immediately following reconnaissance missions, scheduled to be conducted 8-9-10 May. Other documents captured proved to be an intelligence estimate of the Loc Ninh area to include a VC plan of attack. Generally the plan of attack called for the employment of four regiments, one of which would be reinforced with 8 anti-aircraft guns for the final attack of the objective. The regiments were identified as Q762, Q763, and the 101st Regiment of the 35th Division. The fourth was later identified as Q761. Objectives outlined in the document included target A-1 alleged to be the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp and target A-2, the Loc Ninh District Headquarters and air strip. Each target was to be attacked by one regiment.

The third and fourth regiments assigned missions were to cut highway 13 to preclude reinforcement, and to area ambush the highway and landing zones to prevent possible reinforcement by helicopter operations. One of the regiments would also function as a reaction force. In reaction to what was considered to be valid intelligence of an impending attack, the Multi-Purpose Reaction (MPR) force with a strength of 441 troops was airlifted to Loc Ninh on 6 May to reinforce and improve the defensive posture of the camp, secure the airfield, and to conduct limited operations to seek out VC units operating in the area. On 8 May the 5th ARVN Division reinforced the area with the 9th ARVN Regiment. Numerous contacts were made by the MPR force and CIDG units with small VC elements and signs of extensive activity was noted but no major contact was made until 17 May 66. The contact was made near the Cambodian border vicinity XM8053 by the MPR force and one company of CIDG. The contact was with a superior force. The MPR force and CIDG company were forced to break contact and withdraw. On 19 May 66 the 1st US Infantry Division reinforced Loc Ninh with the 1st Brigade. The 1st US Infantry Division troops conducted extensive operations but were unable to make any significant contact. They were extracted from the area on 25 May. The VC immediately increased their activities and indications were that they would carry out their original mission even though their plans had been compromised. Based on the indications of VC continuation on their plans the 1st US Infantry Division returned to Binh Long Province in strength in early June. Their mission was to secure and defend critical installations and to conduct operations to locate and destroy the four VC regiments reported in the province. Since then there has been numerous contacts and three major battles have been fought with the VC. Body count of VC killed on 31 July was 133.

Opening of Camp Trai Bi, Tay Ninh Province

On 22 Jun 66 the ARVN force made a heliborne assault on Trai Bi (20°16'02"), Tay Ninh Province, in preparation for the operaition for a new CIDG camp there. The ARVN force met no resistance on the ground during the initial assault. A Detachment along with five CIDG companies, the 35th RVN Ranger Battalion, and a company of ARVN Engineers travelled by convoy from Trang Sup (AT165555), Tay Ninh Province, up highway 22 and closed into the proposed camp site without incident on 23 June.

It is expected the area by Viet Cong is apparent due to the extensive fortified base areas and tunnels discovered. There have been two major encounters with the VC. The first involved an operation which a ARVN force company was conducting approximately four kilometers north of the camp. At 041400, an estimated VC battalion was engaged. Due to the superior fire power of the VC battalion and the 35th Ranger Battalion, the ARVN company was forced to withdraw. A second ARVN company was committed to reinforce but due to the dense jungle growth they were unable to deploy into a position where fire superiority could be gained. Both companies withdrew under cover of ARVN air and 105mm Artillery support. A combined operation utilizing the ARVN and the 35th Ranger Battalion was later conducted in the area in an attempt to locate and destroy the VC, however contact could not be regained. The second major action was a VC initiated artillery attack against the camp location, VC forces began shelling the camp with 70mm Pack Howitzers at 232210 July. Approximately 150 rounds were fired, damage was not extensive, and the VC did not follow up the barrage with an assault. The rapid deployment of a FAC and a flareship along with counter mortar fire may have interrupted plans for an infantry advance.

By 31 July the construction of the Camp is approximately fifty percent complete.
1. General Situation: Intelligence reports received on 7 May indicated that a VC meeting had taken place on 24 April to discuss and formulate plans for attacks against outposts in An Phu district, Chau Doc Province, during the rainy season. Participants in the meeting consisted of the Chau Doc Province Commissioner, An Phu District Commissioner, 564th VC Battalion Commander (AKA 521st Bn), and the 261st VC Battalion Commander (AKA 261st Bn). Intelligence reports continued, indicating that an attack would occur in the immediate future. On 16 May current intelligence strongly indicated that two VC battalions, the 564th and 261st, would attack CIDG POB's and FF outposts at Khanh-An, Pho-Hoi, Phu-Hau and Don Li that night. Based on this accumulation of intelligence, all CIDG and FF units in the area were placed on a 100% alert. An ambush force, consisting of one platoon CIDG, one platoon FF, one USASP, and two USASP, was dispatched to guard a vital bridge along the main supply routes to the POB's and OP's, and also to act as the initial reaction force for units in the northern portion of the district in the event of a VC attack.

b. At 0325 hours on 19 May, the 261st VC battalion reinforced by the 567th VC battalion with an estimated strength of 700, launched an attack against the CIDG company at Khanh Binh and completely surrounded their position. The VC force employed 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 81mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launcher, LMG and small arms fire, and conducted "human wave" type assaults every 15-20 minutes. Simultaneously the FF outpost at Khanh An, manned by a platoon of FF and the reconnaissance platoon from camp An Phu, came under attack by an estimated force of 200 VC from the 512th VC battalion. The 512th Bn employed 81mm mortars, 81mm recoilless rifle, LMG and small arms fire during the assault. Anti-aircraft guns were also employed upon the arrival of a "Puff" ship over the area. At 0330 hours, the ambush force at the bridge site ambushed a CIDG demolition squad attempting to blow the bridge. At 0340 hours on the 19th, the FF outposts at Khanh Binh, Phu Hau, Pho Hoi, and Don Li came under harassing small arms fire, which continued for approximately two hours at each location.

c. At 0515 hours, a reaction force of 3 platoons CIDG, 2 USASP, 1 USASP, and the VC Camp Commander departed An Phu, linked up with the ambush party at the bridge then proceeded to Khanh Binh to relieve the pressure on the surrounded CIDG company. By the time the reaction force reached Khanh Binh, at 0700 hours, the VC had penetrated and were occupying 10 meters of the outer perimeter defensive trench. Effective heavy fire was placed on the VC lines by the reaction force, forcing the VC to withdraw from Khanh Binh into Cambodia. From their sanctuary in Cambodia the VC continued to place 31mm mortar and LMG fire on the CIDG positions until 1030 hours. At 1100 hours, the VC broke off the attack on the Khanh An OP and withdrew north approximately 2 kilometers.

d. On 20 May at 0300 hours, a company of VC launched a second attack against the FF OP at Khanh An. The OP at this time was being supported by a company of Regional Force troops, causing the VC to be unsuccessful in their attack which they broke off at 0320 hours. A second attack against the CIDG company (now reinforced) at Khanh Binh was initiated.

INCLUSION: 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS 0-29 (R1)) 31 July 1966.
by an estimated 500 VC at 0130 hours on 20 May. A second reaction force consisting of 3 platoons of CIDG, 2 VNSF and 2 USAF conducted an assault on An Phu at 0500 hours. An 81mm mortar, manned by 2 VNSF and 2 CIDG, was set up approximately 1800 meters from the battle area to give supporting fire while the remainder of the reaction force moved into contact with the VC who had once again surrounded the CIDG positions at Khanh Binh. The VC broke contact at 0600 hours and once again withdrew into Ca Mau. At 0700 hours, the CIDG company was withdrawn from Khanh Binh and replaced with a company of fresh troops. Although the VC had withdrawn from the CIDG positions at Khanh Binh, the PF OP, 2 kilometers north, was still surrounded and receiving harassing fire. A relief operation for the OP was requested from Province headquarters, but was not approved. However, a CIDG force moved to the OP and cleared the immediate area.

d. A third attack was launched against the CIDG post at Khanh Binh by an estimated 200 VC at 2045 hours, 20 May. This assault was limited to MG and small arms fire which indicated that the VC had spent their crew served weapon ammunition or were preparing for a large scale assault. A flare ship and a gun ship arrived over the area approximately 25 minutes later giving illumination and fire support. Under heavy suppressing fire from the "Puff" ship, the VC were forced to withdraw, limiting their actions to the south side of the CIDG positions until finally breaking off the attack at 0300 hours on 21 May.

e. On 21 May, a temporary FOB was established at the Don KI IV outpost, consisting of 1 platoon of PF and 2 USAF. An 81mm mortar was mounted, with the capability of supporting both Khanh Binh and Khanh An. At 2200 hours, the VC launched a fourth attack against the CIDG company at Khanh Binh with an estimated strength of 200. A "puff" ship arrived over the area at 2200 hours, providing illumination and fire support, but was greatly hampered by 50 caliber MG fire from a Cambodian outpost approximately 2 kilometers from Khanh Binh. The VC broke off the attack at 2210 hours, but continued to harass the CIDG positions with 81mm mortar fire until 2345 hours.

f. A fifth attack against the CIDG at Khanh Binh was launched at 2030 hours on 22 May by an estimated 200 VC, supported by 60mm mortar and HE fire. The CIDG forces were supported by 81mm mortar fire from the temporary FOB at Don KI and 155mm howitzer fire from An Phu. The VC attack was broken up and they were forced to withdraw at 2110 hours.

g. On 24 May, a multi company search and destroy mission was mounted to clear the VC from the area thus preventing them from gaining a foothold. Friendly elements consisted of 1 company NVA Force, 1 company of KKK, 1 company of CIDG, 2 VNSF and 2 USAF. The operation was initiated with 155mm howitzer and 81mm mortar concentrations being fired into the area. Upon entering the operational area the NVA Force established heavy contact with the VC at 0910 hours. An airstrike was received at 1035 hours, covering the area with rockets, napalm and strafing runs in close support of the attacking ground forces. At 1225 hours, contact with the VC was lost and the operation was terminated.

h. Throughout the entire period of 19-24 May, CIDG and PF forces in the northern half of An Phu district were in continual contact with the VC.

NICO J-3 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RG 378 EXPO-37 (R1)) 31 July 1966
3. Conclusion

a. The intelligence employed in An Phu district was a well-organized and highly effective force, providing extremely accurate information in a timely manner.

b. The CIDG and PP forces maintained a high state of morale and fighting effectiveness throughout the period and defended their positions in an outstanding manner.

c. Had the ambush party not been sent to the bridge site on the night of 18 May, the VC would have successfully destroyed the bridge, causing a lengthy delay in the reaction forces reaching the battle area, which could have resulted in a decisive victory for the VC.

d. Air support that was received was exceptionally well executed and proved highly instrumental in the defense of the FOB and OP's, however air support was lacking in quantity as indicated below:

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<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
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EXCLUSION: 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS COGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966.
US Army Special Forces camps are located in five of the provinces of I CTZ. They are situated in areas of limited visibility and low cloud cover. The adverse weather situation worsens during the Autumnal Monsoon season, and the campsites are surrounded by dense jungle growth and steep mountains. Prior to the employment of US Forces in I Corps the CIDG forces conducted unilateral operations only. In most cases CIDG units were the only government influence in the area.

During the past year, and particularly during the past quarter, VC infiltration from North Vietnam has become a cause for concern. To counter the potential threat this buildup poses to Special Forces camps contingency plans have been formulated to strengthen their defensive posture and enhance their operational capability. The battle of A Shau on 9-10 February confirmed the necessity for flexible support capability for camps imminently in danger of or actually under attack, even in poor weather.

The I Corps Senior Advisor (CG III MAF) and detachment commander, C-1 jointly developed a responsive system for relieving camps under heavy pressure from Viet Cong/NVA forces. This system includes the rapid deployment of Airmobile artillery, direct air/ground communications with supporting aircraft, direct communications with FIDF forces, and the use of Sky Spot bombing techniques.