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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY
San Francisco, Calif 96266

AVFS-PAC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSPR - 65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

In compliance with AR 1-19, 26 May 1966, the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 May - 31 Jul 1966 is attached in sections I and II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Incl

Charles H. Bell
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

FOR 07 UT
260139

SECRET

Regarded as UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified document.
Section 1 - Significant Organization Activities.

A. (C) Administration/Personnel.

1. Strength.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery II FFORCEV Artillery is organized under TAC 6-501F with an authorized and assigned strength as of 31 July as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>HM</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Gains and losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
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<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>HM</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Casualties during the period include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Battle Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Casualties</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery is assigned to Headquarters, II FFORCEV and, as such, all personnel actions are handled by a combined II FFORCEV/II FFORCEV Artillery Personnel Section. The SI, II FFORCEV Artillery is charged with the responsibility of monitoring the personnel actions pertaining to II FFORCEV Artillery.
5. Reen and Recuperation Program.

The RR# program is beginning to pick up participants as the unit approaches the half-way point of its stay in Vietnam. The following RR quotas were filled during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bangkok</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The morale of the organization continues to be outstanding.

7. Decorations and Awards.

The following decorations and awards have been presented to members of this command during the reporting period:

- Bronze Star: 1
- Air Medal: 1

8. Discipline, Law, and Order.

Judicial and non-judicial actions during the period include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 15</th>
<th>Summary Court</th>
<th>Special Court</th>
<th>General Court</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>


The battery sustained one vehicle accident and one personnel injury during the period, neither of which were serious enough to require hospitalization of personnel involved.

10. Civil Affairs.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery has provided assistance to the hamlet of XU VAN COI, and the orphanage in the hamlet. The staff Chemical Officer has the additional duty of SS; he has coordinated with the hamlet to determine what assistance is needed and arranged for the provision of this assistance. Through the efforts of the Chemical Officer, on 26 July 1966 the hamlet chief was presented 20 bags of rice, 10 bags of wheat, and 10 bags of corn. Several of the enlisted men in the battery have volunteered and are teaching English classes to the orphanage, and...
make frequent visits to entertain the children. Arrangements are now being made to pick up several truck-loads of supplies from the Catholic Relief Services warehouse in Saigon for delivery to the village. The packages will consist of foodstuffs, clothing, insecticides, personal hygiene items and toys.

B. (S) Operations/intelligence.

1. (C) General.

Operations and intelligence activities of the headquarters during the period included follow-up of actions reported in letter, file AVAC-C, this headquarters, subject: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSCPO - 28 (R1)) (U), dated 11 May 1966, and initiation of several new projects. Plans for stationing artillery units in III Corps Tactical Zone were under continual review as changes were required by establishment of firm stationing plans for major maneuver elements coming into II FFORCEV. Attempts were continued to provide sufficient OI aircraft to perform aerial observation missions, to improve the countermortar posture of II FFORCEV, and to find ways in which to assist ARVN in artillery employment. Programs were initiated to provide survey and calibration support to artillery units in III Corps Tactical Zone, and to improve coordination between US, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) and ARVN artillery units and the many US, FWMAF and Vietnamese installations and forces which require artillery support.

2. (S) Plan for Stationing of Artillery Units.

a. The stationing of incoming US artillery units referred to in Section I, paragraph c2h of the previous Operational Report continues to receive much of the attention of this headquarters during the reporting period. The objectives used in preparing the plan were that the plan should:

(1) Extend to the maximum artillery coverage in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).

(2) Provide a mixture of calibers at several different locations to be readily available to support operations in any sector of the III CTZ and to protect base camps.

(3) Provide US artillery support directly to ARVN tactical operations, and to fire in support of ARVN installations.

(4) Provide artillery support for opening, securing, and maintaining additional ground lines of communication.

(5) Insure adequate security for the artillery units to preclude loss or destruction of artillery materiel.
b. A plan for the stationing of incoming units, designed to meet these objectives, was presented to the CG, II FFORCEV on 4 May and approved by him for planning purposes. Since that date, several changes in the program for incoming units have occurred. In addition, changes in the stationing of units already in country were planned in order to improve artillery coverage and provide for the fire support of incoming major maneuver elements. The plan for stationing of US artillery units in III CTZ as of 31 July 1966 compared to the actual stationing as of 1 May 1966 is at Inclosure 1. At Inclosure 2 is a map showing the fire capabilities of II FFORCEV Artillery as of 15 March 1966, the date on which this headquarters became operational, and the fire capabilities of the artillery units which will be in III CTZ at the end of the present build-up phase - March 1967. The fire capabilities circles of the 1st and 25th Division Artilleries lie within the fire capabilities circles of the II FFORCEV Artillery units shown for 15 March and hence are not shown on this map.

c. On 2 July 66 COMUSMACV in message (S) 22684 directed that 2/13th Arty, a 105mm towed howitzer battalion belonging to 23d Art, be deployed to IV Corps in October to be under operational control of SA, IV Corps. This redeployment was to take place after the arrival of the 1/40th Arty, a 105mm SP howitzer battalion, whose ETA in country is 25 October. Since the 7/9th Arty, also a towed 105mm battalion, is programmed for II FFORCEV Artillery with an ETA in country of 1 November, this headquarters recommended to COMUSMACV (II FFORCEV mag (S) 70260, DTG 15O0J0Z Jul) that the 7/9th Arty be substituted for the 2/13th Arty for deployment to IV Corps. The decision was announced in this recommendation on 29 Jul 66 (USARV mag AVRGC-A33, 553), but no decision had been received from COMUSMACV by the end of the period. The stationing plan at Inclosure 1 omits the 7/9th Arty on the assumption it will be stationed in IV Corps.

d. Due to interest expressed by COMUSMACV in LONG AN Province, this headquarters undertook a study of stationing possibilities in that area for US artillery units. At present there is no US artillery in LONG AN Province. The stationing of one or more units in that area would permit ARVN to reposition its own artillery and thereby improve the overall coverage. A reconnaissance disclosed that artillery position areas are extremely scarce; possible position areas were located at TAN AN, BEN LUC, THU THUA and CAN GIUOC. At the end of the period, a plan was being considered to move an 8-inch platoon to TAN AN for a 2-3 day operation to demonstrate to the VC and the local populace that US artillery can be moved to and employed in LONG AN Province. On a longer range basis, it is envisaged that a composite 8"/175mm battery might be stationed at BEN LUC.

e. The first US artillery unit to arrive in III CTZ since this headquarters became operational was the 2/35th Arty, a 155mm SP battalion. Its advance party arrived at BIEN HOA Air Base on 13 June 1966. The main body arrived at VUNG TAU on 21 June 1966, and moved into a staging area just north of BIEN HOA to await the arrival of the unit's equipment.
The equipment arrived at CAM HANH Bay on 16 June 1966, was offloaded, then transshipped through the port of SAIGON in three separate shipments. Ten of the howitzers arrived in the staging area on 10 July, and started participating in the harassing and interdiction program of this headquarters on 11 July 66. By 14 July 66 the rest of the equipment had arrived, and on 19 July the battalion (minus one firing battery and Service Battery) moved to XUAN LOC, becoming operational the same day in fulfilling its mission of general support, reinforcing 10th ARVN Division Artillery and US artillery units operating in the area. The other firing battery moved on 22 July to its base camp located with 1 Australian Task Force northeast of HA RI, where its mission is to reinforce the artillery of 1 ATF and provide fire support to GVN and ARVN installations and operations in the area. Service Battery is collocated with this headquarters.

f. On 19 June, one 8" tube was exchanged for a 175mm tube in A Btry, 6/27th Arty which is stationed at BEAR CAT, 17 km south of BIEN HOA. This change, which leaves three 8" howitzers and one 175mm gun in this battery, greatly increases the heavy artillery coverage from BEAR CAT.

g. At the end of this period, plans were being finalized for moving 2/32d Arty minus one firing battery and Service Battery to the TAY NINH area. It is planned to move one composite 8"/175mm battery to SUOI DA GP camp, 16 km northeast of TAY NINH City, in September. From this location this battery will be able to support the base camp being constructed for the 146th Infantry Brigade which is scheduled to be stationed in that area in September. It will also permit attack of targets in War Zone C which are currently out of range of any artillery in III CTZ, and will permit artillery coverage of the Michelin Plantation. In October or November, it is planned to move a second composite battery, now stationed in XUAN LOC, to the SP camp at TRAN SUP, 5 km northwest of TAY NINH City. That battery will be able to interdict VC routes of entry into Vietnam along the Cambodian border. The Battalion Headquarters will be stationed in the brigade camp concurrently with the movement of the second battery.

3. (c) Aerial Reconnaissance/Observation.

a. Since ground observation is normally impossible due to the relatively flat terrain and dense jungle areas, aerial reconnaissance has provided the vast majority of targets for all artillery units in this part of Vietnam. Aerial reconnaissance/observation, and adjustment of artillery fires by artillery units sustained a serious setback with the announcement by DA on 3 May that nondivisional combat support units, including separate artillery battalions, will have their aviation sections deleted, and that those combat support units already in Vietnam would have their aviation sections deleted.
b. The uH-15 can be used for short range observation and conduct of fire; however, it does not have the endurance and range for sustained observation nor instrumentation required for night reconnaissance. Since division and separate brigade artillery units do not have light fixed wing aircraft, the O1 aircraft assigned to II FFORCEV Artillery units are used to supplement the aerial surveillance coverage of J5 Tactical Areas of Operational Responsibility in III CTZ, particularly at night.

c. USAV is working on a plan which will provide the required number of O1 aircraft (22) to support the needs of II FFORCEV Artillery units. This plan will also provide 8 observation helicopters to II FFORCEV Artillery. This number is inadequate in that it is only half of the observation helicopters needed, which is: two for each group headquarters, one for each artillery battalion, and three for the headquarters battery of the target acquisition battalion, for a total of 16. However, this plan is acceptable as an immediate and short range solution considering existing shortages in HVN. Acceptance of this plan does not change the requirement for 16 observation helicopters for II FFORCEV Artillery units to perform their combat role to the fullest extent.

4. (S) Requirements for Additional Countermortar Radar Sets.

a. In the last Operational Report (Section I, para C2g), mention was made of the need for 37 additional AN/MPQ-4A radar detachments in order to adequately counter the mortar threat. On 11 May 1966, a letter was submitted to the Commanding General, USAV, requesting 37 separate artillery countermortar radar detachments be added to the troop program with a high priority. To date, no reply has been received and the radar detachments have not appeared in the troop program for CY 66-67.

b. On 18 July, a liaison visit was made by representatives from this headquarters to the Capital Military District, formerly a separate command but now under the command of III Corps Commander. The purpose of the visit was to determine the manner in which the CMD employs its countermortar radars, the requirements for additional radar sets, and what action has been taken to obtain them. There are presently two countermortar radar sets employed in the Capital Military District. One is at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the other at the POL storage facility at Nha Be, approximately 7 kilometers southeast of Saigon. It was learned that, on 10 May 1966 a study was made by J3, MACV which determined the need for two (2) additional countermortar radar sets at Tan Son Nhut. This requirement was approved by MACV on 4 July 1966; however, the detachments have not yet appeared on the incoming troop list.

c. On 23 July message number AVF-FA 70426, subject: Requirement for Countermortar Radar Detachments, was sent to USAV requesting the availability of the 37 AN/MPQ-4A radar sets mentioned in paragraph
a above, and the status of the request for two (2) additional radar sets for Tan Son Nhut.

   d. The continued use of mortars by the Viet Cong on key US installations substantiates the need for additional countermortar radars for airfields, base camps and other vital installations.

5. Assistance to ARVN.

   a. When this headquarters became operational in mid-March, the Commanding General, II FNCV, stated that one of the most important missions of II FNCV Artillery is to be that of helping ARVN to improve the employment of their artillery. Since that time, this headquarters has endeavored to accomplish this mission in every way possible.

   b. One of the first steps taken to assist ARVN was to learn as much as possible, through meetings and visits with US advisors, about the employment of ARVN artillery. Information such as the locations, manner of employment, and fire capabilities of ARVN artillery was sought out by members of the staff to obtain a better understanding of what type of assistance was needed.

   c. Visits to the ARVN Corps and division artillery by the Commanding General, Deputy Commander, principal staff officers, and liaison officers from this headquarters to III Corps have provided a valuable exchange of information on artillery matters and a basis for future plans for assistance.

   d. In order to broaden the exchange of ideas and to seek out possible problem areas for assistance, this headquarters sponsored two artillery conferences during the reporting period. The first one, held on 20 May, brought together the principal US artillery commanders and the US artillery advisors for the express purpose of seeking the answer to the question: How can US artillery assist ARVN in the employment of artillery? Conferences were briefed on stationing plans for incoming artillery units, and on programs for the provision of calibration, survey and metro support to artillery units in III CTZ. Discussion after the briefing centered on methods of improving coordination between US and ARVN units. Shortages of material in some ARVN units were brought up; this headquarters has been assisting in reducing these.

   e. A second conference on 1 July was attended by the ARVN Artillery Commander, the Commandant of the ARVN Artillery School and senior ARVN artillery commanders, as well as US artillery commanders and advisors. Briefings and discussions of the same and additional subjects provided a mutual exchange of ideas that will lead to closer coordination between US and ARVN artillery units.

f. As a result of a study conducted by the communications officer and the efforts of the S4, this headquarters, 11 radios were issued
to two ARVN artillery battalions on 29 May, filling a shortage which had heretofore existed in these units.

The fact that the stationing plan at Inclosure I provides US artillery not only to support ARVN operations but also to fire in support of ARVN installations will afford ARVN the opportunity to consolidate some of its platoons, now scattered throughout the corps area and thus to provide more tubes in support of their operations.

h. In April the US 10th ARVN Division indicated his desire to establish a Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) in the Division Tactical Operations Center at Xuan Loc. Since the arrival of a battery of the 2/32d Arty and the Headquarters and two firing batteries of the 2/55th Arty, the FSCE has been established with both ARVN and US staffing, and is coordinating the fires of US and ARVN artillery in the area. With the arrival of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Headquarters, 54th Artillery Group in Xuan Loc in September, it will be possible to expand the FSCE into a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) which can coordinate all means of combat and combat service support available for combined operations in the area.

6. (C) US/FWMAF and ARVN Artillery Coordination.

a. During the Artillery Conference on 1 July, Major Chung, III Corps Artillery Commander gave a presentation on the subject of improving coordination between US and ARVN artillery units. Major Chung was particularly concerned with the coordination which would have to take place between US and ARVN before US artillery units can assume ARVN territorial support missions and free ARVN artillery for combat operations. He suggested that an SOP be developed which would spell out the responsibilities and coordination required of US artillery commanders in providing necessary liaison and communications to ARVN units to insure effective fire support for ARVN operations and defense of ARVN installations.

b. In the course of developing the SOP it was decided instead of an SOP, to propose a II FFORCEV Letter of Instruction on the subject. The proposed LOI will list the responsibilities of US/FWMAF commanders under the operational control of II FFORCEV in insuring that all friendly units, installations and outposts can call for immediately responsive fires from every US/FWMAF artillery unit in range.

7. (C) Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) Program.

a. The procedures used in conducting the H&I program of this headquarters have been improved and refined during the reporting period. Most of the improvement has been in the area of intelligence-gathering and targeting to which the S2 section has devoted considerable effort. Each morning every bit of intelligence is examined from every available source before targets are selected for the program. Targets are selected after considerable effort is made to try to determine where the VC/NVA forces may be operating at a particular time based on a study of previous
enemy activities. All targets are catalogued and filed for ready reference in future programs.

b. During the quarterly period a total of 10,322 8-inch and 7,879 175mm rounds were expended on 13,198 suspect enemy installations and routes of supply in III CTZ.

c. The effectiveness of the H&I program has been difficult to evaluate, as the VC scrupulously police the battlefield and bury their dead. Surveillance at the time of firing is not always practical as H&I fires are fired primarily at night. Visual reconnaissance of the target area has been made the following day but with inconclusive results. However, there have been indications of the overall effectiveness of the H&I program such as:

(1) Reports from captured VC of losses sustained from unexpected attacks by artillery.

(2) VC-organized demonstrations of villagers protesting to GVN authorities against artillery fires.

(3) A reported decline in morale due to the need to move continually or remain in tunnels.

d. A copy of II FFORCEV Regulation Number 525-10, Combat Operations, Integrated Harassment and Interdiction (U), 12 May 1966 is at Inclosure 3.

8. (C) Safeguarding Army Aircraft From Artillery Fires.

a. The directive referred to in the previous Operational Report (Section I, para c2k) was published on 23 July under the title "Safeguarding Army Aircraft From Artillery Fires" a copy of which is at Inclosure 4.

b. In essence the directive provides for air corridors for use by Army aviators for flights between frequently visited places and for warnings of artillery firing through these corridors which are broadcast every five minutes on a common frequency. An agency, known as the Division Artillery Air Control Agency (DAACA), will be established by each of the 1st and 25th Infantry Division Artilleries for the purpose of providing information to Army pilots on artillery firing through or in the vicinity of flight corridors.

9. (C) The 8" Howitzer and the 175mm Gun.

a. Problems with the 175mm gun continue to occur: which have restricted the use of this much-needed long-range weapon. On 29 June, USAFV
established a tube replacement criteria which limited the number of rounds that could be fired by the 175mm to a total of 400 rounds per tube, of which not more than 300 could be fired at zone 3. In addition all components of earlier model breech assemblies were to be limited to 300 rounds, of which not more than 600 rounds could be fired using zone 3. Later models of the 175mm gun breech assemblies were limited to 1200 total, no more than 900 of which could be fired with zone 3. These restrictions had the effect of deadlining 12 out of 13 weapons on hand from 29 June to 7 July at which time four were back in operation. The remainder remained deadlined until 14 July.

b. In a later message on 11 July the above criteria was changed so that now a total of 400 equivalent full charge (EFC) rounds can be fired, but still in effect is a restriction of 300 rounds at zone 3. The EFC factors established by USARV are 0.24 for zones 1 and 2, and 1.0 for zone 3. Since about fifty-four per cent of all rounds fired with the 175mm gun have been with zone 3, on the average, the restriction of 300 zone 3 rounds per tube materially affects combat capabilities with this weapon.

c. In other messages, 8 and 10 July, USARV established a detailed 10-step procedure for inspection of the 175mm propelling charge prior to firing zone 3, directed that each unit erect a sandbag barricade behind which the members of gun crews will deploy when firing zone 3, and required the use of a 50-foot lanyard when firing zone 3. In the message of 10 July, the criticality of the depth of ramming was pointed out and a recommendation was made to check each round for a depth of 58 3/4 inches with a locally fabricated "T" bar before firing.

d. The average daily deadline rate of the M107 (175mm) in April was 5.9 per day for 13 weapons; however, in May this was reduced to 4.1 and in June to a low of 2.6. During July the rate rose to 4.5 due to the criteria established for breech mechanism assemblies referred to above. The principal causes of deadlining were hydraulic motors, loader rammer failures, elevation mechanisms, traversing housings, recoil leaks, auxiliary front drive assemblies, tubes and breech rings. Shortages of repair parts which were prevalent in April gradually improved during the period.

e. The average daily deadline rate of the M110 (8") in April was 3.5 per day for 11 weapons; however, this was reduced to 3.1 in May, 3.0 in June, and to a low of 2.3 in July. The principal causes were again loader rammers, recoil mechanisms, hydraulic motors, spade cylinders, elevating mechanisms, recoil leaks, problems with the sight, and fuel tank ruptures.

f. The 175mm gun notwithstanding the difficulties experienced with it, has, on balance, established itself as a valuable fire support asset of II FFORCEN. Its great range enables it to attack targets which would otherwise remain untouched, and thus the Viet Cong have been
10. Programs Designed to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.

a. In order to inflict the maximum number of casualties, the immediate objective of the artillery is to deliver timely, accurate surprise fire. Since observation in Vietnam is often restricted by dense jungle or lack of good observation points, a large percentage of fire delivered is unobserved, thus placing a premium on accurate fire. Three programs designed to increase the accuracy of artillery fires were undertaken by the headquarters during the quarter in the areas of meteorology, survey, and calibration.

b. Artillery Ballistic Meteorology (Metro).

(1) With four metro stations already stationed in III Corps Tactical Zone and five more programmed to arrive during CY 66, a study was undertaken by the Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT) to determine the best locations for the metro stations. Initially the test will determine by comparison the difference in metro effects between XUAN LOC in the eastern sector of IJI CTZ and BA RIA in the southeastern sector. Later the results of this test will be compared with metro data from other areas in III CTZ. This test was still in progress at the close of the quarter.

(2) Another test was conducted at the request of the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. Since the 1st Field Regiment does not have a metro capability, they requested the assistance of the MQCT in conducting tests to determine the effects of metro on the firing of their artillery pieces. Visual flights were conducted by the MQCT for four days and the metro messages were provided to the Australians for use in their harassing and interdiction firing. On the final day of the test, the 1st Field Regiment fired with and without metro data at a range of 2500 meters. This resulted in a metro correction of only 30 meters. Fire at greater ranges to get more valid sampling was not possible because of patrol activity in the area. The 1st Regiment was pleased with the results and plan to use metro corrections provided by US artillery units to be stationed in their area. During their stay with the Australians, the MQCT assisted the Australian counter mortar radar section in the performance of an optical-electrical bearing check of their radar. This was done by attaching a foil target to the metro pilot balloons and tracking them with the radar.

(3) Still another study was conducted for the benefit of ARVN artillery. The purpose of this study was to determine whether an
average metro message could be provided for use by ARVN since they have no metro capability of their own. During the conduct of the test it was found that it was not feasible to have a single average metro message since ballistic wind direction varied greatly -- often as much as 3200 miles -- and the average wind speed was only half that of actual ballistic wind speed. As a result, an average metro message was not recommended.

c. Survey.

In order to accurately mass artillery units which are within supporting range of each other, the need exists in III CTZ to place units on a common grid. This is the aim of a plan being carried out under the guidance of the S2. The plan is to install 3d order survey control points (SCPs) at certain key installations in III CTZ using the services of the 569th Engineer Company (TOPO). The Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery, after it arrives in August, will continue the survey by bringing 4th order control to all US/PAK/MAY artillery units in III CTZ. Later, plans are to extend the control to include the ARVN artillery units. It is expected to take until February 1967 to place all artillery in III CTZ on a common grid.

d. Calibration of Artillery.

Arrangements were made through the 177th Ordnance Detachment to calibrate all artillery in III CTZ, both US and ARVN. In addition to calibrating each weapon, the team has been borescoping and checking each tube for excessive wear. Because of combat operations the team has, on several occasions, taken its equipment to field positions and by 31 July 139 of 194 US and 44 of 154 ARVN pieces had been calibrated.

11. (S) Reorganization of the FATAB.

The USARV troop list in effect when this headquarters became operational carried a headquarters and headquarters battery of a target acquisition battalion (HBB, 2/26th Arty). In view of the fact that the letter batteries were not coming with the headquarters, a study was initiated to eliminate those portions of the HBB Battery used solely for the support of the letter batteries, and to bring to RVN only those personnel and equipment pertaining to survey and metro. Later a recommendation was submitted to USARV on 13 May to delete non-essential personnel and equipment from the TOE, leaving 6 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 130 enlisted men. This recommendation, except for the aviation section, was implemented by DA; the unit was redesignated as HBB, 8/25th Artillery, with personnel drawn from the 2/26th Artillery. It is scheduled to arrive in RVN on 13 August and will be colocated with this headquarters, with the mission of general support of II FFORCEN Artillery.
12. (S) Assistance to Incoming Units.

a. II FFORCEN Artillery is programmed to receive six more artillery battalions by March 1967, four of which will arrive during the period September to November. In order to efficiently receive, stage, and prepare these units for their operational role before they move to their base camp, this headquarters appoints a unit to sponsor each incoming unit; further an SOP has been published by this headquarters which outlines the procedures to be followed. Each sponsor unit is requested to complete an after-action report so that problems which were encountered by one unit and the actions taken to resolve them will benefit other units in the accomplishment of their sponsorship mission.

b. The goal of the program is to have all necessary facilities ready for the unit when it arrives. After the main body arrives, briefings and tours are arranged by the sponsoring unit to acquaint the new unit with its mission and some of the problems that can be expected in the accomplishment of that mission.

15. (C) Lack of Information on Incoming Units.

One of the recommendations in the previous Operational Report (Section II, para 48) dealt with the lack of information on incoming units. At that time it was pointed out that host units must be provided with certain information several months in advance of the unit's arrival. One such item is the date and time of arrival of advance parties. On 13 June 1966, the advance party of the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery arrived unannounced at BILOC NGA AFB with 24 personnel and 6,000 pounds of cargo. On 20 June 1966, the Commanding General, II FFORCEN artillery sent a letter to the Commanding General, USARV through Commanding General, II FFORCEN citing actions taken by this headquarters to ascertain the expected time of arrival and composition of the advance party. This letter recommended that one agency with access to Air Force and Army communications be given the responsibility of aggressively seeking information from CONUS on incoming units, and of furnishing timely reports to those agencies responsible for receiving these units. USARV sent a message (cite number 52082) to CINCUSARFAC pointing out the lack of information and requested that action be taken to insure that messages are dispatched by commanders of CONUS departure airfields to USARV with a precedence which will insure receipt NLT 24 hours prior to arrival of aircraft in RVN.
Section II, Part 1 - Observations (Lessons Learned):

Equipment Accompanying Troops

Item: The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery is deploying to RVN with items of individual and organizational equipment necessary for living in the field packed as Red TAT.

Discussion: When units are programmed to arrive in a staging area prior to the arrival of Red TAT equipment, it is necessary for them to have such items as individual weapons, ammunition, steel helmets, protective vests, web equipment, mosquito bars, air mattresses and sleeping bags immediately accessible to each individual. According to information given by members of the advance party of the unit, HHB, 8/25th Arty will arrive in RVN with many of these items packed as Red TAT, which means, since the personnel will off-load at VUNG TAU and its equipment will continue aboard ship to SAIGON, that they will not be immediately available to troops in the staging area at LONG BINH.

Observation: All units deploying to RVN should be so packed that items of equipment necessary to live in the field will be available as soon as the unit arrives in its RVN staging area.

Section II, Part 2 - Recommendations:

A. (C) Aircraft for II FFORCEN Artillery.

One of the recommendations in the previous Operational Report (Section II, para A2) concerned the need for an aircraft augmentation for II FFORCEN Artillery. On 9 June a letter was submitted to II FFORCEN with a specific request for six utility helicopters and three observation fixed-wing aircraft for this headquarters pending the arrival of a Corps Artillery Aviation Battery. In addition, the USARV plan referred to in Section I, para B3c to provide aircraft to artillery groups and separate artillery battalions does not meet the requirement for rotary-wing aircraft in artillery units.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Headquarters, II FFORCEN Artillery be augmented with six utility helicopters and three observation fixed-wing aircraft, and that artillery groups and separate artillery battalions being deployed to Vietnam be augmented with two observation fixed-wing aircraft and one light observation helicopter.
B. (C) **Counter-martor Radars.**

Reference paragraph 84 of Section I, the need exists for 39 additional radar detachments (37 for III CTZ, and 2 for Capital Military District) to adequately counter the mortar threat in III CTZ.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That 39 AN/MPS-4A radar detachments be added to the CY 67 troop program as a matter of priority.

C. (C) **The 175mm Gun.**

The inherent weaknesses in the 175mm gun referred to in Section I, paragraph 89 have had the effect of seriously limiting the use and effectiveness of this extremely valuable weapon.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That every effort be made to improve the 175mm gun to eliminate the weaknesses in the system and increase the tube life.

D. (C) **Lack of Information on Incoming Units.**

One of the recommendations in the previous Operational Report (Section II, para 8a) dealt with the lack of information on incoming units. The letter written by this headquarters (reference Section I, para 814) recommended that one agency with access to Air Force and Army communications be given the responsibility of aggressively seeking information from CONUS on incoming units.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

In addition to the above cited recommendation, all units deploying to RVN should be requested to keep sponsor units informed of departure and anticipated arrival dates by dispatching priority messages upon departure from CONUS and at each stopping place along the route.

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4 Incl.

as

15
# LOCATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As of 1 May</th>
<th>As of 31 July</th>
<th>AFTER ALL UNITS ARRIVE (Apr 67)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BA HIA</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>A Btry, 2/35th (155mm)</td>
<td>A Btry, 2/35th (155mm)</td>
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<td>1 FB, 1/83d (8&quot;), Nov</td>
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<td>1 FB, 2/94th (175mm), Oct</td>
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<td>HQ &amp; Svc, 1/83d, Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BEAR CAT</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>A Btry, 6/27th (8&quot;/175mm) (See Note 1)</td>
<td>1 FB, 1/83d (8&quot;), Nov</td>
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<td>H4, Svc, C Btry, 2/32d (8&quot;/175mm) (See Note 2)</td>
<td>HHB, Svc, 2 FB, 1/40th (105mm SP), Oct</td>
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<td>C Btry, 2/2a (8&quot;/175mm SP)</td>
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**INCL 1**

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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<th>As of 31 July</th>
<th>AFTER ALL UNITS ARRIVED (Apr 67)</th>
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<td>LAI KHE</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAY NHINH</td>
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<td>HBB, Btrys A &amp; B achieve a composite 8&quot;/175mm SP), 2/32d Btry, Sept &amp; Oct. (See Note 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATIONS</td>
<td>As of 1 May</td>
<td>As of 31 July</td>
<td>AFTER ALL UNITS ARRIVE (Apr 67)</td>
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<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
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<td>B Btry, 6/27th (8&quot; SP)</td>
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<td>C Btry, 6/27th (175mm SP)</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>A Btry, 2/52d (8&quot;/155mm SP) (See Note 2)</td>
<td>HNB, 54th Arty Sp, Sep</td>
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<td>HNB, Svc, 3 FB, 2/11th (155mm T), Sep (See Note 5)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1 FB, 2/94th (175mm SP), Oct</td>
<td>1 FB, 1/84d (8&quot;), Nov</td>
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<tr>
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<td>__Btry, Searchlight, Apr 67</td>
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NOTES

NOTE 1
a. Btry moved from Bien Hoa to Base Cat, 9 June.
b. Formed a composite battery (3 8" tubes, 1 175mm tube), 19 June.
c. Will displace in Nov to a location to be determined.

NOTE 2
a. Formed two composite batteries out of A & C Btrys:
   A Btry moved to Xuan Loc, C Btry stayed at Cu Chi.
b. HQ Btry and A Btry will displace to Tay Ninh in Oct 66 forming a composite battery.

NOTE 3
3, 2/32d will displace from Lai Khe in Sep and move to Xuan Loc
forming a composite battery.

NOTE 4
One searchlight battery to be attached to each US division and
the 11th Armored Cavalry.

NOTE 5
Three 155mm and three 105mm batteries to be stationed in 10th
ARVN Division area, exact locations to be determined.
Note: The range capability circles shown are those of the 175mm gun. The shorter range weapons' circles are included within those of the 175mm and therefore are not shown here.
1. (U) REFERENCE. IIFFORCEV Directive 525-10, dated 2 March 1966, subject, "Combat Operations, Harassment and Interdiction (U)".

2. (U) PURPOSE. To establish coordinated air and ground harassment and interdiction (H&I) programs to be conducted in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) at US force, division, and brigade level by elements of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV).

3. (C) GENERAL. In order to bring and keep under fire known Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) formations, supporting installations, facilities, and lines of communication, H&I programs will be conducted by the divisions and separate brigades of II FFORCEV, using all available fire support means. In addition, an H&I program will be conducted at Field Force level so that participation by strategic air, tactical air, space, naval gunfire, and artillery will be considered for appropriate targets. Participation of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in H&I programs will be included to the maximum extent possible.

4. (C) CONCEPT.

a. Harassment and interdiction programs will be developed to cover areas known to be used and occupied by the VC/NVA. All major VC forces (regiments, battalions) will be harassed on a sustained or programmed basis as their locations or approximate locations become known. These programs are intended to be a continuing, coordinated effort to destroy enemy base areas and installations, disrupt enemy activities, and harass enemy movement.

b. All means available will be employed around the clock to include US, Free World, and RVNAF capabilities. During periods of inclement weather, specific attention should be given to the use of SKY SPOT in the tactical air portion of the H&I program.

c. The success of these programs depends on the acquisition of targets by the entire intelligence system and the rapid dissemination and exchange of information laterally, and up and down the chain of command.

*This regulation supersedes II FFORCEV Reg 525-10 dated 14 April 1966.

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Incl 3
d. The principle of economy of force will apply to the application of effort in these programs. Within the context of this principle, the means used will be those which can most technically accomplish the mission. Every effort will be made to avoid inflicting non-combatant casualties, and to minimize damage to civilian property. In particular, all targets in H&I programs will be cleared with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) commander concerned.

e. The technique of H&I (spraying or firing of aerial delivered bombs) will be utilized particularly following an extraction from an Area of Operation (AO). Provisions of paragraph 5j will apply when requesting this type of H&I mission.

5. (c) General:

a. Procedures in this directive apply only to the conduct of the H&I programs.

b. All H&I programs falling outside US tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs) and/or AO's must be approved and cleared for execution by an ARVN Commander at division or corps level. Clearance will be made at the lowest level (division or corps) at which mission has been established by the programing, joint powers.

c. No H&I will be conducted in the TAOR or AO of any US unit will be attacked unless specific permission has been obtained from the unit's US Commander having responsibility for the TAOR or AO. All target requests with sector and/or subsector commanders prior to granting final clearance to fire.

d. Each division and separate brigade will establish, control, coordinate, and carry out an integrated H&I program within its own TAOR.

e. Divisions and separate brigades desiring to include targets in their H&I programs which are outside their own TAORs and not in the TAOR of another US unit, will:

   (1) Obtain clearance to fire in accordance with 5b, above.

   (2) At least 12 hours prior to firing, furnish II FFORCE' FSECE the coordinates of the target, the maximum ordinate, and the time of firing.

f. H&I targets developed by a headquarters to which the appropriate attack means are not available will be reported to the next higher headquarters for eventual inclusion in an H&I program at a higher echelon. Target reports to this headquarters will be made to the Fire Support Coordination Element (FSECE) of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and will include the following information:

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(1) Target location and description.

(2) Recommended fire support means.

(3) Preferred time(s) of firing.

(4) Priority among targets reported.

(5) Status of clearance. (Identify the ARV Hq which granted clearance or state that clearance has not been obtained.)

g. Headquarters conducting H&I programs will encourage the submission of targets by ARV commanders. Such targets will be accepted whether or not the appropriate attack means are available to the receiving headquarters. The provisions of paragraph 5f, above, apply.

h. FSCE, II FFORCEV TOC will keep current information of naval gunfire support capabilities, and will program naval gunfire for particular targets when appropriate.

i. Requests for strategic air strikes will be addressed to this headquarters, ArT.: G2. Requests will include information on target description and justification as specified in instructions to be issued separately.

j. Reference paragraph 4e, all SEEDING missions must be approved by this headquarters. Details regarding SEEDING will be published at a later date.

k. Commanders conducting operations outside US TARPs will establish a Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The location of the FSCL will be reported through fire support coordination channels to FSCE, II FFORCEV TOC, for appropriate dissemination. The provisions of paragraph 5c, above, apply.

l. Where significant results are known to have been achieved in the execution of an H&I program, these results will be recorded in daily situation reports.

m. Division and separate brigade requests for H&I missions to be flown by tactical air will be forwarded directly to II FFORCEV G3 Air along with the daily planned requests. G3 Air will forward the coordinates of each H&I target requested to the II FFORCEV FSC.

n. II FFORCEV FSCE will check all targets, both artillery and TAC air, for duplication and where required, will select the best fire support means in keeping with the principle of economy of force.
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Reg No 525-10, HQ II FFORCEV, 1200 10th St., San Francisco 94107, 12 May 66 (Cont’d)

b. H.1 fires programmed for heavy artillery, including 8 inch or
175mm artillery organs or attached to subordinate units, will be reported
to the II FFORCEV FSCC not later than four (4) hours prior to firing. These
reports are required for the purpose of complying with a MACV directive re-
garding the use of airspace in III CNE. Reports will include the following
elements:

(1) Coordinates firing From.
(2) Coordinates firing To.
(3) Maximum ordinate (in feet).
(4) Time of firing.

6. (c) REMARKS.

a. A monthly report (HCS AVXRY-M-1) summarizing the H&I activ-
ities for the preceding month will be prepared by each division and separate
brigade and forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: FSCC, to arrive NLT the
3rd of each month (format at Incl l). The first report is due on 3 June
1966.

b. II FFORCEV FSCC will prepare the report required by paragraph
4a (5), referenced MACV directive, and forward to the Commanding General,
II FFORCEV NLT the 6th of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Vernon R. Rider
Colonel, ADC
Adjutant General

V. D. CRITTEMBERGER, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Staff

Summary of H&I Activities

DISTRIBUTION:

10 G3, 25th Inf Div (Div Arty)
25 CG, II FFORCEV Arty
15 CG, 173rd Abn Bde
50 DSA, III Corps
25 CO, 23rd FA Group
25 CG, 1st Inf Div (Div Arty)

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: FSCB
APO San Francisco 96227

SUBJECT: Summary of H&I Activities ( ) (RE-AVARTY-M-1)

The following summary of integrated fires in the H&I program of this headquarters during the month of May 1966 is submitted in accordance with para 6a, II FFORCE V Reg 525-10 dated 12 May 1966.

1. ( ) The following summary of integrated fires in the H&I program of this headquarters during the month of May 1966 is submitted in accordance with para 6a, II FFORCE V Reg 525-10 dated 12 May 1966.

a. Artillery

(1) Total H&I fires for the month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>NO OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>NO OF ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
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</table>

(2) Total H&I fires in support of ARVN operations for the month:

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<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>NO OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>NO OF ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
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<td>155mm</td>
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<td>8&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
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(3) Total H&I fires included in organization's H&I program based on requests from II FFORCE V Art for the month:

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<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>NO OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>NO OF ROUNDS</th>
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<td>175mm</td>
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Incl 1 to II FFORCE V Reg 525-10 dated 12 May 1966.
b. Tactically

(1) Total number of H&I sorties conducted during the month.

ORDNANCE

Rockets
Grenades
C&G

(2) Total of above number SKY SPOT missions conducted.

(3) Number of illumination missions conducted.

(4) Number of S/IERT H&I missions conducted.

c. Army Aviation

(1) Number of H&I sorties conducted during the month.

(2) Ordnance expended by type:

Rockets
40mm Grenades
7.62mm

2. ( ) Comments on and recommendations for improvement of Target Intelligence.

3. ( ) Problems in programming H&I fires. (Include comments regarding clearance procedures.)

4. ( ) Enumerate known and estimated effects of H&I fires and means used to determine effects.

5. ( ) Recommendations for improvement of overall integrated H&I program.

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26
SAFETY

SAFEGUARDING ARMY AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES (U)

1. (U) REFERENCE: COMUSMACV message, cite 0304, subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Heavy Artillery Fires (U), HQG 040859z Feb 65.

2. (U) PURPOSE: This directive establishes procedures to be followed by elements of this command to minimise the hazard to Army aircraft from friendly artillery.

3. (U) GENERAL:
   a. The principle to be followed in applying the procedures prescribed herein is for all agencies concerned to exchange necessary information regarding artillery fires and Army aircraft flights as soon as practicable.
   b. For purposes of this directive, the term “artillery” includes mortars.

4. (U) CONCEPT: This directive establishes air corridors during daylight hours through which Army aircraft may fly between frequently visited places in III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ), and into which artillery will not fire without notification to pilots. Flights outside the corridors will be coordinated with artillery fires using procedures prescribed by this directive.

5. (C) PROCEDURES:
   a. Daylight Hours (0600-1900).
      (1) Aviation.
         (a) The air corridors shown on the overlay are established for use by Army aircraft during daylight hours. Division Artillery Air Control Agencies (DAAAC), established by each US division, will serve as sources of US artillery information for areas of III CTZ not covered by Tactical Areas of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) or areas of operations (AO). (See paragraphs 6a & b, below.) Pilots using the corridors will monitor the radio frequency utilized by the appropriate DAAAC to receive broadcast warnings to pilots of US artillery firing through corridors. These warnings, repeated every five minutes until firing ceases, will be in the following format:

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INCl 4
Artillery firing (through corridor ______) \(75 \text{ feet}\)

from (nearest 1000 meter grid intersection, e.g., 456172)
on azimuth (azimuth of fire in degrees)
maximum ordinate ______feet,
time of firing in ______minutes for ______minutes.

(b) Army aviators leaving the corridor will report their point of exit, destination, route, altitude and time of exit. This report will be made to the appropriate DAACA if point of exit, route or destination lies outside a TAOR or AO. The report will be made to an agency designated by the TAOR or AO commander if point of exit, route or destination lies in or over a TAOR or AO. (See paragraph 5a, below.) Upon receiving the pilot's report, the DAACA or TAOR or AO agency will, if necessary, route the pilot around any artillery fires affecting his flight. Should the pilot declare an emergency flight condition, the ground station will, on request, take action to suspend such fires interfering with the flight.

(2) Artillery.

(a) Artillery units will not fire through the corridors without broadcasting warnings to pilots on the radio frequency of the appropriate DAACA in the format shown in paragraph 5a(1)(a), above. The warnings will be repeated every five minutes until firing ceases.

(b) All other fires will be reported to the agency designated by the TAOR or AO commander if the artillery is located in a TAOR or AO, or to the appropriate DAACA if the artillery is located outside a TAOR or AO. This procedure will permit these agencies to route aircraft, when necessary, around US artillery fires outside the corridors. When a pilot declares an emergency flight condition and requests suspension of fires, the DAACA or TAOR or AO agency will direct suspension of those fires interfering with the flight.

b. Night Hours (1900-0600).

Information regarding planned fires will be kept by DAACAs. Army aviators will obtain information of planned fires from the appropriate DAACA and adjust their flight plans accordingly. Pilots will monitor the appropriate DAACA frequency for notice of any fires not previously planned or reported. Artillery units will report all planned fires through the TAOR or AO agency to the appropriate DAACA. Warnings to pilots of artillery fires not previously planned or reported will be broadcast on the radio frequency of the appropriate DAACA in the format of paragraph 5a(1)(a), above, and repeated every five minutes until firing ceases.
6. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The 1st US Infantry Division will establish a DAACA at Phu LOI (XII616). This DAACA will have information of all US artillery fires east of the Saigon River any part of whose trajectory lies outside a TAOR or AO. The radio frequency utilised by the DAACA will be used by all agencies for broadcasting warnings of US artillery firing through corridors east of the Saigon River. This DAACA will be prepared:

(1) When necessary, to route Army aircraft around US artillery fires outside the corridors, TAORs and AOs east of the Saigon River.

(2) On request, to suspend fires interfering with any flight declared by the pilot as being flown under an emergency condition.

(3) To provide to pilots, on request, information of US artillery fires planned east of the Saigon River between 0600 and 2400 hours daily.

b. The 25th US Infantry Division will establish a DAACA at CU CHI (XII6414). This DAACA will have information of all US artillery fires west of the Saigon River any part of whose trajectory lies outside a TAOR or AO. The radio frequency utilised by the DAACA will be used by all agencies for broadcasting information of US artillery firing through corridors west of the Saigon River. This DAACA will be prepared:

(1) When necessary, to route Army aircraft around US artillery fires outside the corridors, TAORs and AOs west of the Saigon River.

(2) On request, to suspend fires interfering with any flight declared by the pilot as being flown under an emergency condition.

(3) To provide to pilots, on request, information of US artillery fires planned west of the Saigon River between 0600 and 2400 hours.

c. Each commander assigned a TAOR or AO will designate an agency or element of his headquarters:

(1) To receive reports of all US artillery activity originating in the TAOR.

(2) When necessary, to route Army aircraft around US artillery fires outside the corridors in the TAOR or AO.

(3) To make the reports of artillery firing from inside to outside the TAOR to the appropriate DAACA.

(4) To provide notification to pilots on the appropriate DAACA frequency of artillery firing through corridors.
d. Every commander assigned an AO for a specific operation will establish corridors for the use of Army aircraft in the AO. These corridors should be of the same dimensions as the corridors shown in Inclosure 1, and should be selected along terrain features which are easily identifiable from the air. Routes from the nearest of the corridors shown in Inclosure 1 to the corridors in the AO will be designated by the AO commander. Location of corridors, their dimensions and the times they are in effect, routes between corridors, and call signs and frequencies of the control center in the AO will be reported to the II FORCEV TOC as soon as determined.

e. The 12th Aviation Group will obtain from the DAACAs, and disseminate to Army aviation units, call signs and frequencies to be used by the DAACAs and the subordinate stations in the TACRs. In addition, 12th Aviation Group will insure that all Army pilots are briefed on:

1. TACR and AO boundaries.
2. Corridor limits.
3. Communications provisions of this directive.

f. The Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) of each Division Tactical Operations Center (TOC) will report through the division G3-Air to the II FORCEV G3-Air representative at III Corps Direct Air Support Center (DASC) all 8" and 175mm fires of artillery units physically located in TACRs or AOs of elements of the division. The report will include the firing position (to the nearest 1000 meter grid intersection, e.g., XT8132), the target area (again to the nearest 1000 meter grid intersection), the maximum ordinate in feet, and the time of firing. FSCE, this headquarters, will make these reports for units under control of II FORCEV Artillery that are not physically located in a division TACR or AO. The II FORCEV G3-Air representative at III Corps DASC will notify the US Air Force Control and Reporting Center at TAN SON NHUT (PARIS CONTROL) of such fires.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD T. KNOWLES
Brigadier General, GS
Chief of Staff

Vernon R. Rider
Colonel, AG
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
2 - 303
2 - 32
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2 - Sig
2 - Surg
6 - CG, II FFORCEV ARMY
4 - CO, II FFORCEV Avn Det (Prov)
2 - CO, 1st Sig Bn
6 - CO, 63rd ARV
20 - DSHA, III Corps
25 - CO, 25th Inf Div
20 - CO, 25th Inf Div
15 - CO, 173d Abn Bde
6 - CO, 1 ART
25 - CO, 12th Avn Grp
15 - CO, 234 Art'y Grp

31
FLIGHT CORRIDORS FOR ARTILLERY-AVIGATION COORDINATION

1. STANDARD WIDTH OF CORRIDOR IS 4,000 METERS (2,000 METERS ON EITHER SIDE OF CENTER LINE SHOWN).

2. STANDARD VERTICAL DIMENSIONS OF CORRIDOR 0-3,000 FEET (ABSOLUTE ALTITUDE).

3. AT BIEN HOA, CU CHI, LAI KHE, PHU LOI AND PHUOC VINH THE WIDTH OF THE CORRIDORS FOR 2,000 METERS FROM THE LANDING STRIP NARROWS TO 2,000 METERS (1,000 METERS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE CENTER LINE SHOWN). WHERE THE CORRIDORS NARROWS AT THESE LOCATIONS, THE VERTICAL DIMENSIONS ARE 2,500-3,000 FEET (ABSOLUTE ALTITUDE).

4. CORRIDORS ARE FOR AVIATION USE DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY (0600-1900).

OVERLAY OF AIR CORRIDORS

MAP: VIETNAM, JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC (GROUND), 1:250,000, SHEETS NC 48-3, NC 48-4, NC 48-7 AND NC 48-8.
AVPSC-H (14 Au 66)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-66)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APC San Francisco 09.66  14 SEP 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1966 submitted by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery is comprehensive, well prepared and contains valuable lessons, many of which are applicable throughout the theater.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part 2 - Recommendations:

a. Aircraft for II FFORCEV Artillery.

This headquarters concurs in the need for additional aircraft. A request was submitted to United States Army Vietnam on 31 July 1966 for six utility helicopters and three fixed-wing observation aircraft pending the arrival of a Corp: Artillery Aviation Battery.

b. Countermortar Radars.

Additional countermortar radar detachments have been approved for shipment to this command.

c. This headquarters concurs in the recommendations contained in paragraph C and D.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

INCL 1

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Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when separated from SECRET Inclosures

SECRET 33

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