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**AUTHORITY**

12 May 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

5 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 17th
Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
   with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
   be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
   of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the
   Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent opera-
   tions.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned
   Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons
   Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the
   reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the
   attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion
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Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
17th Combat Aviation Group
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group
APO San Francisco 96240

AVGD-SC 12 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) Section I: Operations, Significant Activities.

   a. There have been no mission changes during the report period. The 17th Combat Aviation Group provides command and control of non-divisional Army Aviation assets in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and aviation support to combat and combat support units subordinate to IFFORCEV, DSA 17 Corps and FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES in support of operations to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and assist the Government of Vietnam (GVN) extend control throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

   b. Organizational changes:

      (1) C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry minus personnel and equipment was relieved from US Army, Vietnam and reassigned to the US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. F Troop, 8th Cavalry was activated 1 April 1968 utilizing the personnel and equipment of the old C Troop and assigned the Americal Division, US Army Vietnam. General Orders No. 182, dated 12 March 1968, Headquarters, US Army, Pacific.

      (2) 363d Airfield Support Detachment arrived in RVN from CONUS on 27 April 1968, assigned to 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and stationed at Phan Thiet.

      (3) 364th Airfield Support Detachment arrived in RVN from CONUS on 27 April 1968, assigned to 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and stationed at IZ English.

      (4) An Air Force Airfield Command, attached to 17th Combat Aviation Group effective 1 April 1968.

      (5) Station List, Inclosure 1.
c. The TET Offensive, which began on 30 January continued into this report period. Major action was concentrated around the Combat Aviation Group installations at Kontum, Pleiku, and P \textit{Piortar} attacks on Ban Me Thuot continued during the month of tapering off towards the end of the month. Later during the report period, actions developed in the Phan Thiet area where major damage was caused when an ARVN ammo dump at the Phan Thiet airfield was blown up during a mortar attack. Aircraft damage and personnel casualties resulted from the blast which littered the area with unexploded 105 and 155mm projectiles. More detailed information on the impact of the TET Offensive may be found in the GRLL's of the 10th, 52nd, and 268th Combat Aviation Battalions. TET impact on the 17th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters is outlined in Special 17th CAG GRLL, Inclosure 2.

d. During the report period the 17th Group Headquarters did not participate in any troop movements or operations. The Headquarters Company did undergo 72 days of unit training.

e. As a result of General Palmer's letter on conservation of the T53, L11 and L13 Engines (Inclosure 3), 17th Combat Aviation Group has initiated Group wide programs aimed at engine conservation and aircraft utilization. These include a Commander Orientation Program initiated by Colonel Smith, the Group Commander who personally briefed all major unit commanders, Province Chiefs and Province Advisors in II Corps. This program requires the subordinate units to conduct periodic briefings for supported combat and combat support units on the use of Army Aviation. The purpose being to provide key personnel in these units with a basic understanding of the capabilities and limitations of Army aircraft, to develop a mutual understanding between the ground commander and aviation personnel on mission planning and execution, and to effect more efficient utilization of aviation assets. A maintenance program was initiated to eliminate foreign object damage (FOD), which has caused approximately 50% of the turbine engine failures. Command emphasis has been placed on dust suppression around airfields and heliports, more frequent crew inspections, and improved maintenance supervision. Movement Control Centers (MCC) are being established down to battalion level to effect more efficient use of aircraft. These centers schedule and coordinate organic assets with the intent to consolidate flights within designated areas of responsibility. This control does not deter aircraft from tactical support. In fact, it enhances the benefits to the aviation user in both administrative and tactical support by emphasizing close and continuous coordination between the supported and supporting unit and the appropriate movement control centers. In addition to the MCC a Logistical Support Operations Center (LSOC) was established at Group level and collocated with the Group MCC. The purpose of the LSOC...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GGFOR-65 (R1) (U)

In order to provide logistical support for tactical operations conducted by 17th Combat Aviation Group units, the LSOG provides transportation services for the movement of supplies that cannot be moved by aviation assets of the aviation battalions, for the movement of repair parts, and transportation for personnel. The LSOG accomplishes its mission by coordinated utilization of available Group aircraft and by integration of requirements with existing missions, where possible. Maximum utilization is made of USAF resources. See inclosure 4, message from CG, IFFORCEV to all users of Army Aviation in II Corps, Subject: IFFORCEV Aviation Program to Conserve Army Aviation Resources (U).

f. Throughout this reporting period the 17th Combat Aviation Group was commanded by Colonel Bill G. Smith, Infantry, 053387. There were four changes of Battalion Commanders as listed below:

(1) On 6 March 1968 LTC Raymond C. Lehman Jr., 056621, assumed command of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion vice LTC Edward P. Lukert Jr., 063915.

(2) On 31 March 1968 LTC Henry J. Dethlefs III, 066635, assumed command of the 223rd Combat Support Aviation Battalion vice LTC Leslie H. Gilbert, 0112059.

(3) On 31 March 1968 LTC Stephen F. Cameron, 062328, assumed command of the 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron vice LTC Lawrence H. Johnson Jr., 069702.

(4) On 4 April 1968 LTC Wayne B. Sargent, 061671, assumed command of the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion vice LTC Donald E. Mulligan, 079600.

g. The following changes occurred within the Principal Staff of Headquarters 17th Combat Aviation Group.

(1) On 7 February 1968 LTC Carroll C. Issacs, 0100091, became the Group Executive Officer vice LTC Henry J. Dethlefs III, 066635.

(2) On 8 February 1968 MAJ John W. Mayhew, 087555, became the Group S4 vice LTC Robert M. Fowler, 0226599.

(3) On 10 March 1968 LTC Glenn W. Lewis, 097935, became the Group S2 vice LTC Donald D. Dowie, 0187725.

h. 17th Combat Aviation Group strengths as of 30 April 1968:

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Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

12 May 1968

(1) Military:

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<td>19/40</td>
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<td>74/181</td>
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<tr>
<td>201st Corps Avn Co</td>
<td>8/13</td>
<td>18/13</td>
<td>89/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Khe AAC</td>
<td>6/4</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>143/129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33/37</td>
<td>21/25</td>
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*25th Med Det reassigned 268th CAB to HQ 17th CAG effective 1 April 1968.

(2) Civilian:

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<td>An Khe AAC</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
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*Reduction to 19 effective 20 June 1968.

1. Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, 201st Corps Aviation
Company, and An Khe Army Airfield Command sustained no casualties during
this reporting period.


k. Operational results as of 30 April 1968: Inclosure 6.

1. Flight Safety.

(1) Period 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968
### SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGCS FOR-65 (R1) (U)

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<td>Incidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precautionary Landings</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
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</table>

(2) Cumulative accident rate per 100,000 hours flying time during the report period: 30.4; during FY 68: 29.4.
2. (c) Section II Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.


      (1) Observation: Shortage of key enlisted personnel with critical MOS's continue to be a matter of concern. Maintenance personnel with 68 series, 45J and 67W are still critical. Due to the reorganization of the Airfield Operation Detachments, MOS's 93B and 51M are critical. Expected fill action on emergency requisitions should alleviate the 93B and 51M shortages in a short time.

      (2) Evaluation: Unless these critical MOS shortages are filled, the ability to maintain our aircraft in a flyable condition will continue to remain strained, thus impeding the Group's mission.

      (3) Recommendation: Due to the special skills required, it is not possible to cross-train other MOS's into the critical MOS's as they require special training and schooling. The only possible solution is to program more personnel into the courses of instruction.

   b. Operations: None.

   c. Training: None.

   d. Intelligence: Visual Reconnaissance.

      (1) Observations: During the period, there were 5,749 hours flown exclusively for Visual Reconnaissance out of a total of 10,462 hours flown for all missions. The percent of total hours devoted solely to Visual Reconnaissance during the period was 55%, a decrease of 17% from the previous period.

      (2) Evaluation: There has been a significant increase in the requirements for O-1 aircraft to support special operations, to provide radio relay for isolated long range patrols and mobile strike forces, and to provide aerial observers for artillery observation. Since additional assets are not available, a detailed reevaluation of the overall utilization of O-1 aircraft has been necessary to insure all missions are properly accomplished without degrading the VR program. Actions that are being taken include:

         (a) Closer coordination between all users to obtain maximum benefit from the use of all aircraft.

         (b) A significant increase in the flying hours for the aircraft
Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

comitted solely to the VR program.

(3) **Recommendations**: None.

e. Logistics:

(1) Support Requirements for 17th Combat Aviation Group:

(a) **Observation**: The increase in enemy activity which occurred at the beginning of the Lunar New Year focused attention on the critical area of logistical support for units of the Group. Previously tasked to the limit to provide their own logistical support, the units of this command were, in many instances during the TET Offensive, unable to fulfill their logistical requirements while performing increased tactical mission assignments.

(b) **Evaluation**: A detailed study was initiated to determine exactly what critical support problems existed and to recommend possible solutions. The conduct of the study disclosed the following problem areas:

1. That the units of this command provide logistical support for approximately 8,000 personnel, without the services of an organic and immediately responsive support command.

2. That a definite shortage of organic transport vehicles sufficient to meet logistical requirements over long haul resupply lines exists.

3. That there is a shortage of organic petroleum handling equipment.

4. That adequate equipment and personnel are not authorized or available within aviation units to support the base airfields and the tactical sites.

5. That the units of this Group are dependent upon the 1st Logistical Command to provide "retail distribution" to the Aviation Company level of the heavy tonnage Class III and V items.

6. That the support provided by the 1st Logistical Command is unprogrammed, and as such, is not as responsive to the immediate needs of the commander as is required. This cannot be construed as a complaint against the 1st Logistical Command as the requirement exceeds their capability in many instances.

(c) **Recommendations**: That an aviation group logistical support unit, comparable to a brigade logistical support element, be organized.
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12 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFUR-65 (R1) (U)

proposed TOCE for an aviation group logistical support battalion is
attached for consideration. (Inclosure 7)

(2) Inadequate Anti-Tank Capability:

(a) Observation: The reported movement of NVA Armor into the II
CTZ prompted an evaluation of this Group's anti-tank capability. To date,
this capability is still inadequate.

(b) Evaluation: Immediate response to the reported movement of NVA
Armor into the II CTZ came from the Group's Battalion Commanders in the
form of requests for temporary loan of 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles
to bolster base camp defenses. To date, most of these requests could
not be honored due to non-availability of the weapons. The secondary
response was an attempt by this headquarters to provide the supported
ground commanders with an aerial delivered anti-tank capability. To
this end a request was submitted in message form on 31 Mar 68, to the CG,
1st Avn Bde, requesting release of 4 N-22 systems or 4 UH-1C aircraft
currently fitted with the N-22 system. As an interim measure the same
message requested 600 rounds of FFAR 2.75 inch HEAT Ammunition. In reply
the 1st Aviation Brigade advised that the HEAT Ammunition was not available,
nor was it effective, and that 4 UH-1C A/C with M-22 systems were
to be assigned to the 17th Combat Aviation Group in the near future.
Follow-up action was submitted on 23 April 1968. This Group still has
an immediate requirement for an aerial delivered anti-tank weapon.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That commanders strengthen perimeter of defenses to include improved
barriers, tank traps, anti-tank mines and prepositioned firing points
for employment of the readily available LAW, 66mm, anti-tank weapon.

2. That immediate release of 4 M-22 systems be made to the 17th Combat
Aviation Group.

(3) Helicopter Gunship Shortages:

(a) Observation: Helicopter gunship shortages have steadily increased.

(b) Evaluation: During the past quarter the loss rate of gunships
damaged or destroyed as a result of combat or crash has exceeded the re-
placement rate. This Group is now short 21 gunships, or the equivalent
firepower of 2-1/2 Assault Helicopter Companies. Another factor contributing
to gunship non-availability is the increasing number of maintenance hours
required on each aircraft. In many cases during the TET Offensive,
maintenance was deferred as long as possible. Units recovered from this deferred maintenance with difficulty. The combination of increased shortages and increased mission requirements has drastically increased the flying time of available gunships. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the 17th Combat Aviation Group is currently testing two MK18 rapid fire grenade launchers. This system mounted in a UH-1D model, which has also been rigged with a flex gun system, has proven highly satisfactory for use in providing LZ preparatory fires, convoy escort, and suppressive fires. This system has the capability of placing accurate, concentrated fire on an area target from an altitude of 1500 feet, thereby reducing crew and aircraft vulnerability. The success of this system has prompted efforts by the Group to obtain 75 MK18 systems to be distributed on the basis of 5 per Assault Helicopter Company and Cavalry Troop.

(c) Recommendations:

1 That favorable consideration be given toward procurement of 75 Honeywell MK18 rapid fire grenade launchers for issue to the 17th Combat Aviation Group.

2 That consideration be given to the conversion of UH-1D aircraft to gunships equipped with the MK18 and M-21 systems.

4 Transfer of the 339th Transportation Company (DSU):

(a) Observation: The 339th Transportation Company was transferred out of the Phu Hiep area early in April.

(b) Evaluation: This loss was keenly felt by all units at Phu Hiep. Because all the units had organic DS maintenance detachments, the loss of supply support was more critically felt than was the reduction of maintenance support.

2 HHB 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, 134th Assault Helicopter Company, 180th Assault Helicopter Company, 203d Reconnaissance Airplane Company, and the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company located at Phu Hiep now receive DS from the 79th Direct Support Unit at Qui Nhon. This has placed a burden on each of these units to move aircraft parts to Phu Hiep. To accomplish this, the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, has formed a central control point to expedite the handling of parts and requisitions at Phu Hiep. This operation as opposed to one in which each unit at Phu Hiep operates its own parts run, has saved a great deal of manpower and flying time.

(c) Recommendations: That consideration be given to assigning the 34th General Support Group the mission of stationing a supply platoon at
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Phu Hiep to function as a Direct Support Unit extension.

(5) Improved Maintenance Lighting Equipment:

(a) Observation: TOE lighting equipment for supporting night maintenance is considered to be inadequate.

(b) Evaluation: The performance of thorough post flight maintenance is a key to success in providing a high availability of safe, reliable aircraft. Since the bulk of the maintenance work is done at night, adequate lighting is essential. Some units have borrowed floodlight, portable FSN 6230-877-9172 from Air Force facilities. This floodlight is the Air Force Mercury Vapor Lamp Set, P/N 67E3502-1, contract DDSA400-67C8161, mfg: American Filter Inc, St Louis, Mo. This set is far superior to any other lighting used by this Group.

(c) Recommendation: That Floodlight Portable FSN 6230-877-9172 be issued to aviation companies on the following basis: Six (6) per CH-54 and CH-47 Company, four (4) per UH-1 Company, and three (3) per Fixed Wing Company.

(6) Aircraft Washing Vehicles:

(a) Observation: Units maintaining the cleanest aircraft are also the units experiencing less Foreign Object Damage and other maintenance problems related to dirty aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: Aircraft washing equipment is not provided to aviation units by TOE. Some units have fabricated water trailers or are using salvage tankers for this purpose; however, these are not always available. A clean aircraft can be inspected much more quickly and efficiently, and the possibility of a crack or other defect being concealed by a build-up of dirt and grease is eliminated. A thorough cleaning of the engine area, filter systems, and air inlet area greatly increases the efficiency of the FOD prevention program. Those units using fabricated water trailers or tankers, and water soluble aircraft cleaning compounds obtain the best results with less labor.

(c) Recommendation: That a tank truck type of aircraft washing vehicle be developed for issue to each aircraft unit. This vehicle should have a compartment for the cleaning compound as well as a compartment for rinse water. A pump must provide pressure to a nozzle where a selection valve permits change over from cleaning compound to rinse water.

(7) Aircraft Engine Conservation:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG5 OGPDC-65 (ML) (U)

(a) Observation: A program for conserving aircraft engines has been initiated to overcome a possible shortage of T53-L13 engines and to insure continued effective tactical mobility.

(b) Evaluation:

1. The L-13 is much more susceptible to FOD than is the L-11. To guard against FOD the 17th CAG has adopted the program recommended by 34th General Support Group for the inspecting and cleaning of engines and engine air screens, particle separators and plenum chambers. This program involves additional inspections which are accomplished in conjunction with the Daily (PMD), Intermediate (PNI), and Periodic (IP) Inspections. In addition to the 34th GSG requirements, 17th CAG recommends that the helicopter (UH-1) roof be swept after personnel have been there, and that the upper transmission area be hosed off daily to rinse particles down and away from the short shaft entry cutout in the air plenum chamber bulkhead.

2. Support units have been briefed to keep LZs as dust and sand free as possible and to police these LZs of all foreign objects. The foreign objects most often causing FOD in an LZ area are: ponchos, clothing, empty sand bags, and cardboard and paper from C-rations or ammo packing.

3. Aviation units have been instructed to perform thorough troubleshooting and maintenance on turbine engines before turning them to a higher level. Frequently, good maintenance practices will return a low powered engine to acceptable performance. Adequate stocks of engine repair parts must be on hand to reduce down time in awaiting for parts.

4. A mobile assistance team was formed by the Group Maintenance Officer to visit each 17th CAG Company. The team evaluates the maintenance operation in each unit and makes appropriate recommendations for improvement. The team also notes all good ideas, and time saving methods and passes them along to other companies.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That continued emphasis by all aviation commanders be placed on eliminating the source of FOD by stressing good maintenance housekeeping.

2. That continued emphasis by all supported unit commanders be placed on policing of LZs for which they are responsible.

9. Dust Suppression:

(a) Observation: The suppression and control of dust continues to be a major problem encountered by aviation units during dry season operations.

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particularly in forward support areas.

(b) Evaluation: Through an aggressive dust control program executed by all elements of the 17th CAG, the suppression of dust and foreign object damage at base camp locations has been maintained within reasonable standards. This program included the application of enormous quantities of penemiprime or substitutes on a continuing basis. Salvaged tankers have been acquired, and in many cases, field expedient dispersing equipment has been put together to provide aviation units an organic and responsive means of spreading penemiprime where and when required. Grass seed is currently being obtained and sown wherever possible as a long range effort to stabilize the soil on, and adjacent to, runways and heliports. Dust control in forward support landing zones and fire bases has posed as great a problem as that at base camp locations. The necessary dispensing equipment and sufficient quantities of penemiprime are normally not available at these locations to effect adequate dust control. Currently a survey is being made of all forward area helipads within the II Corps Area to determine the requirements at each location necessary to provide maximum dust suppression.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That a distributor or salvaged tanker capable of dispensing penemiprime be issued to each base airfield or heliport thus providing aviation units an organic and responsive capability of spreading penemiprime when and where it is needed.

2. That the use of asphalt at base locations be considered as a more effective, longer lasting and, over a period of time, less expensive method of accomplishing dust suppression.

3. That the use of the standard airfield T-17 membrane be considered for use at forward support helipads. The membrane can be placed, then removed and reused at new locations without difficulty.

f. Organization: None.

g. Medical: Sanitation in construction of Mess Halls.

(1) Observation: Within the Group, several mess halls have been constructed during the past year. None of these facilities have been built with a provision for the installation of drains in the floor.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R.I) (U)

(2) Evaluation: It has been difficult to maintain a high level of sanitation in these mess halls, especially in the kitchens, because of the lack of floor drains. In some instances it has been necessary to break up a portion of the floor and add a drainage system in order to allow water to run-off after the floor is scrubbed.

(3) Recommendation: That the construction policies for mess halls be reviewed and that consideration be given to the installation of floor drains at the time concrete slabs are poured.

7 Incl

as

BILL G. SMITH
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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3 cys USARV
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3 cys IPPV

TABS L, M, & N to INCL 7 - Withdrawn, Hq, DA
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and submits the following comments and recommendations:

a. Reference paragraph 2e(1) Section II, page 7, Support Requirements for 17th Combat Aviation Group: The recommendation for establishing an aviation logistical support unit appears to have merit; however, such a unit would require a detailed study by the 1st Aviation Brigade. The use of MTO&E action and possible assignment of cellular units should also be considered as a possible solution.

b. Reference paragraph 2e(9) Section II, page 11, Dust Suppression: Concur with observations and recommendations however the placement of T-17 membrane should be done by engineer units or under the supervision of qualified engineer personnel.

c. Reference paragraph 2g(1) Section II, page 12, Sanitation in Construction of Mess Halls: Recommend USARV Regulation 415-1 and MACV Directive 415-1 be revised to include floor drains in mess hall floors.

d. Reference paragraph 4, page 3, Inclosure 2, Aircraft Revetments: An improved revetment design has been approved and plans are being forwarded by 18th Engineer Brigade to CG, USARV, for allocation of funds and arrangement for off-shore contract to construct prefabricated kits capable of being installed by troop labor on existing revetments.

e. Reference paragraph 5b, Section II, page 6, Inclosure 2, Active Defensive Measures: Nonconcur with recommendation as combat units are generally not available for static defensive missions. Present policy places the responsibility for local and physical security on the commander in charge of the particular installation or airfield.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
9/3/68
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

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2 - ACSPOR, DA, Wash DC 20310
1 - 17th Cbt Avn Gp

CONFIDENTIAL
THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AV-IGC-DST, APO 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except for the following:

Paragraph 4, Tab 7th Inclosure.

The comments of the Group Surgeon are essentially compatible with the proposed reorganization of aeromedical support, which has already been approved by the CG, 1st Aviation Brigade and favorably received by HQ, Department of the Army. This plan will be tested on a trial basis in RVN shortly. The proposal calls for reorganized battalion medical sections and medical detachments. The personnel and equipment of both would be changed to provide more effective support. Additionally, in another set of proposals, the Group Surgeon would be authorized a MSG Admin Officer (03), an enlisted man in the grade of E-7, and two other men in the grade of E-4.

The concept of a medical administrative and service company envisioned by 17th Group is not included in the proposed reorganization. Such a company would create a radically new organization involving new problems.

The title of this company implies its responsibilities would be personnel management, records control, and supply management. At present, existing administrative headquarters are responsible for the personnel of the medical units. In addition, the records and supply management, it has been found, is best accomplished at the lowest level under the guidance of group and brigade headquarters. The proposed battalion medical section is specifically tailored to these, as well as other, functions.

Under the present proposals, the medical force has been reduced to that level believed essential for field operations. An administrative and service company, if formed, would necessarily add spaces to the structure and, consequently, wipe out some of the economies under the new plan.

Such a company, if formed, would incorporate a basic inflexibility since a fixed quantity of men and equipment would be authorized to support a varying number of battalions and companies. It is the intent of the
proposals staffed by Brigade and Headquarters that additional aero-medic support, in the form of medical detachments, be assigned to Brigade resources as required by additional aviation units.

The fact that such a company would be an entirely new unit should not be ignored. The problems involved in setting up a new TOE organization and the problems in supporting yet another type of unit within an aviation group would far outweigh any advantages which might accrue from such an organization.

2. (c) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2a, page 6. The 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters has been unable to provide assistance on this problem except to advise higher headquarters. In addition to requiring long term schooling for these special skills it has also become a retention problem.

b. Paragraph 2e(1), page 7 and Paragraph 8, 1st Indorsement. The observations and recommendations appear valid when viewed from a parochial point of view, however under existing circumstances experienced by the 1st Aviation Brigade it would appear impractical to implement. The 1st Aviation Brigade is at present below authorized strength and in many areas already experiences shortages of the equipment that would be required to support the recommendations.

c. Paragraph 2e(2)(c), page 8. The recommendation to strengthen defense to meet the threat of tanks should more appropriately be made to installation commanders in areas where a tank threat exists. Coordination at the local level should adequately solve this problem. The 4 M-22 systems requested were released to the 17th Combat Aviation Group on 23 May 1968.

d. Paragraph 2e(3), page 8. The present shortage of gunships is experienced throughout the 1st Aviation Brigade. It is not feasible to convert UH-1H or UH-1D model helicopters to gunships with the present short supply of lift ships and the programmed delivery of AH-1G aircraft in this area of operation. The 191B rapid fire grenade launcher was a test item and is not programmed for production at this time.

e. Paragraph 2e(4), page 9. The assignment of 34th General Support Group units is not within the purview of 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters. Any additional supply support, however, would be of definite value to units of the 1st Aviation Brigade.

f. Paragraph 2e(5), page 10. The ESH stated in the basic CALL is in error and should be 0-30-817-9172. Present field lighting sets are inadequate for the needs of aircraft maintenance facilities in RVN. The 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters recommends that the Air Force flood light set be procured for issue to aviation units.
AVK-C
S U B J E C T: Operational Report of the 17th Combat Aviation Group for
Period Ending 30 April 1966, 263 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

- Paragraph 2e(6), page 10. The development of a wash vehicle for the
  use of all aviation units would substantially reduce the foreign object
damage to T-53 and T-55 engines and would generally improve the overall
maintenance on aircraft by providing maintenance personnel with the needed
facilities to wash aircraft. The present skid mounted aircraft are, in
most instances, too cumbersome to use a centralized wash point.

- Paragraph 2e(7), page 11. The 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters
  has published information and instructions for the prevention of FOD
  and disseminated it to all Brigade units. Information was accumulated
  by evaluating all recommendations derived by an intensive program to
  reduce FOD throughout the Brigade. Command emphasis has been placed on
  this problem and it is closely monitored at this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group. 

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel shortages, page 6, paragraph 2a: Concur. This command continues to experience requisition shortfall in all MOS's listed. Due to special type training required in each MOS, it is not possible to cross train personnel in RVN. Recommend DA place emphasis toward an immediate increase in the training of personnel in MOS's listed.

b. Reference item concerning transfer of the 339th Transportation Company (DSU), page 9, paragraph 2e(4); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2e: Nonconcur. The pick-up of repair parts is the responsibility of the unit receiving parts, not the DSU. The 34th General Support Group does not have an organization which could assign a supply platoon for the purpose of handling the requisitioning, receipt and issue of parts at a location separate from the DSU.

c. Reference item concerning aircraft washing vehicle, page 10, paragraph 2e(6); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2g: Concur. Request that unit submit additional justification and information on requirement as outlined by USARV Reg 705-2 so that action may be initiated under ENSURE procedures.

d. Reference item concerning dust suppression, page 11, paragraph 2e(9); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph b: Concur.

(1) The 17th Combat Aviation Group, was authorized by 1st Logistical Command to pick up some C-131 series fuel tankers from the Qui Nhon Depot, which were to be used as distributors, at Kontum. It might be possible for the 17th Group to make such arrangements again if the salvaged tankers or like items are available.
AVHCC-DST (12 May 68) 3d Ind (C) 11 JUL 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RL) (U)

(2) The use of asphalt, instead of peneprime would be more effective, but at this time LOC's are enjoying the first priority on asphalt and asphalt distributors.

e. Reference item concerning mess hall floor drains, page 12, paragraph 2g(3); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph c: Nonconcur. USAVE Reg 415-1, 2 Apr 68, Appendix I provides for waterborne sewage for intermediate modified and temporary standard construction of mess halls. Letter AVHEN-CD, 31 Dec 67, HQ USARV, subject: Mess Hall Construction, prescribes that new construction of cantonment type mess halls will include all necessary plumbing and completed mess halls which require up-grading of utility systems will be modified under the provisions of AR 415-35.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATOKA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CG furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 17th Cbt Avn Gp
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 17th Cbt Avn Gp for period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 AUG 68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference (page 15) 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1: Medical support plans should be developed and implemented at the highest command level rather than by piecemeal actions of the subordinate command surgeons. The plan to reorganize battalion surgical sections and to form aviation company medical detachments specifically tailored in personnel and equipment to support the attached companies is preferred over the group recommendation to organize a separate medical administrative and service company.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

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CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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### STATION LIST

**17th Combat Aviation Group - ENGAGED - ATTACHED**

(as of 30 April 66)

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**TOTAL**  69

Incl: 4   15  Incl: 1

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Proposed Schedule "X" Authorization*

52d CAB  149 Holloway (Pleiku)
   18  Kontum
   14  Ban Me Thuot

10th CAB  24  Dong Ba Thin
   24  An Son

268th CAB  33  Phu Heip

TOTAL:  262

* These figures were determined by a DA Team, and have not been authorized.
14 February 1968

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
APO 96384

SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period
29 Jan to 2 Feb 68. (U)

1. (U) General:

   a. Mission: The mission of the 17th CAG continues to be command
      and control of all non-divisional aviation assets in II CTZ and to provide
      support of air mobile operations as directed by Commanding General,
      IFFV, to US, ARVN, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in II
      Corps Tactical Zone.

   b. Organization and structure remains unchanged from ORLL
      period ending 31 Jan 1968.

2. (C) Intelligence:

   a. Source: Intelligence is made available to 17th CAG units
      from all IFFV intelligence sources and was considered adequate as to
      the situation in II CTZ.

   b. CO, 17th CAG issued instructions to the battalion commanders
      on 29 Jan 68 to review their local security situations and assume an
      increased alert posture. In addition alerting messages from higher head-
      quarters were passed to all subordinate units. The severity of the
      pending situation in the Central Highlands was not known however, Camp
      Holloway was at a 100% alert status when the first mortar attack occurred.
      This advanced warning was a major factor in reducing the casualty rate
      at 17th CAG installations.

3. (C) Operations and Planning Activities.

   a. Plans:

      (1) Contingency plans for defense are constantly reviewed
      and revised to reflect changes in the local situation and security threat.
      The review of these plans offer a check for the Group Commander by
      enabling him to personally evaluate the state of readiness during his

INCL. 2
SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period 29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

frequent command visits to all 17th CAG installations.

(2) Request for increased security forces in selected 17th CAG areas has been initiated. Schedule X and manpower survey has been completed by USARPAC, however, 17th CAG non concurs with the reduced manpower level recommended by the USARPAC Survey Team. Recent events give credence to this position.

(3) Contingency plans of installation coordinators and major combat commanders do not provide for the automatic relief or reinforcement of 17th CAG Airfields. Each contingency is evaluated on an individual basis.

b. Operations:

(1) On 25 Jan 68, Holloway Airfield was mortared receiving light damage. Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, had received a mortar and/or ground attacks on 17 and 10 Jan respectively. These attacks increased the readiness state of 52d CAB units. Kontum has been reinforced by a 35 man security force provided from resources of 17th CAG, a face lifting with lights, and improved perimeter fence. Once the TET attacks were mounted, the real surprise was the duration of the attack and the attacks on the civilian population. 17th CAG units responded immediately and with ferocity and valor.

(2) The most destructive single action was the sapper attack at Flanders AAF on 30 Jan 68. This attack resulted in 8 aircraft being destroyed or damaged. The success of the attack lies in the fact it was undetected by friendly forces.

c. Active Defense: All units in the highlands were engaged in active defense of their installations. The pattern for each was similar. Each unit (location) physically occupied defensive positions and fired effective defensive fires. Each unit employed flares and gunships in coordination with other friendly elements.

4.(6) Section I: Planning and Preparation Which Affected the Command's Readiness Posture upon Initiation of the Tet Offensive.

ITEM: State of Readiness of 17th CAG Units on 29 January 1968.

DISCUSSION: Events leading up to TET had set the stage for a high state of combat readiness for 17th CAG units. The mission of providing aircraft for command and control, logistical resupply, and repositioning of units during the proposed Truce had fully committed 17th CAG aviation assets. This commitment precluded any feeling of complacency during the Truce period.
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LESSONS LEARNED: A constant high state of combat readiness must be maintained in the counterinsurgency environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

ITEM: Intelligence Available Prior to TET.

DISCUSSION: Intelligence available to 17th CAG units provided warning for impending activities. Although all units were not on 100% readiness, units receiving the greatest threat were in fact manning all positions with personnel in protected areas.

LESSONS LEARNED: Intelligence must continually be evaluated and reactions must coincide with the forecast enemy threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE.

ITEM: Aircraft Revetments.

DISCUSSION: Present revetments offer minimum protection for helicopters. They preclude destruction from near misses on the covered side however, extensive damage occurred in the main and tail rotor section of the helicopter.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That aircraft revetments continue to be improved and modified to offer increased protection.

Section II: Conduct of Operations During the TET Offensive.

a. Personnel: The overall personnel status of the 17th Combat Aviation Group for 29 January is attached as Inclosure 1. Similarly, the personnel status of the 17th Combat Aviation Group for 2 February is attached as Inclosure 2. Both Inclosures include the authorized, assigned, and present for duty strength for both days, and a comparative percentage of the authorized strength over the present for duty strength. Attached as Inclosure 3 is a breakdown of the combat casualties suffered during the period 29 January - 2 February 1968. It should be noted that the overall personnel picture remained unchanged, as programmed personnel were received during the period and reassigned to the major elements of the Group as replacements. (Incl 4).

ITEM: The flow of casualty information from battalion sized units to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam.

DISCUSSION: Prior to the TET offensive, it had been the policy of this
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14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period
29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

Headquarters, consistent with the guidance furnished by Headquarters, USAV, that casualty reporting be telephoned from the battalion direct to USAV. This was followed by a similar call to this Headquarters. The information was required at USAV Headquarters within twelve hours. The only exception to this was light injuries in which case the information was required at USAV within 48 hours. The sudden influx of casualties (See Inclosure 3), complicated by the burdensome communications problems, made this Headquarters realize that the current system of casualty reporting was entirely too time consuming.

LESSONS LEARNED: That a new system of casualty reporting must be adopted to assure that accurate timely information was being given to this headquarters, and Headquarters, USAV. Also, shortage of administrative personnel at battalion level precluded the feasibility of the duplicate effort necessary in reporting the casualties first to USAV and then repeating the same information to this Headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION: That the flow of information regarding casualties be from the battalion to this Grop from where it will be expedited to USAV.


DISCUSSION: The problem of insufficient numbers of security personnel to adequately defend the airfields of the 17th CAG has been a continuing problem, as only one of the five (5) battalion sized units assigned is authorized a security platoon. (This problem had been examined in a recent "Schedule X" evaluation, with the results reflected as Inclosure 5.) During the month of January, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Security Platoon was short 85 of the 102 men authorized. This became a matter of command attention, as this battalion had security responsibilities at Kontum and Ban Me Thuot in addition to Pleiku. As a result, each battalion furnished seven (7) men to bolster this platoon as an emergency measure for the Kontum area and provided fifty three (53) 11B's just prior to TET. The last of these personnel arrived on 29 January, and were shipped to the 52d CAB on 30 January. Also, coordination had been effected with the 4th Infantry Division for an additional 40 11B's for reassignment on 5 February. (33 have been assigned).

LESSONS LEARNED: It became increasingly clear that security forces for airfields is a continuing problem which must be considered in the overall allocation of personnel within USAV, and that a higher priority must be given 17th CAG by USAV in the assignment of 11B personnel to include increasing the forces currently authorized.

RECOMMENDATION: That "Schedule X" authorization be implemented as interim solution immediately, and a higher priority be given to the 17th CAG in the assignment of 11B personnel.
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b. Operations:

ITEM: Reports.

DISCUSSION: Due to the numerous requirements for reports placed on this unit early in the TET period, it was evident that the standard reports established in current regulations and SOP's were inadequate for sustained large scale contact.

LESSONS LEARNT: Reports containing all required information must be submitted by aviation companies as expeditiously as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That standard reports required by current regulations and SOP's be reviewed and modified as necessary to insure that all information required is included. Thus the requirement for additional reports and the resulting heavy load on communications systems will be eliminated.

ITEM: Interior Lighting.

DISCUSSION: The most serious damage incurred during this period resulted from the sapper attack at Dong Ba Thin. The most effective passive measure against sappers is lighting and vigilance. There is a calculated risk involved in having the interior lighted, however, most indirect fires are not observed fires. They are preplanned for a short duration and little or no adjustment is made after the initial round.

Additional advantages of interior lighting is positive identification of targets that may have penetrated the perimeter. The incidence of firing on friendly troops is prevalent in a blackout condition where anything that moves is a fair target.

LESSONS LEARNED: The advantages favor the use of a lighted interior. Areas with good illumination are normally not susceptible to sapper penetration.

RECOMMENDATION: That aircraft parking areas be fully lighted to reduce the vulnerability to sapper infiltration.

ITEM: Increased use of obstacles as passive security measures.

DISCUSSION: Areas employing correctly installed obstacles withstood continued enemy attacks better and were in a better posture to continue their assigned mission. Standard barrier patterns are considered adequate however, the method in which they were employed varied. Common errors include: Double fences too close together allowing one bangalor torpedo...
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SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period 29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

to clear a path; defiles not covered with patrols or indirect fire;
inadequate fields of fire both inside and outside the perimeter fence;
limited use of minesfields and lack of protection of the minesfield; none
of these conditions existed in a critical state because they were
effective in areas.

LESSONS LEARNED: Continued emphasis must be placed on correct employment
of barrier and obstacles as passive defense measures.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the defense plans and physical security measures
of each installation be survey to insure that maximum protection is being
provided. (This survey is presently underway, 17th CAG).

ITEM: Active Defensive Measures

DISCUSSION: It is felt 17th CAG active defensive measures were
instrumental in breaking the enemy offensive. After the barrier and
obstacles had impeded the enemy's advance, the reaction of the aviation
units proved to be the surprise of the operation. Apparently the enemy
envisioned overwhelming Kontum and reducing it to rubble. Perimeter
defense immediately engaged the attackers. Gunships were in the air
and engaging targets at will. The guns caught a wave of NVA between the
perimeter fence and killed them to the last man. Ferocity of this nature
changed the tempo of the attack and allowed the defenders an opportunity
to consolidate their gains.

LESSONS LEARNED: The use of patrols and sentry dogs would have enhanced
the defensive posture of the installations. Aviation units are not
staffed to actively patrol an area of operation and have time and
personnel to continue aviation simultaneously. To compensate for the
limited defensive personnel, Claymore mines, perimeter wire and mine
must be used extensively. In addition a rapid reaction force must
be maintained to combat any breach of the perimeter defense. Each
17th CAG unit presently maintains a quick reaction force.

RECOMMENDATION: That combat units provide assistance in securing
17th CAG Airfields. That sentry dog units be employed to bolster airfield
defenses.

ITEM: Refugees

DISCUSSION: An acute problem with refugees occurred at Ban Me Thuot during
this period. The Ban Me Thuot Army Airfield was the only secure area in
the vicinity and US and third country civilian personnel sought refuge
with the 155th AHC. The 155th shared willingly however, they were unable
to adequately provide for the required minimum comfort without emergency
resupply.
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LESSONS LEARNED: That all areas must be prepared to provide for refugees in future operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That USARV authorize for the preplan and prestock of refugee packages to include tentage, bedding, clothing, and food to be dispatched to areas requiring support of refugees.

ITEM: Aircraft Dispersion and Vulnerability of Present Posture.

DISCUSSION: 17th CAB units received repeated mortar attacks at Ban Me Thuot, Holloway, and Kontum. The accuracy of this fire increased with each attack. All aircraft were revetted and received varying degrees of protection. Concentrations were fixed on aircraft parking areas, and were considered effective. Units lacked flexibility to move or disperse the aircraft in a secure area.

LESSONS LEARNED: Alternate positions must be made available to disperse aircraft. Revetments must continue to be improved to afford protection to aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That funds be made available to improve protection of aircraft and real estate procured to allow for greater dispersion of aircraft.

ITEM: Communication with Subordinate Units.

DISCUSSION: Communication was maintained with subordinate units throughout the operations. The primary circuits (Land Lines) were overloaded from the start of the enemy attack hindering command and control of subordinate units. Alternate sources were effectively utilized. Single Sideband (HF) radio was the most reliable. The 52d CAB was able to maintain communications with Kontum and Ban Me Thuot after installation of the circuit. Land Lines circuits from Nha Trang to Long Binh were extremely overcrowded and communications became a matter of which had the higher priority.

LESSONS LEARNED: Alternate means of communications must be maintained. Single Sideband was the most reliable means of communication available.

RECOMMENDATION: That Single Sideband radios continue to be developed and improved for tactical use in aviation units.

c. Logistics:

ITEM: Review of Class I, III, & V Basic Loads.

DISCUSSION: On hand supplies must be sufficient to sustain the units for a minimum of three days. Consideration must also be given to the mode of transportation available for resupply of the unit.
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LESSONS LEARNED: Some units, which are primarily resupplied by air, found themselves down to less than one day supply on hand before resupply could be accomplished. Other units were requesting emergency resupply as early as 12 hours after initial contact. It was also noted that there was a 200% over consumption of certain ASR controlled ammunition. This over consumption was a result of units underestimating their daily requirement when in sustained contact.

RECOMMENDATION: Commanders at all levels must review their stockage levels. Basic load stockage must reflect the units requirement to operate for three days under heavy contact with the enemy. Consideration must be given to the modes of transportation available for resupply of the unit and adequate storage sites.

ITEM: Transportation of Critical Supplies:

DISCUSSION: During the latter part of the TET offensive the airlift resupply capability was reduced to the critical state. Emergency resupply which normally requires two hours required 36 hours.

LESSONS LEARNED: During periods of heavy contact throughout the RVN, critical supplies must be moved by organic aircraft. It is necessary to effect close coordination with all units to insure that all available air/ce are utilized for this purpose. "Back Hauling" not only reduced the criticality of the aircraft shortage, but also better utilized 17th CAG a/c.

RECOMMENDATION: That commanders and staff officers at all levels develop a plan for movement of supplies under conditions of reduced airlift and 17th CAG should be reinforced with CH-47 support from other than IFFV resources.

ITEM: Aircraft Spare Parts Support.

DISCUSSION: During the TET period units of the 17th CAG (and supporting DSUs) were extremely hard pressed for aircraft parts. These shortages were critical in semi-isolated units, such as those based at Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Minh Hoa, and Phan Thiet, but to a lesser degree, extended to other installations.

LESSONS LEARNED: Spare parts shortages during this period may be traced to several causes:

a. One of the primary causes was diversion of USAF transport from routine LCU AIR support during the entire month of January. This lack of support resulted in 17th CAG CH-47 units flying over 100 hours, 20 missions, to Saigon for parts pick up. Over 130,000 pounds of spare parts were returned to DSU's, but the cost was high and resulted in 100
CH-47 flying hours which could have been better used in direct tactical support during this emergency.

b. The above problem resulted in DSUs and units being in poor supply posture at the beginning of the TET period. Following the initial attacks in the IFFV area on 29 Jan 68, a great deal of effort was expended in attempting to arrange for parts delivery (and replacement of aircraft) on 30 Jan 68. The efforts to obtain spare parts from Saigon would have been at least partially successful had the attack on Saigon and Tan Son Nhut not taken place on the night of 30-31 Jan 68. As it was, large quantities of parts were awaiting transportation from Saigon to Norther DSUs when Tan Son Nhut was attacked, and the parts depot ceased to function.

c. After the parts depot at TSN resumed operation, the USAF did not respond immediately to the backlog of parts that had been slowly accumulating throughout January, and particularly on 30 January. With the reopening of the depot, parts were hurriedly issued, only to sit on the ramp awaiting transportation. Only an insignificant number of CH-47 sorties could be diverted to pick up the most critically required parts. It is suspected that this build up was at least partially the result of aircraft supply agencies not being familiar with procedures for obtaining emergency airlift support, or from consignee or consignor reluctances to declare a "Combat Emergency" or "Emergency Resupply" situation.

d. The generally unknown (at that time) capability of the Qui Nhon Depot resulted in complete dependance on Saigon for aircraft spare parts. Had Group units, staff, and supporting units been made aware of Qui Nhon's capability it is felt that the supply situation would not have become as critical as it did.

e. The basic cause of the parts shortages which were again felt in time of critical need stems from the supply philosophy of stocking at depots, DSUs, and units only those parts which are normally needed. The system of stocking based on demand data developed over periods of relative inactivity can not possibly support periods of extremely intense activity. This situation was noted during the Dak To engagement in November 1967, and was reemphasized during the TET emergency. If parts shortages are to be minimized and if the tactical commander is to retain the maximum aviation capability during periods of sustained contact, aircraft spares parts stockage authorization criteria must be revised. This authorization should be based on peak requirements rather than on "normal" requirements.

RECOMMENDATION:

a. That the feasibility of prestocking supplies in large quantities at DSUs or units, based on peak requirements, be closely studied.
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SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period 29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

b. That, pending the outcome of the above study, the following actions be rapidly implemented:

1. Positive action should be taken to fix responsibility for declaring "Combat Essential" or "Emergency Supply" situations to expedite delivery of parts from both Saigon and Qui Nhon depots. Less restrictive definitions should be established and channels for declaring these situations should be clearly understood by responsible individuals. Backlogs should be very closely monitored at both depots.

2. Maximum quantities of spare parts should be stocked at DSUs. These should include critical AIMI (SMI) parts as well as large quantities of more readily available parts. Authorization to stock AIMI parts should be granted to units based at semi-isolated airfields such as Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Minh Hoa, and Phan Thiet.

3. Some US forces should be maintained at both Saigon and Qui Nhon depots to prevent complete work stoppages in these depots.

4. Contingency plans should be detailed to permit shifting of primary support responsibility between Saigon and Qui Nhon depots as dictated by the situation in either location. These plans should include coordination with transportation and movements control elements to minimize the impact of sudden increases in requirements of this type.

5. USAF must be tasked to allocate aircraft for the immediate support of 34th US GP to assist in prompt distribution of parts.

6. Packaging, palletizing, and documentary requirements normally enforced by USAF should be waived, to expedite, to the maximum delivery of parts.

7. Specific contingency plans should be developed by IFFV and 17th GAG to provide direct support CH-47's to 14th Trans Rn (AM&S) and to the QUI NHON depot to cover those situations where both TSN and Qui Nhon airfields are closed. (Assuming that the QUI depot helipad is open.)

c. That the above plans be exercised not less than quarterly to insure familiarity and decrease response time.

ITEM: Repair of Aircraft During the TET Emergency.

DISCUSSION: Combat damage sustained both on the ground and in flight during the TET emergency increased the maintenance workload significantly. The possibility of further attacks, either in the form of sporadic sniper fire, attacks in force, or mortar and rocket attacks, seriously hampered repair efforts. On two separate occasions aircraft which were picked up to replace destroyed aircraft were themselves damaged by mortar attacks the first night after they were received. Due to sniper fire during the daylight hours and to blackout restrictions at night, units in the
Central Highlands were particularly hard pressed in their repair efforts.

LESSONS LEARNED: The only satisfactory solution to the problem of sniper fire into a maintenance area is to eliminate the snipers. This was not possible at Kontum or Ban Me Thuot. It would have been possible to relocate at least a portion of the Kontum maintenance personnel to Pleiku but since mechanics comprise a major portion of any aviation units defense capability, this was not done. Such a move is not feasible from the Ban Me Thuot standpoint due to distance consideration alone. The remaining possibilities, working behind at least visual cover and working in spite of harassing fire (with immediate and heavy response to enemy snipers) were exploited to the maximum. In addition, repairs were limited to quick fixes, designed as only interim repairs, to make the aircraft safe to fly. Final repairs were not attempted. To overcome certain parts shortages, severely damaged aircraft were cannibalized where possible.

It is possible to eliminate night maintenance for one or two nights but such a decision results in severely reduced availability rates. The decision should be made in only the most urgent of circumstances.

Decisions were made on 1 Feb to:

1. Limit repairs to the minimum required to make an aircraft flyable.

2. Accept the risk of sniper fire and mortar or rocket attack in completing these absolute necessary repairs.

3. Expand the daylight maintenance capability of as many units as possible through the use of maintenance contact teams from DSUs. This was done primarily at Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.

RECOMMENDATION:

a. That maintenance areas be shielded from outside view through erection of fences, tents, maintenance shelters, or hangars, to reduce sniper hazards.

b. That the possibility of relocation of maintenance effort be considered in periods of sustained emergencies.

c. That DS and GS companies be prepared to stop work on all but the most urgent work in their shops so as to make the maximum number of personnel available for contact teams. This is required to insure maximum immediate aircraft availability.

ITEM: Defense Against Sapper Attack.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC 14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period 29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

DISCUSSION: It is apparent that the enemy considers the use of sapper squads with satchel charges against aviation units as preferable to attacking these units with mortars and rockets. The effects of sapper squad satchel charges attacks have been more serious than mortar attacks when considered on a "per attack" basis. On two occasions in recent months satchel charges have been placed in aircraft in DS company maintenance areas.

LESSONS LEARNED: The shortage of aircraft makes it imperative that they be provided a majority of the protective units available at a given installations. Strengthening outer defensive perimeters is apparently only partially successful. An additional measure to protect aircraft is being considered by 17th CAG for application of an inner passive perimeter around the entire aircraft parking area. This inner perimeter would be comprised of concertina wire, mines, and trip flares, where feasible. Perimeter type lights could be used with discrimination to light the parking ramps themselves as discussed previously.

RECOMMENDATION: That the inner perimeter around aircraft parking ramps be considered for use by all aviation operating companies and direct and general support maintenance units.

d. Medical.

ITEM: Dispatch of ambulances.

DISCUSSION: Ambulances are dispatched from the unit dispensary to evacuate injured personnel from areas within the compound. Patients are brought to the dispensary for treatment and preparation for further evacuation by helicopter if necessary. Patients requiring further evacuation are transported to the helipad by ground ambulance. After loading patients on the aircraft, ambulance and crew return to the dispensary for further orders.

LESSONS LEARNED: It was found that more efficient use could be made of ground ambulance by the installation of mobile radios. Communication with the dispensary could be maintained eliminating unnecessary return trips to the dispensary for further orders. Furthermore, as additional evacuation missions were required, the nearest ambulance could be dispatched via radio to expedite evacuation of wounded personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in situations where unit dispensaries are required to furnish emergency care that the dispensary and its evacuation
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Special Operations Report and Lessons Learned for the Period
29 Jan to 2 Feb 68.

vehicles be equipped with radios.

BILL G SMITH
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
SUBJECT: Conservation of the T53L-11 & 13 Engines

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The consumption of UH-1 helicopter engines has exceeded the programmed engine support for the last two months. Our asset position is marginal and prompt action must be taken to reduce high consumption rates. These excessive rates result from high engine time, wear and damage from ingestion of dust and foreign objects, and inadequate inspection and maintenance.

2. Unless engine time is reduced, it will become necessary to ration flying hours. This requires the elimination of unproductive engine time, such as orbiting of lift flights resulting from poor and/or incomplete planning, unnecessary C&C aircraft on an operation, alert aircraft with engines running for prolonged time, unnecessary use of helicopters for resupply missions. One commander has almost eliminated tactical emergency requests for supply missions by requiring subordinate commanders who declare a tactical emergency to explain the reason in detail to him the following day.

3. The second major problem area is wear and damage to engines caused by ingestion of dust and foreign objects. Wherever possible, those areas used in helicopter operations must be prepared and maintained so as to minimize engine damage. In the field environment, this is the responsibility of the supported commanders. In more permanent areas, the installation commander/coordinator is responsible. Aviation unit commanders must ensure that their aviators use prepared landing areas wherever tactically feasible. Commanders must plan for and habitually use pesticide or landing area membrane when required to control dust and foreign objects on helipads and landing areas.
4. The third major problem area that results in high engine consumption rates is insufficient time available for thorough inspection and maintenance. Aviation units should be given the maximum daylight time at their home base for maintenance consistent with the demands for tactical employment. Some commands have required supporting aircraft to arrive at pickup points by daylight, remain alert at pickup point for several hours before being employed, fly troop lifts during daylight hours, remain and fly supply missions after dark and return to their home base after dark. In these cases, supported units are compensating for their lack of planning with the speed and flexibility of helicopters. Planning must begin the night before and be completed before the aircraft are requested or at least before the aircraft arrive for pickup. To insure adequate planning and proper utilization, commanders should set a time limit on holding aviation units. Units should be required to launch their operation within fifteen minutes after aircraft reporting time unless an unexpected change has taken place in the tactical situation. Unless aviation units are given more daylight time at their home base, aircraft availability will continue to decline.

5. Where the Time Between Overhaul (TBO) for removal of the T53L-11 is 1,200 hours and 600 for the T53L-13, our experience in RVN is 685 hours and 390 hours respectively. Thus we are realizing approximately one half of the design time on these engines and losing an important part of our combat capability.

6. Every responsible commander must carefully plan helicopter use. Such use must be valid and essential, and resorted to only if the mission can be accomplished by no other means. Necessary time for proper maintenance must be programmed and provided. Clean and dust-free landing areas must be prepared and maintained.

7. Please give your personal attention to this matter and inform me by 1 May of measures taken to conserve these engines and results achieved.

S/Bruce Palmer Jr.
BRUCE PALMER, JR.
Lieutenant General
Deputy Commanding General

DISTRIBUTION:
D

A TRUE COPY

ROBERT R. LOVELY
Captain, AGC
Adjutant
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FROM: CG I FFORCE V NHA
TO: CG 4TH INF DIV PKU

B-2005

CG 173D ABN EDE EGH
CG I FFORCE ARMY NHA (COURIER)
DSA II CORPS PKU
CO 17TH CAG NHA (COURIER)
CO 3/506TH ABN PNT (COURIER)
CO 54TH SIG BN NHA (COURIER)

INFO:
COMUSMACV SGN (COURIER)
CG USARV LSN (COURIER)
CG ROKFV FC NHA (COURIER)
CG 1ST AVN EDE LBN (COURIER)
CG 1ST LOG CHD LBN (COURIER)
CO 18TH ENGR BDE DET (COURIER)
CO CRESC CRB (COURIER)
CO QNFC QBN (COURIER)
CO 5TH SPGA NHA (COURIER)
CO 16TH MP GP NHA (COURIER)
CO 21ST SIG GP NHA (COURIER)

DISTRIBUTION:

B-2005 CG 173D ABN EDE EGH
CG I FFORCE ARMY NHA (COURIER)
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CO 18TH ENGR BDE DET (COURIER)
CO CRESC CRB (COURIER)
CO QNFC QBN (COURIER)
CO 5TH SPGA NHA (COURIER)
CO 16TH MP GP NHA (COURIER)
CO 21ST SIG GP NHA (COURIER)

B-2005

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCEPT ROKS

B

INTERNAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR

TRUE COPY:
EXCEPT ROKS
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
a. Tactics: In order to reduce combat losses, aviation unit commanders in conjunction with the supported ground combat commanders will continually review and evaluate tactical procedures and techniques with the view toward improving the effectiveness of combat operations and reducing the aircraft combat damage and loss ratio. Particular attention will be given to adequate prior planning to insure proper route and altitude selection, flight formations, landing sequences and the effective utilization of suppressive and supporting fires. Additionally, each unit which builds a landing pad in an LZ or other area will designate an officer or senior NCO as the Safety Officer. He will be responsible for the removal of trees, brush, loose objects and other things which present a danger of safe helicopter operations.

b. Aviation Safety and Training: Well planned and supervised aviation training is the single most effective deterrent to aviation accidents. Accordingly, all units having organic aviation will maintain a training program covering those aspects which are critical to their area and include rotary wing instrument training, confined area operations at high density altitudes, area weather patterns and emergency procedures.

c. Conservation of Engines: This program is divided into two parts:

AVFA-AV 5 8 EXCEPT ROKS EP

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOB DIR 5200,10

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
(1) Part I - Maintenance: Foreign object damage (FOD) is the cause of approximately 50% of the turbine engine failures in Vietnam. FOD includes dust, sand, rocks, stray pieces of metal, ponchos, sandbags, tools and other assorted items ingested by the engine. A significant increase in engine life will result from combined actions taken by aviation unit commanders, maintenance personnel, airfield operators, and supported units. More emphasis must be placed on dust suppression, crew inspections, adequate time for maintenance and improved maintenance supervision. Aviation commanders will conduct unannounced engine inspections and institute FOD control procedures in their units. Except for combat emergencies, aircraft will be released in time for ground crews to inspect the aircraft during daylight hours, usually 1700 hours.

(2) Part II - Reduction of Flying Hours: A 30% reduction in flying hours on UH-1D/H helicopters is expected. This can be accomplished by eliminating all missions in the "nice to have" category, utilizing fixed wing aircraft, Air Force aircraft, scheduled couriers and other means of transportation, to include maximum utilization of ground LOCs. In addition, aircraft operating away from their home base require necessary maintenance crews and material on site so that unproductive return trips to the home base can be reduced. Supported units are responsible to build AVFA-AV 6 8 EXCEPT ROES
revetments for aircraft remaining overnight. Consolidation of flights not directly supporting active combat operations will be scheduled and coordinated by Movement Control Centers to insure maximum efficient utilization of aircraft. The 17th CAG is directed to establish area Movement Control Centers in conjunction with major subordinate and supported commands for this purpose. The 17th DAG will submit to this headquarters for approval, a detailed plan establishing Movement Control Centers and appropriate operational procedure by 1 May 68. Sling loading is the preferred method for delivery of supplies by UH-1 as well as by CH47. The reduction in engine time and vulnerability in fire bases utilizing sling loads is apparent. Adequate prior planning is the key to reducing flying hours for all users of Army aircraft.

3. (C-NF) The procedures outlined above must be implemented upon receipt as should the suggestions contained in the reference letter. Additional suggestions and lessons learned which would increase the effectiveness of this program should be sent to this headquarters. The 30% reduction in flight time combined with nonoperational aircraft should permit each aviation commander to schedule at least one 24 hour period of maintenance per week for each aircraft and crew exclusive of nonscheduled maintenance.
4. (C-NF) After a 30 day trial period of the above program to test various concepts and effectiveness, an I FFORCEV regulation will be published.

GP 4
CONFIDENTIAL

CG I FFORCEV NHQ

OIC MACV PRES SF CAP (COURIER)
OIC MACV PRES SF QM (COURIER)
SP LO ROK V FC NHQ (COURIER)
SP LO CAP ROK INF DIV NHQ (COURIER)
SP LO 9TH ROK INF DIV NHQ (COURIER)
I FFORCEV LO TO MACV SGN (COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL (NOFORN EXCEPT ROKS) B-2006

FEES SENDS: MACV FOR MACOs; USARV FOR AVHAV-OPT

SUBJ: I FFORCEV AVIATION PROGRAM TO CONSERVE ARMY AVIATION RESOURCES (U)

REF: Letter, HQ USARV, Subj: Conservation of the T53-11 & 13 Engines, dated 4 Apr 68 (U)(NOTAL)

1. (C-NF) The predicted engine shortages identified in the reference letter could have a serious impact on future combat operations of this command. The engine shortage combined with the increasing helicopter attrition rate, current helicopter shortage and lack of replacements, plus the abnormally high engine consumption has created a problem which requires immediate corrective action at all levels of command. To overcome this problem and insure that adequate effective tactical mobility is available, the following Aviation Program is instituted.

2. (C-NF) This Aviation Program is subdivided into three areas:

AVFA-AV

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR 1 TRIALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
SUBJECT: Support Requirement for 17th Combat Aviation Group

1. Problem:
   To determine the adequacy of the internal 17th CAG Logistical Support Organization, (minus aviation supply and maintenance support) and to recommend improvements wherever required.

2. Assumptions:
   a. The present size and mission of the 17th CAG will not drastically change until cessation of hostilities.
   b. The 1st Logistical Command and its subordinate elements will continue to provide wholesale supply and transport support for the units of 17th CAG.
   c. 17th CAG unit commanders will continue to function as installation coordinators for those base camps that are predominately occupied by Group units.

3. Facts bearing on the problem:
   a. The responsibilities for the control and operation of all installation facilities and services is incumbent upon the senior commander of the 17th CAG unit assigned to each base camp.
   b. The majority of personnel required for the control and operation of base camp facilities are not authorized by TC&E.
   c. The nature of aviation requires operation from a fixed base, while the mission of aviation requires the establishment of forward, mobile, tactical bases.

4. Discussion:
   a. The units of the 17th CAG man and operate ten (10) base airfields. In addition, 17th CAG units are tenants at two (2) other airfields (Tab "A"). The 17th CAG unit commanders must function as installation commanders for those base camps that are predominately occupied by Group units, and are responsible for the control and operation of all base camp facilities and services (Tab "B").
(1) At the present time the assigned personnel strength of the 17th CAG is equivalent to an Infantry Brigade (Tab "C"). The resupply requirements fall directly upon the unit commanders. The transportation requirements by class supply, together with distances from supply points to the base camps is contained in Tab "D".

(2) The locations of the base airfields make them ideal for use as staging areas. Because of their strategic position, aviation and ground elements will use these facilities for resupply and other logistical services. The command relationship policy of the 17th CAG (Tab "E") requires that the battalion commander assume logistical and administrative responsibility for transient aircraft and units operating within the battalion's AO.

b. The majority of the personnel required to plan, control and operate the base camp facilities and services are not authorized by either TO&E or TD. Those personnel who are authorized, such as POL handlers or truck drivers, are in grade structures and numbers less than those required to perform the necessary duties under combat conditions. Therefore, other personnel must be withdrawn from unit resources, creating a constant decimation of the unit's effectiveness to perform its primary mission.

c. The effective performance of aircraft maintenance to meet the high mission ready availability requirements necessitates the operation of aviation units from fixed bases. At the same time, tactical requirements frequently necessitate the establishment of one or more forward bases of operation. The additional requirements of providing transportation, resupply and other necessary services to one or more forward tactical bases as well as the base camps tasks the units of this command to the limit.

(1) Because of the tactical employment of the helicopter company, the unit commander must have the capability to move all classes of supplies and medical support to his forward operating base and still be able to operate his base camp facilities. This creates a void in three areas, viz., transportation, POL servicing equipment and personnel.

(a) An aviation unit has a very limited number of organic vehicles, thus restricting its capability to resupply itself. This is especially true since most units must make long line hauls for most classes of supplies. The majority of a unit's vehicles are committed to the daily requirements within the base camp. The classes of supplies available at the forward support element (FSE) is dependent on the size of the tactical unit being supported by the FSE. In most cases the transportation of fuel, the loan of fuel servicing equipment and the loan of POL handling personnel whenever required. The retail delivery of fuel to the company's forward area is not a mission of the 1st Log Command. However, without this support, the aviation unit would not be able to resupply its...
base camp and forward elements. Support of this nature is on a non-programmed basis, and is therefore, not responsive to the commander's needs. A detailed discussion of the problems encountered in providing logistical support for base camps and tactical sites is shown in Tab "G".

(b) There is a continuous problem of obtaining and maintaining POL servicing equipment. This equipment is either not authorized or not available to the unit when it is required. Operating a Class IIIA refueling point is dependent in many cases on equipment which must be borrowed from 1st Log Command units or other aviation units. The aviation company is authorized six (6) 2½ ton tankers and the "Miniport System" consisting of 6 each 100 GPM pumps. (USARPAC authorization for 100 GPM pumps is 11.) Under normal operating conditions the equipment available for short haul transportation and operation of a unit size POL point is adequate (Tab "H"). However, the equipment or personnel available are not adequate to meet the demands of operating simultaneously over vast distances from several tactical sites. To provide immediate response to the tactical support requirement, additional equipment must be expeditiously made available to the unit commander. The equipment required and a discussion of the POL problem is shown in Tab "J" and Tab "K".

(c) The spreading of a unit's assets over vast territories automatically necessitates spreading the unit's personnel over the same area. An aviation unit does not have adequate personnel to operate refueling points, ASP'S and helicopter rearming points at both the base camp and the forward tactical sites.

(2) Medical support for the 17th CAG presently consists of 5 organic medical sections and 9 attached medical units. The present concept is to attach a medical detachment to an aviation company. This concept allows for support of the base camp and forward operating areas without interruption of the medical service. A detailed evaluation of the medical support concept is shown in Tab "F".

5. Conclusions:

a. That all aviation units operating in a battalion AO are dependent on the 17th CAG for logistical support.

b. That adequate equipment and personnel are not authorized or available within aviation units to support the base airfields and the tactical sites.

c. That the majority of the group's units must make long line hauls for most classes of supplies.

d. That the 1st Log Command is filling the transportation void between the aviation units and the supply points.

e. That the 1st Log Command is filling the POL void created when units operate from forward tactical sites.
f. That the support provided by the 1st Log Command is non-programmed, and as such, is not responsive to the immediate needs of the commander.

g. That the current medical support plan is adequate, however, the wide dispersion of medical units and troop density is such that an organic medical unit HQ is required to provide administrative and mission peculiar logistical support for organic medical units.

h. That additional personnel and equipment over TO&E authorizations are required to meet transportation, resupply and POL servicing requirements.

6. Recommendations:

a. That this study be favorably considered.

b. That the basic concept of the Aviation Group Support Battalion be approved.

c. That the recommended battalion be established on a provisional basis for test and evaluation in the Republic of Vietnam.
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XXX - 4th Inf Div has majority of responsibility for this base camp.
7/17th is responsible for their own area.
FACILITIES AND SERVICES REQUIRED FOR THE OPERATION OF BASE CAMPS

1. 17th CAG unit commanders acting as installation commanders must fulfill the following requirements:

   a. Supervision of base development for all facilities to include elements which are tenant units and are not attached to the 17th CAG.

   b. Operation of all post facilities to include exchanges, concessions, open messes, and clubs. (6 em)

   c. Provision or augmentation of fire fighting units to include personnel and equipment. (6 em)

   d. Operation of refueling points for all equipment to include transient aircraft. (5 em)

   e. Stockage and maintenance of ammunition supply points and helicopter rearming points for any element operation within the unit's area of operation. (3 em)

   f. Development and conduct of physical security to include limited light infantry in the form of reaction forces and perimeter patrols. (60 em)

   g. Aero-medical service support.

   h. Operation and maintenance of central communications center, to include switchboards, teletype, radio and land lines.

2. Average number of personnel above TO&E authorization required to operate these facilities at each base camp is approximately one hundred and four (104) enlisted men.
### Personnel and Aircraft Distribution

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**Tenant Personnel** 3,000

*Authorized

**Based on medical records maintained in the 17th CAG attached medical units.

***Air Force aircraft and personnel not included in totals.

****4th Inf Div has majority of responsibility for the base camp. 7/17th Cav is responsibility for their own area.
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Tab "D" 63

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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</table>
SUBJECT: Command Relationships of Aviation Units to Ground Combat Units and Other Aviation Units

1. The purpose of this letter is to establish policy concerning the command relationships of aviation units to ground combat units and other aviation units within the 17th Group. Frequently an aviation unit will be given a mission that removes it from the control of its parent organization or moves it to an area where the parent organization cannot effectively control and support it. When this happens, the unit will be placed under the control of another aviation unit capable of providing the necessary control and support.

2. The following terms from the 1st Avn Bde Opns Manual are presented and discussed to insure common understanding.

   a. Assignment. (AR 320-5 Apr 65) Assignment is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent. An aviation unit will be assigned to an organization only when the relationship is to be permanent or relatively permanent. Units will not be reassigned for short periods of time.

   b. Attachment. Attached units are bound temporarily to a command other than their assigned command. When a unit is attached to another unit, the commander to whom the attachment is made then commands the attached unit. Because of the specialized nature of logistical and supervisory support associated with aviation operations, aviation units normally will be attached to other aviation units and placed in support of ground combat units.

      (1) Within the Group, when resources are drawn from several units to support a single mission, one unit will be charged with the mission and all other elements will be attached to that unit.

      (2) The attachment order will specify any restrictions or limitations in the attachment as well as special instruction deemed necessary.
a. Operational Control (OPCON). Operational control places units under a commander for assignment of tasks and authoritative direction to accomplish the mission. Operational control does not include responsibility or authority for administration, logistic, discipline, internal organization or training. An aviation unit may be placed under the operational control of a headquarters when the controlling headquarters desires to have the same degree of control as with attachment but does not wish to assume responsibility for logistical and administrative functions of the aviation unit. In addition, by retaining operational control, the controlling headquarters retains authority to displace the unit and may further place the aviation unit in DS or GS of another unit. Company size aviation units will not normally be placed under operational control of a non-aviation headquarters.

d. Direct Support (DS). Direct support is a mission or task requiring one unit, under command of its parent unit, to support another specific unit. The supporting unit is authorized and required to answer directly the supported unit’s requirement for support. A direct support relationship will be directed between an aviation unit and a ground combat unit when all of the effort of the aviation unit is to be directed to support a ground combat unit and a direct mission request channel is desirable. A common example is a DS mission in support of a brigade by a combat aviation battalion or assault helicopter company.

e. General Support (GS). General support is a mission or task requiring one unit, under command of its parent headquarters, to support more than one specific unit. The supporting unit is authorized and required to answer requests for support according to priorities assigned by higher headquarters. A general support relationship is appropriately used when one aviation unit is to support more than one ground combat unit. Control and priorities for support are retained by the parent unit or a higher headquarters.

3. In normal situations, command relationships will be established in accordance with the following guidelines:

a. Aviation units will be assigned to an organization only when the relationship is to be permanent (i.e., in excess of six months).

b. When an aviation unit or elements thereof is moved from the geographical area of its parent unit for purposes other than reassignment it will be attached to the major aviation command in that area to which it moves or to the aviation unit controlling a given operation.
SUBJECT: Command Relationships of Aviation Units to Ground Combat Units and Other Aviation Units

The attachment order will specify any restrictions or limitations to this attachment as well as special instructions deemed necessary.

c. A mission of direct support will be given to an aviation unit providing support to one specific ground combat unit.

d. A mission of general support will be given to an aviation unit when it is required to provide support to more than one ground combat unit.

e. Company size aviation units will not normally be placed under the operational control of a non-aviation headquarters.

s/ BILL G. SMITH
t/ BILL G. SMITH
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE COPY
1. There are 5 medical sections organic to the battalion and Squadron headquarters and a Group Surgeon (6 officers and 32 enlisted men). At the end of May 1968 there will be 11 (OA) Medical Detachments attached to units of the 17th Aviation Group (11 officers and 38 enlisted men).

2. The current concept of operations is as follows: the Battalion surgeon with his organic medical section is responsible for recurring medical reports within the battalion and for medical care of the battalion headquarters. The medical detachments are assigned to various aviation companies for an overall ratio of one detachment per three companies. The Squadron medical section supports the Air Cav and ground troops.

3. Several inadequacies in the current concept of operations have been noted, to-wit:
   a. The maximum number of aviation companies that a flight surgeon can adequately handle is two. On the basis of one medical detachment per 3 companies, insufficient slots are available for flight surgeons.
   b. Single companies isolated from the battalion base camp are assigned their own medical detachment. However, it has been found that only 5 enlisted medics are needed in single company operations. Therefore, 3 personnel are not properly utilized.
   c. Medical resupply is often a problem in isolated areas.
   d. Assignment of medical detachments to aviation companies renders them not readily responsive to group-wide needs should contingencies develop.
   e. The Group Surgeon is unable to operate without a staff section.
   f. The (OA) Medical Detachment as a TO&E unit falls short of providing the requirements of aviation medicine.

4. It is deemed possible to obtain better support by establishing aeromedical units within the Aviation Group. This would be done by establishing a medical administrative and service company which would assign one Aeromedical Detachment for every two aviation companies assigned to the group. The present method of attaching does not fully meet the needs of an aviation unit or allow for the needed medical support while conducting combat operations. The present organization...
can be reorganized into 15 Aeromedical Detachments and would result in a decrease of 7 enlisted slots and the increase of 5 officer slots. The increase of officer slots would not require additional personnel as they are presently assigned and required to maintain medical standards.

5. The advantages of a reorganization are listed below:


   b. More authorized flight surgeon slots.

   c. Better supply system thru the use of Transportation Service aircraft.

   d. A reduction in enlisted strength.

   e. More responsive to group-wide needs.

   f. More effective control over personnel replacements and assignments.

   g. Medical Co Hq staff performs functions of Surgeon's staff section.

   h. Group Surgeon has command as well as technical control over medical units.

   i. Aeromedical detachments are placed in GS, DS, or OPCON of battalion or companies as required.

   j. The aeromedical detachment is tailored to meet aviation medical needs in airmobile operations.
### Aviation Battalion Medical Section, personnel

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### Air Cavalry Squadron Medical Section, personnel

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1. The following problems encountered at the Kontum Base Camps and the operating area are repeated at all base camps and forward operating areas to one degree or another.

2. The 57th SFG occupied the Kontum Airfield in October 1967. UNAV designated the 17th CAB as the predominate user when the aviation company became operational.

3. During the period Oct - Dec, large scale combat operations were conducted in the Dak To - Kontum area. Because the units were in support of brigade size units the division support command established Forward Support Elements that were responsive to the logistical support required by the aviation units. The primary support requirements listed below:

a. Transportation of Classes III and IIIA from the supply point located in Pleiku to Kontum.

b. POL storage and pumping facilities capable of supporting a daily consumption of 32,000 gallons.

c. Transportation for all other classes of supplies from the supply point at Pleiku to the units located in Kontum was estimated at six tons a day for the three company operation.

4. During the latter part of December the Brigade size operations were terminated. However, there were continuous company size operations in the area. These operations were based out of Kontum and they required logistical support which was beyond the unit capability. This was caused by the termination of brigade operations resulting in withdrawal of the PB26s. The supply point located at Pleiku required a supply haul of 50 miles with a 24 hour turn around. The aviation company has a limited capability to transport supplies as they are only authorized 5 2½ ton cargo trucks. Without the assistance given by 1st Log Command the supplies could not have been transported. Daily jet fuel consumption is 14,500 gallons and the aviation company only has six 2½ ton tanker trucks.

5. Although the fuel presents a large problem the need is present for flat bed trucks to transport all other supplies. During the months Jan - Mar 1968 a minimum of 5 each S & P's daily were required to transport ammunition, pensions, building material and other supplies to the base camp at Kontum.

6. The logistical support required at the base camps could not be accomplished without the support of the 1st Log Command. However,
they do not always have sufficient vehicles available to support all units. This is particularly true when the aviation units require unit distribution because of their location and distance from the supply points. Because the 1st Log Command is primarily a wholesale distributor the aviation units have experienced difficulty in obtaining unit distribution. The assets are not available nor the supply points close enough for them to make unit pick up.

7. A limited amount of supplies are received and directed to the units of the 17th CAG. These items are primarily command control items and they must be released from the depot which has the item in stock. Usually the items come from a depot other than the servicing depot. The aviation group does not require a platoon to receipt for and distribute II and IV supplies. However, it does require a limited capability to accomplish this requirement. The present procedure is for the SHC to draw the equipment from depot store and issue to the receiving unit. This does not occur daily but is necessary to facilitate supplies.

8. The result is a definite void which cannot be overcome with the present equipment and personnel.
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SUBJECT: 1000 GM KENCO PORTABLE FUEL TRANS. SYSTEMS

1. REQUEST THIS ORGANIZATION BE PROVIDED WITH SIX (6) 1000 GPM KENCO PORTABLE FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEMS, FSN 4320-900-8544, IMMEDIATELY.

2. THESE SYSTEMS WILL BE USED FOR FIELD POL SITES.

3. THE 52ND CAB HAS NO CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUEL PUMPING FACILITIES AT ANY FIELD SITE OR AIRFIELD. ALL AVAILABLE TO&E EQUIPMENT IS PRESENTLY BEING UTILIZED. AN EMERGENCY REQUEST FROM G-4, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION FOR ASSISTANCE IN POL SUPPORT AT DAK TO AIRFIELD COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHOUT ENDANGERING REFUELING CAPABILITIES AT CAMP HOLLOWAY AND KONTUM ARMY AIRFIELDS. THIS HAS RESULTED IN EIGHTEEN (18) BATTALION AIRCRAFT BEING GROUNDED AT DAK TO FOR LACK OF FUEL CREATING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION.

4. INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS REQUEST: PUMPS AUTH 66-ON HAND 35.

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1. (C) All attempts to date at providing fuel storage and dispensing equipment satisfactory to the complete spectrum of air mobile operations have fallen far short of the mark. As a result critical combat operations hinge precariously on the ability of those responsible for logistical support to fabricate, with equipment borrowed from a multitude of sources, those necessary remote area refueling facilities. As an example, a recent combat assault executed by this battalion required the dispensing of more than 65,000 gallons of JP-4 during an 8 hour period from four separate refueling sites. In order to accomplish this it was required to borrow 2 each 350 GPM pumps and filter separators, and 5 each 10,000 gallon collapsible bladders, with accompanying hoses and hardware. The POL equipment which could be freed from support of the base area was used to augment and thereby provide the required 26 separate refueling points (nozzles). The available TOE equipment (miniport system) was clearly inadequate for the above requirement, even if all equipment within the battalion had been available for use. In actuality, much of the battalion miniport equipment is continually tied down in support of base airfields and cannot be used for its intended purpose, the support of combat operations in the field. It should be pointed out here that Commanding General USARV is responsible for providing and operating base camp common user petroleum storage and distribution systems, (USARV Reg No. 701-5). At the present time, however, TOE equipment is the only means available to satisfy this requirement at a majority of our base camp locations. On the other hand, the above operation would have been impossible except for the support provided by 1st Log Command, specifically in the loan of necessary equipment. Their interest and assistance has far exceeded that required by regulation or directive.

2. (C) Concerning the air logistics miniport system which was introduced into the Republic of Vietnam in May 1966, the following observations can be stated:

a. This system affords a refueling rate which is unsatisfactory for aircraft engaged in a combat assault.

b. Refueling a Chinook on the same system as a UH-1 helicopter makes the problem more profound, in that the refueling time for the CH-47 is such that it is almost necessary to shut the aircraft down in order for the fueling system to catch up. The fueling rate of the miniport system is only one third of what it should be. The storage capacity is inadequate as well, (2000 gals).

c. The 180 day support kit which was introduced with the miniport system has been depleted, and no parts lists has been published. Units are unable to maintain a FLL for the miniport system because of the absence of parts and publications.

Tab "J"
3. (C) This battalion presently operates two each 350 GPM systems and
two each 225 GPM pumps (at base camp). Evaluation of each system follows:

a. 350 GPM Dispensing System:

(1) Supports a 12 points refueling system and can produce a fuel
flow sufficient to refuel UH-1 type aircraft in approximately two minutes
at all 12 points (CH-47 type aircraft in four minutes).

(2) With proper maintenance provides an almost trouble free system.

(3) Emplacement of a 12 point system can be accomplished in less
than two hours.

(4) The system is completely air mobile, and can be moved by one
CH-47 aircraft.

(5) Fuel filtration is possible when filling the bladders, as well
as when servicing aircraft. The filtration unit used with this system
is felt to be the most efficient one available.

(6) Bladders can be refilled without stopping aircraft servicing.

b. 225 GPM Pump

(1) Supports a 4 points refueling system with adequate flow rate.

(2) Filtration of fuel must be provided as a separate function,
either through a 350 GPM separator or through a system containing Go-No-
Go-fuses.

(3) Due to the vintage of those pumps no TM's or parts manuals are
available.

(4) The system was designed for vehicle refueling and is quite
bulky heavy.

4. (C) Recommendations:

a. Provide each Assault Helicopter Company two (2) each 350 GPM
dispensing systems, to include pumps, separators, a total of four (4)
each 10,000 gallon collapsible bladders.

b. Retain the miniport system for remote area operation for platoon
and company size operations, in which function it is completely adequate.

c. Retain six each 100 GPM Kenco pumps as backup for both the above
systems.

5. (U) It is felt that authorized POL personnel are sufficient in numbers
and training to provide the desired service when adequate equipment is
made available.

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SUMMARY OF POL DISPENSING PROBLEMS

1. A general summation of the aircraft refueling problem is as follows:
   a. The equipment is not adequate to conduct base camp operations, and large field operations, when rapid refueling is required.
   b. The additionally authorized 100 GPM pumps still do not give desired capacity where rapid multiple aircraft refueling is required. The 30/40 GPM pumps simply do not stand up under continuous operation and their capacity extremely limits their usage. Further neither type pump was supplied with filter-separator units, and none were available. (Soon after receipt of these pumps, the 100 GPM's were employed on a large operation. Due to an inordinate amount of water in the fuel, the fuel, the Go-No-Go gauges were quickly saturated and replacements were not available).
   c. The so-called "mini-ports", of which seven (7) each were given to 17th Aviation Group some time in 1966, did help somewhat, but maintenance was a problem. (These mini-ports are not basically authorized, but are believed to have come from ACTIV).
   d. Tank trucks are of little use for rapid refueling, or for deployment on field operations.
   e. In order to perform their mission most units have acquired a variety of equipment, some borrowing large pumping units. 1st Log Command has given a big assist in this area putting itself in the "retail" business on several large operations by providing 8 and 12 point refueling set-ups.
   f. All units find the 350 GPM pump units to be most satisfactory when available with sufficient hose and large volume tanks.
   g. The Skid Mounted 225 GPM pumps recently issued, are not equipped with filter-separators, nor are they easily moved.

3. A rather extensive study of this same basic problem was made by ACTIV in 1965, and published in a report in May 1966. They noted, among other things, that having several different types of POL pumps and filter separators resulted in excessive maintenance, safety, and quality control problems. They also recommended that each Helicopter Company be augmented with a KD Team.

4. It is obvious that all units favor the use of the 350 GPM pump because of its capacity, ease of movement, set-up, and use. A small pump with filter-separator would be adequate for back-up reserve and small mission operations. The assignment of a KD Team, at least one per battalion, with its complete FSSP plus additional equipment, would satisfy the high capacity, multi-point, refueling requirements desired by the units both at base camps and in field operations.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

CO, 17th Combat Aviation Group

12 May 1968

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** PAGE #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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