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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned
   Headquarters, 2D Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery for quarterly period
   ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be
   reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19
   and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations
   and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of
   receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to ensure appropriate benefits in the
   future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted
   for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

G. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, ACC
Acting The Adjutant General

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2702658
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AVAC-V

31 October 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, RG-OSFOR-65(U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
Attn: AVOG-C
APO 96257

Commanding Officer
II Field Forces Vietnam Artillery
Attn: AVFOR-3 AVIFB FAC
APO 96227

Commanding General
USARV
Attn: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
USARPAC
Attn: OPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Forces Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 20310
SECRET

SECTION I

1. (s) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. Administration/Personnel. None

b. Intelligence. None

c. Training.

(1) A general training program directive has been formulated and will be published as a memorandum on 1 November 1966. This memorandum provides guidance for replacement and refresher training for all personnel. In order to standardize policy concerning cannon gunnery and emphasize safety precautions, a circular on gunnery procedures will also be published 1 November 1966.

(2) Aerial observers have completed training and currently conduct visual reconnaissance, registrations and fire missions. Additional personnel are receiving cross training in this field.

(3) On 22 October 1966, four officers and ten enlisted men of this battalion departed for 10 days TTY to Headquarters USA, Korea, for nuclear weapons refresher training.

(4) On the job training and individual cross training continue in all sections of the battalion.

d. Operations.

(1) On 20001 October 1966, the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery was reassigned from the 23rd Artillery Group to the 54th Artillery Group by USAG General Order Number 6111, 1966.

(2) HQ, B, and C Batteries continued General Support/Reinforcing of the 10th ARVN Division from the Kuan Loi base camp, Battery A continued General Support/Reinforcing of the Australian Task Force from the Kui Dat base camp, and Service Battery (-) continued its support mission from Long Binh. The only change in the disposition of battalion elements was the move of the battalion personnel section from the 23rd Artillery Group consolidated personnel section at Long Binh to the 54th Artillery Group consolidated personnel section at Long Binh.

(3) During the quarter, elements of the battalion participated in nine different field operations, with the following breakdown by battery: Battery A, five operations involving a total of 31 days; Battery B, three operations, 68 days; Battery C, 3 operations, 47 days. A battalion HQ element accompanied B Battery on Operation Toledo for 13 days. While not engaged in field operations, all batteries continued normal training, maintenance and area improvement and provided fire support from their base camps.
d. Operations: (Con't)

(4) The first field operation for the battalion occurred 1-2 August when Battery B moved out in general support of units from the 10th ARVN Division operating to the southwest of Xuan Loc and out of range of the base camp. The battery occupied one firing position and fired H&I's and a preparation before returning to the base camp. The operation was primarily useful in familiarizing the battalion with road march problems and artillery support procedures for ARVN units.

(5) From 14 August - 7 September the battalion provided general support for Operation Toledo which was conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and attached units. Participating units of this battalion were attached to the 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery, of the 173rd. Batteries moved out separately to a series of positions east and south of Xuan Loc in support of search and destroy infantry sweeps. Both batteries fired extensive H&I's and LZ preparations. However, there were very few observed missions and no significant surveillance of results.

(6) On 9 September B Battery was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and moved to Lai Khe for a series of operations. At the end of October the battery was still attached in a General Support/Reinforcing role, making this the largest operation in which the battalion has participated.

(7) Battery C was again attached to the 3/319th Artillery with the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 25 September - 17 October for Operation Sioux City and Robin. For Sioux City, the battery occupied a position 25km north of Bien Hoa and supported search and destroy sweeps within Artillery range. The battery then moved back to Bien Hoa and down Highway 15 in support of a road clearing operation carried out by elements of the 173rd Airborne and the 11th Armored Cavalry. Battery A also participated in this operation. No enemy contact was made and only routine missions were fired.

(8) In addition to Robin, Battery A took part in the following operations during the three month period: Holsworthy, 10-14 August; Crow's Nest, 1-5 October; Canbebe I, 6-10 October; and Queenbebe, 16-26 October. These search and destroy operations were all conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force and involved moving only part of the firing battery to the field while the rest continued its fire support mission from the battery base camp at Nui Dat.

(9) Ammunition expenditures for this quarter were as follows:

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<th>October</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>Miss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2741</td>
<td>718</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>254</td>
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<tr>
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Battalion Total: 3,787 Missions; 28,919 Rounds Expended

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**SECTION II**

Commander's Observations and Recommendations

Part 1. Observations:

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

**DISCOURAGEMENT OF VC ROAD MINE LAYING**

**ITEM:** Use of artillery to assist in keeping roads clear.

**DISCUSSION:** On operation Sioux City, in which one of our batteries participated, it became increasingly apparent that daytime road clearing operations only temporarily removed obstacles from the path of friendly forces. At night new mines and booby traps were emplaced. Therefore, artillery H&I missions were fired using fuse VT and shell HE on unoccupied portions of roads and shell HE and WP rounds with PD fuses on both sides of roads.

**OBSERVATION:** Although this procedure did not completely halt the emplacement of mines and booby traps, it did cause a significant reduction in the number of new obstacles introduced. The use of fuse VT on the unoccupied portion of the roads provided a deterrent, while not subjecting the road to damage. On two occasions partially installed mines were discovered in the vicinity of previous night H&I fires. Apparently the artillery frightened the VC away before they could finish the job.

**Artillery H&I Fires**

**ITEM:** Artillery H&I fires in depth.

**DISCUSSION:** The common practice for artillery H&I missions is to plan a given number of rounds, a given number of times, on one set of coordinates. These are almost totally unobserved fires into suspected areas or supply routes and are based on current intelligence without confirmation.

**OBSERVATION:** A systematic coverage of an area rather than firing at a given point will greatly enhance the possibility of damage and injury to the VC.

**Artillery Air Warning Notification**

**ITEM:** Establishment of one standard air warning net.

**DESCRIPTION:** In order to properly effect aircraft notification of artillery firing, this battalion has to provide firing data to three agencies so that it can be disseminated on three different nets. In addition, when the data includes a high ordinate, high performance aircraft must be notified which requires disseminating the data to a fourth agency.
b. Operations, Artillery Air Mission Notification (Cont'

OBSERVATION: Furnishing the data to all these agencies generates an unnecessary delay in firing and seriously hampers the surprise element of artillery fires. Providing firing data to only one aircraft control station would eliminate excess radio transmission and would save time.

c. Training and Organization. None

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics. None

f. Other. None

Part 2. Recommendations:

a. H&I Fires. H&I fires planned on a number of coordinates in close proximity to the coordinate listed as the suspect location will provide coverage in depth and width of the area and afford a greater chance of disrupting operations there. A systematic program of attacking targets on an area basis, in this manner, should cause the VC not just to move out of the way of the artillery, but to leave the area altogether.

b. Aircraft Control Stations. It is recommended that the aircraft control stations be MACV operated. Since ARVN as well as US units use artillery, the coordinating centers would be manned by MACV personnel. In addition ARVN pilots would then have access to the information of artillery firing which they do not now have. Data required by the pilots is the location from which the artillery is being fired, the direction of fire, the range to the next thousand meters (for safety), the inclusive time of firing, and the maximum ordinate in feet computed from sea level.

LOUIS J. DASKELL
Lt Col, Arty
Commanding
SECRET

W - 7 (12 Nov 66)

1st Ind

USAFRICA Quarterly Operational Report (EC)

F., 54th Artillery Group, N. San Francisco 94157

G.: Commanding Officer
11 Field Force Vietnam artillery
A/T.: AWFS-FAC
N. San Francisco 94157

1.(o)Forwarded for consideration.

2.(o)The Commander's observations and recommendations are considered adequate and valid. The artillery air warning procedure has been changed to require only one notification by the firing unit.

Charles M. Magell
CHARLES M. MIZELL
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

Forwarded at 9 pm November 14, 1966
Received at 6 a.m. November 15, 1966
AVFB-FACO (12 Nov 66)  2nd Ind  (C)  22 NOV 1966

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Report (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV ARTY, APO 96266

THRU:  Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report submitted by the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part 2a; concur.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part 2b; nonconcur. The responsibility for broadcasting notifications of artillery fires must rest with the US commander having the responsibility for the TAOR/AO from which the artillery is firing. A new regulation on this subject is presently being published by HQ, II FFORCEV. This regulation makes provisions for broadcasting notifications of ARVN artillery fires as well as US. The requirement to notify pilots of artillery firing is not intended in any way to delay the delivery of artillery fires in support of units in contact or on immediate type targets. The 2/35 Arty has been so informed.

4. (U) The overall classification of the ORLL should be SECRET because of the information contained in Section I, para 1c (3). The 2/35 Arty has been instructed to upgrade all copies of this report to SECRET.
AVFDC-5 (22 Nov 66) 3rd Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, RCS-CPOR-65 (U)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 8 JAN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, US Army, ATT: AVG-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATT: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 2D Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is considered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the 1st and 2nd Ind. Concur with the comments and action taken as stated in the basic report and 1st and 2nd Ind.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WAYNE D. BLANTON
WO-W1, USA
Acting Asst AG

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Page #1 of 1 page
Copy #1 of 2 copies

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65-S-87 241

SECRET
AVNCC-EN (31 Oct 66) 4th Inf.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RO# 0829-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 21 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOR-OT
APO 96698

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 2d Mortar Battalion, 35th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
Lt. AGC
Assoc Adjutant General
SECRET

GPOP-OT (31 Oct 66) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (BCS CEMOR-65), HQ 2d How BN, 35th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concur in the basic report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

ROBERT L. BUTCH
Lt Col, AGG
Asst AG

In printed on 2 year intervals
in office for 12 years
in active service

HQ 2d BN
6-66 6-67

03-3-67 2-41