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AVFA-AT-D

14 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

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1. (C-NOPORN) Section 1. Operations; Significant Activities.

   a. (C) General

   (1) During the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, IFFORCEV Arty continued to support US, FWMAF, RVNAF, RP/PF and CIDG forces in II CTZ.

   (2) IFFORCEV Arty units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, three separate batteries, and ten detachments supported all major operations in the II CTZ to include Operations BINH TAY-MACARTHUR, DAN SINH-COCHISE, DAN HOA-BOLLING, DAN THANG-MCLAIN and WALKER. SF and CIDG forces operating in Blue, Red, and Black AO's and operations conducted by 22d and 23d ARVN Div, 24th STZ and the provincial defense forces were supported. ROK forces in the 9th and CRID AO's were supported during Operations MANG HO XII and BAEK MA VI. Organizational structure of the command appears at Inclosure 1.

   b. (U) Personnel

   (1) Personnel strength of Hq and Hq Btry, IFFORCEV Arty on 31 Jul 68 was:

      |     |     |     |
      | OFF | WO | EM |
      | Auth | 34 | 2 | 159 |
      | Assg | 34 | 2 | 150 |
      | Present for Duty | 34 | 2 | 148 |

   (2) The lack of tube artillery qualified lieutenant colonels to fill vital artillery positions in IFFORCEV Arty, reported in this organization's ORRR for the period ending 30 Apr 68, appears to have been checked. Assignment of six lieutenant colonels, programmed as replacements during the next quarter, will enable a satisfactory transition for the incumbents.

   (3) The overall officer assignment strength of the attached battalions continues to be below the authorized strength. Reorganization of the light
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FORCEN Artillery for period ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSOR-65 (H1)

artillery battalions under the G-Series INCL on 1 Apr 68 and of the medium and heavy artillery battalions under the G-Series INCL on 15 Jun 68 and 1 Jul 68, respectively, increased the authorized battery officer strength. Currently, I FORCEN Artillery units are short 26 battery grade officers. The problem is compounded by the lack of tube artillery experience of the replacement officers in this category. Of the 90 captains assigned since 1 Sep 67, 70 percent lacked tube artillery experience. Lieutenants' percentages approximate those of the captains. Consequently, in-country training is required before these officers can be considered capable of assuming their duty assignments.

(4) Enlisted personnel status during this period indicates no improvement in the three critical areas listed below. The shortages outlined increased the difficulty of achieving a satisfactory state of operations, maintenance, communications, and morale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE/RCO</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6 Section Chief - 13340</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Crewman - 17B20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTT Operator - 05C</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) On 1 May 68, the CG, I FORCEN Artillery received authority to award the Bronze Star Medal and below. The time to process and present these awards has been substantially decreased during this period. The following awards and decorations were processed for I FORCEN Artillery units. The number of awards increased over the last reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE/RCO</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Honor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (V)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (V)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS OSFOR-65 (RD)

Purple Heart

IFORCEV Certificate of Achievement

TOTALS

(6) Morale and discipline continued to be excellent throughout the period.

(7) The following accidents were recorded during this period for IFORCEV Arty units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VEHICULAR</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Fatal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The 6th Bn, 84th Arty has been designated as a quick reaction mobile force to provide artillery support to major operations throughout II CTZ. As of the end of the reporting period, the battalion participated in operations conducted in every AO of the II CTZ to include LUCAS GREEN in MACARTHUR AO, VELVET HAMMER in COCHISE AO, MAENG HO XI and XII in CAP ROK AO, BAEK MA VI in 9th ROK AO, and TASK FORCE SOUTH in DAN THANG-MCLAIN AO.

(2) The 5th Bn, 27th Arty (105T) continued support of maneuver elements in the four southern provinces of the II CTZ. The firing battalions are located in Binh Thuan and Tuyon Duc Provinces. To accomplish the assigned general support mission, the battalion has forward T.O.C.P.'s at Dalat and Bao Loc with battalion rear located at Phan Rang. In addition, liaison teams are disposed in Binh Thuan and Tuyon Duc Provinces. Two FSCE's are located at Phan Thiet and Phan Rang, respectively.

(3) On 29 May 68, three countershore radar (JH/IFQ-4A) detachments arrived in country followed by a fourth detachment on 28 Jun 68. All detachments arrived at the port of Qui Nhon and convoyed to HHR, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (T.B.), Camp Townes, west of Qui Nhon, for in country orientation, processing and check out of equipment with the exception of the fourth detachment. Orientation, processing, and check out of equipment of this detachment was accomplished at Camp Radcliff, N.K., due to the relocation of HHR, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (T.B.), on 20 Jun 68. The first three detachments are presently located in DINH T.L., MACARTHUR AO and the fourth in the vicinity of HHR GILAN R.K.R. AO.
(4) Evaluation of selected munitions by IFRORCEV Arty was completed on 30 Jun 68, using data compiled on all artillery missions fired with those munitions in II CTZ during the period 1 Feb through 15 Jun 68. There were a total of 120 missions fired expending 1818 rounds of all calibers resulting in 436 confirmed KIA, 49 KIA estimated by intelligence, and 30 confirmed WIA. This indicates an expenditure of only 3.5 rounds per casualty although surveillance of only 21 missions or 17.5 percent of the total was observed. The fatalities quoted for the above missions also include those that may have occurred as a result of small arms or conventional HE artillery projectiles.

(5) Artillery Support for RP/PF

(a) A formal program was established in June to insure that all RP/PF elements are capable of using the artillery support available to them. Each US artillery unit in II CTZ was assigned an area of responsibility based upon political boundaries in which they are to execute the program through the district and province advisors.

(b) Under the concept of the program, each US unit is making a survey of the RP/PF elements in its area of responsibility to determine the number of elements, locations, fire support requirements and communications available. As the surveys are completed, contact teams are being dispatched with the purpose of visiting all RP/PF elements. Their mission is to assist in fire planning, fire in defensive concentrations, insure that responsive fire request channels exist, and provide training in forward observer procedures.

(c) The goals of the program are to provide 100% coverage of RP/PF elements and to react to a request for fire by any allied artillery unit within three minutes. A number of RP/PF personnel have already been trained in forward observer procedures at the IFRORCEV Artillery FO School. Training has also been conducted in other areas in conjunction with ARVN artillery units.

(d) The program has been in effect for quite some time in areas of II CTZ where the preponderance of US artillery is located. An example of the effectiveness of the program is shown by the defense of an RF outpost at Kon Sanh Lou in the Central Highlands. A report of this action and the key role the artillery played in preparing for and supporting the defense of the outpost is at Inclure 2.

(6) The US Army Calibration team calibrated US artillery in the 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde (Sep) 40’s during the period 10-17 June 68. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRORCEV Arty</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORGEV Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RES GSFR-65 (R)

3d Bn, 319th Arty

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(7) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) During this period, increased emphasis was placed on naval gunfire support. Coordination meetings were conducted by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NLO) with representatives of the USS Craig and the USS Carronade. The meetings enabled a better understanding of the principles of naval gunfire. An average of three ships were on station each day in the contiguous waters of the II CTZ. Naval gunfire was used extensively in AO's DAN SHINH-COCHISE and DAN THANG-MCCLIN.

(b) Target processing increased greatly during the month of May when over 3,000 targets were developed and passed to firing units. During the period 1 May to 31 July, an average of over 2,400 targets were processed each month. An increased specialization in target processing was developed in conjunction with certain targeting information furnished by G-2. As a result of this information, two types of targets, immediate reaction and hangfire, were developed. Immediate reaction targets are those developed from usually reliable intelligence sources (agent reports, VR sightings) and passed to the firing unit for instant firing. Hangfire targets are those acquired from very recent, sophisticated intelligence sources and passed to the firing units for immediate firing. Areas of increased enemy activity are given special emphasis in immediate reaction and hangfire targeting. Procedures have been established through liaison and advisory channels to obtain rapid firing response by ROK and ARVN firing units and to obtain clearance to fire outside US AO's on these targets. During the period, 387 hangfire and 730 immediate reaction targets were developed and passed to the firing units by the FSCE.

(c) In coordination with the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command (IDC), the FSCE developed and passed targets to supporting artillery commands with a specific schedule of fires allowing the IDC to conduct its operations with more efficiency. The NLO in the FSCE also coordinated closely with IDC for scheduled naval gunfire in support of IDC operations.

(d) Targeting coordination meetings were conducted during the period with the 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and the 41st Arty Gp. A representative from the FSCE has been at TF South since 26 June serving as fire support ID. This resulted in increased targeting efficiency and provided a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) for TF SOUTH.

(e) Several JIC Light coordination visits were conducted during the period. The most notable were with the Capital ROK Div and the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV). As a result of the visits, more complete ground follow-up requests for JIC Light targets from JICV and IDC commands increased. A total of 126 targets were processed, of which, 136 were fired.
Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORGEV Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS, CSFOR-65 (Hi)

(f) On 15 July, members of the ILCV Combat Operation Center (COC 8) and ILCV 32 presented an ARC Light briefing at I FFORGEV. Personnel from subordinate commands and HQ, I FFORGEV who are involved in the daily processing of ARC Light missions attended. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the new ARC Light regulation, ILCV Directive 95-14, Subject: ARC Light Operations, dated 3 Jul 68.

(g) Personnel of HQ and HQ Btry, IFFORGEV Arty were engaged in 92 days of mission oriented operations during this period.

(h) The number of artillery pieces available and the ammunition expenditure in II CTZ for this period are at Inclosure 3.

d. (C) Training.

(1) Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training.

(a) The backlog of artillery lieutenants who had not attended the Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses, conducted respectively by the 41st Arty Op at An Khe and the 52d Arty Op at Pleiku, has been reduced to a point where quotas to attend the schools were extended to personnel other than artillery lieutenants. Recent graduates of the schools include ARVN, CIDG, and RF/PF personnel. In addition, newly assigned captains and majors with no field artillery experience are being sent to both schools.

(b) A total of 104 students have graduated from the Fire Direction Officer Training Course during the reporting period for an overall total of 212 graduates since the schools began in Jan 68. The Forward Observer Training Course trained 154 students during the period and have trained 311 students overall.

(c) Since Jan 68, the Forward Observer Training Course has trained 38 ARVN, 117 RF/PF and 32 CIDG/SF personnel.

(2) In addition to the training rendered to Vietnamese forces by the FO and FDO Schools and pursuant to the objectives of the Artillery Support to RF/PF, the 6th Bn 32d Arty (175 SP) conducted a FO School for RF/PF personnel during the period 24-29 Jun 68. The after Action Report pertaining to this school is at Inclosure A.

c. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Artillery Intelligence Seminar

(a) An artillery Intelligence Seminar sponsored by IFFORGEV Arty was conducted at HQ, 52d Arty Op on 11 Jul 68. Attendees included intelligence representatives from US, ARVN and ROK Arty units in II CTZ. The purpose of the seminar was to provide an opportunity for discussion of intelligence
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FORGEV, Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

operations at various staff levels and to facilitate exchange of intelligence information between the US, ARVN and ROK representatives. Briefings were presented by five intelligence representatives. The following is a resume of subject matter presented:

1) CORDS, I FORGEV: A representative from CORDS, I FORGEV presented a discussion of the PHOENIX program and the recently organized District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). The mission of the PHOENIX program is identification and neutralization of the VC infrastructure. The DIOCC consolidates all available intelligence agencies at district level, and is advised by a PHOENIX representative.

2) II CORPS: The US advisor to the II Corps G2 Targeting Section presented a briefing on the mission and operations of II Corps Targeting Center. Discussion centered upon procedures involved in development of strategic targets in II CTZ.

3) I FORGEV Arty: A briefing was presented by a representative of S2, I FORGEV Arty concerning counter-battery intelligence operations. Utilizing a series of maps, charts and bar graphs, it was demonstrated how a continuing analysis of enemy artillery capabilities may be used as a management tool to improve counter-battery operations in II CTZ.

4) 9th Inf Div, ROK: S2, 9th Inf Div Arty presented a comprehensive description of defensive positions in the 9th Inf Div Arty and illustrated each type of fortification with color slides. Additionally, a brief discussion of planning and execution of counter-artillery programs was presented.

5) 173d Abn Bde (Sep): A representative from 41st Arty Gp charged with the responsibility for targeting in the 173d Abn Bde's AO, explained collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence in that AO, and discussed utilization of visual reconnaissance aircraft assets to support most effectively the target acquisition effort.

(b) At the conclusion of the five briefings, highlights of the day's discussion were reviewed and recommendations for improvement of intelligence operations were presented. The seminar was found to be an excellent opportunity for exchange of information between US, ARVN and ROK artillery intelligence officers. Significant advances in integrated intelligence operations and subsequent increased effectiveness of artillery fire support can be realized from conferences of this type.

(2) During this ORLL period, the Artillery Quality Control Team continued analysis of data provided to firing units by the nine electronic artillery sections in II CTZ. A reduction of errors to 1.5% of all Artillery data provided to artillery unit was noted. This record low percentage of error has contributed significantly to accuracy of artillery fires and reduced greatly the
(3) Counterbattery Intelligence Operations.

(a) In May 68, the counterbattery intelligence section of IFFORCEV Arty published its first monthly analysis of the enemy artillery threat in II Corps Tactical Zone. The report was compiled from data that had been collected for several months, and was disseminated to artillery units, major maneuver headquarters in II CTZ, and to other selected headquarters in Vietnam.

(b) The purpose of the report was to identify the enemy artillery threat in II CTZ. For purposes of the analysis, artillery was defined as recoilless rifles, mortars, rockets and cannons. Objectives of the analysis were:

1. To determine, from data collected and evaluated, what artillery capabilities existed in II CTZ.

2. To determine the effectiveness of active and passive countermeasures employed at installations in II CTZ.

3. To determine actions required to increase the effectiveness of active and passive defense of installations in order to reduce the enemy's capability of attacking them, or if he did attack, to reduce the effectiveness of his fires.

(c) The analysis contained descriptions of enemy artillery dispositions, summaries of attacks and rounds expended by caliber, and summaries of weapons captured and destroyed by caliber. From this information, conclusions could be drawn concerning the areas in which the enemy employs certain types of weapons, the percentage of attacks and rounds fired in any area versus the enemy artillery in that area, and the amount and location of captured or destroyed enemy ammunition compared with overall artillery expenditures throughout the II CTZ.

(d) Subsequent monthly analyses refined the first publication and emphasized effectiveness of active and passive defense against enemy artillery. Specific attention has been directed toward effectiveness of countermortar radars. Analysis of information collected by the counterbattery intelligence section has assisted the radar officer in measuring the proficiency and effectiveness of his countermortar radar detachments. Analysis of enemy attacks on installations where countermortar radars are located has assisted in determining if proper sectors of scan have been assigned, or if additional sectors of scan are required. Similar analysis of enemy artillery activity in areas where countermortar radars are not located has provided guidance for relocation of detachments. Degrees of operational effectiveness were measured by comparing the number of hostile firing positions acquired with the total number of attacks received.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, (RCS CSFOR-65 (R1))

(e) The ultimate objective of analysis is to increase the effectiveness of target acquisition agencies, which in turn, can substantially reduce effectiveness of hostile artillery by providing better targeting information for planning counterfires.

(f) Implementation of GOLF Series MTOE.

Medium and heavy artillery battalions of IFFORCEV Arty were reorganized under the standardized GOLF Series MTOE by USARFAC General Order 275 and 311, respectively. The effective date for reorganization of medium units was 15 Jun 68, and for heavy units, 1 Jul 68. The major impact of the reorganization is that all heavy and medium battalions are now authorized six forward observers, an additional liaison officer, and another assistant S3. Each firing battery is also authorized an additional assistant executive officer. Each battalion is authorized two light observation helicopters by the new MTOE. Because of the nonavailability of aircraft, the majority of the battalions will not receive them until early 1969.

(g) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis.

(1) The analysis of ammunition expenditures was expedited through the development of a computer program which performs the numerical calculations of the weekly and monthly expenditure data. A Burroughs 263 computer, located at the Base Data Automation Section, 14th Cbt Spt Gp, Nha Trang Air Force Base, is used. A series of programs was developed by a programmer assigned to the section. The sophisticated program, incorporating numerous double check features and variable time interval flexibility, provides output parameters of rounds, missions, percentage of rounds and missions against total expenditure, and rounds per mission for each target category by caliber, area of operation, and battalion. Weekly and monthly copies of the computerized expenditure analysis are provided to all major artillery commands within IFFORCEV to use as a means of analyzing their subordinate unit's expenditures. As a result of the IFFORCEV Arty ammunition management system, a significant shift has been noticed in expenditures from the interdiction category to the more profitable target categories, such as confirmed and acquired.

(2) Since all US Artillery in Vietnam are adopting the expenditure classification system for use in analyzing their ammunition expenditures, a comprehensive report on the system was compiled by IFFORCEV Artillery as an aid in its implementation. The report includes a discussion on the evolution of the system, definitions of target categories, the application of manual and automatic data processing, and a detailed guide for analysis of the expenditure data. Copies of the report, the computer program and programmer's instruction manual have been made available to all artillery units in Vietnam.

(3) A copy of the report was presented to the Secretary of the Army during his visit to IFFORCEV. The Secretary was briefed on the system, its results and its application to artillery improvement programs.
h. Artillery Seminar. An artillery seminar was held at Camp Radcliff An Khe on 21 June. Artillery commanders of US, ROK and ARVN forces at the corps, division and group level participated. A demonstration of selected munitions was presented after which a conference was held to discuss several topics of mutual interest. The discussion covered such areas as combined support for RF/PF elements, improvement of artillery effectiveness through the analysis of ammunition expenditures, methods to increase the number of forward observers operating with Vietnamese maneuver units, and the means of preventing artillery accidents. This second in a planned series of meetings has resulted in a strengthening of ties between allied artillery units with the outcome of more effective and responsive artillery support for maneuver units of all allied nations.

i. The IFFORCEV Arty Command Inspection program continued during this reporting period. Units evaluated were: 1st Bn, 92d Arty (13 May); 7th Bn, 15th Arty (27 May); 5th Bn, 22d Arty (10 Jun); 7th Bn, 13 Arty (26 Jun); 3d Bn, 6th Arty (1 Jul); 6th Bn, 14th Arty (15 Jul); and 6th Bn, 84th Arty (29 Jul).

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Target Processing.

(a) OBSERVATION. An efficient means of processing targeting information is essential for planning and conducting operations and the selection of special targets.

(b) EVALUATION. The vast amount of information available to an artillery command is of little value unless an efficient means for processing and storing is utilized. Incoming targeting information should be plotted on a 1:50,000 map and then posted on 5x8-inch index cards with coordination and nature of target. Also include on the card the data of the sighting, method of target determination, and accuracy of the information of an intelligence report. Cards are then filed by grid zone designation and target type. The target analyst can then check the targeting map in the area of a pending operation and obtain the exact locations and target types from the card file.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this means of processing and storing targeting information be adopted by all fire support coordinating elements.
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- Intelligence. None
- Logistics. None
- Organization. None
- Other.

(1) Bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION. Bunkers collapse frequently as a result of monsoon rains and termite infestation in timber.

(b) EVALUATION. Excessive rain will cause deterioration of timber and sandbags at an accelerated rate. Also sandbags lose footing during heavy rains. To preclude bunker collapse, frequent inspection should be conducted to check for roof sag, wall cant and termites. The following inspection procedures can be conducted easily.

1. Check for soundness of timber by tapping with a hammer along the entire edge and gouging the timber ends with a knife.

2. Check for roof sag and wall cant by suspending an empty small arms cartridge from the roof. Place a one foot square piece of any flat material on the floor directly below the suspended shell casing until it touches the flat surface and draw a circle around the circumference. Raise the shell casing 2-3 inches above the circle. Lowering the shell casing periodically and particularly after heavy rainfall, will indicate if roof sag or wall cant has occurred.

3. Timbers with 10% or more of the surface containing termite holes should be replaced.

4. Sandbags should be checked frequently to determine if slippage or loss of footing has occurred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That commanders insure that troops at the lowest level are aware of the need to frequently inspect bunkers and that they are made aware of inspection methods.

RICHARD A. EDWARDS JR
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-AT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAO-C-DST
4-CG, IFFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
1- File
AVFA-OC-OT (14 Aug 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFORCSV Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, HGS CORP-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 29 AUG 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

(U) This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters I FFORCSV Artillery.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. GABBARD
HE: AG
ASSISTANT GENERAL

Cop.es furnished:
2-AGSFOR, DA, Wash, DC, 20310
1-I FFORCSV Arty
AVHGC-DST (14 Aug 68) 2d Ind (U) MAJ Klingman/de/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORC 6 Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 SEP 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and concurs with the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furnish:
HQ I FFV
HQ I FFV Arty
Operational Report of HQ & HQ Btry, IFForcev Arty for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 SEP 1363

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.F. Shortt
C.F. AGC
Asst AG
Artillery units attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery at the end of the reporting period were:

**IFFORCEV ARTILLERY**

- 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
- 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8-inch SP)
- 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AVSP)
  - Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)
  - Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)

**Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery**

- 77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

**41st Artillery Group**

- 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
- 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm SP/G)
- 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T)
- 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

**52d Artillery Group**

- 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)
- 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8-inch SP)
- 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8-inch SP)
- 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

Incl 1
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D ARTILLERY GROUP
APO 96318

AVQO-CO

2 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Artillery Support for Kon Som Luh

1. Kon Som Luh is an outpost 13 kilometers ENE of Kontum City in the western highlands. It stands alone faced by the threat of attack by units of the 24th NVA Regiment as well as the 30th Main Force Battalion. Two RF companies occupied Kon Som Luh on the night of 14-15 May; at 0135 hours on the 15th an estimated NVA battalion attacked the outpost from several sides. (The attacking unit was later identified as the 6th Bn 24th NVA Regt). There were no US advisors or US forward observers at the outpost. An ARVN forward observer and radio-telephone operator from the 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion in Kontum had been positioned with the companies. The forward observer immediately called for preplanned defensive fires from the ARVN 155mm howitzer platoon on the north side of Kontum City, and from the US 8 inch/175mm battery (C-6-14) located in Kontum City. The first rounds were on the way in four minutes. The observer skillfully shifted the artillery fires to threatened areas of the perimeter using preplanned targets as reference points. The artillery raked the enemy force with devastating fire and the NVA battalion broke its attack at 0615 hours leaving 147 dead behind. In contrast, only three RF were slightly wounded in the successful defense of the outpost.

2. It was not by chance that artillery made the difference between holding or losing the outpost at Kon Som Luh. Many US artillerymen and US advisory personnel had worked and planned steadily for several months with the RF and with the ARVN artillery to bring about this well coordinated and timely response. Following is a synopsis of actions taken from the beginning of the year by artillerymen from the 52d Artillery Group which relate to the victory at Kon Som Luh:

JANUARY

(1) After a brief series of coordinating visits to the senior US advisory headquarters in Kontum, a liaison section headed by a captain was placed in Kontum City to make daily contact with the US advisors to the 24th Special Tactical Zone and Kontum Province, and to Detachment B-24 of the 5th Special Forces in Kontum City. At this time there were no major tactical US units operating in the area. The senior advisor to the 24th STZ welcomed this participation by the 52d Artillery Group, and offered the assistance of his intelligence, operations, and artillery advisor sections.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Artillery Support for Kon Som Luh

(2) In discussing artillery capabilities with these headquarters, the liaison officer created an alternate link among the advisory staffs for the exchange of information about enemy capabilities and the current operations of the US forces in the 4th Division's AO MacArthur.

(3) At the end of January, the enemy began his TET offensive. The liaison officer used his communications links and contacts between US forces and the US advisors to further coordination of fire support means in the battle for Kontum City and to submit timely reports on the close-in fighting to higher headquarters.

FEBRUARY

(1) Because of the enemy drive into Kontum during TET, more attention was focused on the coordination of US and ARVN units in the area. The 1-92d Arty sent a liaison sergeant with radio equipment to the 24th STZ to strengthen the US side of what was to become a more capable combined US-ARVN control center; this reinforcement was in addition to the liaison party mentioned above.

(2) In mid-February three US artillery batteries moved into Kontum to support operations by US maneuver forces. The 52d Artillery Group immediately initiated a program to support the isolated villages, hamlets, and RP/PP outposts with pre-planned artillery fires. A US forward observer from the 175mm/8 inch battery (C-5-22) worked with the province and district advisors to plan the fires. An interpreter was provided by the province, and helicopter lift was furnished by this group and by the province.

(3) Simultaneously the 1-92 Arty formed a task force of about 35 officers and men to render assistance to ARVN artillery units in Kontum. In four days, an intensive and detailed cooperative evaluation was conducted; on the spot improvements were made, particularly in maintenance and repairs; and recommendations as to how the effectiveness of the ARVN artillery could be increased were developed. The ARVN artillery was fired in on targets selected by the province and district chiefs and adjusted by a US/ARVN observer team. US artillery fired TOT with ARVN on the more important targets. Survey control was extended between US and ARVN artillery, and land lines were added to the communication plan.

(4) Charlie Battery, 5-22 Arty, was one of the US artillery units operating in Kontum City. The battery commander reinforced the program described above with his personal participation and enthusiastic "salesmanship" of the expanding coverage for outlying hamlets and outposts. By a fortunate circumstance, the US S3 advisor to Kontum province (an armor officer) had served recently as an instructor at Fort Sill and was convinced that artillery fire planning could add a great deal of protection to ARVN, RP/PP, and friendly villagers. He was given full support by the US province senior advisor who made certain that red tape and unwieldy procedures were eliminated in processing fire requests.
SUBJECT: Artillery Support for Kon Som Luh

(5) As the influence of artillery was increased, the RF and RF extended the range of their patrols and listening posts. Advisors with these units were coached in the techniques of the forward observer. Radio communications were checked and procedures to call for fires were rehearsed.

(6) The battalion commanders of the 5-22 Arty and the 1-92 Arty monitored the program closely to keep all elements actively participating. Their timely visits to senior US and ARVN officers and officials in Kontum City kept the program running smoothly.

MARCH AND APRIL

(1) C-5-22 Arty displaced west of Kontum to Polei Kleng; however the program in Kontum was well established so that the heavy battery (C-6-14) which replaced it continued the program without pause.

(2) Daily liaison to the US advisors and the ARVN artillery in Kontum strengthened the planning cycle and added US support to ARVN ground operations northeast of the city.

MAY

(1) The efforts of the US and ARVN units in the associate battery program enhanced the mutual support and cooperation among the artillerymen in Kontum.

(2) When the NVA battalion attacked on 15 May, the plan which was developed over many months brought immediate response from the US and ARVN artillery. Kon Som Luh was successfully defended and the enemy attack turned into a defeat which virtually eliminated one NVA battalion.

3. In summary, the following steps outline a program which might be used when US artillery moves into a new area or accelerates the fire planning for defense of ARVN, RF/PP and friendly villages:

a. Senior artillerymen should make initial visits to US advisors to set the stage for the proposed cooperative effort.

b. An energetic liaison officer should be stationed with the advisors to keep the program in focus and to gain the contacts that will surface intelligence data for target and fire planning.

c. Find out what problems can be solved by artillery reaction. Show the advisors how weapons already available can be better utilized when coordinated with and reinforced by US artillery.
AVGG-CO
SUBJECT: Artillery Support for Kon Som Luh

With the assistance of US advisors and ARVN interpreters, begin an extensive program to fire-in defensive targets for villages, hamlets and ARVN/FF/PF outposts. Include ARVN artillery in this program within ARVN range capabilities.

e. Teach classes and give briefings on the use of the available calibers of artillery. Many US personnel and most ARVN are unfamiliar with the 175mm gun and the 8 inch howitzer. Include typical reaction times, techniques of fire, adjustment and communications.

f. Follow intelligence indicators carefully so that artillery is positioned to respond to likely enemy actions. Response time can be reduced with precomputed data. Pieces can be laid on defensive targets so that rounds are on the way in the first few critical minutes of the action when the enemy is trying to destroy the friendly force's communications and will to resist.

4. The 52d Artillery Group is engaged again in proving out these principles in Ban Me Thuot (Darlac Province). Our efforts there have so far achieved excellent results and progress is stimulated because of the greater density of ARVN artillery with which to work, and because of the larger number of friendly units and populated areas which are enthusiastically seeking artillery support.

/s/Hal E. Hallgren
/t/HAL E. HALLGREN
Colonel, Artillery Commanding

A TRUE COPY

PETER D. HEINDBAHL
MAJ, Arty
Asst S3, Tng

NOTE

Much of the activity indicated in this Memorandum For Record was stimulated by the IPPV Commanding General, Major General R. Peers, who became concerned with the lack of fire support for RF/FF units in this area. Prior to the actions recorded herein two RF/FF outposts in this area were overrun by the enemy and an RF unit at Kon Braih, approximately 28 kilometers NE of Kontum, also came under attack. Major General Peers directed a 175mm unit moved so as to provide artillery coverage to this outpost.
CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL DATA
ARTILLERY STRENGTH AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

1. (a) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN, and ROK Artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>355</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
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2. (c) Ammunition Statistics for US Artillery in II CTZ for the Reporting Quarter:

(a) Expenditures by Target Category:

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<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAY ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
<th>JUNE ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
<th>JULY ROUNDS/MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>49,063/1,612</td>
<td>25,471/777</td>
<td>19,335/1,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>71,356/8,680</td>
<td>44,073/8,654</td>
<td>30,792/3,694</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>14,491/371</td>
<td>4,015/116</td>
<td>2,129/394</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>28,808/1,729</td>
<td>22,955/1,140</td>
<td>17,152/677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>79,572/28,879</td>
<td>59,721/15,807</td>
<td>20,820/12,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>32,510/4,508</td>
<td>29,707/4,234</td>
<td>20,097/3,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>44,207/5,522</td>
<td>4,280/521</td>
<td>4,379/594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>279,995/66,549</td>
<td>190,662/41,119</td>
<td>114,709/22,284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Expenditures by Caliber:

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<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>RDS EXPENDED</th>
<th>% of TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/TUBE/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>May</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>177,479</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>67,088</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>21,879</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>13,549</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279,995</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>34*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>124,583</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>39,064</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15,686</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>11,289</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB - TOTAL</td>
<td>190,622</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>73,364</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>20,765</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17,820</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>7,755</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<td>SUB - TOTAL</td>
<td>114,704</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>585,321</td>
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* Prorated Average
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CG, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

1. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

14. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

N/A

16. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

683168

18. OTHER REPORT NO(s) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

17. ABSTRACT

N/A
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
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Washington, D.C. 20310
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