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
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GPOP-MH (14 Jan 66)

2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (U)

AD393828

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

10 MAR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded herewith is the Quarterly Command Report of the 23d Artillery Group for the period ending 31 December 1965.

2. Action by this headquarters is in process to determine status of office supplies in Vietnam. Redistribution of theater stockage will be made if found necessary.

3. Reference para 8, Section IX. This headquarters does not concur with the commander. Increasing the days of PLL for deploying units will not increase the fill for PLL. If PLL were increased, CONUS agencies would have increased problem of filling PLL's for deploying units.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*DG Harrison*

D. A. HARRISON  
Capt, AIC  
Asst AG

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GPOF-WV (14 Jan 66)

2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 10 MAR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. HARRISON  
Capt, AGC  
Asst AG

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GPOP-MH (14 Jan 66) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 9556 01. 1. 66

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. HARRISON  
Capt, AGC  
Asst AG

*[Handwritten initials]*

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*Dean K. Henderson, Col*  
for ROBERT H. SCHELLMAN  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

MFR: Staffed within Hq USARPAC  
under standard procedures.

*for Robert H. Smith*  
ROBERT H. SMITH  
Ch, MH Div, G3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS,  
23D ARTILLERY GROUP  
APO U. S. FORCES 96745

AVAC-C

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⑪  
14 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

THRU: Commanding General  
US Army Republic of Vietnam  
APO U. S. Forces 96307

⑫ -sp.

⑬ CACSFOR

THRU: Commanding General  
US Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-H  
APO U. S. Forces 96503

⑭ C-T-UT-650136

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations  
Department of the Army  
Washington D. C.

In compliance with AR 525-24 dated 29 October 1959, the Command Report for the period 1 July - 31 December 1965 is attached in Sections 1 thru 9.

9 Incls  
as

*James H. Dyson*  
JAMES H. DYSON  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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## SIGNAL I - ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL

### 1. General.

a. This headquarters is assigned to United States Army Vietnam and is required to operate as a major command in all personnel matters except General Courts Martial jurisdiction and awards which are administered by Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Normal S1 activities have been conducted since arrival in country on 4 November 1965.

### 2. (C) Strength.

a. Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending 31 December 1965 was:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
HQB, 23d Arty Gp	15	1	90	14	1	98
2/13th Artillery	27	3	486	27	3	495
6/27th Artillery	35	4	544	34	4	540
2/32nd Artillery	32	4	518	32	4	556
TOTAL:	109	12	1638	107	12	1689

b. Gains during the period included:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
5	0	129

c. Losses during the period included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
ETS	2	0	55
KILLED IN ACTION	0	0	0
DIED OF BATTLE WOUNDS	0	0	0

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>EM</u>
WOUNDED IN ACTION	0	0	1
MISSING IN ACTION	0	0	0
NON BATTLE DEATH	0	0	0
NON BATTLE CASUALTIES	2	0	3

3. Personnel Management. The personnel section of each of the three assigned battalions have been co-located in a rear area base camp. The three sections have kept unit records separate but have reorganized into a pay, management and records sub-sections. Each of the personnel warrant officers supervises one sub-section as well as maintaining coordination with respective battalions on all personnel matters of his assigned unit. This co-location with sub-sections is considered a consolidated Group personnel section and is similar to the personnel service division organization of the infantry division and has increased overall efficiency by reducing individual battalion reports.

4. Morale. The morale of the command is excellent.

5. R & R Program. The following out-of-country R & R's have been allocated and utilized by this command.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FOR DEC 1965</u>	<u>FOR JAN 1966</u>
Bangkok	18	18
Tokyo	0	14
Manila	0	5
Hong Kong	4	7
Taipei	3	5
TOTAL:	25	49

6. Decorations and Awards. One purple heart has been awarded during this period.

7. Mail. Unit mail clerks pickup and deliver mail from nearest postal section. Units use the APO numbers and are supported by:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO NO</u>	<u>SUPPORTED BY</u>
HQB, 23d Arty Gp	96345	1st Inf Div Arty
2/13th Artillery	96345	1st Inf Div Arty
6/27th Artillery	96307	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
2/32nd Artillery	96307	APO 96307 direct

8. Religious Services. Regular schedules of protestant and catholic services are held weekly. The protestant chaplain assigned to this headquarters and the catholic chaplain from 1st Infantry Division are utilized on an area coverage under the supervision of the 1st Infantry Division Chaplain.

9. Medical. Each battalion and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group operates a medical section. Statistics include:

- a. Evacuated out of country - 5.
- b. Malaria cases admitted - 1.

10. Discipline, Law and Order. Judicial and non-judicial actions by units include:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
HQB, 23d Arty Gp	2	0	0	0
2/13th Artillery	5	0	0	0
6/27th Artillery	21	1	0	0
2/32nd Artillery	27	0	0	0

11. Safety. Recordable accidents by units are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
III AF, 23d Arty Gp	2	0	0
2/13th Artillery	7	0	0
6/27th Artillery	2	0	0
2/32nd Artillery	3	1	1
TOTAL:	14	1	1

12. Education. Personnel are utilizing USAF1 and extension courses to further their education. No local off duty educational classes are being conducted at this time; however, such a program under the USARV education officer is planned.

*Inds*

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SECTION II- INTELLIGENCE

1. Administration.

The 23d Artillery Group intelligence section completed the normal requirements in preparation for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam. These requirements included screening classified material to accompany the unit; initiating security clearances; effecting appropriate dissemination of classified messages pertinent to deployment; procuring maps and censorship stamps; and presenting briefings and orientations on meteorological data, terrain, economic, religious, political, military and cultural backgrounds pertaining to Vietnam.

Since arrival in Vietnam the 23d Artillery Group intelligence section has merged with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery intelligence section for combined Div Arty/Group combat intelligence operations. The merging of the two intelligence sections has materially benefited the intelligence effort by permitting the Div Arty and Group S2 to devote additional time for liaison with subordinate and adjacent units for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the intelligence effort.

2. (C) Aerial Surveillance.

Difficulty has been experienced in the realm of aerial surveillance and target acquisition. Continuous day and night surveillance is required for the collection of information and target acquisition. Lack of sufficient surveillance aircraft has been a primary drawback in this respect. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery is equipped with the OH-13 helicopter which has a limited night capability and a restricted flying hour program. Operating in an environment where ground means of movement is restricted, the requirement to utilize the available H-13's for command and

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control purposes further reduces the number of aircraft for aerial surveillance. The acquisition of several O1 fixed wing aircraft by the 23d Artillery Group will materially assist in overcoming the aerial surveillance problem. The capability of the O1 for longer stay time over the target area and its night capability make it a highly desirable aircraft for 24 hour aerial surveillance.

Due to the lack of trained aerial observers, it has been necessary to conduct on-the-job training of observers which results in inefficient utilization of flying hours.

Daylight aerial surveillance offers no insurmountable problems. Night surveillance, in particular, requires a well trained aviator/observer team. The 23d Artillery Group is developing and employing the following techniques for night surveillance and artillery adjustment which have proved effective:

a. 105mm and 155mm Howitzer Illuminating Shell:

Critical points such as locations along enemy routes of communication and areas of suspected activity are selected. On call illumination of these points is prearranged with the Fire Direction Center. When the O1 aircraft arrives in the target area the observer calls for the illumination on the prearranged points in turn. The aircraft circles the flare while the observer conducts his surveillance. If enemy activity is observed, continuous illumination is called for and artillery is adjusted in on the target. This technique has proved effective when conducting surveillance within range of 105mm and 155mm howitzers.

b. Aircraft Flares:

The aircraft illuminating flare is used when conducting surveillance beyond the illuminating range of the 105mm and 155mm howitzer.

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It is used for surveillance of suspected areas of enemy activity and the adjustment of artillery on targets located. Due to the limited number of flares the O1 aircraft can carry (four each) it is necessary to select the area to be illuminated before takeoff and prearrange with the FDC for immediate artillery fire if a target is spotted.

## c. Air Force Flare Ship:

The Air Force Flare Ship is particularly effective when long periods of surveillance are required or a very large area is required to be illuminated. The effectiveness of the flare ships illumination is dependent upon the observers ability to adjust the flare ship and his understanding of flare ships employment techniques. The flare ship has been very effective in interdicting routes into and out of an operational area and for interdiction of supply routes.

## 3. (C) Radar Surveillance.

a. Countermortar radars have been successful in locating enemy mortars.

b. The lack of surveillance radars for locating enemy targets has hampered the target acquisition effort. The acquisition and employment of the AN/TFS-25 radar would materially assist our target acquisition program.

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### SECTION III - TRAINING

Prior to departure for Vietnam HIB, 23d Artillery Group and assigned battalions underwent an intensive training program oriented for operations against irregular forces. The purpose of the training was to raise the individual soldier's proficiency and attain a high degree of section and unit teamwork. This was especially needed since each unit received an appreciable number of new personnel to replace those trained personnel not eligible for movement to Vietnam.

Command emphasis was given to the sixteen hour training program directed by USCONARC for units destined for duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The required subjects as outlined by USCONARC Pamphlet 350-16 were:

- a. Orientation - 2 hours.
- b. Perimeter Defense - 1 hour.
- c. Duties of Sentries - 1 hour.
- d. Ambush Drill - Mounted and Dismounted - 8 hours.
- e. Sanitation - 1 hour.
- f. Jungle Survival - 1 hour.
- g. Lessons Learned - 1 hour.
- h. Miscellaneous - 1 hour.

In many instances subjects were given at least twice in order to allow personnel leave time. Battalions conducted section, battery and battalion training, which culminated in field training exercises. In addition, battery commanders placed added emphasis on platoon operations and 6400 mil fire direction capability. Where possible personnel, such as survey and howitzer crew personnel, were cross-trained in fire direction procedures.

Training continued for all units while aboard troop transports. While training facilities, space and conditions were inadequate aboard ship, considerable benefit was obtained. Training was conducted in the following subjects: Field Sanitation, Tropical and Communicable Diseases, Jungle Survival, Mission and Country, Water Treatment, Personal Hygiene, First Aid, Jungle Operations, Escape and Evasion, Insurgency Operations, Operations Against Irregular Forces, Individual Responsibilities for Censorship, and Handling of POW's. Physical training was conducted for all personnel during the warmest period of the day in order to climatize and maintain good physical conditioning. It was decided that daily, brief subject presentations of 2 hours followed by 20 to 30 minutes of physical training accomplished the training objectives. Because of troop details aboard ship and drills, maximum flexibility in training was required.

#### SECTION IV - OPERATIONS

##### 1. Alert, preparation and movement to the Republic of Vietnam.

On 4 August 1965, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group was officially notified that Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group had been nominated for service in the Republic of South Vietnam. On 11 August 1965, notification was received that HIB, 23d Artillery Group had been accepted for service in Vietnam and was placed on an alert status. Subsequently, Movement Orders (Letter Order Number 8-172) was published by Headquarters Fort Lewis, Washington, the Group's next higher headquarters, directing movement to port of embarkation at Oakland Army Terminal, on call of CINCSTRIKE. Assignment to USARPAC was directed upon embarkation. An equipment readiness date of 1 September 1965 and a personnel readiness date of 15 September 1965 were established. The unit was directed to move with personnel as authorized by TOE 6-401E which was 15 officers, 1 warrant officer and 90 enlisted men. In order to fill the TOE strength several officers and enlisted men were provided by battalions then assigned to the Group and from local resources at Fort Lewis, Washington. At this time the Group was commanded by Colonel Andy W. Pribnow. Units assigned to the 23d Artillery Group at the time the Group was alerted were the 5th Battalion (105mm) (T), 27th Artillery, 3rd Battalion (8") (SP), 18th Artillery, 1st Battalion (155mm) (T), 30th Artillery, and the 6th Battalion (8") (SP), 32nd Artillery. All assigned battalions were alerted for Vietnam, except the 6th Battalion, 32nd Artillery. None of these battalions were designated to remain with the Group upon the Group's deployment to Vietnam.

On 15 September 1965, Colonel Andy W. Pribnow relinquished command of the 23d Artillery Group to Colonel James H. Dyson, the present Group

Commander. As of 15 September the unit was filled to authorized strength except one officer (Catholic Chaplain) and two enlisted men.

Word had been received that the 2nd Battalion (105mm) (T), 13th Artillery and the 2nd Battalion (175mm) (SF), 32nd Artillery, both of Fort Sill, Oklahoma and the 6th Battalion (8") (SP), 27th Artillery would be assigned to the 23d Artillery Group for operations in Vietnam. For planning purposes, Colonel Dyson had the commanders of the three battalions programmed for the Group report to Fort Lewis on 20 September 1965 for briefings and exposure to Group policies and plans. During this session the Battalion Commanders related the status of training, personnel, equipment and problems associated with the move to Vietnam. The Group Commander stressed his policies on morale, discipline, training, leadership and command relationships. The units were charged with the mission of insuring adequate individual and unit training for the counter-insurgency environment. Units were also directed to plan for training while enroute to Vietnam to include physical training. During the conference it was determined that no unit had any insurmountable problem. A problem common to each unit was the possession of obsolete wheeled vehicles, particularly 2½ ton trucks. It was directed that effort be made at the respective battalion's home stations to exchange these vehicles, but if this effort was unsuccessful serviceable equipment on hand would be taken to Vietnam. This program was only partially successful as one battalion (2/13th Artillery) deployed with 48 2½ ton vehicles M211.

Battalions programmed for the Group were alerted as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2/13th Artillery	15 July 1965
6/27th Artillery	15 July 1965
2/32nd Artillery	23 July 1965

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In order to gain familiarization with Vietnam, the Group Staff and assigned battalions at Fort Lewis which were alerted for Vietnam (3/18th Artillery, 5/27th Artillery and 1/30th Artillery), were briefed by recent returnees from Vietnam who provided valuable insight as to what to expect and prepare for in connection with duty in Vietnam. Other available information obtained were documents written by units already in Vietnam in the form of lessons learned and critique of operations.

The schedule for movement of the main body of personnel of the Group and its programmed battalions was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTING DATE</u>	<u>NAME OF SHIP</u>
HQB, 23d Arty Gp	4 October 1965	USNS W. H. Gordon
2/13th Artillery	10 October 1965	USNS Breckenridge
6/27th Artillery	4 October 1965	USNS W. H. Gordon
6/32nd Artillery	4 October 1965	USNS W. H. Gordon

The schedule for movement of equipment was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTING DATE</u>	<u>NAME OF SHIP(S)</u>
HQB, 23d Arty Gp	25 September 1965	Mornack Trader
2/13th Artillery	8 October 1965	Express Virginia
6/27th Artillery	29 September 1965	Dick Lykes
2/32th Artillery	29 September 1965	Morris E. Crane
	2 October 1965	Green Wave
	8 October 1965	Express Virginia

2. (S) Advance planning and movement of units to the Republic of Vietnam. On 23 September 1965, the advance planning group consisting of Colonel J. H. Dyson, Major H. R. Whitaker (S3), and Major J L Hooper (S4) departed Fort Lewis by air for the Republic of Vietnam. The advance planning

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group arrived in country at Ton San Huet, Saigon on 25 September 1965. Upon arrival the planning group learned that the mission of the 23d Artillery Group would be General Support - Reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. The Group would be under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division while USARV retained command less operational control. The advance planning group also confirmed that the battalions previously assigned to the Group at Fort Lewis would not be a part of the Group in Vietnam but that the following units would be assigned to the 23d Artillery Group upon arrival in country: 2nd Battalion (105mm) (T), 13th Artillery, 6th Battalion (8") (SP), 27th Artillery and the 2nd Battalion (175mm) (SP), 32nd Artillery.

The advance planning group effected coordination with the MACV, USARVN, 1st Infantry Division units, ARVN III Corps, 25th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Division, U.S. Special Forces Advisors, and Vietnamese provincial chiefs. Based upon the tactical situation, the Group Commander recommended wide dispersion of the Group heavy artillery units to give maximum artillery coverage within the III Corps Tactical Zone (ARVN). In some instances the artillery would constitute the "front lines" since U.S. units were not scheduled to accompany the artillery, especially in the vicinity of Cu Chi and Tay Ninh. The artillery was recommended to be positioned to give support to ground gaining forces and in addition provide a means of interdicting enemy locations and lines of communication between war zones C and D as well as ability to cover both zones with artillery fire. In addition, the Group Commander recommended composite gun/howitzer battalions of 175mm and 8" in some locations in order to provide maximum artillery coverage and flexibility.

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The advance planning group made extensive reconnaissance of proposed artillery positions. Areas reconnoitered included Duc Hoa, Bao Trai, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Sui Da, Tran Sup, Phouc Vinh, Ben Cat, Lai Khe, Cu Chi and Phu Loi. A road reconnaissance was conducted from Saigon to Tay Ninh (including Sui Da and Tran Sup) which was significant since this route had not been traveled by U.S. personnel for many years.

3. (S) Initial Concept of Employment. The concept at this time was to establish base battery positions for the artillery. In most areas these were to be co-located with 1st Infantry Division units. In three locations; however, (Bao Trai, Suoi Dai and Trang Sup) a heavy battery would be base located with either ARVN or CIDG troops and in these instances local security would create a grave problem due to the exposed positions. In all cases the units would fire defensive and harrassing and interdiction fires as well as support fires for local operations from these base positions. All units would displace from their base positions wherever required to support operations elsewhere or to extend ranges.

The 2/13th Artillery (105mm) (T), was to be located at Phu Loi together with the Group headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery headquarters and its 155mm/8" battalion (-). (The 8" howitzer battery was to locate at Ben Cat). Positioning of the 2/13th Artillery and the 1st Division Artillery's 155mm batteries at Phu Loi was to provide local defensive fires for the old Japanese air field at Phu Loi on which 2 aviation battalions and several air mobile companies were to be based. The 2/13th Artillery was also to become the "scout and shoot" battalion to be deployed by road or air wherever additional artillery would be needed. It also became apparent that it would be necessary to reconfigure the 175mm gun and 8"

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howitzer battalions into composite battalions. The Group Commander decided to exchange four 8" howitzers from 6/27th Artillery for four 175mm guns from the 2/32nd Artillery. This would permit the co-locating of an 8" and a 175mm gun battery or the forming of a composite 8"/175mm gun battery within each battalion.

The 2/32nd Artillery was then to establish headquarters at Tay Ninh while the Service battery would establish a base camp and Group rear area on the northern edge of Tan Son Nhut AFB at Saigon. The 2 composite batteries of the 2/32nd Artillery were to be positioned within the Special Forces (CIDG) camps northeast and northwest of Tay Ninh at Suoi Dai and Trang Sup. These units would cover the area out to the Cambodian border and north and east into War Zone C which has long been a Viet Cong Stronghold. The third firing battery was to be located near Bao Trai to provide General Support for the ARVN forces along the Oriental River and in the Plain of Reeds out to and along the Cambodian border to the west.

The 6/27th Artillery was to be employed with Battalion Headquarters, an 8" howitzer battery and a 175mm gun battery at Phouc Vinh and an 8" howitzer battery at Bien Hoa AFB. These units would provide coverage of operations into War Zone D and interdict enemy lines of communication in and between War Zones C and D.

The rear detachment and advance party of the 23d Artillery Group consisting of 1 officer and 4 enlisted men departed Fort Lewis on 9 October 1965 by air enroute for Vietnam arriving at Bien Hoa Air Base on 13 October 1965. The advance party for the 6/27th Artillery departed Fort Bliss on 8 October 1965 and arrived in RVN on 11 October 1965. It was composed of the Battalion Commander, S3, Commo Officer, Battery Commanders and necessary

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enlisted personnel. The advance party of the 2/32nd Artillery, consisting of 5 officers, 2 warrant officers and 23 enlisted men departed Fort Sill by air for RVN on 13 October 1965 and arrived in RVN on 17 October 1965. The advance party of the 2/13th Artillery departed Fort Sill on 20 October 1965 by air and arrived in RVN on 25 October 1965. The advance parties participated in reconnaissance, established command liaison, became familiar with communications requirements, supply procedures, and arranged for the reception of the main bodies. The caliber and experience of the officers and EM of the advance party in each case was significant. Each party should have included the Battalion Commander, his S3 and S4, a qualified Personnel/Administrative Officer and the Battalion Sergeant Major. Considerable difficulty was experienced by those units whose advance party was not made up of senior, experienced people.

The main bodies of HHB, 23d Artillery Group, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery departed Oakland Army Terminal on 4 October 1965 aboard the USNS General William H. Gordon for the RVN. On 19 October 1965 the Gordon docked at White Beach Naval Station, Okinawa for refueling. Subsequent stops were at Quin Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and finally, arrival at Vung Tau on 2 November 1965. Conditions aboard the ship were not good because of overcrowding. There were 3,900 troops aboard.

Personnel of the 2/13th Artillery departed Oakland Army Terminal on 10 October 1965 aboard the USNS General J. C. Breckenridge and arrived in Vung Tau on 30 October 1965. As was the case with all units the personnel were off loaded at Vung Tau and flown to Bien Hoa Air Base and transported by truck to the U.S. Army Staging Area between Saigon and Bien Hoa on national route 1A.

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On 26 October 1965 GO #1227, Headquarters United States Army Vietnam relieved HEB, 23d Artillery Group from assignment to USAFAC, assigned the unit to USARV and placed it under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. On the same GO, 6/27th Artillery and 2/32nd Artillery were assigned to the 23d Artillery Group. The 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery was assigned to 23d Artillery Group on USARV GO #1445, dated 5 November 1965.

4. (S) Staging Area. While in the Staging Area (10 miles northeast of Saigon on Route 1A) activities consisted primarily of unpacking equipment, continued reconnaissance of base position areas and coordination and liaison of staff sections with their counterparts at the 1st Infantry Division and USARV. Officers and key NCO's were briefed by U.S. Advisors at III Corps (ARVN) concerning present status of the Vietnamese War and ARVN operations in III Corps Tactical Zone.

Units of the 23d Artillery Group closed into the Staging Area (vic XT 971026) with the following personnel:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
HQB, 23d Artillery Group	14	1	88
2/13th Artillery	27	2	472
6/27th Artillery	30	4	539
2/32nd Artillery	31	4	507

On 2 November 1965 the Group Commander toured the Western Area of III Corps Tactical Zone (ARVN) with the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division to discuss selections of artillery positions at Tay Ninh and Cu Chi.

While in the Staging Area the Group experienced minor incidents of sniper fire and small unit probes into the perimeter. Initially security of the staging area was provided by elements of the 1st Infantry Division but as the Group became more settled it assumed an increased responsibility

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for its own defense. From positions in the Staging Area, the 8 inch howitzers of 2/32nd Artillery supported Capital Military Region, RVN, in two operations conducted east of Saigon (vic YS 0392 and XS 9993) with preparatory, close support and H and I fires. On 8 November 1965 the Group S2, Assistant S3, Liaison Officer, Intelligence Sergeant, and Assistant Operations Sergeant departed for Phu Loi to begin laying the ground work for combined operations and intelligence operations of the 23d Artillery Group and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

5. (S) Planned Deployment. The following represented the Group Commander's plans for deployment of the 23d Artillery Group as outlined to General Critz, Commandant USAAMS, in a letter dated 22 November 1965.

a. HHB, 23d Artillery Group. The Group was planned to be based near Phu Loi (vic XT 869155) co-located with 1st Infantry Division Artillery with a combined S2/S3 operations with 1st Division Artillery - tantamount to a Corps FSCC. One of the most difficult problems expected was to be coordination of artillery fires with massive air traffic of all types.

b. 6th Battalion (8 in How) (SF), 27th Artillery. The battalion headquarters and two firing batteries (B and C) are in firing positions near Phouc Vinh (vic XT 955475) with a mission of General Support of the 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, which is the DS battalion for the 1st Brigade, located at Phouc Vinh. C Battery of this battalion will have four 175mm guns. Battery A was already in position near Bien Hoa (vic XT 045119) with a mission of GS/Reinforcing 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery. The reasons for the two batteries with GS/R one Artillery Battalion and one Battery with a GS/R another battalion was to retain command control of the heavy artillery, yet establish fire channels and liaison

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between the two reinforced battalions as required. Also considered was the fact that the battalion headquarters was to be separated from Battery A, 6/27th Artillery by approximately 38 kilometers.

e. 2nd Battalion (175mm) (SA), 32nd Artillery. This battalion was expected to be deployed in three phase operation: Phase I was to have been the movement of the entire battalion minus Service Battery, plus one Infantry Battalion, 2 companies of engineers, and a VHF Signal Detachment to Cu Chi (vic XT 550052). Phase II. From the Cu Chi position the engineers were to prepare a battery position near Boa Tri (vic XT 550052). It was estimated it might take 3 months to construct the position since the location was a rice paddy at the end of an isolated air strip. After completing this position one battery, consisting of four 175mm guns and one 8" howitzer, were to be moved into position at Boa Tri. Since this position was highly vulnerable to VC attack, an ARVN Ranger Battalion was planned to provide security. From this position the battery would be able to interdict the Oriental River, the Plain of Reeds and the Cambodian Border within the 5 kilometer zone which friendly aircraft cannot go and which thus provides a VC sanctuary. Phase III was to have been the movement of the battalion (-) to base camp near Tay Ninh (vic XT 199508) which would have involved considerable engineering effort to prepare the road for Class 60 traffic. From Tay Ninh the engineer element would prepare firing positions by expanding the perimeters of the Special Forces Camps at Suoi Dai (vic XT 345581) and Trang Sup (vic XT 165555). At each of these positions one battery, consisting of two 175mm guns, and two 8" howitzers, would be placed in firing positions behind a 12 foot berm. The battalion headquarters would be located in Tay Ninh (vic XT 199508)

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with service battery at Ton San Nhut (vic XT 798968). The permanent base firing positions at Bao Tri, Trang Sup and Soui Dai were to have 7 hard-stand pads placed in an L shape permitting 6400 mil direction of fire. Since all three positions are located on rice paddy or soft soil, they would otherwise be untenable during the rainy season. It was planned that these batteries would at times move out as security became available to extend ranges up to the Cambodian Border northwest of Tay Ninh and also support Special Forces Operations and other operations well north and east into War Zone C.

It will be noted that this planned deployment of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery has not materialized yet, due to the 1st Infantry Division (Reinforced) being fully deployed in vital areas northeast and northwest of Saigon.

6. Tactical positioning and conduct of tactical operations.

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group - The main body of the Group departed the Staging Area along with elements of 2/13th Artillery for Phu Loi on 11 December 1965 and closed into position the same day. Upon arrival at Phu Loi the main body settled into prepared positions and was immediately operational due to efforts of the advance party from HHB, 23d Artillery Group. The remainder of the operations and intelligence personnel phased into joint operations with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. A "jump operations" van and CP was built while in the staging area and set up at Phu Loi.

Operations with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery has consisted primarily of clearing artillery fires, coordinating these fires with friendly aircraft and troops and scheduling harrassing, interdiction and

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neutralization fires. In order to clear a target for artillery engagement it is necessary to obtain clearance from U.S. Forces as well as Republic of Vietnam military and civilian agencies. Because the guerrilla often intermingles with the friendly populace he is a floating target and clearance by ARVN channels takes considerable time since checks must be made as far down as the village chief level.

In order to have a versatile Harassment, Intordiction and Neutralization (HIN) artillery program, the Group has proposed and is setting up a HIN team to coordinate the HIN fires of all the U.S. Artillery in III Corps Tactical Area (ARVN). This team will consist of the Group S2, S3 and two enlisted assistants. The HIN team will select, schedule, clear and coordinate all HIN fires based on the best available intelligence.

Since arrival at Phu Loi the Group headquarters has continued improving the base camp area, completed the perimeter defense structures, constructed two showers, and dug a well to provide water for the showers. VC activity has been limited to sniper fire at outposts along the perimeter, light probes, and exploding claymore type mines along the perimeter. To date these VC efforts have been ineffective against Group personnel.

Cooperation between the 23d Artillery Group and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery has been excellent.

b. 2/13th Artillery - Equipment began arriving in Saigon on 4 December 1965 and on 11 December 1965 the battalion completed its move to Phu Loi with all batteries closing into their permanent positions. As early as 7 November 1965 an advance party consisting of approximately 50% of the battalion was sent to Phu Loi to prepare for the movement of the battalion. Defensive positions were constructed, tent emplacements were established, howitzer positions built and communications installed by the

advance party. In addition, the advance party participated in the perimeter defense of the Phu Loi Area. Since 11 December 1965, the battalion has provided support to Phu Loi perimeter defense while furnishing general artillery support to the 1st Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam Army, Regional and Popular Forces. The battalion has fired 4,506 rounds during this period.

c. 6/27th Artillery - While in the Staging Area the battalion was reorganized into a composite gun/howitzer battalion with two batteries of 8" howitzers and one battery of 175mm guns. The battalion, including Batteries C and B, displaced its wheeled vehicles to Phouc Vinh (vic XT 955475) on 19 November 1965 while tracked vehicles moved to Phu Loi. On 20 November 1965 the tracked vehicles reached a position in the vicinity of Song Be River (vic XT 925443) and on 21 November 1965 the tracked vehicles crossed the river on an engineer constructed ferry and moved from the Song Be crossing to position vicinity Phouc Vinh. This was a difficult crossing due to very steep muddy banks. It was necessary to ferry a VTR (M88) across first and it was used to pull the M107 and M110 weapons up the far bank. Otherwise the guns could not have made the crossing. On 8 December 1965 Battery A and Service Battery (-) displaced to Bien Hoa Air Base (vic YT 047116) with a mission of General Support 1st Infantry Division and reinforcing the fires of the 319th Artillery, the Direct Support Battalion of the 173rd Brigade. Battalion (-) with Battery's C and B in Phouc Vinh were given a mission of General Support Reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, the Direct Support Unit of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. During this period, the unit fired 1173 missions expending 1966 8" rounds and 501 175mm rounds.

d. 2/32nd Artillery - On 19 November 1965 the battalion moved to Bien Hoa Air Base (vic XT 999148) and fired the first 175mm round ever fired in combat. A volley from three pieces was fired on a suspect VC regimental headquarters. Brigadier General Charles Mounts, Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division, autographed one of the rounds with the inscription "Sorry about that!" The Group Commander, Colonel Dyson, gave the order to fire. Nose plugs from the first rounds fired were chrome plated and mounted on plaques describing the historical artillery event. The plaques were presented to the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, Commanding General, III ARVN Corps, and Commanding General, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The battalion then returned to the Staging Area.

On 22 November 1965 four 175mm guns of Battery B closed in position in vicinity of Bien Hoa (vic YT 062118) for the purpose of supporting operation "New Life" which was being conducted by the 173rd Brigade. This mission terminated on 26 November 1965.

On 27 November 1965 the battalion was alerted to provide a 175mm battery to deploy in vicinity of Lai Khe Plantation (Ben Cat) in a general support reinforcing mission of the 2/33rd Artillery, the direct support battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. On 28 November 1965, Battery B, departed the Staging Area for Lai Khe. Wheeled vehicles were escorted by 1/18th Infantry along Route 13 to the final position. The tracked vehicles, because of bridge limitations, took an overland route, stopping at Phu Loi to be escorted by elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry to a point approximately 10 miles from the final destination, where elements of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division would assume escort duty. Because of a poor road one M107 became stuck so badly that it could not be pulled free

by three APC's and another M107. The decision was made to leave the stuck M107 under guard and the remaining guns closed into position. A VTR M88 was dispatched and the gun was pulled out and it closed into position before nightfall. The requirement for a VTR M88 to accompany heavy self-propelled artillery in this part of Vietnam was again firmly established. It is interesting to note that the Viet Cong had spotted the wired gun and were gathering forces about 2000 meters away to attack it at night. They disclosed their position by placing a large volume of fire on the Group Commander as he flew low over their position while reconnoitering an exit route for the gun. He neutralized the VC with artillery fire from nearby Lai Khe.

On 11 December 1965 Headquarters Battery and Battery C departed the Staging Area and closed into a position south of Bien Hoa Air Base (vic YF 045117). Battery C received the mission of GSR the 1/7th Artillery with 2 M107's and 2 M110's. Battery A departed the Staging Area 11 December 1965 and closed into position northeast of Bien Hoa Air Base (vic YF 020154) and received a mission GSR 3/319th Artillery, the DS unit of the 173rd Brigade with 2 M107's and 1 M110. Service Battery moved the same day to the edge of Ton San Nhat Air Base (vic XS 799965).

On 15 December 1965 the 2/32nd Artillery received operational control of Battery A, 6/27th Artillery located at Bien Hoa Air Base which was some 38 kilometers away from its Battalion headquarters, located at Phouc Vinh. During December Battery C supported missions for three ARVN units and the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in operation "Smash". The battalion expended a total of 2,287 175mm rounds and 448 8" rounds.

## SECTION V - LOGISTICS

1. During the period 1 July 1965 to 15 August 1965 supply activities were normal. Units of the 23d Artillery Group experienced no real difficulty in preparing for overseas movement. The unit departed with all equipment less the Radar Chronograph M36.

2. Transportation. Due to road and bridge conditions in Vietnam vehicles cannot be loaded to maximum cargo capacity. Road and bridge conditions are critical considerations when conveying equipment as well as security of area to be traveled. Frequently, guerrillas mine roads and establish road blocks or ambush sites hindering transportation and delivery of supplies. Movement of supplies in most all cases require heavily armed and escorted convoys preceded by road clearing operations. Because of route insecurity, 108,150 pounds of ammunition have been airlifted to elements of the 23d Artillery Group. Most routes contain many small stream crossings with bridges of very low capacity. These could be quickly and easily traversed by utilization of self-propelled self-launched bridges which are organic in the Divisional Engineer Bridge Company but which, for unknown reasons, were not brought to Vietnam. Heavy SP artillery should have such bridges readily available in this country.

3. Maintenance, care and repair of equipment.

a. This unit has published two Group regulations: Regulation 750-1 subject "Command Maintenance Management" which outlines policies and program for maintenance operations in units and is directed at organizational and unit level preventive maintenance and preventive maintenance operations; and Regulation 220-2 subject "Section Readiness" which provides a system of portraying the status of operational readiness at section level. This

further increases the section chiefs' awareness of the detailed status of personnel and equipment for which he is responsible.

b. Motor Stables are conducted daily and equipment serviceability Criteria inspections are conducted twice a month.

c. Repair parts are critical and difficult to obtain.

Establishment of the RED BALL express for repair parts should improve the deadline for parts situation.

d. Maintenance support is excellent with the exception of a shortage of repair parts (PLL).

#### 4. Administration of Supply:

a. The S4 this headquarters provides administrative supervision, staff planning and supervision of supply operations for units assigned to the 23d Artillery Group.

b. During the month of November enlisted personnel forfeited their clothing allowance due to the direct exchange program for individual clothing. To this date a DX system has not been effected. It is anticipated this program will be effected 15 January 1966 in eight (8) locations in country.

#### 5. Exchange of Supply Information.

a. Weekly S4 meetings are conducted at the S4 section, Group Headquarters. These meetings are informal and the S4's are encouraged to disseminate information which may be of value to all units.

b. The S4 section, this headquarters, frequently reproduces letters, messages, etc. from other sources pertaining to supply, maintenance, reports, forms or records for distribution to assigned units as applicable.

#### 6. Construction. Construction is on a self-help program with very

major construction equipment and material being made available. Limited construction of latrines, showers and a mess hall/kitchen are underway utilizing scrap lumber from damage and packing boxes.

7. Barrier Material: There is no shortage of concertina or barb wire, but a shortage of sand bags still exists.

8. Supply operations.

a. Allocation of critical items.

(1) The following items have been requested as excess to authorized equipment. They are considered critical to enable Group and assigned units to accomplish the assigned missions or for security reasons:

a. Panoramic telescope M13 (6 extra).

b. Launcher grenade, M79.

c. Shotguns.

d. Mortars, 81mm.

e. Radio set, AN/GRC-125.

f. Truck, wrecker.

g. Antenna Group AN/GRA-50.

h. Collimator, infinity aiming.

(2) Item a is on approved requisition.

(3) There is a critical shortage of tubes for the 175mm gun.

(4) Initially there was a shortage of nitrogen for the 175mm gun.

b. Supply Status Reports and other supply reports. The following recurring status and supply reports are submitted:

(1) Materiel Readiness Report.

- (2) Unit Readiness Report.
- (3) World Wide Monthly Ammunition Reports.
- (4) Report on Imprest Funds.
- (5) Receipt of Red Ball Express Items (RP).
- (6) Report of Boots, Jungle, DMS & Combat Requirements.

9. Supply by Requisition:

a. There is a critical shortage of jungle boots and light-weight fatigues at present. Combat boots and regular fatigues are becoming available in limited quantities.

b. Expendable office janitorial supplies are in short supply. This unit has not been issued janitorial or office supplies since arrival in Vietnam.

c. Isolated elements of the 23d Artillery Group are issued repair parts with Class I distribution. Bulk and heavy Class II & IV items are issued isolated elements by armed convoy movement on periodic basis.

d. Other Special and Emergency Supply Operations. Request for the aviation section augmentation which was deleted prior to overseas shipment has been initiated. Approval will increase equipment requirements of major end items and PLU. However, experience already shows the normal augmentation of 1 O1 aircraft and 1 H-13 helicopter to be completely inadequate.

10. Summary: The sudden influx of troops in Vietnam placed a severe strain on the limited supply and logistic system in country. Nearly all classes of II and IV supplies are critical or short in supply with little alleviation of this problem in the foreseeable future. A thirty day supply

of janitorial, office supplies and PMA will not be sufficient for units arriving in country until the problem of sufficiently supplying in-country units is effected.

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## SECTION VI - CIVIC ACTION

1. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the 23d Artillery Group distributed toys, food and candy to hospitals and schools in the Phu Loi area on 24 December 1965. On 25 December 1965 the Group Surgeon dressed as Santa Claus distributed additional candy and gifts to the approximately 450 children of Phu Cong Village. In addition the Group Surgeon has held sick call in the local village of Pho Hoa. Plans are being made to continue this program. On 24 December 1965, personnel from Headquarters Battery and Battery C, 2/32nd Artillery distributed Christmas gifts to children of Khu Gia Vien village, Bien Hoa Province. Over 230 gift packages were distributed. The village chief, Nhuyen Van Nhan, was presented a special gift of a safety razor and blades along with other toilet articles. On Christmas Eve, Battery A, 2/32nd Artillery took turkey, nuts and candy to Xa Tan Phu, Bien Hoa Province, for distribution to village children. The battalion medical officer also held sick call at that time.

2. The civil affairs officer of the 6/27th Artillery has established a cordial relationship with the District Chief at Phouc Vinh. The civil affairs efforts began 28 November 1965 shortly after arrival in the tactical area. It was necessary to include a portion of land that belonged to a local school into the Headquarters Battery perimeter. In an effort to forestall hard feelings, the Battery built a volley ball court for the local school which was used immediately and continually by village children. In addition a fence was constructed around the school to keep out wandering water buffalo. A flag pole was also built for the school to fly their Vietnamese national flag.

3. The Battalion Surgeon donated one day a week for sick call at the

District Dispensary at Phouc Vinh. On an average day he saw and treated over 50 people. Nearly 500 Vietnamese have been seen and treated by the Battalion Surgeon since the arrived in the Phouc Vinh area.

4. On 23 Decenbor 1965, some 14 enlisted men and 2 officers of the 2/13th Artillery distributed toys, cake and fruit juices to over three hundred orphans and refugees in a small pagoda in the village of Phu Cuong. The 2/13th Artillery plans to have its Battalion Surgeon conduct sick call in a nearby village.

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## SECTION VII - PROBLEM AREAS (C)

1. Lack of TOE augmentation of aircraft has severely hampered the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Especially has reconnaissance, adjustment of fires, liaison, intelligence collection and administration been affected. An artillery unit cannot operate effectively in Vietnam without adequate aircraft of its own.

2. Trained air observers are important. More air observers should be authorized due to the terrain and type conflict.

3. (C) The 175mm ammunition needs a variable time fuze (VT), a mechanical time super quick (MSQ) on projectile, HEM437MOS, and a White Phosphorous (WP) projectile. The WP projectile is needed to assist in the adjustment of long range artillery fire in dense jungle.

4. FM radio communication has been unreliable because of the wide spread location of artillery and the terrain. Arrangement should be made for VHF communications between widely separated heavy artillery units and parent headquarters.

5. M107 and M110 have been unnecessarily deadlined because extra Panoramic Sights M115 are not available.

6. The short tube life span of the M107 (approximately 422 at maximum charge) has been a problem of concern. These weapons fire the maximum charge more frequently than the lower charges.

7. Convoys must be heavily guarded and air cover provided on most routes. Even then there is loss of equipment and personnel by command detonated mines.

8. Coordination and clearance of artillery fires remains a serious obstacle to the timely engagement of targets of opportunity.

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SECTION VIII.- LESSONS LEARNED

1. Both battalion and battery Fire Direction Centers must maintain a chart with 6400 mil capability. The polyethylene charts have been found to be the most satisfactory. Battery positions should be plotted in the middle of a chart large enough to plot the maximum range of the artillery weapon in any direction. In this manner a battery can be readily relayed to meet a contingency in any direction.

2. Batteries are divided usually into three platoons for the 105mm and two platoons for heavy artillery, so it is important to keep the deflection indices of each platoon readily visible and discernable on the firing chart.

3. Time will not allow the registration of each platoon of a battery. It is therefore important that Met plus VE corrections be applied.

4. Convoy movements and displacements involving the M107's or M110's must be accompanied by a VTR-M38.

5. A thorough route reconnaissance with particular attention to width and weight limitations of bridges must be performed prior to moving a convoy.

6. The TM for the M107 lists the M51A5 fuze and the M572 as authorized for firing; however, only the M572 is currently authorized.

7. By aggressive air reconnaissance particularly at night artillery units can find many targets for engagement. The O1 aircraft is the best aircraft for aerial observation and surveillance.

8. On one occasion, splitting of the battalion supply section resulted in increased efficiency because units of the battalion were separated some 38 kilometers.

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9. Shortages of repair parts have affected operations. This problem is expected to be partially alleviated with the Red Ball I express recently inaugurated here.

10. Personnel <sup>FROM</sup> ~~FOR~~ CONUS are arriving overseas without weapons.

11. Wide dispersion of artillery has caused maximum decentralization, increased difficulty of coordinating and control of artillery fires.

12. Requirements for 6400 mil coverage.

13. A loss of approximately 20% of the enlisted personnel, primarily in grades E4 and below without MOS qualified replacements, has reduced unit efficiency.

14. Target acquisition in the jungle environment continues to be a major problem.

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9. Field fortification training prior to deployment is a must.

10. Visual reconnaissance over jungle terrain is extremely difficult due to double and often triple-layered canopies. To overcome this problem it is often necessary to fly at a height of approximately 50 feet over the tree tops. Even at this altitude area coverage is limited to approximately 10% of the jungle floor. Best observation for other areas, i.e. sparse jungle clearings is accomplished at an altitude of 1500 feet.

11. Target area survey and survey data for registration is not feasible. Control must be assumed from map inspection and direction from sun shots or polar observation.

12. In general, daylight surveillance yields very little overt enemy personnel activity. Night observation by aircraft promises to be worthwhile and often gives positive indications of Viet Cong personnel and equipment movements. (See Intelligence section).

13. Aircraft landing lights are impractical in many areas. Illumination for night landings of fixed wing when within a tactical area where ground control radar is not available, can be provided by mortar flares fired on the command of the pilot. This eliminates the hazard of exposing ground personnel using battery powered landing lights.

14. Present maps of South Vietnam have some distortion. When possible it is advisable to register in all quadrants with the same piece concurrent with metro and compare, e.g. faults in the map may show up as a drastic change in VE in a particular quadrant.

15. AM Radio Transmitting. Transmission by AM radios in this locality has developed into a pattern caused by a combination of atmospheric conditions and high traffic loads. The poorest hours for transmission are

from 1200 hours to 1900 hours local time. Other times afford marginal transmission capability.

a. Direct exposure to the sun and prolonged operating causes malfunction of the set by overheating. Turning off teletypewriter sets and security equipment when not in use and overhead sandbagging helps keep the equipment cool.

b. Antennas. When using a doublet antenna it must be cut exactly to the length corresponding to the frequency used or resistors will burn out in the final loading stage of the transmitter.

16. Chief of Gun Sections have relied on the Safety Officer to check safety, thus when placed in a combat situation, where he does not have a safety officer leaning over his shoulder, there is a period of adjustment until he learns that he (the Chief of Section) is the safety officer and is entirely responsible for the accurate setting of firing data on the piece.

## SECTION IX - COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Artillery units assigned to the Republic of Vietnam must come equipped with TOE aviation and/or TOE aviation augmentation. Even the currently authorized augmentation has proven altogether inadequate. Special emphasis should be placed to insure that adequate pilots and maintenance personnel also accompany the unit. In order to meet the demands of aggressive twenty-four hour observation and surveillance, extensive reconnaissance and administrative requirements, the artillery group should have as a minimum 2 O1 and one U6 type fixed wing aircraft and 2 OH13 light observation helicopters. Likewise, the artillery battalion needs as an absolute minimum 2 O1 fixed wing aircraft and 1 light observation helicopter. The O1 type aircraft is proving superior to the helicopter for observation and surveillance.

2. The United States Army Artillery and Missile School could be of great assistance in alleviating the difficulties experienced with untrained aerial observers by incorporating aerial surveillance and aerial adjustment of fires into the program of instruction. Units in the field should conduct practical work in aerial adjustment of artillery fires and aerial surveillance to include hours of darkness. In fact, a special course in aerial surveillance should be considered by the USAAMS.

3. The AN/TPS-25 is a valuable target acquisition radar especially to detect VC night probes of perimeters which are frequent. These radars would be helpful in preventing the VC from emplacing claymore and other type mines against the perimeter.

4. A brochure containing helpful hints about Vietnam would be valuable to units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam. This brochure

should be organized on an area basis because of different problems.

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Armament

5. A White Phosphorous round for 175mm ammunition is urgently needed. In addition, a VT fuze should be standardized for the 175mm gun.

Needs

6. The present tube life (approximately 422 rounds) for the 175mm gun is unsatisfactory. This weapon has proved valuable to accurately engage long range targets. A more durable tube is needed. On occasion the 175mm gun may expend 500 rounds per week. Adequate targets are available. However, the problems associated with the supply and changing of tubes is considerable.

7. Personnel arriving from CONUS should bring individual weapons already zeroed.

8. Units scheduled for duty in VN should have an initial 60 day authorized stockage of PLL and repair parts to forestall unnecessary downtime of equipment.

9. VHF equipment should be issued down to and including the battery level in heavy artillery units. This is the most practical means of communicating here in Vietnam.

10. The infinity aiming device should be a standard item of issue for artillery units to replace aiming stakes because of the 6400 mil requirement.

11. The radar chronograph authorized by TOE is vitally needed so that units can have the best VE possible available. This particularly true with the 175mm gun and its short tube life.

12. A VTR with capacity and characteristics of the M88 type with a comparable weight to the M107 gun (31 tons) would be most useful. At present heavy SP artillery can itself utilize 30 ton routes, but, since it

is unwise to not include a V R (55 tons) in any movement, these weapons are limited to travel over 50 ton routes of which there are precious few in Vietnam.

13. The M107 and M110 gun carriers do not appear to be sufficiently strong and durable to withstand prolonged firing with maximum charges. It is believed that extensive strengthening and modification will have to be made if these weapons are to remain in service to perform the tasks for which they are needed in Vietnam.

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AVC (14 Jan 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307 FEB 0 5 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH  
APO US Forces 96558

1. (U) Reference Section IX, Commander's Recommendations, 23d Artillery Group quarterly command report for 2d quarter, FY 66.
2. (U) Reference paragraph 1: The unit has been directed to submit a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to change the equipment as desired.
3. (U) Reference paragraph 2: Concur.
4. (U) Reference paragraph 3: The unit has been directed to submit a MTOE to include this equipment.
5. (U) Reference paragraph 4: USMACV has published a brochure of helpful hints about Vietnam. It is in pocket-size booklet form. The booklet is currently being published in Japan and should be issued to individual soldiers during the month of January 1966.
6. (S) Reference paragraph 5: Army Material Command, Research and Development (AMCRD), indicated to USARV on 27 December 1965, that the 175mm WP Round (XM510E) can not be type classified within the next twelve months, and that no WP round is planned prior to type classification. Concur in the need for a standardized VT fuze.
7. (S) Reference paragraph 6: Concur that the present tube life for the 175mm gun is unsatisfactory. Information from recent USAWECOM tests indicate that the XML jacket, developed for use on zone 3 propelling charge, will at least double the present tube life. The XML jacket will be available on 15 March 1966. However, even with this increase in tube life, development of a more durable tube is needed to reduce logistical support requirements.
8. (U) Reference paragraph 7: This command has requested that individual replacements be provided individual weapons in CONUS.
9. (C) Reference paragraph 8: Do not concur. Many units arrive in Vietnam without authorized fill of PLL because repair parts are not available in CONUS. Increasing authorized stockage to a sixty day level would not insure an increase in parts fill. The additional demands for stockage

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AVC (14 Jan 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (U)

parts could further reduce quantities available for issue of priority replacement parts. First priority is to increase ASL and PLL fill to units in Vietnam whose needs are more urgent than that of units preparing to depart CONUS.

10. (U) Reference paragraphs 9 and 10: Concur.


11. (C) Reference paragraph 11: The Radar Chronograph Set, M36, was on POM requisition by the 23d Artillery Group. The requisition was cancelled because the item was not available in Depot Stocks. The 23d Artillery Group requested the item on Requisition AT88335295-008, priority 02, to CSA. Item is in zero balance in Vietnam. CSA was notified that the requisition was cancelled because the item is in production and will not be available until June 1966. The 23d Artillery Group has been notified to resubmit their requisition.

12. (C) Reference paragraph 12: The M-578 recovery vehicle, using the same engine, chassis and transmission as the M107 (110), weighing 54,000 pounds, with a 30 ton winching and boom capability and a 15,000 lift, is in production. The 23d Artillery Group has been informed of the existence of this recovery vehicle.

13. (S) Reference paragraph 13: This command is aware of the problem. Units having 175mm gun cannons have been directed to limit firing to charge 1 and 2, except for highest priority targets. This command requested two technical advisors be provided by the designing agency, or by the US Army Tank Automotive Center, until the problem is resolved.

14. (U) The 23d Artillery Group included all battalions in the group quarterly command report, for the period ending 31 December 1965. This was discussed with the Group S3, who agreed to have each battalion submit the quarterly command report for the period ending 31 March 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



HENRY L. DENNEY  
CWO USA  
Asst Adj Gen

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