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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGM-P (M) (22 Oct 68) FOR GT-BD-683277

28 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Reports: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Corps

(22 Oct 68)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

THRU: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: EAGO-T, APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: ACSFOR, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.

1. (U) SECTION 1 Operations; Significant Activities.
   a. The organizational structure of I Corps (Gp) is indicated at inclosure 1 as prescribed by TOE 52-1T dated 31 December 1966 and TDA F8-WAT399-10 dated 31 December 1966.
   b. During the entire reporting period I Corps (Gp) has engaged in supporting the Republic of Korea by physically occupying assigned portions of the DMZ.
   c. During this period there was one major command change and one significant staff change.
   d. During the period 6-10 May 1968 I Corps (Gp) scheduled a Corps wide CPX "OPFORUCKE TIME", to include all headquarters down to and including battalions, assigned or attached; however, due to increased DMZ activity the CPX was canceled.

2. (C) SECTION 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation.
   a. Personnel
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(1) Observation: Personnel at Camp Colbern, APO 96301, are receiving inadequate religious coverage.

Discussion: The MTOE has eliminated a slot for a chaplain and chaplain's assistant at Camp Colbern. At present, Camp Colbern is covered by Chaplain (CPT) Barry Walker (Protestant) and Chaplain (CPT) James Lo Presto (Catholic) and their assistants once a week. Both chaplains are presently assigned to Camp St. Barbara; their heavy work load in their own area and visitation load prevents them from being at Camp Colbern more than a total of three or four times a month. Thus the ministrations and counsel of a chaplain are denied the men of Camp Colbern for the greater part of each month.

Recommendation: That action be taken to reauthorize and fill a slot for a chaplain and chaplain's assistant at Camp Colbern.

(2) Observation: Blackmarketing is a problem of large proportions in Korea. Investigation of incidents involving diversion of government and private property show that the blackmarketeer possesses large amounts of MPC. Money changers can provide almost any amount of NC at only small premiums.

Discussion: Many blackmarketeers deal quite openly in MPC as evidenced by CID investigations, and have accumulated large amounts of cash. The easy availability of this cash contributes to the diversion of all types of property and PX merchandise through corruption of authorized buyers or handlers of property and merchandise. There has not been a change of series of MPC since 1964. A money conversion at this time might have drawbacks at the Korean National level; however, such a conversion would go a long way in curbing the current blackmarket activities.

Recommendation: That conversion to a new series of MPC be planned and accomplished as soon as possible. In the future, money conversions be planned and carried out at more frequent intervals.

b. Operations: No significant operational lessons learned to report.

c. Training: No significant operational lessons learned to report

d. Intelligence:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (G) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(1) (U) Observation: North Korea is conducting an extensive propaganda campaign throughout the ROK. Most of the propaganda is directed toward denunciation of the ROK government, creation of anti-US sentiments among the ROK citizens and self praise of living conditions in North Korea.

Discussion: North Korean propaganda has had very little influence on UNC forces or ROK citizens. The basic motivation for defection to North Korea is believed to be sociological rather than political or ideological. Poverty, unemployment and home ties with North Korea were listed as the primary reasons for attempted defections.

Recommendation: Every effort should be made for early discovery and recovery of seditious North Korean propaganda material. Increased emphasis should be placed on propagating the true living conditions in North Korea to the people of the ROK. An intelligent and well informed public will be able to distinguish between propaganda and the truth.

(2) (C) Observation: North Korea has attempted to cause disturbances on occasions when high ranking US government officials are visiting or meeting in Korea.

Discussion: This can probably be attributed to North Korean efforts to embarrass ROK and US government officials by creating incidents along the DMZ.

Recommendation: During conferences of well-publicized visits of high ranking foreign officials, security measures should be increased. Patrols and Quick Reaction Forces should be alerted, and should be prepared for immediate deployment.

(3) (C) Observation: Activity along the DMZ generally increased during North Korean festivities and armed forces holidays.

Discussion: North Korea considers holidays as a prime time to launch anti-ROK operations.

Recommendation: The Corps security posture should be increased during North Korean holidays. Subordinate commanders should be notified of NK holidays and reminded that the North Koreans generally increase their activities during such periods.

(4) (C) Observation: Most agents dispatched to the ROK are believed to have been dispatched on reconnaissance missions, and therefore, rarely initiate aggressive action. If discovered, the agent team will attempt to break contact as soon as possible; however, when trapped they will attempt to inflict heavy casualties upon friendly forces.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Discussion: The agent team attempts to gather information and exfiltrate without being discovered. Once engaged, individual team members will not hesitate to sacrifice himself to allow the other members to return to North Korea with the information.

Recommendation: When agent teams are encountered immediate action should be taken to pin down the agent team so that they can be surrounded and neutralized. In the vicinity of friendly positions claymore mines or hand grenades can be effectively used to eliminate the team with minimum risk to friendly personnel. However, care must be used because of the agents unwavering dedication to his mission.

(5) (C) Observation: Reporting of intelligence information continues to be a problem area. Reports received are often untimely, incomplete, and in some cases, inaccurate.

Discussion: Provided timely and accurate information, commanders can use the information to make intelligent and timely decisions for the deployment of appropriate security elements.

Recommendation: All personnel should be periodically trained to immediately report significant information to higher headquarters. Reports should include the basic requirements of WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, and HOW.

(6) (C) Observation: To locate and neutralize NK agents who have infiltrated into the extensive mountainous areas of ROK presents a problem in manpower and logistics.

Discussion: After a determination is made of an agent's mission through analysis of his equipment, direction of travel and activities conducted along his route, US Army and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are deployed to prevent the agent from accomplishing his mission. When the agent is discovered, forces are deployed along the agent's suspected route in order to prevent his infiltration deeper into the ROK territory. In those instances when the agent has managed to infiltrate and is in the process of exfiltrating, forces are deployed to prevent escape.

Recommendation: Sufficient numbers of ground troops must be deployed to completely cordon an area in which agent are suspected. Sweep forces outnumbering agent personnel in a ratio of at least 500 to 1 have been successful. In many instances extremely large numbers of troops have
been deployed along the predetermined phase lines to block likely avenues of infiltration; other troops have been used to sweep the areas between the blocking lines. By using this tactic friendly troops are able to neutralize the agent whether he continues his mission or decides to abort the mission and attempt exfiltration.

\[(7) (C)\] Observation: NK agents, after having come into contact with UNC forces, have frequently eluded and escaped capture.

Discussion: Once contact is lost with the enemy agents, trailing is extremely difficult and time-consuming due to the excellent concealment available and the ruggedness of the terrain.

Recommendation: It is essential that the OH23 helicopters be immediately available with qualified aerial observers whenever infiltrators are discovered. Using the OH23, which is capable of flying lower, slower, and changing direction faster than a fixed wing aircraft, immediately after the enemy agent has been discovered would aid tremendously in keeping them constantly under surveillance. This would reduce the possibility of their escape.

\[(8) (C)\] Observation: Infiltrators have repeatedly been detected by using the starlight scope.

Discussion: Through the use of the starlight scope, night infiltration has been significantly inhibited. Agents have been discovered and engaged in spite of the cover of darkness.

Recommendation: The starlight scope should continue to be used in large quantities in and around the DMZ. Also, additional Starlight scopes should be obtained for use by other units manning phase lines of the counter-infiltration/counter-espionage plan, "Big Cliff". The scope would also be an aid to perimeter defense of any unit, whether combat or support.

e. Logistics

\[(1) (C)\] Observation: During the visit to this headquarters by Mr. Flaherty, GS-16, Army Material Command on 30 April 1968, he advised that the expected round life of 175mm tubes is far less than what is listed in current DA publication.

Discussion: Based on the information received from Mr. Flaherty, the following actions were taken.

(a) It was determined that there were no spare 175mm tubes in Korea to support the one battalion in I Corps (Gp) Artillery (12 Guns).
EACICT-M

SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

(b) Based on initial recommendation of the Commanding General, I Corps (Gp) Artillery, immediate action was taken to recommend that EUSA order 12 spare tubes as back-up support.

(c) USAWECOM was queried as to recommend quantity of spare tubes which would be stocked in Korea. WECOM recommended a stock level of 64 based on a 155 day pipe line.

(d) Concurrently, a survey was made of remaining tube life in the 12 guns in the battalion.

(e) Based on data obtained from c and d above, estimates of requirements for FY 69, 70 and 71 were prepared and forwarded to EADC and EUSA. These forecasts are:

- FY 69: 0 (assuming 12 on hand or on order)
- FY 70: 24 complete cannon, 40 tubes
- FY 71: 12 tubes

(f) Three of the original twelve spares recommended have been received at EADC. EUSA G4 advises that these tubes are stock funded and some difficulty is expected in obtaining funds for the remaining nine during FY 69. The cost of each tube is $21,000 plus.

Recommendation: That adequate funds be obtained to purchase the remaining nine tubes for stockage during FY 69.

f. Organization: No significant operational lessons learned to report.

g. Others: No significant operational lessons learned to report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. K. LEDWITH

2LT, AGG
Acting AG

1 Incl as
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period 1 May thru 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference items concerning North Korean propaganda, page 3, para 2d(1); and North Korean holidays, page 3, para 2d(3). Concur. Hq, Eighth Army does notify subordinate commanders of North Korean holidays and the type of activity that may be expected during these periods. In addition, the Weekly Intelligence Bulletin (WIB), which is distributed to company level, will include a list of these holidays. Measures are being taken to include sociological as well as military topics in the WIB's discussions of conditions in North Korea.

3. (C) Reference item concerning North Korea's attempting to cause disturbances during visits of high ranking officials, page 3, para 2d(2). Concur in part. Itineraries of high ranking officials are handled on a "need to know" basis and communications security concerning their movement is being stressed. QRF's are prepared for immediate deployment at all times, not just when visitors are in-country.

4. (C) Reference item concerning reporting of intelligence information, page 4, para 2d(5). Concur. A staff study is currently being conducted on the advisability of revising Eighth Army operating instructions in order to provide better criteria for DMZ tactical sighting reports.

5. (C) Reference item concerning use of helicopters, page 5, para 2d(7). Concur. OH-23 aircraft are available in aviation units throughout the ROK. Due to the shortage of aircraft however, aviation support may have to be requested from aviation units at some distance from the ground unit, which will affect reaction time. Aerial observers should be supplied by the ground unit to take advantage of their knowledge of the terrain.

6. (C) Reference item concerning Starlight Scopes, page 5, para 2d(8). Concur. 2d Division currently employs 280 Starlight Scopes. The utility of this particular night vision device is appreciated at DA. The G-Series TOE for infantry divisions includes Starlight Scopes at the rate of 90 per Division base and 58 per maneuver battalion. A 10 Battalion Division would thus have 679 Starlight Scopes.
EAGO-MH (13 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Op) for the period 1 May thru
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

7. (C) Reference item concerning 175MM gun tubes, page 5, para 2e(l). This command currently has four 175MM gun tubes on hand. WECOM's recommended stock level of 64 gun tubes was intended as a war reserve level, based on a 155-day pipeline. Subject gun tubes formerly required expenditure of Eighth Army stock funds but have since reverted to AMC control. Hq, Eighth Army will follow-up on AMC's intention to provide the recommended war reserve. No action by USARPAO or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. N. HUNTER
1Lt, AGC
ASST AG

Copies furnished:
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1-CC, I Corps (Op), APO 96358
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Corps (Group) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 OCT 1388

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

STF

C. SHORTT
CPT AGC
Act AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Corps (Group) (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CG, I Corps (Group)

13 August 1968

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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