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AGAM-P (M) (30 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683048 5 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Air
Cavalry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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Subject: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
APO 96490

1. (C) SECTION 1 OPERATIONS: Significant Activities.

   a. This reporting period saw the conclusion of Operation DELAWARE, and the start of Operation JEB STUART III.

      (1) Operation DELAWARE was a reconnaissance in force into the A Shau Valley by the 1st Air Cavalry Division (-2 Bde) and the 3d ARVN Regiment, 1st ARVN Division. Throughout the Operation the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery, and 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery were in direct support of the 1st and 3d Brigades respectively. Supporting the fires of the two direct support battalions were B and C Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155 towed) (GSR), and A and C Battery, 2nd Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 20th Artillery (GS). Artillery extraction from the A Shau Valley began on 10 May with the movement to Camp Evans of C/1/21 Artillery from LZ Tiger and B/1/21 Artillery and C/1/30 Artillery from LZ Goodman. On 11 May, A/1/21 (-) moved from LZ Pepper to Camp Evans. The following day B/1/21 was deployed from Camp Evans to LZ Jack and A/1/21 (-) to LZ Jeanne. Three tubes of B/1/30 were extracted on 13 May from LZ Stallion to Camp Evans, but inclement weather delayed displacing the remainder of the battery until 15 May, at which time the entire battery moved by road to LZ Sharon. The same day A/2/19 Artillery and B/2/19 Artillery were airlifted from LZ Lucy and LZ Stallion respectively and moved from Camp Evans to LZ Sharon by road. On 16 May C/2/19 was airlifted from LZ Castle to LZ Sharon, and the two tubes from A/1/21 on Signal Hill were airlifted to LZ Jeanne completing the extraction of artillery from the A Shau Valley. During Operation DELAWARE, the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, with the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery in direct support, was under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division operating in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. They also operated north of the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at Dong Ha and participated in Operations SCOTLAND II (16 April - 7 May) and Gomorria Square (8 - 17 May 1968).

      (2) Operation JEB STUART III began on 171100 May 68. The mission of the 1ACD in this operation is to destroy enemy forces, installations,
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and caches within the 1ACD area of operations with emphasis on NVA Base Areas 114 and 101. Simultaneously, the division conducted offensive rice denial operations within the AO. The artillery available to support the operation consisted of the battalions organic to Division Artillery plus the attached 1/30 Artillery (155mm How towed) augmented by A Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105 SP), 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (8" SP) (-1 Btry), and 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (105 towed) (-2 Btry). On 27 May 1966 the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. During the reporting period numerous changes were made in the number and caliber of corps artillery units available to the division. At the end of the reporting period, non-divisional artillery supporting JEB STUART I consisted of C/2/94 Artillery (6" How SP), B/6/33 Artillery (105 towed), and A/1/40 Artillery (105 SP).

(3) JEB STUART III has been characterised by frequent small unit contact rather than major engagements. All LZ's within the Division area of operations came under rocket and mortar attack during the reporting period, sustaining only light casualties and damage with one exception. At 1920 hours on 19 May 1966, Camp Evans received 12 x 122mm rocket rounds which impacted in the vicinity of the ammunition supply point. The resulting explosions completely destroyed the ammunition supply point and damaged a number of aircraft barged in the vicinity.

(4) The most significant enemy contact during the period occurred during the three days from 27 - 29 June 1966 when elements of the 2d Bde made heavy contact with the 814th NVA Battalion, 7th Front, in the hamlet of Binh An (YD 405633) located on the coastal plain northeast of Quang Tri. As infantry and armor elements of the 2d Brigade surrounded the enemy forces, artillery, aerial rocket artillery (ARA), airstrikes, and naval gunfire delivered devastating fire into the enemy positions resulting in 225 NVA killed and 44 enemy taken prisoner.

b. Direct Support Artillery.

(1) 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery: The beginning of this quarter found the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery in the A Shau Valley (Operation DELAWARE) supporting the 1st Brigade in a reconnaissance in force. The operation was characterised by continuous moderate contact requiring close and continuous fire support. On 16 May 1966, the battalion was extracted from the A Shau Valley and continued to provide direct support to the 1st Bde in Operation JEB STUART III concentrating on base area 101. A successful operation was staged against the enemy, driving him further into the base area. As a result, LZ Barbara (YD 330333) was established on 10 June. On 28 June, B Battery, located on LZ Barbara, was placed under the operational control of 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, to support...
the 2d Brigade. During the period 17 May (Operation JEB STUAHT III) to the present, the battalion has participated in three joint ARVN/US operations, two in the coastal area and one in the jungle area. Two of the operations required the ARVN Artillery to be displaced by air. The ARVN artillermen were given air movement training by the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery. The 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, is currently deployed as follows:

- HHB, LZ Betty (YD 34502)
- Btry A, LZ Sharon (YD 338490)
- Btry B, LZ Barbara (YD 330335)
- Btry C, LZ Anne (YD 298394)

1st Battalion, 77th Artillery: At the start of the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery plus A/1/30 Artillery (OPCON) was in direct support of the 2d Brigade which was OCON to the 3d Marine Division. The battalion participated in Operations SCOTLAND II (16 April - 7 May) and CONCORDIA SQUARE (8 - 17 May 68). On 4 May 1968 A/1/77, located at LZ Peanuts, (YD 809392), came under 120mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire. At approximately 1630 hours three 122mm rockets impacted on a helicopter pad in the midst of approximately 2000 rounds of 105mm ammunition that had been delivered just prior to the attack. The resultant fire and explosions, coupled with a direct hit on a 105mm gun section rendered portions of the unit ineffective. Although the cook-off of howitzer ammunition continued on thru the next day two gun sections continued to function. However, in the pre-dawn hours of 5 May 1968 LZ Peanuts again received incoming 120mm mortar rounds and B-40 rockets coupled with a ground and sapper attack. The attack was repelled with thirty-two NVA killed inside the defensive wire. Once again the battery suffered losses in both equipment and personnel. Upon notification of the serious losses in both personnel and equipment that A/1/77 had sustained, action was taken to have the unit extracted and repositioned at LZ Jane (Base Camp of the 2d Bde, 1ACD). On 5 May 1968 all personnel and equipment were extracted from LZ Peanuts in spite of sporadic incoming rounds and continuing ammunition cook-off throughout the day. Simultaneous with the units extraction the 27th Maintenance Battalion (DS) and all other 1st Air Cav Div Support Command elements assisted in reconstituting A/1/77 through the movement of required operable equipment into LZ Jane by road and CH-47 helicopters. By dusk, 5 May 1968, A/1/77 was in position with the necessary personnel, equipment, and ammunition to continue its mission of close and continuous fire support while continuing to replace and re-furnish lost and damaged equipment. On 17 May, the battalion, in direct support of 2d Brigade, returned to control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and displaced to LZ Jane (YD 380425) to begin operation JEB STUART III. On 23 May 1968, C Battery was moved to LZ Meredith (YD 470209) and placed OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. On 9 June, C Battery displaced to its present position on LZ Hooven (YD 445193). On 26 June, B Battery displaced from LZ Jane to LZ Carol (YD 343193). The current deployment of 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, is as follows:

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HHB .................. LZ Jane (YD 380425)
Btry A .................. LZ Hardcore (YD 448510)
Btry B .................. LZ Carol (YD 343193)
Btry C .................. LZ Mooney (YD 445193)

(3) 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery: The battalion remained in direct support of the 3d Brigade throughout Operations DELAWARE and JEB STURT III. The battalion (-) returned to Camp Evans from Operation DELAWARE on 9 May 68. A Battery (-) returned on 10 May while 1 platoon of the battery supported the operation until its termination on 17 May 68. In order to support the maneuver elements along the coastal plains and base area 114 during the current operation (JEB STURT III), A Battery (-) was displaced to LZ Jeanne (YD 551393) on 12 May with the remaining platoon arriving on 17 May. B and C batteries alternated between LZ Evans (YD 529320) and LZ Jack (YD 495286). B Battery, presently located at Camp Evans, is the base defense battery and provides artillery support for the 1ACD Training Center. The 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, is currently deployed as follows:

HHB .................. LZ Evans (YD 529320)
Btry A .................. LZ Jeanne (YD 551393)
Btry B .................. LZ Evans (YD 529320)
Btry C .................. LZ Jack (YD 495286)

c. General Support Artillery.

(1) 2d Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 20th Artillery: During the period 1-7 May 1968, the battalion was in general support of Operation DELAWARE. A Battery established a forward operational base at LZ Stallion in the A Shau Valley and provided priority of fires to the 1st and 3d Brigade elements in the valley. Operations were conducted in the face of the heaviest anti-aircraft fire encountered by the Division to date, consisting of .50 caliber machine guns, 23mm, and 37mm weapons. B Battery was placed in a general support-reinforcing role to the 1/77 Artillery in support of the 2d Brigade in the SCOTLAND II AO. Operations were conducted from LZ Stud (forward operational base) with the 3d Marine Division. On the night of 4-5 May, LZ Peanuts was assaulted by NVA forces. B Battery provided continuous fires in defense of the position and contributed significantly to repulsing the attack. Covering fires were provided for the next two days for the extraction of forces from LZ Peanuts and LZ Snapper. C Battery was in general support and answered calls for fire throughout the division AO. Two sections were OPCON to A Battery in the A Shau Valley. Battalion Headquarters remained at LZ Evans, coordinating and controlling the widespread assets of the battalion. A and B Batteries flew mortar patrol sorties nightly from their forward operational and rear bases. C Battery patrolled the "rocket belt" south of LZ Evans nightly from 8-17 May. Priority of A Battery fires were given to 1st and 3d Brigade
 elements in the A Shau Valley. On 13 May, A Battery was placed in GSR/2/19 Artillery. Extraction from LZ Stallion began on 13 May and continued through 15 May. This period was marked by sporadic firing of NVA artillery on the LZ. On 15 May the battery forward base closed and the battery reverted to a general support role at LZ Sharon. B Battery closed-out its forward base at LZ Studor on 9 May but continued to provide GSR fires to 1/77 Artillery. The 2d Brigade conducted operations with the 3d Marine Division north of Dong Ha during Operation CONCORDIA SQUARE. From 8 May through 15 May, B Battery estimated 172 NVA KIA by their fires and was officially credited for a body count of 66 NVA. CONCORDIA SQUARE terminated on 15 May, and B Battery reverted to a general support role at LZ Jane. C Battery remained in general support of the Division.

Battalion headquarters continued operation at LZ Evans. Rocket/mortar patrol was conducted nightly at LZ's Sharon, Jane, Evans and Stallion. On 17 May 68, the battalion commenced Operation JEB STUART III. On 3 July, LZ Evans was hit with rocket fire while LZ Miguel was simultaneously attacked by NVA forces. C Battery participated in the successful defense of Miguel throughout the night. On 29 July, B Battery flew 64 sorties and fired 1325 rockets in support of C/2/12th Cavalry when the unit became heavily engaged west of LZ Jane. The 2nd Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 20th Artillery is currently deployed as follows:

HUB............LZ Evans (YD 529320)
Btry A............LZ Sharon (YD 338490)
Btry B............LZ Jane (YD 380425)
Btry C............LZ Evans (YD 529320)

(2) 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery: At the beginning of the reporting period, the battalion remained attached to the Division. A Battery, OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, was located at LZ Smpper (XD 842346). B Battery was located at LZ Stallion in the A Shau Valley with the mission of general support, reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery. C Battery in general support, reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, also participated in Operation DELAWARE and was located at LZ Goodman (YD 320071). On 17 May, the battalion began supporting Operation JEB STUART III. On 27 May 68, the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Division by USARV General Order 2522. On 5 July 68, B Battery (-), located at LZ Sharon, displaced to the Citadel at Quang Tri (YD 360336) to support a combined operation on the coast conducted by ARVN elements and elements of the 1st Brigade. On 22 July 68, two platoons of C Battery, located at LZ Mooney, were airlifted to LZ Maureen (YD 343193) for the purpose of interdicting the A Shau Valley. One platoon from A Battery was airlifted from LZ Jane to LZ Carol (YD 343193) on 28 July 68, also with the mission of interdicting the A Shau Valley. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, is currently deployed as follows:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HHR...........LZ Evans (YD 529320)
Btry A (-)......LZ Jane (YD 380425)
Btry A (FLT)....LZ Carol (YD 343191)
Btry B (-)......LZ Sharon (YD 338490)
Btry B (FLT)....LZ Anne (YD 290401)
Btry C (-)......LZ Maureen (YD 428121)
Btry C (FLT)....LZ Jack (YD 495286)

(3) Battery E (Avn), 82d Artillery: The battery remained at LZ Evans for the entire reporting period, co-located with Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery. The unit provided direct and general aviation support during Operations DELAWARE (1-17 May 1968) and JEB STUART III (17 May - 31 July 1968). Aviation support was provided to Headquarters, Division Artillery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, and the direct support battalions for command and control, artillery adjustment, reconnaissance and surveillance, logistics, and administration. During the reporting period, 10 of the 16 OH-13 which were assigned in lieu of the authorized OH-6 aircraft were replaced by OH-6's.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Aviator Experience.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period the level of aviator experience has dropped significantly through the replacement of experienced aviators with newly trained aviators.

(b) Evaluation: The drop in aviator experience has resulted in the requirement for extensive unit training, a reduction in mission capability, and an increase in aircraft accidents.

(c) Recommendations: That the assignment of aviators provide a greater mix of experienced aviators.

b. Operations.

(2) Enemy Artillery.

(a) Observation: Enemy Artillery can outrange U.S. artillery when operations are conducted near national boundaries.

(b) Evaluation: When this division conducts operations near national boundaries beyond which the enemy enjoys sanctuary, it can expect
AVDAAR-CO

Subject: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

To be shelled by enemy artillery which can outrange U.S. artillery available for airmobile operations. The enemy artillery positions can be attacked by TAC AIR, but this is not as responsive in the counter-battery role as is artillery.

(c) Recommendation: A new airmobile artillery weapon or rocket assisted ammunition for current light and/or medium artillery be developed which would have a range equal to or exceeding that of the 130mm and 152mm guns available to the enemy.

(2) Operations with Units Unfamiliar with Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA).

(a) Observation: Coordination and control of ARA fires presents a problem when supported units are unfamiliar with ARA operations.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that ground controllers from units other than those organic to the 1ACD do not understand ARA employment. They expect the aircraft to fly a low, armed reconnaissance type run which would enable the pilot to distinguish between friendly elements and enemy troops as the firing run is made. When close and discreet ARA fires are desired, positive marking of all friendly elements must be accomplished.

(c) Recommendations: Prior to planned operations with units other than those of 1ACD, liaison should be effected to orient advisors, artillery liaison officers, and forward observers concerning the employment of ARA. When this is not feasible due to operational requirements, 1ACD Circular 525-8, "Employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery", dated 15 July 1968, should be distributed to the units prior to operations.

(3) Anti-aircraft Fire Suppression.

(a) Observation: During operations in the A Shau Valley artillery fires were used effectively to suppress anti-aircraft fire, thereby facilitating airmobile operations.

(b) Evaluation: Coordination between helicopters or fixed wing aircraft and artillery units can mutually increase the effectiveness of airmobile operations.

(c) Recommendations: Aircraft operating in areas threatened by anti-aircraft fire should be made aware of procedures for contacting available artillery units and adjusting artillery fires.

c. Training.
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(1) Standardization Training for ARA Aviators.

(a) Observation: Most newly assigned aviators are directly assigned from flight school and require considerable additional training prior to release on combat missions.

(b) Evaluation: Newly assigned aviators on their first aviation tour assigned to ARA are weak on in-flight emergency procedures and require additional training prior to release for combat missions. These individuals also must be trained in rocket gunnery and artillery tactics and procedures. The shortcomings of new aviators and a list of recommended areas to stress in flight school has been provided the Director of Instruction, US Army Aviation School, during a recent visit.

(c) Recommendation: That CONUS aviation training should place a greater emphasis on emergency procedures, rocket gunnery and artillery tactics and procedures.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Imagery Interception.

(a) Observation: Photo missions were of little or no value due to late receipt of photo interpretation reports.

(b) Evaluation: Requests for photo missions submitted before and during Operation DELAWARE were of little or no value to using units due to late receipt of the photo interpretation reports. As an example, on 2 May, after a DS artillery battalion placed counterfires on a suspect rocket location, it requested an immediate photo mission. The mission was eventually flown and the photos were received by the Battalion on 18 May.

(c) Recommendations: Initial imagery interpretation readout of items of military significance should be expedited to the using requesting unit by RTT or other appropriate electronic means. The photos can be forwarded at a later date.

e. Logistics.

(1) Building Materials.

(a) Observation: Due to airlift requirements, aircraft on forward fire bases lack construction material for fortifications, particularly wooden beams and steel matting roofs. The building of bunkers
is time consuming and many times results in fortifications which are not properly constructed to afford maximum protection.

(b) Evaluation: Building materials are generally in short supply. Some of the material that is obtained is wasted by inexperienced builders. Often the material is destroyed rather than moved, when a unit moves. Simple pre-cut bunkers would greatly alleviate the problem of procuring materials and constructing bunkers.

(c) Recommendation: That standard pre-cut bunkers be designed and made available to combat and combat support units. The bunkers should be easy to assemble and disassemble.

(2) Initial Stockage of Forward Supply Base (FSB) Accomplished by Airdrop.

(a) Observation: Initial stockage and resupply for the forward supply base (FSB) in the Shau Valley (IZ Stallion) was accomplished by airdrop without proper correlation between operational requirements and types of ammunition delivered or with regard to requirements for complete rounds for separate loading and semi-fixed howitzer ammunition.

(b) Evaluation:

1 The supply build-up at LZ Stallion was accomplished initially primarily by C-130 airdrop with subsequent air landed supplies upon opening the air field. The C-130 drops were initially made in poor visibility and within NVA anti-aircraft range. These factors contributed to wide dispersion of artillery ammunition (105mm and 155mm) throughout the area making recovery time consuming, costly in man hours and in some cases, prohibitive due to lack of security. The clearing of the drop zone (DZ) was further complicated initially by insufficient personnel and lack of sufficient motor transport.

2 Airdropped items of artillery ammunition were not correlated with actual requirements. This was particularly true of separate loading ammunition where incompatible amounts of fuzes, projectiles, and propellants were dropped. Additionally, the amount of various types of ammunition, (high explosive, smoke, white phosphorous and illumination) dropped was not in concurrence with stated operational requirements. This difficulty was alleviated with resupply from LZ Evans.

(c) Recommendations:

1 Sufficient personnel and equipment be inserted early in the initial supply build-up phase to cope with clearing the drop zone at FSB's.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, HCS CSPG-65 (R1)

2. Aircraft loads or flights be planned to provide complete rounds of separate loading ammunition.

3. The quantities of various types of artillery munition delivered be commensurate with the tactical requirements specified. This can best be accomplished by the presence of liaison personnel at ASP's where ammunition is being prepared for air delivery.

(3) Supply Retrograde Concurrent With Extraction Operations.

(a) Observation: Retrograde of artillery ammunition must be already fitted to the extraction of maneuver and artillery units.

(b) Evaluation: During extraction from the A Shau Valley, 10-16 May 1968, artillery ammunition was retrograded at a greater rate than were the artillery units. This resulted in a requirement to airlift retrograded ammunition to artillery units by CH-47. This was partially attributed to weather and visibility obscuring some LZ's on which artillery was employed, thus delaying their extraction. However, it may also be attributed to the following:

1. Tonnage requirements were stressed by logistical planners with little regard for individual items.

2. Lack of appreciation for problems relative to complete rounds associated with separate loading and semi-fixed artillery ammunition, i.e., fuse, projectile and propellant charge.

(c) Recommendation: Planning for retrograde of artillery ammunition must be planned in detail, yet must provide for flexibility in order to adjust to changes in the tactical situation.

f. Organization.

(1) Liaison Personnel for the Air Cavalry Division Artillery.

(a) Observation: Liaison personnel are required for division artillery headquarters.

(b) Evaluation: The TOE for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Air Cavalry Division Artillery (TOE 6-701T), makes no provision for liaison personnel. The need for these personnel was again demonstrated during Operations DELAWARE and JEB STUART III in which division artillery headquarters was required to furnish liaison to the 3d Regiment, 1st ARVN
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (HI)

Division. For over two years, the addition of liaison personnel has been recommended through MTOE action.

(c) Recommendation: That division artillery headquarters be authorized liaison personnel consisting of three officers and six NCOs. (MTOE proposal will continue to reflect this requirement).

e. Other. None.

INCL

Organization, 1ACD Arty

WILLIAM R. WOLFE JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVDAOS (10 August 1968) 1st Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968

1st Air Cavalry Division, AFO San Francisco 04490 10 August 1968
CG, FCV, ATT: 7-3 WT, APO San Francisco 09308

1. Attached is the Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 July 1968.
2. Distribution is being made in accordance with AR 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CS

Commander

Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RL)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division, APO 96490


2. The inclosed ORLL (1st ACD Arty) is returned for action required by
paragraph 5g, reference regulation.

3. Request the ORLL together with comments and/or recommendations mentioned
in paragraph 2 above, be returned to this headquarters NLT 4 September 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVDACS (29 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1st ACD, APO 96490 1 Sep 68

Commanding General XXIV, ATTN: G-3 DAT, APO 96308

1. Reference USARV Reg 525-15, para 5g.

2. Concur with basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CONRAD L STANSBERRY
CQL, GS
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS PCR-65 (R1) (U)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The inclosed ORLL, 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty, is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations, are listed below.

   a. Item: Aviator experience, page 6, para 2a(1). Concur and recommend the records of experienced aviators be screened by higher headquarters for aerial rocket artillery experience and assignments of experienced ARA aviators made to those positions when feasible.

   b. Item: Enemy artillery, page 6, para 2b(2).

      (1) This paragraph has been numbered incorrectly; it should be 2b(1).

      (2) Concur with recommendation. Extended range, rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) are presently under development, as is a new 155mm self propelled gun-howitzer. The new weapon, however, will not be Phase I or II air transportable.

   c. Item: Operations with units unfamiliar with aerial rocket artillery (ARA), page 7, para 2b(2). Concur. The following action is being taken to familiarize forward observers with characteristics and adjustments of all types of artillery:

      (1) 6th Bn, 33d Arty has initiated a forward observer school of five days duration for forward observers from the 1st Cav Div (AM). The course will begin in early September and will include ARA, naval gunfire, COFRAM, and all other phases of artillery observation (the ARA portion will be taught by 1st Cav Div instructors).

      (2) This training will be evaluated by HQ, XXIV Corps Arty for possible Corps-wide application.

   d. Item: Standardization training for ARA aviators, page 8, para 2c(1). Concur and recommend US Army Aviation School take into consideration those areas to stress in training that were provided the Director of Instruction by 1st Cav Div Arty.

   e. Item: Imagery Interpretation, page 8, para 2d(1).

      (1) Concur with recommendation for rapid dissemination of photo interpretation (PI) reports. The following has been accomplished to speed delivery of both PI reports and photoprints.
(a) Photo reports containing significant tactical items are telephoned to Corps G2 Air by III MAF within 4 - 12 hours after the aircraft lands. Corps G2 Air further disseminates the information to divisions by telephone.

(b) Det 45, 1st MBARS is now operational at Phu Bai. This detachment makes supplementary PI reports, reproduces photos as required and assures timely delivery to all divisions.

(2) The experience of Corps Artillery during Operation Thor is provided to assist other units in planning special operations. "During counterbattery operations conducted along the DMZ, RTT messages were transmitted to control headquarters giving readouts of photo missions flown only hours before. This system provided for engagement of new targets within a reasonable time frame and also provided targeting information for updating and deleting targets fired on prior to photo missions. A responsive system must include, as a minimum, a direct communications link with the facility providing PIR and regularly scheduled photo recon flights which may be diverted as necessary through liaison personnel."

f. Item: Building materials, page 8, para 2e(1). Concur with recommendation, however, the provision of standard pre-cut bunkers will not alleviate the problem of unit destruction in lieu of movement. Recommend this problem be addressed at division level by the Division Engineer. Due consideration should be given to:

(1) The technique and procedures used by division units.

(2) The availability of various types of material to the division.

g. Items: Initial stockage of forward supply base (FSB) accomplished by airdrop, page 9, para 2e(2), and supply retrograde concurrent with extraction operations, page 10, para 2e(3). Concur with recommendations, however, both these problems can be effectively resolved at division level.

h. Item: Liaison personnel for the air cavalry division artillery, page 10, para 2f(1). Concur with recommendation. Armor, Infantry and Mechanized division artillery headquarters and headquarters battery (TDE 6-302G) are authorised liaison sections; the need for a liaison section for the comparable organisation in an airborne division would be equal if not greater.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CC Furs:

HQ, 1st Cav Div (AH)
HQ, 1st Cav Div Arty
AVHCC-D3T (10 Aug 63) 5th Ind (C) N:\J Klingman/hga/IBM 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS G5FOR-65 (C)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATT: G5FOR-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning aviator experience, page 6, paragraph 2a: This headquarters does not control the input of experienced aviators to USAF. However, in assigning aviators among the major subordinate commands, this headquarters exercises stringent control to ensure that each command receives a proportionate share of experienced aviators. The distribution of experienced aviators within any major subordinate command is correctly the prerogative of its commander.

   b. Reference item concerning artillery, page 6, paragraph 2b(1): Concur in need for airmobile artillery weapon and/or rocket assisted ammunition to provide greater range for airmobile artillery. As comment 2b(2), 4th Indorsement indicates, this is currently under development.

   c. Reference item concerning standardization training for USAF Aviators, page 9, paragraph 2c(1): Concur with the recommendation for greater emphasis on inflight emergency procedures. This recommendation was given to the Director of Instruction, USAF, during his visit to USAF in July 1960. Nonconcur with the recommendation that USAF place more emphasis on rocket gunnery and artillery tactics and procedures. Aviators in training at the Aviation School are not identified for specialized assignments, such as aerial artillery. Any additional specialized training would be accomplished at the expense of basic aviator training.

   d. Reference item concerning imagery interpretation, page 8, paragraph 2d(1); and 4th Indorsement, Headquarters, USAF Corps, page 1, paragraph 2e: Concur. Action initiated by Headquarters, USAF Corps to speed delivery of imagery interpretation reports will greatly assist in getting the information to the requesting unit in time for the information to be of value.

   e. Reference item concerning building materials, page 8, paragraph 2e(1): Concur with recommendation that pre-cut bunkers be used when feasible. The use of steel matting in bunker roofs is not authorized. It is structurally unsound under impact loads.
CONFIDENTIAL

IWCO-DCT (10 Aug 68) 5th Ind (c)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, NCC CSFCL-65 (c.1)

f. Reference item concerning liaison personnel for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery, page 19, paragraph 2f(1); and 4th Indorsement, paragraph 2h. The requirement for a liaison section in the UTP of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery is recognized as a necessary addition to that unit; however, due to the critical space shortage, it is not possible to honor the request. The following alternatives have been provided the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery:

(1) Submit an LTOE for MTP, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) C-701T reflecting the required personnel.

(2) In order to expedite the requested increase in authorization, it is recommended that nine trade-off spaces be identified. The LTOE for affected units should be submitted simultaneously. The trade-off spaces cannot be provided from units included in the DA directed standardization program.

FOR THE CHIEF:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
10 XIV Corps
10 1st Cav Div (A') Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Air Cav Div Arty for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
Btry E (Aviation) 82d Arty

2d Battalion, 19th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 21st Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 77th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

2d Battalion (Aerial Artillery) 20th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (assigned)
Hqs, Hqs Btry, Svc Btry, A, B, C Batteries
Plt (-), Btry C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (OPCON)

4 x M55's, 4 x M42's, 4 x M23 xenon Searchlights

Incl 1
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery (U)

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68**

**CO, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery**

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