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AGAM-P (H) (22 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682349
5 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Provisional Corps, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

LESSONS LEARNED

(RCS CS FOR-65)(RI)

1 FEBRUARY - 30 APRIL 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96308

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RCS CS FOR-65 (R1).

Deputy Commanding General
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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Section 1 - Operations: Significant Activities
   A. Command
   B. Intelligence and Counterintelligence
   C. Plans, Operations and Training
   D. Personnel and Administration
   E. Logistics
   F. Inspector General
   G. Information
   H. Command History
   I. Aviation
   J. Signal
   K. Engineer
   L. PSYOPS, Civil Affairs

II. Section 2 - Lessons Learned

III. Section 3 - Inclosures
   1. Roster of Key Personnel: Withdrawn, Hq, DA
   2. Troop List of PCV Units
SECTION 1

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
A. COMMAND

1. (U) Historical Background.

a. From the beginning of the 1965 US military buildup of forces in support of the Republic of Vietnam, the vulnerability of the northern provinces was apparent. These provinces comprise the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). The common borders with North Vietnam and Laos serve to shorten the enemy's difficult, but efficient, supply line and make infiltration of North Vietnam Army (NVA) units into South Vietnam comparatively easy.

b. The defense of this portion of South Vietnam was strengthened when the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) was established at Da Nang in May 1965. The Commanding General, III MAF, serves concurrently as Senior Advisor to the I CTZ Commander and as Senior US Military Commander in the northern corps. By mid-1967, US, Vietnamese and Republic of Korea forces were operational in the combat zone. Thus, enemy plans for large scale offensive operations were continuously disrupted throughout the Northern I CTZ (NICTZ) until the latter part of 1967. However, in December of that year a major enemy buildup began which culminated in the attack on Khe Sanh.

c. With the increasing enemy threat in the north, COMUSMACV directed that DCG, USARV, establish a corps headquarters for the northern two provinces of I CTZ. While this action was being taken, the enemy continued to build large forces around Khe Sanh and along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An immediate threat was posed.

d. To quickly influence the tactical situation by (1) judicious employment of supporting arms; (2) timely commitment of forces, particularly his limited reserve forces; and (3) to place sufficient command and control at the critical point to direct and influence the battle, COMUSMACV directed on 25 January 1968, that a Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) forward command post be established. General Creighton W. Abrams was designated as Deputy Commander MACV Forward (DEPCOMUSMACV FWD) with his headquarters to be established in the Hue-Phu Bai area. He was to assume operational control (OPCON) of all US Army and Marine combat forces in I CTZ and to conduct tactical operations to destroy enemy forces in I CTZ. Priority of interest was to be centered in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

e. Headquarters MACV FWD was constituted as a joint staff, functioning similarly to the operational portions of MACV. Headquarters, US Army Vietnam (USARV), 7th US Air Force, and Naval Forces Vietnam (NAVFORV) were tasked to provide personnel with approximately one-half of the officers and enlisted men being furnished by Headquarters MACV. Supporting units included a Headquarters Company, Signal Battalion, Military Police Platoon, Transportation Platoon (Car), Aviation Platoon and an Engineer Repair and Utilities Detachment.
The site selected for this headquarters had been the headquarters of the 3d Marine Division. The division was deploying its headquarters to Dong Ha and only the rear element, some 800 men, remained at Phu Bai. The 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-RAY was also housed on the site.

On 28 January 1968 instructions were issued to Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, CG I Field Force Vietnam (I FFV) to prepare a contingency plan for constitution of a provisional corps headquarters to move to I CTZ and assume OPCON of designated US Army units. Upon implementation of the plan, General Rosson would be designated Provisional Corps Commander.

An advance party and a communications element of the 459th Signal Battalion moved to Phu Bai on 29 January. Communications were established between MACV Command Operations Center (COC), Tan Son Nhut, and the FORWARD quartering party that night.

The combined Viet Cong/NVA TET Offensive (29 Jan - 14 Feb) and the Battle of Hue (31 Jan - 25 Feb) over-shadowed the problem involved in establishing the new headquarters. But the fact that MACV FWD was activated, staffed and became operational during this period attests to the flexibility and capability of the staff which had the responsibility for its formation. This staff began functioning on 30 January from an operations center set up in room 2HCQ in MACV Headquarters. Personnel requirements were determined, principal appointments effected and activation instructions issued within one week after the decision was made to establish the headquarters.

Staff personnel and support units began arriving in Phu Bai during the first week of February. General Abrams arrived at the command post in Phu Bai on 13 February and assumed OPCON of all US Forces in I CTZ, less 7th Air Force units, on 15 February.

Following the Battle of Hue the decision was made to convert MACV FWD to a provisional corps as planned. General Rosson was designated as Commanding General and PCV, upon activation, placed under OPCON of III MAF. General Rosson was authorized direct coordination with Army of Vietnam (ARVN) forces within his area of responsibility.

On 10 March 1968, PCV became operational at Phu Bai. The Corps then assumed OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (-) with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division under its OPCON and Task Force Clearwater.

2. (U) Key Commanders and staff. (See inclosure 1).

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (U) G2 Organization. Organization of the G2 section is standard for
a Corps headquarters, to include augmentation of the G2 staff by specialists from the Military Intelligence (MI) detachment. The detachment commander has the dual function of Chief, Intelligence Division.

2. (C) Available Intelligence and Intelligence Planning. On 10 March 1968, concurrent with the activation of PCV, planning was begun for Operation PEGASUS (the relief of Khe Sanh). Information available on the enemy in that area was collated, analyzed and developed into intelligence. Little was known of other portions of the PCV area of responsibility, the A Shau Valley, Highway 547, Base Areas 101 and 114, and the coastal plain. Accordingly, studies were requested of the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) and begun on our own. In the planning for PEGASUS and later for Operation DELAWARE (a reconnaissance-in-force of the A Shau Valley), the majority of the collateral intelligence was based on aerial and ground reconnaissance and on the reported results of tactical air strikes. No unit identifications in the A Shau Valley were available through collateral sources. Estimates were made as to what types of units were present, based on the types of activity noted. Anti-aircraft emplacements, road construction, communication facilities and heavy vehicular traffic all pointed to the presence of air defense, engineer, signal and transportation units. Initially, unit identifications were possible south of the DMZ, in the coastal plain and in the piedmont area where contacts with the enemy were more frequent.

3. (C) Terrain.

a. There are three distinct types of terrain in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. These areas are the coast and coastal plain, piedmont, and the mountain region.

b. The coast and coastal plain is composed of sandy areas from the coast to approximately 4 kilometers inland. The rest of the coastal plain is composed of rice paddy areas. Cross-country movement is fair to unsuited for all types of movement and conditions for infiltration are good throughout the whole area.

c. The piedmont area is composed of gently rolling hills which are covered with brushwood and light undergrowth forest. Cross-country movement is fair to good in this area. The infiltration routes are through the valleys, following rivers, roads and trails through the area.

d. The mountain area is composed of rugged mountains covered with multi-canopied, dense undergrowth forest except in the river valleys where the vegetation is brushwood in some areas. Cross-country movement is poor in most of this area with the exception of some of the valleys and along the rivers, roads and trails of the area.
4. (c) Enemy Situation.

a. At the time PCV was activated, the enemy in the Corps zone was poised for attack against and positioned to place pressure on Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) and Hue. Enemy activity indicated a containment and harassment strategy. Major offensive operations were not initiated by the enemy; however, attacks by fire continued. Attacks along the Cua Viet River were sustained, indicating the enemy's keen interest in interfering with resupply activities on this waterway. The intensity of attacks by fire on KSCB began to decrease and ground probes were not as persistent as in the past. Ground fire on aircraft continued. The situation around Hue remained static. As of 23 March the enemy retained the capabilities of conducting attacks by fire and ground probes on KSCB, and commencing Phase II of the offensive on the Hue-Phu Bai area.

b. Enemy activity through the end of March remained at a low level as he continued his strategy of containment and harassment and his activities of regrouping and resupply. An attempt was made, however, to interdict shipping on the Perfume River. A significant decline in the number of attacks by fire on KSCB was noted. Elsewhere, the enemy appeared to be building up his forces in the Hue area and in the A Shau Valley where numerous storage depots and defenses were detected.

c. During the first part of April there were several intense, but sporadic contacts in the vicinity of KSCB as a result of Operation PEGASUS and in northeastern Quang Tri Province due to Operation KILO. Enemy activity throughout the rest of the Corps zone was generally limited to harassing attacks by fire. He appeared to be avoiding contact while withdrawing to relatively secure areas in order to resupply, train and reconstitute his forces. Only small unit contacts, standoff and sniper attacks were reported around Hue. Aerial reconnaissance continued to detect anti-aircraft positions and truck parks throughout the A Shau Valley. The disposition of units near Quang Tri City combined with fairly large contacts in the area and agent and reconnaissance reports of enemy armor in the Ba Long Valley all indicated a growing threat to that city. The enemy was capable by mid-April of applying pressure on and attacking Quang Tri City and the Hue-Phu Bai area.

d. Enemy-initiated activity through the end of April remained at a low level. Agent reports continued to indicate the imminence of a second offensive in the eastern part of the Corps zone against major cities and allied installations. Enemy units appeared poised for such an offensive, whose delay was possibly due to political rather than tactical considerations. The successful completion of Operation PEGASUS relieved the pressure on KSCB while friendly forces in the A Shau Valley met with light resistance. There the enemy refrained from any sustained contact while conducting a hurried withdrawal from the Valley. Enemy activity around Quang Tri City remained light as agent reports indicated an enemy buildup in Base Area 101 for a future
offensive on the city. Enemy-initiated activity in the Hue area continued to be light and generally restricted to small unit contacts. At the end of April the enemy still posed a definite threat to Quang Tri City and to the Hue-Phu Bai area.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) COMUSMACV was present in Phu Bai on 10 March 1968, both for the activation of FUC and for the purpose of being briefed on operations planned for NICTZ. Three courses of action were presented to him.

a. Conduct operations to secure the Cua Viet logistics complex and to destroy elements of the 320th and 324th NVA Divisions, in the northeast portion of NICTZ. CG, 3d Marine Division would control a combined force of US Army, Marine Corps and ARVN units, with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) making the main effort from the Cua Viet River north to the DMZ (NAPOLEON/SALINE AO). Following this attack, the concept called for an assault in the vicinity of Khe Sanh to relieve that base and to destroy the 304th and 325th NVA Divisions.

b. Relief of Khe Sanh. The concept of operations called for an air-mobile assault by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at landing zones (LZ's) northeast and southeast of KSCB. Concurrently, a Marine Corps regiment was to conduct a ground attack from the vicinity of Ca Lu astride Route 9 to KSCB and an ARVN Ranger Task Force was to attack KSCB from Thon Son Lam, northeast to the base. After the base had been relieved all US and ARVN forces would take part in an assault west toward the Laotian border to destroy the two NVA divisions.

c. Assault into the A Shau Valley. Again, in this third course of action, the employment of a combined force was planned; the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the 101st Airborne Division and a three battalion ARVN airborne task force. According to the plan this assault was to follow the relief of Khe Sanh and was to be completed before the end of May when bad weather conditions in the Valley would hamper air-mobile operations. It would be conducted in two phases: Phase I, an assault overland astride Route 547 to an area west of Fire Support Base (FSB) Bastogne (then FSB Cumberland); Phase II, an air-mobile assault into Ta Bat and A Luoi. Phase II was to commence NIT 15 April because of the weather consideration.

2. (U) The relief of Khe Sanh (Operation PEGASUS) was selected by COMUSMACV as the most critical requirement, to be followed by a reconnaissance-in-force into the A Shau Valley to be known as Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

3. (C) While detailed planning continued for Operation PEGASUS, heavy B52 and close air support strikes helped to relieve the enemy pressure in Khe Sanh. From 10 March until the successful relief of the base on 15 April, 478 B52 sorties and 1260 tactical aircraft sorties pounded the communists. It is
unlikely that we shall ever know the true extent of destruction and demoralization achieved by these precision air attacks but there can be no doubt that the Air Force was the prime killer at Khe Sanh and that the measured violence of these attacks saved many American lives both during the defense and during the subsequent advance of the relief column.

4. (C) Before proceeding to an account of Operation PEGASUS, this report covers operations in progress at the time PCV was activated which continued at least until 31 March. The primary object of all these operations was to secure friendly lines of communication and supply in the coastal plain in order to permit a rapid buildup of friendly logistical bases so that PEGASUS could be launched and supported.

a. Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE. Three battalions of the 3d Marine Division were committed to the security of the Cua Viet River LOC in northeastern Quang Tri Province. Through 31 March, US losses were 172 KIA and 1007 WIA (708 evacuated). Enemy losses were 1079 KIA, 234 detainees, 182 individual weapons and 95 crew-served weapons captured. This operation was still in progress as April began.

b. Operation KENTUCKY. Four battalions of the 3d Marine Division conducted search and destroy operations in the piedmont area of northern Quang Tri Province. As of the end of March, US losses were 227 KIA and 1392 WIA (998 evacuated). Enemy losses were 1543 KIA, 314 detainees, 173 individual and 57 crew-served weapons captured. This operation continued in the month of April.

c. Operation LANCASTER II. The 4th Marine Regiment with three battalions conducted search and destroy operations in northern central Quang Tri Province in the jungle along the DMZ. Through 31 March, US losses were 101 KIA and 598 WIA (432 evacuated). Enemy losses were 312 KIA, 32 detainees, 102 individual weapons and 26 crew-served weapons captured. LANCASTER II also continued into the month of April.

d. Operation SCOTLAND. The 26th Marine Regiment, with four battalions, conducted search and destroy operations in western Quang Tri Province, in and around Khe Sanh. This operation terminated on 31 March as the 26th Marine Regiment passed to OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) for Operation PEGASUS. SCOTLAND, which had commenced on 1 November 1967, resulted in US losses of 204 KIA and 1622 WIA (645 evacuated); and enemy losses of 1561 KIA, 41 detainees, 9 PW's, 112 individual and 66 crew-served weapons captured.

e. Operation JEB STUART. 1st Cavalry Division (AM) had been conducting search and destroy operations in southern Quang Tri Province and in Thua Thien Province since 22 January 1968. When this operation was terminated on 31 March, to commence PEGASUS, US losses totaled 291 KIA, 1735 WIA and 24 MIA; 26 aircraft had been lost. Enemy losses inflicted by the airmobile division were 3268 KIA, 119 detainees, 585 individual weapons and 148 crew-served weapons.
captured. In addition, 1314 mines, 76,837 rounds of small arms ammunition, 2996 rounds of mortar and rocket ammunition, and 890 tons of salt and rice were captured.

f. 101st Airborne Division (-)(Reinforced). 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was attached to 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at the time PCV was activated; on 27 March, the 101st Airborne Division's main CP opened at Camp Eagle. The division's rear remained at Bien Hoa. The division's 3d Brigade remained in III CTZ, OPCON to II FFV, while the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, which had been hastily deployed from CONUS in late February 1968, was attached to the 101st Airborne Division when the latter arrived for operations in NICTZ.

5. (C) Operation PEGASUS.

a. On 12 March 1968, CG III MAF, directed initiation of construction of a C123-capable airstrip at Ca Lu to provide the necessary forward logistical base to support Operation PEGASUS. CG 3d Marine Division was directed to provide security of movement of engineer equipment along Route 9 from Dong Ha to Ca Lu. The 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion #5 were to assist the 8th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 1st Cavalry Division (AM), to perform this task. The strip was to be capable of receiving C123 aircraft at a later date. CG III MAF later changed construction start date to 22 March. An additional combat engineer battalion was requested and received by PCV to assist in the opening of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. To insure a maximum 10-hour work day to speed construction, CG PCV ordered 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and 3d Marine Division each to furnish one rifle company for security. To deceive the enemy, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) troopers removed their shoulder patches and were airlifted in Marine helicopters.

b. While improving the logistical posture, PCV sought to reinforce the combat forces presently available. On 12 March, CG PCV requested the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (- Troop D), reinforced by a company of the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, be deployed in PCV zone ASAP to be OPCON to PCV with expected arrival of 19 and 23 March. 3/5th Cavalry was initially placed OPCON to the 3d Marine Division with Troop A OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. On 15 March, CG PCV requested two Marine battalions from the 1st Marine Division be deployed in the vicinity of Ca Lu and placed OPCON to PCV effective 30 March to be further OPCON to the regiment of the 3d Marine Division in Operation PEGASUS. A third battalion was provided by the 3d Marine Division. CG III MAF approved this action on 16 March. CG PCV also requested on 15 March that CG III MAF obtain approval of CG I CTZ and Vietnamese Government for participation of an ARVN task force in Operation PEGASUS. CG PCV especially asked for three battalions of ARVN airborne division. This request was approved on 21 March with the three battalions to be available 28 March.
c. As Free World Forces prepared for major offensive operations to relieve Khe Sanh, the enemy continued heavy mortar, artillery and rocket shelling of KSCB. Also on 18 March the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion, located at KSCB with the 26th Marines, received a ground attack by an enemy battalion. However, the perimeter was not penetrated and the enemy withdrew leaving 2 KIA.

d. To deceive the enemy as to friendly offensive intentions in the Khe Sanh area as well as to clear the Gio Linh coastal plain from the Cua Viet River north to the DMZ, a combined US-ARVN operation (PCV OPLAN 1-68) was initiated on 29 March in the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO. Task organization was 3/5th Cavalry, C/2/34th Armor, A/1/501st Airborne Infantry and 2/4th Marines under control of 3d Marine Division. ARVN forces were 1/2d Regiment and 3/1st Regiment under the 1st ARVN Infantry Division.

e. Operation PEGASUS commenced at 0800 hours on 31 March 1968 as Operations JEB STUART and SCOTLAND closed. The control headquarters was the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the task organization consisted of all organizations and units of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the 1st Marine Regiment and the 26th Marine Regiment. In coordination with US forces was an ARVN task force of three Airborne Battalions.

f. On 1 April 1968 the 2/1st and 2/3d Marines moved to seize Objective One (YD 0144) and Objective Six (YD 9944). No contact was reported. At 1302 hours that day the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) began landing at LZ's, first at LZ Mike (XD 9341) and later at LZ Cates (XD 9344). During the afternoon all battalions of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) closed in these two LZ's. On 3 April the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) began an air assault into LZ's Tom (XD 9034) and Tim (XD 8836) southeast of KSCB. Later in the day the 1/9th Cavalry developed several significant contacts resulting in 41 enemy KIA.

g. On 4 April the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines attacked out of the KSCB and seized their objective, Hill 471, 2 kilometers south of Khe Sanh, without enemy contact. In the early morning hours of 5 April, an estimated NVA battalion counterattacked the Marine's position. The attack was repulsed; 122 enemy were killed in the two hour fight with only 2 friendly WIA.

h. Also on 4 April, the 1st Brigade began moving from Quang Tri City to LZ Stud for staging then on to LZ Snapper (XD 8434), closing at 1515 hours.

i. On 6 April link-up by the attacking forces of Operation PEGASUS with the Marines inside KSCB was reported imminent. As the operation continued, mass graves were found containing many enemy bodies. Large numbers of enemy weapons continued to be captured indicating that the enemy was at least partially abandoning the Khe Sanh area. Elements of the 325C NVA Division that were around KSCB withdrew by 9 April. There was strong evidence that units
of the 304th NVA Division were widely dispersed and that the enemy had lost
the capability to wage offensive operations in the area. On 10 April, 58
individual and 15 crew-served weapons were found as well as 1084 rounds of
81mm mortar ammunition, 665 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 153 B-40 rock-
ets, 2000 grenades, 50,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 500 lbs of THT and 25
lbs of medical supplies. On 11 April, ground forces and KSCB forces success-
fully linked up with the opening of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.

j. On 13 April the ARVN portion of Operation PEGASUS continued with heavy
contact in the Lang Vei area. The 6th Airborne Battalion lost 11 KIA and 45
WIA while inflicting 25 KIA on the enemy and capturing 2 crew-served weapons.

k. On 14 April, large caches of enemy weapons and ammunition continued
to be found along with 113,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 6700 rounds
of large caliber ammunition and 320 hand grenades. Major elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division (AM) withdrew to prepare for future operations. The Divi-
sion CP and 3d Brigade closed Camp Evans at 0900 hours. The 1st Brigade had
already withdrawn to an area south of Quang Tri and the 37th ARVN Ranger Group
also departed, returning to Da Nang. On 15 April the 3d Marine Division
assumed responsibility for the Operation PEGASUS area of operation. On 16
April all ARVN Airborne Battalions were withdrawn from the Khe Sanh area. Op-
eration PEGASUS was over with the following results:

PEGASUS DECEPTION PLAN (30 Mar - 1 Apr)

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PEGASUS (1 Apr - 15 Apr)

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<td>TOTAL</td>
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CAPTURED: 9527 mines and grenades; 261,760 rounds of small arms ammu-
nition; 12,608 rounds of large caliber ammunition.

6. (C) Operation CARENTAN I and II.

a. Upon its closure in NICTZ, the 101st Airborne Division assumed respon-
sibility for an area of operations along the coastal plain northeast from the
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city of Hue and extending inland to a depth of approximately 15 kilometers on both sides of Route 547. From 10 March to 31 March the division was engaged in Operation CARENTAN I. On 1 April the 101st Airborne Division began Operation CARENTAN II, a search and destroy operation, in this area of operation.

b. In mid-April, the area of operations was extended further inland along Highway 547 to facilitate planned operations by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and ARVN forces in the A Shau Valley. The 2/327th Airborne closed FSB Bastogne, 17 kilometers southwest of Hue. The 1/501st Infantry closed FSB Henry, 14 kilometers southwest of Hue.

c. B52 and tactical air strikes were flown in support of the 101st Airborne Division's operations along Highway 547 and to the west along Highway 547A. The airborne division operated aggressively, day and night, staying away from fire bases for period of three or four days. Each night the companies established hasty defensive positions within mutually supporting distance of each other and put out ambush patrols ranging in size from squad to platoon. This constant harassment of his LOC's and interference with his normal plan of night resupply and freedom of movement cost the enemy dearly. Despite the absence of any large single engagements, the troopers from the 101st wound up the month of April with the following impressive results:

CARENTAN I (10 Mar – 31 Mar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA 87</td>
<td>WIA 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA 676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAPONS CPTR IND/CREW-SVD 159/18

CARENTAN II (1 Apr – 30 Apr)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA 106</td>
<td>WIA 601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA 1166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAPONS CPTR IND/CREW-SVD 226/40

7. (C) 3d Marine Division DMA Operations (1 – 30 Apr). Possible because of the pressure being applied by the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in the Khe Sanh area, contacts with the enemy were relatively few along the DMZ during the month of April. A few notable actions were:

a. Night attack by hostile forces on K/3/3, 9 kilometers southwest of Gio Linh resulted in the temporary penetration of the Marine's perimeter but the enemy was driven out leaving 16 KIA behind. One Marine was wounded.
b. There were standoff attacks by fire on DMZ positions on 9 and 10 April.

c. On 12 April, elements of the 3d Marine Division commenced Operation CHARLTON, an armored sweep. On the first day 32 detainees were taken from a cordoned village for interrogation and classification. The operation continued for five days with light contact.

d. Light contacts on 15 and 17 April east of Dong Ha resulted in 16 enemy KIA; the friendly casualties were 17 KIA and 13 WIA.

e. On 19 April, the NVA sprang an ambush on a convoy of eleven trucks and one tank, killing 9 Marines and wounding 26 others.

f. The 3d Marine Division launched Operation RICE on 21 April, an operation designed to secure the ripening rice and to destroy enemy forces.

g. West of Ca Lu on 21 and 22 April, several sharp clashes resulted in 24 enemy KIA and 21 friendly KIA and 77 WIA.

h. 100mm, 120mm and 152mm artillery fire was received at Con Thien, Cam Lo and Cua Viet on 24 April but friendly protective positions were effective and the totals for the day's operation showed 13 enemy KIA and 5 Marines KIA and 27 WIA.

i. In the heaviest fighting of the month along the DMZ, the Marines killed 72 enemy on 26 April in a battle 2 kilometers west of Con Thien; there were 9 friendly KIA and 17 WIA.

j. On 27 and 28 April, enemy artillery and rockets were again active; 218 and 153 respectively were incoming on friendly positions.

8. (c) Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

a. The carefully planned air assault into the A Shau Valley was preceded by numerous B52 strikes and tactical air missions. As of 30 April, the end of the reporting period, 432 B52 sorties and 937 tactical air sorties had been flown against enemy targets in the Valley. ARA was also called in to engage tanks, anti-aircraft artillery and moving vehicles.

b. Final preparations for DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 were concurrent with the final days of Operation PEGASUS. Westward movement of the 101st Airborne Division units along Highway 547 commenced on 16 April as the last of the ARVN Airborne Divisions units were being withdrawn from the successful lifting of the siege of Khe Sanh to join with the 101st Airborne Division in blocking any attempted escape eastward out of the Valley.
c. Two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and one regiment from the ARVN 1st Infantry Division were ready to conduct the air assault. At 0905 hours on 19 April, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) commenced their airmobile operation. Losses in helicopters were heavy during the first day as enemy anti-aircraft gunners opened intense fire on the aircraft. Only the skill and coolness under fire on the part of the pilots and air crews prevented correspondingly high losses in human lives. As the 3d Brigade was being inserted, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade moved north from the Americal Division area of operations and assumed responsibility for the security of Camp Evans, the sprawling base camp of the airmobile division and the coastal area to the east.

d. By 20 April, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was in the A Shau Valley in strength. Simultaneously, the 101st Airborne Division with the ARVN Airborne Task Force attacked west along Highways 547 and 547A. The 1/327th Airborne landed near the junction of these two routes, encountering only light resistance.

e. On 24 April, as the 3d Brigade in the northern Valley continued to improve its landing zones, the 1st Brigade prepared for commitment in the vicinity of A Luoi, the airfield further south. On 25 April, two battalions of the 1st Brigade were inserted near A Luoi and most elements of the 3d Battalion also closed. Elements of the ARVN Airborne Task Force were landed at LZ Veghel in the vicinity of the junction of Routes 547 and 547A, and commenced to advance westward for a link-up with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) forces. Five enemy vehicles were destroyed and three flat bed trucks, three 37mm guns, 315 rifles, 1 radio, 30 flame throwers, 36 mine detectors and 2000 anti-aircraft rounds were captured. Two Soviet bulldozers had previously been captured. Two CH-47's were shot down with 3 KIA and 7 WIA but ground action was light. The 101st Airborne Division forces encountered two enemy companies along Route 547 and inflicted 22 enemy KIA while sustaining 1 friendly KIA. Later in the day, 38 enemy were KIA with no friendly casualties.

f. On 30 April, at the close of the reporting period, the 1st Cavalry Division continued its buildup in A Shau with 4 bulldozers, 2 roadgraders and 6 155mm howitzers lifted into LZ Stallion at A Luoi. Six enemy trucks were destroyed and in scattered contacts there were 28 enemy KIA with 5 friendly KIA and 15 WIA. Cumulative results of Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 at the close of this period were: Friendly - 74 KIA, 456 WIA; Enemy - 396 KIA, 1 detainee, 566 individual and 28 crew-served weapons captured.

9. (U) Coordination with ARVN. The 1st ARVN Infantry Division enhanced its reputation as a fine fighting division during the reporting period, and showed its continued readiness and willingness to participate in combined operations with US forces. An ARVN Airborne Task Force, previously mentioned, consisting of the 3d, 6th and 8th Airborne Battalions, participated with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operation PEGASUS, and with the 101st Airborne
Division in Operation DELAWARE. The 3d ARVN Regiment, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, and the 2d Battalion of the 1st ARVN Regiment, participated in Operation DELAWARE with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The cooperative spirit and dedication of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division's troops, from Brigadier General Truong to the individual infantry soldier, contributed greatly to the success of these operations.


a. During the period February thru April 1968, COMUSMACV and CG III MAF, in an exchange of messages, examined the feasibility and desirability of the airmobile tactics of the Army Airmobile Cavalry Division being adopted by Marine Corps elements. It was agreed that an exchange of helicopter gunship pilots between the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st Marine Air Wing was desirable to provide the cross training and cross enrichment. It was also agreed that reconnaissance personnel of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions should be exchanged. At the direction of CG III MAF, an exchange training program was coordinated and arranged by this headquarters during this reporting period. The reporting date for the start of cross training is 1 May 1968. Six helicopter gunship pilots from the 1st Marine Air Wing are to commence 30 days TDY with the Airmobile Cavalry Squadron; three helicopter gunship pilots from the Airmobile Cavalry Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) are to commence 30 days TDY with the 1st Marine Air Wing. Three more pilots from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) are to join the program in May. Similarly, a representative number of officers and noncommissioned officers with reconnaissance experience are to be exchanged between the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions.

b. A conference is to be held at Headquarters III MAF upon completion of the period of TDY for training, on or about 15 June 1968. The results and lessons learned from the training and conference will be included in the ORLL for the quarter ending 31 July 1968.

D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) Personnel Administration.

a. Military Personnel Management. During the reporting period a major effort was required to coordinate the replacement of a large number of headquarters personnel due to the conversion of this headquarters from MACV PWD to Provisional Corps Vietnam. Significant numbers of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel were returned to MACV, and replacements arrived. By the close of the reporting period any turbulence created by these moves had settled to acceptable levels.

b. Civilian Personnel Management. This command obtained an authorization for the hire of 30 Vietnamese Nationalists. At the close of the period
twenty-nine had been hired.

2. (U) Discipline, Law and Order. Provost Marshal Activities: All Military Police duty functions within PCV during this period were performed by the Division Military Police Companies, the only exception being the attachment of the 2d Platoon, Company "A", 50th Military Police Battalion (a unit assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade) to PCV for the purpose of securing the Corps Headquarters area. This unit reported for duty 3 February 1968, and was placed under the OPCON of MACV FWD Provost Marshal's Office and then the Provost Marshal. The remainder of Company "A" arrived in the PCV area on 10 April and provides Military Police support to PCV.

3. (U) Religious Activities. The religious program of the command was carried out within the framework of a cross-service arrangement. The local program was implemented in conjunction with Task Force X-Ray, a 1st Marine Division unit. All TOE positions for chaplains and assistants were filled for Headquarters PCV and attached or assigned units. Chaplain coverage throughout the zone was complete.

4. (U) Medical. Operation PESASUS necessitated considerable coordination with the medical resources of each service. Cross-utilization of evacuation and hospitalization means was used when it was in the best interest of patients or provided for the best use of resources.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (U) During the period 25 January to 9 March 1968, the ACoS, J4 Staff Section, MACV FWD, devoted its primary effort towards coordination with higher, lower and adjacent headquarters, compilation of logistics planning factors and support requirements for NICTZ forces and the establishment of a logistical data reporting system.

2. (C) The most significant accomplishment during the report period was the re-establishment of a normal logistics posture for the forces in NICTZ concurrently with the increased enemy activity during the TET Offensive and thereafter. Enemy interdiction of the NICTZ LOC coupled with the significant increase in US force strength, added to the complexity of the support mission. The success of the logistical support mission, attested by the uninterrupted logistical support during the reporting period, was assured due to the combined efforts of this headquarters, the supported divisions and the logistical support activities of all branches of the service. Uninterrupted logistical support was achieved primarily as a direct result of effective LOC security, rehabilitation and upgrading of LOC's and through augmentation of logistical personnel and equipment.

   a. Through the joint efforts of the US Army Engineers, US Navy Seabees and the logistical support troops of the US Army Support Command (USASUPCOM),
Da Nang, an effective logistical over-the-shore operation was established at Thon My Thuy Beach, thereby significantly increasing the daily tonnage capacity of NICTZ.

b. Transportation truck assets of the USASUPCOM and the Force Logistics Command (FLC) were used interchangeably in order to provide an uninterrupted flow of supplies to supported forces.

c. The rehabilitation and creation of LST landing facilities, particularly at Thon My Thuy Beach and the Tan My port complex, significantly increased daily tonnage capabilities within the Corps area.

d. The logistical forces of the USASUPCOM and the FLC were effectively combined in order to provide a cohesive and responsive logistical support system.

3. (c) Convoy Control Center. The MSR in NICTZ became congested due to increased troop buildup and subsequent expansion of port and beach clearance operation. The G4, Transportation Division, PCV, after effecting coordination with the Corps Provost Marshal and a representative of the USARV ACoS G4, G4 Highway Branch, determined that - Corps Convoy Control Center should be established, with highway regulating points and traffic control points distributed within NICTZ. The nucleus of the Convoy Control Center has been established.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL


G. INFORMATION

1. (U) General.

a. A forward element of the MACV Office of Information became operational at Phu Bai in early February as a special staff section of Headquarters, MACV FWD. Concurrent with the conversion of the Forward headquarters to a provisional Army corps headquarters, the Office of Information was redesignated as the PCV Information Division.

b. The first personnel and equipment increments of a provisional Public Information Detachment began arriving in Phu Bai in mid-March. The Public Information Detachment (TDE 45-500E /AE/) was assigned to PCV and has the mission of providing billeting, mess, transportation assistance and operational briefings to members of the press corps. The Public Information Detachment press camp became fully operational in early April.
Photographic Assignment Team "D", 2d Platoon, 221st Signal Company, 160th Signal Group, was provided to PCV Information Officer in mid-March by USARV.

2. (U) Command Information. During this quarter, the following were produced in support of the Command Information program:

a. One fact sheet was published, on the subject of the $200 restriction on money orders and purchases.

b. "Afternoon News Highlights," a topical resume of the day's news as monitored from AFVN, commenced publication in early February. In the short time the news sheet has been in existence the distribution has grown from 50 to 220 as a result of requests for copies from non-Provisional Corps units in the area.

c. A project has been initiated to develop an orientation pamphlet providing guidance to newly assigned personnel.

d. The Information Office prepared a large display board of Viet Cong atrocity photos. The board was viewed by visitors and headquarters personnel while on display.

e. As part of the Command Information program, the PCV Chief of Staff conducted three orientation briefings for newcomers.

f. Photo coverage was given numerous VIP visits to the headquarters.

3. (U) Public Information, during the quarter.

a. A total of 28 home town news releases were processed.

b. A total of three stories and one feature story were released.

H. COMMAND HISTORY

1. (U) The 31st Military History Detachment was activated at Fort Meade, Maryland in February 1968.

2. (U) The 31st Military History Detachment was established as a special staff section, Headquarters PCV, on 31 March 1968 and PCV Regulation 870-1, Historical Activities, was published on 12 April. The first directed historical study (PCV Organization and Activation) was submitted on the same date, and forwarded to the Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.
3. (U) Historical studies in progress at the end of the reporting period were:

a. PCV Historical Study 2-68 (Operation City of Hue).

b. PCV Historical Study 3-68 (Operation PEGASUS).

I. AVIATION

1. (U) The Aviation Section reached full strength on 10 March 1968, with the assignment of four additional officers and four enlisted men. On 11 March the Aviation desk became operational in the TOC on a 24 hour per day basis.

2. (U) The PCV Aviation Company was organized at Phu Bai on 14 March 1968 per USARV General Order 1431, dated 30 March 1968. The company was authorized two U-21 command fixed wing aircraft and eight UH-1D helicopters. Personnel and equipment from USARV elements that had been operating in support of MACV FWD were retained at Phu Bai and incorporated into the new unit. During the first full month of operation the company flew a total of 723 hours in support of PCV Headquarters. Experience has proven that assigned aircraft are not sufficient to provide the support required. Accordingly, additional aircraft are being requested.

3. (U) In March the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned to the 16th Aviation Group with OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. The battalion arrived in NICTZ during the period 15 - 25 March 1968 and was operational on 26 March. The battalion is composed of Headquarters, 308th Combat Aviation Battalion, 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company, 188th Assault Helicopter Company and the 17th Assault Helicopter Company.

J. SIGNAL

1. (C) ACofS, J6, HQ MACV FWD.

a. One of the influencing reasons for selecting Phu Bai for the original MACV FWD Headquarters location was a recently completed dial telephone exchange (DTE) that had not yet reached its programmed fill. Also, Phu Bai is an Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) nodal point with circuits to Da Nang and Hue.

b. The initial J6 task was the establishment of communications which would be responsive to the needs of DEPCOMUSMACV and his staff. Accomplishment was difficult because of the tactical situation, the already saturated, in-being communications facilities, the lack of communications center facilities and the lack of guidance on forthcoming command relationships in NICTZ.

c. Primary communications in NICTZ consisted of the Southeast Asia
Wideband System (SEAWBS)/IWCS extending northward from Da Nang with terminals located at Phu Bai, Hue, Quang Tri and Dong Ha. The US Marine Corps had tactical systems extending west from Dong Ha to Camp Carrol, the Rock Pile and Khe Sanh. The predominance of equipment in this extension were the four channel AN/MRC-62 and one twelve channel AN/TRC-97 tropospheric scatter (tropo) system from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh. A special, high capacity tropo system from Hue to Khe Sanh had also been established using Army AN/TRC-129 terminals. Other low capacity USMC systems existed to Con Thien and to two DYE MARKER positions along the DMZ. Limited Army area communications support was being provided by Company B, 37th Signal Battalion, 21st Signal Group in the areas of Dong Ha, Quang Tri and Phu Bai.

d. The period 29 January to 10 March was characterized by the growth of the headquarters, evolution of command relationships, and the concomitant buildup of responsive communications. Of particular interest was the introduction of an AN/TSC-48 teletype relay and the AN/TSC-50 crypto facility to provide interim communications center facilities to the headquarters.

2. (C) Signal Officer, Provisional Corps Vietnam.

a. Upon activation of PCV, the MACV FWD J6 section was replaced by a Corps Signal Section.

b. The provisional corps was not assigned an organic corps signal battalion. Instead, USARV tasked the 459th Signal Battalion, 1st Signal Brigade, (reassigned 63d Signal Battalion, 1st Signal Brigade, 25 March 1968) with providing Army area communications support in the Corps zone and the necessary Corps command and control communications. This included establishment of Corps radio nets: the PCV FM Secure Voice Net and the PCV Command Single Sideband Radio Teletype Net.

c. The unique situation of a lack of a Corps signal battalion posed some problems with respect of responsiveness. The Corps Signal Officer had to submit communications requests to USARV to task 1st Signal Brigade to satisfy the requests. By agreement this problem was overcome by having the Signal Officer submit his requirements to CO, 459th Signal Battalion and requesting "after-the-fact" validation from USARV, in most cases.

3. (C) Communications for Operation PEGASUS.

a. As described in paragraph 1c above, communications in the Khe Sanh area were limited to support tenant units in the area. Preliminary planning revealed a need to upgrade the communications into the Khe Sanh/Ca Lu area by at least 24 channels to provide the necessary command and control communications for CG PCV. It was envisioned that this would be accomplished by extensions from the established axis Phu Bai - Camp Evans - Quang Tri - Dong Ha.
c. As planning progressed, it was determined that CG 1st Cavalry Division (AM) would establish a forward CP in the Ca Lu area, (LZ Stud) on D-Day. Requirements for 12 channels of voice and teletype to both Phu Bai and Camp Evans (a total of 24 channels) were thus developed.

d. Systems engineering revealed that VHF systems to Camp Evans and Phu Bai would be marginal at best. The solution appeared to be the use of tropo systems.

e. Hill 450 (YD978480) was selected as a radio relay site. 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was made responsible for preparation and security of the installation, as well as airlift of all equipment to the hill and subsequent resupply. The hill was to be ready for occupancy by 26 March and communications were to be operational by 28 March in anticipation of a 1 April D-Day.

f. Availability of equipment posed a problem. Resources of the 63d Signal Battalion, formerly 459th Signal Battalion, were inadequate to meet the requirements. ACofS, CE, USARV and CG III MAF were briefed on the plan. III MAF offered the use of four twelve channel AN/TRC-97 troop terminals. USARV made available two twenty-four channel AN/TRC-129 tropo terminals and associated VHF radio relay equipment to extend the systems from Hill 450 to LZ Stud. Combat essential airlift was used to fly all equipment to the Phu Bai/Camp Evans area. Equipment was staged in the area by 23 March. A decision was made to use the USMC TRC-97 in preference to the Army TRC-129 because of smaller size and easier transportability. Also, this provided an opportunity to establish two separate twelve channel systems - one at Phu Bai, the other to Camp Evans, thus achieving a degree of desired redundancy.

g. Securing and preparing of the site did not proceed according to schedule. Hostile action, difficulties with airlift, and operation of bulldozers, as well as adverse weather conditions combined to delay final siting of signal equipment until 30 March.

h. On 31 March, radio contact was established between all points; by morning of D-Day most voice circuits were in operation. The installation of teletype circuits proved difficult. Some were established by the evening of 1 April. Activation of all teletype circuits, however, was delayed by several days. The problem was solved by mutual and constant cooperation between Army and Marine communicators at the operator, command and staff levels.

i. Early in the operation, CG 1st Cavalry Division (AM) assumed OPCON of the 26th Marine Regiment, Khe Sanh. This required positive communications from LZ Stud to KSCEP. The problem was solved by routing voice circuits over the TRC-97 systems to the Hue-Phu Bai area and transferring these to the high capacity tropo system Hue-Khe Sanh.
Upon termination of Operation PEGASUS, the Marine equipment was returned to Marine control and the Army equipment was returned to 63d Signal Battalion contingency assets for use in subsequent operations. The entire operation was marked by careful planning, thorough coordination and mutual cooperation on the part of the Signal staffs of III MAF, PCV, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the excellent performance of elements of the 63d Signal Battalion, 1st Signal Brigade. All combined to score a unique communications success and materially assisted in the favorable outcome of the operation.

4. (C) Communications for Operation DELAWARE.

a. This operation envisioned combat action in the A Shau Valley and along Route 547. Communications into the A Shau Valley were non-existent prior to the start of the operation. The 101st Airborne Division, operating west on Route 547 to the vicinity of FSB Bastogne (YD 620095), had extended VHF communications (12 channels) to that location.

b. Preliminary planning revealed a need to install twenty-four channels of communications from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Tactical CP vicinity of A Luoi (YD 380002) for command and control communications for CG PCV, and lateral communications for fire support between 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and 101st Airborne Division.

c. The location of A Luoi is unique in that it sits on the floor of the A Shau Valley between high ridge lines extending north and south. The mountains on both sides of the valley are on the average in excess of 1000 meters high. The west wall lies almost entirely within Laos. These ridge lines are completely covered by triple canopy jungle, further complicating the communications problem. In coordination with Signal Officer, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), two hills were selected as possible relay sites: Hill 1487 (YD 400354) and Hill 1774 (YD 382082). Eventually, Hill 1487 was selected as the Signal Hill and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was tasked with clearing an area and providing security for the site.

d. Immediately upon termination of Operation PEGASUS, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) were inserted into the valley to clear landing zones and conduct reconnaissance. The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) requested the use of the U-1 aircraft equipped with AN/ARC-121 airborne relay. USARV had provided PCV with four U-1 aircraft equipped with the AN/ARC-121's, and four ground terminals; AN/GRC-163's. These U-1 aircraft were made available to 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The aircraft flew an orbit to the east of the valley relaying FM communications between the valley and Camp Evans. Concurrently, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) initiated bombing strikes of Hill 1487 to clear some of the jungle canopy and to permit engineers access to the ground on the hill for clearing operations. Clearing operations commenced with teams rapelling into the area. The first AN/MRC-54 radio relay terminal was lifted into the site
by 25 April. Delays had been encountered due to adverse weather, enemy action and difficulties in the actual clearing of the site. With the opening of the site, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was able to place FM relay on the hill, thus relieving the U-1 aircraft from their aerial relay mission.

e. To date, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) has not required establishment of the planned twelve channel systems into the valley. However, the equipment on Hill 1487 is in place and operational.

K. ENGINEER

1. (C) Organization: On 10 March, the Engineer Section was reorganized to conform to a US Army Corps organization with an authorized strength of six officers and five enlisted men. Excess personnel were returned to their former units. The joint staff billets were authorized for retention through 30 April in recognition of the requirements for close coordination with Marine and Navy units in the TAOR.

2. (C) Command Relationship: During the period 28 February - 10 March 1968, the technical chain-of-command was from MACV FWD Engineer directly to MACDC. Additional Engineer troop effort was required to support planned operations and troop buildup in NICTZ. An Engineer Combat Group was requested to satisfy this requirement. This request was approved and the 45th Engineer Group (Combat) was placed in general support of US forces in NICTZ. The 45th Group deployed the 35th Engineer Battalion (Combat) to the Hai Van Pass area in mid-February; the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) to Wunder Beach (YD 1459) in mid-March; the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) to Cia Le (YD 8216) in mid-April and Group Headquarters to Da Nang in mid-March. The 14th and 27th Battalions were placed in general support of PCV upon their arrival in the TAOR. In addition to the Army Engineer units, the 32d Naval Construction Regiment with four battalions; the 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force (FMF), and the 3d Bridge Company, FMF, were available for tasking through CG III MAF. The reorganization of MACV FWD to Headquarters PCV made this headquarters a subordinate of III MAF but it did not materially affect working relationships with the supporting engineer units.

4. (C) Operations.

a. Engineer Priorities: Upon becoming operational in the Hue-Phu Bai area an evaluation of the tactical situation in NICTZ was undertaken as the first order of business in order to establish resources, requirements and priorities for engineer effort. The following broad priorities were established and coordinated with appropriate affected agencies:

(1) Support of tactical operations.
(2) Establishment and maintenance of lines of communications and logistical support facilities.

(3) Provision of minimum essential requirements in support of the troop buildup.

b. Support of Tactical Operations:

(1) Operation PEGASUS, 20 March to 15 April 1968. Engineer operations were focused on the accomplishment of three major missions. Construction of the FSE/FSA at LZ Stud (between Ca Lu and the Rock Pile) with supporting Type II C123 airfield; opening and restoration of Route 9 from vicinity of LZ Stud to KSCB; and direct support of infantry elements in combined ground and heliborne operations. The mission was accomplished by a combined effort of Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 5, the 8th Engineer Battalion (1st Cavalry Division (AM)) and the 11th Engineer Battalion, FMF, USMC, coordinated by the Division Engineer, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(2) Operation DELAWARE (19 April and continuing at the end of the reporting period). Primary engineer missions were: Provide direct support of infantry elements in the establishment of landing zones and fire support bases; rebuild A Luoi airfield to C130-capability; open and maintain Route 547 to FSB Bastogne; and conduct denial operation within the AO. The engineer missions were accomplished by engineer units organic to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 14th and 27th Engineer Battalions with some items of airmobile engineer equipment supplied by 32d Naval Construction Regiment.

c. LOC's and Logistical Support Facilities.

(1) Reopening Highway I from Da Nang to Phu Bai. The limited through-put capability in NICTZ during February dictated that a maximum effort be devoted to re-establishment of the MSR as soon as possible. The 35th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was deployed from II CTZ to the Hai Van Pass area in mid-February with the mission of repairing, widening and securing the road from the Nawr Bridge north to the vicinity of Phu Loc. Simultaneously, Naval Construction Battalion 121 was working south from Phu Bai to meet the 35th in the vicinity of Phu Loc. The road was opened to the first north-bound convoy on 1 March, and has remained open since that time with only occasional enemy interdiction.

(2) Wunder Beach. In order to provide additional through-put capability to support planned tactical operations and troop buildup it was decided to establish a Logistics Over-The-Shore (LOTS) facility at Wunder Beach. On 16 February, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 began work on the establishment of a landing beach; construction of off-loading facilities; and construction of approximately eight miles of two lane roadway to Highway I at Hai Lang.
Off-loading operations began in early March. The LST causeway was installed by the Navy on 19 March and the first LST was discharged over it the following day. The 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was deployed from the II CTZ area by sea to Wunder Beach on 25 March and immediately assumed the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the facility. Construction work is continuing.

(3) Route 551, Tan My to Hue. In order to fully utilize the throughput capabilities of the LST ramps at Tan My, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 8 was given the mission of repairing the bridges and reopening the road to one-way traffic as soon as the tactical situation permitted. Work commenced on 4 March and is continuing with the objective of upgrading the road to two-way, all weather capability.

(4) POL Pipelines. Construction forces of the 32d Naval Construction Regiment completed the following pipelines in the PCV TAOR during this period: Tan My - Hue - Phu Bai; Wunder Beach - Quang Tri; and Quang Tri - Dong Ha. Construction of the Hue - Camp Evans and the Camp Evans - Quang Tri pipelines have been deferred because of the shortage of materials. Considerable difficulty is being experienced in keeping pipelines in operation due to extensive enemy interdiction and damage by friendly vehicles.

L. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) Civic Action.

a. Civic Action Progress: During the seven week March - April 1968 period of PCV's operation, Civic Action showed a gradual yet definitely noticeable increase after being all but halted in I CTZ, and especially in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, during the winter TET Offensive. The month of March saw a period of coordination and planning for a vigorous resumption of civic action programs and April, the execution of that planning phase.

b. Civic Action Effectiveness: The following trends were noted in civic action reports received by this headquarters.

(1) Useful information on enemy locations was received in increasingly greater amounts in areas where civic actions had been performed.

(2) A gradually more cooperative attitude on the part of the Vietnamese towards US personnel was in evidence as fear of reprisal, created during TET, lessened as areas became more secure.

(3) The realization that MEDCAPS are an effective civic action program which can be performed in areas where long range projects are difficult or impossible to implement due to the problem of resource supply or the tactical situation.
2. (U) Distinguished Visitors.

a. On 13 March 1968, ACofS G5, accompanied Monsignor Palmus, apostolic delegate, and five Catholic priests to Hue to call on the Archbishop of Hue for the purpose of presenting a Vatican contribution of $40,000 for assistance to the orphans and needy in the Hue area. Additionally, the party was accompanied by COL Titterud and COL Ringler from MACV CORDS.

b. On 24 March, personnel of the G5 section escorted a party of visitors from Saigon to visit the Province Senior Advisor of Thua Thien and Hue hospital. The group included Mr Gordon, the British Consul General, Dr Apley, Medical Team Chief from the British Embassy, and a number of Vietnamese dignitaries.

3. (U) Statistical Highlights.

a. TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP) Contributions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>MPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters, PCV</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>190.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>15,275</td>
<td>729.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division (AM)</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>3,990.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Marine Division</td>
<td>5,755</td>
<td>2,472.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$27,880</td>
<td>$7,371.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Following guidance set down by COMUSMACV, the units OPCON to PCV, in coordination with the Province Senior Advisors, will utilize the funds collected for TARP in civic action projects to directly support areas damaged during the TET Offensive.

4. (U) PSYOP Activities.

a. The PCV G5, PSYOP, monitored all PSYOP conducted in PCV TAOR and coordinated with adjacent and higher headquarters.

b. During the reporting period the PSYOP Division developed and published three PSYOP Annexes to Corps OPLANS and one contingency PSYOP PLAN. Special leaflets and tapes were designated and requested for all plans.

c. PSYOP support requests from the divisions OPCON to PCV are received and processed by the G5 section on a daily basis. After these requests are
reviewed they are submitted to the III MAF PSYOP Support Center. In the seven week this headquarters has been operational the daily average of requests for leaflet drops and aerial broadcast missions has risen from approximately 20 to over 60.
SECTION 2

LESSONS LEARNED
A. COMMAND

1. (C) Item: Capability of the Air Mobile Division

a. Observations. Two important operations commenced during this reporting period; one was completed and the other was still in progress on 30 April. Both operations capitalized on the unique combination of mobility and fire power which characterizes the air-mobile division. Operation DELAWARE, commenced during this period, saw the major portion of combat elements of two brigades inserted into an area heavily defended by air defense artillery weapons including 37mm AA machine guns, in the short space of seven days.

b. Evaluation. Operation PEGASUS objectives could not have been accomplished in such a short space of time without the air mobility inherent in the helicopter support organic to the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). The speed of the 1st Cavalry Division’s strike force enabled it to inflict casualties on a disorganized enemy force, while taking few itself; this rapid mobility and our superior firepower demoralized the enemy force, which was already seriously weakened by B52 strikes, and tactical air. The same may be said of Operation DELAWARE. The operation conducted during this period also focused attention on the need for extensive low level air reconnaissance to develop the situation in an area characterized by uncertain intelligence. As an example assault plans could not be finalized until reconnaissance revealed separate approach routes, landing zones, and locations of enemy anti-aircraft replacements.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Item: Communications Security (COMSEC):

a. Observation: Persuasion of VC/NVA documents, interrogation of prisoners and reportedinitiative communications deceptions (ICD) and evidence of jamming attempts indicated that the enemy is becoming more efficient in intercepting and exploiting US communications at the tactical voice set level.

b. Evaluation: Since the threat is real, concrete measures within PCV have been taken. In addition, the Commanding General, PCV, has required communications security orientation and a productive training program. The PCV effort is being supported by the 8th RRFS with personnel coming from the 101st RRU.

c. Recommendation:

(1) Concentrate on the rules for authentication to include use of authorized operational codes.
(2) Emphasize to all personnel the vulnerability of communications to interception and the strict maintenance of circuit discipline.

(3) Indicate and demonstrate how poor communications security can endanger military operations, equipment, personnel and even US installations.

2. (U) Item: Coordination with US Intelligence Community in the Two (2) Northernmost Provinces:

a. Observations: On 10 March 1968 PCV was activated as a corps headquarters having an area of operations covering the majority of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Within these provinces were approximately eight (8) different counterintelligence units that reported to different Army and Marine units within the Corps area. The problem was to insert PCV into the chain without creating any fallacies in the reporting channels that were already in existence.

b. Evaluation: The success of any intelligence elements is its ability to collect, collate, analyze and disseminate information/intelligence in a timely manner. In order to do this PCV had to determine what focal point would be available for input and output of intelligence information generated by the US Intelligence Agencies in PCV's area of responsibility.

c. Recommendation: A careful review of the mission and functions of the counterintelligence elements in the PCV AO revealed that the most efficient method of entering into the US Intelligence Community in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces was to establish a close working relationship with the District Office Intelligence Coordination Center (DOICC) or the Province Intelligence Coordination Center (PICC). These two (2) centers were the focal points of intelligence activities in PCV's AO. Thus, it is clear that any intelligence agency intending to make inroads into intelligence activities already in operation can successfully do so by establishing a productive operational liaison program with the DOICC's or PICC's.

3. (U) Item: Security-Threat - Sanitary Fills

a. Observation: Sanitary fills and/or trash dumps to which indigenous personnel have access are often a lucrative source of supply of US equipment and information of intelligence value.

b. Evaluation: Where access to sanitary fills is not restricted, large numbers of indigenous personnel become "rag pickers" sorting through the refuse for anything of value. There is no US Government control over the subsequent disposition of salvaged items of equipment and/or documents of official and personal nature. Experience factors indicate that US
personnel are prone to dispose of official waste (daily bulletins, military correspondence, telephone directories, etc.) and personal correspondence, lucrative sources of intelligence information for the VC/NVA.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Positive counterintelligence efforts be directed to the method of trash disposal by headquarters personnel.

(2) Spot checks be made to trash containers used to dispose of unclassified and non-official waste.

(3) Command attention be directed to the matter of uncontrolled dumping of garbage and trash in unsecure areas and coordination with the Vietnamese officials be effected to impose workable controls over civilian "rag pickers".

4. (U) Item: G2 Organization:

a. Observation: A significant feature of the G2 Section, Headquarters, PCV is the integration of the MI Detachment (Prov) into the G2 Staff. The Commanding Officer, MI Detachment serves in the dual role of commander and Chief, Intelligence Division, G2 Section. By serving in this dual capacity, he established a single chain of command/staff supervision for each member of the MI Detachment to the G2. He exercises direct supervision over Imagery Interpretation and Order of Battle. Because of his position on the G2 Staff, he is also continuously aware of the manner of performance of duty on the part of those MI Detachment personnel working under the supervision of other divisions. It is noted that regardless of the position on the G2 Staff held by the MI Detachment Commander, he is able to exercise some measure of supervision over the personnel he commands. In other headquarters, this same situation does not prevail, frequently causing conflicts of interest between members of the G2 Staff and the MI Detachment personnel, section chiefs or commanders.

b. Evaluation: This structure creates an orientation focused on the G2 and supporting him in his mission by the mutual identification of command interest with staff interest. Under it, Military Intelligence and G2 Staff personnel function together as one team without regard to unit identity, and produce, through close coordination, a highly polished product for the G2.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that the MI Detachment, minus administrative support, be integrated with the G2 Section.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (U) Item: Operating Procedures
a. **Observation:** Since this headquarters had its beginning as an element of HQ, MACV, corps level references and procedures were not immediately available.

b. **Evaluation:** When establishing a new headquarters, consideration should be given to establishing it from existing like headquarters. Operating procedures applicable to a higher headquarters are not necessarily applicable to a corps headquarters. Therefore, when a new headquarters is developed from an existing like headquarters, directives establishing SOP's for correspondence, communication, etc, can be provided to the new element as initial guidance, to be modified as required to meet local needs.

c. **Recommendation:** That a new headquarters be established from existing like headquarters and that the SOP's of the parent headquarters be provided and utilized initially, to be modified as required by the local situation.

2. (U) **Item:** Unit Deployment

a. **Observation:** Units assigned or attached to this headquarters were deployed as directed, but lacked the prior coordination necessary to facilitate a smooth and orderly transition.

b. **Evaluation:** Support units normally assigned to a corps headquarters include a Military Police Company, Chemical Det, Engineer Det, Photo Det, Signal Battalion, Transportation Company, Military Intelligence Det and Historical Det. The arrival of these units into the newly established headquarters area could present problems if care is not exercised in the planning of headquarters space allocation. The assignment of unit sponsors working in conjunction with the headquarters commandant could greatly assist the arriving units.

c. **Recommendation:** That the newly established headquarters provide for a system of sponsoring assigned and attached units. Use of advance parties is encouraged.

D. **PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION MORALE AND DISCIPLINE**

1. (U) **Item:** Strength Accountability of a Provisional Headquarters

a. **Observation:** As a provisional unit, no morning report for the unit can be prepared. As an interim measure, USARV directed that PCV personnel be assigned to the 108th Arty Group for strength accounting purposes, commencing 10 Mar 68. This required that all personnel gains, losses, and status changes be reported on the morning report of the 108th Arty Gp. In Mar 68, USARV transferred the 204th MI Det (less personnel and equipment) to PCV to be used as a carrier unit for PCV personnel, and on 1 Apr 68 all PCV personnel were reassigned, on paper, from the
108th Arty Gp to the 204th MI Det. The morning report for the 204th MI Det is now being maintained by AG Personnel. (Prior to 10 Mar 68, during the era of MACV Forward, personnel were assigned to HQ, MACV with duty at MACV Forward).

b. Evaluation: Strength accountability by the 108th Arty Gp proved to be unsatisfactory primarily because of the distance involved and poor communication between the two headquarters. Gains and losses were reported late. After the activation of the 204th MI Det, some initial difficulties were encountered in accounting for all assigned personnel, however these have been overcome and all assigned personnel are now being properly accounted for. Normally a unit morning report is not prepared in the Personnel Office, however, the nature of this particular unit morning report, which accounts for six separate provisional units, requires that it be prepared at a central location.

c. Recommendation: That, should the occasion arise wherein another provisional unit of this nature is necessary, provisions be made to assign it an established TO&E unit designation, at zero strength, to handle strength accounting.

2. (U) Item: Promotions

a. Observation: Personnel assigned to the original USARV Support Company in January, and later the Support Company, Provisional Corps Vietnam had no opportunity for promotion until April. Personnel who came originally from MACV could be promoted through MACV, however, personnel who were in the provisional unit did not have the same opportunity.

b. Evaluation: A procedure to assure immediate promotion opportunity should be included in establishment of a new headquarters.

c. Recommendation: Provisional Headquarters, when established should have promotion allocations for all the units which make up the headquarters. There should be no lost time for personnel to be considered for promotion. Additionally the headquarters responsible for the creation of the provisional unit should provide the necessary allocations.

3. (U) Item: TOE Equipment

a. Observation: Forced issue of TOE equipment by the 14th ICC without supply personnel accompanying the shipments resulted in lost or misdirected pieces of equipment.

b. Evaluation: The shortage of TOE equipment, particularly mess hall equipment, significantly affected the ability of the USARV Support Company
to support the Provisional Headquarters. When a provisional unit is formed and forced issue of its equipment is accomplished, trained supply personnel should go to the depots making the release and accompany the equipment to its final destination.

c. **Recommendation:** Equipment for provisional units be provided by forced issue; however, supply personnel should accompany the equipment. Additionally, this equipment should be granted the highest shipping priority possible from the releasing depot to final destination. Such shipments should be monitored by transportation personnel to prevent mis-routing or and delay whatsoever in delivery to the unit concerned.

E. **LOGISTICS.**

1. (C) **Item:** Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) of Repair for Maintenance Units

   a. **Observation:** Lack of ASL's prevent mission accomplishment.

   b. **Evaluation:** Maintenance units have been deployed from CONUS without an ASL. This practice results in a unit which is initially incapable of mission accomplishment. The time required for a unit so deployed to become operationally effective varies greatly but as a minimum, time must be allowed for the determination of types and quantities of equipment to be supported, computation of the ASL, preparation and submission of requisitions and receipt of the repair parts.

   c. **Recommendation:** That units scheduled to deploy from CONUS to RVN should deploy with an ASL based upon information provided by USARV.

2. (C) **Item:** Maintenance Support Planning as an Integral Part of Operational Planning

   a. **Observation:** Delay in support planning and commitment of logistical units results in a poor maintenance posture.

   b. **Evaluation:** When planning for extended combat operations, maintenance support planning must be conducted concurrently and logistical units deployed concurrently with combat units. To do otherwise will result in a time frame during which no maintenance support is provided the combat elements. Large backlogs and excessive down time of mission-essential equipment will result in reduced combat effectiveness. This is particularly true in the case of nondivisional units because of their greater reliance on external maintenance support.

   c. **Recommendation:** That concurrent planning and commitment of logistical units with combat units be effected so as to provide more responsive combat service support and increased combat effectiveness.
3. (C) Item: Interservice Solutions to Common Maintenance Problems

a. Observation: Greater emphasis should be placed on interservice cooperation.

b. Evaluation: The rapid influx of Army units into NICTZ resulted in an overload on Army maintenance detachments which were organized to support a much smaller force. USMC, on the other hand, had a well established maintenance support plan and the required facilities and personnel. By direct contact and coordination with Marine maintenance personnel, arrangements were made to provide emergency support to Army units. The large number of common items of equipment used by both the Army and Marine Corps units makes this type of interservice cooperation both possible and highly desirable.

c. Recommendation: That interservice cooperation be postured at all levels to provide solutions to many of the maintenance problems encountered in the highly mobile environment experienced in RVN.

4. (U) Item: Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Support

a. Observation: Several organizations have deployed into the NICTZ without having adequate maintenance and supply support capability included in initial movement phases of the units. This included tools, equipment, supplies and personnel. Thus, unit operational elements were required to function with less than acceptable maintenance and supply support.

b. Evaluation: The result of not receiving proper day-to-day preventive maintenance, coupled with long delays in receiving direct maintenance and supply support, caused a 10-15% reduction in aircraft availability.

c. Recommendation: Concurrent logistical and operational planning should be accomplished to insure that logistical support parallels the operational requirement.

5. (U) Item: Cross Service Support

a. Observation: With a two-service corps (Army and Marine divisions) an informal cross service agreement has been achieved on ammunition supply at the ammunition supply points (ASP's).

b. Evaluation: It has been agreed upon by FLC and the USASUPCOM, DANANG, that ammunition located at ASP's would be issued without regard to the service that provided the ammunition. In view of the joint occupancy of the ASP's by Army and Marine units, the system has provided excellent service to the Corps. There have been several instances where cross servicing has facilitated bookkeeping by the Corps Ammunition Officer and assured commanders of continued ammunition support in the event heavy engagements caused a severe draw down of one service's stocks. This has been particularly beneficial to
the ASP located at PHU BAI in the case of 155mm and 8" Howitzer projectiles. Reimbursement is easily accomplished after the fact when stocks are once again built up.

c. **Recommendation:** That such informal working agreements be continued for the benefit of combat elements.

6. **(U) Item:** Stockage Levels at Supply Points.

a. **Observation:** Logistic support for operations PEGASUS and DELAWARE was hampered by low stockage levels at primary supply points.

b. **Evaluation:** Primary supply support for PEGASUS was from DONG HA; however, much of the Class III pkg, Class IV and Class V required for prestock was available only at the Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) site. Shipments from the LOTS site required one extra day for delivery at a time when all supplies competed with unit moves for transportation priority. Primary supply support for DELAWARE came from the LOTS site through TF LANGLEY, FORWARD SUPPORT AREA (FSA) at CAMP EVANS. No prestock objectives were set; however, stockage objectives were significantly increased (based upon daily usage factors) for Class I, Class III and Engineer Class IV. As with PEGASUS, essential supplies competed with unit move requirements for transportation.

c. **Recommendation:** Recommend a prestock of lst Logistical Command supplies be maintained at QUANH TRI, DONG HA, CAMP EVANS and PHU BAI in sufficient quantities to allow for immediate logistical response in support of Corps tactical operations in NICTZ.

7. **(U) Item:** Centralized Control of Petroleum Products.

a. **Observation:** There is a need for a single command or agency to be responsible for the supply of all POL products in NICTZ.

b. **Evaluation:** When Army units displaced to NICTZ initially, all petroleum products were supplied through POL installations operated by the USMC and the Navy. Subsequently, POL pipelines as well as additional POL facilities located at the LOTS site came under the operational control of USASUPCOM, DA NANG. In lieu of the fragmented responsibility for POL support in NICTZ, it is felt that one overall agency should be responsible for POL activities.

c. **Recommendation:** That a single agency be given overall responsibility for the supply of petroleum products in NICTZ.

F. **INSPECTOR GENERAL**

None
G. INFORMATION

None

H. COMMAND HISTORY

1. (U) Item: Lack of Familiarity of Military History Detachment Personnel with Supply Procedures

   a. Observation: Within the two-man TOE it has usually been some time since most majors have worked directly with supply procedures and the technical knowledge of an administrative specialist in the supply area is naturally limited.

   b. Evaluation: The information and knowledge must be gained, but it would be easier if the applicable regulations and an orientation and/or review could be provided prior to deployment.

   c. Recommendation: That a study of appropriate regulations relating to supply procedures used by historical detachments be included in the orientation training conducted by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

2. (U) Item: Multimeter AN/URM-105 or TS-352/U

   a. Observation: Operating instructions for the Recorder-Reproducer Set, Sound AN/UNH-10 (TOE equipment) state that a multimeter reading should be taken before the set is used to determine the charge on the battery.

   b. Evaluation: TOE 20-17E does not include a multimeter, even though the PLL prescribed for military history detachments include items considered to be second echelon maintenance.

   c. Recommendation: Recommendation has already been made through historical channel that TOE 20-17E be changed to include a multimeter.

I. AVIATION

None

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) Item: Interface of Teletype Circuits Between USMC TRC-97 Equipment and AN/MCC-6 Carrier Systems.

   a. Observations: During Operation PEGASUS, interface difficulties were encountered while trying to establish teletype circuits from LZ STUD to CAMP EVANS and PHU BAI. The circuits were passed from CAMP EVANS and PHU BAI over tone packs on the USMC AN/TRC-97 systems to Hill 450 at which point the circuits were strapped over to an AN/MCC-6-AN/TRC-24 system and extended to LZ STUD. Testing performed on each of these two trunks showed
the circuits in question to be of good quality; however, when strapped together between the AN/MCC-6 and the AN/TRC-97, the subscribers at LZ STUD would receive garble. The mode of operation for these circuits was originally DC Tandem. It was determined that the TRC-97 was providing too much current. By direction, the circuits were then converted to voice frequency operation but the problem was still not alleviated.

b. **Evaluation:** After much testing it was determined that the signal level on the transmit side of the MRC-97 to the MCC-6 was too high. This was solved by placing a 100 ohm resistor across the teletype channel input terminals on the AN/TCC-4 telegraph terminal of the AN/MCC-6.

c. **Recommendation:** That this information be widely distributed since the Army will be using AN/ARC-97A tropo terminals on an increasing basis.

2. *(U)* **Item:** Overheating of KY-8's.

a. **Observation:** The KY-8 voice crypto devices when installed with the AN/VRC-12 series radios have a tendency to overheat. Eventually, this overheating causes a malfunction of the KY-8 dependent upon the amount of usage of the equipment.

b. **Evaluation:** Two methods have been used to partially solve this overheating problem. The KY-8 is placed on blocks and a fan is used to provide direct additional ventilation. Also, the X-mode cable is disconnected after each secure call.

c. **Recommendation:** The above solutions are not completely satisfactory at best. The KY-8 should be modified so that it will perform adequately without the makeshift solutions.

3. *(U)* **Item:** AN/GRC-163 Tests

a. **Observation:** Tests of the AN/GRC-163 FM multichannel terminals in conjunction with AN/ARC-121's mounted in U-1 aircraft revealed two major defects in the system:

   (1) The U-1 aircraft were modified by placing two regular AN/VRC-12 series antennas under each wing and two atop the fuselage.

   (2) The PP-2953 power supply on the AN-GRC-163 radio will not hold the system on high power. The 10 amp fuse in the power supply will blow after sustained use.

b. **Evaluation:**

   (1) The aircraft safety problem was solved by removing one antenna from each wing. This reduced the drag sufficiently to fly the aircraft safely. However, the capability of the AN/ARC-121 for FM retransmission was reduced by a third.
(2) Information available indicates the PP-2953 originally failed its service tests because it would not carry 10 amps. Nevertheless, it was used in the AN/GRC-163. The AN/GRC-163 will operate successfully on low power, but when high power is required, it fails. Often signal loss because of distance or terrain obstacles can be overcome by using high power.

c. **Recommendation:**

(1) That aircraft mounting AN/ARC-121 be equipped with antennas that are better air foils. Reduction of the drag would allow the aircraft to operate safely with the AN/ARC-121 using 6 antennas.

(2) That the power supply PP-2953 be redesigned to handle the AN/GRC-163 on high power.

4. (U) Item: TT-76 for AN/VSU-2

a. **Observation:** The AN/VSC-2 in its original configuration contains only a TT-4 for teletype purposes. While the TT-4 provides "hard copy" for incoming messages, it is extremely slow and inefficient for outgoing messages. They have to be hand typed directly over the air.

b. **Evaluation:** A tape transmitter-distributor should be added to the AN/VSC-2. With the TT-4 for incoming hard copy and a TT-76 transmitter-distributor for outgoing pre-poked tapes, RTT traffic over the AN/VSC-2 net improves considerably. This is especially true in a semi-fixed station environment near a communications center which can pre-poke tapes.

c. **Recommendation:** Recommend that all AN/VSC-2 radio teletype terminals be equipped with a tape transmitter-distributor in a semi-fixed environment.

5. (U) Item: AN/TSC-48 Teletype Relay and AN/TSC-50 Crypto Facility

a. **Observation:** When HQ MACV Fwd was established at Phu Bai, there was no fixed communications center facility to support the headquarters. The AN/TSC-48 Teletype Relay and AN/TSC-50 Crypto Facility were used as the communications center for the headquarters as an interim measure. This facility proved inadequate for the following reasons:

(1) These equipments were designed to provide tape relay facilities and not terminal facilities. There are no page copy of poking positions in these vans.

(2) The AN/TSC-50 van was configured for twelve KW-26 terminations and six KW-7 terminations. The van had to be reconfigured once it arrived on location.
(3) The van air conditioning equipment posed a constant maintenance problem.

b. Evaluation:

(1) AN/TSC-48 and -50 are adequate when used as a tape relay facility. However, when employed as a terminal facility for a headquarters, these vans are inadequate.

(2) The AN/TSC-50 is hard-wired for twelve KW-26's and six KW-7's. In this configuration it lacks the capability of accepting additional tactical KW-7 covered teletype circuits.

(3) Air conditioning units in these vans are not adequate to pull the heavy cooling load.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That the AN/TSC-48 and -50 not be employed to provide a communications center for a headquarters unless poking and page copy positions are provided in an associated van.

(2) That the AN/TSC-50 Crypto Facility, when it must be used as a tactical terminal, be configured to accept a predominance of KW-7 terminated circuits.

(3) That heavier duty air conditioning equipment be installed in the AN/TSC-48 and -50 vans.

K. ENGINEER

1. (U) Item: Command and Staff Coordination

   a. Observation: Engineer operations in the PCV TAOR require the integration, coordination and close cooperation of Army, Marine and Navy engineer units.

   b. Evaluation: The presence of Marine and Navy officers on the staff of the Engineer contributed immeasurably to the extremely close working relationship that has been developed with all engineer units concerned.

   c. Recommendation: That joint staff positions be authorized HQ PCV and that at least one Navy and one Marine billet in the Engineer Section be filled by qualified personnel at all times.

2. (C) Item: Operation PEGASUS, Intraservice Coordination

   a. Observation: Army, Navy and Marine Engineer efforts in support of the operation were coordinated by the Division Engineer of the 1st Air Cav Div.
b. **Evaluation**: Coordination by the Division Engineer who was in the areas of operations produced complete and immediate responsiveness to the needs of the tactical commander.

c. **Recommendation**: That the Engineer on the staff of the tactical commander responsible for an operation be given coordinating authority over all supporting Engineer units.

3. (c) **Item**: Operation PEGASUS, Engineer Organizational Characteristics

a. **Observation**: 11th Engineer Battalion, FMF, USMC, had the mission of opening Route 9 from LZ Stud to Khe Sanh Combat Base. Prefabricated bridges and bridge sections were airlifted by helicopter to the required locations and CH-54 helicopters were used to transport D6 Airborne dozers to K3CB in order to work on the road from both ends simultaneously.

b. **Evaluation**: The marriage of the light engineer equipment and high mobility capability of the 1st Air Cav Div with the heavy engineering capability of the Marine Engineer Battalion resulted in timely completion of the assigned mission.

c. **Recommendation**: That characteristics peculiar to different type organizations be exploited to the maximum to achieve the desired results.

4. (C) **Item**: Operation DELAWARE

a. **Observation**: The early repair of the heavily damaged A LUOI Airfield for use by C-130 aircraft was critical to the successful accomplishment of the mission. Due to the high altitude operations required to enter the A SHAU Valley, lifting capacity and operational radius limitations of the available helicopters dictated that the lightest available engineer equipment be utilized.

b. **Evaluation**: Nine TD-6 dozers with operators and mechanics were obtained from resources of the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and were lifted by CH-54 helicopters into the AO. This item of equipment has the distinct advantage of being light enough to be airlifted without dismounting the tracks and blade. The TF-6's materially aided in the timely completion of the airfield and the early establishment of many of the required LZ's.

c. **Recommendation**: That USARV continue its program of establishment of airborne equipment pools and expand it to make such pools available in each of the corps areas.

5. (U) **Item**: Line of Communications - Security of Critical Targets.
a. Observation: The highway and railroad bridges in HUT were blown by the NVA early in the Tet Offensive; however, the demolition of the RR bridge was poorly accomplished. The blown span was cut at only one end which rested on the shore, thereby allowing traffic to utilize the bridge once the tactical situation permitted. This bridge was the last fixed span across the Perfume River and provided the only means of access from north to south by land. Although friendly forces gained control of the south bank of the river and were operating within the walled city, no concerted effort was made to secure the bridge to prevent further destruction.

b. Evaluation: The NVA apparently failed to recognize that the bridge, although damaged, was still trafficable. Although the enemy had continued access to the bridge for approximately two additional weeks, they failed to complete the destruction.

c. Recommendation: That critical targets be designated as tactical objectives for early seizure and security.

6. (C) Item: Lines of Communications - Minesweeps.

a. Observation: LOC's located in areas of heavy enemy troop activity (Q11 in the Hai Van Pass area and the access road from Wunder Beach to QL 1) are subject to heavy mining resulting in the roads being closed daily until thorough minesweeps are conducted.

b. Evaluation: The through-put capacity of a given section of LOC is drastically reduced by the necessity for time consuming minesweeps. The need for maximum through-put must be balanced against the availability of tactical forces for security of the LOC to reduce or eliminate the mining.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That LOC's be paved to facilitate detection of the mine emplacement.

(2) That ambushes be established at known points of frequent interdiction.

(3) That frequent highly mobile patrols be conducted on the affected sections of the road.

L. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) Item: Psychological Operation Exploitations.

a. Observation: On 28 April 1968, acting on information gained through intelligence services, elements of the 101st Abn Div surrounded a village. An NVA unit was known to be in the village, but the size of the organization was unknown. After very heavy fires were brought to bear and in close coordination with the combat units, surrender appeals
were broadcast to the encircled enemy on 30 and 31 April. These broadcast consisted of asking NVA soldiers to surrender, assuring them that they would receive good care and that the allied forces would hold their fire for specified time period. After repeated appeals, coordinated with artillery and airstrikes and cease fire periods, the NVA soldiers started to surrender. The total number of PW's gained from this action was 103.

b. Evaluation: Imaginative PSYOP techniques employed in close coordination with tactical elements resulted in extraordinary success (Para 1b). Allied firepower, the enemy's situation and plausible themes all are of PSYOP value when used on a target audience. Success will result only when all facets of the situations are known and a well thought out, closely coordinated campaign is conducted. A close working arrangement with the tactical commander on the ground is a must if our PSYOP effort is to bear fruit.

c. Recommendations: None.
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning operating procedures, Section 2, page 3, paragraph C1: Concur. Headquarters established from existing like headquarters would be provided with the initial operating procedures which can then be modified as required. However, operational necessity may prohibit this procedure, at which time direct coordination must be made with like headquarters.

   b. Reference item concerning promotions, Section 2, page 5, paragraph D2: Concur. Procedures have been established to provide timely promotion opportunities for individuals assigned to provisional units.

   c. Reference item concerning TOE equipment, Section 2, page 5, paragraph D3: Concur. Release of equipment through supply directives for provisional units is an expeditious means of making equipment available since command assets must be used. Supply personnel to accompany shipments, however, must be provided by the provisional unit since depots are not staffed to provide such a service. USARV Regulation 55-4 contains provisions for priority air delivery of mission essential equipment to customers.

   d. Reference item concerning authorized stockage lists (ASL) of repair for maintenance units, Section 2, page 6, paragraph E1: Concur. Available information indicates that recommended procedure is currently being incorporated into a USARV regulation. Adoption of this system or a modification thereof should result in support units arriving in-country capable of providing mission support.
e. Reference item concerning stockage levels at supply points, Section 2, page 8, paragraph E6. Nonconcur with the recommendation as pertains to Class I, II, III, and IV. 1st Log support to Operations Pegasus and Delawarp was the best that could be provided with available information and resources. The establishment of supply points as recommended by PCV is not presently feasible due to lack of adequate real estate and facilities. Closer coordination with 1st Log in the planning phases of operations in NICTZ will preclude shortfalls in supply support. Concur with the recommendation as pertains to Class V.

f. Reference item concerning centralized control of petroleum products, Section 2, page 8, paragraph E7: Concur. USARV, G4 has initiated action in an attempt to have the Navy assume its responsibility in ICTZ and operate all pipelines and POL facilities in NICTZ. MACV has taken this proposal under consideration and a decision is forthcoming.

g. Reference item concerning overheating of KY-8, Section 2, page 10, paragraph J2. The only modification authorized to prevent malfunction due to overheating of the KY-8 is to replace the one-half watt resistor 1A21A2R14 with a two watt resistor. Recommend equipment be turned in to GS unit for modification. If modification has already been performed on equipment in the unit, an Equipment Improvement Report should be submitted in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4, TM 38-750.

h. Reference item concerning AN/GRC-163 tests, Section 2, page 10, paragraph J3.

(1) The AN/VRC-12 antennas used in the original tests will be replaced by Collins 437S-1 blade antennas. One U-1 aircraft has been so equipped, but has not been made available to USARV Aviation for testing. The use of the blade antennas will reduce drag and provide the required FM retransmission capability.

(2) The AN/GRC-163 New Equipment Training Team recommended to USAECOM that the PP-2953 power supply be replaced by a 15 ampere power supply and the fuse be replaced by a circuit breaker. The USAECOM Area Field Office, Vietnam has requested information on the status of this recommendation as well as any modifications that are proposed to be made to the AN/GRC-163 prior to being introduced in this command. Unit will be notified upon receipt of information.
i. Reference item concerning TT-76 for the AN/VSC-2, Section 2, page 11, paragraph J4. The advantage in adding a TT-76 reperforator-transmitter to the AN/VSC-2 is recognized. However, USAMC has pointed out that the vehicle is already overloaded, restricting its cross country trafficability. The present load, two men and the AN/VSC-2, weighs 1100 pounds. As a point of reference, an 800 pound load on the one-quarter ton truck is standard for unrestricted cross country use. The addition of the TT-76 would not only add an additional 45 pounds to the total load, but would also add to the present top-heaviness of the vehicle. A better solution for semi-fixed operation, would be to connect a TT-76 located in the communications center, by wire pairs to the AN/GRA Control Box, thus providing the desired tape transmitting capability. The AN/VSC-2 RATT terminals were designed for use in support of airborne operations and not in support of a Corps Headquarters. The AN/VSC-2's were made available to meet an urgent operational requirement using equipment available from theater assets. The AN/GRC-122 and AN/GRC-142 RATT terminals, when available, will replace the AN/VSC-2 equipment for units providing communications in support of PCV. These terminals have the TT-76 as a component and can provide the required tape poking capability.

j. Reference item concerning AN/TSC-48 Teletype Relay and AN/TSC-50, Crypto Facility, Section 2, page 11, paragraph J5.

(1) The AN/TSC-48 and -50 are, as noted by the unit, normally employed as a tactical tape relay facility. However, these were the only assemblages available for deployment to meet the then existing conditions. A Non-Tactical Telecommunications Requirement (NTTR) was submitted on 6 May 1968 for the construction of an area communications center at Phu Bai. This NTTR was approved by CINCUSARPAC on 11 May and is currently being reviewed by DA. It is intended that the new area communications center will, when completed, replace the present vanized tactical equipment.

(2) Reference item concerning the recommendation that heavier air conditioning equipment be installed in the AN/TSC-48 and -50 vans, recommend unit submit an Equipment Improvement Report in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4, TM 38-750.

k. Reference item concerning command and staff coordination, Section 2, page 12, paragraph K1. PCV is an Army headquarters organization and therefore is not authorized a joint staff. Nothing precludes the continued exchange of liaison officers between the services in an effort to maintain close coordination in the engineer effort.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CS FOR-65 (RI)

1. Reference item concerning Operation DELAWARE, Section 2, page
13, paragraph K4: Concur. Airmobile equipment pools are currently
located to support II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Lack of
assets have precluded establishment of such a pool in I CTZ. Cons-
sideration will be given to establishing an airmobile equipment pool
in I CTZ when assets become available.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAKATSEKUSA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, PCV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Provisional Corps VN for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RL)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  14 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT

TASK ORGANIZATION/TROOP LIST - APRIL 1968

Provisional Corps Vietnam (Phu Bai)
   Headquarters Company (Provisional) (Phu Bai)
   Avn Co (Provisional)
   574th APU
   172nd Engr Det (Utility)
   559th Engr Det (Terrain)
   204th Mil Intel Det
   PIO Det (Prov)
   Signal Photo Team D
   33rd Chem Det
   1st Plt, Co A, 504th MP
   Prov Trans Co (Car)
   Mil Intel Det (Prov)
   31st Mil Hist Det
   Special Security Det

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Camp Evans)
   HHC, 1st Cav Div (AM)
   1st Sqdn, 9th Cav
   62 Inf Plt (Combat Trackers)
   13th Sig Bn
   545th MP Co
   E Co, 52 Inf (LRRP)

Incl 2
191st Mil Intel Det
583d Mil Intel Det
184th Chem Plat
26th Chem Det
14th Mil Hist Det
42nd Public Info Det
371st RRU

1st Brigade

HHC, 1st Brigade
1st Bn, 8th Cav
2nd Bn, 8th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav
25th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
41st Public Info Det

2d Brigade

HHC, 2d Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2nd Bn, 5th Cav

3d Brigade

HHC, 3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2nd Bn, 7th Cav
5th Bn, 7th Cav
34th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
2d Bn, 12th Cav
196th Lt Inf Bde
  HHC, 196th Lt Inf Bde
  3d Bn, 21st Inf
  4th Bn, 31st Inf
  2nd Bn, 1st Inf
  3d Bn, 82nd Arty

Div Arty
  HHB, Div Arty
  E Btry, 82nd Arty (Avn)
  1st Bn, 21st Arty
  1st Bn, 77th Arty
  2nd Bn, 19th Arty
  2nd Bn, 20th Arty (ARA)
  1st Bn, 30th Arty
  C Btry (-), 4th Bn, 60th Arty
  D Btry (-), 1st Bn, 44th Arty
  Plat, B Btry, 29th Arty
  Plat, G Btry, 29th Arty

11th Avn Gp
  HHC, 11th Avn Gp
  11th GS Avn Co
  227th Aslt Hel Bn
    478 Hvy Hel Co
    382 Trans Acft Maint Det
229th Aslt Hel Bn

Div Spt Cmd

HHC and Band, Div Spt Cmd
15th Admin Co
15th S&S Bn
15th Med Bn
15th Trans Acft Maint Bn
27th Maint Bn
8th Engr Bn

101st Airborne Division

HQ & HQ Co (Camp Eagle)

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
HHC
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 502d Inf

2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
HHC
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf

3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
HHC
1st Bn, 505th Inf
2d Bn, 505th Inf
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1st Bn, 508th Inf
2d Bn, 321st Arty (DS)
B Trp, 1st Sqdn, 17th Cav
C Co, 2d Bn, 307th Engr
D Co, 307th Engr
3d Flt, 82d MP Co
3d FASCP, 82d Sig
Flat, 82d Avn
Flat (+), 358th RRC
Det, 82d Mtd
Det, 782d Maint
Det, 582d Supply Co

Div Artillery

HHB

2d Bn, 320th Arty (DS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div)
1st Bn, 321st Arty (DS, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div)
HQ & Svc Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (GSR)
B Btry
C Btry
C Btry, 6th Bn -- 16th Arty (atch)

Naval Gun Fire Team

101st Abn Div Troops

2d Sqdn, 17th Cav (-)
101st Avn Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
308th Avn Bn

HHQ
17th Aslt Hel Co
188th Aslt Hel Co
200th Aslt Spt Hel Co

326th Engr Bn (-)
501st Sig Bn (-)
101st MP Co (-)

F Co, 58th Inf (LRRP)

265th RRU

42d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
58th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
557th Inf Plat (GBT Trackers)

20th Chem Det
36th Chem Det

22d Mil Hist Det
25th PI Det
34th PI Det
101st MI Det
181st MI Det
204th MI Det

Division Support Command

HQ & Band

326th Med Bn
801st Maint Bn
501st Supply Co
101st QM Co (Air)

3d Marine Division

HQ Bn (-) (Rein)
  HQ Co (-)
  Svc Co (-)
  MP Co (-)
  Det Comm Co

Task Force Hotel

HQ Co

1st Mar (-) (Rein)
  HQ Co
  1st Bn, 1st Mar
  2d Bn, 1st Mar
  2d Bn, 3d Mar
  3d Bn, 4th Mar
  1st Bn, 11th Mar

Det 238 Field Arty (USA)

Prov Mech Co

3d Mar (-) (Rein)
  HQ Co, 3d Mar
  BLT 2d Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Rein)
  1st Bn (-), 3d Mar
  1st AMTRAC Bn (-) (Rein)
4th Mar (-) (Rein)

HQ Co (-)

Co C, 9th MT Bn

2d Bn, 9th Mar (Rein)

CMO Group "B" 3d Bn, 9th Mar

BLT 3d Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein)

2d Bn (-) (Rein) 26 Mar

9th Mar (-) (Rein)

HQ Co

Co B, 9th MT Bn

1st Bn, 9th Mar

3d Bn, 3d Mar (-) (Rein)

1st Bn, 4th Mar (Rein)

3d Bn (-), 9th Mar

26th Mar (-) (Rein)

HQ Co

1st Bn, 26th Mar

3d Bn, 26th Mar

3d Sqdn, 5th Arm Cav

Co C, 2d Bn, 24th Arm

Det, 15th Engr

12th Mar (-) (Rein)

HQ Btry (Rein)

1st SL Btry (-)

1st Bn (-) (Rein), 12th Mar
1st Prov 155 How Btry
2d Bn (Rein), 12th Mar
3d Bn (-) (Rein), 12th Mar
2d Prov 155 How Btry (-)
4th Bn (-), 12th Mar
1st Bn (-), 13th Mar
3d Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
Task Unit (TF Robbie)
3d Recon Bn (Rein)
3d Engr Bn (Rein)
3d SP Bn
3d Med Bn (-) (Rein)
3d MT Bn (Rein)
9th MT Bn
3d Dental Co

Corps Artillery (Phu Bai)

HHB, PCV Corps Arty

108th Field Arty Group

8th Bn, 4th Arty (8" SP/175SP)
6th Bn, 33d Arty (105T)
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (40mm AWSP)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (8" SP/175SP)
Btry F, 26th Arty (TAB)
Btry G, 29th Arty (SLT)
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Provisional Corps Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968 (U)

CG, Provisional Corps Vietnam

4 June 1968

682349

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
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ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________________

** FOR OT RD # ______________________________________

***PAGE # ______________________________________

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________________

PAGE # ______________________________________

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________________

PAGE # ______________________________________

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________________

PAGE # ______________________________________

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________________

PAGE # ______________________________________

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