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AGAM-P (H) (4 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683061 10 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 38TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AD)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96570

SuBA-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. The organizational structure of the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) is indicated in enclosure 1. The Brigade and its five subordinate Battalions are organized under TOE 44-260, NEXE 44-260(USARPAC 2/67), TOE 44-236D, NEXE 44-236D(USARPAC 2/67), TOE 44-536D, NEXE 44-536D(USARPAC 2/67), TOE 44-537D, NEXE 44-537D (USARPAC 2/67) and USARPAC General Orders 255, 14 November 1967.

B. There were three changes of command in the five Battalions during the period 1 January to 30 April 1968. On 14 February 1968 LTC Richard A. Rein was transferred from 7th Battalion (HAWK) 2d Artillery to the 4th Battalion (HAWK) 4th Artillery and replaced Major Jacob E. Lustig as Battalion Commander. LTC Edward H. Hampton took command of the 7th Battalion (HAWK) 2d Artillery the same day. On 19 April 1968 LTC George C. Kirr, the Battalion Commander of 7th Battalion (HAWK) 5th Artillery returned to CONUS and was replaced as Battalion Commander by LTC Paul Vanturc.

C. As early as 2 January 1968 the Brigade began planning and coordinating for its Annual General Inspection scheduled for the period 4 through 30 March. All units excluding those of the 7th Battalion (HAWK) 5th Artillery were to be inspected. Over twenty-four separate units were involved; these units were located from North and East of Seoul to South and West of Chonju. Transportation problems were compounded by poor roads and unpredictable weather conditions. A sudden storm could easily strand the inspection team and delay them for days. The inspection team was divided into two teams and two separate schedules for inspection were created. The results of the inspection indicated that the Brigade was fulfilling its mission. All units received a satisfactory or higher rating and the Brigade received an overall rating of Satisfactory.

D. On 17 March the two USA Signal Companies R/R 5760th and 5761st were inactivated. The two companies totaling approximately 170 men supplied VHF communications to all five of the Brigade's Battalions and Headquarters Battery. The two companies controlled thirty-five radio relay sites through
which 42 VHF systems were channelled. The property and equipment of the companies was laterally transferred to six different property books. Seven VHF teams were formed containing 58 to 107 men each. These seven teams were charged with the same mission as the original two companies. Administratively the Headquarters of the companies was dissolved and the Operation and Maintenance Functions divided among the seven teams. Operational control was placed in the Brigade Headquarters Signal office where a twenty-four hour control facility has been established.

E. Upon implementation of the current NICE on 1 December 1967, the Brigade was assigned the Ordnance direct support mission; personnel and equipment were authorized in the NICE. The actual mission was not transferred from Eighth Army Support Command to the 38th Artillery Brigade until 1 April 1968. Approximately 378 personnel were reassigned from the 50th and 65th Ordnance Companies on that date.

F. Although the present NICE for the Brigade was implemented on 1 December 1967, much of the additional equipment authorized was received during this reporting period. Significant amounts of equipment will also be received during future reporting periods. Major changes were made in vehicle and generator strength. The designation of the 7th Bn (HAWK) 2d Arty and 6th Bn (HAWK) 44th Arty as mobile units, in effect, tripled the vehicle authorizations of the two battalions. In making communications support organic to the Brigade's units and Brigade, Battalion headquarters batteries were also authorized NRC-54, 69, and 73 radio sets. For battalions this meant an additional authorization of over 40 1 kw/60 cycle generators per headquarters battery, as with vehicle support, these requirements are being gradually filled. At full equipment strength, Brigade HAWK units will be fully mobile and all Brigade units will have improved communications capabilities.

G. 45kw/400 cycle generators, the primary source of tactical power for both HAWK and HERCULES units, remained at an operational level of 85% throughout the reporting period. This contrasts with a 45% rate for the First Quarter, CY 1967. The improvement is largely due to the influx of new generators at all firing batteries.

H. Material improvement programs continued in the Brigade areas as indicated:

(1) HAWK

(a) The Brigade's "Sweepdown Program" continued throughout the reporting period. Initiated to counter a backlog of Modification Work Orders,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI)

Sweepdown is organized into blocks of 120's performed by contractor teams in Korea. During the reporting period, Block III was nearing completion. Blocks I, II and III include a total of 66 120's.

(b) The contractor conducted "HAWK Refurbishment Program" continued through the period in refurbishing the 91 major items of HAWK equipment.

(c) Final plans were made for the High Power Illuminator Radar - Built In Test Equipment Program (HIFIR-BITE) designed to reduce the time required for maintenance check, installation will begin in May 1968.

(d) Missile modification and exchange continued throughout the period. This will continue until the improved HAWK comes into the inventory in late 1971.

(2) Mike Hercules

Final plans were made for installation of the Alternate Battery Acquisition Radars (ABAR) at each firing battery. Tower installation will begin in May 1968.

(3) MSG-4 System

Console remoting to AMCP detachments has been completed. AN/GSA-77 installation is scheduled to start at 4th Battalion (Herc) 44th Artillery in November 1968. The program for the Brigade is to be completed in May 1969.

I. The lack of spare parts continued to be a definite block to efforts to achieve a high degree of materiel readiness. An unacceptable fill time resulted in excessive down time for both HAWK and Mike-Hercules units. To correct this deficiency for HAWK units, the HAWK Missile Support Element Provisional program (Stovepipe supply) became operational during the period. Although benefits from this "stovepipe" program should eventually be substantial, the improvement in the overall capability of the Brigade will be gradual.

2. (c) Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel.

(1) Inactivation of EUSA Signal Companies

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the major problems encountered was an improper authorization on the NTCE.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 28th Artillery Brigade (ID) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSCP-65(RI)

(b) EVALUATION: The TDA of the two signal companies authorized non-commissioned officers in the grade of E7 with an MOS of 31Z, Area Communications Chief. The NAE of 1 December 1967, however, authorized the Brigade non-commissioned officers in the grade E7 with MOS of 31H, Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant. It became readily apparent that the duties actually performed were more properly those of personnel with MOS 31Z. A recommendation for change to the NAE has been submitted. In the interim personnel with MOS 31Z will be retained as surplus. Of the seven spaces involved no personnel with MOS 31M are assigned; this further justifies the retention of the personnel with the MOS 31Z.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the recommended change to the NAE be expedited to authorize MOS 31Z rather than 31H.

(2) Transfer of Ordnance Direct Support Mission

(a) OBSERVATION: The transfer of the Direct Support Ordnance mission created a number of shortages of personnel in a few key MOS, specifically 23T, HAWK Continuous Wave Radar Repairman and 52D, Power Generator Equipment Repairman. There were also shortages in the technical supply area.

(b) EVALUATION: Sufficient replacements have been received to resolve the 23T shortages and programmed replacements will alleviate the 52D shortage. As an interim measure eight enlisted men with this MOS have been placed on TOY from CONUS. The Brigade conducted two schools to train personnel with MOS's that were surplus to the requirements of the Brigade. Officer shortages were also acute; of nine officers authorized, only one was received. Seven of the eight warrant officers were received. It became apparent, however, that the authorization of one warrant officer in each Direct Support Platoon of the four HAWK Battalions was not sufficient. The authorization of four warrant officers, MOS 251B (Hawk) was sufficient. Eighth Army has made every effort to secure additional warrant officers with an MOS of 251A, Air Defense Missile System Repair Technician, Hawk, to permit assignment of two to each of the four Hawk Battalions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That qualified MOS 251B's be assigned as authorized. That the officer shortages and warrant officers requested be assigned.

B. NAE

C. Training:

(1) Missile and Radar Crewman Training
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 36th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GEOR-65(HI)

(a) OBSERVATION: During this reporting period this command
experienced an influx of non missile trained personnel. This influx was a
direct result of personnel requisitions being filled on a quantitative
rather than a qualitative basis.

(b) EVALUATION: Untrained personnel received by units of the command
required considerable NCO training prior to being utilized as missile and
radar crewmen. An effective training program could not be conducted at a
central location due to a shortage of tactical equipment and an extremely
stringent operational requirement for all units. An "on site" training
program for the qualification of several personnel compounded an existing
problem, as the qualified personnel available were required to conduct the
program. The unqualified personnel were assimilated into the crews and
trained on an individual basis as operational requirements and availability
of experienced instructors permitted. The success of this program cannot be
fully determined at this time. However, personnel being trained in this
manner required an extended period of time before becoming qualified, there-
by seriously reducing the productive portion of their tour in Korea. If
personnel requisitions are to be filled on a quantitative basis, the number
of such personnel should be kept to an absolute minimum and should not in-
clude either technical or operational missile peculiar NCO's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That missile peculiar personnel requisitions be
filled on a purely qualitative basis or that personnel provided on a quanti-
tative basis be utilized in non missile peculiar duty positions to pre-
clude the need for tactical units to conduct an NCO training program.

D. Intelligence.

(1) NIKE HERCULES Site Security

(a) OBSERVATION: Because of the tactical value of the NIKE HERCULES
missile an augmented security force is necessary to provide an adequate
defense against the possible destruction of these weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: During late 1967, information gained from captured
North Korean agents revealed that plans have been made for the destruction
of air defence coastal NIKE HERCULES sites. At this time the NIKE HERCULES
NOS authorized only 27 security guard personnel, including eight sentry dog
handlers. With the increased security posture, as the result of this in-
formation, almost fifty per cent of the unit personnel were on guard duty
each 24 hour period. The effect was reduced maintenance, training and abil-
ity to maintain an effective air defense capability.
Initially an infantry platoon was assigned the security mission for these sites. By early March two infantry platoons and two 81mm mortar squads were deployed around each launcher area. The infantry personnel provide external security (e.g., OP/LR’s and roving patrol). Ground defense exercises are implemented twice a day and the 81mm mortars are fired periodically to check the registration. In addition, the infantry maintains a 40 man quick reaction force to be air-lifted to another site, if required.

Artillery personnel are still tasked with the responsibility for securing the fire control and administrative area and providing internal security for the launcher area. In order to be able to deploy a fighting force in the minimum amount of time, personnel on the tactical site carry their individual weapons, operational ammunition, steel helmet and protective mask at all times. 11-60 machine guns and K-79 grenade launchers are pre-positioned in the launcher area so that they are readily available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the security guard portion of the NIKOS of the NIKE HERCULES be increased by 45 personnel in order that the unit have an adequate internal security force and still maintain its air defense mission; and that the infantry augmentation be considered a permanent assignment to the unit.

(2) NIKE Site Security

(a) OBSERVATIONS: NIKE air defense missile sites have insufficient security personnel and equipment to provide an adequate defense from within the unit’s resources.

(b) EVALUATION: The isolation of NIKE air defense missile sites on remote mountain tops leaves the unit extremely vulnerable to an agent/subterfuge attack. This is particularly true for the seven NIKE batteries located on the west coast of the republic. Although available intelligence information indicates that plans have been made by a “suicide team” to destroy a NIKE HERCULES air defense missile site, the propaganda value gained from the destruction of a NIKE site would be the same.

The organizational structure for a NIKE unit is 114 personnel, including 7 security guards (sentry dog handlers). Therefore, operator and maintenance personnel must be used to perform sentry duty. The result is a decreased operational capability. In order to provide a ready fighting force on the tactical site, all personnel are required to carry their individual weapon, operational load of ammunition, steel helmet and protective mask at all times. In addition, for these security personnel to function effectively, they must have adequate equipment—communications and weapons. The NIKE
ITCE provides only 25 TA-312 field phones for both administrative and tactical areas. Security personnel need a primary and alternate means of communication. Because these units are located atop rugged mountains, the grazing fire of the M-60 machine gun cannot always cover approaches to the tactical site as well as the M-79 grenade launcher.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That HAWK air defense missile sites be augmented with a 30 man security force. That the authorization for TA-312 field phones be increased and portable radios be authorized for the security force. That an additional four M-79 grenade launchers be authorized per unit.

E. Logistics.

(1) Contractor Support of Material Improvement Programs.

(a) OBSERVATION: Technical expertise of contractor provided logistical support has been substantial. "Sweepdown" and the Refurbishment Program are excellent examples.

(b) EVALUATION: Contractor programs, using equipment allocated for specific repair or improvement programs and handled by skilled technicians, have normally completed the goals for which they have been designed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Use of contractor programs in material improvement should be increased. By allocating specified equipment for these improvements and reducing continuity problems created by turnover in military personnel, these programs have significantly increased the Brigade's operational capability.

(2) Availability of Spare Parts in Country.

(a) OBSERVATION: The extremely limited supply of vital spare parts and chassis, especially for HAWK radars, has greatly reduced in-action time for Brigade units.

(b) EVALUATION: This problem is to a great degree due to lack of replacement and float stocks in Korea and throughout the world.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Stocking levels and floats for major items of equipment should be significantly increased. This should correspondingly greatly reduce the number of instances where equipment is out of action because of the lack of a part or replacement chassis which must come from CONUS.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 38TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AD) FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968, SGS CSFOR-65(RI)

(3) Helicopter Support for Out-Of-Action Batteries.

(a) OBSERVATION: Road mileage between batteries and support units is great enough to cause batteries to be out-of-action for periods up to one day, due to lack of repair parts which are in-country. Although helicopter support is normally available for "Phase Alpha" missions, there are often delays in securing air transportation from Eighth Army. Additionally, no helicopter support is available during darkness or periods of low cloud ceiling.

(b) EVALUATION: Out-of-action time could be significantly reduced by more responsive helicopter support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Helicopter support be more readily available.
Use of air support between larger air strips/helips during darkness should be considered.

F. None
G. Signal

(1) Signal Officer Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Signal Officer personnel assigned to the 38th Artillery Brigade are trained in basic Artillery communications as opposed to the more complex Air Defense communications circuitry.

(b) EVALUATION: The battalion communications officer is in a slot where of necessity he exercises supervisory responsibility over a VHF section and of a Fire Distribution Section. In Air Defense Artillery communications, the primary communications are provided by VHF terminals. Basic Artillery communication courses touch only lightly on VHF communications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all Signal Officer personnel which are assigned to Air Defense Artillery units be qualified VHF Radio Officers with 1OS 0500.

(2) ADL Feedback.

(a) OBSERVATION: When the gain controls on the AN/TCC-7 channel modems are not too high, the ADL is fed back into the system thus blocking its transmission.

(b) EVALUATION: Constant monitoring of the ADL channel is required to avoid excessive gains.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGCS CSPOR-65(RI)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That VHF operators be instructed on the specific difficulties of excessive gain settings.

(3) Automatic Frequency Control.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many VHF sites do not use the AFC on the AN/TRC-24 radios due to the belief that nearby site radar interferes with the radio when the AFC is used.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the AFC on AN/TRC-24 radio receivers causes interference by the radar which is usually adjacent to the VHF. The radar does not interfere with the radio transmitter when the AFC is used.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The AFC should be used at all times on the radio transmitter but not on the receiver. Personnel at each VHF site can line up their receivers with transmitters of distant sites which employ AFC and vice versa.

(4) Proper Grounding of Communications Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Improper grounding of equipment may cause noise and hum on communications lines. In many cases proper grounding of equipment is not in effect. Grounding rods are not driven deep enough to reach the water table.

(b) EVALUATION: Grounding rods can be driven into the ground and then removed to see if the rod is deep. If so, the rod was deep enough. If not, the rod should be deeper or the ground should be moistened periodically. Addition of a small amount of salt periodically will also improve grounding.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That equipment operators and site chiefs pay particular attention to equipment grounding and not rely on commercial grounding.

1 incl.

John A. Lea, Jr.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
TO: Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, AIO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs in the report. The comments below supplement the report.

2. (C) Personnel. a. Reference item concerning improper authorization on MTCE, page 3, para 2a(1). Nonconcur with recommendation. The following information is provided:

   (1) Current authorization documents (1MTCE), which were approved by DA, effective 31 Dec 66, and implemented by USARPAC General Order No. 255, dated 14 Nov 67, include the following MOS entries as required and authorized for the 38th Arty AD (AD):

   a. Seven (7) 31W60: One per AD & n (5); two in AD HHB (2).

   b. One (1) 31Z10: one in Pte HHB.

   (2) MTCE prepared by the 38th Arty AD, and subsequently submitted to USARPAC in May 1967, are still pending DA approval. These updated MTCE do not reflect any changes to the current requirements and authorizations for the MOS entries indicated in para (1), above.

   (3) If it is determined by the 36th Arty AD that MOS 31Z10 is required in lieu of MOS 31M1C, an MTCE submission with complete justification is required to A A C 31G-1.

   b. Reference item concerning qualified MOS 532's be assigned as authorized and officer shortages and warrant officers requested be assigned. page 4, para 2a (2) (c). The following action has been taken to improve the personal status.

   (1) As of 6 July 1967, 36th Arty AD was at 100% assigned strength in MOS 52B.

   (2) Although FRA for ordnance officers in only one, 3 ordnance officers are assigned and 4 additional are reckoned through August.

   (3) Current Brigade authorization for MOS 251C, Air Defense missile Systems Repair Technician (a,n) is 4. As of 6 July 1967, 5 warrant officers MOS 251C are assigned. 3 additional are programmed for November to offset losses through November. In addition, a request has been made to USARPAC requesting the immediate assignment of 20 additional warrant officers.
MOS 2510. HTCE's have been prepared showing the trade-off of 20 presently authorized commissioned officers spaces and will be submitted upon receipt of approval for the warrant officers.

3. (C) Intelligence. a. Reference item concerning NIKE-HERCULES Site Security, page 5, Section II, para 9 (1). Concur with recommendation. Present augmentation request includes a 1½ man internal security force and a 180 man rifle company for external security to be permanently provided each NIKE-HERCULES site.

b. Reference item concerning UAM Site Security, page 9, Section II, para 1 (2). Concur with recommendation. The augmentation of the 30-man security force for each site has been requested. The authorization for the additional TA 312 field phones and 1-79 grenade launchers have been added to changes to the "TCV.

c. Currently, the security of these critical and isolated sites is being provided by the deployment of US and RVF forces from other units.

4. (C) Logistics. a. Reference item page 7, para 2c (2) concerning availability of spare parts in country. As a result of recent actions taken to improve operational readiness of "A.A." equipment, maintenance float authorizations have been significantly increased to 25% for fire control equipment, 11% for launchers, and 20% for test/maintenance equipment. Action is being taken to improve the supply of spare parts and maintain maintenance organization and procedures.

b. Reference item page 8, para 2c (3) concerning helicopter support for Unit Action Batteries. Concur with recommendation. Support is being provided to extent permitted by Eighth Army aviation resources. In addition, 2 each CH-47's with related personnel, equipment and repair parts have been requested to improve the air defense posture in Korea.

5. (C) Signal. a. Reference item concerning Signal Officer personnel page 3, para (1). Concur and make the following additional recommendations:

(1) Signal officers to be assigned to ADA units should have good written knowledge of ADA organizational functions and operations prior to assignment.

(2) A two-week orientation course in ADA communications should be organized at Fort Bliss ADA Center, Texas.

b. Reference item concerning ADA Feedback, page 9, para 2c (2). Concur.
c. Reference item concerning Automatic Frequency Control, page 9, para 29 (3). Concur and make the following additional recommendations:

1. AV/TRC-24 radio receivers/transmitters should be calibrated at each end of a radio link prior to full activation of the system to prevent miscalibration of equipments and harmful radio frequency interference with other systems.

2. System alignment and calibration should be performed weekly during normal maintenance sessions to prevent drifting off frequencies.

3. Whenever the AFC in the AV/TRC-24 radio receiver is not used, the receiver should be fine-tuned against the transmitter every four hours.

d. Reference item concerning Proper Grounding of Communications Equipment, page 9, para 21 (b). Concur and make the following additional recommendations: (A) A semi-fixed installation: a method that should be used for obtaining proper grounding of equipments is to bury a 55 gallon drum filled with rock-salt and to place the grounding rods in the drum. An occasional wetting down of the area of the buried drum will further improve grounding conditions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. N. Hunter

Information Copy Furnished:
CJ, 36th Arty Sd
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 6a: It is not considered necessary for Signal Officer Personnel assigned to Air Defense Artillery units to possess MOS 0500. The Signal Officer Basic Course offers adequate instruction in VHF equipment and operational techniques.

3. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 5d: While use of a 55 gallon drum filled with rock salt would undoubtedly tend to improve conductivity, the grounding method recommended in the basic report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Cy furn:
CG USAEIGHT
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| REPORT TITLE                           | Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 38th Artillery Bde (AD) (U) |

| DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) | Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68 |

| AUTHORITIES (First name, middle initial, last name) | CG, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) |

| REPORT DATE | Undated |

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