### UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD392844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **FROM:**                |
| confidential             |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **FROM:**                |
| Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; MAY 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310. |

### AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 Apr 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrections should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKPAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
  US Continental Army Command
  US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
  US Army War College
  US Army Command and General Staff College
  US Army Adjutant General School
  US Army Air Defense School
  US Army Armor School
  US Army Artillery and Missile School
  US Army Aviation School
  US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course
  US Army Chaplain School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
USAF Air Ground Operations School
Joint Action Control Office
Senior Army Representative, Staff COMSEVENTHFLT

Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Flight Training Center
US STRIKE Command
US Army Southern Command

Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
1st Regiment, 18th Armored Cavalry Squadron
3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
This report, received at Hqs, Department of the Army without complete indorsements, is published as received to preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
3d BDE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96355

4 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 February to 30 April 1968, the 3d Brigade (TF), 4th Infantry Division participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa for 28 days and Operation Patrick for 31 days. On 30 March the 3d Brigade returned under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and participated in Operation MacArthur for the remainder of the reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division has participated in 722 consecutive days in combat as of 30 April 1968.

a. Mission: The 3d Brigade’s TF mission in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was to assume responsibility of the northern half of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO for:

(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVN elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, guerrilla units, and the well established Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the AO.

(2) Assume responsibility for providing security for the 39th Engineer Battalion repair parties along Highway #535 and convoy escort.

(3) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Highway #1 from BT114497 north to BT 102510 and south to BT 175418.

(4) Provide security for listening units at LZ Baldy (BT131452).

b. The 3d Brigade Task Force’s mission in Operation Patrick was to assume responsibility within the Patrick AO:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance in force, economy of force, and security operation north of the Bong Son River in close cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment and RF/FP Forces.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDC-OF 4 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Alert for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

(2) Conduct search and clear operations south of the Bong Son River in close coordination with the 11th ARVN Regiment, RF/PF Forces, and CSF Units to support and provide security for the Revolutionary Development effort and to neutralize or destroy enemy forces throughout the AO.

(3) Assume responsibility for security of LZ English (BS875010) and LZ Uplift (BR927755).

(4) Assume responsibility for security of bridge sites from Bong Son Bridge north along Highway #1 to BS 9222L6.

(5) Secure Highway #1 from ICTZ/IICTZ Boundary north to BS 9222L6.

(6) Be prepared within 1 to 6 hours to relieve or reinforce USSF, LLDB and refugee camps, District Headquarters, RF and PF outposts, Bong Son Bridge security force, critical signal installations, 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry at Phan Thiet (AN855100) and RCK Forces within their TAOR with forces ranging in size from a platoon to a battalion (TF).

(7) Be prepared within 2 to 6 hours to provide two (2) rifle companies as a reaction force for iSF Operations in Darlac Province.

(8) Be prepared to assist in relief/reinforcement of Brigade elements in Patrick AO by one brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and if relieved of AO be prepared to deploy by air/land movement elsewhere in IICTZ or 4th Infantry Division TAOR.

(9) Conduct psychological and Medcap operations in support of tactical operations and Revolutionary Development.

c. The 3d Brigade's mission in Operation MacArthur was to assume responsibility within the MacArthur AO:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance in force, bushmaster, and security operations designed to detect and destroy VC/NVA forces, extend GVN control, and interdict enemy LOC and infiltration routes within the AO.

(2) Defend the Provincial Capital of Kontum.

(3) Provide security for 29th Engineer Battalion on Highway #14N.

(4) Conduct road clearing operations, provide security for mine sweep teams and escort convoys along Highway #511 and Highway #14N.

(5) Be prepared to provide one (1) infantry battalion within 1 to 4 hours to support and reinforce iSF operations north of Dak Pek.

CONFIDENTIAL

2
AVDCC-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

d. Operational Areas: (See Inclosure #1 for Wheeler/Wallowa AO, Inclosure #2 for Patrick AO, and Inclosure #3 for MacArthur AO.

(1) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa encompasses Duy Xuyen, Que Son, and Duc Duc Districts in Quang Nam Province.

(2) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Patrick encompasses Phu My, Hoai Nhơn, Hoai Lin, and Binh Khe District in Binh Dinh Province and part of Duc Pho District of Quang Ngai Province.

(3) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation MacArthur encompasses Kontum District in Kontum Province.

e. Task Organization: Principal units of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with commanders names and dates of command, and major supporting units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Commander: Colonel George E. Wear (1 Feb - 25 Feb 1968)
Colonel Eugene P. Forrester (25 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

Deputy Commander: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
LTC Harold F. Bentz (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

Executive Officer
LTC Melton H. Kunze (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
LTC George L. Ball (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC William W. Taylor Jr (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC William J. Livsey Jr (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery
LTC Gerald B. Bobzien (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion (DS)
CPT Boyd A. Jones (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
LTC Ery L. Davis (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)
2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: During this reporting period, 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, enemy activity is categorized in three phases, based on the three separate areas of operations.

b. Phase One: 1 February 1968 - 28 February 1968, Que Son - Thang Binh area of operation. The beginning of this phase coincided with the "Tet Offensive" which found well armed and well disciplined enemy forces attacking almost all friendly installations in the TarnKy areas to the south of LZ Baldy and the Hoi An - Da Nang area to the north. Local force units in coordination with NVA elements conducted numerous standoff and harassing attacks in the Que Son - LZ Baldy area during this same period. Intelligence sources indicated that the 2nd PAVN Division Headquarters and its three subordinate segments, the 3rd, 1st, and 21st, had moved north from its normal base areas into Duc Xuyen District in order to continue their part of the offensive. The Brigade launched operations in this area in order to interdict any withdrawal or future attack plans of this division. On 6 February 1968 the 3rd NVA Regiment attacked Hoi An and suffered 109 NVA KIA. Elements of the 1st NVA Regiment were engaged by Task Force Miracle elements north of the Song Thu Bon River on 8 February 1968, resulting in 266 NVA KIA. On 9 February 1968, 1-14th and 1-35th Infantry in separate contacts with elements of the 2nd NVA Division Headquarters and 21st NVA Regiment killed 236 NVA and captured or destroyed approximately 100 weapons. After these contacts the 2nd NVA Division began to
withdraw to its base areas in the mountainous jungle area of Que Son and Thang Binh Districts. The remainder of this phase was spent in platoon and company size operations on search and destroy missions directed against the withdrawing enemy. Although the enemy fled in small groups in order to avoid observation and contact, elements of the 3d Brigade killed 129 enemy and captured 32 weapons during the last two weeks of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa.

c. Phase Two: 29 February 1968 - 30 March 1968. On 29 February 1968, the 3d Brigade commenced Operation Patrick in Northern Binh Dinh Province. Although the 1st Air Cavalry Division had inflicted very heavy casualties over a four month period in the AO, it was apparent that the 3d NV.A. Division was still conducting sole offensive operations; probably because they had received numerous replacements during the month of January and February. On 2 March C, 1-50th Infantry OrCOW to the 3d Brigade, contacted elements of the 2nd VC Regiment east of their base area in the Nui Muu Mountains and killed 43 NV.A. and captured 11 weapons. On 4 March 1968 the Thu My District Headquarters came under attack, results: 20 VC KI., additionally 23 VC PW's were killed when the district jail took direct hits from 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket rounds. On 4 March LZ Crystal received heavy 120mm mortar and RR fire that resulted in light casualties. The same night LZ Noon came under a heavy ground attack from an estimated NV.A. Battalion and 56 NV.A. were killed and 15 weapons were captured. On 8 March 1968 a LUP Team in the Cay Gop Mountains spotted an NV.A. company apparently on a supply mission. Artillery and tactical air strikes were called resulting in numerous secondary explosions, the destruction of a bridge, and 30 NV.A. KI.. Intelligence sources confirmed that the 22nd NV.A. Regiment had moved south from the Bong Son Plain area into the 506 Valley area and on 9 March 1968, LZ Little Vic BR 511712, received a ground attack from the 8th Battalion, 22nd NV.A. Regiment resulting in 36 NV.A. KI., and 12 weapons captured. The mission of the 22nd NV.A. Regiment was to reinforce the 2nd VC Regiment in the Phu My Valley area and gain the confidence and support of the population in this area. On 9 March 1968, 1-50th Infantry again contacted elements of the 2nd VC Regiment and killed 23 NV.A.. The remainder of this phase was spent in platoon and company size recon in force operations against an enemy that withdrew to resupply and refit.

d. Phase Three: 31 March 1968 - 30 April 1968. During this phase the 3d Brigade returned to the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and assumed responsibility for the 173rd Airborne Brigade area of operation in southern Kontum Province. The enemy in this area was capable of fighting a more conventional type of war because of the proximity to the Cambodian-Laotian Borders. Also a new enemy road system which extends into southern Kontum Province has enabled the enemy to infiltrate personnel and supplies with much greater rapidity. When the Brigade moved into the MacArthur AO, the 1st NV.A. Division Headquarters and its support elements were believed to be located in the vic of Ya627? This was believed to be an indication of an impending enemy offensive for the 1st NV.A. Division Headquarters had not been in country since the Battle of Dak To. The newly infiltrated 20th Regiment was located southwest of P.D. 11, which it attacked on the 20th of March 1968. The 24th NV.A. Regiment, directly
subordinate to the B-3 Front was located Vic YB9902 where they were receiving supplies and refitting. The 66th NV. Regiment was located in the Tri-Border area, but in early April joined the Division, as the Brigade began operations, 1-35th Infantry moved into FSB 14 and came under sporadic stand-off attacks from an unknown and unidentified enemy. Over 400 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and RR were fired at the FSB during an 8 day period. On 5 April A, B, & C Companies, 1-35th Infantry made heavy contact Vic Y95933 with an estimated enemy battalion and killed 68 NV. On 15 April 1968, C, 1-35th Infantry made contact with a large enemy force Vic Y935357 with unknown results. Shortly after this contact, 2-35th Infantry was moved into FSB 14 and located numerous enemy KIA probably as a result of the 1-35th Infantry contact and heavy artillery and air strikes. On 20 April 1968 two Hoi Chanh rallied to the 2-35th Infantry. These individuals stated that they were from the 14th AA Company of the 320th Regiment and that their Regiment had taken the place of the 32nd NV. Regiment which had moved south into Darlac Province. On 16 April, 1-14th Infantry and 1-22nd Infantry established a fire base to the west of FSB 14 in order to intercept infiltration and withdrawal routes. On 29 April 1968 at Vic Ya 828906, Company B, 1-14th Infantry received a ground attack from elements of the K-4 Battalion, 323rd Regiment and possible elements of the 66th Regiment resulting in 46 NV. KIA and 9 weapons captured. 1-22nd Infantry had sporadic contacts with an unidentified enemy force Vic LZ Pause during the period 26 - 30 April 1968 resulting in 25 NV. KIA. It appears that the enemy is concentrating on improving infiltration routes and has no plans for withdrawing. Future plans may include a new general offensive to be launched prior to the monsoon season.

e. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses: 1 Feb - 30 April 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WHEELER/WALLOWA</th>
<th>PATRICK</th>
<th>MACARTHUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW/NV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW/WC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETURNES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/4</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/S</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/A AGNDO</td>
<td>10,935</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>13,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81/82mm MORT RDS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm MORT RDS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREMDES</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 'OCCKETS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33 (2 B-50'S)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINES</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACKS</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFORMS</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHEELER/WALLOWA  PATRICK  MACARTHUR

WHEELEI-WALLOWA  PATRICK  MACARTHUR

BED SUPPLIES (LBS)  31  5  14
PHONES  1  4  3
STRUCTURES  308  149  119
RADIOS  3  0  0
RICE (TONS)  32.5  .5  0
40MM GRENADES  1  24  12
SALT (TONS)  .75  0  0
RICE MILLING MACH'S  3  0  0

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

a. Plans

(1) During the period covered by this report the 3d Brigade Task Force was responsible for assisting American Division in the relief of 3d Brigade elements from the Wheeler/Wallowa AO and planning the relief of 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Patrick AO effective 291200H February 1968.

(2) During the latter part of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade planned and conducted the relief of 173rd Airborne Brigade in the MacArthur AO effective 302000H March 1968.

b. Operations

(1) General: During the period 1 Feb - 30 March 1968 the 3d Brigade participated as a Task Force in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa and Operation Patrick. During Operation Wheeler/Wallowa (1 Feb - 28 Feb 1968) the 3d Brigade conducted recon in force operations in its respective area of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Armored Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery. The contacts during this period were heavy with the most significant action occurring during the Tet Offensive. At this time the 3d Brigade Task Force was employed to exert maximum pressure on the enemy's southwestern flank in order to relieve pressure during the attack on Da Nang, and to block the enemy withdrawal routes into his established base areas. In order to accomplish this mission, 3d Brigade elements were combat assaulLed on controlling terrain features, where battalion fire support bases were established. From the FSB, companies conducted recon in force operations to block enemy routes of egress and deny the enemy access to previously established base areas. The action of the 3d Brigade Task Force in blocking routes of egress, interdicting enemy LOC, and making maximum utilization of extensive harassing and interdicting fires from artillery and air throughout the AO were factors in attuncting the enemy attacks in the Da Nang-Hoi An area. On 28 February the 3d Brigade Task Force was ordered to pass responsibility for the Wheeler/Wallowa AO to the 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt.) and relieve the 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division in place and assume the responsibility for the Patrick AO effective 1200H
29 Feb 1968. During Operation Patrick (29 Feb - 30 Mar 68) the 3d Brigade Task Force with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Armored Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery conducted detailed recon in force, economy of force, and security operations north of Bong Son River and search and clear operations south of Bong Son River in close coordination with ARVN and RP/FF Forces to support the Revolutionary Development effort and neutralize and destroy enemy forces in the AO. Battalion operations were characterized by show of force, maximum utilization of ARVN, RF/PF Forces in combined operations, and the use of rapid reaction forces which continually disrupted the enemy's capability to mount significant operations. Enemy contacts during this period were light due to the continuous Brigade operations which forced the enemy to withdraw in small groups. Operations became a process of methodically searching for, locating, and destroying small groups of enemy in tunnels, caves, and spider holes. On 30 March the 3d Brigade Task Force passed responsibility for the Patrick AO to the 173rd Airborne Brigade effective 301200H March 1968 and assumed responsibility for the MacArthur AO effective 302000H March 1968 and reverted to 4th Infantry Division control. During the period 30 March through 30 April the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force, bushmaster, and security operations to defend the Provincial Capital of Kontum, interdict LOC, and block enemy routes of escape to the Cambodian Border. The contacts during this period were heavy and in some cases initiated by the enemy; however, in all cases enemy attacks were repulsed. The general plan was to have infantry battalions establish fire bases with the battalion command post and supporting artillery and mortars. The rifle companies were employed to guard the firebase and conduct local operations while the remainder of the infantry elements conducted operations throughout the TAOR. After the enemy was located and fixed, maximum artillery and tactical air power were employed to repulse attacks and enable the infantry to advance and destroy enemy forces. Arc Lights were also employed and exploited to the maximum extent to harass and destroy suspected enemy base areas and troop concentrations.

(2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: During the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with the Battalion CP at LZ Hardcore, west of Hoi An Vic AT977501 under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. Later in the reporting period the battalion deployed to LZ English and conducted operations from LZ Geronimo (BS880174), the Battalion Fire Support Base, after relieving elements of the 1-8th Infantry, 1st Air Cavalry Division in zone. Operations continued in Patrick/Cochise Area of Operations under the control of the 3d Brigade Task Force. Upon departure of the 3d Brigade Task Force to Kontum City (MacArthur AO), the Golden Dragons reverted to the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and continued security missions and reconnaissance in force operations in the Cochise AO. On 6 April 1968, the Golden Dragons were relieved of missions in the Cochise AO by the 3d Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry and prepared for deployment to the MacArthur AO. On 10 April 1968 the Battalion conducted multiple combat assaults to LZ No Slack (2E99/067) from Phu Loa Air-strip. On 17 April 1968, the Battalion was ordered to establish a new fire base.
support base vic YA 835965 in order to relieve pressure of LZ Mile High and LZ Incomong (FSB 14) and block enemy approach from the west. On 29 April 1968 the Battalion was ordered to conduct a combat assault and establish a new fire support base at the Chu Do Ridge vic YA 899933. During this reporting period the Battalion had many minor contacts and ambush engagements with a major enemy contact occurring on 29 April 1968.

(3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with the Battalion CP located at LZ Baldy (BT132453) and LZ Cacti (BT059479) under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. On 19 February 1968 the Battalion moved to Pershing AO and became OCPON to the 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. On 29 Feb the Cacti Green returned to the operational control of 3d Brigade Task Force and participated in Operation Patrick with the Battalion CP located at LZ English (BS875001). On 29 March 1968 the Cacti Green deployed to MacArthur AO and participated in Operation MacArthur and established a Battalion CP at LZ Mile High (YA937931) and at LZ Bass (ZA027934). During the reporting period the Battalion had a number of minor contacts and ambush engagements with 3 major contacts occurring on 9 February, 5 and 15 April 1968.

(4) 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with a Battalion CP located at LZ Ross (AT025043) under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. On 13 February 1968 the Battalion came under the operational control of the 106th Infantry Brigade (LT), and established a Battalion CP at LZ Ryder (BT947345) and continued to participate in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. On 20 March 1968 the Cacti Blue came under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and participated in Operation Campaign and established a new Battalion CP at LZ Thunder (BS874325). On 26 March 1968, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry deployed from LZ Thunder to Fire Support Base 7 (Z025933) and participated in Operation MacArthur under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. On 29 March 1968 the Battalion was released from operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and established Battalion CP's at FSB 7 (Z025933) and LZ Mile High (YA937931). During the reporting period the Battalion had numerous minor contacts and ambush engagements and 4 major contacts occurring on 1 February, 27 - 29 February, 3 March and 30 March - 8 April 1968.

(5) C Company, 4th Engineer Battalion:

(a) General: During the reporting period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968, Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion continued to support the 3d Brigade with combat engineer support in the areas of operation and with construction and maintenance support at "LZ Baldy", "LZ English", and "LZ Mickey Mouse".

(b) Operations (LZ Baldy)

1 Clearing landing zones
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDC-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont’d)

2. Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.

3. Construction, maintenance, and clearing of defensive perimeters.


5. Penepreme distribution.

(c) Operations (LZ English)

1. Construction and maintenance of Brigade Forward Base.

2. Penepreme distribution.


4. Construction of defenses around Bong Son Bridge.


(d) Operations (LZ Hickey Mouse)


2. Road construction into LZ Mary Lou.

3. Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.


5. Mine clearing operations on Highway 511.

6. Maintenance of water supply point.

(5) 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery:

(a) General: During the period 1 February to 30 April 1968, the mission of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support of the 3rd Brigade.

1. Battery A was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry from 1 February to 27 February 1968. From 28 February to 17 March 1968, Battery A was in direct support of 1-35th Infantry. From 18 March to 30 April 1968, Battery A was in direct support of 2-35th Infantry.

2. Battery B was in direct support of 1-35th Infantry from

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

1 February to 17 February 1968. From 18 February to 30 April Battery B was in
1 direct support of 1-14th Infantry.

Battery C, was in direct support of the 2-35th Infantry from
1 February to 17 April 1968. From 18 April to 30 April 1968 Battery C was in dir-
3 ect support of 1-35th Infantry.

Additional artillery units which were under the operational
control (OPCON) of this Battalion were as follows:

a Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

(1) Battery D, 1-14th Artillery was OPCON from 13 Feb-
1 ruary to 27 February with the mission of direct support.

(2) Battery C, 3-82nd Artillery was OPCON from 3 Feb-
2 ruary to 27 February with the mission of direct support of 1-6th Infantry.

(3) Battery C, 3-16th Artillery (155) was general sup-
3 port, reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(4) Battery W, 2-11th Marines (155) was attached to
4 3-16th Artillery with the mission of general support, reinforcing the 2-9th Artil-
5 lery.

(5) Battery B, 3-18th artillery (8" and 175) was general
6 support, reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.

(5) Four searchlight sections from Battery C, 29th
7 Artillery were attached throughout the period.

b Operation Patrick

(1) 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) provided 16 M-42
8 (dusters), 3 Quad .50 Caliber machine guns, and 4 searchlights which were
9 OPCON to 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.

(2) 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105) was reinforcing
10 the 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.

(3) Batteries A and B, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery
11 (8" and 175mm) were reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.

(4) Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155)
12 was attached to 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery throughout the period with the
13 mission of GSR to the 2-9th Artillery.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

2. Operation MacArthur

(1) Battery A, 4-42nd Artillery was OPCON from 30 March to 3 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 1-8th Infantry.

(2) Battery C, 6-29th Artillery was OPCON from 30 March to 3 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 3-8th Infantry.

(3) Battery C, 4-42nd Artillery was OPCON from 2 April to 30 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 1-22nd Infantry.

(4) Battery A, 6-29th Artillery was OPCON from 3 April to 30 April with the mission of direct support of the 1-8th Infantry.

(5) Battery C, 1-92nd Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(6) Battery C, 5-16th Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(7) Battery C, 5-22nd Artillery (175) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(8) Battery C, 6-14th Artillery (8" and 175) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(9) Battery B, 1-92nd Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery from 10 April to 30 April 1968.

(10) Battery B, 1-92nd Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery from 10 April to 30 April 1968.

(11) 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) provided 3 M-42 dusters, 1 Quad .50 Caliber machine gun and one searchlight which were OPCON to 2-9th Artillery during the period.

(b) Summary of rounds expended by 2-9th Artillery during the reporting period.

1. Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105 HE</td>
<td>49,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 HE</td>
<td>3,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 H/L</td>
<td>1,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 SMOKE</td>
<td>1,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
2 Operation Patrick

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105 HE</td>
<td>7,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 WP</td>
<td>2,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 ILLUM</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 SMOKE</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Operation MacArthur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105 HE</td>
<td>15,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 WP</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 ILLUM</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 SMOKE</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Summary of results of artillery fired in support of 3d Brigade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>ENEMY KIA BY ARTILLERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler/Wallowa</td>
<td>146 - 25 Secondary Explosions, 11 Structures Destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>98 - 12 Secondary Explosions, 4 Structures Destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacArthur</td>
<td>62 - 9 Secondary Explosions, 1 X 57 RR Destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Aviation

(a) During the quarter the Brigade Aviation Section flew a total of 1,473 hours, 2,177 sorties, and carried 1,201 passengers. Of the total OH-23G flying time, 243 hours and 434 sorties were flown on scout operations. The section recorded 5 confirmed KIA and no weapons captured. One aircraft was damaged by mortars and 2 aircraft were shot down and totally destroyed.

(b) Tactical Air Support statistics for the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAC MISSIONS</th>
<th>COMBAT SKY SPOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REG</td>
<td>FLown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 143</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 104</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 397</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 644</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDLC-CP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

4 May 1968

(7) Training

(a) During the reporting period 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division personnel graduated from the following schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>GRADUATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division NCO School</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCV Recondo School</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division Pre-Recondo School</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) A one-day in-country orientation and training course was conducted by the 3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School for replacements received during the period 1 February - 30 March 1968. This training was supplemented during periods of stand-down or while units were providing security for battalion fire bases. This training consisted of individual instruction on the following subjects:

1. Familiarization and zeroing of individual weapons.
2. Artillery and mortar forward observer procedures.
3. Patrolling and bushmaster techniques.
4. CBR Proficiency.
5. Briefing on intelligence and operations by the Battalion S-2's and S-3's.

(c) During the period 30 March - 30 April 1968 mandatory and refresher training was conducted by 3d Brigade elements while participating in the Division Rotation Program at Camp Enari.

(8) Chemical: During the reporting period extensive use was made of the airborne personnel detector in support of 3d Brigade operations. Bulk CS delivery systems were used in Operation Aclcarth with 3350 rounds being dropped since 1 April 1968.

4. (C) LOGISTICS

a. General: The 3d Brigade Support Battalion (Prov) had the primary responsibility for logistical support of the Brigade until 31 March 1968. From 1 April 1968 through 30 April 1968, the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion through their forward support elements located at Xortan had primary responsibility for logistical support. General support was provided by T. FULGT from 1 February - 28 February 1968 while the Brigade
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-QP 4 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

was at LZ Baldy. At LZ English general support was provided by FSA (Task Force Lathrop) from 29 February -- 30 March, 1968. At Kontum general support was provided by the 4th Infantry Division. At LZ Baldy repair parts requisitions were passed through the general support maintenance support unit, the 188th Maintenance Battalion at Chu Lai. At LZ English repair part requisitions were passed through the general support maintenance activity at Qui Nhon. From 1 February to 30 March all other requisitions were delivered by courier to Qui Nhon depot. From 30 March the forward elements of the Brigade at Kontum were supported by the 704th Maintenance for repair parts. The Brigade rear detachment at Camp Enari is supported by Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance.

b. Supply

(1) Class I

(a) Ration breakdown for the Brigade was accomplished by the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) until 30 March 1968. Perishables were stored in two 1/2 ton refrigerator vans and four 600 cubic feet refrigerators. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 ration breakdown for the Brigade was the responsibility of the forward support elements of the 4th S & T Battalion located at Kontum, RVN.

(b) Class I issue for the reporting period:

A Rations - 371,520
C Rations - 106,466

(2) Class II and IV

(a) From 1 February 1968 through 30 March 1968 Depot shipped directly to our activity address code through the Brigade Supply Officer to a Class II and IV storage and distribution area. This was made possible by the opening of a supply account which enabled all organic, attached, and OCON units to requisition and draw directly from the Brigade Supply Officer. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 Class II and IV Items were handled by the 4th Infantry Division Supply Officer at Pleiku. Fortification materials were issued from the Forward Support Element at Kontum.

(3) Class III

(a) At LZ Baldy, all fuels were wholesale issued by 3d Support Battalion (Prov). Stockage capacity was 100,000 gallons. At LZ English all fuels were wholesale issued by the FSA (Task Force Lathrop). At Kontum the responsibility of Class III was the responsibility of the Forward Support Element of the 4th S & T Battalion.

(b) POL issue for the reporting period (gallons): JP-4 (1,012,000) - AVGAS (963,500) - MOGAS (329,400) - Diesel (372,000).

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operations Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont’d)

(4) Class V

(a) At LZ Baldy, TP FRAZIER operated the ASP and resupply of Class V originated from Chu Lai. At LZ English FSA (Task Force Lathrop) operated the ASP and resupply of Class V originated at Qui Nhon. At Kontum the 3d Brigade operated its own ASP with resupply coming from Pleiku.

(b) Class V issues for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>155mm HE</td>
<td>18,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm HE</td>
<td>64,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2'' HE</td>
<td>21,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm HE</td>
<td>17,902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Transportation

(a) Two (2) light truck squads and one (1) medium truck squad from the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) supported the Brigade until 30 March 1968. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided support to the Brigade.

(b) At LZ Baldy Air Force C-123 aircraft provided by Americal Division Transportation Officer, arranged scheduled aircraft between the Brigade and its rear detachment at Pleiku. At LZ English the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided scheduled C7-2 aircraft between the Brigade and its rear detachment at Pleiku. At Kontum the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided scheduled C9A aircraft between Kontum and the 3d Brigade rear detachment at Pleiku. Air Force C-123 aircraft also make scheduled airlifts between Kontum and Pleiku. During the reporting period the following air movement record was compiled:

1. Sorties - 273
2. Passengers - 3,601
3. Cargo - 74 ton

(6) Medical

(a) D Company, 4th Medical Battalion provided immediate medical support for the 3d Brigade during the reporting period. Medical evacuation support in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was provided by the 54th Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being sent to 2nd Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai.
and the Naval Station Hospital in Da Nang. During Operation Patrick evacuation facilities were provided by the 498th Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being evacuated to the 67th and 85th Evacuation Hospitals in Qui Nhon. During Operations in the MacArthur AO, medical evacuation facilities have been provided by the 283rd Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being taken to the 71st Evacuation Hospital in Pleiku.

(b) Medical statistics for reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease Patients</th>
<th>772</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle Casualties</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle Casualties</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,560</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. General: Priority of effort was directed towards the following three areas: Public health and sanitation, refugee relief, and civic construction. All projects were designed to be short range and high impact in nature. All projects were coordinated with GVN Officials and most of the work was performed by indigenous personnel. US personnel and units participating in civic action were the 3d Brigade S-5 Section, 51st AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Team, 13th VA Team, 41st Civil Affairs Company; and three subsector MACV Advisory Teams. GVN agencies included ten RDC Teams; GVN refugee relief personnel, VIS personnel, and a New Zealand Medcap Team.

b. Public health and sanitation

(1) Medcap results

(a) Sick Call | 8408 |
(b) Youth Health | 1478 |
(c) Baths for Children | 432 |

(2) GVN health workers trained | 9 |
(3) Latrines constructed | 5 |
(4) Public health films shown | 11 |
(5) Bong Son Hospital received 6,500 lbs of Medical supplies.

c. Public education:

(1) Construction began on two schools with five class rooms being completed.

(2) Seven English Classes were taught to a total of 140 children,
CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

(3) Fifty-one pounds of school supplies were distributed.

d. Refugee Relief: Three thousand (3,000) pounds of food, and one hundred and six (106) pounds of clothing were distributed.

e. Civil Construction

(1) Homes repaired - 4

(2) Roads built and repaired - 40 Km

(3) Dispensaries built - 2

(4) Bridges repaired - 3

f. Psychological Warfare:

(1) Psychological Operations included leaflet drops, ground and aerial speaker missions (both live and taped).

(2) Leaflet drops and aerial speaker missions were accomplished using CH-47, O-2B, and UH-1D aircraft. Ground missions were accomplished with 250 Watt and 500 Watt speakers.

(3) Armed Propaganda Teams were very effective when used during medcaps conducted in contested villages and when employed with rifle companies operating in populated areas.

(4) Summary:

(a) Leaflets dropped - 34,001,367

(b) Aerial speaker time - 215 hours

(c) Ground speaker time - 90 hours

(d) Ralliers - 2

(e) Leaflets made - 1

(f) Tapes made - 5

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Unit strengths as of 1 February, 1 March, and 1 April were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 FEB</th>
<th>1 MAR</th>
<th>1 APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVDDC-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

4 May 1968

b. Total numbers of casualties suffered during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-14TH INF</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-35TH INF</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35TH INF</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total replacements received during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-14TH INF</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-35TH INF</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35TH INF</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. R & R Program

(1) R & R utilization figures for the period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>USED</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CON{}DENTiAL

AVDDC-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED</th>
<th>ALLOCATIONS USED</th>
<th>PERCENT USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Awards presented during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star with &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal with &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

-20-
Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: Not Used

2. (C) Intelligence:
   a. Infra Red Mission
      (1) Observation: Rapid dissemination of red haze read-outs will enable artillery to place effective fire on located targets.
      (2) Evaluation: Using the data link system at Dragon Mountain, targets can be identified and the information disseminated to Brigade Headquarters before the target can relocate.
      (3) Recommendation: Information gathered on infra-red missions should be disseminated to Brigade level within two (2) hours.
   b. Use of OLE aircraft as artillery forward observers
      (1) Observation: Headhunter aircraft may be used effectively for artillery spotting when operating on artillery communication channels.
      (2) Evaluation: By entering the artillery command net headhunter aircraft will have immediate access to artillery support and can coordinate with artillery liaison officers for movement between battalion area of operations.
      (3) Recommendation: Headhunter aircraft should enter the artillery command net concurrent with entry into the Brigade AO.
   c. NVA Road Network
      (1) Observation: The NVA have constructed a road network in western Kontum Province and are using it to facilitate resupply.
      (2) Evaluation: The road system has greatly increased the NVA resupply capability and it is expected that expansion efforts will continue.
      (3) Recommendation: The USAF should develop a comprehensive interdiction program and be given the road network as an area of operation.
   d. NVA Dummies
      (1) Observation: In contacts made with the NVA in April 1968, dummies made of clothing stuffed with leaves were found tied to trees.
4 Hay 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

(2) Evaluation: These dummies were positioned to draw fire and disclose US positions. The degree of success enjoyed was directly related to the care taken in placing the dummies.

(3) Recommendation: US Forces should be made aware of this technique and be prepared to cope with the situation.

3. (C) Operations

a. Combined Operations

(1) Observation: Experience in operations with ARVN intelligence teams has proved beneficial to the combat operations of the Brigade. A specific squad was normally assigned a mission to support a given Battalion and a rapport was quickly established that enhanced combat operations.

(2) Evaluation: In an attempt to further integrate both US and ARVN Forces in combined operations, intelligence teams were furnished upon request down to company level. These teams proved to be of great assistance in that they provided valuable information which was extremely beneficial to US Troops. Their ability to communicate as well as their knowledge of VC/NVA tactics have proven invaluable to Brigade operations.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever the tactical situation permits, US Units should employ ARVN Intelligence Teams. Results obtained will be beneficial to MI/F Operations.

b. Minibase Concept

(1) Observation: The Minibase concept has proven effective in enhancing the distribution of combat power to support attacking rifle companies. The minibase compliments and provides the needed fire power from the battalion's 4.2" Platoon. Further combat power is given the minibase by restricting the Recon Platoons activities on or near the base. Security of the minibase is further enhanced by its selection of difficult commanding terrain from which 106 RM can provide direct fire on targets of opportunity. In conjunction with the Battalion CP, the minibase also solves the problem of security of the Battalion Command Group.

(2) Evaluation: In a search for methods to further enhance the combat fire power and effectiveness of the attacking companies without a major change in the Battalion CP and Battalion Trains, the minibase concept was developed.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever the tactical situation prohibits the redeployment of the Battalion CP and the accompanying trains, it is highly recommended that the minibase concept be employed.
c. Non-permissive Air Operations

(1) Observation: During operations by the 1-14th Infantry, vic LZ Hardcore, a unique and unusual experience was encountered. Upon the establishment of the Battalion CP the entire area was designated a "non-permissive entry" area to helicopters and light aircraft due to intensive enemy anti-aircraft emplacements throughout the area. LZs marked with smoke were constantly in danger of enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire. To offset this situation the Battalion established flight corridors and all aircraft entering this area were required to check in with a Battalion Air/Ground Center. Furthermore all resupply, medevac, and CH-47 sorties were supported by artillery, gunships, or close air support. Gunships were used extensively throughout the period with the responsibility for the tactical briefing often coming from the Battalion Commander while in flight and, on occasion, from the infantry company commander in contact.

(2) Evaluation: In a search for a solution to the "non-permissive" air conditions, ground commanders readily adopted to the situation by establishing Air/Ground control elements with the responsibility of controlling all aircraft within this area. Signaling mirrors as well as other items were utilized to control the aircraft coming into landing zones rather than smoke. Ground unit commanders became proficient at delivering in flight briefings, as often this was all the tactical situation permitted.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever a situation such as this arises the unit commander must remain flexible and be prepared to adjust to new situations as they arise.

d. Chemical Munitions Employment

(1) Observation: During the reporting period the 3d Brigade had the opportunity to employ CS by means of the 4.2" delivery system. Difficulty was experienced during the TOT due mainly to fuze timing problems. In general the rounds exploded early and therefore did not cover the objective area effectively. Upon insertion of ground troops, only minutes later, it was discovered that ground troops did not need protective masks.

(2) Evaluation: Not applicable

(3) Recommendation: It is felt that if the fuze timing (and concurrently the adjustment problem) and the persistency of the round is improved, the terminal effects will match the capabilities of the delivery weapon and the weapons system will be effective in surprise actions for the infantry battalions.

e. Command and Control Helicopters

(1) Observation: Helicopters utilized by battalion commanders are not
AVMC-UP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

4 May 1968

equipped with sufficient radio drop cords to allow all members of the aircraft to properly communicate.

(2) Evaluation: Helicopters provided as command and control ships with insufficient radio drop cords hamper the tactical operation by forcing the battalion commander to communicate with the pilots on the Battalion Command Net.

(3) Recommendation: All command and control ships utilized by Battalion Commanders should be equipped with sufficient radio drop cords to allow the commander to communicate with crew members and pilot without jamming the Battalion Command Net with his instruction.

f. Combat Assaults and Extractions

(1) Observation: On numerous occasions aircraft coming into a pick-up zone or a landing zone have had their side doors on and their seats down. This practice is considered extremely hazardous, as it hampers the infantry personnel movement, thus forcing the aircraft to stay on the ground longer than would normally be necessary.

(2) Evaluation: In an attempt to reduce the time involved at pick-up zones and landing zones, aircraft have been instructed to remove their doors and raise their seats.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever aircraft are reporting for a combat assault or an extraction, it should be a matter of Division SOP that all doors be removed and all seats remain in the upright position.

g. Aircraft Consoles

(1) Observation: It has been determined that the command and control ships provided the battalion commanders have insufficient communication systems. The FM radios of most aircraft are unreliable, thus requiring the commander to have a UHF and back-up FM capability.

(2) Evaluation: To cope with this problem the Battalion Communication Sections have constructed consoles with 2 FM radios (AN/VRC 46s) and 2 PRC 25s to provide the battalion commander with an adequate communications system.

(3) Recommendation: Aircraft consoles should be made available for command and control ships to increase unit commander's control of gunships, lift ships, airborne FACs, participating ground units, and airborne members of the command group.
h. Use of the .45 Caliber Pistol in Holes and Tunnels

(1) **Observation:** The use of the .45 Cal Pistol during tunnel clearing operations has proven impractical due to the deafening effects from the pistol being fired in a confined area.

(2) **Evaluation:** Not Applicable

(3) **Recommendation:** One (1) .38 Cal Pistol with silencer should be issued to each company to support tunnel clearing operations.

i. Clearing Ridges

(1) **Observation:** During recent operations the enemy has been observed allowing friendly units to move unhindered along ridgelines. When a U. S. unit reaches a pre-selected location along a ridge, the enemy fires direct and indirect fire weapons from concealed draws that lead into the ridge.

(2) **Evaluation:** A method of reconnaissance by fire is now being employed by maneuver elements to insure that reverse slopes and gullies do not provide concealment for the enemy along routes of advance.

(3) **Recommendation:** The necessity for flank security must be emphasized to small unit leaders, with specific attention directed to clearing all adjacent ridge lines and draws, and making maximum utilization of reconnaissance by fire to those draws immediately to their front.

j. Use of Aerial Reconnaissance Teams in Fortified Areas

(1) **Observation:** During the Battle of AP BON, aerial reconnaissance teams were of great assistance in picking up enemy movement along hidden trenches flanking friendly forces.

(2) **Evaluation:** In all situations friendly units were alerted of enemy movement on their flanks in sufficient time to react and employ artillery and blocking forces to prevent the enemy in gaining their objectives.

(3) **Recommendation:** Aerial reconnaissance aircraft should be provided to elements entering known enemy fortified areas so that early warning of enemy activity and quick reaction by friendly forces can be achieved.

k. Hoi Chanhs

(1) **Observation:** On 20 April 1968, 2 NVA NCOs rallied to Company A, 2-35th Infantry at FSB L4. Upon entering the perimeter they set off a trip flare causing them to run away. Only after intensive persuasion did they enter
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDCC-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

4. (C) LOGISTICS

a. LRP Rations

(1) Observation: LRP rations were designed to support elements on extended operations.

(2) Evaluation: Although the Brigade had planned many extended operations, LRP Rations have not been available through normal supply channels to support a battalion operation.

(3) Recommendation: LRP Rations should be made available and issued to units planning extended operations for a period of three days or longer.

b. Disposable Food Containers

(1) Observation: Operations have been frequently delayed due to non-availability of aircraft to extract food containers.

(2) Evaluation: Disposable Food Containers made available on a limited basis, appear to be the solution. By utilizing these containers on a larger scale, aircraft sorties may be significantly reduced and operational delays minimized.

(3) Recommendation: Disposable Food Containers should be provided in sufficient quantity to eliminate the need for daily extraction of food containers prior to the conducting of tactical operations.

c. Air-dropable water container

(1) Observation: Operations during the past have demonstrated a need for a water container durable enough to withstand an air drop, yet light enough to be carried until extraction.

(2) Evaluation: Not Applicable.

(3) Recommendation: An air-dropable water container should be developed to allow resupply of elements operating in mountains or in terrain where it is either impractical or operationally undesirable to cut landing zones.

CONFIDENTIAL
d. Forward Logistic Support

(1) Observation: While operating as a separate task force, the 3d Brigade received its logistical support from the 3d Provisional Support Battalion which has since been dissolved. Currently the Brigade has only a limited FSE which provides fast moving Class II and Class IV items composed mainly of defensive materials, i.e., Concertina barbed wire and sandbags. This necessitates procuring items essential to tactical operations from the Division Supply Officer in Pleiku. Experience has proven this to be a time consuming process that could be eliminated by stockage of these items at the Brigade FSB.

(2) Evaluation: Not Applicable

(3) Recommendation: The FSE supporting the Brigade should be required to stock Class II and Class III at Kontum. This would make the supply system much more responsive to the requirements of the combat battalions.

e. Cargo Rigging for External Chinook Loads

(1) Observation: Due to the non-availability of secure LOC in the Brigade AO and the shortage of UH-1 aircraft for resupply, it is necessary to move Class I and Class V by Chinook. The wear out period for cargo slings presently in use by this brigade is 10 external loads. The slings available to the Brigade have been used in excess of the prescribed 10 loads. Net failure has been experienced and may continue in direct proportion to the number of loads carried.

(2) Evaluation: Although attempts have been made to procure these slings through supply channels only limited quantities have been received.

(3) Recommendation: Immediate command emphasis be given to the procurement of rigging equipment for Chinook sorties.

5. (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL/CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

a. Psychological Warfare Loudspeaker System

(1) Observation: Psychological warfare loudspeaker systems currently being used by elements of the 4th Division have many shortcomings.

(2) Evaluation: A completely satisfactory power source for the speaker systems employed on the ground in support of infantry units has not been developed. The 250 watt system is currently being powered by the two FRC 25 batteries connected by WD-1 power wire. Two 12 volt batteries are being used to power the 500 watt system but frequent recharging is necessary. The equipment is very sensitive and frequent malfunctions occur due to normal handling under field conditions. During the monsoon excessive moisture causes shorts in the system because component parts are not waterproof.
CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1968

SC:

30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

(3) **Recommendation:** Lightweight, compact, durable, water-proof, speaker systems with adapter plugs for batteries commonly used by infantry units should be adopted for employment with psychological warfare field teams.

b. Hoi Chanh reaction to US/South Vietnamese Ultimate Victory Claims in Psychological Warfare Propaganda

(1) **Observation:** Two Hoi Chanhns who rallied to the 3d Brigade on 20 April 1968 stated that US/South Vietnamese ultimate victory claims are being repudiated by NVA political officers.

(2) **Evaluation:** NVA political officers are telling the NVA soldiers that the goal of US/South Vietnamese forces is to totally destroy North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese Army. Propaganda developed from these claims tends to make the NVA soldiers fight harder.

(3) **Recommendations:** Ultimate victory claims should be eliminated from propaganda leaflets, broadcasts, and newsletters.

c. Employment of Armed Propaganda Teams

(1) **Observation:** Armed Propaganda Teams can be employed effectively at battalion and company level.

(2) **Evaluation:** An effective method of employing Armed Propaganda Platoons is to attach them to battalions in two man teams. The teams should be provided with US fatigues, boots, weapons, and field gear. They should further be attached to rifle companies to participate in operations being conducted in populated areas. The teams can also be effectively employed during Medcaps in support of tactical operations or with psychological warfare loudspeaker teams.

(3) **Recommendation:** When Armed Propaganda Teams are available, they should be employed by infantry battalions and companies.

d. Leaflet Drops over North Vietnam

(1) **Observation:** Leaflet drops over North Vietnam should be continued.

(2) **Evaluation:** In an interview with Sgts Nguyen Si Bo and Hoang Van Can, Hoi Chanhns who rallied to the 3d Brigade on 20 April 1968, both men stated that leaflet drops over North Vietnam have a demoralizing effect on NVA Soldiers before they reach South Vietnam.

(3) **Recommendation:** Leaflet campaigns over the trail complexes in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be continued.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVDDC-OP

SUBJECT: Operations Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont’d)

4 May 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Variations in Leaflet Appeal

(1) Observation: Attaching blank envelopes and/or writing paper to leaflets would cause more leaflets to be read by the enemy.

(2) Evaluation: Hoi Chans have stated that if plain pieces of paper or envelopes were attached to propaganda material there would be more incentive to pick up the leaflets and thus be exposed to the literature. NVA soldiers would like to use the paper and envelopes in writing home. If the political officers denied the soldiers use of the writing materials morale problems could result.

(3) Recommendation: Selected leaflets and newsletters should have paper and envelopes attached.

d. Civil Affairs.

(1) Observation: Village improvement projects are most effective when the villagers are required to participate in the projects.

(2) Evaluation: In some cases improvement projects which have been completed solely by US Civic Action Teams are not even used by the Vietnamese. However, when the Vietnamese participate a sense of pride in the project is derived and community spirit is generated.

(3) Recommendation: A civic action project should not begin without the approval of the villagers and their pledge to participate in its construction until completion.

EUGENE P. Foستر
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

3 Incl:
1 - Map of Wheeler/Wallowa AO
2 - Map of Patrick AO
3 - Map of MacArthur AO

DISTRIBUTION:

CINCUSARPAC 2
DCG, USARV 3
CG, IFVF 2
CG, 4TH INF DIV 2
CG, AMERICAL DIV 1
CO, 1-14TH INF 1
CO, 1-35TH INF 1
CO, 2-35TH INF 1
CO, 2-9TH ARTY 1
CO, 29TH MIL HIST 1

CO, C/4TH ENGR 1
CO, HHC 3/4TH 1
CO 1
DCO 1
S1 1
S2 1
S3 1
S4 1

CONFIDENTIAL

29
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and makes the following recommendations and comments.

a. Reference paragraph 2b Section 2 page 21, Use of OIE aircraft as artillery forward observers. All US Artillery units of IFFORCEV have been directed to establish liaison with Army Air and Air Force (FAC) elements, exchange SOI/SSI's and insure that pilots are familiar with artillery fire request procedures.

b. Reference paragraph 3e Section 2 page 23, Command and Control Helicopters. The shifting of aviation assets from one unit to another makes it impractical to designate certain helicopters as C and C helicopters. Rather than equip all helicopters with extra drop cords each unit should obtain Y cords which can be plugged into the crew chief or gunner's dropcord to serve the same purpose.

c. Reference paragraph 3g Section 2 page 24, Aircraft Consoles. The present radios are considered reliable. With present aviation assets only commanders of brigades or higher have the exclusive use of C and C helicopters. The solution used by the 3d Brigade appears the best solution at this time.

d. Reference paragraph 3k Section 2 page 25, Hoi Chanhs. Current national rally instructions are widely disseminated but are too general in nature. This deficiency has been noted and MACV has requested 4th PSYOPS Group study the problem nationwide. More specific media will be developed.

e. Reference paragraph 4a Section 2 page 26, LRP Rations. Qui Nhon Support Command indicates that LRP rations are on hand and that no shortage has existed for two months. The 4th Division G4 could provide no data to indicate inability to obtain these rations. This headquarters requested 4th Division G4 to advise the 3d Brigade of the availability of these items are the procedure for obtaining them.

30

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

f. Reference paragraph 5b Section 2 page 28, Hoi Chanh reaction to US/South Vietnamese Ultimate Victory Claims to Psychological Warfare Propaganda. Nonconcur, as the psychological objectives of our effort in Vietnam are contained in JUSPAC Guidance 20 and PSYOPS annex to the Combined Campaign Plan (AB 143) and are official US Mission Policy.

g. Reference paragraph 5c Section 2 page 28, Employment of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT). In order to be more successful APT should be employed in squad strength instead of the recommended two man teams.

h. Reference paragraph 5e Section 2 page 29, Variation in Leaflet Appeal. Since note paper is in short supply for the VC/NVA, simply printing some leaflets on one side would have the same effect. Dissemination of paper and enveloped attached to a leaflet would be difficult by air.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. GABBARD
ILT; AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished:
2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wash DC 20310
1 - 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

CO, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD #</th>
<th>PAGE #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***PAGE #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

DA Label 18, 1 Apr 89 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE.