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| 30 Jun 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr 29 Sep 1980 |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Corps (Group), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

THRU: Commanding General Eighth United States Army, ATTN: RACO-T
APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, USARPAC, ATTN: GFOP-DT
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: ACSFOR, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. SECTION 1 Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. The organizational structure of I Corps (Gp) is as indicated at inclosure 1 and proscribed by TOE 52-17 dated 31 December 1966 and TDA F8-WAT399-10 dated 31 December 1966.

   b. During the entire reporting period I Corps (Gp) was engaged in supporting the Republic of Korea physically occupying an assigned portion of the DMZ.

   c. There were no major command changes during the period, however there were several significant staff changes.


      (2) G-3: Colonel Jack Balthis was medically evacuated to CONUS and Colonel Richard A Beyer assumed the position of G-3 on 8 March 1968.

      (3) G-4: Colonel George A. Schnebli assumed the position of G-4 on 8 March 1968.

      (4) G-5: Lt Colonel Douglas Tucker assumed the position of G-5 on 8 March 1968.

   d. During the period 15-19 January 1968 I Corps (Gp) conducted a Corps wide CPX CAPTTOI III which included all headquarters down to and including battalion, assigned or attached.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gn) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Additionally with the concurrence of the Commanding Officers concerned elements of the 21st Direct Support Group, 36th Artillery Brigade and USAF Korea also participate in the exercise.

e. I Corps (Gn) received its annual Inspector General inspection during the period 25-26 January 1968. Eighth Army I.G. conducted the inspection and gave an overall rating of EXCELLENT. It is significant to note that there were no major deficiencies.

f. MTOE's for I Corps (Gn) U.S. units were submitted in March 1968. These were based on instructions and guidance provided by the Department of the Army, United States Army Pacific and United States Eighth Army. There were no personnel changes. MTOE changes were made to conform to the new MOS numbering system. Numerous equipment changes were made to update I Corps (Gn)'s armament and equipment picture. Simultaneously with the MTOE's a new KITHA was submitted. This document picked up all the assigned KATUSA personnel and their equipment. In addition it picked up all the specialized non-THE equipment presently in the J Corps (Gn) troop units.

2. SECTION 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation.

a. Personnel:

   (1) Observation; To obtain assignment instructions and port calls on a more timely basis for personnel desiring to reenlist.

   Discussion; Personnel desiring to reenlist for an option most often expect to be reenlisted and out of Korea within a short time after they decide to reenlist. At present it takes approximately three weeks to obtain assignment instructions for an individual desiring reenlistment for Vietnam. This long delay coupled with the further delay of obtaining the port call and clearing the command often become a source of irritation to the man and hampers the reenlistment program. Personnel desiring reenlistment options for schools, ITT's, Station of Choice or CONUS must wait until they are within 6-months of Derose before requesting assignment instructions. Many personnel contact the Reenlistment NCO regarding these options prior to the established time frame and must be told to wait. It appears that at least some of these requirements can be projected for more than 6-months (i.e., school courses, common MOS' to major units).

   Recommendations; Suggest that major commands be authorized to reenlist common user MOS' and other MOS when large monthly fill is

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required in VN, against previously allocated numbers. Personnel desiring to reenlist for VN could be reenlisted without delay and port calls could be requested concurrently with VN's reenlistment. Assignment instructions for personnel in MOS* other than those discussed above should be requested by phone or wire to insure timely verification of vacancy. Personnel desiring to reenlist for school, Station of Choice or CONUS should be permitted to reenlist early as possible. School classes are normally projected well in advance of the present 6-months limitation on reenlistment and many recurring MOS requirements exist in all large units such as Division or CONUS installations. It appears that with little additional effort, arrangements could be made whereby these personnel could reenlist well ahead of the present 6-month restriction.

(2) Observation: It has become common for senior grade enlisted personnel requisitions to become long overdue without cancellation. This problem is particularly acute because the item cannot be re-requisitioned until notification of cancellation is received.

Discussion; Overdue requisitions create vacancies usually of several months duration in important senior grade enlisted positions. An additional period of up to six months is required for newly reenlisted senior grade enlisted men to arrive. This creates a hardship of several months in the unit or staff section concerned.

Recommendation; A system of reporting should be standardized whereby major PACINCS commands report to DA all overdue requisitions. This should be done at a specified time period such as 30 days after due date. DA should then make an immediate determination as to the individual's availability, and if necessary select a new senior grade enlisted man to report at earliest possible date.

b. Operations:

(1) Observation; Lack of coordination and timely passage of information and intelligence during counterinfiltration operations.

Discussion; Due to lack of adequate communications codes, equipment and facilities, it was extremely difficult to maintain coordination and to effect passage of timely information and intelligence between higher, lower and adjacent headquarters of US and ROK military forces and ROK National Police.

Recommendation: An exchange of liaison officers proved highly effective and successful in establishing proper coordination and for passage of information, intelligence, plans and overlays.

(2) Observation; Insufficient and inadequate organic artificial lighting for conduct of night cross-country counterinfiltration operations.

Discussion; During the period 20-29 January 1968 while conducting cross-country counterinfiltration against the 31 man
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

NK "Blue House" force, there was insufficient and inadequate organic artificial lighting for continuous night cross-country operations when contact was established with enemy agents.

Recommendation: It was determined to be feasible and highly successful to coordinate with USAF elements for provision of airborne flag ship during night contact with enemy agents and for 30 minute around alert flare ship during non-contact periods.

c. Training

(1) Observation; Use of Air Force Aircraft for Army Training.

Discussion; US Air Force and ROK Air Force aircraft can be used effectively as training aids for classes on aircraft recognition and for tracking with the XM REDEYE trainer by REDEYE gunners. The use of live aircraft greatly enhances the ability of the individual soldier to recognize aircraft that could be encountered in the Korea area. The soldier is motivated more to learn the different types of aircraft when he can actually see them fly rather than try to memorize silhouettes from cards that are used when no aircraft is available. The absence of drones for tracking purposes would seriously hamper tracker training if not for the live fly-bys.

Recommendation; None

(2) Observation; QRF Teams.

Discussion; The use of UH-1D helicopter to train Quick Reaction Forces is becoming more and more valuable each day. During "Big Cliff" operations small units are moved with the use of the UH-1D helicopter. The Blue House raid made in January by 31 North Korean agents has shown the need for Quick Reaction of small units to act as blocking and sweeping forces. Presently each battalion sized unit in I Corps (On) is or has trained a small unit QRF team to be available to move anywhere in the I Corps (On) area within a minimum amount of time.

Recommendation; None.

d. Intelligence

(1) Observation; On the night of 17 January 1968 a North Korean agent Team consisting of 31 men, all officers in the NKPA, infiltrated into the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the mission of assassinating the ROK President, Park Chung Hee. The team proceeded south traveling at night and bivouacing during the day. The team made (4) four bivouacs. They
entered Seoul on the night of 21 January 1968 and were moving toward the
Blue House when challenged by Korean National Police (KNP). A firefight
ensued. The NK's thwarted in their effort to assassinate the president,
tried to escape to North Korea. Five North Koreans were killed and one
was captured in Seoul. The rest attempted to escape north through the I
Corps (Go) area. Twenty three enemy agents were neutralized within the
Corps (Go) area. This brought the total losses of the 31 man team to 28
killed and one captured. During the counter-agent operation, which began
late on the night of 19 January 1968, I Corps (Go) intelligence agencies
encountered a number of problem areas: Reporting was one of the major
problem areas. Reports received were often late and inaccurate. The initial
information was received from the Korean National Police without proper
evaluation as to the validity of the information.

Discussion; Timely and accurate reports submitted with an assessment as to the reliability of the source of information will better assist higher headquarters in evaluating the information.

Recommendation; All personnel should be instructed in the importance of reporting incidents together with an evaluation as to the validity of the source, as soon as they are observed or encountered.

(2) Observation; Aid of Civilian Population: During the operation the ROK civilians made a definite contribution by reporting suspicious people and events. In fact, most of the H/I's were neutralized as a result of reports from civilians. However, this valuable source of information can be improved through a better communications system such as the placement of telephones and/or radios at strategic locations throughout the Corps area so that the nearest communication point would be no more than 15 minutes walking distance of the local residents. Prisoners: NK agents often commit suicide when capture appears imminent.

Discussion: North Korean agents once captured often readily reveal information concerning their mission, capabilities, and intentions of their organization. A live agent can be an invaluable source of information.

Recommendation; Every reasonable effort should be made to persuade enemy agents to surrender. However, it should be noted that once defeated, most agents tried to inflict as much destruction as possible before being killed. Friendly elements must be instructed that agents usually will not surrender and once engaged will fight to the death.

(3) Observation; SURVEILLANCE: During the events following the attack on the Blue House it would have been advantageous to have had several CH23 or CH13 helicopters continuously searching the area from the
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

air with qualified aerial observers to assist in locating and tracking the agents. The CH23 is more suitable for reconnaissance than the UH-10 which was fully committed with ORF missions, and the CH23 is also more suitable than the fixed wing since it can fly lower, slower, and changes direction faster. Boundaries: Difficulties sometimes arose as to the exact responsibility for areas lying on or near unit boundaries.

Discussion; Interrogations have revealed that enemy agents are familiar with DMZ boundaries between units along the DMZ and attempted to exploit the difficulties of close communications and coordination between US and ROK units, to cover their movements.

Recommendations; Close coordination and liaison between adjacent US and ROK units through use of language qualified liaison officers should be stressed. Arrangements should be made between units to cover all contingencies.

(3) Observation; Identification of Friendly Personnel (C): Identification of friendly personnel becomes extremely important after agents are sighted in an area. North Koreans usually wear clothing similar to ROK uniforms.

Discussion; Agents in ROK uniforms can escape detection or approach too near friendly troops before they are identified.

Recommendation; A special method of identification, periodically changed, which the agent cannot readily duplicate should be given each individual operating in the area. During the January operations all friendly elements were required to wear steel helmets as a means of identification. Another method used is to sew white thread next to the front pocket for identification.

(4) Observation; In addition to the 21 January 1968 incident, numerous other incidents have occurred in the I Corps (Gp) area. These incidents include harassment and probing of friendly GP's and DMZ defensive positions, ambushes of friendly patrols within the DMZ, and infiltration attempts by small groups of from 3 to 5 agents. North Koreans will not hesitate to attack and ambush patrols during the day, the North Koreans usually travel by night, and they are often supported in operations by fire from enemy troops north of the DMZ.

Discussion; North Koreans will move into position at night and set up positions of observation or ambush. The positions are usually located to facilitate rapid withdrawal when encountered by friendly troops.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for I Corps (Gp) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Recommendation: Positive attention should be directed toward the training of personnel on DMZ patrols. Well positioned, alert, night ambush patrols within the DMZ would hamper NK movement. Ambush patrols must maintain strict light and noise discipline.

e. Logistics:

(1) Observation: During recent accelerated increases in personnel strengths within I Corps (Gp), it was noted that there was an excessive period of time between arrival of the individual and reaction of the supply in providing his individual weapon.

Discussion: Currently Direct Support Units are authorized to maintain a float utilized to replace weapons unable to be repaired immediately. Issues for other than direct exchange from this float are unauthorized. The inability to issue from this float and the inability of a unit to stock any extra weapons when the unit personnel strength exceeds that authorized by TO/MT/GE resulted in excessive periods of time when a new arrival is without an individual weapon.

Recommendation: To alleviate this delay in weapon issue in its recommended that consideration be given to either: Increasing the current maintenance float within the DSU sufficiently to allow initial issue of new arrivals or that a unit faced with a strength situation above authorization be authorized to maintain up to a prescribed percentage of extra weapons to insure immediate availability for new arrivals and to reduce supply turbulence of requisition and turn-in action or the supporting supply activity maintain a prescribed percentage of weapons on hand, based on supported density, to insure immediate availability.

(2) Observation: During the 3d Quarter FY 68, this command started receiving an unusually high input of new equipment, particularly tactical vehicles. The normal method of distribution to the using unit was commercial rail which usually resulted in an extremely high percent of pilferage.

Discussion: The high pilferage resulted in a new item being deadlined for a considerable length of time as soon as it arrived in a unit due to a missing part. The preference of thieves for certain parts placed an extremely high demand on the supply system for replacement of those certain parts and thus rapidly depleted the supply which further lengthened deadline time. Due to the extremely long transit time (3-4 days), providing rail guards was impractical from a logistical support point of view. Little reliance could be placed on Korean railroad to secure loads or assume pecuniary liability for consigned loads.
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EACICT-N

SUBJECT: Operational Report for I Corps (Gp) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Recommendations: In an effort to circumvent the problem areas outlined above, this command initiated a "Drive Away" concept where military drivers were employed to immediately deliver vehicles to using units upon arrival at the point of entry. This concept has been most successful in expediting delivery and reducing pilferage to acceptable limits. It is recommended that this concept be continued.

(3) Observation: The extremely high zero balance rate in unit Prescribed Load Lists caused a considerable command interest during the 3d quarter of Fiscal Year 68.

Discussion: Aside from having a detrimental effect on the deadline rate within a given unit, the high percentage of zero balance proved to have a devastating effect on achievement of the assigned ESCAPE within the unit. Research by this office indicated that one contributing factor was the inability of the supply system to distinguish between a normal replacement requisition and one to replace a last in bin item since both warranted only an Urgency of Need Designator "M".

Recommendation: This headquarters recommended that in order to eliminate this shortcoming, Urgency of Need Designator C be utilized in cases where the request was for replacement of a last bin item. Eighth Army acted favorably on this recommendation and issued an appropriate change to EIGHTH US ARMY Regulation 735-35 on 5 June 1968.

f. Organization: "None"

g. Other:

(1) Observation: National and provincial plans for civilian evacuation and refugee control during war are not disseminated to lowest civil government levels responsible for execution.

Discussion: National plans for civilian evacuation from combat areas are prepared in great detail. Plans include routes, locations of collecting points, control points, assembly areas, grain storage, and establish priorities. To be executed effectively civil leaders at gun (county) and myon (township) levels as a minimum must be familiar with actions required by them and routes and control measures in their section. Overall civil government responsibility must be maintained but primacy of military necessity must be understood. During CFZ Capitol Hill 68, Corps and division G5 coordination with appropriate level civil officers revealed complete ignorance of plans and requirements or, in best cases insufficient knowledge. Due to SECRET classification of ROK National
SUBJECT: Operational Report for I Corps (Go) for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Emergency Countermeasure plan province officials were reluctant to disseminate pertinent portions until considerable discussion and coordination had taken place. The essential portions could actually be unclassified and can be so published without compromising operations plans, the education of lower level officials was initiated by military direct coordination which, together with renewed North Korean activity in early 1968, spurred action by civil officials.

Recommendations: That portions of national plans for civilian evacuation be unclassified. That national level coordination effect simultaneous and prompt dissemination of plans through civil administrative and military channels with requirement for expeditious implementing plans to lowest appropriate level. That civil affairs staff officers maintain close liaison with civil counterparts at appropriate levels and assist in planning and training for civilian evacuation.

FOR THE COMMANDER;

D. K. Ledwith
2 LT, AGC
ASST. AG

1 Incl
As
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EAGO-ME (22 Jun 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Op) for the Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS C5502-65 (R) (U)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301 7 AUG 69

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-D7, APO 96553

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference item concerning assignment instructions and port calls for personnel desiring to reenlist, page 2, para 2a(1). Nonconcur. Procedures described are in consonance with DA regulations and policy. No previous substantiated request has been submitted recommending proposed changes. As resolution of any proposed change must be made at DA and should be staffed thru this headquarters and USARPAC, a separate factual study should be submitted thru channels for appropriate consideration.

3. (C) Reference item concerning cancellation of overdue enlisted personnel requisitions, page 3, para 2a(2). Nonconcur. All overdue requisition items are presently being reported to DA on a 60-day basis. Since 30-day deferrals are relatively easy to obtain, it is believed that 30 days is not a sufficient period of time prior to requesting status of overdue personnel. Upon submission of a report of overdue replacements to DA, return replies are rarely forthcoming. Recently, on an experimental basis, Eighth Army has requested cancellation rather than status of an overdue individual. This will not completely solve the problem, but it is an attempt to force DA into taking some action on overdue items of requisition.

4. (C) Reference item concerning communication codes, page 3, para 2b(1). The Eighth Army Staff Operations Code has been coordinated and reviewed by the staff. This has resulted in the addition of new words and phrases for better coordination and passage of information between this headquarters and major subordinate headquarters.

5. (C) Reference item concerning use of Air Force aircraft for Army training, page 4, para 2c(1). Concur. Aircraft fly-bys conducted by both the US and 20K Air Forces greatly enhance the Army's aircraft recognition training program. Continual emphasis is placed upon the Air Forces to vary the type of aircraft so that the majority of models in the current inventory are utilized.

2812771
6. (S) Reference item concerning QRF Teams, page 4, para 2d(2). To assist each battalion sized unit in I Corps (Gp) to maintain its QRF Team capability, pilot strength within Eighth Army will be increased from the present 87 pilots to 225 pilots by the end of March 1969. In addition, UH-1 helicopters will be significantly increased during C70.

7. (U) Reference item concerning instruction of personnel in incident reporting, page 4, paragraph 2d(1). Concur. Various actions have been taken to instruct personnel in the importance of incident reporting.

8. (U) Reference item concerning efforts to persuade enemy agents to surrender, page 5, para 2d(2). Concur. Actions have been taken to instruct personnel to attempt to persuade enemy agents to surrender. Dispatches to UNC tactical units and MOX law enforcement agencies emphasize the advantages of capturing KPA agents detected in the MOX.

9. (U) Reference item concerning supply of individual weapons, page 7, para 2e(1). Nonconcur. The 10% maintenance float seems quite adequate provided USU's concerned turn in unserviceables (via DT) to Depot frequently. Allowances are made for their augmented KASA's. Latest 711-5 reveals that I Corps has a maintenance float of 516 weapons when they are authorized a float of 596.

10. (S) Reference item concerning pilferage, page 7, para 2e(2). Concur. Subject system has worked very effectively.

11. (C) Reference the recommendation that portions of (MOX) national plans for civilian evacuation be unclassified, page 8, para 2g(1). Concur. The MOX G 5 has been approached concerning implementation. The MOX agreed to conduct a study to determine if the portions of the national plan for civilian evacuation can be unclassified. Since Eighth Army must recognize the sovereignty of the ROK government, the only action deemed appropriate at this time is the urging that expeditious action be taken for implementing this proposal.
SECRET

EASO-MH (28 Jun 63) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) for the Period Ending
   30 April 1963, AGS CSROE-65 (R1) (U)

12. (G) Reference recommendation that Civil Affairs Staff Officers
    maintain close liaison with civilian counterparts, page 8, para 2g(1).
    Concurrence is, in fact, maintained at the present time at the Eighth
    Army Staff level by G5.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. N. Hunter
R. N. HUNTER
LT. ASC
ASST AG

Copies furnished:
2-AGSROE, DA
1-I Corps (Gp), APO 96353
GPOP-DT (28 Jun 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Corps (Gp) for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 SEP 1968
70: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Smith
CFL, AGC
Arm AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Corps (Gp) (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, I Corps (Gp)

28 June 1968

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
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