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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (28 Jan 67) FOR OT

3 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl a/s

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US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Civil Affairs School
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-PA-C
APO 96227

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I

1. (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities:

   a. (C) Administration and Personnel

      (1) The Headquarters remains assigned to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and operates as a major subordinate command of USARV except that the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam has been given General Courts Martial jurisdiction.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,

Reports control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

1. Normal SI activities have been conducted during the period 1 May 1966 through 31 July 1966.

2. The personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1966 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOE AUTH</th>
<th>MTOE PENDING</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 23rd Art.</td>
<td>17 5 45</td>
<td>24 3 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 11th Art.</td>
<td>33 4 544</td>
<td>37 7 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 27th Art.</td>
<td>33 4 518</td>
<td>36 5 565</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 32nd Art.</td>
<td>33 4 574</td>
<td>34 4 537</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 35th Art.</td>
<td>144 17 2217</td>
<td>114 21 215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MTOE's are being prepared and will be submitted in the near future.

3. Personnel changes during this quarter included:

GAINS: OFF WO 449

I 34

LOSSES: OFF WO 19 I 294

NOTE: The gains far exceed the losses due to influx of replacements for large DEROS losses in August and September 1966.

4. Casualties included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non battle dead</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non battle casualties</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Awards and decorations presented to members of this command included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commendation Medal (Merit)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (merit)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Merit)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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NOTE: In addition to these awards, 104 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

(7) R&R Program

(a) The in-country R&R consisting of 3 day passes to Vung Tau included 4 permanent quotas which were increased to 6 quotas on 19 July.

(b) The out-of-country R&R included the following 5 day quotas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>179</strong></td>
<td><strong>186</strong></td>
<td><strong>436</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest postal section. APO numbers for units are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>46289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Inf Div</td>
<td>46289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hqs, USA RV</td>
<td>96235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>96307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hqs, USA RV</td>
<td>96237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Judicial and non-judicial actions by units included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ARTICLE</th>
<th>SUMMARY COURT</th>
<th>SPECIAL COURT</th>
<th>GENERAL COURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Inf Div</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Arty</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Arty</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Each Battalion and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group, operates a medical section. Pertinent statistics included:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>HHB, 23d Arty Gp</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 32nd Arty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(11) Reportable accidents included:

(12) Personnel Management within the Group has been outstanding. The personnel sections of the four assigned battalions have been consolidated into a Group Personnel Section and co-located in a Group rear base camp. The consolidated personnel section consists of pay, management and records sub-section with a Personnel Warrant Officer supervising each sub-section under the control of the Group SI. This consolidated Group Personnel Section, which is similar to the personnel service division organic to the infantry division, has increased overall efficiency by managing individual battalion reports. It has proven particularly effective in processing replacements and returnees.

(13) The morale of the command is outstanding. The Group SI is appointed on orders as an acting Inspector General and to date no complaints have been received.

(14) The education opportunities for personnel are primarily USAFI and extension courses. No local off duty educational classes are being conducted at this time; however, such a program under the USARV Education Officer is planned.

(15) Religious Services both Protestant and Catholic, are held weekly on regular schedule. The Protestant and Catholic chaplains assigned to this headquarters and the chaplains from the 1st Infantry Division are utilized on an area coverage basis under the supervision of the 1st Infantry Division Chaplain. The Group Catholic and Protestant chaplains visit each battery within the Group once each week for counseling sessions.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) During the month of June the 23rd Artillery Group Intelligence Section conducted a counterintelligence inspection of all Group battalions. The inspection included a check of administrative procedures and a 100% physical inventory of classified documents. All units were rated excellent with no deficiencies noted.
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(2) During the month of July the Group aerial observers en-
countered three (3) incidents of FM radio jamming. The incidents occurred
on the 5th, 6th, and 18th of July over widely scattered areas in III Corps
Tactical Zone. Specific details were forwarded to II FFV and MACV.

(3) Presently, the Intelligence Section is supervising the
training of observers of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery to qualify them
as aerial observers.

c. (S) Training

(1) On 13 July 1966 the 23rd Group published Training Circular
Number 1 which prescribes a replacement training program for subordinate
commands. In addition to an initial briefing and orientation, personnel
will receive 40 hours of instruction semi-annually. Subjects to be covered
include squad tactics, patrolling, hand grenades, mines and booby traps,
demolitions, personal hygiene and field sanitation, fundamentals of airmobile
operations, and survival, escape and evasion. In addition, the replacement
training program also requires each subordinate unit to instruct replacements
on unit organic weapons and conduct familiarization firing of these weapons
to include test fire and battlesight zero of assigned weapons.

(2) Training of aerial observers continues on a recurring and
as needed basis. The Group Headquarters is presently training observers
from the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery to qualify them as aerial observers.

(3) During the period 16 May to 24 May 1966, selected personnel
of the 23rd Group, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery and 6th Battalion, 27th
Artillery attended Nuclear Weapons Refresher Training conducted by 2nd
Battalion, 76th Artillery in Korea. Personnel of the Group consisting
of officers and enlisted men departed Bien Hoa AFB on 140700 May 1966 and
arrived at Kimpo AFB, ROK on 142130 May 1966. Personnel returned to RVN
on 251030 May 1966. The officer-in-charge of the 23rd Group personnel stated
in his critique that the refresher training was very worth while and was
presented in a professional manner. The nuclear Weapons Refresher Training
presented by 8th US Army was considered beneficial to Group personnel.

(4) On the job training and individual cross training continues
in all sections and units of the 23rd Artillery Group. During the next
quarter, the vast majority of Group personnel who originally departed the
U.S. in October 1965 will rotate. However, no problems are anticipated.

d. (S) Operations

(1) Change of Command. At 011600H June 1966 Colonel Thomas H.
Sayes assumed command of the 23rd Artillery Group from Colonel James H.
Dyson. Among some of the visitors attending the ceremony were LTG Heintges.
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Deputy CG, MACV, LTG Engler, Deputy CGUSARV, MG DePuy, CG 1st Infantry Division, and MG Weyand, CG 25th Infantry Division. Colonel Sayes came to the Group from II Field Force Vietnam Artillery where he held the position of Executive Officer. Colonel Dyson assumed the position as Assistant Chief of Staff of II Field Force Vietnam.

(2) Assignment of a new battalion. The major event during this reporting period was the assignment, staging and deployment of the 2nd Battalion (155) (SP) 35th Artillery. The battalion was assigned to the 23rd Artillery Group effective 23 June 1966 by USARV General Orders Number 4270 dated 29 June 1966. The 35th Artillery was stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado when it was alerted on 10 January 1966 for overseas movement. The battalion was organized under TOE 6-425D and was a 5th US Army unit attached to the 5th Infantry Division (Mech). On 11 March 1966, the battalion received 260 AIT fillers from Fort Sill to bring it up to a strength of 90%. An intensive training program was culminated during 13-14 April when the battalion successfully completed its AIT. An advance party consisting of 3 officers and 20 enlisted men arrived in-country on 13 June 1966. 23 June 1966 the main body of the battalion arrived in the staging area at Bien Hoa Base. The first round was fired by the battalion from the staging area on 11 July 1966.

(3) Local Pacification. The Phu Loi Pacification Program began on 22 May 1966. Operation Lam Son II, as it is called, is sponsored by the 1st Infantry Division and is a joint undertaking composed of a 1st Infantry Division maneuver battalion, Division Artillery personnel and personnel from tenant units located at Phu Loi. The 23rd Artillery Group provides personnel and equipment to the Task Force Headquarters. The pacification Program is a joint US-ARVN undertaking oriented to both military and civic action. Since the pacification effort began, there has been a marked decrease in attacks and night harassment of the Phu Loi base camp area. The last mortar attack upon this installation was 21 May 1966 and resulted in no damage.

(4) Deployment during the past quarter.

(a) The newest addition to the 23rd Artillery Group, the 2nd Battalion (155) (SP), 35th Artillery, began deployment from the staging area on 19 July 1966 with Headquarters, Batteries B and C moving to Xuan Loc. Locations are Headquarters (XT47310966), Battery B (XT47310982) and Battery C (XT47340950). The Battalion (-) has the mission of General Support Reinforcing the 10th ARVN Division Artillery with Headquarters at Xuan Loc. Service Battery, 35th Artillery is located at Long Binh (XT052112). Battery A, 35th Artillery was escorted to its permanent position at Nui Dat (YS4281655) on 22 July 1966 by a security element of the 1st Australian Task Force. Battery A has the mission of reinforcing the 1st Australian Artillery Regiment of the 1st Australian Task Force.
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(b) In May, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery was alerted to move a composite 8"/175mm battery to Xuan Loc to provide long range, heavy artillery fires in a general support reinforcing role to the 10th ARVN Division and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) located in the vicinity. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery, consisting of two 8 inch howitzers and two 175mm guns, moved to Xuan Loc (XT465085) on 23 June 1966. The move was made in conjunction with 173rd Airborne Brigade during Operation Yorktown. Battery A was previously located at Cu Chi.

(c) Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery continued the mission of General Support - Reinforcing the 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery at Bien Hoa until 9 June 1966 when the battery moved to a new permanent position at Bear Cat (YS172996). Its mission was changed to General Support - Reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery. A 175mm gun tube was exchanged to replace an 8 inch howitzer tube, thereby making the battery a mixed caliber unit of three 8 inch howitzers and one 175mm gun.

(d) Other permanent change of station involved the move of the Group Consolidated Personnel Section and Service Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery to Long Binh (XT045079) on 9 June 1966. The personnel section was previously located at Tan Son Nhut with Service Battery, 35th Artillery. Overcrowding of that area necessitated the movement of these units. Service battery of the 32nd Artillery moved to Cu Chi (XT640146) on 5 June 1966.

(e) With the exception of the above changes the remaining units of the Group remain situated as reported in the last Quarterly Report.

(5) Control of the Phu Loi Base Camp.

(a) On 5 June 1966, the 23rd Artillery Group assumed the responsibility for a sector of the Phu Loi installation. The Group Executive Officer was appointed commander of the perimeter of this sector and he coordinates the defense of the sector as well as patrol actions in out-lying areas of the sector.

(b) The 23rd Artillery Group assumed responsibility for the complete Phu Loi Installation and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery TAOR twice during Operation Birmingham and from 9 June to 27 July 1966 during Operation ELPASO II. The responsibilities assumed included coordinating the defense of the Phu Loi Installation, coordinating operational matters affecting the installation and clearing and coordinating fires in the surrounding Division Artillery TAOR. The responsibilities and authority associated with the assumption of control of the Phu Loi Base Camp are being formalized in writing.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
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(6) Tactical Standing Operating Procedures Published. On 2 July 1966 the 23d Artillery Group published its Tactical SOP. Having gained considerable experience in Vietnam, the Group's Tactical SOP is oriented for actual conditions as they exist in Vietnam.

(7) Future Deployment Plans.

(a) The 23d Artillery Group has been directed by IIFFV Artillery to prepare a scale drawing for the Layout of a 105mm (Towed) Howitzer Battalion for the My Tho Area (XS471448) for future occupation by a unit yet to arrive in Vietnam. Preliminary reconnaissance has been completed. The Group also has a requirement to plan for the deployment of 8"/175mm composite battery at Ben Luc (XS625767).

(b) Presently, plans are being made for the deployment of a composite 8"/175mm battery to the Tay Ninh area (XT170515). It is anticipated that the location of this battery will be within the area occupied by the 196th Infantry Brigade in the Tay Ninh Area. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery is the unit currently slated for this move. The battery is presently located at Lai Khe. Contingency planning for artillery to the Tay Ninh area provides for the deployment of another composite battery (8"/175mm) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery plus the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery.

(c) Each of the artillery batteries previously discussed are presently in-country. Plans for the stationing of artillery units in-country during the next 5 months are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Estimated Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 111th Artillery (155mm Towed)</td>
<td>Sep 66</td>
<td>Xuan Loc (XT460092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm, SP)</td>
<td>Oct 66</td>
<td>Cu Chi (XT650150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNB, Svc &amp; 2 FB</td>
<td></td>
<td>Long Binh (XT052110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (175mm)</td>
<td>Oct 66</td>
<td>Bear Cat (XT170000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNB, Svc &amp; IBF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ba Ria (XS430666)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FB</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (U)

1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (8", SP) Nov 66

HHB, Svc & 1 FB

Ba Ria (YS430666)

1 FB

Bear Cat (XT170000)

1 FB

Xuan Loc (XT460092)

(d) The redistribution of artillery units presently in-country and the deployment of these units scheduled from COMUS will allow a more complete artillery coverage of the III ARVN Corps Tactical Zone and support of US maneuver elements programmed for this area.

(e) The major considerations for moving heavy artillery into the Tay Ninh area are as follows:

1 To protect and support the FWMAP planned for this location.

2 To provide artillery coverage of the newly established Special Forces camp at Trai B4 (XT180515) which intercepts Highway 22, an important VC supply route from Cambodia.

3 To provide artillery coverage of War Zone C.

4 To cover infiltration routes along the Cambodian border.

5 To provide artillery coverage of the Michelin Rubber Plantation.

(8) Total missions and ammunition expended. The total number of missions fired and ammunition expended during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NO OF MSNS FIRED</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/13 Artillery</td>
<td>5,158</td>
<td>39,539</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27 Artillery</td>
<td>11,468</td>
<td>10,787</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/32 Artillery*</td>
<td>5,986</td>
<td>5,116</td>
<td>6,457</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Artillery</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On 30 June 1966 Colonel Sayes fired the 25,000th round of heavy artillery fired by the 32d Artillery since arrival in Vietnam.

SECRET
(9) Studies.

(a) On 22 July 1966 the 32d Artillery's Meteorological Section was sent to Nui Dat along with Battery A, 35th Artillery for the purpose of conducting a metro study of the Xuan Loc - Nui Dat areas. The requirement is to determine the similarity of metro conditions between the two areas. If weather conditions are similar then only one metro station will be required. As of 31 July the study continues.

(b) In June an evaluation of the Collimator, Infinity, Aiming, M-1 was completed. The Group had asked for the collimator for use in Vietnam. The 27th Artillery and 32d Artillery were issued the collimators in May. Both units reported the instrument to be highly satisfactory. EIR's were submitted by both units in July outlining suggested improvements.

(10) Increase of 175mm difficulties. Considerable safety restrictions were imposed on the 175mm weapon system during the past quarter. These restrictions caused increased "down time" for the 175mm system and for brief periods significantly reduced the 175mm capability of the Group. These limitations involved now tube life (400 rounds), breech assembly, breech ring, powder, ammunition, restrictions on firing Zone 3, additive jacket, and firing procedures (use of a 50 foot lanyard under certain conditions). While these limitations were initially frustrating, the unit had learned to adjust to them. The value of the weapon, even with these restrictions, is still appreciable and the effectiveness of the weapons on the war effort is still considered a major one.

(11) Operations participation. 23d Artillery Group units participated in the following major operations during the past quarter: Birmingham, Turkey Shoot, El Paso II, Bluefield, Yorktown, Fireball, El Paso III, Aurora, Kahana I, Adelaide, Rolling Stone, Lam Son II, Cedar Rapids II, and Springfield.

(e) (C) Logistics.

(1) General: (a) During the period 1 May 1966 to 31 July 1966, the general condition of supplies has improved. This is especially true of Class II and IV (general supplies). There are still some problem areas of supply which remain, but they are in the process of being resolved.

(b) Maintenance support for the units has improved in this quarter, but is a foreseeable problem in the next quarter as additional units are added to the Group and the area of coverage of units is expended in III CTZ.

(2) Transportation: Vehicle assets within the group are
still insufficient to meet the requirements of resupplying the more remote and isolated units of the Group. Route clearing & security requirements necessitate that convoys to the more remote areas be held to a minimum. More frequent convoys would alleviate the requirement for the additional vehicles required to move the unusually large tonnages into these remote areas. Augmentation transportation has been more available this last quarter, but not always in the quantities and type vehicles required. As the buildup of new units continue, additional vehicle support from logistical units will be more difficult to obtain because the transportation will be committed to port clearance and support of newly arrived units.

(3) Maintenance, care and repair of equipment. (a) Stockage levels of repair parts for M110 and M107 were greatly improved in the last quarter. The 185th Ordnance Battalion was able to support most of the requirements for repair parts, however, there were some repair parts that were required to be placed on Red Ball to expedite its arrival in the theater. One problem area is the lack of float sights to replace unserviceable sights on M110's and M107's. Modified sights that were expected from CONUS during the quarter have not arrived in the theater. In relation to the last quarter, the down time per maintenance failure of M110/M107 has been reduced. One limiting factor for repair of M110-M107 is the lack of organic air transportation to maintenance support units to move larger repair parts to areas where the weapons are deadlined. This adds additional time to weapon downtime. Group aircraft have been used extensively to move smaller repair parts to units of the Group. Contact teams of the 185th Ordnance Bn have been placed with the more isolated units of the group to expedite the troubleshooting and determining the requirements of repair parts at these more remote locations. Tube replacements and breech assembly replacement continues to be a problem. Due to present restrictions on M107 it is expected that tubes will require replacement every thirty days and breech assemblies every 90-120 days. This will mean a major supply as well as a maintenance problem. EIR's are continuing to be submitted on M110-M107. Many replies to EIR's have already been received by the units.

(b) Maintenance of generators continues to be a problem within the Group. Shortages of repair parts continue to hamper the repair of generators. The time that generators are Equipment Deadline for Parts (EDP) continues to be high, although there has been some improvement this quarter over the last quarter. Additional heavy generators have been received by units of the Group resulting in a improved power situation and a decline in the number of small tactical generators being used to furnish necessary power to operations centers, etc. This should result in a decrease during the next quarter of the numbers of tactical generators that will be on deadline. The 178th Engineer Company (DS) has been placed in support of generators of the Group and should expedite the repair of generators.
(c) The DX system for fatigues, boots and clothing has continued to improve. Quantities and sizes available at the DX points have increased during the quarter. The transition of receiving personnel without TA50-901 equipment after 1 July 1966 will undoubtedly strain the system and cause a shortage of TA50-901 equipment at the unit level during the next quarter. Jungle fatigues and jungle boots are still not being issued in quantities at the DX points to replace worn out fatigues and jungle boots.

(d) Repair parts are still a problem for the M211 trucks. the 2nd Bn, 13th Artillery was short 25 trucks when the unit was finally issued the necessary M3A2 trucks. Other units have had trouble keeping the M211 trucks operational. All M211 trucks should be replaced by the M3A2 at the earliest possible date. M211 trucks will continue to fail and be salvaged causing tactical units to be short of needed equipment. Additionally, this problem requires the units to maintain two PLL's to support the vehicles in the unit.

(4) Supply Operations.

(a) Supply of Class V to isolated units from ASP's continues to strain the vehicle assets of the Group. There is a great need for forward ASP's to be established to cut down the time/distance factor for the service batteries to move the high tonnages of Class V to the firing units. Airlift of Class V is difficult to obtain and is not profitable.

(b) The movement of Class II and IV repair parts should be given higher priority for heavy artillery to reduce ED times. Aircraft should be made more responsive to expediting high priority arts to the more outlying areas.

(5) Staging of New Units: The staging of the new battalion joining the group presented several problems that had to be solved prior to the arrival of the advance party. Advance notification of the arrival of new units is poor. Problem areas and solutions were as listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM AREA</th>
<th>SOLUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Selection of secure staging area.</td>
<td>Site was selected on Bien Hoa Air Base within the defensive perimeter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Prepositioning of tents and mess equipment for newly arriving unit.</td>
<td>Mess equipment secured from a unit that had just completed staging and had received its TAT; extra tentage was borrowed from several units of the Group and other units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PROBLEM AREA</strong></th>
<th><strong>SOLUTION</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c) Transportation for unit upon arrival in RVN.</td>
<td>Units of the Group were levied for vehicles; II FFVA provided some additional vehicles. 48th Transportation from airstrip to the staging area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Rations for main body upon arrival and feeding upon arrival.</td>
<td>Property accounts were obtained and ration account opened at Long Binh for the advance party. Personnel were levied from units to provide the first meal for the main body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Off loading of equipment</td>
<td>A recon was made of the dock areas by the arriving unit personnel and a route was outlined for rapid move-out of material from the harbor to the staging area. The unit organized an unloading system to control equipment and prevent loss of equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Movement to tactical position area of supplies, advance party.</td>
<td>Use was made of 173d Airborne Brigade convoys to Xuan Loc area to send in the advance party and to shuttle supplies as they become available to Xuan Loc Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Engineer effort for construction and water in area.</td>
<td>Engineers at 5th ARVN Div and II FFV and 159th Engineer Group provided necessary engineer support for 23d Arty Group areas at Xuan Loc. Water was contracted on supply point distribution from commercial sources. Eventually the unit will have piped the water from commercial sources. Construction was provided by a unit of 159th Engineer Group. Grading and building construction started prior to arrival of main body.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(i) Movement of unit cargo from Cam Ranh Bay to Saigon. Transportation delays encountered and became intolerable before the equipment was moved. Command action was taken through 1st Log Command expedite movement of cargo to Saigon. The last LST with cargo arrived on 15 July 1966. The unit cargo arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 27 June 1966.

(ii) Logistical support for separate battery is Ba Ria, RVN. Logistical support was arranged for support of the separate battery at Ra Ria through Rang Tau Sub Area. All support seems to be satisfactory. Rarely the unit will be required to support itself until other elements join it in that area.

(6) Problem areas.

(a) The short tube life of M107 weapons continues to be a problem. Present criteria is 400 EFC rounds, no more that 300 zone three; zone 1 and 2 are equivalent to .24 of EFC round.

(b) A white phosphorous round is still not available for M107 or M110's.

(c) PLL and higher echelon repair parts are still in short supply, both the 185th Ordnance Bn is keeping close control of all spares to keep the M107/M110's operational. The situation of repair parts is greatly improved over the last quarter.

(d) Vehicle support of convoys with group assets continued to be a problem. The infrequent moves to the more remote units places a requirement for large numbers of vehicles to support the convoys. Outside vehicle support continues to be limited. Additional 5 ton vehicles are required in the Service Batteries to adequately resupply the large tonnages of Class V required in the firing units.

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(a) There continues to be a shortage of meteorological expendables. Very few supplies have been received by the units of the 23d Artillery Group. Additional supply action is required to make these expendables more readily available.

f. (C) Aviation

(1) General. The number of aircraft remained constant throughout the reporting period with a total of nine O1 aircraft, five CH13 helicopters, and one U6 Utility airplane in the Group. Availability of O1 airplanes improved during the period with an average availability of seven aircraft. CH13 helicopters had high availability during May and June but in July, this fell to an average of one aircraft. Two CH13's were down for engine change and two were in field maintenance for overhaul of the rotor system. The major problem causing the downtime was lack of repair parts in the supply system. Since this problem is prevalent for CH13's models, early resolution of the problem is not anticipated.

(2) Performance. The Group flew 4,922 sorties logging 2,880 combat hours during the reporting period. Each type aircraft passed and exceeded the combat flying hour program prescribed by US Army Vietnam. Basic performance statistics are listed below:

(a) O1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Recon</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Cmbt Art</th>
<th>Admin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) U6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Trans</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Flare</th>
<th>Admin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Flying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(c) OH-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Cmd &amp; Control</th>
<th>Recon</th>
<th>Admin</th>
<th>Total Pax</th>
<th>422</th>
<th>341</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Utility aircraft. The presence of a utility airplane in the Group paid dividends during the reporting period. This was mainly in the area of parts resupply. Elements of the Group was scattered in the III Corps Tactical Zone from Tay Ninh, Loc Ninh and An Loc in the northwest to Xuan Loc and Bear Cat in the southeast. Resupply of critical repair parts and movement of ordnance repair teams by air significantly reduced deadline time of artillery weapons and other vital equipment. Mail, laundry, rations, personnel replacements, PX supplies, and numerous other small but critical commodities were hauled on a daily basis to batteries remotely located from parent battalions and base camps. The U6 picked up repair parts from supply agencies as far away as Cam Ranh Bay to keep critical items of equipment in operation. The problem of having only utility type aircraft was emphasized when the U6 was grounded for scheduled maintenance. Responsive outside support was generally not available and consequently vital supplies did not get moved. The requirement for an organic utility helicopter was clearly established during expanded field operations. Batteries were often located some distance from a fixed wing strip and since the ground routes to these strips were generally not secure only helicopter resupply was feasible.

(4) Aircraft Requirements. The arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery without the TOE aviation augmentation created problems similar to those experienced by the other battalions of the Group before receipt of an aviation section. Prior to the battalions arrival, action was initiated to obtain an aviation section consisting of two C1 airplanes and one OH-13 helicopter. To date no action has been taken on this request. The Group Headquarters provides an aircraft an aircraft daily to the battalion but this is inadequate for operational requirements and reduces to some extent the Group's visual reconnaissance program. The Group also initiated a request for one UH-1B helicopter for the Headquarters but no action has been taken to date.

(5) Training. Aviator training continued throughout the period. No new aviators were added to the Group and the one aviator in orientation training at the end of the previous quarter completed all phases of the checkout training. An instrument training program was initiated in May to keep all aviators qualified and current in instrument flying. Benefits of the training have been realized on a number of night reconnaissance missions when weather closed in suddenly and an instrument
landing approach was required to return to home base. Major emphasis is placed on developing the capability to land by GCA (Ground Controlled Radar Approach) under conditions of a ceiling of less than 100 feet and visibility less than 2½ mile. Air Observer training continued with 12 new observers becoming rated. A period of 30 days is generally required to provide new observers with the basic fundamentals and the advanced level of techniques used in day and night surveillance. Night reconnaissance poses the greatest obstacle toward development of all ground observers. The problem area is orientation and getting the first rounds in the general area of the target. Illumination using the aircraft flares from the Group U6, Air Force flare ships, or ground illumination is used, but unless continuous illumination is available the air observer can become hopelessly disoriented and even experience vertigo when sudden blackness prevails, following illumination burnout.

(6) Maintenance. Despite field maintenance problems associated with the OH-13S, organization level maintenance improved throughout the quarter. The Group constructed a hanger (made out of ammo boxes) which afforded a dry area for aircraft maintenance during the rainy season. The hanger is also equipped with extensive lighting providing a continuous around the clock maintenance program. This single facility has been largely responsible for the low down time for organizational level maintenance. The Group still does not have a qualified technical inspector. Primary reliance is placed on the direct support maintenance unit for quality control of organization maintenance. The percent of fill of the PLL/ASL of aircraft repair parts dropped from 70-80 percent to approximately 35 percent. This is a temporary situation caused by the 200 plus percent increase in the number of line items authorized plus the authorization to stock at least two of every item. Requisitions have been submitted for the additional parts and parts are now coming in daily to bring up the PLL/ASL up to authorized stockage levels.

(7) Problem areas to be encountered during the next reporting period.

(a) Aviator Rotations. During the next three months, one third of the assigned aviators will be rotated. This includes all but one of the aviators with an extensive aviation background. With one exception, incoming replacements will be aviators just out of the Army Aviation School. During the transition period, the number of day/night reconnaissance missions will be reduced due to the lower skill level and extra flight time required for training. Average time required to fully transition an aviator in all types of operations varies between three and six weeks, depending on the skill level of the individual.
(d) Aircraft allocation to units of the Group. As pointed out earlier, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed without its TOE aviation augmentation. New units arriving in the next quarter are not deploying with aviation sections even though they are organic to heavy battalions and augmented to light and medium battalions. Lack of the organic aviation element renders the target acquisition capability of the battalion ineffective. The employment of two O1 airplanes and one OH13 helicopter by the three battalions in the Group during the past six months has clearly and repeatedly established the requirement for organic aviation. Prior to the build up of organic aviation assets, the ratio of observed to unobserved fires was lopsided in favor of the latter. The current ratio is more in balance although it is still unacceptable as vast expanses of the III Corps Tactical Zone are still uncovered. Tests of unobserved fires conducted in July showed that, while most unobserved fire impacted in the so-called box for a perfect score on an ATT, the tolerances preclude reliably interdicting pin point targets such as crossing sites, road junctions, etc. Greater efforts are being made to increase the number of observed fire missions. Following the aircraft request for the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery, USARV initiated a study to determine aviation requirements for all corps support units. The study is still underway, however, indications are that assets in the Group may be spread among some 10 or more battalions with each battalion having only one O1 airplane. The allocation of assets would be completely unacceptable as the presence of only one aircraft in a battalion means simply that 10 days out of a month a battalion would have no aircraft due to maintenance and no aircraft would be available for backup. The removal of an OH13 from the battalion renders command and control ineffective. This is equally vital when a battalion operates with units scattered over a 50 X 60 mile area. Aviation is so vital to daily target acquisition and operations of the artillery that non-availability of immediately responsive aircraft in this combat zone is unqualifiedly unacceptable. This Headquarters is exerting maximum effort to obtain the necessary aviation assets required by each of the assigned battalions. MTOE’s have been submitted to USARV for the Group Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery. These MTOE’s incorporate the aviation requirements needed to support operations in Vietnam. MTOE’s are now being prepared for the remaining battalions and will be submitted during the month of August.

g. (U) Civic Action

(1) The 23rd Artillery Group initiated a major civic action project during the month of June. It is called the Gadsden Project so named because it is being supported by funds from the city of Gadsden, Alabama. The goal of the project is to eventually construct a Vietnamese
village named Gadsden which will provide homes for approximately 200 refugee families. The actual site of the village is East of Phu Cuong.

(2) The idea for the village was conceived shortly after the arrival of the 23rd Group in Vietnam when the City of Gadsden, Alabama adopted the Group and agreed to sponsor the Group in the establishment of the village. Plans for the Gadsden Project were finalized during the week of 8-14 May 1966, when the Sergeants Major of the Group were flown to Gadsden, Alabama to participate in 23rd Artillery Group Week. Shortly thereafter the Group began receiving money, clothing, toys, candy and toilet articles which were distributed to the refugees who were selected for the project. In order to provide continuity and control, a Major was assigned full time duties of steering the Gadsden Project.

(3) The project was well received by the local District Chief and the USAID Representative. Land was donated by the District Chief and a squad of ARVN soldiers provides security for the refugees while they busy working on the village. The clearing of jungle and undergrowth has been completed for 60 homes. Thirty families have been selected to participate in the initial block of houses. Each family furnishes one worker daily to contribute labor thereby making the construction a community project. Military personnel from the Group volunteer to instruct workers in the necessary construction skills such as stonemasonry and carpentry. In addition, military skills and equipment are used for surveying roads and homesites, constructing drainage ditches and landscaping.

(4) On 27 June 1966 work began on the foundations and construction of several houses. As of the close of the reporting period about 8 houses have been completed. Occupancy of those houses will begin in the near future. In order to plot progress and resolve difficulties, frequent meetings are held between interested Vietnamese, USAID and 23rd Artillery Group personnel.

(5) The Gadsden Project promises to be a unique and interesting civic action project with many promising rewards. The fact that a US City is sponsoring a Vietnamese Village adds to the enthusiasm of all concerned for the success of the project.

h. (U) Communications

(1) During the month of May, the communications section supervised the receipt, installation and issuance of the new AN/VRC-12 series of FM radios and conducted turn in of the old series FM radios. Maintenance activities were stressed to insure compliance with directives
and efforts were directed toward increasing the operational capabilities at fixed locations. A duplicate wire system of lines terminating at the 1st Infantry Division Artillery Operations Center was installed at the 23rd Group Operations Center to be used when the Group took over control of the Phu Loi base camp. The system requires 22 circuits to accomplish its purpose. Two transfers were completed during the reporting period. Extensive improvements were made in wire systems throughout the Group, such as construction of overheads, culvert crossings, and installation of terminal boards.

(2) Amplitude modulated radio telephone and teletype continued to perform excellently. There were fewer intense electrical storms that the previous reporting period. Hence, there were few outages due to inclimate weather. However lately the Group has had difficulty communicating with Xuan Loc.

(3) Additional VHF circuits to firing units have been installed and the only circuits remaining to be installed are those circuits from Lai Khe to Cu Chi and Phuec Vinh to Bear Cat. Other considerations for circuits from battalions to distant organic batteries are being staffed.

(4) The previous reporting period indicated a maintenance non-operational percentage of 38%. Due to increased maintenance efforts, air resupply of repair parts, and increase in available float supplies and improvement of the technical skill of maintenance personnel the 38% non-operational figure has been reduced to an average of 20%.

SECTION II

1. Section II, Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. (C) Personnel

   (1) Requisition of blank forms and publications

   (a) Item: Requirements for blank forms and publications.

   (b) Discussion: Under difficulties arise when blank forms and publications are not readily available. The delay encountered from the time of submitting a requisition until receipt of items is excessive.
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(c) Observation: Units must anticipate their requirements for blank forms and publications by at least three months.

(2) Personnel Management Organization

(a) Item: Consolidated Group Personnel Section

(b) Discussion: Group units are spread over the III Corps Tactical Zone in an area 50 miles by 50 miles making personnel management very difficult.

(c) Observation: By consolidating battalion personnel sections under the Group SI and organizing sub-sections of pay management and records, the net result has been an increase in personnel service efficiency and a reduction in individual battalion reports.

(3) Superior Performance Pay

(a) Item: Loss of Proficiency Pay (Superior Performance)

(b) Discussion: The loss of Proficiency Pay (SP) selected personnel has become a morale problem. The present system of awarding proficiency pay on a percentage basis for each MOS has resulted in personnel previously drawing proficiency pay having it terminated because the number of personnel authorized the award was exceeded by the number previously drawing it.

(c) Observation: As an interim solution it is suggested that all personnel having been awarded proficiency pay (SP) by virtue of attainment of a minimum qualifying evaluation test score, be authorized continuation of proficiency pay (SP) while in Vietnam if, by reason of assignment to Vietnam, they could not be tested on the regularly scheduled test date for their MOS. It is further suggested that the present system be continued if the number of personnel drawing proficiency pay (SP) does not exceed the authorized percentages. As an ultimate solution, it is recommended that complete MOS proficiency testing be instituted within USARV.

b. (C) Operations

(1) Movement of ammunition during the monsoon season
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(a) Item: Movement of Ammunition
(b) Discussion: While on Operation Birmingham, the 32d Artillery experienced difficulty moving ammunition with 5 ton wheeled vehicles. Artillery bases were frequently established in rice paddies and wheeled vehicles often became stuck when leaving the primary road network.
(c) Observation: Tracked vehicles make better overall ammunition carriers. APC's pulling ammunition trailer may be used with success.

(2) Rapid Fire on targets of opportunity
(a) Item: Rapid engagement of targets.
(b) Discussion: Air observers, upon discovering targets, formerly called Group operations for clearance and designation of unit to fire.
(c) Observation: By having the air observer select a firing unit and call the fire mission direct to the unit and having the firing unit obtain clearance, time was saved.

c. (C) Intelligence

(1) Movement patterns of the Viet Cong
(a) Item: Night patrols were making less contact with VC in the Phu Loi Area.
(b) Discussion: In order to avoid friendly patrols, the VC changed their tactics from moving under cover of darkness to moving in the daytime.
(c) Observation: By increasing the day patrols more contact was made with the VC.

(2) Area Coverage
(a) Item: More territory can be covered with smaller patrols.
(b) Discussion: By decreasing the size of patrols and increasing the area coverage more contact was made with the VC. Large size patrols are more easily spotted.
(c) Observation: To increase area coverage and reduce the sighting of large patrols, smaller patrols with increased fire power should be employed.

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d. (U) Logistics

(1) Staging of units

(a) Reducing problems associated with staging units.

(b) Discussion: The problems associated with staging of units are many and constant supervision is necessary to cover all areas.

(c) Observation: Developing a check list and assigning specific staff responsibilities will greatly facilitate the orderly staging of units.

e. (U) Civic Action

(1) Project Construction by Vietnamese

(a) Item: The Gadsden project utilizes Vietnamese labor.

(b) Discussion: The Vietnamese are more apt to react unfavorably to VC destruction of projects if they, the Vietnamese, helped build the project.

(c) Observation: By allowing the Vietnamese to participate in local projects they are more likely to react to VC destruction of these projects than if they were solely built by U.S. personnel.

2. Section II, Part 2, Recommendations

a. (C) A white phosphorous (WP) round be produced for the 175mm gun and 8" howitzer.

b. (C) Units deploying arrange to have generators shipped with the TAT package.

c. (C) EIR's on the Collimator, Infinity Aiming M-1 recommending the following modifications be approved:

(1) A hood similar to the one on the aiming post light be fabricated to prevent the collection of rain drops on the objective lens to prevent blurring of the sight picture.

(2) The reticle "push-to-use" switch on the remote control unit be modified into a two position on-off switch so that the reticle may remain illuminated without the switch having to be continually depressed thus allowing the gunner the use of both hands.

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(3) A carrying bracket be constructed on the M107 and M110 for transporting the collimator.

d. (U) The idea of American communities sponsoring refugee villages such as the Gadsden project be widely publicized and encouraged since it is a unique people-to-people project.

e. (C) Action be taken to insure that artillery units arriving in Vietnam have TOE aviation augmentation intact. Artillery units in Vietnam without adequate aviation are ineffective.

f. (U) One UH-1B helicopter be readily available to the Group Headquarters to deliver vital repair parts, transport personnel, and conduct limited resupply of critical items to the Group's four battalions.

g. (U) Additional transport vehicles described in MTOEs submitted by this Headquarters be assigned to Service Batteries to adequately support heavy artillery units.

h. (C) Immediate action be taken to raise the level of meteorological expendables for artillery units in Vietnam.

i. (U) A package of equipment, to include tents and mess equipment, be made available to sponsoring units of newly arriving units.

j. (U) All M211 model trucks be replaced by the M35A2 model.

k. (C) Forward Ammunition Supply Points be established to reduce the time/distance factor required for Service Batteries to support firing batteries.

l. (C) Consideration be given to the development of small transmitter to "seed" jungle areas and VC supply routes to detect activity. The signal device should be sensitive enough to detect troops walking. By monitoring an appropriate receiver and plotting the signals, troop movements and concentrations could be determined.

m. (C) Consideration be given to the development of a "homing" transmitter signal device for Army Aircraft which can be activated manually by a downed able pilot or which will activate automatically be ground impact of a downed aircraft.

THOMAS H. SAYES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFCB-65 (U))

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266

AUG 29 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) The Operational Report for the quarterly period 1 May - 31 July submitted by the 23d Artillery Group covers comprehensively the activities of the Group during the quarterly period.

2. (C) The following comments are made on the problem areas/recommendations contained in the report:
   
   a. Ref Section I, para 1e(3), page 11. The lack of maintenance float sights has unnecessarily deadlined M10 and M107 weapons.
   
   b. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2a, page 23. Concur. On 5 December 1965, the 23d Artillery Group, in a letter to USAHV, requested that white phosphorous (WP) rounds, which were then reported to be undergoing engineering tests be shipped to RVN for field testing. Also in 3d Indorsement, AVXF-C, HQ II FFORCEV, dated 27 May 1966, subject Draft Proposed Small Development Requirement (SDR) for Projectile, Marking and Screening, Heavy Gun, 175mm (U), a recommendation was made that the marking and screening projectiles then under development be sent to RVN for field testing. To date this ammunition has not arrived.
   
   c. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2b, page 23. Concur. Generators are now included in TAT packages accompanying units to Vietnam.
   
   d. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2c, page 23. Concur.
   
   e. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2d, page 24. Concur. This project should be given wide publicity in CONUS.
   
   f. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2e, page 24. Concur. This has been made a matter of comment in letter, AVFPAC, this headquarters, dated 14 Aug 66, subj: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Section II, Part 2, para 1.
   
   g. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2f, page 24. Concur. On 9 June this headquarters requested an aviation augmentation consisting of 5 utility helicopters and 3 observation helicopters pending the deployment of a corps artillery aviation battery to RVN for II FFORCEV Artillery. If this augmentation is approved, a utility helicopter will be made available to 23d Arty Group.
h. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 21, page 24. Concur. Even though a unit ships its combat essential equipment as "YELLOW TAC," it is not always immediately available because of delays in arrival times of some ships. In such a case it would be extremely helpful if such a package were available.


l. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2m, page 24. Concur. Such an item is available now for Air Force aircraft and should be installed in Army aircraft.

REMARKS

CONFIDENTIAL WHEN SEPARATED FROM BASIC LETTER

GEORGE H. ALLIN, JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Acting Commander
AVFBC-H (12 Aug 66) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 submitted by Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The actions taken by HQ, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery appear to cover adequately the recommendations contained in Section II, subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
WILLIAM K. HAGY
Major ARMOR
Act Asst AG.

1 Incl
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RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CINC-PAC

1. (a) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 submitted by Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (c) The following comments are made on the problem area/recommendations contained in the report:

a. Reference Paragraph 1e(3), Page 11 and Paragraph 2a, 1st Enforcement: The problem of obtaining modified rights for the M16 and M17C was eased in August 1966 by the receipt of 30 shots from the Frankfort Arsenal.

b. Reference Paragraph 1e(3)(b), Page 11: The multiplicity of makes and models of generators in use has been the major contributor problem in providing satisfactory repair parts supply. Actions already taken to obtain greater standardization will tend to alleviate the problem with the passage of time.

c. Reference Paragraph 1e(3)(c), Pages 11 and 12: Information available to this headquarters fails to confirm that a significant shortage of M50-901 equipment has been incurred by deploying personnel. On the contrary, sufficient stockage is available for issue except for jungle fatigue uniforms and boots.

d. Reference Paragraph 1e(3)(d), Page 12; Section 11, Part 2, Paragraph 21, Page 21: Concur: The M35A1 and M35 trucks are standard Item A and will replace the K211 truck as soon as adequate truck parts are available for issue. When this occurs, the repair parts problem for the K211 truck will be removed.

e. Reference Paragraph 1e(3)(a), Page 12; Section 11, Part 2, Paragraph 24, Page 24: While a local matter between the unit and the supporting communication activity, this headquarters is mercy for the unit to insure that the matter is resolved.

HQ USARPAC

8-66-

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
AVHGC-DH (12 Aug 66) 3d Tnd
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1966 (POS C/POR-65)

f. Reference Paragraph 1e(4)b: Movement priority is established by the requisition priority designator. Priority designators 1, 2, and 3 are authorized air movement priority. The feasibility of such movement becomes a matter of determination on an individual basis and is influenced by the availability of aircraft and accessibility of the unit itself.

g. Reference Paragraph 1e(6a): Tube life criteria have been established by the US Army Materiel Command based upon tests that have been conducted. Adequate supply of tubes and sub-assemblies are available to support the tube life that has been established.

h. Reference Paragraph 1e(6b), "are 1f; "are 1s; Section 17, "art 2, Paragraph 2a, "are 2s; Paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement: Concur; there is no white phosphorous ("W") round available in the supply system. Information available is that such a round is presently under development and test for the M907.

i. Reference Paragraph 1e(6c), "are 1g: Concur. Maintenance of adequate stocks for low density weapons always presents a problem. However, improvement is being accomplished as noted.

j. Reference Paragraph 1e(6d), "are 1f; "are 1s; Section 17, "art 2, Paragraph 2x, "are 2ss; Paragraph 2x, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Policy is to grant first priority on available motor transport units to port and beach clearance missions. Greater support will be provided tactical units as additional transportation units become available.

k. Reference Paragraph 1e(6e), "are 1s; Section 17, "art 2, Paragraph 2y, "are 2y: This headquarters is overruling 1st Logistical Command to insure resolution of the matter.

1. Reference Paragraph 1e(3), Page 16; Section 17, "art 2, "are 2x; Paragraph 2x, 1st Indorsement: The 1st Indorsement requested arrived in USARV, 03 on 14 November 1966 and is presently being staffed in USARV headquarters. Upon determination of validity of subject request, appropriate forwarding action will be initiated.
GTOP-OT (12 Aug 66) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1966 (KCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2n, 3d Indorsement: By separate correspondence USAKV has indicated the information pertaining to MTO 6-406D is in error. The most recent information available at this headquarters and at USAKV indicates the MTO 6-406D was forwarded to DA on 26 April 1966. USAKV has been informed that the MTOE for the 23d Artillery Group was deleted by DOD from the CINCPAC Force Development Schedule.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. L. CHAPPELL
MAJ, AGO
Asst AO

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