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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
AGAM-P (M) (22 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683335 28 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LT)
AFO San Francisco, California 96279

AVBH-4H

22 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65, UIC WPEDAB

See DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command:

(1) Brigadier General Franklin M. Davis Jr., assumed command of
the brigade from Brigadier General Robert C. Forbes on 10 May 1968.
BG Davis was absent from 14 June-16 July during which period Colonel
Frederic E. Davison, Deputy Commanding Officer, assumed command.

(2) Changes of command occurred in 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry;
3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; 7th Support Battalion; D Troop, 17th
Armored Cavalry; and 44th Military History Detachment. All changes
in command were due to rotations with the exception of the 3/7th
Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Hall was killed in a heli-
copter accident on 24 June 1968 vicinity coordinates XS 937798. The
Battalion Executive Officer, Major James F. Mac Gill, assumed command.

NAME
LTC Leon Lichtenwalter
LTC Jack Gray
MAJ James F. Mac Gill
MAJ Richard E. Bjork
CPT Keith J. Phillips

POSITION
CO, 4th Bn., 12th Inf.
CO, 7th Support Battalion
CO, 3d Bn., 7th Inf.
CO, 44th Military History
CO, D Troop, 17th Armored Cav.

(3) During the reporting period the brigade was under operational
control (OBCON) of three different commands; 25th Infantry Division;
II Field Forces Vietnam; and Capital Military Assistance Command
(CMAC) with the maneuver elements located generally southwest of
Saigon. The brigade main base (BM) with support elements remained
at Camp Frenzell-Jones, Long Binh (YT 073122). North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) units continued to infiltrate Saigon

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years. DOD DIR 5200.10
and its periphery with brigade forces mainly actively engaged in search and destroy missions southwest of Saigon.

b. Personnel:

(1) Staff personnel who were changed during the quarter include the Executive Officer, S-1, Brigade Surgeon, Provost Marshal, and the Staff Judge Advocate.

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<tr>
<td>LTC Manuel Asensio</td>
<td>XO, 199th Inf. Bde.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ Berry R. O'Shields Jr.</td>
<td>Bde. S-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ Gary Bannister</td>
<td>Bde. Surgeon</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ Richard A. Spaulding</td>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT Donald F. Kirkpatrick</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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(2) The total assigned strength of the brigade decreased by 71 personnel during the quarter. On 31 July 1968, the brigade was operating at 103% of authorized strength.

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<th>OFFICER Asgd</th>
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(3) A total of 993 awards were approved for members of the command. Breakdown by units indicated below.

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<td>103</td>
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(4) Rest and Recuperation (R&R leaves) were taken in-country by 363 men, with 1177 going out of Vietnam for an R&R leave. Utilization by unit as indicated below.

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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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</table>

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c. Intelligence:

(1) Possibly due to the defection and capture of some high ranking VC cadre, the planned major VC offensive was postponed twice. From intelligence reports, numerous sightings and contacts with VC/NVA elements it was evident that the main objective would again be Saigon. The time frame for the offensive was estimated to be between 5 and 10 May 1968. Large caches of weapons, ammunition and individual equipment were discovered short distances from Saigon, generally along the well known enemy approaches into the city. Numerous agent and Special Police reports indicated that several VC/NVA battalions had already infiltrated into Saigon. Among the confirmed units in the city were the Thu Loi II Battalion, the 265th Local Force Battalion, and a portion of the 6th Local Force Battalion.

(2) AO COLUMBUS III covers portions of Duc Tu and Cong Than Districts, Binh Hoa Province; and Xuan Loc, Kiem Tan Districts, Long Kanh Province. Small unit contacts on 1 and 2 May indicated some enemy reconnaissance, but there was a marked absence of large VC/NVA units. Numerous reports from civilians and agents indicated that several battalion size units crossed highway 1, generally east of Tran' Bao, travelling along the Kien Hoa-Long Kanh border from north to south. There were additional reports that the 2d Battalion, 81A Rocket Regiment crossed the highway, proceeding southeast. Several bunker complexes and small weapons caches were discovered along the stream vicinity YT 1917 to YT 1918. The 275th VC Regiment was reported to be located north of Duc Tu River vicinity YT 0027. The 274th Regiment was identified from a contact with the elements of the ARVN 43rd Regiment on 4 May 1968, northeast of Xuan Loc (YT 4433). 5th VC Division Headquarters was reported in souther War Zone D, in vicinity YT 25365, and the 1st Battalion and Headquarters of the 84 A Rocket Regiment in vicinity of YT 23724. The 1st Province Headquarters was reported de-centralizing between the prepared base camps in AO COLUMBUS III (YT 1923, YT 2424, YT 2220).

(3) AO RYEVESTER encompasses the greater portion of Binh Chanh District, Cia Dinh Province. The terrain is generally flat with sparse vegetation along the numerous canals. On the west is the large pineapple plantation, a known enemy assembly and base area. From all intelligence reports, visual reconnaissance, and imagery interpretations, the pineapple area contains in excess of 3,700 fortifications, built by the 6th Local Force Battalion and other village guerrilla units during the preceding 13 months. Prior to the onset of the wet monsoon, the trafficability throughout the area was generally good. However during the rainy season the available routes are limited to the paddy dikes, larger trails and roads. Cross country travel then is very difficult and slow. The enemy did make an extensive use of canals
as avenues of approach running from west to east and southwest to northeast. The land approaches from the west and southwest converged in the Phu Lam section of Cholon (XS 79090). The canals generally converge in the southwest portion of Cholon (XS 7966).
and 6th Local Force Battalions were entrenched in an abandoned factory (XS 783864). The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry killed twelve and took two prisoners. On 14 May elements of the 6th Local Force Battalion attacked the US 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry at Binh Dien bridge (XS 751831). This was the only enemy initiated incident in the AO. On 14 May, the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry contacted a large enemy force in bunkers along a canal (XS 7083). From PONs and captured documents remnants of the 9th VC Division, 6th Local Force, 308th and 277th battalions were identified. From 15-22 May, scattered contacts with the remnants of previously identified enemy units indicated that the enemy was disorganized and fleeing to the west.

(c) During the interrogation of prisoners and Hoi Chanh numerous battalion size infiltration groups were identified. These groups started their infiltration from the north just prior to or shortly after Tet, arriving in Cambodia in April. Most of these groups joined the 9th VC Division on 4 May 1968, or one day prior to the start of the offensive. The groups identified were 100 percent North Vietnamese: 266th; 269th; 247th; 265th; and 268th. Further intelligence indicated that as of 22 May, the enemy was withdrawing to their nearest sanctuaries.

(4) On 22 May, the 199th Infantry Brigade moved back to the area north and northeast of Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex. Intelligence reports indicated that Viet Cong and NVA forces were occupying base camps in the Catcher's Mit - Ba Da area north, northeast of Tan Uyen. The MR-1 Headquarters was reported in vicinity XT 9737 with 147th and 165th NVA Regiments identified by the 1st Australian Task Force in a series of sharp clashes during the period 14-21 May (XT 9632 and XT 9829). Numerous reports were received on plenary meetings being held at the MR-1 Headquarters. Two B-52 strikes were flown and the Bomb Damage Assessment indicated that a large VC/NVA Headquarters was hit on 2 June. A Long Range Patrol team captured documents at XT 974371 which were identified as messages belonging to the 7th NVA Division Signal Company. Aero Scouts and LRP teams reported seeing numerous bodies scattered in the area of the B-52 strike. Another Long Range Patrol captured documents indicating the presence of the Dong Nai Regiment in vicinity YT 032284. The documents were orders to move the Dong Nai Regiment in the Go Vap area of Saigon. During a sweep operation, the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry discovered a weapons cache containing 4107mm Chinese Communist Rockets and 4 120mm Soviet Rockets (YT 0733). Small contacts with remnants of the Dong Nai Regiment and 165th NVA Regiment indicated that the enemy was trying to avoid contact. Further intelligence reports indicated that series of planning conferences were being held throughout the VC MR-1 area.
(5) Intelligence reports received indicated a large build-up of VC/NVA forces around Saigon. On 22 June 1968, the 199th Infantry Brigade deployed south, southwest and west of the city to provide ground and mortar-rocket defense of the city. The area of operation encompassed the western portions of VC sub-regions two and three, equivalent to Binh Chanh and Binh Ba districts, Gia Dinh Province. The enemy dispositions of forces in sub-region two indicated that the main threat, like during the 5 May Offensive, would be from the west. The COSVN forward headquarters was reported moving to Tan Buu (XS 6681). The 9th VC Division deployed northwest of Duc Hoa and the 6th, 308th, and 267th Local Force Battalions were reported in the pineapple plantation. VC sub-region three, the 2d Independent Battalion at XS 6569; the 506th Local Force Battalion at XS 6673; the 265th Local Force Battalion at XS 8369; 5th Local Force Battalion at XS 8276; and the Nha Battalion at XS 9071. During sweep operations only small contacts were reported and no new units were identified. The C 125 Company, a Long An propaganda and administrative section was identified from contact and documents on 24 June. The presence of the 308th, 6th Local Force and 506th Battalions had been confirmed by several contacts with small reconnaissance parties. From the locations of these contacts and findings of large caches along the well known VC routes it is assumed that the VC will again use the same routes to infiltrate Saigon. On 13 July, information was received that the 5th VC Division was moving through Cambodia, north. On 16 July a report was received that elements of the 271st and 273d VC Regiments were in contact with the B 36 Special Forces, northwest of Tay Ninh city (XT 0359). This fact, and the lack of contact on the periphery of Capital Military District indicate that the pressure on the Capital has decreased somewhat. The finding of VC caches along the known routes into Saigon again indicate that the major offensive is not far off. Prepositioning of equipment well forward are known VC tactics. The continuous VC reconnaissance of the routes further shows that the future attack will be led by the Local Force elements.

(6) During the second stage VC Offensive, (5-31 May) it was evident that the VC were lacking the element of surprise. Their preparations were not coordinated and their plans were obvious. Countermeasures were taken and the VC offensive collapsed in one week. Observation of VC tactics, interrogation of POWs and Hoi Chanches, and screening of documents reveal the reasons why the VC offensive failed.

(a) Preparations were not coordinated. The VC units did not have their equipment and weapons prepositioned as needed. These caches that were in place were compromised and easily captured.

(b) Inflexibility of the plans. Numerous VC units were following the same routes to contact although the units preceding them were defeated. Lack of effective communication accounts for the inability to change plans.
(c) Lack of knowledgeable personnel. Many of the VC/NVA units were completely lost because their few local guides were either killed, captured or deserted.

(d) New units and infiltration groups were placed into action as major maneuver battalions with less than one day of coordination.

(e) New infiltrators were poorly trained, in most cases they were very young (as young as 14 years, 8 months), inexperienced and poorly motivated.

(f) Once a VC/NVA soldier was wounded, in many cases, his weapon was taken away from him and he was left to his own devices. Many were captured wandering aimlessly through the rice fields.

(g) Lines of supply again were non-existent. Many VC soldiers surrendered because of hunger.

(h) Since the VC/NVA forces instituted their terror tactics the local population, in most cases, ceased to support them and in fact turned against the Liberation Front altogether.

(i) The repeated desertion of high ranking VC Cadre as well as the arrests of the infrastructure, the VC/NVA forces have tremendous difficulties to organize and execute a coordinated offensive. The recent reports are indicating a large VC/NVA build-up in the III Corps area. The 33d, 32, 174th, and 66th NVA Regiments have been confirmed in the northern III Corps area. These facts are further indications that the VC/NVA will conduct another major offensive in the near future.

(7) The total cumulative losses for the Viet Cong are shown below for the period 1 May to 31 July 1968. (Operation TOAN THANG I and II).

| VC KIA (DC) | 842 |
| VC KIA (PROd) | 91 |
| Detainees processed | 373 |
| HoI Chanh | 53 |
| Small Arms Captured | 264 |
| Crew Served weapons captured | 78 |
| Small Arms amm (rds. captured) | 163,943 |
| Crew served wpns amm (rds captured) | 1,572 |
| Rice Captured (tons) | 1,775 |
| Fortifications Destroyed | 2,144 |
| Buildings destroyed | 172 |
| Grenades captured | 682 |
d. Operations, Illus., and Training:

(1) The brigade terminated operations in AO COLUMBUS III on 5 May 1968. Commencing 051200 May 1968 the Brigade was assigned the new mission of conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations and prevent enemy infiltration and attacks on Saigon from AO WESTCHESTER, located to the west and southwest of Saigon. During the period 12 thru 21 May the brigade was OFCON to the 25th Infantry Division. On 21 May the brigade was released from OFCON, terminated AO WESTCHESTER, and moved into AOs PHOENIX and TULSA, located north and north west of Long Binh. The brigade once again assumed responsibility for the defense against rocket/mortar and ground attack on the Long Binh-Bien Hoa Complex. On 31 May, Phase I of Operation TOAN THANG was terminated and Phase II initiated on 7 June. On 20 June the brigade received a change in mission, sending it to the south and west of Saigon to AO LAURA, to assume the responsibility for ground, rocket, and mortar defense of Saigon under OFCON Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). All elements of the brigade began aggressive and extensive operations, patrolling, establishing night ambushes on all likely avenues, land and water, leading into the AO and maintaining a 24 hour surveillance throughout assigned sectors. As of 31 July the brigade continued its active coverage of the AO, maintaining a high state of readiness to react to any enemy threat that presented itself.

(2) Operations Conducted:

(a) 5 May -11 May. On 5 May the brigade was assigned to a new AO, AO WESTCHESTER, lying to the west and southwest of Saigon. Phase I, Operation TOAN THANG continued. Commencing at 051700 May the new mission was to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations and prevent enemy infiltration and attacks on Saigon from AO WESTCHESTER. The brigade was organized with three battalions, 3/7th Infantry, 4/12th Infantry, and 6/31st Infantry (OPCON from 9th Div). On 6 May 6/31st Infantry was released from OFCON and 2/3d Infantry returned OFCON to the brigade at 070000 May. 5/12th Infantry continued its operations in AO LOS ANGELES, OFCON to 101st Air Cavalry Division. Significant activity began at 060830 May when Company E, 4/12th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Company C, 4/12th Infantry, D/17th Armored Cavalry (-) and elements of Company B, 4/12th Infantry reinforced Company D. Although brisk at first the contact had deteriorated to sporadic fire by 1130 hours. Results: US-1 KIA, 12 WIA; Enemy-25 KIA (BC), 7 FOV. Light to heavy contact flared during the afternoon until 1540 hours with the enemy losing 19 KIA (BC). Documents found in the area indicated the 271st NVA Regiment had been engaged. Contact was made again at 062105 May with elements of Companies B, C, and D, 4/12th Infantry being engaged. At 1645 hours Company D, 3/7th Infantry

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case in contact with an unknown enemy force in a fortified base camp and was supported by TAC air, artillery, and a light fire team (LFT, 2 helicopters) with unknown results. Companies A and B, 3/7th Infantry each discovered a base camp during the night at 2245 hours and destroyed their air strikes destroyed additional bunkers while supporting. At 0700/5 May an ambush patrol of Company B, 4/12th Infantry encountered unknown number of enemy. Contact was lost at 0210 hours, no US casualties, the enemy had 6 KIA (BC). At 0300 hours Company D, 4/12th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy and at 0330 Company A, 4/12th fired on three platoons of enemy. At this time it was estimated that an enemy battalion was located between Companies A and D, 4/12th. Light Fire Teams, Heavy Fire Teams, (HFT, 3 helicopters) artillery, shrapnel, and TAC air supported. Contact was lost at 0645 hours but regained by Company D at 0600 hours during a sweep of the area of contact. Contact terminated at 0730 hours. From 0300 to 0445, all units of 4/12th Infantry were in contact simultaneously and C Battery, 2/35th artillery (155 SF) fired direct fire in defense of the battalion fire support base (FSB). Airstrikes during the period resulted in 12 secondary explosions. Results: US-1 KIA, 12 WIA and 1 MIA; Enemy-86 KIA (50 BC), 50 KIA (HOB) and 1 12. At 071130 May, Company B, 4/12th came into contact with an enemy force in the village of Tan Thanh, receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Companies A and B, 3/7th moved north to reinforce Company B; A Company to the west and D Company to the east. Both units were in contact by 1400 hours and Company B, 4/12th was placed 0600 to 3/7th Infantry for the remainder of the action in the village. The enemy force was estimated to be a battalion. B/17th armored Cavalry (-) moved through 3/4/12th in an effort to penetrate the enemy position but was driven back losing 1 armored personnel Carrier and 3 KIA to an RPG round. Artillery and air continued to support. Contact terminated at 1900 hours but friendly forces continued to contain enemy elements in the village. Results: US-2 KIA, 8 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy-44 KIA (3C). At 080610 May, Company B, 4/12th began receiving heavy RPG fire from Tan Thanh. LFT, artillery, and 3 12/35th air strikes were called in. At 1400 hours B 4/12th and D 3/7th began a sweep of the village and immediately encountered stiff resistance from the enemy force, later identified as elements of 1st Battalion. Contact was broken at 1525 hours so that 5 more air strikes could be brought in. Companies A, B, and B, 3/7th and B 4/12th continued to contain the enemy forces throughout the night. Results of the air strikes were: 51 structures destroyed, 27 structures damaged, and 50 to 75 meters of trench destroyed, enemy personnel losses unknown. At 09030 Company C, 3/7th engaged 180 enemy with support from LFTs, artillery and 3 helicopters (-5-17 aircraft w/NG). Results: US-1 KIA; Enemy-35 KIA (-). Contact broke off at 0110. At 0600 hours, Company C 3/7th engaged 100 enemy north of their positions with similar support from LFTs, artillery and helicopters. Results: US no casualties; Enemy-21 KIA (-C) and 5 12/35.
0245, Company A 3/7th took 150 enemy under fire, killed 19 and captured 12, with assistance of supporting air and artillery. These contacts continued until 0630 hours when sweeps were conducted through the areas and an additional 55 enemy KIA (BC) were found. During the day on 9 May, Companies A, B, C, and D 3/7th and Company D 4/12th swept Tan Thanh village receiving scattered fire. Results: US - 1 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy - 4 POW. At 2020 and 2130 that evening, D 4/12th was assaulted by a large enemy force but held and received an air strike in support. Results: US - 1 WIA; Enemy - 5 KIA (BC). At 100345 May, Companies B and C 3/7th both engaged approximately 50 enemy each with the support of artillery, LFT, and TAC air. Both contacts were broken off by the VC at 0555 hours. B Company's sweep netted 9 more enemy KIA (BC) and Company C tallied 29 enemy KIA (BC), neither company suffering any casualties. Company D 4/12th found an additional 13 KIA (BC) during a sweep at 0430 hours. During the night of 10/11 May, Companies C and D 3/7th engaged small enemy element. FOGs and documents identified the enemy engaged on 10 May as the 271st Regiment. During the morning of 11 May, Company A 4/12th took two small groups of enemy under fire killing 6 and capturing 2. At 111215 May, Company D 3/2d came into contact with 30 to 35 enemy occupying two factory buildings. Company C 2/3d moved to reinforce Company D. All approaches to the buildings were covered by enemy fire from bunkers and positions in the factory buildings. One LFT strike, three airstrikes, and artillery were used to assist in approaching the enemy positions. Contact continued intermittently until 120310 May and resulted in 12 enemy KIA (BC). At 120005, Company A 2/3d engaged 70 enemy moving west from the area and called in LFT, Artillery, and Spooky to support. The LFT had 2 KIA (BC) with further results unknown.

1. Results:
   a. Friendly losses: 10 US KIA, 92 US WIA
   b. Enemy losses: 403 KIA (BC), 53 KIA (FROB), 33 Detainees, 35 POW, 120 small arms, 34 crew served weapons, 144 heavy rounds ammo, 5,595 rounds of small arms ammo, 1 min, 7 1/2 pounds of demolitions, 108 grenades, 102 military structures destroyed, 109 fortifications, 8 sampans destroyed, 1.11 tons of rice captured.

2. LFT missions: 12
   USAF support:
   a. Airstrikes: 34
   b. B-52 strikes: 0
(b) 12 May-31 May. Commencing at 1200 05 June, the brigade was placed OCON to the 25th Infantry Division and continued operations in place. All battalions continued reconnaissance-in-force operations within AO WESTCHESTER with intermittent light to moderate contact. At 1215 05 May an ambush patrol from Company B 2/3d took 2 enemy under fire and subsequently 50 to 100 enemy appeared. LIT, artillery and Spooky were called in and caused the enemy to break contact. The enemy re-grouped and formed for assault but were dispersed by artillery. Both 4/12th and 2/3d elements continued to spot groups of 60-80 men moving in their area and called in artillery on them causing them to scatter. Company B 2/3d Reconnaissance Platoon made contact again during the morning of 13 May with an unknown size force and 2/3d Infantry committed three companies to assist. B 3/7th was also committed to support during the afternoon. Contact was lost at 1650 hours. Reconnaissance Platoon E 2/3d was extracted at 1830 hours but Companies B and D 2/3d and A 5/12th Infantry (OCON to 2/3d) regained contact which was finally lost later in the evening. Elements of the 271st, 272d, and 273d Regiments were identified during the day’s contacts as they tried to make their way to the west exfiltrating from Saigon. Results: US- 3 KIA, 13 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy- 65 KIA (BO) and 3 POW. During the early morning hours of 14 May, two sizeable contacts were made by 2/3d elements. Company C had contact with an unknown size force from 0300 to 0600 and was supported by artillery, LIT, and Spooky. Companies B and D 2/3d and A 5/12th had contact from 0335 to 0430 with a large enemy force and also called in artillery, LIT, and Spooky. A reconnaissance-in-force by these elements during the day confirmed the presence of the 6th LF Battalion which suffered 81 KIA (BO) from the early morning contacts. US casualties: 6 KIA and 29 WIA. From 15-22 May only minor contacts were made as the enemy had apparently decided to avoid further contact. It was noted that many of the enemy units were filled with NVA infiltrators recently arrived in South Vietnam, who were inexperienced, unknowntal of the terrain, and very young. They did not retrieve their wounded, dead or weapons from the battle area in the manner that enemy units had in the past. On 31 May the brigade received instructions releasing it from OCON to the 25th Infantry Division and directing it to move into AOs PHOENIX and TULSA located north and northeast of Long Binh Post. The brigade’s mission was to assume responsibility for defense against rocket/mortar and ground attack on the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Complex. The brigade left 4/12th Infantry OCON to the 25th Infantry Division in AO WESTCHESTER and regained OCON of 5/12th Infantry from the 101st Air Cavalry Division. This provided the brigade with three battalions, 2/3d, 3/7th, and 5/12th Infantry Battalions. In order to maintain aerial surveillance over the extended AO, Troop A 3/17th Air Cavalry was made OCON to the brigade. Operations in AOs PHOENIX, TULSA, and later LEH failed to contact any appreciable enemy forces. Enemy units appeared to avoid contact whenever possible. Some minor contacts with Xe Lai Teams occurred near known VC base camps.
revealing the presence of very small units. Several base camps were discovered without incident and 3/7th discovered a cache of 41 107mm rockets in AO TULSA on 30 May. On 31 May Phase I of Operation TOAN THANG was terminated and Phase II initiated on 1 June.

1 Results:

   a Friendly Losses: 28 US KIA, 160 US WIA.

   b Enemy Losses: 241 KIA (BC), 22 KIA (PROB), 1 Civil Defender, 14 Captives, 9 FOW, 25 small arms, 16 crew served weapons, 971 heavy rounds of ammo, 8,654 rounds of small arms ammo, 2 mines, 3/4 round of demolitions, 45 grenades, 28 military structures, 4,344 fortifications, 17 sampans destroyed, 4.4 tons of rice captured.

2 LRP Missions: 47

3 USAF support:

   a Airstrikes: 24

   b B-52 strikes: 1

(c) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II, 1 Jun-30 Jun. The change in phases of the present operation brought no change in the brigade's operations and all units continued their missions. On 2 June, B 5/12th made contact in AO TULSA with an enemy force of unknown size while conducting a reconnaissance-in force. D 5/12th joined Company B and the two units combined to kill 14 (BC), while losing 3 KIA and 6 WIA. Airstrikes assisted during the action. From this date through 20 June, extensive RIF operations and LRP insertions were conducted throughout the AOs without leading to any significant action or development. On 20 June the brigade received a change in mission sending it to the south and west of Saigon to AO LAURA to assume the responsibility for ground, rocket and mortar defense of Saigon under OPCON to Commanding General, CMAC. The brigade was given OPCON of four battalions, 3/7th, 4/12th, 5/12th, and 2/14th (from the 25th Inf. Div.). With the assumption of this mission the brigade relinquished OPCON of Troop A 3/17th Air Cav. and F 51st Infantry (LRP). The brigade took control of AO LAURA at 221200 Juné. All elements immediately began to conduct aggressive and extensive operations, patrolling, establishing night ambushes on all likely avenues, land and water, leading into the AO, and maintained a 24 hour surveillance throughout assigned sectors. Through 30 June no contact of note was made and indications were that the enemy desired to avoid contact with our forces.
(d) 1 July-31 July. On 012035 July an AP of A 2/14th Infantry, vicinity XS 755835, received 6 RPG and 3 mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WIA (Evac). Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) (Art). On 051200 July, 2/14th Infantry terminated operations under OPCON 199th Infantry Brigade and airmobiled to the 25th Infantry Division's AO. 2/3d Infantry returned from OPCON II Field Forces, Vietnam to brigade control. On 081005 July vicinity XS 841861 LFT from B 3/17th Air Cav. engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1550 hours vicinity XS 706845 LFT engaged an occupied base camp resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). On 182025 July AP of 71st Infantry Detachment (IRP) (OPCON 4/12th Inf) engaged an unknown sized VC force resulting in 2 US WIA (Evac). LFT and artillery supported, the VC had withdrawn with unknown losses. On 190621 B 2/3d engaged 6 VC, VC fled west with unknown results. On 231135 July vicinity XS 696817 A 2/3d Infantry and elements of 662 Regional Forces Company engaged 5 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 2 PWS. On 27 July vicinity XS 710820 A 2/3d engaged a squad of VC resulting in 3 US WIA (Evac) and 9 VC KIA (BC). On 29 July D 3/7th engaged 6 VC vicinity XS 806787 resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 1 POW. During the month of July the brigade provided security for 8 bridge sites, conducted 1170 APs, 474 LPs, 578 company size reconnaissance-in-force, 52 company size combined operations, 42 cordon and search operations and 583 resource control check points.

1 Results:

a Friendly losses: 13 US WIA

b Enemy losses: 21 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC KIA (IRP), 149 detainees, 5 PWS, 11 small arms, 9 crew served weapons, 13,228 rounds of small arms ammo, 1 - 82mm mortar sight, 20 pounds of documents, 23 sampans, 8,615 pounds of rice, 31 grenades, 456 pounds of TNT, 1,002 bunkers, and 7 military structures destroyed.

(3) Training Activities:

(a) The Redcatcher Training Center trained an average of 120 personnel per week as replacements for the 199th Infantry Brigade, USARV Special Troops, or 54th Artillery Group. Training schedule is attached as Inclosure 1.

(b) Counterpart training of ARVN Ranger Battalions directed by Headquarters II Field Forces, Vietnam commenced on 1 July, training one company per week. Training schedule is attached as Inclosure 2.

(c) The brigade initiated a Brigade Mobile Training Team on 10 July to train units at field locations. The training schedule is based on a three day block of instruction per company. As of 31 July one battalion had completed this training. Training schedule is attached as Inclosure 3.
(d) Each Infantry battalion designated a team to conduct combat in built-up areas refresher training for company size elements. The training schedule was based on a two day block of instructions per company initially, and repeated monthly when operating in cities for sustained periods. POI for Officers and NCOs is attached as Inclosure 4. POI for the individual soldier is attached as Inclosure 5.

(4) Chemical Operations:

(a) Personnel Detectors: There were fifty-five Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) missions flown during this period. The XM-2 Personnel Detector was utilized on all missions. The new XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector was used on two of the missions and has proved to be far superior to the XM-2. Experience has determined that whether the Sniffer is used up, down, or cross wind depends upon weather conditions, terrain, and area to be covered. Follow up checks of the Brigade Daily Incident Reports have shown the People Sniffers to be successful and helpful to the accomplishment of the brigade's missions.

(b) Insecticide: Two insecticide spray missions were flown during this period. One mission was flown using three percent Malathion and the other using two and one-half percent. Results and reports are, as yet, inconclusive as to effectiveness. A mixture of Malathion, cornmeal, sugar and vegetable oil (Fly Bait) was mixed and sent to the forward base camps. The results are still unknown.

(c) Herbicide: Two herbicide missions were flown during the period. It was learned that the success on grass and small vegetation can only be determined by burning the defoliated area three weeks after spraying. Herbicide has proven successful for removing the leaves from trees to allow for better aerial reconnaissance. One spray mission was flown around the FOW compound using diesel oil with the idea that the area could be burned off. However the area was too green which proved this method unsuccessful. A check of the area three weeks later showed that the diesel had affected the vegetation to the extent that additional applications and a few more days of waiting would have resulted in a successful burning operation.

(d) Riot Control Agents: No CS missions were flown during the period. However, the unit has received manufactured CS munitions and has made various types of field expedients. CS munitions are maintained in a constant state of readiness should the opportunity arise to use them.

(e) Flame Weapons: No flame weapons were used during this period. The unit is prepared and has assisted the battalions with various types of flame weapons and field expedients. Flame throwers are kept at the battalion fire base charged and ready for immediate deployment.
(5) Air Operations:

(a) United States Air Force: The USAF Tactical Air Control Party gave continuous support to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade during operations TOAN THANG, Phases I and II. FACs flew 402 missions and logged a total of 929 hours. Support included directing air strikes in support of ground forces as well as day and night visual reconnaissance. During critical periods, the TACP maintained a scramble capability so that it could give timely response to the needs of the ground commander during the time a FAC was not airborne.

1 USAF Aircraft flew the following missions:
   a Air Strikes: 162
   b Sky spots: 37

2 Bomb Damage assessment was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures:</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers:</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions:</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Enemy Killed By Air: 405

(b) Air Cavalry: A Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry supported the brigade with aerial reconnaissance of AOs PHOENIX and TULSA, Light and Heavy Fire Team support and an Aero-Rifle Platoon Reaction Force. During the hours of darkness, stand-by Light and Heavy Fire Teams were ready to support long range patrols located within the Brigade AO. The responsiveness of the troop contributed greatly to the accomplishment of the brigade mission in AO PHOENIX and TULSA. B Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry supported the brigade with aerial reconnaissance of AO LAURA.

(c) Army Aviation: Army aviation assets supported the brigade with airborne companies, daily resupply ships, and CH-47 sorties for build-up of fire support patrol bases. Missions performed were:
1 Command and Control.
2 Airmobile Combat Assaults.
3 Eagle Flights.
4 Troop Extraction and Repositioning.
5 Aerial Reconnaissance.
6 Artillery Fire Adjustment.
7 Medical Education.
8 Radio Relay.
9 Resupply.
10 PsyOps Leaflet Drops.

Logistical, Transportation, and Engineer Operations:

(1) On 5 May, three battalions were deployed to the west of Sai- gon. The move was made by trucks provided by the 48th Transportation Group (MT). At the end of May the units, with the exception of one battalion, were returned to the Long Binh area. This move again was made using 48th Transportation Group trucks. Most logistical support during this whole period of time was by ground lines of communication (LOC). During the period 20-26 June, the remaining battalions and the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) again were deployed to the west of Saigon utilizing vehicles provided by the 48th Transportation Group. Logistical support at this time was split between the brigade main base and support elements in Saigon. Some Class I and Class III supplies were drawn directly from the 506th Field Depot in Saigon by the battalions, with the remainder of the supplies originating from the EBB.

(2) During the month of July an intensive inspection and turn-in of CONEX containers was conducted within the brigade. Within 10 days, 44 were turned in and an additional 16 are presently waiting turn-in. This represented a nearly 10% reduction in on-hand CONEX containers.

(3) In July the truck platoon that is attached to the brigade from the 48th Group was co-located with the 7th Support Battalion motor pool. This was done to take advantage of the better maintenance facilities available in the support battalion.
(4) On 18 July, the first increment of 200 "black barrel" M16 rifles were exchanged for rebuilt M16s with chrome chambers. This will continue in future months at a rate of 200 per month until the program is complete.

(5) Recomposition and maintenance activities were otherwise normal. The following supplies were issued by the 7th Support Battalion:

(a) Class I - (tons issued)
1. Individual Combat: 792
2. A-Rations: 1,044
3. TOTAL: 1,836
4. Weekly Average: 142

(b) Class II and IV
1. Requisitions received: 8,833
2. Requisitions filled: 6,186
3. Requisitions passed: 2,688
4. Percent Fill: 70%
5. Average number received for week: 679

(c) Class III
1. Gallons issued: 1,710,333
2. Average weekly issue: 131,564

(d) Class V
1. Tons drawn: 5,814
2. Average weekly draw: 449

(6) Following is the current supply status of the brigade:

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CLASS | STORAGE CAPABILITY | ON HAND
--- | --- | ---
1 | Rations | 15 days | 15 days
| Meal Individual Combat | 180,000 meals | 152,202 meals

III (BULK)
| JT-4 | 25,000 gallons | 24,000 gallons
| VTGAS | 3,000 gallons | 3,000 gallons
| MOGAS | 22,000 gallons | 13,000 gallons
| DTESUL | 13,000 gallons | 7,500 gallons

V

Portions of unit basic loads are stored in the brigade ammunition dump. Also approximately 1,400 2.75" rockets are maintained for the helicopter rearming point at the brigade heliport.

(7) The following engineer projects were completed by the 87th Engineer Company:

(a) Prefabbed and constructed 23 bunker kits and 75 waterbox structures.

(b) The H&U section processed 730 job orders.

(c) Completed pouring concrete foundation, vertical construction, and electrical installation of the following buildings:

1. 45' x 136' Aviation Maintenance Building.
2. 50' x 130' Enlisted Men's Open Mess.
3. 30' x 120' Post Exchange.
4. 20' x 120' Post Exchange Warehouse.

(d) General maintenance and repair of BM8 roads. Graded, shaped, and cut ditches in the BM8 for drainage.

(e) Constructed four 14' x 15' x 16' water towers in the BM8.

(f) Completed construction of sun deck at the brigade swimming pool.

(g) Placed and fitted taxi-way membrane at the 45' x 136' aviation maintenance building.

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(h) Renovation of building 5005, brigade Headquarters. Completed interior, exterior construction and electrical installation.

(i) Constructed a 16' x 32' wabtec structure at the brigade POW Compound (10W billet).

(j) Surveyed location for runway and revetments at the Brigade Extension Heliport.

(k) Constructed and erected a 16' x 20' brigade sign at check point alpha: Camp Frenzell-Jones.

(l) Constructed a 12' x 24' access bridge at location of the Brigade Extension Heliport.

(m) Graded 20km of road sections for adequate LOCs.

(n) Constructed and placed 60 feet of culvert for drainage.

(o) Redecked center span of double-single two lane Bailey bridge.

(p) Rebuilt timber superstructure and 30' x 80' span of steel "I" beam bridge.

(q) Constructed and placed 150' of corduroy road.

(r) Constructed a 28' x 50' field dispensary with sheet metal roof, interior panelling and electrical installation.

(s) Constructed fighting positions and fortifications.

(8) The following is a list of projects presently being worked on by the 87th Engineer Company:

(a) Renovation of the Commanding General's Mess Hall.
(b) 20' x 100' BOQ.
(c) 20' x 100' Army Post Office.
(d) 20' x 50' Administrative buildings (3 each)
(e) 20' x 100' Administrative buildings (2 each)
(f) Runway and revetments at the Brigade Extension Heliport.
I. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations:

(1) During the month of May, the 35 mission continued in support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Civil Recovery Program, and in support of other reconstruction projects created as a result of combat damage to civilian property since Tet in Ho Nai Village, Bien Hoa Province.

(a) Reconstruction work progressed satisfactorily. Reconstruction was begun on 5 homes in Thanh Tam Hamlet, 3 in Bac Hai Hamlet and 1 in Trang Bom Hamlet. Reconstruction continued on 5 homes in Tay Hai Hamlet and 1 in Bac Hai Hamlet. Construction repairs of one church in Thanh Tam Hamlet were completed. Of 58 temporary homes in Bac Hai Hamlet programmed for newly arrived refugees from Long Khanh Province, 30 were completed, 18 were under construction and 10 were not started.

(b) A condolatory solatiun payment of 7,000$VN was paid to Mr. Huynh Van Thanh and emergency aid provided his family as a result of damage caused by the accidental drop of cargo being transported by a helicopter. The accident occurred in the vicinity of the US Saigon Depot and caused the death of two members of Mr. Thanh's family. Twenty pounds of foodstuffs, one container of liquid soap, two coloring books, and one box of crayons were also provided to the family.

(c) Emergency aid was furnished to the family of Nguyen Thi Lun, (female child), who died as a result of a truck accident/fire, Nguyen Thi Gui and Tan Thien (Vietnamese children) received burns when powder bags caught fire. A supply of foodstuffs was provided each family, and solatiun in the amount of 4,000$VN was paid to the family of Nguyen Thi Lun; solatiun in the amount of 1,000$VN each was paid to Nguyen Thi Gui and Tan Thien. A letter of condolence in each case was forwarded to the appropriate Vietnamese government authority.

(d) Sixteen cans of Guigoz powdered formula milk were specially purchased for the care of young babies of Ngu Phuc Orphanage, Ho Nai Village, as a result of a report indicating that several babies were ill and could not be fed regular milk or food.

(e) Ten thousand sandbags were delivered to Duc Tu District Headquarters, and further distributed to Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) outposts along Highway 1. The sandbags were used to fortify existing defenses.

(f) Fifty pounds of clothing, one CARE physical education kit, and miscellaneous supplies were delivered to Bothany Orphanage, Bao Chu Hamlet, Ho Nai Village.
(g) The following commodities were distributed in Ho Nai Village and throughout the brigade area of operations:

- Cement: 20,740 pounds.
- Lumber: 11,891 board feet.
- Culvert: 24 - 30" sections.
- Sand: 11 cubic meters.
- Tin Roofing: 154 sheets.
- Bricks: 53,644.
- Concertina Wire: 2,400 meters.
- Iron Picket Posts: 25.
- Sandbags: 14,000
- Sandbags (filled): 400.
- Masonite: 25 sheets.
- Laterite: 20 tons.
- CARE Woodworking Kits: 3.
- CARE Physical Education Kits: 2.
- CARE Midwife Replacement Kits: 1.
- Foodstuffs: 3,083 pounds.
- Clothing: 61 pounds.
- Health Items: 247 pounds of soap distributed at MEDCAP.
- Nails: 150 pounds.

(h) The brigade S5 section continued to operate a permanent MEDCAP Dispensary at Loc Lon Refugee Area, Tay Hai Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, under the supervision of SP6 Allan G. Jones, the S5 Staff MEDCAP NCO, on a daily basis. During the month, 4,395 patients were treated; of these, 215 were dental patients. Brigade Combined MEDCAP in Ho Nai Village and throughout the brigade area of operations totalled 3,674 patients.

(i) The mission given the PsyOps staff of the 199th Infantry Brigade involved both the organization of the civilian population in the area of operations and offensive PsyOps against Viet Cong and NVA troops. The brigade PsyOps effort was aided in Ho Nai Village by a six-man Political Warfare (POLWAR) Team provided this headquarters by the G5, III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ), Bien Hoa. A total of 313,802 leaflets and 12 hours of ground broadcast time was conducted by this team in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi and Weapons Reward programs, and the weekly village-wide MEDCAP conducted by this headquarters.

The 6th PsyOps Battalion, Bien Hoa, airdropped a total of 10,453,000 leaflets and broadcast 4½ hours of aerial broadcast time. During Operation THAN THANG in Minh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province, the Brigade PsyOps Officer coordinated with Capital Military District (CMD) G5 in targeting leaflet drops in the brigade AO. Total Chieu Hoi leaflets distributed by this Brigade and the 6th PsyOps Battalion numbered 5,850,000.
(1) A daily English Language class was taught at Dong Hai I Public School, Dong Hai I Hamlet, Ho Nai Village. Twenty-six classes were taught, with a total attendance of 1,000 students.

(2) During the month of June, the staff continued support of the GVN Civil Recovery Program and reconstruction projects in Ho Nai Village, and began support of other reconstruction projects created as a result of combat damage to civilian property since the Tet Offensive.

(a) Reconstruction of destroyed homes progressed satisfactorily. Reconstruction was begun on two homes, one in Thanh Tam Hamlet, and one in Dong Hai II Hamlet; and on two schools in Cong Thanh District. Reconstruction continued on 5 homes in Tay Hai Hamlet, 8 homes in Bac Hai Hamlet, and 1 home in Trang Bom Hamlet.

Six homes in Thanh Tam Hamlet, six in Bac Hai Hamlet and one school in Cong Thanh District were completed. Twenty-eight temporary refugee homes in Bac Hai Hamlet were completed. The Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), continued to reinforce the Ho Nai Village defense system, and an additional 10,000 sandbags were supplied through Doc Tu District Headquarters for this purpose.

(b) Solatium in the amount of 15,000$VN was paid as a result of an artillery accident which destroyed the home of Mr. Hoa Minh Hap, Dong Hai II Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, caused the death of his wife and son, and injury to three of his children. Medical treatment was provided the survivors immediately after the accident, and later all were taken to the 93d Evacuation Hospital for further treatment. The unit responsible for the accident immediately began reconstruction of the home, and donated 12,000$VN to the family.

(c) Bethany Orphanage, Bui Chu Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, was provided 1,200 gallons of water. The orphanage well dried, leaving 100 children and 16 nuns without water.

(d) Brigade 35 Staff personnel procured from CARE, a new Singer sewing machine and two CARE sewing kits, which were presented to Bethany Orphanage.

(e) Brigade 35 continued support to the Ngu Phuc Orphanage by providing a special Cuipoz formula milk. This project was initiated during the month of May, in response to a report from Sister Cecelia stating most of the babies in the orphanage were sick due to insufficient nutrients. Recent reports indicate that the milk provided was most helpful in restoring the ill babies to good health, and that the incidence of ill babies at the orphanage has decreased.
(f) The following commodities were distributed in Ho Nai Village and throughout the brigade area of operations:

- Cement: 19,840 pounds.
- Tin Roofing: 151 sheets.
- Lumber: 149,000 board sheets.
- Bricks: 47,114.
- Sand: 29.5 cubic meters.
- Concertina Wire: 16,760 meters.
- Sandbags: 10,000.
- Steel Pickets: 216.
- Steel Culvert: 9 - 36" sections.
- Window Frames: 22.
- Door Frames: 7.
- Doors: 3.
- Volleyball Kits: 1.
- Sewing Kits: 2.
- Foodstuffs: 2,676 pounds.
- Health Items: 481 pounds of soap, distributed at MEDCAP.

(g) The 55 MEDCAP NCOIC treated 4,319 patients, both medical and surgical, at the Loc Lan MEDCAP Dispensary, Tay Nai Hamlet. Of these, 293 were dental patients. The MEDCAP NCO also delivered 6 babies during the month. This dispensary is very popular, and has greatly contributed to understanding between the people of the village and the 199th Infantry Brigade. Brigade Combined MEDCAP treated 4,670 patients in Ho Nai Village, and throughout the brigade AO.

(h) The mission given the PsyOps staff of the brigade involved both the organization of the civilian population in the area of operations and offensive PsyOps against Viet Cong and NVA troops. The brigade was aided in the PsyOps effort in Ho Nai Village by the continued support of a six-man PSYOPS Team provided this headquarters by the G5, III CTZ, Bien Hoa. A total of 39,240 leaflets and 6½ hours of ground broadcast time was conducted by this team in support of the GVN NVA Campaign and the weekly village-wide MEDCAP conducted by this headquarters. The 6th PsyOps Battalion, Bien Hoa, airdropped a total of 545,000 leaflets and broadcast 5½ hours of aerial broadcast time in the brigade AO. The brigade aviation unit airdropped 228,000 leaflets and conducted 2½ hours of aerial broadcast time. Total NVA Campaign leaflets distributed by this brigade and the 6th PsyOps Battalion numbered 812,240. During Operation TOWN THAM in Mê Bô and Binh Chanh Districts, Gia Dinh Province, the brigade PsyOps Officer continued coordination with OIC G5, in targeting leaflet drops in the brigade AO. During June, a Mobile PsyOps team was attached to the brigade from the 6th PsyOps Battalion. This team has been further attached to battalions of the brigade to assist in the conduct of PsyOps, and is proving to be highly successful.
(1) A daily English Language Class was taught at Dong Hai I Public School, Dong Hai I Hamlet, Ho Nai Village. Twenty-two classes were taught with a total attendance of 820 students.

(3) During the month of July, the S5 mission remained the same.

(a) Reconstruction work progressed satisfactorily. Reconstruction began on 9 private homes in Tay Hai Hamlet and 3 in Thanh Tan Hamlet, and on two schools in Tan Thuan Dong and Tan Qui Dong Villages. Reconstruction continued on 6 private homes in Tay Hai Hamlet, 3 homes in Bac Hai Hamlet, and one school in Cong Thanh District. Completed reconstruction of 3 homes in Thanh Tam, Trang Dom and Dong Hai II Hamlets, 7 homes in Tay Hai Hamlet, and 5 homes in Bac Hai Hamlet. Began construction of 44 temporary homes for refugees in Minh Tri Dong Village.

(b) As a result of a special request from the Minister of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, the 87th Engineer Company began and completed a medical dispensary in the Rach Ong Section of Saigon, consisting of waiting room, doctor's office, maternity ward, and space for beds. The dimensions of the dispensary are 28' x 50'. Building construction consisted of ship-lap siding, corrugated metal roofing, interior paneling, partitions, and installation of electrical wiring. The dispensary will serve about 12,000 people, most of whom are refugees who had their homes destroyed during Tet and the second offensive in May.

(c) The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry graded 3.2 kilometers of road in the brigade area of operations.

(d) Brigade S5 personnel delivered 430 pounds of rice to Bethany Orphanage, Bui Chu Hamlet, Ho Nai Village. Condolary solatium in the amount of 21,000,000VN was paid to seven families for nine injuries and two deaths caused by artillery fired in support of US positions in Nha Be and Binh Chanh Districts. Medical treatment was provided to the injured, and foodstuffs were provided for each family.

(e) The following commodities were distributed in Ho Nai Village and throughout the brigade area of operations:

- Cement: 21,890 pounds
- Foodstuffs: 37,313 pounds
- Steel Wool: 1 pound
- Candy: 226 pounds
- Lumber: 68,970 board feet
- Bricks: 29,220
- Sand: 13 cubic meters
- Tin Roofing: 136 sheets
- Nails: 150 pounds
- FSP: 15 sheets
Doors: 3.
Sandbags (filled): 1,216.
Sandbags: 500.
Concertina wire: 240 meters.
Health Items: 806 pounds of soap and 196 bottles of multiple vitamin tablets.

(f) Operation of the 55 MEDCJ Dispensary in the Loc Lam Section of Tay Hoi Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, continued on a daily basis. 3,246 patients, both medical and surgical, were treated. Of these, 165 were dental, and 3 were maternity patients. The Brigade Combined MEDCJ treated 7,295 patients throughout the brigade area of operations.

(f) The mission given the PsyOps staff of the brigade in July involved both the organization of the civilian population in and around the brigade AO, and offensive PsyOps against Viet Cong and NVA troops. A total of 264,179 leaflets and 49 hours of ground broadcast time was conducted in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi Campaign and the weekly village wide MEDCJ conducted by this headquarters. The 6th PsyOps Battalion, Bien Hoa, airdropped a total of 164,000 leaflets and broadcast 3 hours of aerial broadcast time in the brigade area of operations. The PsyOps officer coordinated daily with CMN C5 in targeting leaflet drops in the brigade AO. The PsyOps Staff has made extensive use of the Mobile PsyOps Team assigned from the 6th PsyOps Battalion in June, in the capacity of advising battalion S5 Officers and NCOs in the conduct of psychological operations in their respective battalion AO.

(b) Six English Language classes were taught at the Dong Hai I Public School, Dong Hai I Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, during July, with a total attendance of 240 students.

g. Communications:

(1) The communications effort of the brigade has remained near full capacity to provide reliable communications during a very fluid period which saw numerous moves by combat units. The primary means of communications has been FM radio. On 5 May 1968, the brigade consisting of the 3/7th Infantry, 4/12th Infantry, and 6/31st Inf. (CICON from 9th Division) moved to SW of Saigon continuing Operation TOAN THANG, Phase I. Brigade Headquarters collocated with 3/7th at FSFB (HORSESHOE). VHF/Carrier communications was established from 4/12th (at FSFB STEPHANIE) and at Forward OCF back to Camp Frenzell-Jones to provide telephone and secure teletype capabilities. The brigade was CICON to the 25th Infantry Division and a VHF/Carrier system connecting the 25th Division and brigade forward was provided by the 25th Div, resources. An AN/GRC-26 was provided by II FFORCEV
to establish communications between the brigade forward and II FFORCEV.

(2) On 6 May 1968, 6/31st was released from OICON and 2/3d Inf. moved S of Saigon with VHF/Carrier team accompanying the battalion. The VHF/Carrier system provided secure teletype and telephone to Camp Frenzell-Jones.

(3) On 22 May the brigade forward CP returned to Camp Frenzell-Jones. 2/3d Infantry moved to FSi: HORSESHOE END and 3/7th moved to FSi: HORSESHOE END. 5/12th Inf remained at FSi: STEINAMZ, OICON to the 25th Division and the brigade assumed OICON of 5/12th Infantry at FSi: RIMIZ. VHF/Carrier systems were maintained with each battalion from Camp Frenzell-Jones. Secure and non-secure FM was also maintained.

(4) On 31 May 3/7th Inf. moved to Phouc Vinh and 5/12th moved to FSi: TWENTY-TWO. VHF/Carrier teams accompanied each battalion.

(5) On 3 June 3/7th Inf. moved to FSi: HORN LYE with accompanying VHF/Carrier teams.

(6) On 21 June elements of the Brigade Headquarters moved south of Saigon to FSi: HORSESHOE END and the 3/7th moved to FSi: TWENTY-TWO. The VHF/Carrier element from the 2/3d accompanied the Brigade Headquarters in the anticipation that the 2/3d would relocate with the Brigade Forward Headquarters.

(7) On 22 June 1968 the brigade main party joined the forward element and became OICON to CMAC. The 2/14th (25th Div) also became OICON to the brigade. The 5/12th moved to FSi: BLACKFOOT. The Brigade Forward Command Post at HORSESHOE END was required to provide the terminal end at Brigade Forward CP of a VHF/Carrier system to CMAC. The terminal came from the 5/12th. The VHF system to the 3/7th was terminated at the Brigade Forward CP. The 5/12th was not provided a VHF/Carrier system due to the requirement of adding a terminal or VHF/Carrier system at CMAC, Brigade Forward, and deadlined equipment.

NOTES:

1. System installed 21 June 68, Relay furnished by 53d Sig. Bn.
2. Systems installed 22 June 68.
3. System in existence since May 68.
4. System installed 28 June 68.
(8) On 5 July the 2/14th (25th Div.) was released from 01 CON to the brigade and the 2/31st moved to FSR #6 HORSeshoe Bend and collocated with the Brigade Forward C1.

(9) On 23 July a four channel VHF/Carrier system was installed by the 53d Signal Battalion (11 FFORCEV) between CHAC and 5/12th to provide telephone communications to the 5/12th.

(10) Communications means during TOAN THANG Phase II, 22 June - 31 July for the brigade was as follows:

(a) Radio Relay/Carrier systems:

1 Radio Relay Diagram, shows the radio relay systems utilized during the period 22 June-31 July 1968 to provide command and control communications.

2 All LR systems at the Brigade Forward C1 were operated by the 299th Signal Battalion (Forward Area), 199th Brigade.

(b) Radio:

1 Brigade Forward at FSR #6 HORSeshoe Bend:
   a Brigade Command net - FM (Non-secure)
   b Brigade I&O net - FM (Secure)
   c CHAC command net - (Non-secure with secure on call)
   d CHAC I&O net - FM (Non-secure with secure on call)
   e Brigade Artillery LNO net - FM (Non-Secure)
   f Brigade Fire Direction Net - FM (Non-secure)
   g Brigade ALO net - FM, AN, UHF (Non-secure)
   h Brigade Rear TOC at Camp Frenzell-Jones:
      a II FFORCEV Command net - FM (Non-secure)
      b Brigade Command net - FM (Non-secure)
      c Brigade I&O net - FM (Secure)
      d Brigade AVN net - FM (Non-secure)
Infantry Battalion

a Each Infantry Battalion operated a Command net and a Logistics net.
b The rifle companies operated a Command net and a Logistics net.

Artillery Battalion

a The 2/40th Artillery Battalion operated a Command net and an Admin/Logistics net.
b Each firing battery operated a Fire Direction net.

c) Wire:

1 Wire lines were limited to local distribution within the CFs and from Battalion to Company level when possible.

2 Switchboards:

a Redcatcher TOC Forward Switchboard utilized an AN/MCG-10 with a 60 line capacity of which 37 jacks were filled.
b Redcatcher TOC Rear Switchboard utilized an SD-86 switchboard with a 60 line capacity of which 55 jacks were filled.
c Redcatcher Switchboard in the area Switchboard (AN/MTC-1) with 180 subscriber lines and 20 trunk line capacity of which 170 subscriber lines and 10 trunks were filled. The Switchboard is operated by C/36 of the 39th Signal Battalion.
d The Infantry Battalions utilized 2 SB-22 Switchboards stacked for a total of 29 line capacity.

3 Communications Center:

a The Brigade rear comcenter at Camp Frenzall-Jones was an AN/MTC-17 teletype central office dismantled. It terminated one FDX on-line ckt to II FPC IEEE Command center and one HDX on-line ckt to Brigade Forward CF.
b The Brigade Forward comcenter at FSP HOOHESESHOE XEND was an AN/MCC-34. It terminated one HDX on-line ckt to Brigade rear and one HDX on-line ckt to CHAC.
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Messengers service was conducted for units at Camp Frenzell-Jones and to Headquarters at USAV and II FORCEV. Courier Service was provided between Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear, twice daily.

(d) Communication Statistics:

1. Radio relay systems effectiveness- weekly average, 93%.
2. Communications Center Forward, Processed an average per day of 60 messages.

(e) Communications Support: (Brigade Forward)

1. Signal Section - 1 Officer.
2. Radio Relay Section - 1 NCO and three teams.
3. Switchboard Section - One team.
4. Wire Section - Two wire teams.
5. Communications Center Section - One team.

(f) Power: Main power was provided by a 36 kilowatt commercial diesel with two 10 kilowatt and one 5 kilowatt gasoline generators as backup.

h. Brigade Surgeon:

(1) The health of the command shows an average admission rate of 500 per 1000 men per year, and a daily non-effectiveness in respect to sick days as an average of 385 per month. These figures have been fairly static due to the lack of major offensive action by the enemy in the past three months.

(2) Malaria continues to be a problem but extensive prophylaxis on an individual basis has kept the rate down to 3 to 7 cases per month. Field units are taking Chloroquine-Pinasquine pills weekly in addition to the daily 50 mg pills.

(3) The incidence of diarrhea has decreased. An outbreak of Shigellosis (Diarrhea) was noted in May. An extensive investigation was made of the food and water supplies but no point sources of contamination was identified. The outbreak was thought to be due to the monsoon flooding conditions.
(4) The venereal disease rate has progressively increased each month. Lack of individual prophylactic protection and increased exposure to the local populace have been important factors. Units which are in a static position seem to be involved the most as contacts are more frequent.

(5) Skin and Cellular tissue disease have been confined to soldiers exposed to extremely wet environmental conditions. The rate has increased due to the monsoon season and the placement of soldiers in flooded areas.

(6) An extensive program of foot care was instituted in the month of July. Individuals were encouraged to change socks frequently, to air dry the feet daily, and to wear shower shoes as much as the tactical situation permits.

(7) Aerial spraying of the forward areas was performed during the month of July in an attempt to control the insect population. Most areas noted a decided decrease in the number of flies in their area.

(8) Field Sanitation teams from each unit were designated during the month of July. The 20th Preventive Medicine Detachment will supply the necessary instructions for these teams.

(9) The Battalion Surgeons and corpsmen held MEDCAFs in many of the hamlets and villages of the AO. A total of 18,000 patients were seen and treated. Most of the patients were children under 13 years of age. Half of the major complaints involved the digestive tract, dermatological (skin) conditions, and eye problems. Most of the children had chronic anemia from a combination of hook-worms and vitamin deficiencies. Many of the skin problems resulted from scabies and the lack of soap. Conjunctivitis appeared to be the chief eye problem. The other half of the outpatient care involved other medical conditions which were not statistically broken down. Patients requiring hospitalization were evacuated by civilian transportation to the nearest civilian hospital.

1. Provost Marshal:

(1) All segments of Provost Marshal operations continue to place increasing emphasis on security measures and on providing more effective support to the infantry battalions. Concerted efforts have been placed on maintaining an effective preventive enforcement program through command emphasis. The Security Guard Platoon continues to improve its perimeter security facilities by the addition of new towers and bunkers. These positions have been equipped with starlight scopes and automatic scopes for early warning and locating rocket launching sites and mortar emplacements. Improvements con-
continued to be made on the Brigade Detainee Collection Point to enhance security and to provide a well-built facility for handling and processing prisoners of war and detainees. The Brigade Detainee Collection Point is the only detainee facility in the Long Binh area. Of prime consideration also is that it is situated in close proximity to the III Corps Headquarters. Due to this key location, the facility has frequently provided assistance to other units by temporarily securing POWs overnight while enroute to III Corps Cape. The civilian Labor Checkpoint continued to maintain tight control on passes issued to Vietnamese Nationals employed within Camp Thunder-lance.

j. Public Information:

(1) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, the 40th Public Information Detachment and attached photographic personnel provided increased coverage of brigade activities through closer liaison with civilian news media representatives and increased organic efforts in the field. Due to the brigade's tactical location close to Saigon, an increase in the number of news media visits was experienced. Field operation coverage has greatly increased due to a forward brigade information office being established and the close proximity of all the combat elements of the brigade. Cooperation from brigade unit commanders has been outstanding. Commanders and their staffs down to company level have provided briefings, food, and transportation whenever they could to the visitingpress. This has been a great help in establishing good relations and better, more favorable coverage by the civilian news media.

(2) Photographic development support has improved slightly from the 221st Signal Photographic Laboratory due to the efforts of a new Officer-in-Charge. A new format for the brigade internal summary publication now allows for the use of brigade news photos of combat action, change-of-command, and awards ceremonies. A new publication reproduction process in the brigade Adjutant General section enabled the change.

(3) The following is a breakdown of the 40th Public Information Detachment information activities:

(a) News Releases - 34.
(b) Picture Releases - 223.
(c) Hometown News Releases - 555.
(d) Hometown Picture Releases - 37.
(e) Hometown Press - 156.
(f) Press Briefings and Interviews - 190.
(g) News Media Visits - 16.
(h) Hometown TV Film Clips - 18.

(4) The 199th Infantry Brigade Information Office was specifically mentioned in the US Army Hometown News Center Quarterly Report, 4th quarter, FY 1968 as being one of the three leading overseas contributors in in-depth television coverage of unit activities for FY 1968. The Hometown Radio Tape Releases report in the same quarterly Report, also favorably mentioned the office.

(5) The Information and photographic section continue to lack adequately trained personnel. Several enlisted men in the office have been Army school trained in other occupational skills, such as 11B, and have had to be retrained by personnel in the office to fill badly needed photographer and correspondent slots. Several of these men will be rotating to the United States within 60 days and replacements with the necessary skills will be difficult to obtain. The office also lacks one of its authorized information officers, a first lieutenant. A Department of Defense Information School Trained officer is also very difficult to obtain. The USARV Information Office Administration Officer is presently trying to locate a suitable replacement to fill this officer slot.

k. Staff Judge Advocate:

(1) During the reporting quarter, 1 May to 31 July 1968, this command paid $12,948.19 in personal property claims to United States Military personnel. As in the last quarter, the majority of these claims resulted from a fire which destroyed one of the unit's barracks. See below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Claims Paid</th>
<th>Amount Paid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$2,152.61</td>
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<td>JULY</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$6,690.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>$12,948.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Solatium payments of 40,000 VN were made to Vietnamese Nationals for property damage and personal injury. Four claims filed by Vietnamese Nationals under the Foreign Claims Act, AR 27-26, were investigated and processed.
(3) Emphasis is still being placed on unit commanders at all levels on the use of non-judicial punishment to enforce and maintain discipline within their commands. Article 15s administered were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3d Inf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>6th Eng Co.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Troop, 17th Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Brigade      | 63  | 113  | 188  | 364   |

(4) Courts-Martial rates within the brigade continue to be below the overall Army level. Continued command emphasis is being placed on the expeditious processing and forwarding of charges once they have been preferred against an individual and a chronology of events in all courts-martial cases is being maintained. In keeping with USARV policy, special emphasis must be placed on all unit commanders to make use of the rehabilitation and clemency program initiated by this brigade.

GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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SUMMARY:

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(5) Complete breakdown of legal assistance cases handled during the reporting period are as follows:

- Adoption and Change of Name: 3
- Citizenship, Immigration, and Passport: 13
- Civil Rights: 1
- Domestic Relations and Fertility: 60
- Depositions: 0
- Divorce and Support: 3
- Notarizations: 7
- Personal Finances, debts, Ins., Etc.: 29
- Personal Property, Automobiles, Etc.: 68
- Powers of Attorney: 44
- Real Property, Real Estate, Sale, Lease: 9
- Taxation, (All Kinds): 4
- Trusts: 6
- Wills and Estates: 10
- Miscellaneous: 35
- TOTAL: 292

1. Chaplain's Activities:

(1) The religious coverage for the 199th Infantry Brigade included services for Roman Catholic and Protestant. A Jewish Chaplain made periodic visits to the brigade. Memorial Services were held in each unit sustaining losses of personnel as a result of combat. Information was provided to all personnel interested in denominational and Jewish services. The Sacraments are always provided as well as religious instruction. Counselling, orientations, visits to hospitals, the sick, and troop areas continued to establish a good rapport between the Chaplains and the men. The more than adequate Chaplain coverage within the brigade for religious activities and other morale support highlights the overall coverage by the Brigade Chaplains. Chapel attendance continues to be satisfactory.

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(2) Statistics concerning Chaplain activities for the reporting period:

**ATTENDANCE**

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations.

(1) Tide Problems on Riverine Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Two opposing problems exist as a result of the wide variation in tides; high tides permit maximum penetration of the canal system but prevent passage under many bridges, with the opposite situation during low tide. Areas blocked-off by bridges can only be entered at night during very low tide, followed by a wait the following day for high tide operations along the canal systems, followed again by departure during low tide at night. The only recourse during the day has been to shuttle under bridges using the small River Patrol Craft and losing the advantage of the heavy RAG firepower in the AO.

(b) EVALUATION: Very close attention must be devoted to tides. When practicable, entry into areas blocked by bridges may be made at night, but requires troops for boat security until morning. A partial solution in shuttling troops under bridges is the use of River Patrol Craft or LCVPs (the monitor and standard LCMs are too high during daylight hours, and the Commandant Boat is unable to move under most bridges regardless of the tides).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all parts of the monitor and commandant boats above turret level and not armor-plated be removed so as to provide the lowest possible silhouette and result in greater access to areas with bridges.
Rotational Patrol System.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the past, Military Police personnel have been working a twelve hour tour of duty on the Military Police Checkpoints. This tour of duty was continuous except for chow and personal relief.

(b) EVALUATION: The alertness of the Military Policemen has definitely been impaired by this long, continuous tour of duty. During the hours of darkness, the Military Police must be alert to prevent any breech of the perimeter and to give early warning of any pending attack.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: As a solution to this problem a rotational patrol system has been established. Each individual Military Police-man has a chance during his tour of duty to serve as a patrolman for a period of four hours each shift. This rotational system has greatly increased the alertness of the individual Military Policeman and has greatly enhanced the security of the Brigade Main Base.

Training.

(1) The effect of decreased troop movement on the Venereal Disease rate.

(a) OBSERVATION: The venereal disease rate has increased from 159 cases per 1000 men per annum to 246/1000/annum. This represents a monthly increase of Gonorrhea from 64 cases to 76 cases/month. The case number of syphilis has remained low and represented only cases contracted during R&R (2 per month) until the month of June when 4 cases were contracted in-country. Chancroid (Soft Chancre) due to the Ducrey bacillus has shown a rapid increase from 10 cases per month to 29 cases per month. This is a threefold increase in the number of cases of chancroid.

(b) EVALUATION: Prostitution and uncleanliness are factors favoring the transmission of Venereal Disease. Both of these factors are difficult to control in static locations even though MP patrols, showers, and laundry facilities are more easily obtained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Increased command emphasis in the use of prophylactic protection, troop education on the results of exposure, and frequent patrolling of problem areas should help to alleviate the problem.
(2) **Foot problems due to the prolonged exposure to water.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The feet and lower legs become macerated and infected from the contaminated water in rice paddies and ditches. Topical antibiotics were helpful in many cases. However, if any evidence of cellulitis appeared, systemic antibiotics were needed for cure. Some cases were severe enough to require evacuation to the rear areas for hospitalization.

(b) **EVALUATION:** There are many approaches to preventing foot problems. Socks are changed frequently during the day. The boots are removed at least once daily to allow the feet to air dry. The men are requested to wear shower shoes in the forward areas and the rear areas as much as the tactical situation allows.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Command emphasis on having the individual soldier change his socks frequently, remove his boots and air dry his feet, and wear shower shoes as often as the tactical situation allows.

d. **Intelligence.**

(1) **Rapid exploitation of intelligence information on Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Viet Cong operations are directly dependent on the VCI. This organization is set up practically in all population centers. The members are civilians, normally possessing valid identity cards and population control papers. In their covert work, they perform varied essential supporting tasks in VC operations such as propaganda, proselyting, supply, food procurement, guides, communications, and other varied tasks. It is known that in most cases the success of VC operations depends on the strength and efficiency of the VCI.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Neutralization of VCI or portions thereof can totally disorganize VC plans and operations. To neutralize VCI, it is necessary to gather all available information about the hamlets, villages, and towns with specific emphasis on VC supporters, and sympathizers. This information can be obtained from the District Intelligence personnel, National Police as well as from the personality files compiled from interrogation and debriefing reports. A cordon and search operation is the most effective method of neutralization of VCI. The target area is condoned preferably at night and the search element moves into the area at first light. The search element should be composed of experienced personnel, both US and Vietnamese. Screening and interrogation teams are furnished the necessary list of VCI personnel. Since the VCI members possess legitimate papers, they do not normally evade search parties. The screening personnel then compare
the identity cards with the names on their lists. Immediate interrogation of VCI members and suspects in most cases reveal further names and addresses of VCI, VC sympathizers and local VC. Information of this type must be exploited immediately. A special operation can be mounted and the suspects arrested before they receive warning of their discovery. Speed and secrecy are the keys to successful anti-VCI operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that special emphasis be placed on discovery of VCI members and that an operation is mounted without delay. Thorough coordination is effected with all US and GVN agencies. To preserve complete secrecy of the operation, it is recommended that the US and GVN agencies establish a meeting area near the target and brief the participants there. The target lists can be distributed just prior to entering the target area. Sufficient number of interrogation and screening teams must be available to handle all of the population. Detailed coordination must be made to facilitate rapid exploitation and evacuation of prisoners and suspects.

e. logistics.

(1) Use of the Airboats on Riverine Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: On Riverine Operations, much time is lost when troops must cross canals using ropes because the canals are too shallow to permit LCMs or RPCs to assist crossings. Airboats may be towed (to save fuel and engine time) to the AO and used to move units quickly across canals. Extra airboat fuel should be carried on LCMs.

(b) EVALUATION: Air boats should always be towed behind LCMs to areas of operation and used to assist troop passage of canal obstacles. Airboats permit full flexibility so that once a River Assault Group arrives in an AO the entire AO is accessible, not just the larger canals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That airboats always be taken on Riverine Operations and that additional airboats be issued to all units conducting Riverine Operations.

(2) Protective Lighting and Protective Barriers.

(a) OBSERVATION: After an informal survey of the Military Police Checkpoints, it was determined that some type of lighting fixtures and protective barriers were needed to prevent forced or unauthorized entry. When a vehicle approaches any of the MP Checkpoints, the vehicle and passengers cannot be identified until they are adjacent to the checkpoint itself. This could result in a forced or surprised entry.
(b) EVALUATION: The use of protective lighting in accordance with USARV Regulation 190-30 and the installation of solid, moveable barriers would enhance identification and prevent entry onto the BMZ. The lighting would be controlled by the MP on duty and the protective barriers would be closed during the hours of darkness.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A request has been submitted for the construction and installation of gates on all of the MP Checkpoints. Several of the MP Checkpoints have had flood lights installed on them and arrangements are being made to provide all the checkpoints with protective lighting. Protective lighting should be installed around the entire perimeter of the BMZ in order to meet the minimum specifications of USARV Regulation 190-30.

(3) Arms Room Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last quarter, Physical Security Surveys were conducted on all arms rooms within the brigade. It was determined that the security was not adequate and that corrections would have to be made to meet minimum criteria of 199th Regulation 190-30.

(b) EVALUATION: It is necessary that units maintain rigid control of weapons and ammunition to preclude any incidents involving unauthorized use and possession of weapons. All units must insure that weapons and ammunition are tightly controlled.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Actions have been taken to provide the brigade with a standard operating procedure for the securing of and the control of all firearms. Follow-up surveys will be conducted to insure that all discrepancies have been corrected.

(4) Construction of a Tower.

(a) OBSERVATION: Because of the terrain observation was limited along the northside of the BMZ perimeter.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the most vulnerable side of the BMZ was along the northside and since most of the rocket and mortar attacks came from this direction, it was suggested that a tower be constructed for the purpose of observation, spotting, and early warning.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It was requested that a sixty foot tower be constructed along the northern perimeter of the BMZ and this has been done. In this tower there is a BC Scope which can be used for plotting the position of enemy rockets and mortar positions. The Security Guard can now locate these positions and directly call for artillery. This
accurate locating of enemy positions will enhance the early warning of an eminent enemy attack on Camp Frenzoll-Jones and the Long Binh Complex.

(5) Transportation for Staff Judge Advocate.

(a) OBSERVATION:Means of vehicular transportation should be organic to the Staff Judge Advocate section.

(i) EVALUATION: This section has no vehicle assigned for transportation of the personnel on official business. The General Courts-Martial convening authority is some distance away from the brigade, as are all the units of the brigade. Transportation to these areas is frequently needed, but unavailable. It greatly hinders the effectiveness of the section.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this section be assigned one 12 ton vehicle.

f. Organization.

(1) Stray Animals on FMJ.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that there are a great number of stray dogs running loose on FMJ. These stray animals have been a health hazard to the members of this brigade in that rabies quickly spread throughout this area.

(b) EVALUATION: USA RV Regulation 40-15 requires that all unit pets be inoculated and registered annually at the Office of the Provost Marshal. Medical personnel have been immunizing pets at the Office of the Provost Marshal, and all units have been given an opportunity to have their pets registered.

(e) RECOMMENDATION: The opportunity for immunization and registration has been afforded; all stray animals will be apprehended by the Military Police and impounded for a period of three days. After this period of time, if the animal remains unclaimed, he will be destroyed. Each company is limited to one pet and must have his immunized, tagged, and registered.

(2) Pass System at the Forward Command Post.

(a) OBSERVATION: There have been a number of Vietnamese Nationals hired for employment in the Brigade Forward Command Post and there has thus arisen a security risk. Because of the number employed, identification and control has created a problem.
(b) EVALUATION: A pass system must be initiated to properly control the Vietnamese Nationals employed in this area. A pass system combined with an access list of Vietnamese personnel authorized in the Forward Command Post would provide adequate security.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The HHC MP Platoon has established a pass system for the control and identification of Vietnamese Nationals in the forward area. This pass system has increased the security at the base camp and has possibly precluded unauthorized access to the forward base camp.

(3) Techniques for Mortar Emplacements in Soft Soil with a high Water Table.

(a) OBSERVATION: During operations in Vietnam, 4.2mm Mortar platoon experienced difficulty emplacing weapons without burying the baseplate in mud which affected mobility, effectiveness and accuracy of the 4.2mm mortar. The primary problem was attributed to very soft soil and a high water table. Some form of bracing was required to stabilize the baseplate from settling beyond operational limits. The displacement of the baseplate reduces the accuracy and effectiveness of the 4.2mm mortar. The baseplates constantly have to be dug up and reemplaced after firing 20 rounds.

(b) EVALUATION: The most effective and successful method determined within the 199th Infantry Brigade to maintain stability of the 4.2mm mortar baseplates was to construct an emplacement in the following manner: (See Inclosure 6)

1. Dig a circular hole approximately 3 feet deep and 5-6 feet wide.

2. The bottom (floor) of the hole is covered with perforated steel planking (PSP) to provide the initial base.

3. On top of the PSP a culvert about 4' in diameter which is bolted together and emplaced on its edge. The culvert is secured at the bottom with engineer stakes to preclude lateral displacement of the culvert material. Place inside of the culvert three layers of 8" x 8" logs.

4. On top of the logs and culvert place sandbags, two or three layers thick. The sandbags provide a substantial foundation for the baseplate. The sandbags should be replaced as necessary; experience of the 199th has been replacement was required after firing between 50-100 rounds.

5. With utilizing the above method, the displacement of the mortar baseplates was reduced to a minimum and resulted in more accurate fire support.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when units are required to operate in soft soil with a high water table or similar terrain, the 4.2mm mortar emplacements described above be utilized.

FREDERIC E. DAVISON
Colonel, Infantry
Acting Commander

Withdrawn, HQ, DA

Incl 1-5 (training outlines)

Incl 6 Diagram of Construction of Mortar Emplacements in Soft Soil with high Water Table
AVFHC-RH (22 Aug 68) lst Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFADAB

DA, HQ II FORSCV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMC(BST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: G6OP-G1F, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 199th Infantry Brigade for the period ending 31 July
1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. B. KENY
1LT, AGS
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade, and concurs with the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy Furn:
HQ IIFFV
HQ 199th Inf Bde
GPOP-DT (22 Aug 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 199th Infantry Brigade for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
DIAGRAM OF CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN IMPLOSIONS
IN SOFT SOIL WITH REINFORCED WALLS

TOP VIEW

STEP 1

SIDE VIEW

STEP 2

CROSS-SECTION

STEP 3

STEP 4

STEP 5

48
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt) (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68**

**CG, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

**Security Classification**
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** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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