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IN Reply Referto
AGAM-P (M) (17 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683203 22 October 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report ~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 41st
Artillery Group, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
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of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the
Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent opera-
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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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41st Artillery Group
AVGK-C

31 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968, ROS C3PRC-65 (R1)

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a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the following organizations/units were attached to this headquarters. Locations of battalion CP's are listed:

(a) 7th Bn (105) (T) 13th Arty, LZ Uplift.
(b) 7th Bn (8"-175) (SP) 15th Arty, LZ Uplift.
(c) 2nd Bn (105) (T) 17th Arty, An Khe.
(d) 6th Bn (155) (T) 84th Arty, An Khe.
(e) Attached for operational control:


(2) 41st Artillery Group with headquarters at Camp Fidel, RVN (BR 998402) continued the mission of general support of US, RVNAP, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in the northern coastal region of II Corps Tactical Zone.

(3) Primary activities of the Group consisted of providing artillery support for the 173d Airborne Brigade in operation Dan Sinh-Cochineal Green and Walker TACR, the Capital (ROK) Infantry Division in operation Dong Ho 12, the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) in operations Quang Trung 22-4 and 22-5, Ha Tay and Vinh Thanh Camp Strike Forces, II Corps Mobile Strike Forces, and Binh Dinh Province Regional and Popular Forces.

For OR PD

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DR 5200.10
(4) The US-ARVN Mutual Support Program received continuing emphasis and gathered momentum during the reporting period.

(a) The EFVY US-ARVN Associate Battery Program was formally initiated on 11 May 68 at Camp Fidel, RVN by a business/social meeting between US and ARVN counterparts. Attendees included CO II Corps Arty, CO 22d Div Arty, CO 22nd Arty Bn, CO 57th Arty Bn, CO 221st Arty Bn, and battery commanders on the ARVN side. The US side included CO 41st Arty Gp, CO 7/13 Arty, CO 7/15 Arty, CO 2/17 Arty, MACV advisors to II Corps Arty, 22d Div Arty, 222d Arty Bn, 37th Arty Bn, and US battery commanders. A conference was held in which the objectives of the Associate Battery Program were agreed upon, and immediate goals for the future were proposed. Since this initial meeting battery commanders have established firm professional and social relationships with their ARVN associates. Visits have been exchanged, friendly competition has been conducted, and much mutual assistance has been provided. As a result, ARVN artillery has been integrated into US fire plans, ARVN commanders have made specific requests for US artillery support for ARVN operations, and defensive fires have been exchanged between US and ARVN batteries. The program shows considerable promise for improving the effectiveness and self-confidence of ARVN artillery.

(b) As a direct result of the Associate Battery Program a firm relationship has been established between HQ 22d Div Arty and HQ 41st Arty Gp. This headquarters is presently assisting CO 22d Div Arty in preparing for combat the recently activated 105mm battalion, 63d Arty Bn, to be assigned to the 22d Div Arty. Attached battalions of this headquarters are training cadre in fire direction, firing battery procedure, and survey. These cadre will return to 63d Arty Bn and train the remainder of the battalion. In addition to training cadre, much equipment has been loaned to the battalion for training pending receipt of their own equipment.

(c) The VHP-CIG support program continued with no major changes. FO’s were provided for numerous camp strike force and mobile strike force operations. In one instance a heavy battery was displaced and two forward observer parties were provided to support a 9 day operation by the Vinh Thanh CIG in the Crazy Horse Mountains. Defensive fires are planned and fired in around both camps by a battery of the Group Headquarters (Vinh Thanh and Ha Tay). Close and continuous liaison is performed by attached units.

(d) The RF/PF support program received great emphasis during the reporting period. On 14 June 68 IFFV formalized the program and outlined specific tasks to be accomplished. Each attached battalion and the Group Headquarters was assigned responsibility for support of at least
AVGK-C

31 July 1968


The Group Headquarters is currently working with 22d ARVN Div Arty to establish a program of instruction for forward observer training for RF/FF. It is felt that the relationship established here will solve more than the immediate problem of providing trained forward observers.

b. Chronological Sequence of Events:

(1) On 5 May 68 A/1/50 Inf was attacked while at lunch halt in the Crescent area (BR 9080) by elements of the 93d, 95th, and 97th Bn of the 2d VC Regt. Initial losses by A/1/50 were heavy, with four 170mm destroyed immediately. The contact lasted two days with a total of 20 maneuver companies being inserted. A/2/17(-) was displaced from Walker AO to LZ Salem to support. Other batteries within range were 1/7/15 Arty at LZ Uplift, A/1/13 Arty at LZ Uplift, B/3/319 Arty at LZ Uplift, and A/7/15 at LZ Pony. Limited support was provided by 1/7/13 Arty at LZ Crystal, A/3/319 Arty at LZ Pony, and 1/7/15 Arty at LZ English. There were sufficient maneuver companies and artillery in the area to effectively seal off the contact. However the area was not sealed off, and the 2d VC Regt escaped. Also, coordination between artillery and airstrikes was slow reacting, the major problem being a large time lapse between shutting off the artillery and bringing in the aircraft. Total casualty figures for this contact were 25 US KIA, 120 US WIA, 118 ARVN KIA.

(2) On 11 May 68 the 1/50 Inf again made contact with a large size enemy force near the mouth of the 506 valley (BR 9072). Units committed initially were 1BC 1/50 Inf, B/1/69 Armor, B/2/505 Inf, and three CSF companies from 12 Tay CDXG camp. Three US forward observer parties were provided to the CSF companies. The contact lasted until 13 May 68. At the conclusion of the operation 11 companies were committed, 4 CDXG and 7 US (1BC/1/50 Inf, B/1/69 Armor, and A, B, C, and D/2/505 Inf). One battalion of the 41st ARVN Regt acted as a blocking force along QL 1. Total casualty figures were 12 friendly KIA, 71 friendly WIA, 61 ARVN KIA.

(3) On 21 May 69 Firecracker ammunition was released for use in Binh Dinh Province.

(4) On 26 May 68 22d ARVN Div began operation Quang Trung 22-4 vicinity Ky Son Mountain (CR 0432) involving 2/41st Regt, 401st Scout
CO, and 5 RF companies of Tuy Phuoc District. Artillery support was provided by 0/222d Arty (ARVN), 0/7/13 Arty, 0/2/17 Arty, and one platoon of 3/7/15 Arty (8". This headquarters dispatched a complete liaison party to Ba Gi to assist 22d Div Arty in controlling artillery fires. Only one brief contact was made in which 2 VC were KIA and 5 captured. Many caves containing food and equipment were found, and several were closed by artillery and air strikes. This headquarters arranged with the 173d Abn Bde to provide persistent CS crystals and fan to seed the caves and prevent their further use. However, 22d Div decided against using the persistent crystals and used CS hand grenades instead. The operation ended on 31 May 68. The significance of this operation was not the size of the contact made, but rather that it was planned and controlled by the Division headquarters. Prior to this the regiments had been allowed to plan their own operations with no assistance or guidance from Division headquarters. This operation also marks the first time CO 22d Div Arty had come personally to this headquarters and asked for US artillery support.

(5) Two schools at group were organized during the month of May; one for TAWS clerks and one for PLL clerks. Duration of each course was three days. Twenty-five (25) students attended the TAWS school and eighteen (18) students attended the PLL school. The 1st Logistics Command with project counter personnel conducted two day PLL classes for twenty-four (24) members of the group from 22 July to 31 July.

(6) On 7 June 68 the Capital ROK Infantry Division initiated operation Mong Ho 12. Area of operations was the Phu Cat Mountains (CR 0055) and the Go Boi Plain (CR 0540), suspected locations of the 18th NVA regimental headquarters and two battalions. 0/7/15 Arty was displaced to a position in the Go Boi Plain to support the operation. The operation was terminated on 19 July with 29 friendly KIA, 54 friendly WIA, 355 enemy KIA, 38 WIA, and 77 miles.

(7) On 20 June 68 the 22d ARVN Div initiated operation Quang Trung 22-5 in the Hai Niu Mountains (CR 0075) the operation included the 4th Regt, 28th/40th Regt, 3 companies of the 2/505 Inf, and 1/50 Inf as a blocking force. An interesting aspect was the amphibious assault by one company of the 4/41st Regt at CR 060741. Although again a good training exercise for the 22d Div, little contact was made. The operation ended on 24 June 68 with 12 enemy KIA and 3 WIA.

(8) On 27 June the Vinh Thanh CIDG camp initiated a 10 day operation through the Crazy Horse Mountains (BR 7055) with two CSP companies and two forward observer parties provided by this headquarters. 0/7/15 Arty was returned to all 3" howitzers and dispaced to LZ Jenny (BR 8555) to support simultaneously this operation and the continuation of Mong Ho 12 in the Phu Cat Mountains. The objective of the operation was to locate a large weapons cache reportedly left behind when the 3d NVA Div HQ moved north. Although the weapons cache was not found, contact with the enemy was made several times. The two companies were
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AWK-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968. ROS CSPOR-65 (R1)

extracted on 7 July 1968.


(10) Bn TLC OP and C/6/84 Arty were displaced to BQ 9276, 29 July 68 to support a joint ROK-RVN-US operation in Ky Lo Valley (BQ 9316). Operation continued at close of reporting period.

(11) The IFORCES Artillery Forward Observer Training Course, operated by Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group, graduated 168 US and 67 RVNAF students during the reporting period.

(12) The plan to replace the howitzers of 2/17 Arty with M102's did not materialize. Replacement of howitzers began in July with M101A1 being furnished. Seven howitzers were replaced during the month of July.

(13) The group surgeon and the medical personnel performed MEDCAP visits every week to villages in this area. Twenty six (26) visits were made during the quarter and approximately 5,600 personnel received treatment under this program.

(14) Headquarters and headquarters battery participated in 92 days of operations during the reporting period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations:

   (1) Artillery-Airstrike Coordination.

   (c) OBSERVATION. Artillery fires are often shut off prior to an airstrike by high-performance aircraft, thus creating a break in supporting or suppressive fire.

   (b) EVALUATION. It has been noted that many times FQO's will shut off artillery fire when their high performance aircraft arrive on station. The result is a gap in support which allows the enemy to regroup and in many cases serves as a warning of the impending airstrike. A significant example occurred on 11 May 68 when an infantry company halted at noon was attacked by a large enemy unit with mortars, B-40 rockets, automatic weapons, and small arms. The forward observer, because of proper prior defensive fire planning, was able to hold off the initial assault with artillery fire. However when the high performance
aircraft arrived on station the FAC requested that all artillery be shut off, which was done. During the ensuing lull between shutting off the artillery and bringing the aircraft in on target, the enemy force attacked the company and engaged them at close quarters.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. That artillery not be shut off during airstrikes but that they either be shifted to blocking fires or that a corridor be constructed through which the aircraft can fly without danger from the artillery.

(2) Safety zone for debris fallout from base ejection smoke shell.

(a) OBSERVATION. The danger exists that personnel in the vicinity of the target area may be injured by the ejected base plate of a base-ejection smoke shell.

(b) EVALUATION. This danger is particularly acute in light of the fact that the most common use for this shell is to ensure safety of close-in fires prior to switching to HE, and for firing in defensive targets around unit perimeters. This headquarters dispatched a letter to the Director of the Gunnery Department, USAMIS, Ft Sill, Oklahoma, requesting assistance in establishing a danger zone. The reply was that funds have been allocated for study of this problem and a solution will be forthcoming.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That pending receipt of a prescribed danger zone, all personnel be warned of the danger of being struck by debris from base-ejection smoke shell and that they take proper cover during firing of close-in targets.

o. Training.

(1) Observed Fire Training.

(a) OBSERVATION. The majority of unit personnel are not trained to bring effective artillery fire on targets of opportunity.

(b) EVALUATION. The nature of the conflict in RVN can present any individual the opportunity to engage the enemy with artillery fire at unpredictable times. Whether at a fire base, rear base camp, traveling on roads, or flying the possibility always exists that the enemy will appear. When this occurs, artillery fire should be brought on the target immediately. Unfortunately, most personnel in artillery units, not to mention other branches, are not trained to bring effective fire on targets of opportunity. Consequently, many targets go unattacked.
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AVUK-C

31 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968. HQ USARVN-65 (R1)

(a) RECOMMENDATION. That all personnel be trained to adjust artillery fire just as they are trained to engage with small arms. There should be at least one map and one compass in each vehicle or group of vehicles outside a fire base or base camp.

(2) SELECTION OF OPTIMUM METHOD OF ATTACK.

(a) OBSERVATION. In most cases FDO's are not trained to select optimum method of attack based on competent target analysis.

(b) EVALUATION. FDO's are not fully aware of the optimum methods of attack as indicated in FM 6-141-1 (C). The differences in expected casualty percentages resulting from each fuze-round combination used on a specific type target are significant and should be foremost in the mind of every FDO. Because targets usually appear for only brief moments, if the optimum method of attack is not employed the maximum return per round is not obtained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That battery and battalion FDO's be trained in selection of optimum method of attack based on FM 6-141-1(C). A copy of FM 6-141-1 (C) should be in every FDO.

d. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) MANPACK PERSONNEL DETECTOR (MPD).

(a) OBSERVATION. The manpack personnel detector has been tested within Dan Sinh-CoChinh area of Operation and found to be effective.

(b) EVALUATION. The manpack personnel detector was evaluated mounted in an O-1 Birdog and found to be effective. The detector affords the aerial observer an electronic sensor, in addition to his eyes, which may be mounted efficiently in the observer's aircraft. During flight the MPD was mounted behind the pilot with the sensor taped to the right wing strut 3 feet from the floor of the plane. Mounting time took less than 5 minutes with no modification necessary. The pilot noted that the maximum time for sustained low-level flights for experienced pilots should not exceed 45 minutes. A preflight briefing is necessary so that the crew ship can anticipate moves of the ship with the detector. Familiarity by all with the terrain is essential. Altitude of test was from 6 to 50 feet with flight speed of approximately 90 knots. This system has much potential for the uses described above, but because of the UH-1’s insurmountability over the O-1, the MPD is not a substitute for the airborne personnel detector.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That more MPD's be placed in the hands of personnel responsible for visual reconnaissance and aerial observer missions.

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AVUK-C

31 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968. ROS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(2) Night Vision Sight.

(a) OBSERVATION. Night Vision Sights (Starlight Scopes) mounted in O-1's have proved effective in the detection of personnel movement at night.

(b) EVALUATION. The starlight scope was used in an O-1 Birdog on nights with much moonlight and proved to be quite effective. Since the enemy conducts much of his movement at night, this device used as described above should be quite helpful, especially when used in areas of suspected enemy locations. The drawbacks of required moonlight and personal fatigue cause this method to be dependent on personnel and available light.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Night Vision Sights be made available to aviation companies in quantity of one per aircraft and that this method be directed and monitored at the maneuver element's targeting section.

(3) Forward Observers.

(a) OBSERVATION. The deployment of forward observers has increased considerably with the results of better support to supported unit and an additional source of intelligence for the artillery in the field.

(b) EVALUATION. Forward observers are presently employed with U.S., ARVN, MCR, GSF, RF and FF units in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces. The concept of filling the forward observer positions with higher priority than some other lieutenant positions has enabled the 41st Artillery Group to have forward observers deployed with almost every operation in its area of responsibility. Furthermore, it affords the maneuver element the added support of a school-trained artillery observer. A by-product of the forward observer deployment is that more intelligence is available through artillery channels, thus enabling the supporting headquarters to keep more abreast of the current situation and to accomplish better targeting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That deployment of forward observers continue to be given command emphasis and that priority of placement for artillery lieutenants remain unchanged.

(4) Perimeter Defense.

(a) OBSERVATION. Observation posts within 41st Artillery Group have detected enemy artillery attacks and thus enable friendly artillery to respond quickly and accurately on the targets.
 condemnation. That all observation posts be equipped with azimuth indicator devices.

c. *Logistics.*

(1) Maintenance support of firing batteries on artillery raids and long range moves.

(c) OBSERVATION. Units must leave their regular assigned DSU support when supporting a mission outside of area of operations (AO).

(b) EVALUATION. Firing batteries should not cancel all previous requisitions and start fresh with a new DSU each time they move. Neither is it profitable to have accounts with several DSUs that must be checked periodically for actions. Often the DSU supporting the area a battery moves into does not have any experience supporting that type of weapon; consequently, few if any parts are on hand to support that type of weapon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That fire units maintain accounts with the DSU that is assigned to them at their home station. When moving to a new area establish contact with local DSU for support, but requisition material only on a fill or kill basis. Any parts that cannot be furnished by temporary DSU send to the DSU which provides continuous support by regular requisitioning procedures. The maintenance of a continuous flow of repair parts is essential for an adequate PLL stock.

(2) Float Howitzers.

(a) OBSERVATION. Complete maintenance cannot be performed on howitzers (155-8"-175mm) when they are in support shop because of the constant pressure to get the weapon back to firing condition. The emphasis is to forget the minor problems and correct only those that decline the howitzer. Because of this rush to get the piece back to fir-

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AVGK-O

31 July 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968. ROCS CGOF-65 (R1)

ing status, other deficiencies go uncorrected at the time and result in the piece becoming non-operational shortly thereafter, causing additional down time.

(b) EVALUATION. With a float howitzer available in the area, commanders will not be as insistent on having their howitzers back as soon as possible, and adequate time to go over ordnance howitzers thoroughly will result. This will increase the service life of all howitzers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That float howitzers (175-8"-155mm) be maintained in the Binh Dinh Province area and rotated among the appropriate units to allow adequate maintenance time for howitzers requiring both Organization Maintenance and Direct Support Maintenance.

(3) Liaison Sgt at 58 Field Depot.

(a) OBSERVATION. Under "Direct to Depot" requisitioning, many problems were arising with lost requisitions, follow up on requisitions and poor inventory control at Depot.

(b) EVALUATION. Major commands i.e., 4th Division, Americal, 101st, etc, have Liaison Sections at Depot and feel it is essential to insure the proper distribution and expeditious movement of supplies. 41st Group has maintained a Liaison Sgt at Depot for one month. His success in locating supplies, regulating hand carry, and obtaining follow-up information substantiates the value of this system. Distances from units to DSU's make it impossible for regular assigned personnel to effectively manage this function.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That major artillery commands be authorized a Supply Liaison Section to coordinate supply problems with supporting agencies.

(4) Medcap Visits.

(a) OBSERVATION. The language barrier is a deterrent to trust and effective treatment of Vietnamese civilians.

(b) EVALUATION. Without an interpreter the diagnosis of patients is difficult and assurance that medication given will be taken as prescribed is lacking. Crowd control is difficult; various control measures were tried and a numerical system is most effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an interpreter be included as part of the Medcap Team for effective visits and that a numerical system be established and utilized for patient crowd control.
AVCK-C
31 July 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for
Period Ending 31 July 1968. ROS CSFOR-65 (R1)

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

By权威

Benjamin L. Carroll
Colonel Artillery
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (31 Jul 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968 RCS GSFOR-65 (R1)


TO: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(c) This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report and concurs with all recommendations with the following comments:

Reference paragraph 2d (2)(c), page 8, Night Vision Sight. Concur with recommended use of night vision sights. Quantity of one per aircraft is excessive. Recommend that optimum number be coordinated between maneuver elements and aviation agency. Night vision sight equipped aircraft should be controlled by targeting agency within an AD.

FOR THE CO/ADJUTANT:

[Signature]

GERALD G. FROST
LTC, Artillery
Adjutant
AVFA-GC-OT (31 Jul 68) 2d Ind


DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report as indorsed and makes the following recommendations or comments.

a. Reference paragraph 2d(1), Section 2 page 7, Manpack Personal Detector (MPD). An analysis of the test results on the use of MPD is being conducted by I FFORCEV Arty. This headquarters will take action on the distribution of MPD upon receipt of I FFORCEV Arty's recommendations.

b. Reference paragraph 2d(2)(c), Section 2 page 8, Night Vision Sight. This headquarters concurs that the night vision sights should be used and controlled as described by I FFORCEV Artillery in the 1st Indorsement.

c. Reference paragraph 2e(2), Section 2 page 9, Float Howitzers. Non concur. There are insufficient assets to provide howitzers to meet all float requirements at the present time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. GABBARD

Copy furnished:
I FFORCEV Arty

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13
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEAODQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 SEP 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. Arnzt
W. C. ARNZ
II T, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ I FFV
HQ 41st Arty Gp
GPOP-DT (31 Jul 68) (U)4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 41st Arty Gp for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Air AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 41st Artillery Group (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CO, 41st Artillery Group

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

16 pages
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

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***PAGE

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD

PAGE

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD

PAGE

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD

PAGE

ITEM 5

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FOR OT RD

PAGE

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

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