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| FROM: |
| Distribution: Further dissemination only as directed by Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC 20310, 29 APR 1980, or higher DoD authority. |

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<th>AUTHORITY</th>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SECURITY
MARKING

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AGAM-P (M) (21 Aug 68) FOR 5 September 1968
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command, Da Nang (Prov), 30 April 1968 (U)

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 incl

as

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Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (U) General.

(1) During the reporting period, efforts were directed toward planning, and establishment of the USASUPCOM, DNG with the objective of providing increased logistical support to Army units in I CTZ. Initial planning was performed by USASUPCOM, QNH in late January and early February when the large influx of tactical units to I CTZ made it apparent that the Da Nang Sub-Area Command (90th General Support Group) and USASUPCOM, QNH would not be able to provide adequate support. During initial planning it became apparent that additional logistical units (both operational and command

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
and control) were needed to assume the Army logistical responsibilities that had been performed by III MAF and Force Logistical Command (FLC). Concurrently, it was recognized that additional port capability in INCTZ would be essential to support the build up of Army Forces. After careful consideration and evaluation of alternatives, a decision was made to activate a support command at Da Nang and to establish a Logistics-Over-the-Shore Operation in the vicinity of Thon My Thuy. Additionally, another Group Headquarters was required and positioned in NICTZ to reduce the geographical span of the 80th GS Gp, which had previously operated throughout ICTZ.

(2) On 25 February 1968, the US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) (USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV)) was activated by General Order 99, 1st Logistical Command, dated 24 February 1968, with an authorized strength of 79 officers and 152 enlisted men. The Da Nang Sub-Area Command, the 80th General Support Group, the 26th General Support Group and the 159th TC Battalion (TML SVC) were assigned to USASUPCO, DNC (PROV) upon activation. The Quang Tri Sub-Area Command operated by the 26th GS Group was activated 5 April 1968 by USASUPCO, DNC (PROV) General Order 22, dated 5 April 1968. (A Command Organizational Chart is attached as Inclosure 1.)

(3) The headquarters engaged in logistical support operations for sixty six (66) days of the reporting period. The reporting period was 25 February 1968 through 30 April 1968. Command emphasis was placed on retail distribution of supplies to Army units and realignment of maintenance, transportation, and other service type activities within ICTZ.

b. (U) Command Group Activities.

(1) Key command and staff positions were assigned within USASUPCON, DNC (PROV) during the reporting period as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ASSIGNED TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>George B. Stalice</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Dudley A. Williams</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>John F. Boves</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Allan C. Williams</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Alfred Buckert, Jr.</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Eugene J. Bright</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>George B. Bean</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Robert C. Crow</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lawson S. Williams</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Virgil W. Davis</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Oscar C. Fisher</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Roosevelt D. Adams</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Benjamin H. Tucker</td>
<td>Cefi of Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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18 May 1968

LTC Frank J. Gigliotti
LTC Ilfaus, Jerry, Jr.
LTC John A. Coover
LTC John A. Young
LTC Samuel B. Hudson
LTC Joseph N. Gravemann
Lt Col. John A. Corner
Lt Col. John A. Young
Lt Col. John A. Young
Lt Col. John A. Young

ASSIGNMENT
Air of Feed
Command Engineer
Adjutant General
Provost Marshal
Headquarters Commandant
Signal Officer
Staff Judge Advocate
Information Officer
Civil Affairs Officer

ASSIGNMENT

(2) During the reporting period the headquarters was visited by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific; General Frank L. Besson, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Material Command; Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam; Major General T.E. Scott, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command; Major General Owen S. Hurburt, AGO/CS, C-H, U.S. Army Pacific, and Major General John J. Hayes, Director of Supply, Army Materiel Command. A list of other distinguished visitors is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>JOB TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG Wm. H. Van Matrener, Jr.</td>
<td>CG, 1st Sig Bde</td>
<td>19 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG John A. Taylor</td>
<td>Dir of Sustainment, TC</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL J.A. Tannous, Jr., Jr.</td>
<td>Dir of Procurement, 1st Log Bde, TC</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL T.E. Johnson</td>
<td>Dir of Procurement, 1st Log Bde</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Gordon W. Kohler</td>
<td>P1, 1st Log Bde</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL T.E. Johnson</td>
<td>Dir of Procurement, 1st Log Bde</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL DeMerit</td>
<td>OIC, War's Data Unit</td>
<td>30 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) AGO/CS, COMPTROLLER: The AGO/CS, Comptroller Section was established 4 March 1968. The section was designed to operate under austere conditions even when fully staffed. Planned strength is twelve officers and enlisted men. As of 30 April 1968, 67 percent of this strength was assigned. The Staff Finance function ordinarily executed by the Comptroller Section was performed by the Commanding Officer of the local finance unit, acting in a double capacity as a special staff officer.

(1) With staffing existing at the end of the period, the Comptroller could perform the following initially assigned functions:

(a) Review and Analysis.

(b) Progress and Statistical Reporting.

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AVCA-DNG-GO-H

18 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(c) Command Management Improvement and Cost Reduction.

(d) Monitoring of Inter-Service Agreements (ISSA).

(2) During the period 4 March through 30 April 1968, the ACofS Comptroller performed the following in addition to routine operations.

(a) Publication of Review and Analysis Regulation Number 11-1.

(b) Publication of Command Organization and Function Manual.

(c) Review of Loss of Funds Investigation.

(d) Initiation of program of auditing Non-Appropriated Funds and monitoring of other Sundry Funds.

(e) Establishment of liaison with other US Services, and the Chase Manhattan military banking facility.

(f) Arrangement of nomination and processing of participants for ADP executive courses held in Long Binh.

(g) Initiation of Lost Mandays Survey.

(h) Initiation of a Monthly Command Survey.

(3) After a survey of operating requirements, Comptroller, this headquarters, found that the Comptroller coordination and control of ISSA and other inter-service agreements would be desirable. While the Comptroller of 1st Logistical Command agreed with this finding, they were forced by a general lack of finance officers to transfer the officer executing this function to another command. As of the end of the reporting period, ACofS, Personnel efforts to fill this augmentation position had failed.

d. (U) ACofS, PERSONNEL. The office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel, was in operation from 25 February through the end of the quarter.

(1) Safety:

(a) During the first full month of operation, the command's Army Motor Vehicle (AMV) accident rate was .39/100,000 miles, as compared with the USARV expectancy rate of 1/100,000. In April, the AMV rate was .95/100,000.

(b) In March, the personal injury (PI) rate for the command was .54/100,000 mandays, compared with the USARV expectancy rate of 5/100,000 mandays. The PI rate was 4.12/100,000 for the month of April.
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA FANG (PROV), FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1966, ECS CSF-66-05 (CVI)(U)

(2) Graves Registration. The command's graves registration capabilities were thoroughly tested during the quarter as a result of the TET offensive and the subsequent increase in allied activity in I COR.

(a) Initially, the only graves registration capability organic to the command, other than the mortuary, was a small section in the 625th SSS Company. Personnel from Qui Nhon Support Command were attached to task forces to supplement the command's organic capabilities. By spreading these available assets thinly, it was possible to meet all graves registration requirements. In April, the two graves registration platoons of the 167th Field Service Company, Can Tho Bay Support Command, were attached to this command, less personnel. When these platoons are at full strength, it will be possible to attach GR personnel to each forward collection point. Also, sufficient personnel will be available to escort remains and personal property to the Da Nang Mortuary.

(b) The US Army Mortuary, Da Nang operated in excess of 150 percent of its rated capacity during the reporting period. This achievement was made possible through an expansion of the physical facilities and the assignment of additional personnel, including some servicemen who are licensed embalmers.

(3) Personnel Funds. An account was established for the purpose of picking up daily-hire money from ESCV and distributing it to unit pay agents. This account serves both Support Command and non-support command units. The command received $15,000 from USASOC's CHQ for the months of February and March. The daily hire authorization for the command for the second quarter, CT 66, provides enough money for 26,173 man-days.

(h) Manpower Authorization. As of the end of the reporting period, the command had not received a manpower authorization voucher for direct-hire local nationals and lay-tenant of the army civilians. Seventy-three local nationals were employed at the end of the quarter.

(5) Educational Services. Army personnel in the Da Nang area are being provided education center services by the Air Force. An Army education center is planned, and personnel needs were requested in a proposed TDA for Headquarters, USASOC, POC (P.O.V).

(6) Other Sundry Funds. During the reporting period, one application for establishment of an Other Sundry Fund Club was forwarded to 1st Logistical Command.

c, (II) ADJUTANT GENERAL

(1) The Office of the Adjutant General was formed on 25 February upon activation of the United States Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov). Structured into a Personnel Management Division, a Special Services Division

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and an Administrative Service Division, the Office of the Adjutant General initially assured operational control over the 575th Army Postal Unit, located at Phu Bai and the 42nd Army Postal Unit, located between Phu Bai and Hue, and in direct support of a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division which deployed to Vietnam without postal support. The rapid build-up of 1st Logistical Command forces in the ICTZ quickly overtaxed the capability of the small local personnel section and made movement of a personnel service company into the area mandatory. Accordingly, the 516th Personnel Service Company at Cam Ranh Bay was alerted to move. An advance party of one Warrant Officer and 13 personnel specialists was immediately sent into Da Nang to cope with the growing number of personnel activities and the remainder of the company arrive in Da Nang by LST on 8 March. It was assigned to the 80th General Support Group, but came under the operational control of the Adjutant General. Because the 516th Personnel Service Company was deployed without its machine capabilities, a small type "A" personnel service company, the 400th, was sent to Da Nang from Fort Riley, Kansas, not to provide machine support but to provide extra personnel in lieu of machines. The two companies were located together forming a Personnel Service Center - again, under the operational control of the Adjutant General. There were no other organizational changes during the reporting period.

(2) The Office of the Adjutant General processed 46 Congressional and Special Interest Inquiries during the reporting period. Awards and Decorations processed are as follows:

### April 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MEDAL</th>
<th>60th</th>
<th>26th</th>
<th>152nd</th>
<th>LCD</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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### March 1960

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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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AVC1-170-OC-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, CS CSFCA-65 (R-1)(U)

(3) The reporting period was characterized by rapid growth which saw the command strength begin at 125 Officers, 22 Warrant Officers and 3,209 enlisted, culminating in the present strength of 367 Officers, 74 Warrant Officers and 7,624 Enlisted. Adjutant General activities were generally routine as modified by problems inherent in the rapid formation of a new command.

1.(c) OCCURRENCE, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

1.(b)(c) Security Division.

(a)(v) Personnel Security Program: During the reporting period, the Security Division established a personnel security program within USASUP-CCM, DMZ (PAV) with the following accomplishments.

1. Clearances Validated:
   a. SECRET: 116
   b. TOP SECRET: None

2. Request for National Agency Check: 20

3. Request for Background Investigations: 1

4. Request for US Army Investigative Records Repository Check: 20

5. Clearances Granted:
   a. SECRET: 15
   b. CONFIDENTIAL: 16

(b)(U) Security Regulations: The following regulations were published by the Security Division.

1. 380-5 - Safeguarding Defense Information
2. 380-8 - Unsolicited Correspondence
3. 380-20 - Restricted Areas
4. 610-5 - Personnel Security

(c)(U) War Trophies processed: None

(d)(C) Security Program

1.(U) Inspections: The Da Nang Field Office of the 52nd IT Detachment
arrived on site on 29 March 1968. Courtesy security inspections were made available and by late April inspections had been completed on document security at the AG Repository, Directorate of Ammunition and The ACoS, SP&O. A system of after duty hours security inspections was initiated and all elements of the headquarters were checked periodically.

2. (C) Physical Security: Contact was immediately established with adjacent intelligence units and continuous liaison has been maintained with the 525th MI; G2 III MAF; G2 I Corps; Co B, 1st Marine MI Bn; 1st Marine Div; G2, 3rd Marine MI Det; 5th Marine MI Det; ONI; OST; S2, MCB 53 and S2 Co C, 5th Special Forces. This has resulted in a maximum interchange of information and consequently a better security posture. Prior to 29 April, each compound within East Da Nang was organized on a 360 degree defense plan. The influx of new units and the establishment of additional compounds dictated that an integrated defense structure be established for the area. A Conference was held at III MAF on 29 April 1968 with a view toward integrating all defense measures into an area plan. The conference was presided over by the CO, 1st Marine MP Bn, the coordinator of defense measures for the area occupied by Da Nang Support Command. The results of the integrated defense plan has provided greater all around security with reduced personnel requirements plus provided increased measure of safety. The Security Division was active in surveying security measures of DSC units in the Da Nang TAOR and recommending strengthened defensive postures.

3. (U) Maps: Maps have been in great demand during this period of organization. The headquarters staff elements and subordinate staff elements were provided necessary maps even though initial stocks were obtained from Navy and Air Force elements in Da Nang. Resupply was established through Army channels.

4. (C) Enemy Activity:

a. The enemy was active in ICTZ especially in areas such as Hue and Dong Ha. Much of this activity was a continuum from the TET offensive which was evident throughout most of the reporting period. Of significant concern to logistical installations has been their vulnerability to rocket, mortar and in the northern most sector, artillery attacks. Installations at Ca Lu, Wunder Beach, Quang Tri, Phu Bai, Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Chu Lai and Duc Pho experienced mortar and or rocket attacks with varying degrees of damage. In addition to rocket and mortar attacks, Dong Ha installations were plagued with artillery strikes from DMZ. A continuous program of passive defense measures was followed by this command with emphasis placed upon construction of revetments, bunkers, and barricades. Security in depth has been provided for logistical installations by tactical units.

b. Enemy Terrorists. Enemy terrorists and sabotage activities took various forms during the period. In addition to conventional methods, the
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the enemy employed personnel in an attempt to lure and kidnap or assassinate military personnel. A program of orientation and indoctrination was initiated to acquaint military personnel with the dangers inherent in succumbing to sexual temptations presented by female strangers. Other incidents took the form of frogmen activities, assassination of local officials and propaganda broadcasts and leaflets and the use of riot control agents.

LOC Security. Enemy interdiction of roads and pipelines was frequent during the period. A new road was opened from Da Nang north on 1 March; however, interdiction was frequent. The Toa Van Pass area proved to be the bottleneck of this route. Interdiction tactics included mining, demolition of bridges, road cratering, and ambushes. The Hai Lang Beach Road (via LOTS site) was subject to heavy mining with the road seeded with metal objects to make clearance more difficult. Heavy interdiction of the Wunder Beach-Guang Tri and the Tan My-Hue POL pipeline was accomplished by the enemy as well as interdiction of the waterways. Especially vulnerable was the Con Vat River utilized as an LCC to Dong Ha. The interdiction of roads and inland waterways was a contributing factor in the decision to establish Wunder Beach.

(b) The beginning of this period was characterized by the build-up of 1st Logistical Command forces to support the rapid build-up of Army tactical forces in ICTZ. On 21 February 1968, the 1st Logistical Command submitted the requirements, justification and concept of employment to ICTZ. This planning document formed the basis for the units comprising the support command including more units which had to be requested from outside the RTF. During the period, a total of fifty-two 1st Logistical Command units were deployed to ICTZ. Forty-six of these units were deployed from other support commands within RTF while two units were deployed from Thailand and four from CCAU.

(b) The following plans, LOC's, etc were published by the office during this period.

1. Operation Order 1-68 was published on 27 February providing guidance and direction on the establishment and operation of Wunder Beach.

2. A time phase plan was developed and submitted to 1st Logistical Command on 8 April for the accumulation of combat service support of Army Forces in ICTZ. The basic criteria agreed upon with III MAF and Forces Logistcs Command was that Da Nang Support Command would provide supply support for all forces located between Hue and Guang Tri.

3. A Letter of Instruction was published on 31 March for the 26th (General) Support Group outlining mission and responsibilities for activities in Guang Tri and Thua Thien province (ICTZ).

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4. Twenty one General Orders were prepared for publication assigning and attaching subordinate units within the command.

5. An initial station list for the command was published 10 March 1968, reflecting current and proposed locations of the support command units including those programmed for deployment. A subsequent station list was published 29 March 1968 reflecting command and control sequence. A station list is included in this report as inclosure 2 reflecting units assigned and attached by branch, TOE, strength, applicable 1st Logistical Command and USA Support Command General Orders, date closed ICTZ and location. A standard four part station list is being prepared for publication early in the next quarter.

6. A proposed Table of Distribution and Allowances for the headquarters was submitted 24 April 1968 and was under going revision at the end of the quarter.

7. Excess equipment authorization for 180 day loan have been processed and approved by Headquarters, USARV as follows:

   a. 572nd Trans Co  
      Launcher, grenade 7-79  8 ea

   b. 29th Civil Affairs Co  
      Launcher, grenade 7-79  5 ea
      Truck, cargo, 2 1/2 ton  1 ea
      Truck, cargo, 3/4 ton  8 ea

   c. USA Depot Co, Da Nang (Prov)  
      Forklift, 4,000 lbs  2 ea
      Forklift, 6,000 lbs  6 ea
      Forklift, 15,000 lbs  2 ea

   d. 29th Ordnance EOD  
      Truck, cargo, 3/4 ton  1 ea

   e. 63rd Maint "n  
      Telephone, TA-312  24 ea

   (c) Due to initial organizational and operational requirements, formal training activities were limited. Unit training consisted primarily of OJT and classes deemed essential by subordinate commanders. Coordination was made by this headquarters for a unit armorers M-16 course for units of this command, the 16th Aviation Group and the 67th Medical Group. More active monitoring of training will be conducted in the next quarter to insure that the units follow applicable regulations resulting in a more realistic training program for the command.

   (2)(C) Operations Division.

   (a) Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS). A Logistics-Over-The-Shore site, Wunder Beach, was established during the period to augment the LOC capability in ICTZ. The increase in troop strength in ICTZ dictated the requirement that a facility capable of 1,000 3/4 per day be established.

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Subject: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (PROV) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

(b) Support Operations.

1. At the beginning of the reporting period 4 Forward Support Activities (FSA) and 2 Forward Support Teams (FST) were in being and were providing logistical support to combat operations. These FSA's and FST's were controlled by the 80th GS Gp which prior to 25 February was a subordinate command of the USASUPCOM, QNH. The FSA's and FST's operational at the beginning of the period were:

a. TF Brown at Duc Pho in support of the Americal Division.
b. TF Frazier at Hill 63 in support of the Americal Division.
c. TF Moroz at Quang Tri in support of elements of 1st Air Cav Division (ACD).
d. TF McDonald at Camp Evens in support of 1st ACD.
e. FST Slawson at Dong Ha providing logistical and maintenance support to 108th Artillery Group and other Army elements in the vicinity of Dong Ha.
f. FST Kay at Phu Bai providing logistical and maintenance support to Army elements in the vicinity.

2. Task Force Lane was deployed to the Phu Bai area to provide logistical support to the 101st ADN Division on 12 March. This eliminated the need for FST Kay which was closed out. TOE Maintenance units assumed the maintenance functions of FST Kay, TF Lane absorbed the Class V element of FST Kay and assumed operation of the Phu Bai Army ASP. The 26th General Support Group was introduced into the area to provide command and control of logistical units in NICTZ. This mission was assured on 31 March with operational control of 1st Logistical Command units north of the Hai Van Pass.

3. Two large combat operations were supported during the period.

a. Operation Pegasus. An FSA was organized and deployed to Ca Lu to provide logistical support to the 1st ACD and elements of the 3rd Marine Division. Force Logistic Command provided augmentation to TF McDonald. During the operation a total of 878,500 gallons of POL product and 228,032 rations were provided to the combat units plus 3,614 S/T Class V. The LOC utilized was route 9 from Dong Ha where a marshalling area had been established with input from Wunder Beach and Cua Viet ports.

b. Operation Delaware. Operation Delaware which was still in progress at the end of the period, was supported by TF Langley at Camp Evans and TF Lane at Camp Eagle. In addition, augmentation was provided to the 1st ACD FSE in A Luoi. An Air LOC was utilized exclusively for the support of units in the A Shau Valley. 1st Logistical Command Air Delivery units at Da Nang
and at Cam Ranh Bay had delivered some 2,270 S/T by parachute means as of the end of the period.

(4) (U) Civil Affairs Division.

(a) The great influx of 1st Logistical Command units into NICTZ has presented many problems with Civil Affairs implications. With the exception of Headquarters, USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV), no 1st Logistical Command unit operating in ICTZ has a TOE or TD authorization for a Civil Affairs Officer of S-5. This has necessitated that the Command Civil Affairs Officer spend much time assisting field commanders in the solution of problems encountered with local officials and indigenous personnel. This had an adverse effect in that staff guidance and coordination was not pursued to the extent desired because of more pressing operational matters. The major projects pursued by the Civil Affairs Officer during the period were:

1. Negotiations with local officials to obtain additional real estate in Da Nang and Quang Tri.

2. Relocation of villagers from the Wunder Beach perimeter to an area approximately three miles south of the original homesteads.

3. Negotiations involving the movement of grave sites from newly acquired property at Da Nang, Quang Tri and Camp Evans.

4. Negotiations resulting from damage or destruction of crops.

(b) A regulation providing broad general guidance on Civil Affairs to subordinate commanders was finalized during the period. The primary intent of the regulation was to make commanders aware of their Civil Affairs/Civic Action responsibility even without the presence of an authorized TOE Civil Affairs officer. During the next reporting period, it is envisioned that a viable Civil Affairs/Civic Action program will be in effect throughout the command.

g. (U) DIRECTORATE OF SUPPLY.

(1) The Directorate of Supply was formed and began operation as a directorate on 25 February 1968. The initial requirement was to establish a concept of supply operations for ICTZ. The plan established is as follows:

(a) Due to the limited capabilities of the newly formed Da Nang Depot, arrangements were made to have the Americal Division and the 1st ACD requisition all Class II and IV less common service support items and Engineer Class IV directly from the Qui Nhon Depot. The common service support items and Engineer Class IV were requisitioned directly from the Naval Support Activities (NSA) at Da Nang. The 101st Airborne Division requisitioned common service support items.
and Engineer Class IV from NSA, but all other Class II and IV were requisitioned from the Da Nang Depot. At the present time, the Da Nang Depot is having a UNIVAC 1008 installed as well as establishing an ASL to support all three divisional units. It is projected that the Depot at Da Nang will also begin supporting the Americal Division and the 1st ACD by July 1968. Common service support items and Engineer Class IV will continue to be supplied by NSA.

(b) To support the nondivisional units, ICTZ was divided into three areas of responsibility:

1. The ICTZ south of Da Nang. Due to the shortage of supply and service companies in this area, all nondivisional units requisitioned all Class II and IV supplies directly from the 23rd S&T Bn of the Americal Division. To assist this S&T Bn, the 31st Fortification and Construction Plt has been attached to handle Engineer Class IV.

2. The ICTZ from Da Nang to Hue. Again due to the lack of supply and service companies, the US Army Depot, Da Nang was required to deal in retail as well as wholesales of supplies. All nondivisional units in this area requisitioned all Class II and IV supplies from the Da Nang Depot.

3. The ICTZ from Hue north to the DMZ. All nondivisional units in this area requisitioned all Class II and IV supplies from the 625th S&S Co at Trucor Bnah. To assist in the Engineer Class IV division, the 139th Fortification and Construction Plt was attached to the 625th S&S Co.

(c) Exceptions have been made to the above when the conditions demanded. For example, the separate companies of the 1st ACD that are presently in Da Nang requisitioned from the Da Nang Depot. Also elements of the 1st ACD and the 101st Air Div north of Hue have been drawing Engineer Class IV directly from the 625th S&S Co.

(2) The directorate next concentrated on establishing initial issue of supplies to build up the stockage level of the newly formed depot as well as the 625th S&S Co. The plan for stockage of the depot consisted of nine push packages. The first five packages were to come from in country sources and consisted of 15 days supply of the 6,000 line items that initially composed the new depot's ASL. The schedule of these packages were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package #</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>B0B 29 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>ADD 10 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>ADD 25 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>ADD 10 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>ADD 25 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the in country packages, four packages were requisitioned from COMUS. These packages consisted of 30 days supply of the 6,000 line items on the ASL. The schedule of these packages were as follows:

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AVCA-DNG-GO-H

18 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command Da, Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

Package #1  RRD 20 Apr
Package #2  RRD 10 May
Package #3  RRD 25 May
Package #4  RRD 5 Jun

Close coordination was required with 1st Logistical Command to insure the timely input of these supplies. Due to many difficulties, the push packages have not been able to meet the RRD. The supplies are now coming in and although many supplies were critical initially, the supply posture of the depot has greatly improved. The build up of the 625th S&S Co was also accomplished by push packages. This directorate established a Combat Support Package (CSP) which was designed to support one brigade for 15 days with fast moving Class II. Initially six of these packages were requisitioned from in country sources. They were to be distributed as follows:

3 each to the 625th S&S Co
1 each to Task Force Langley
1 each to Task Force Moroz
1 each to Task Force Lane

Due to the fact that parts of each package were coming from different depots a great deal of difficulty was experienced in insuring all packages were complete. At the present time, all depots have reported shipping all of this initial CSP. The last three CSP’s consist of 15 days of fast moving Class II for three brigades. These are presently being shipped to TF Langley (2 each) and TF Lane (1 each). These three packages are the last of the push packages. It is believed by this directorate that although push packages are not the most economical method of resupply, in the initial stages of a build up as was the case in ICTZ, it is the only effective way. With the development of the ASL by the Depot and establishment of RO’s, all supplies will be requisitioned by the conventional method.

(3) Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS). The 625th S&S Co was deployed to the beach on 12 March to operate the Class II and IV supply area. The build up and supply of this area is discussed above. This concept has proven to be an essential asset in the support of the units in northern ICTZ. For the period of 12 March to 27 April, the 625th S&S Co received 46,908 short tons of Class II and IV supplies and issued 24,149 short tons. The largest portion of these supplies have been in Engineer Class IV which were so vitally needed in the build up of Army troops in ICTZ.

(4) Operations. The initial stockage for Operation Pegasus was 2,114.5 short tons of construction and fortification materials. The primary sources of supply for this material were the 625th S&S Co at Wunder Beach and the Naval Supply Activities (NSA), Da Nang. All supplies were moved from these two locations to a holding area at Dong Ha. From Dong Ha, the 57th Trans Bn moved all supplies by convoy into Ca Lu to TF McDonald. On 1 April, 2,305 short tons of construction and fortification materials were at Ca Lu. During the ensuing days of the operation, an additional 400 short tons of replenishment stocks were moved to Dong Ha. Due to the short duration of the operation, these
supplies were never utilized and were returned to the 625th S&S Co.

(5) Difficulty was experienced in the claiming stages in support of operations in ICTZ since there was not an accurate list of troops to be supported in the area. In addition, due to the fluid situation, many of the units were deployed without the knowledge of this headquarters. This made it very difficult to adequately plan support of Class II and IV Commodities.

(6) Training.

(a) 15-18 April: Maj Caleen, Closed Loop Project Officer for the USSUPCOM, CSC visited this headquarters and conducted informal classes on the Closed Loop System for members of this command, the Da Nang Depot and representatives from Da Nang Sub-Area Command. The classes lasted three days and were aimed at establishing a better understanding of the system and the requirements imposed by it.

(b) 19 April to Present: LTC Fren and 9 other members from out of country began work at the Da Nang Depot. This 10 man team has been established to assist in the organization and development of the newly formed US Army Depot, Da Nang. This depot assistance team will work with the depot for 90 days. In addition to the team, Mr. Wong, representative from Computer Science Corporation (CSC) is assisting the depot with the installation of the IBM 1005 computer system.

(c) 22-23 April: CPT Vickers, Liaison Representative of data processing, 1st Logistical Command, arrived to set up the class on the ICR 500. On 23 April, the team arrived and presented the class to 20 representatives of the units in ICTZ who currently are using the PCF 500. This was a one day class.

(7) This directorate has acted on 5 Reports of Survey during the period 28 February to 30 April. The total amount of loss to the government was $4,676.56. The items were the theft of a 1.5 KW generator, M16 E1 rifle and a 1/2 ton 1351 truck. The other two surveys were for accidents; one on a 2 1/2 ton M3512 truck and a 1.5 KW generator.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

h. (U) DIRECTORATE OF FOOD

(1) Upon activation of USASUCOM, DINIC (PPIOV) on 25 February 1968, the Director of Food was established with the Director of Supply. With the arrival of LTC Frank J. Gigliotti on 1 April 1968, as Director of Food, the two directorates assumed separate responsibilities.

(2) On 15 April 1968 issues of "B" and MCI rations, began from Wunder Beach (625th S&S Co) to the supported FSA's. Initial requirements were met by shipment of 30 days supply of MCI's and "B"s for 35,000 troops. Perishable ration support continued to be handled by FLG-B until 20 April 1968, at which time the USS Contest arrived at Wunder Beach with "A" rations. Issues to FSA's began on 21 April 1968.

(3) The use of the USS Contest, a Novel contracted refrigerated vessel, as an off-shore resupply base reduced the requirement for pre-fabricated refrigeration at the Class I Supply Point from the originally planned 15 days of supply, to 10 days of supply. NSA stressed that the stocks on the USS Contest did not belong to the Army until offloaded into Army reefer banks and that NSA reserved the right to resupply other Class I points if the critical need arose. To date, the ship has not been diverted.

(4) The Bakery Platoon of the 34th S&S Bn was sent to Wunder Beach under operational control of the 625th S&S Co. This bakery commenced issuing fresh bread on 20 April 1968. The first issues of bread were in the amount of 7,000 pounds per day but had climbed to 12,000 pounds per day by the end of the reporting period.

(5) Planning was completed to erect an ice cream plant at Wunder Beach. A cement pad was installed; a 50 gal/hour continuous flow ice cream machine was requisitioned on a priority basis; a production and delivery schedule was finalized and work was started on the erection of a building to house this plant. Requisitions were placed for 30 days supply of containers and mix, and freezer space was set aside for storage of the product. Insulated containers were constructed to permit issues of ice cream direct to company size messes in an acceptable condition. Actual production and issue is anticipated during May.

(6) TF Lane in support of LZ Eagle at Phu Bai continued to receive Class I support from FLG-A at Phu Bai, however, ice cream machines, containers, mix and unit mess shippers are being sent to permit an ice cream producing capability at this location. Fresh fruits and vegetables flown from the Saigon area started arriving on 29 April 1968 and are continuing, on a schedule of one plane load (C-130) every second day. On alternate days, one plane load is shipped to Quang Tri.

(7) A similar ice cream capability is being installed at TF Langley. Containers, freezers, mix, unit mess shippers and ice cream machines are being shipped at this time. Meanwhile, work has started on a facility to house the plant.

(8) Support for TF McDonald at Camp Evans and TF Morse at Quang Tri continued from FLSG-B in Dong Ha from activation of the command until 15 April when "B" and MCI rations support from Wunder Beach was initiated.

(9) Army troops in the Da Nang area receive Class I supplies from the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang, through the Army liaison team located there.

(10) Chu Lai: Receives Class I supplies from NSA located at Chu Lai. Issues are made to Americal Division units in the area and to TF Hendrickson. An Army bakery is in operation at Chu Lai producing approximately 12,000 lbs of bread daily. This bakery supplies all US Forces in SICTZ south of Da Nang.

(11) TF Brown: Receives milk from the Foremost plant at NSA, Chu Lai. Bread comes from the Army bakery at Chu Lai and is flown daily to TF Brown with the milk. Other Class I supplies arrive via LCU and refrigerated barge from NSA, Da Nang.

(12) Initial planning commenced on a system to supply fresh milk to troops located in NICTZ. Planning conferences were held with the Foremost Milk Plant at NSA, Da Nang, and TMA at the 15 Aerial Port. It has been determined that enough milk can be produced and that it can be shipped to the Aerial Port. Remaining plans call for dedicated air-ships of approximately 30,000 pints of fresh milk per day. (20,000) to TF Langley and 10,000 to Quang Tri). Final planning is now being coordinated with TMA, 15th Aerial Port, Da Nang, for this air-shipment on a dedicated basis.

1. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM

(1) During this period it was necessary for this command to equip three rotary-winged refuel systems in quick succession. In each case large amounts of 1½ inch hose and nozzles and 2 inch hose and nozzles were required. Due to the fact that the standard Fuel System Supply Point is equipped with only a few sections of 1½ inch and 2 inch hose and nozzles many problems were encountered in getting sufficient quantities in a timely manner. This rotary-winged refuel system should have included as a minimum, 600 feet of 1½ inch hose, 300 feet of 2 inch hose, 1500 feet of 4 inch hose, 8 each 1½ inch nozzles and 4 each 2 inch nozzles.

(2) Construction of the Wunder Beach POL facility began on the class III facility with the NCB's clearing the POL area by 10 April 1968. Berms for the storage of 10,000 gallon collapsible bags and package POL product were constructed by the 14th Engineers. Additional berms have been added as required. PST matting was also laid for the helicopter miniport and the sling out area. This project was completed by 18 April. Concurrently the 625th S&S Co, POL Platoon, was assigned the mission of establishing and operating the class III POL point. This POL facility remained under construction until 15 April 68, with the following completion dates for the various portions; the Marine collapsible bag farm - 12 March 68; helicopter refueling point - 12 April 68; internal road net - 15 April 1968.

(3) LOTS Operations:

a. Also constructed was an eight point tank truck refueling station, a 500 gallon drum refill station with sling out pod, packaged petroleum storage, an eight point helicopter refueling facility and a Marine operated 500,000 gallon A product bulk petroleum bag farm capable of receiving A products directly from 2 sea lines, 6 and 4 inches each.

b. Construction of an eight inch pipeline from Wunder Beach to Quang Tri was initiated during this reporting period with completion date in May. The pipeline will be connected directly to the ship to shore sea lines obviating the need to pump product to Quang Tri from the 10,000 gallon collapsible POL bags. A segment of this line will also be laid to Camp Evans at a later date.

(4) Continued frequent pipeline interdiction caused excessive disruption of pipeline pumping operations. Also, roads continued to be heavily mined resulting in considerable delays in opening the road each day. Examples of these road opening delays are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Apr</td>
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<td>16 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) On 22 March 68, this command was given the requirement of establishing a petroleum storage and handling facility in support of Operation Pegasus. This facility became operational 1 April 1968 at LZ Stud.
The class III facility included 26 - 10,000 gallon collapsible bags for bulk fuel storage. Also included as a bulk and retail refueling capability for all POL products to include 3 separate aircraft refueling points.

A total of 32 - 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks were supplied to the task force with six held in reserve. The Marines were tasked with bulk storage facility while the Army operated the retail outlets.

On 7 April 1968, four leaking tanks and two others destroyed by rockets were replaced from the reserves.

Effective 11 April 1968, a gradual phase down of Operation Pegasus was initiated. A redistribution of equipment assets began on that date in preparation for future operations.

Adequate dispersion of POL handling equipment was achieved by setting up 4 separate POL farms, in support of helicopter refueling operations and one vehicle refueling operation. The effectiveness of this plan was proven when a rocket hit in the center of one of the JP-4 farms destroying 2 - 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks and 4 sections of hose. There was no fire and only a small amount of product was lost. POL operations continued without interruption.

The shortage of POL handling equipment in ICTZ made it necessary to requisition tanks, hoses, fitting, pumps, and filter separators directly from 1st Log Command. Short lead time intensified the problem.

The only major difficulty encountered during the operation of the POL facility was a lack of adequate communications at the outset. This resulted in some initial overstockage which was resolved by 29 March 68 when adequate communications were established.

POL Operations in ICTZ

Line Fill Capacities are as follows:

1. Dong Ha/Qunh Tri, 6", 610 Bbls, 4.5 mi
2. Quang Tri/Evans, 8" + 6", 5,240 Bbls, 23 mi
3. Wunder Beach/ Hai Lang, 6", 2,300 Bbls, 7 mi
4. Camp Evans/ Hue, 8" + 6", 3,800 Bbls, 15 mi
5. Tan My/Hue, 6", 1,250 Bbls, 5.9 mi
6. Hue/Phu Bai, 6", 2,150 Bbls, 12 mi
7. TOTAL: 15,650 Bbls, 68.4 miles
b. Tank Farms include the Army operated 456M gallon facility at Dong Ha, 126M gallons of which is steel tankage, a 500M gallon storage capacity at Quang Tri plus 500M gallon storage at Wunder Beach. There is 632M gallons of storage at Phu Bai with 252M gallons in hard storage, all under Marine control. The Navy has a 2,058M gallon capacity storage area at Tan My.

c. Pumping stations will be located at Wunder Beach, Camp Evans, Tan My, and Dong Ha.

d. The Dong Ha/Quang Tri and the Tan My/Phu Bai segments of the pipeline have been completed. Pumping operations have commenced.

e. The Wunder Beach/Quang Tri line is due for completion o/a 16 May 68.

f. Other pipeline completion dates have not been announced.

g. A tank farm is scheduled for completion at Quang Tri o/a 15 June 68.

h. A tank farm is contemplated for Phu Bai. Two tanks have been completed, no announced date for completion of the remainder.

i. The completed pipeline segments, (Dong Ha/Quang Tri and Tan My/Hue/Phu Bai) have operated at only a fraction of pumping capacity. The enemy situation dictates that all pumping and maintenance activities be carried out during daylight hours. Pipeline breaks occurred daily. Most damage was occasioned by vehicles knocking pipe out of alignment or actually crushing pipeline sections. Daily damage by vehicles when coupled with routine daily repair requirements and periodic enemy interdiction has resulted in a disproportionate share of each day being devoted to repairs rather than pumping operations.

j. The assignment of the Petroleum Platoon of the 148th SSS Co under TOL 29-217F has created some problems in equipment authorization and MOS’s. The bulk of the authorized EM are MOS - 56C, Petroleum Storage Specialists. Some important shortages include MOS - 62B, Engineer Equipment (Tarp) Mechanics, and MOS - 72B, Communications Specialists. Equipment not authorized under TOL 29-217F, but required for this mission includes communication equipment, bolted steel tank erection outfits, pipeline construction tool kits, and special purpose vehicles. Many other shortages exist in the area of housekeeping and maintenance equipment. These items are required to make this platoon self sufficient.
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1. (U) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

(a) Class V Supply

During the build-up in February and March in NICTZ ammunition tonnages moved have increased significantly.

1. Da Nang ASP
   Jan 68-19800 S/T
   Feb 68-22100 S/T
   Mar 68-29900 S/T
   Apr 68-19410 S/T

2. The Support Command handled a total of 112000 S/T of ammunition in March and 104,895 S/T in April. The LOTS SITE (Wunder Beach) received 1147.7 S/T of ammunition and issued 9254 for the period 10 March to 30 April; an average of 400 S/T per day. The off loading of deep draft ammunition ships at Wunder Beach has proven to be very efficient and economical operation. 105mm howitzer ammunition which is used in large volume in NICTZ and constitutes a large portion of tonnage handled, has been the primary item of Class V handled across the beach. To date, two ships, the Crain Victory and the Transribbean Victory, carrying 105mm howitzer ammunition, have been off loaded and the third, the Crain Victory on its second trip, is on site.

(b) Resupply of Calu was accomplished satisfactorily by utilizing Land LOC from Wunder Beach, Dong Ha, and Quang Tri. From 25 March to 1 April 2500 S/T of Class V were positioned at Calu. Of the 20 Cells requested for storage, only 13 50X70', one CS pad, and one pad for unserviceable ammunition were constructed when the operation terminated.

2. Ammunition Organization IOTZ

(a) As of 1 Jan 68, the ammunition structure in IOTZ consisted of TF Brown at Duc Pho, the 205th Ordnance Platoon at Chu Lai, TF Frazier at Hill 63, the 40th Ordnance Detachment at Da Nang, TF Keys at Phu Bai and TF Slawson at Dong Ha. During Feb 68, a M6 Platoon from the 630th Ordnance Company and a platoon from the 40th Ordnance Company (-) were moved into NICTZ from TASSC and SGI respectively. During March 68, TF Lane was organized at Phu Bai and TF Mc Donald at Calu. Our structure at the end of the reporting period was:

1. TF Brown - Duc Pho
   Personnel and Equipment from 184th Ordnance Battalion.

2. 205th Ordnance Platoon - Chu Lai
   Assigned to the 80th GS Gp


4. 10th Ordnance Company: One Platoon is at Tay Mihn operating an ASP. The company operates the Da Nang ASP and has personnel at Phu Bai, Khe Sanh, Quang Tri, Dong Ha and Cai Linh.

5. TF Lane - Phu Bai: Personnel and equipment from 184th Ordnance Battalion augmented by 10th Ordnance Company personnel.

6. TF Longley - Cam Lo: Personnel and Equipment from 184th Ordnance Battalion augmented by 10th Ordnance Company personnel.

7. 6th Ordnance Detachment (Amo) - Wunder Beach: Assigned to the 159th Transportation Battalion to operate Wunder Beach ASP.

8. TF Moroz - Quang Tri: 630th Ordnance Platoon (-) from 184th Ordnance Battalion, 10th Ordnance Platoon (-) and the 630th VAG Platoon.

10. TF McDonald - Gia Linh: Personnel and Equipment from 10th Ordnance Company phased out in April.

(b) Personnel and equipment presently being utilized within I CTZ came from assets of three support commands (Saigon, Con Thanh Gia and Gia Pho). This structure was organizationally weak.

(c) An organic ammunition company is processed into the country in June 1966 to be stationed at Quang Tri with a portion of the company at Dong Ha. Personnel will be furnished to two task forces in ICTZ from the unit. The 10th Ordnance Company (-) will continue to operate the Da Nang ASP, and furnish TF personnel to the SICTZ. The company will still be minus one organic platoon with a platoon of the 630th Ordnance Company attached. The 205th Ordnance Platoon will continue to operate the Chu Lai ASP and the 6th Ordnance Detachment will continue its mission at Wunder Beach until this activity is deactivated.

(d) An ammunition battalion headquarters is an urgent requirement for ICTZ in order to achieve strong command and control over ammunition organizations attached to the support commands and assist in task force operations. The expected arrival of another ammunition company emphasized the importance of this. An ammunition battalion headquarters has tentatively been planned for October 1966.

(e) A request was made to III MAF for 11,000 additional short tons storage space in Da Nang. This additional space will accommodate the 21,000 3/2 Stockage Objective considered to be the minimum acceptable level to support US Army Forces in I CTZ. To meet this requirement III MAF proposes to:
1. Construct three additional 5 Cell Modules and one 4 Cell Module in ASP #1. (Da Nang – Vic 1st Marine Division).

2. Construct three 5 Cell Modules previously planned for ASP #2, (Da Nang Red Beach Area).

3. Expand the perimeter of ASP #2 eastward and construct four additional 5 Cell Modules.

4. Offer to the US Army 17 Storage Pads in the Western portion of the ASP #2.

(g) Construction of the new Quang Tri ASP is scheduled to begin on 20 May 68. This ASP will have a storage capacity of 8000 S/T and will be operated by the Ordnance Company scheduled in country in June 68.

(g) A site has been selected for a new ASP at Camp Evans. The reason for the relocation is safety hazards presented by its present location.

k. (C) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION

(1) (C) During the reporting period, 186,621 S/T of army cargo were received and distributed in support of units in northern IGTZ. The following tonnage was handled by the mode and location:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Ships Worked</th>
<th>DA NANG</th>
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(2) Port Performance (S/T)

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|                  | 20816     | 1053  | 32313   | 10913 | 36690 | 47651 |

(3) Highway Performance (S/T)

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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Haul</td>
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AVCA-DNG-G0-65
18 May 1968

(4) Airlift (S/T)    DA NANG    LOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>219.25</td>
<td>1407.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1603.3</td>
<td>1603.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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(2) (C) For the reporting period, Transportation Truck Units carried 100,465 S/T of cargo to the major distribution points in northern I Corps. Significant activities included daily support of Khe Sanh via Route 9 which was continuously subjected to enemy artillery fire from above the DMZ.

(3) (C) With the advent of the LOTS on 5 March 68, large volumes of cargo began to flow into NICIZ via Attack Cargo Ships provided by Task Force 76. The acquisition of cargo and scheduling of ports of call were coordinated by USASUPCOM, DEG (PROV). During this phase of operations, considerable difficulties were encountered in the staging of available cargo at southern ports, proper stowage and documenting of cargo. As a result, huge backlogs of material and equipment developed. Through extensive coordination with COMNAVSEAPACT and various 1st Logistical Command Agencies, the backlog began to dwindle by late March and cargo offerings were directed to the normal shipping channels, i.e. USAMACV-T/A. Toward the end of the reporting period, an alarming trend had developed. Cargo emanating from southern ports now arrived in NICIZ primarily by LST. This trend will result in severe bottlenecks of LST's at the LOTS site if allowed to continue. Presently only one LST can accomplish discharge at LOTS. The fact that deep draft offerings have tapered off for the LOTS has resulted in the non-employment of its maximum capability. LOTS is properly should be mainly a deep draft operation.

(4) (U) A lack of local haul transport existed in Da Nang during February and March. This prompted the requirement for a local haul contractor within a short period of time due to the COMNAVSEAPACT's limited capability to fulfill its Common User Land Transport (CULT) responsibilities. During late March, Navy indicated its intent to fulfill its CULT responsibilities. As a result, the local haul contract was cancelled. At present, port clearances can not be affected in a timely manner as a result of inadequate lift capability, shortages of LST at both the loading and discharge sites and due to the critical shortage of sufficient storage facilities. To assist in alleviating these conditions, cargo expeditors have been located at aerial ports and seaports throughout I Corps to achieve a system of perpetual motion freight until arrival at final destination.
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(5) (U) The cargo arriving at aerial and water ports in ICTZ indicate a need for added emphasis in the area of documentation and marking/labeling of cargo. A portion of the backlogs being created throughout RVN developed from the lack of adequate documentation and markings thereby causing frustrated cargo and time consuming procedures to properly route trans ship cargo. To preclude a continuation of this situation, COMNAVSUPPACT in coordination with USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV), has instituted a policy of inspection of all cargo destined for ICTZ ports prior to movement beyond Da Nang. This system is being reinforced by locating cargo expeditors at all aerial ports to handle air shipments routed directly into ICTZ destinations by shippers outside of ICTZ.

(6) (U) Due to the operational requirements, only limited training was conducted during the reporting period. Training has been integrated in order to avoid disruption of the logistical resupply of combat forces.

(7) M16A1 rifles were issued to the 57th Trans Bn during the period.

(8) Seven M35A2 armor plated trucks were received and issued to the 57th Trans Bn for use in support of convoy operations.

(9) Increased equipment availability has been realized in all areas of transportation operations as a result of the influx of repair parts during the reporting period.
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AVCA-ING-GO-H
18 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Frov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

1. (U) DIRECTORATE OF RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL

(1) The basic mission of the directorate is to exercise overall staff supervision of command retrograde and property disposal operations, and to monitor and coordinate mission related activities of subordinate commands and staff sections of the headquarters.

(2) Retrograde: Prior to the establishment of the Da Nang Support Command, evacuation of retrograde materiel from the ICTZ was the responsibility of the Qui Nhon Support Command. To provide some CCS capability for the Da Nang Support Command, a 50 man detachment from the 526th CCS Company Qui Nhon was placed on TDY at Da Nang. The advance party of 14 EN and 1 officer arrived 22 March 1968 and were followed by the main contingent on 28 April 1968. Collection points were expanded to provide area service at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Camp Evans, Camp Eagle and Phu Bai in ICTZ and at Hill 63, Chu Lai and Due Fho in SICTZ. Materiel was evacuated to Qui Nhon or Cam Ranh Bay for retrograde. The CCS Activity became operational on 26 April 1968 and had a total of 188 S/T of retrograde assets on hand at the end of the reporting period. Operations are being conducted by borrowing as many cranes and M77s as possible and will continue to be hampered until the equipment requested is provided. Initial shipments of materiel to out-of-country destinations will be initiated in early May 1968.

(3) Property Disposal: The Da Nang Support Command (Frov) assumed responsibility for property disposal in the ICTZ from the Qui Nhon Support Command. The disposal activity at Da Nang was operational throughout the entire quarter. A second facility at Chu Lai is presently being constructed. Opening is pending completion of road nets and hardstand in the area and additional preparation of the access roads. During February, the activity received 600 S/T of usable property and scrap, and by April generations had increased to 2,720 S/T. Almost all of the generations at the beginning of the quarter were Marine, Navy, and Air Force; however, in April Army generations made up approximately 10% of the total. Removals have gone from 190 and 180 S/T in February and March to 520 S/T in April. The beginning of the quarter was the start of the Tet offensive; therefore, very few contract removals were made in February and March. The removals are expected to increase sharply with the 520 S/T being removed in April as an indicator. At the end of the reporting period there were 10,440 S/T of usable property and scrap in the Da Nang Activity.

m. (C) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

(1) In early February only two maintenance companies and several maintenance teams were located in ICTZ. These companies, the 586th Maint Co (DIV)(DS) in support of the Americal Division and non-divisional units in Chu Lai, and the 85th LM Company, in support of non-divisional units in Da Nang, had been performing a mission in ICTZ for some time. Small maintenance teams were located at Duc Pho, Hill 63 (TF Hendrickson) Phu Bai, and Dong Ha. In slightly over two months, field maintenance assets grew to 8 companies — 6 direct support and 2 general support.

With the exception of general support, maintenance responsibilities were split along group lines with the 26th Group responsible north of Hai Van Pass and the 80th Group south of the Pass. General support maintenance responsibility is Corps - wide with a light equipment maintenance company attached to one Group and a heavy equipment maintenance company attached to the other. The southern ICTZ continued with the two maintenance companies previously located there (85th LM and 586th (DIV)(DS)). A third company, the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Co. (GS) was moved into the Da Nang area to provide heavy equipment general support maintenance to ICTZ. This unit will also assist in operation of the collection, classification, and salvage activity to be established in this area until a CC&S Co can be deployed from CONUS. It was augmented with a detachment of personnel from the 526th CC&S Company at Qui Nhon until the new company arrives. Northern ICTZ has undergone the greatest change. This area, formerly supported only by task forces and teams, has received five maintenance companies — two division direct support, one light maintenance company, one light equipment maintenance (GS), and one main support company. The 129th Main Support Company, the 506th LM Co, and the 63rd Battalion Hqs were located at Quang Tri. The 129th Main Support Company will provide greatly improved repair parts support since it is much closer to the customers in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha area than Da Nang which was the nearest repair source previously. In addition, electronics, engineer, and ordnance support will be improved. The 506th Light Maintenance Company will support the large automotive and engineer workload in this area and operate a contact team at Wunders Beach. The 176th Maintenance Company (DIV)(DS) in the Camp Evans area, provides backup support of the 1st Cav Div and support of non-divisional units. The 67th Maintenance Company (DIV)(DS), located at Camp Eagle, supports the 101st Abn Div and non-divisional units in that area. The 576th Light Equipment Maintenance Company, which closed into Phu Bai area on 22 April, has the light equipment general support mission for ICTZ. The northern sector will not have a CC&S activity, however, there will be a collecting point operated at each DS unit.
(2) (C) The first few weeks of the directorate operation were centered around coordinating the movement of maintenance units into ICTZ and coordinating initial maintenance operations of the newly arrived units. Due to lack of transportation, maintenance units were as much as 8 weeks late in closing at their new locations and in starting operations. Consequently, a substantial backlog existed before the first wrench was turned. This clogged the ICTZ maintenance effort to start from a less than favorable position. During the first two months, a large percentage of the available manhours of the Directorate of Maintenance Staff was expended in expediting repair parts. By necessity, the attention of the D of M Staff was focused where the situation was the most critical. Little effort could be given to the long term aspect of the maintenance mission as extensive efforts were required just to keep deadline rates down to levels which would permit the mission to continue. Information flow from both using units and the DSU’s was extremely sketchy in the initial phases of the build-up. Many hours a day were expended attempting to find out what equipment was deadlined and what parts were needed to repair the deadlined equipment. Both supported and supporting units had to be brought into the deadline reporting system so that assistance could be given and major problem areas determined. Support density information is still deficient but is improving steadily. Unit prescribed load list (FLL) submissions to their supporting DSU’s have fallen behind the time in which they should have been submitted. This has delayed the purification of authorized stockage lists (ASL’s) which will have a long term effect on parts supply in I Corps. This condition is gradually being overcome by personal contact of the maintenance units with supported units.

(3) (C) Organization: As maintenance units arrive and become fully operational in NICTZ, the Forward Support Activities (FSA’s) which preceded them are being phased out. The 129th Main Support Co has absorbed the maintenance mission of TF Moroz and the 67th Maint Company (DIV) (DS) has absorbed the responsibilities of Team Kay.
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n. (U) COMMAND ENGINEER

(1) Real Estate.

(a) Real Estate in ICTZ is requested and procured through the Representative, Commander US Naval Forces, Vietnam, Da Nang. All necessary information can be obtained in regulation 1101,1 NAVFORV REP DNG INST.

(b) LTC Berry, the Command Engineer for the Qui Nhon Support Command, began investigating land acquisition and usage prior to the forming of the Da Nang support Command (Prov). The Da Nang Sub-Area Command had approximately 100 acres of land for its use in East Da Nang. The section commonly called East Da Nang is a narrow strip of land running generally southward from a large mountain mass called Monkey Mountain. It is bordered on the west by the Da Nang River, on the east by the South China Sea, and terminates at what is known locally as Marble Mountain. The soil is generally a very fine sand and is predominately sand dunes or marsh. After all available real estate was inspected and all factors were considered, the decision was made to locate the Da Nang Support Command in East Da Nang.

(c) The first section of land procured was located directly across the main Marble Mountain road from DSAC compound and comprised 18.3 acres. To utilize all available land for depot open storage, horizontal construction effort was directed to level the entire area. This caused problems in fencing and steep fill slopes at some boundary points. Complaints were received from the local village representatives that encroachment of private property had occurred. Apologies were made and settlements contracted between the Army and the local land owners. An agreement with Navy representative of RMK-BRJ gained an additional 22.4 acres. The Support Command Headquarters Compound is utilizing 4.1 acres while the other 18.4 acres will be depot open storage cleared of RMK-BRJ material presently stored in the area. High deadline equipment rates have kept RMK from clearing the area in an acceptable time frame. The Support Command has supplied fork lifts in support of the transfer of material but certain items such as sheet steel require heavier equipment that cannot be supplied through Army efforts in Da Nang.

(d) Another 43.5 acres was acquired just north of Marble Mountain and will become cantonment and work area for a Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company and a Collection, Classification and Storage yard.

(e) Awaiting finalization is another 17.1 acres that present plans call for a battalion cantonment and small storage area. This will then increase the land available to 1st Logistical Command in the Da Nang area to 202.3 acres.

(f) Excellent support has been established between the Navy Real Estate personnel and the Da Nang Support Command Engineers. Minimum essential
requirements have been met and priorities and justification for utilization of additional property is continuing.

(2) MCA Construction.

(a) When the Da Nang Support Command was formalized on 25 February 1968, steps had already begun to rectify the serious shortage of depot and cantonment facilities. Initiated and submitted to lst Logistical Command were two DD Forms 1391 for increased depot open and covered storage and a data processing facility. The ADP facility is currently being constructed and the plans are being prepared for additional structures.

(b) Three DD Forms 1391's were submitted through the headquarters. Two were for a 505 and 876 man cantonment, and the third for area and security lighting for the four major depot locations. The cantonment requirements have not stabilized within the command. Prior to the DD Form 1391 for lighting being submitted, it was realized that the requirements for cantonment had exceeded that requested. A study is presently being conducted to ascertain the additional requirements and an increase in scope will be prepared and submitted through this headquarters.

(c) While 1391's were being prepared for submittal, work commenced on depot open storage. An area of 18.3 acres was leveled through the efforts of the 35th Engineer Battalion (combat). Initial plans called for a six inch cap of laterite but it soon became apparent that the inaccessibility of laterite within the immediate area would greatly increase the construction effort. Therefore, an agreement was reached to cap only 197,000 sq. ft, and the road net. The estimated 450,000 square feet of matting and membrane then had to be placed over the untreated and roughly leveled sandy terrain.

(d) Problems immediately arose while trying to spread the membrane over the soft sand. Ruts were produced that could not be removed and trying to lay the matting with transient personnel compounded the problems involved by having an unlevel surface. A solution was found when the use of membrane was discontinued in favor of keeping the sand smooth and level. The use of transients was also discontinued and the project turned over to an Engineer Detachment. The matting (407,660 sq. ft.) has performed exceptionally well and has resulted in savings since the costly membrane was not required.

(3) Repair and Utilities.

(a) During this quarter, the PA&E continued to provide R&U support in the Da Nang and Hue/Phu Bai areas. However, an ISSA has been negotiated and accepted by the Navy for the provision of R&U type support in the Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Chu Lai and Da Nang. Although this ISSA has an effective date of 1 December 1967, it is anticipated that support will not be totally effective until 1 September 1968. Preliminary discussions with the local
Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for period ending 30 April 1968, ASC CSFSC-65 (E-1)(U)

Public Works officer have been completed, and the Navy will assume support of Army units in the Da Nang City area from 1-15 May. Take over of responsibilities in the Da Nang West area will be at a later date on a phased basis.

(b) In order to provide for new work in excess of $500 and less than $10,000, which is beyond the scope of the JSR, a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) has been issued to provide $300,000 for the last quarter FY 68. This MIPR will be renewed quarterly. For new work in excess of $10,000, a separate MIPR will be issued by lst Logistic Command upon approval of a project.

(5) Contract Laundry Operation. Initially there was only one laundry contract operating for the Army in the I Corps. This was located in the Da Nang area. Effective 15 March, negotiations were completed and arrangements made through the US Navy Contracting Officer for contractual laundry service at Phu Bai and Chu Lai. During the month of March, these services amounted to $88,095.00. With the contract in full operation in April, this cost increased to $228,737.06. In anticipation of greater participation by all units in the area, $166,000 has been requested for FY 69.

(5) Field Laundry & Bath. A total of five field laundries were in operation during this period. On 15 March, the equipment from TF Silver was consolidated at Chu Lai with TF Peros. Field laundry production during the month of March and April amounted to 1,006,023 pounds. Problem areas have developed with the supply of repair parts for the Standard "B" equipment and the 10 KW generators on the Field equipment. Wherever possible, larger generators are being made available as a central power source.

(U) COMMAND CHAPLAIN. The Chaplain's activity began operation on 29 February 1968. USAISUCON, PAC (P:07) has eight chaplains assigned. Seven Protestant and one Catholic. The chaplains are with the headquarters, three to 60th GS Group, two at 20th GS Group and one to 59th TCI On (TEL SVC). Jewish Services are handled by III MAF and the Naval hospital, both in the Da Nang Area. The following information concerning the chaplain's program is furnished for the reporting period.

Total attendance at all services: 1,932
Total number of services conducted: 123
Number of interviews and counseling: 150
Community relations activities: 26
Parish activities (Choir, Bible Study): 35
Character guidance instruction: 60
Character guidance instruction on attendance: 1,077

(U) PROVOST MARSHALL. The Provost Marshal section was completely operational by 1 March. Liaison was immediately established with more
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16 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Company, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, HCS OCPGO-65 (S-D(U)

than twenty agencies/units directly involved with law enforcement and security operations in the Da Nang area. Coordination and Liaison was also established with the area and local Provost Marshal of both the Marines and Army. Courtesy physical security inspections were started and by the end of April, over half of the main areas used by USASUCOF, RNG (RNG) in the Da Nang area had been surveyed.

(1) During the period 11 March through 30 April, the Information Office carried publicities of this command's logistical support activities for Operation Pegasus and Operation Pegasus. Special features, articles and news releases were also released on the command's Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS), operation at Hurner Beach in Thon My Thuy. During this period, special emphasis was put on "photo journalism", to increase the readers' attention on this command's activities and the vital role the logistical soldier plays in the war effort.

(2) Press liaisons have been established with neighboring Air Force, Marine and Navy press officers. Overwhelming cooperation has been received from AFVN radio and television stations, Da Nang. Three sergeants majors from this command were on a 30-minute television program to expose and publicize the missions and functions since this command's recent activation and command to the I Corps' Da Nang area.

(3) This office has also taped 15 radio interviews of the command's personnel and activities and featured these on the local AFVN radio station. Reports indicate that these broadcasts have been a great morale factor for the command's logistical soldiers.

(4) The following releases have been made by this office for the period 11 March through 30 April 1968:

Hometown News Releases: 309
Hometown Radio Tapes: 25
News Feature Stories: 22
News Photos: 11

x.(U) COMMAND JUDGE ADVOCATE. A summary of the Command Judge Advocate section activities are as follows.

General Courts-Martial: 0
Article 32 Investigation: 1
Special Courts-Martial: 12
Summary Courts-Martial: 8
Article 15 Punishment: 166
Legal Assistance Cases: 156
Personnel Claims: Filed: 20
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Personnel Claims: Forwarded: 1
That: 15
Withdrawn: 4

Foreign Claims: Investigations Requested: 12
Otherwise disposed of: 1

a. (U) COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. Upon activation, the Communications
Section encountered several problem areas which were:

(1) Lack of organic signal capabilities other than staff sections.

(2) Trunking facilities were inadequate for USASUCM, DFM (PROV) to con-
duct operations.

(3) There was overcrowding of Radio Teletype and Simple Side Radio
nets caused by common users at USASUCM, CS and USASUCM, DFM (PROV).
Eventually, secured frequencies were obtained and divided radio teletypewriter
nets were established with USASUCM, CS (PROV) taking over as Net Control
Station of the southern portion and USASUCM, CS retaining net control for the
southern portion of the radio teletype net.

t. (U) HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT. Upon activation of 02 February 1968, the
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment was composed of 115 personnel.
The Headquarters Commandant had to provide sufficient office space for the direc-
torates and staff sections and billeting and mess facilities for the enlisted
personnel. The area required by the staff sections far exceeded the space
available and it was necessary to acquire a number of porta-cabins for office
space. Also, ten truck vans were shipped here from the US to be utilized
as office space. The Comptroller, Information Office and Provost Marshal
utilized the porta-cabins while the Command Judge Advocate and Command
Engineer are operating from the truck vans.

(1) Ten tents were erected by troop labor to billet the CCO's and enlisted
personnel assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. Each tent
had lighting facilities and each was furnished a foot and wall locker. How-
ever, 24 billets are crowded. Other facilities provided by troop labor were
a refurbished mess hall, shower and latrine.

(2) To help with defense fortification, a number of AMC personnel were
hired and were utilized to fill sand bags. Pay varied to 140 pickets a
day or one picket per sand bag filled. This picket per sand bag in-
creased production per worker.

(3) The Detachment also provided defensive fortifications for the compound.
Bunkers were built, guard posts fabricated and a permanent lighting network
established.
2. (U) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) (U) Availability of basic regulations from higher headquarters:

   (a) OBSERVATION: Basic regulations from higher headquarters were not available to some staff sections, either before establishment of staff sections nor were they available immediately after activation.

   (b) EVALUATION: Lack of availability of references and regulations from higher headquarters hindered the initial operation of the staff sections.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: Higher headquarters should make up basic regulation and reference packages for issue to newly activated headquarters of staff sections.

(2) (U) ADP Machine Capability:

   (a) OBSERVATION: The 516th Personnel Service Company was assigned to the command without its TOE machine capability.

   (b) EVALUATION: Clerical personnel required extensive re-training on manual procedures which previously had been designed for machines. Necessary management tools were excessively delayed due to manual preparation; this proved to be a critical problem in the "rapid build-up" situation of the USASUPCON, BNC (Prov).

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel services units be deployed with full TOE equipment.

(3) (U) Replacement Processing:

   (a) OBSERVATION: More than 2,200 replacements were processed during the reporting period.

   (b) EVALUATION: The rapid build-up of the command resulted in an abnormally high number of replacements requiring processing at Da Nang before being assigned to units. A replacement detachment was formed out of the resources of the command. The requirement for personnel, vehicles, tents, etc, detracted from the smooth accomplishment of the command's normal mission.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That a replacement company cadre, with complete equipment be formed to work with existing units at the two principle in-processing points in Vietnam. Upon notification of similar future build-ups, the replacement company would re-locate temporarily to provide trained replacement personnel and appropriate equipment.
b. Operations:

(1) (U) Highway Regulation of QL-1:

(a) OBSERVATION: Highway regulation has been at best sporadic in NICTZ. Convoy originating in Da Nang and terminating in Dong Ha are delayed and held up due to the necessity to obtain three separate clearances, i.e. one for each TAOR they pass through. The delays encountered often cause unnecessary overnight stops which could be avoided.

(b) EVALUATION: In view of the fact that the MSR is controlled by tactical commanders of each TAOR, a centralized Highway Regulating agency would be an appropriate organization to authorize the use of MSRs which traverse multiple TAORs.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A Highway Regulating agency should be created to regulate the traffic on all MSRs in I Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) (U) Capabilities of truck companies:

(a) OBSERVATION: Paragraph 3.30, FM 55-15, Transportation Reference Data states capability estimates for truck units based upon multiple trips.

(b) EVALUATION: Actual experience with variable factors such as enemy interdiction of roads, traffic congestion and limited MHE at destination has established that only one trip per day can be completed for operations in RVN. Therefore, planning factors should be qualified dependent upon variables known to be prevalent in a particular area of operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That factors should be re-evaluated for their effect on the planning capabilities of truck companies as shown in FM 55-15.

(3) (U) Communications Shortcomings:

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the primary difficulties in coordinating operations, particularly for transportation units, is the lack of adequate communications equipment. This is especially true in the Republic of Vietnam due to the isolation and wide dispersion of units from their higher headquarters. Overcrowded telephone circuits and limited distance radio equipment is the heart of the problem.

(b) EVALUATION: Units that have been issued single side-bands radios have been able to communicate effectively to provide the necessary operational control over subordinate units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each truck battalion be equipped with a single side-band radio capability.

d. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None
o. Logistics:

(1) (U) Use of dedicated vessels for movement of cargo:

   (a) OBSERVATION: The Navy made available to the Army dedicated ships to carry Army cargo from southern ports to Wunder Beach. The purpose was to provide transportation for sending supplies for the initial stockage of Wunder Beach. Due to the overload upon the Da Nang Port, these ships were only to pick up cargo from southern ports.

   (b) EVALUATION: The use of these ships helped to alleviate the tremendous strain on transportation assets available to this command. The disadvantages, however, were many:

   1. The procedure was a reversal of normal supply procedures in that the supplies were being requisitioned to fill transportation requirements.

   2. The availability of the ships was given with very short notice which meant large quantities of supplies had to be requisitioned in a very short period of time. This tended to place a great burden upon the supply system.

   3. Going to southern ports required continued coordination to insure that requisitioned stocks were on hand and made available when the ship arrived at the port. Due to the communication difficulties experienced, as well as the short lead of time of these requests, much difficulty was experienced in trying to insure a full load. The result was that the ships were delayed in ports trying to load cargo that was not staged. Also, the ships were not always filled to their maximum capacity.

   4. In addition to the above, no definite plans could be established based on expected input since many items were substituted without this command being notified.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: Supplies should be requisitioned to fill requirements and then offered for shipment. At this time, transportation should be arranged to move the cargo.

(2) (U) ASL information:

   (a) OBSERVATION: In the case of four of the units transferred to ICTZ, either complete ASLs or major additions were required because of added mission requirements or combat damage. The best available solution to this problem has been to obtain an ASL listing of a similar type unit and duplicate it. When a new end item is to be supported; however, repair parts information must be extracted from pertinent manuals based on engineering estimates rather than Vietnam experience.

   (b) EVALUATION: The above processes are time consuming and the duplication of another unit's ASL is inherently inaccurate due to differences in support missions of any two units. Rapid response is needed to requirements for ASL information.
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A deck of cards be printed for each major end item and be available to a unit as a "starter" set of requisitions with the unit having only to select the number of sets desired for each end item depending on a rough estimate of density to be supported. For example, a set of pro-determined requisitions for an M151A1 truck could be prepared for densities in multiples of 50; M102 Howitzers in multiples of 6; 10,000 RT Fork Lifts in multiples of 10, etc.

(3) (U) Supply storage areas:

(a) OBSERVATION: The requirement to maintain as much stock as possible in unit technical supply activities coupled with the lack of authorization to build warehouses has created a serious storage problem for maintenance units in ICTZ.

(b) EVALUATION: The shortage of storage area reduces efficiency of unit technical supplies.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: field maintenance units be authorized the issue of 3 additional 12-ton supply vans for a total of 6.

(4) (U) Wunder Beach (LOTS site):

(a) OBSERVATION: Wunder Beach has moved 20,411 s/t of Class V during the period 20 Mar - 30 Apr 1968. LSTs and deep draft ships have both been handled successfully.

(b) EVALUATION: The Da Nang port has been relieved of a large volume of Class V tonnage which would have had to been transshipped into ICTZ by LCU or YFU. This resulted in larger volumes of other classes of sorely needed supplies being moved by the LCUs/YFUs available to NSA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: exploitation of a LOTS operation is recommended in a situation where a site can logically be developed and resources are available to operate it.

(5) (U) Class V storage on a fine sand beach:

(a) OBSERVATION: A 20 cell complex was constructed at Wunder Beach and all berm were constructed of sand. Due to the expected time that the site was to be utilized, (Mar to Sep 68) the berm were not stabilized with panoprine or membrane.

(b) EVALUATION: Wind conditions at Wunder Beach has caused serious degradation of berm heights. A constant program of pushing berm back up and clearing storage pads of drifting sand has been initiated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That any Class V storage constructed have berm stabilized with appropriate materials.
Army liaison orders Class I supplies for Wunder Beach (LOTS site):

(a) OBSERVATION: Army liaison office at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang prepares requisitions for Class I supplies shipped to Wunder Beach.

(b) EVALUATION: By close coordination with the Class I officer at Wunder Beach, over and under stocked situations can be reduced. The Army liaison officer can prepare requisitions to NSA on an immediate basis if necessary. If out of stock conditions exist at NSA for some items, substitutions can be made by the Army liaison officer. Close coordination with NSA can be maintained throughout the ordering positioning and shipping cycles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Army liaison at NSA maintain close coordination with the Class I officer at Wunder Beach and continue to place requisitions with NSA Da Nang for resupply to Wunder Beach.

f. Organization:

(1) Task Forces (FSAs):

(a) OBSERVATION: Although Task Forces (FSAs) provide rapid logistical response to tactical units, personnel administration is difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel comprising Task Forces are assigned; in many cases without written orders, from units throughout this command and from other Support Commands. Parent units are responsible for R&R, promotions and replacements. Because the individuals are often away from the parent unit for considerable periods of time, the unit responsibilities to the personnel are often overlooked resulting in low morale, missed DROS, etc.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That present studies of ways to alleviate the problem be continued on a Logistical Command wide scale.

(2) Equipment for FSAs:

(a) OBSERVATION: The current method of equipping a Forward Support Activity (FSA) as a provisional unit is not satisfactory. Organic equipment from TOE units is used to equip the FSAs. No special augmentation has been made to provide the necessary equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the FSA is basic to the concept of supply in Vietnam, authority for equipment should be provided. The withdrawal of TOE equipment from TOE units degrades the entire support capability by not providing enough equipment for all operations. The TOE unit is responsible for the equipment, yet they cannot properly maintain it.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a TDA, TOE or letter of authorization be prepared for the FSA to authorize the necessary equipment.
g. Other:

(1) (U) Civil Affairs community relations program:

(a) OBSERVATION: There is the necessity for close coordination between civilian and military groups in Vietnam. When USASUPCON, ENG (PROV) established the LOTS site, 200 Vietnamese were made homeless.

(b) EVALUATION: The 159th TC BN at the LOTS site provided the Vietnamese villagers with damage lumber to re-build their homes. The Agricultural Advisor in Quang Tri has given some aid and has promised more. Until the people are able to sustain themselves again and produce more, the Vietnamese in the part of Hai Long District near the LOTS site for the first time in three years, have been exposed to the workings and efforts of the Government of Vietnam in their behalf.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By careful monitoring of Civil Affairs activities an improved community relations program can be developed.

(2) (U) Area coverage by Chaplains:

(a) OBSERVATION: The assignment of Chaplains in units with TD authorization for Chaplains along with the disposition of the units which have assigned Chaplains makes it imperative that proper Chaplain's coverage be extended through the concept of area coverage.

(b) EVALUATION: It is not sufficient to just cover the unit to which the Chaplain may be assigned. There may be military units in the surrounding area not covered by a Chaplain. Unit commanders must understand the area coverage concept. There still exists in the minds of unit commanders that the Chaplain assigned works "only" for that particular unit and no one else.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the concept of area coverage be used by Chaplains. Unit commanders should be made aware of area coverage. The Chaplain's efficiency rating should be based in part on the adequacy of his area coverage.

(3) (U) Management of radio operators:

(a) OBSERVATION: Trained personnel are not available in Task Forces (FSAs) for operation of radio.

(b) EVALUATION: Various levy commitments have not affected the overall communications operations capability. On-the-job training for radio operators is a continuous process. Continuing drain in radio operators will require close monitoring of personnel assets to include utilization in secondary and additional MOSs in support of Task Forces.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders at each echelon providing radio operators for Task Forces must exercise prudent management of their personnel assets to provide utilization of qualified individuals in areas where there is a shortage of radio operators.

(4) (U) Vehicle motor number and chassis numbers.

(c) OBSERVATION: A large percentage of units do not have Vehicle motor numbers or chassis numbers recorded and maintained apart from their vehicle.

(b) EVALUATION: When stolen vehicles are recovered after the USA number and data plate have been removed, there is no way for a unit to adequately identify the vehicle as being their property. Failure to be able to positively identify the vehicle increases the possibility of total loss to the unit and increases losses to the government.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Unit motor officers should maintain a list of their assigned vehicles showing motor numbers and chassis numbers. This list should be kept current and apart from the vehicles.

(5) (U) Armed Forces Police.

(a) OBSERVATION: Army Military Policemen are not a part of the Armed Forces Police units in ICTZ.

(b) EVALUATION: The lack of Army Military Police impairs the efficiency of the Armed Forces Police operation in the ICTZ. The other participating services are not as well trained and organized for police operations. In addition, the Armed Forces Police Units lose a great deal of psychological impact and support by the obvious lack of participation by the US Army. During this reporting period, the Army population in ICTZ was approximately 45% of the total troop population.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: US Army Military Police should be assigned to all Armed Forces Police units in ICTZ. This would increase the efficiency and operational capability of the overall police efforts and would provide increased Army Military Support.

GEORGE H. McBRIDE
BE, USA
Commanding

ARMED DISTRIBUTION:
B plus
15 - Cmt: Historian
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Head, quarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section I operations, paragraph 1c(3). Concur. Comptroller coordination and control of ISSA and other interservice agreements is recommended. This function does not require a Finance Corps officer. The officer referred to as being reassigned was never intended for assignment to Da Nang Support Command.

   b. Reference Section I, paragraph 1f(4). Paragraph 6c, LC Regulation 515-1 required that commanders at all levels appoint a commissioned officer on orders with additional duty as civil affairs officer where authorized TOE/TD civil affairs positions do not exist. Conformance with this regulation would relieve the support command civil affairs officer of some of the operational detail at small unit level and allow sufficient time for the development of staff guidance and effective coordination at the support command level.

   c. Reference Section I, paragraph m. Concur. The request for a CC&S Company from CONUS was denied.

   d. Reference Section II, paragraph a(1). Nonconcur. The stockpiling of regulations by any headquarters in anticipation of possible activation of new units is unacceptable. The proper action is that upon activation of a unit, submission of a DA Form 12 series is undertaken as an emergency requisition.

   e. Reference Section II, paragraph a(2). Nonconcur. The 516th Personnel Service Company (PSC) was assigned to USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV) minus its machine capability, however; this action should not have required extensive retraining of personnel for a manual operation. A PSC is designed to function with or without ADP equipment and the qualifications of personnel within the PSC are based on training and experience of manual personnel operations. ADP capability for USASUPCOM, DNG
AVCA GO-0 (18 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

is programmed for FY 69.

f. Reference Section II, paragraph a(3). Nonconcur. Replacement operations within Vietnam is a USARV responsibility. There are no TOE/TD authorizations which allow stockpiling of personnel to meet possible future requirements. Such an operation if established would require personnel assets which cannot be spared from other essential missions. Plans which established the new command at Da Nang did include provisions for personnel activities. However, because of the requirement to accelerate the support forces in ICTZ and lack of transportation to support the build up, personnel units were given a low priority and thus arrived midway in the operation. However, under separate correspondence a request to establish a replacement activity at Da Nang was forwarded to USARV Hqs on 30 May 1968. The request would, if approved, relieve the Personnel Service Company at Da Nang Support Command from being responsible for rendering personnel support to all Army personnel arriving and departing ICTZ.

g. Reference Section II, paragraph b(1). This recommendation is considered inappropriate for inclusion in the ORLL and should be the subject of separate action.

h. Reference Section II, paragraph b(2). Concur. In addition to this reduction from two to one turnarounds for line haul, experience has shown that the average payload for the light truck (5T) and the medium truck (Cargo) is 5 and 10 tons, respectively. This is a result of configuration (palletization) and the low density of much of the cargo hauled. These new factors were officially recognized in the MACV Transportation Resources Evaluation published and distributed in February 1968 and should be used for all RVN planning. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

i. Reference Section II, paragraph b(3). Requirements for specific items of equipment should be requested by MTOE action based on unit mission.

j. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Concur. A system such as the one recommended would have to be established at a point which has considerable data processing capability so that card files of repair parts keyed to end items could be maintained. Inherent in the system would be the requirement for input from the field, i.e., change data as parts were discovered to be required to support end items.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS C3F0R-65 (R-1)(U)

b. Reference Section II, paragraph e(3). Nonconcur. The issue to field maintenance units of 3 additional 12-ton supply vans is contrary to good management practice. Each unit's need should be considered on an individual basis. No action required by higher headquarters.

1. Reference Section II, paragraph f(2). Concur. This headquarters forwarded to DCG, USARV on 21 May 68 a request to approve the establishment of an operational project and assignment of appropriate codes, to equip seven (7) on-call FSA's at the following depots; two (2) each at Saigon, Qui Nhon and Da Nang and one (1) at Cam Ranh Bay. This on-call equipment will be drawn and utilized for specific operational missions and turned back to the issuing depot when no longer required, where it will be reconstituted for subsequent on-call use.

n. Reference Section II, paragraph g(2). Concur. It should be noted that area coverage is now a specific command responsibility. Paragraph 3a(2), USARV Reg 165-20, as changed by Change 1, dated 8 Dec 67, states, "In recognition of the necessity for chaplain area coverage in RVN, commanders will permit chaplains to provide coverage for adjacent or nearby units which do not have chaplains assigned, or which cannot be adequately covered by the assigned chaplain due to distance and transportation factors." Supervisory chaplains should make pertinent and appropriate recommendations to their commanders to assist in discharging their responsibility.

n. Reference Section II, paragraph g(5). Concur. Military police are not assigned or attached to this command. Military police support is provided on an area basis by the 18th Military Police Brigade. Because of continuing commitments in II, III and IV CTZ, and no increase in personnel to support expanding requirements in I CTZ, the capability of the 18th Military Police Brigade to participate in Armed Forces Police activities in I CTZ is limited. The 18th Military Police Brigade is conducting a study to determine whether personnel can be provided the Da Nang Armed Forces Police unit.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2684

W. G. MUNSON
AG

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHOC-DST (18 May 68) 2d Ind (U)  CPT Arnold/dla/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 29 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning replacement processing, page 34, paragraph 2a(3); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f. This headquarters is currently studying the requirement to establish a replacement facility to service Army units located in I CTZ. This study will be completed on or about 30 June 1968. The unit will be informed of the results of this study subsequent to that date.

   b. Reference item concerning use of dedicated vessels for movement of cargo, page 36, paragraph 2e(1): Concur. Requirements for transportation should be developed prior to establishing transportation.

   c. Reference item concerning equipment for FSA's, page 38, paragraph 2f(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2l. Additional equipment to satisfy a continuing requirement must be documented by KTOE action IAW AR 310-31 as modified by DA Circular 310-44. Noncontinuing requirements can be satisfied through temporary loan procedures outlined in paragraph 22e, AR 310-34.

   d. Reference item concerning Armed Forces Police, page 40, paragraph g(5); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2n: Concur. Elements of the 18th Military Police Brigade located in I CTZ, are oriented toward providing
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-l) (U)

support on an area basis to those US Army units operating in that tactical zone. Under the present priority of MP support in I CTZ, it is not feasible to provide even limited support to the Armed Forces Police in Da Nang. As the tactical situation changes, current priorities are reevaluated in view of existing requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy: Start:
HQ, USA Spt Cnd, Da Nang
HQ, 1st Log Cnd
GPOP-DT (18 May 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Spt Comd, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JUL 68
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVCA-DNG-GO-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Prov) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(U) Organizational Chart

- U.S.A. CO.,
  - DA NANG (PROV)
    - QUANG TRI
      - Sub-Area Command
        - 26th GS Op
    - 159th TC BN
      - (TML SVC)
    - DA NANG
      - Sub-Area Command
        - 80th GS Op

Inclusion 1

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**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, Feb 30 Apr 1968**

CG, US Army Support Command

**REPORT DATE**
18 May 1968

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