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**AUTHORITY**

31 Jul 1980, DoDD 5200.10, per document marking; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (H) (18 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 68X073 28 October 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation TOAN THANG. 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Phase I--16-18 May 1968, Phase II--27 June - 5 July 1968 (U)

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2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

2
SUBJECT: Combat Operations - After Action Report

THRU:
Commanding General
Headquarters
9th Infantry Division
APO U.S. Forces 96370

TO:
Commander
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ343
APO U.S. Forces 96222

1. NAME OF OPERATION: OPERATION TOAN THANG.

2. DATES OF OPERATION:
   Phase I: 162050 thru 182030 May 1968
   Phase II: 270510 June thru 051500 July 1968

3. LOCATION: LONG AN and HAU NGO Provinces, RVN, Map References:
   1:50,000, sheet No. 6229 I thru IV and 6330 II and III.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:
   Headquarters Mobile Riverine Force
   2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
   Task Force 117

5. REPORTING OFFICERS:
   a. Captain R. S. Salzer, Commodore CTF 117.
      (Commanding Officer until 28 May 1968)
   d. LTC William P. Lackman, CO, 3-47th Infantry.
   e. LTC Lawrence E. Bryan, CO, 4-47th Infantry.
   f. LTC John G. Hill, CO, 3-56th Infantry.
      (Commanding Officer until 11 June 1968)
   g. LTC George E. Marine, CO, 3-56th Infantry.
   h. LTC W. F. Rawlins, CO, 3-34th Artillery.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION: See Inclosure #1.

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
   a. U.S. Navy: Naval support throughout the operation was provided by Task Force 117. Support included mutual coordination and preparation of operational plans and orders. Administrative and logistical
requirements were effectively fulfilled. Operational support included escort and riverine deployment of combat units, employment of direct and indirect Naval fires, Employment of riverine survey and underwater demolition teams. Tactical operations included employment of assault support boats in cagel float tactics. All operational support provided assisted the brigade in its response to intelligence targets, and subsequently to defeat the enemy.

b. U.S. Air Forces; The 7th U.S. Air Forces supported tactical operations, employing pre-planned and immediate airstrikes. Principal targets were troops in the open, booeing sites, landing zones, bunkers and other fortified sites. Airstrikes were effectively employed and no significant problems were encountered; targets were properly marked and identified.

c. Army Aviation: Army aviation assets were provided through 9th Infantry Division. Maximal utilization was made of air cavalry units when the enemy evaded ground forces. Helicopters were employed extensively in aerial reconnaissance, people sniffer missions, and to saturate the AO with infantry elements in search of the enemy. When contact was established, light fire teams and assault helicopter companies contributed decisively toward the enemy's destruction.

d. Artillery: Artillery fires, employed independently or with airstrikes and gunships, were effectively employed to destroy the enemy and block his withdrawal from areas of contact. Response to all fire missions were quick and efficient. Artillery fires were employed extensively to suppress hostile fire against attacking forces and to eliminate sniper activity.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General. Enemy activity in Saigon (during Phase I) was characterized by sporadic contacts in the eighth precinct (south of the DOI Canal) and the Sixth precinct (west of the Phu Tho race track). The predominant enemy threat to the Naval assault support boats was considered to be along the Cho Gao Canal/SONG THA/SONG VAN river, which was the route of entry to the AO. Previously, several underwater mining incidents occurred along the Cho Gao. The enemy's presence along the waterways continued, and his activities included transportation and bunker construction. Within the AO, the enemy's presence along waterways was estimated to be at squad level. However, VC and NVA units were infiltrating and exfiltrating Saigon. The enemy forces included an artillery regimental command post, resupply and staging personnel, and a VC Command Headquarters.

b. The enemy forces within the AO during Phase II of the operation consisted of VC/NA forces massing to attack SAIGON. Considerable intelligence reports of enemy movement and activities along established LOCs and MSR's indicated an attack against Saigon was imminent.

9. MISSION:

a. Phase I: Mobile Riverine Force and elements assigned to operational control of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, attack at H-Hour, 17 May 1968, to locate, fix and destroy VC/NA elements in AO SNAKEPIT, including an artillery regimental command post, resupply and staging areas, and a VC Command Headquarters.

b. Phase II: Mobile Riverine Force conducts air mobile, riverine, reconnaissance-in-force operations in BEN LUC, THU TRUA, Districts, LONG AN Province and DOH HOA District, HAU NOI/HOA Province, to locate and destroy NVA/VC elements in zone. Coincidentally interdict enemy MSR's and LOCs, and locate enemy supply caches.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Phase I: The Brigade's concept of operation was to employ the 3-47th Infantry as the lead elements of a riverine convoy into the AO. The 3-47th Infantry would deploy from DONG TAM at 162000 May to BACH DANG via XS834660 to BACH DANG again. The 4-47th Infantry would follow the 3-47th Infantry, but move to AO SABANA and conduct eagle float operations. The 3-39th and 4-39th Infantry Battalions (-), OPVN to the Brigade, would be employed in airmobile assaults to exploit contacts developed by the Brigade's maneuver battalions.

b. Phase II: The scheme of maneuver involved employing the 3-60th Infantry by riverine movement to AO POPEYE to assault RED Beach #1 and subsequently attack northwest in same. The battalion would also be employed in airmobile assaults throughout the AO. The 3-47th Infantry would deploy by riverine movement to assault GREEN Beaches and subsequently attack northwest in zone. Artillery support would be provided from two FSBs established in the vicinity of XS865763 and XS875845.

11. EXECUTION:

a. Phase I:

1. As originally conceived, the operation commenced in accordance with OPORD 45-68. Commencing 162000 May, the 3-47th Artillery and river assault craft deployed to establish FSB FARLY at XS897618 to support the transit and employment of the maneuver battalions. After conducting eagle float operations along the NUI River, the 3-47th Infantry beached at 0755 hours, 17 May, in the vicinity of XS877691. The 4-47th Infantry beached at 0755 hours at XS880690, after conducting eagle float operations along the BA DANG River. Throughout the day B/7-lst Air Cavalry made aerial reconnaissance of the AO, and support ground forces in their attacks.

(a) Initially, the 3-47th Infantry employed B and C Companies to sweep south after beaching, while A and E Companies remained embarked prepared to reinforce contacts if encountered. During its sweep Company B apprehended two detained. At 0900 hours E Company, 3-47th Infantry was inserted in the vicinity of XS861679, and Company A inserted later at 0940 hours in the vicinity of XS866679. It was during its beaching, that Company A engaged one VC who was hiding in nipah palms near the landing site. The first significant contact of the battalion occurred when A/3-47th Infantry encountered VC snipers near the beach; one VC was killed and two U.S. KIA resulted. As the sniper engagement continued, it intensified; an estimated platoon size enemy force was employed in small groups to engage the advancing forces. The battalion slowly maneuvered against the insurgent force. Artillery, airstrikes and B/7-lst Air Cav reinforced the infantry's attack. As of 1525 hours the engagement continued. Company A 3-47th Infantry had sustained three U.S. KIA and five WHA, Company B had one WHA. A POW was captured with his AK-47 and other weapons in the vicinity of XS866679. The enemy broke contact at 1800 hours, and the 3-47th Infantry searched the area from which it was engaged. 17 VC KIA were found in bunkers along the river in the vicinity of XS865769.

(b) The 4-47th Infantry conducted its eagle float and beaching operations without incident, and at 1300 hours it had moved to the vicinity of XS867737. Shortly thereafter it made contact with small groups of VC snipers. Company B received three WHA from the initial engagement and five WHA later. One VC tiger scout was KHA when a grenade was tossed into B Company's position. Company E sustained three WHA while moving to the vicinity of XS871636. The contact terminated at 1500 hours and a search of the area was made.

B/4-47th Infantry accounted for two VC KIA, and three additional VC
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KIAs were located in the vicinity of X881736.

(o) The 3-39th Infantry (-) employed its Company A in an airborne assault at 1030 hours to the vicinity of X882063 to exploit a contact of the 7-1st Air Cavalry. Thirty guerrillas were alleged to be operating in the vicinity of X881762. C/3-39th Infantry was airlifted to the vicinity of X881365 to complement Company A's maneuver. Company A captured three VC and three AK-47s, and killed five VC in the vicinity of X881563. At 1545 hours the enemy's fire diminished to sporadic sniper fire, and terminated at 1600 hours. The two companies continued their movement without further incident. Company C established night defensive position in the vicinity of X881633.

(d) The 4-39th Infantry (-) made no significant engagements during the day. C/4-39th was airlifted in the northern portion of the AO to an LZ in the vicinity of X889373 while B/4-39th Infantry remained at KIA in an RRF posture. During the day 16 airstrikes were employed in support of the infantry battalions. Seven VC KIAs were contributed to the total killed as a result of airstrikes. At the end of the day, 41 VC were KIA, five POW captured, 11 weapons were captured, and 107 bunkers were destroyed. Friendly casualties were five U.S., four VN, and 21 U.S., WHA.

(2) The operation continued on the morning of 18 May, after the units' night resupply kia were extracted. The 3-47th and 4-47th Infantry continued eagle float operations, as the 3-39th Infantry (-) searched its area of previous contact. Throughout the day contact was limited to sporadic engagements of B-40 rocket, small arms and automatic weapons fire. No contact could be established with a unit size force the enemy continued to employ his forces in small (two to three man) groups.

(a) The 3-47th Infantry eagle floated southwest along the NUI RIVER and subsequently beached its elements at 0930 hours in the vicinity of X884257 to search the area. Several bunkers were destroyed, and supplies and ammunition were captured. At approximately 1100 hours all elements were extracted by ATO and proceeded in the eagle float operation. Until 1550 hours no engagements were made. It was at that time A/3-47th Infantry encountered rocket fire while searching in the vicinity of X889366. Shortly thereafter, B and C Companies engaged B-40 rocket and small arms fire. Company A was employed in a blocking position in the vicinity of X889366, while C and E companies swept towards the blocking position. The battalion continued its operation until late in the evening. It was late extracted and returned to the KB.

(b) The 4-47th Infantry eagle floated north and west along the BANG River and beached in the vicinity of X884677. The battalion conducted a thorough search of the area, and found 18 VC bodies, two B-40 rocket launchers and several grenades. The VC KIAs were the result of artillery and airstrikes employed in the area. At 1325 hours, B/3-47th Infantry was engaged with B-40 rocket and small arms fire. With the support of artillery, the company suppressed the enemy fire. The battalion embarked ATCs to continue its eagle float operation. In the meantime airstrikes, artillery and gunships engaged suspected VC positions in the vicinity of X890472 on the rocket fire originated. At 1400 hours B and E Companies were inserted in the vicinity of X890672 to search and clear the area. Company E found four chicom carbines, and one 57mm recoilless rifle round. The company also engaged a small group of VC (five to six) running in the area; one VC KIA resulted. Company B was also engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fire; the company established contact and obtained five VC KIA. As the contact continued Company E maneuvered in support of Company B. Together they attacked an enemy bunker position in the vicinity of X890572. When the contact ceased the two companies swept the area and reported 10 VC KIA, and several
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items of equipment captured. The 7-1st Air Cav accounted for ten additional VC KIA's in support of the battalion's contact. The air control reported nine VC KIA's. The battalion (-) unloaded on ATGs and returned to the NRB.

(c) The 3-39th Infantry conducted a search of its area of previous contact employing Company C in the vicinity of XS83655. At 0930 hours Company C located 12 VC who were previously killed by artillery fire, and one RPG-2 rocket launcher in the vicinity of XS83655. Company C continued reconnaissance-in-force operations, and at 1020 hours, located five VC KIA previously killed by airstrikes in the vicinity of X8342654. At 1340 hours Company A commenced airborne operations from B/39th IN, and at 1400 hours had completed (-) insertion in the vicinity of XS835650. The only contact of the day, occurred at 1435 hours when Company A engaged three VC with weapons moving west from the vicinity of XS835652. The battalion continued its search in the AO, and was later extracted by air to B/39th IN at 1730 hours. The 3-39th Infantry was released from OPCON of the 2nd Brigade at 1800 hours. After extraction of its night kits, the 4-39th Infantry conducted a block and sweep operation in the northern portion of the AO. Company C was extracted from its night defensive positions and reinserted in the vicinity of XS836552 at 0839 hours. The company established an east to west blocking position oriented to the north. Company B subsequently made an airborne extraction from NHA BE at 0905 hours, and was inserted in the vicinity of XS837956. B/4-39th Infantry initiated reconnaissance-in-force operations to the south and west, moving towards the blocking positions established by Company A. The battalion was extracted from the AO and returned to NHA BE at 1730 hours. The 4-39th Infantry was released from OPCON of the 2nd Brigade at 1800 hours.

(d) Throughout the day, assault craft of River Division 91 supported the 4-39th Infantry and was ambushed while beaching the unit at 1320 hours. The boats encountered B-VN rocket and automatic weapon fire from both banks of the KEIN. Fourteen enemy men were KIA, although the enemy fires were quickly suppressed. In a later engagement the river assault craft captured three VC KIA and captured one AK-47. Nine airstrikes were employed during the day resulting in 24 VC KIA and 42 bunkers destroyed.

(3) Results of the two day operation were: five U.S. KIA, one VN Tiger Scout KIA, 37 U.S. WIA, and six U.S. WIA. Enemy losses consisted of 126 VC KIA, five FOWs, 61 detonates, one 57mm recoilless rifle, three B-40 rocket launchers, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, ten AK-47's, six chicom carbines, one .38 cal pistol, one 9mm chicom pistol, 11 20mm rounds, 20 240mm rounds, 500 AK-47 rounds and six AK-47 magazines captured. In addition, 180 bunkers were destroyed.

b. Phase III:

(1) On 27 June, the Mobile Riverine Force initiated offensive operations in support of Operation DON THANG - Phase II. The operation began at 0510 hours, when the 3-39th Artillery and river assault craft deployed to establish 3RB WAGON WHEEL in the vicinity of X890 3687. The 3-39th Infantry and 3-56th Infantry were employed into the AO, conducting beach assaults; after which, the two battalions attacked southwest and northeast respectively, employing eagle float techniques. The 3-39th Infantry initially employed B and E Companies in beach assaults in the vicinity of X886680 and X887081, while Company C remained afloat as the battalion RUP. C/3-39th Infantry was subsequently beached at X8861681 and commenced to sweep through the area; one engagement occurred at 0915 hours. The company engaged one VC in the vicinity of X887080; upon examining the VC KIA, it was assumed that he was an officer. The VC wore a holstet and carried a 9mm pistol. Continuing its sweep operations C/3-39th Infantry observed a group of six to seven individuals running in the area; the group were aressed in green uniforms. Artillery was employed

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against the group, which was evading the company's advance; results of the engagement were undetermined. Continuing its operations, the company moved to a PZ located in the vicinity of X35668, where it found a chicom handweapon (pistol). The battalion employed Company C in an airmobile assault at 1352 hours to exploit intelligence reports of enemy activity in the vicinity of X840645. A search of that area revealed only booby traps and no evidence of recent enemy activity. The 3-47th Infantry continued its employment of B and E companies in airmobile and reconnaissance air-crew operations until 1830 hours; at which time it established night defensive positions and employed ambush patrols.

During the day, the 3-60th Infantry was employed conducting cagel float and airmobile operations. The battalion conducted cagel float operations from X8695798 to X8687080, and reconnoitered in force without any significant engagements. At 1100 hours B/3-60th Infantry was employed in an airmobile assault to exploit an intelligence target in the vicinity of X3925740. Subsequently C/3-60th Infantry was also employed by airmobile assault to the vicinity of X8907410. The battalion continued its operations without incident until 1611 hours; at which time it established night defensive positions in the vicinity of X8787328, X8887370 and X9137002. Throughout the day, D/3-5th Air Cav provided aerial reconnaissance and gunships support to maneuver battalions. Another VC KIA was killed by the air cav trooper when it engaged a small group fleeing in the vicinity of XS54692; one 9mm pistol was captured after the engagement.

PSYOPS activities were conducted in conjunction with "People Sniffer" missions flown during the day. Five airstrike were also employed in support of the day's operations; twelve bunkers were destroyed.

(2) After a quiet and uneventful night, the MRB continued operations at dawn on 28 June. At 0340 hours, the 3-47th Infantry embarked ATCs in the vicinity of its night defensive location and deployed to conduct beach assaults. E/3-47th Infantry beached at X5708625 and commenced its sweep operations. B/3-47th Infantry deployed to establish a PZ in the vicinity of X8995599 and prepared for airmobile operations. C/3-47th Infantry beached in the vicinity of X8665385 and attacked northwest. At 1015 hours, B/3-47th Infantry was airlifted to X892642 and attacked southwest. In the meantime, the 3-60th Infantry had embarked ATCs and made beach assaults employing Company E at X8695661, and Company A at X8652661. C/3-60th Infantry was airlifted from X8913702 to an LZ located at X645631. Throughout the day, both infantry battalions were employed in extensive airmobile and riverine roles. Multiple insertions were made to seek out the enemy. "People Sniffer" missions conducted throughout the AO indicated high readings of human activity in the areas of X8756253, X715659, X719643 and X822650 earlier in the day. However, both the ground forces and D/3-5th Air Cav were unable to locate and engage the enemy. The 3-47th Infantry continued its operations until 1620 hours; and established night defensive positions at X8790645, X8689598 and X8694613. The 3-60th Infantry established night defensive positions in the vicinity of X8665559, X874556, X865623 and X866957. Throughout the day, the 3-34th Artillery supported the ground forces from FSB UMA located at X5702608. D/3-5th Air Cav continued its support conducting aerial reconnaissance and providing light fire teams. Two airstrikes were employed resulting in five bunkers destroyed and ten structures damaged.

(3) At 0625 hours the operation continued with the 3-47th Infantry moving to FSB UMA in the vicinity of X8706265 for extraction. At 0715 hours, the battalion (-) backloaded ATC and returned to the MRB without incident. The 3-60th Infantry employed C and E Companies in an airmobile assault to the vicinity of X8697598, where they back-loaded ATCs at 0820 hours and returned to the MRB. A and B Company's back-loaded ATCs in the vicinity of their night defensive position at 0748 hours and 0925 hours respectively, and returned to the MRB.
The 3-34th Artillery (-) departed FSB YUNA, and moved to XS98615; the battalion (-) was LIF at 1600 hours.

(4) Operations continued on 30 June with the MEF implementing OPFR Order #4 to OPORD 55-68. The 3-34th Artillery (-) departed the MEB area at 0400 hours to establish FSB GANTENNE in the vicinity of XS8276. The battalion arrived at 0915 hours and was LIF at 1000 hours. A/3-34th Artillery deployed from Dong Tam and joined the battalion at FSB GANTENNE. The 3-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry were employed in beach assault; afterward, both battalions were employed in subsequent airmobile and riverine insertions. At 0415 hours the 3-47th Infantry and 3-60th Infantry embarked ATCs and proceeded up the SONG VAN CO DONG to the AO commonly titled the "Eagle's Beak," B/3-60th Infantry beached, and established FZ NARR (XS886790) and prepared for an airmobile assault to vicinity of XS888835. A/3-50th Infantry beached at RED Beach #1 in the vicinity of XS612760, and Company E was inserted in the vicinity of XS877790. In the meantime, the 3-47th Infantry had beached on GREEN Beaches in the vicinity of XS7776, and was reconnoitering northeast in zone. The 3-47th Infantry encountered no significant contacts during the day; however, at 1330 hours Company A sustained two U.S. KIA and two WIA from a 105mm round booby trap in the vicinity of XS92786. B/3-50th Infantry was airlifted to vicinity of XS88885 at 1115 hours, landing without incident. Shortly thereafter, one of the airlift helicopters was engaged and downed by hostile fire in the vicinity of XS52817; no casualties resulted and the helicopter was later extracted. C/3-50th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault from XS612760 to vicinity of XS517825 at 1316 hours. The battalion made a series of airmobile insertions throughout the day without incident until 1800 hours. At 0430 hours the 3-60th Infantry embarked ATC and proceeded up the SONG VAN CO DONG to the vicinity of XS948271. It received sporadic small arms fire resulting in one U.S. WIA. E/3-50th Infantry found one case of U.S. grenades in the vicinity of XS548271. The infantry battalions subsequently established night defensive positions and employed ambush patrols. The 3-47th Infantry was located in the vicinity of XS59832, XS553891 and XS55812.

(5) Operations continued on 1 July; with the 3-60th Infantry commencing a.m. operations, moving north from its night defensive positions to the vicinity of XS597913 without any significant contact or engagements. Several booby traps were destroyed during the battalion's recon-in-force operation. The 3-60th Infantry (-) was extracted in the vicinity of XS597913 at 1430 hours, and returned to the MEB at 2310 hours. The 3-47th Infantry attacked northeast from its night defensive positions. At 0115 hours, Company C received small arms and M-79 fire resulting in four U.S., WIA. The remainder of the day was spent exploiting intelligence targets using airmobile and riverine insertions without contact or engagements; however, at 0842 hours in the vicinity of XS59790, Company C had one U.S. KIA and two WIA from a 105mm round booby trap. At 1015 hours in the vicinity of XS600785 Company C sustained one U.S. WIA from a booby trap. C (-) and F Company backloaded ATC at 1900 hours, in the vicinity of XS6276 and returned to the MEB. The remainder of the battalion embarked ATC from the vicinity of XS899622 and XS968659, and returned to the MEB.

(6) The MEB concluded the five day operation at 2300 hours when the 3-34th Artillery deployed from FSB GANTENNE to the vicinity of XS53753. As a result of the operation, NVA/VC infiltration activities were evidently reduced. The absence of enemy contact and enemy losses (four VC KIA, two weapons and assorted munitions) were indications of the enemy's desire to evade friendly forces. During the operation three U.S. KIA and eight WIA resulted.

(7) On 2 July the Brigade deployed the 3-60th Infantry to DUCUONG Province to become OPCON to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The 3-60th Infantry was subsequently employed to secure FSBs established in the vicinity of Route #4, OB deployment was
initiated at 1455 hours when A/3-60th Infantry deployed from the NRB to PZ in the vicinity of XS897615. The company was then airlifted to PDB NOBASM in the vicinity of XS2650, Company C to the vicinity of XS4840, and Company B to PDB LANTASY in the vicinity of XS3249. The battalion was deployed to the 3rd Brigade at 1830 hours. The 3-47th Infantry remained at the NRB and employed Company in defense of the NRB and PZ. The 2/3-47th Infantry continued its task of securing a tank (truck) in the vicinity of XS641767. The platoon was employed on a reciprocal search for the tank which fell through a bridge on 30 June. The 3-47th Infantry continued its preparation for operations, and on 4 June commenced reconnaissance in force operations in GO CONG Province.

(8) The Mobile Riverine Force continued offensive operations on 5 July, implementing OP FRAG 1 to OPORD 56-68. The objective of the operation was to conduct riverine and reconnaissance in force operations to locate and destroy the 314th VC Battalion and other enemy elements in HAV, DONG, CHAU TESI Districts, GO CONG Province. The operation was initiated in conjunction with the MRFs subsequent redeployment to DONG TAM. At 0645 hours, the 3-47th Artillery and its escorting river assault craft deployed to establish PSF LANTASY in the vicinity of XS82353. The battalion arrived at 0700 hours and was LSF at 0845 hours. Concurrent with the artillery battalion's departure, the 3-47th Infantry (-) proceeded to the AO to employ its elements in beach assaults; after which, the battalion would attack south and east in zone. A/3-47th Infantry beaches in the vicinity of XS807502 at 0800 hours. B/3-47th Infantry advanced shortly thereafter in the vicinity of XS814505. Both companies moved south and southeast while reconnoitering for the battalion to employ its elements in beach assaults; after which, the battalion would attack south and east in zone. A/3-47th Infantry beaches in the vicinity of XS807502 at 0900 hours. B/3-47th Infantry advanced shortly thereafter in the vicinity of XS814505. Both companies moved south and southeast while reconnoitering for the battalion to employ its elements in beach assaults; after which, the battalion would attack south and east in zone. Another VC was captured by Company E. The battalion continued its operation until 1800 hours, at which time it established night defensive positions employing Company A in the vicinity of XS797492, Company B in the vicinity of XS783923 and Company E in the vicinity of XS797492. D/3-5th Air Cavalry provided aerial reconnaissance and gunship support throughout the day. Neither the air cav troop or the battalion encountered any engagement during the operation.

(9) On 5 July, the MRF continued the operation with the 3-47th Infantry embarking ATCs in the vicinity of its night defensive positions and deploying to Dong Tam. The battalion completed the transit through the CHO GAO Canal, and arrived at 1500 hours. The 3-47th Artillery departed PSF LANTASY at 0945 hours and transited the CHO GAO Canal. The MRF departed the 801 SAP Anchorage at 0645 hours and deployed by way of the South China Sea and MY THO River to Dong Tam; the transit was completed at 1435 hours. The 3-47th Infantry was released from OPORD of the 3rd Brigade and returned to the NRB at 1700 hours.

12. RESULTS:

a. Phase I

(1) Enemy personnel casualties

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(2) Friendly personnel casualties:

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b. Phase II:

(1) Enemy personnel casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040415 thru 051500 Jul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enemy casualties</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Friendly personnel casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>WNHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040415 thru 051500 Jul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total friendly casualties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: None

14. SPECIAL TECHNIQUES: One new technique which was employed successfully was the JITTERBUG. The JITTERBUG concept is a four-step procedure used to locate, fix, develop and finally destroy an enemy target. With absolutely no pre-reconnaissance, the Command & Control (C & C) aircraft of the maneuver element and an LFT or an AC, working as a team, attempt to confirm intelligence target locations or locate new targets. When a target is located, five of the troop-lift aircraft (already loaded and airborne) are inserted to engage the target. If contact is made or enemy movement out of the area is detected, a second set of five lift ships is inserted to block enemy evasion tactics. As the situation develops, additional troop lifts of five or ten aircraft are inserted. By not committing the airmobile maneuver elements until a definite target has been located, troop strength is conserved and the flexibility to react to any enemy move is retained.

15. COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Throughout both phases of Operation TOAN THANG, the presence of the Mobile Riverine Force reduced the facility with which NVA/VC elements could infiltrate and infiltrate the Capital Military District of Saigon. The Brigade's ability to move anywhere, aboard TF 117 ships, itself represents a continuing deterrent to enemy initiatives against cities and installations. The enemy must always consider the fact that the MRF has the capability to operate against his base areas, his routes of communications and his units whenever they may mass to launch attacks. The two phase operation stressed the significant of employing airmobile and riverine assets. Tactics during both phases of the operation substantiated the conclusion that riverine and airmobile means represent logical complements to one another. Assault helicopter companies were employed extensively to enhance the mobility of the Brigade, such that infantry elements were inserted as required within the AOs to locate, fix and destroy the enemy. Airmobile assets are a must, and their availability and utilization can vastly influence the course of a tactical situation. Employment of air cavalry troops 'as support of Brigade operations has had predominant influence in obtaining the desired tactical flexibility during engagements. In addition, the organic firepower of the air cavalry troops contributed toward destroying the enemy.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DENNIS H. SCHUMAN
I-2d, Infantry
Adjutant

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TASK ORGANIZATION

1. OPORD 45-68 (Period 162050 thru 182030 May)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
b. 4-47th Infantry Battalion (-)
c. 3-34th Artillery Battalion (-)
d. 3-39th Infantry Battalion (+) OPCON
e. 4-39th Infantry Battalion (-) OPCON
f. B/7-1st Air Cavalry

g. Assault Helicopter Company

2. OPORD 55-68 (Period 270510 Jun thru 012350 Jul)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
b. 3-50th Infantry Battalion
c. 3-34th Artillery Battalion (-) DS
d. D/3-5th Air Cavalry
e. Assault Helicopter Company

3. Frag Order 1 to OPORD 56-68 (Period 040415 thru 051500 Jul)

HEADQUARTERS, 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

a. 3-47th Infantry Battalion
b. 3-39th Artillery Battalion (-)
c. D/3-5th Air Cavalry

Inclosure 1

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**Combat After Action Report - Operation TOAN THANG, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Div (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, Phase I 16-18 May 68, Phase II 27 Jun-5 Jul 68

CO, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

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**ABSTRACT**

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***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.