<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
<th>AD392633</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>unclassified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chaplain School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Defense Documentation Center
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Hudson Institute
Naval Inshore Warfare Project Office
USAF Air Ground Operations School
Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3H10)
Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Dev & Educ Cmd

Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Weapons Command
US STRIKE Command
US Army STRATCOM
US Army Southern Command
9th Infantry Division

Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
Joint Action Control Office
# TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)

## 9TH INF DIV ORLL

### VOLUME I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Introduction</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Organization</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Personnel and Administration</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Intelligence</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Operations</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Training</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Logistics</td>
<td>g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. RF/FF Upgrading and ARVN Training</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Engineer Support</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Signal Support</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Army Aviation</td>
<td>l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Chemical Operations</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Logistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover and Deception.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REGRADERD UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT) (U)
9TH INF DIV ORLL

Inclusions

| Incl | 1. 9th Infantry Division | 1 |
|      | a. Organization          |   |
|      | b. Task Organization and Locations | 2 |
|      | * c. Roster of Key Personnel | 3 |
|      | 2. Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) | 4 |
|      | 3. Personnel and Administration Data | 5 |
|      | 4. Enemy Unit Locations | 6 |
|      | 5. Artillery Support | 7 |
|      | 6. G-3 Air Operational Support Chart | 8 |
|      | 7. Class V Supply | 9 |
|      | 8. PFCOP Newsletter "THE DELTA BULLETIN" | 10 |
|      | 9. RVNAP Support | 11 |
|      | a. Status of ARVN Refresher Training | 12 |
|      | b. RF/TP Outpost Support Status | 13 |
|      | c. IMPACT Support to RF/TP | 14 |
|      | 10. Base Operations | 15 |
|      | 11. 1st Bde Operational Report-Lesson Learned (ORLL) | 16 |
|      | 12. 2d Bde ORLL | 17 |
|      | 13. 3d Bde ORLL | 18 |
|      | 14. 3d Bde ORLL-(Inclosure 6 only) | 19 |
|      | 15. 3-5 Cav ORLL | 20 |
|      | 16. DISCOM ORLL | 21 |
|      | 17. 15th Eng. Bn ORLL | 22 |
|      | 18. 9th Sig Bn ORLL | 23 |
|      | 19. 9th Arty Bn ORLL | 24 |

VOLUME II Withdrawn, HQ, DA

Combat Operation After Action Reports (COAAR)

* 20. COAAR Operation RILEY (1st Bde) | 68X041 |
** 21. COAAR Operation CORONADO X (2d Bde) | 68X042 |
** 22. COAAR Operation CORONADO XI (2d Bde) | 68X043 |
** 23. COAAR Operation TRUONG CONG DINH (2d Bde) | 68X044 |
* 24. COAAR Operation ENTERPRISE (3d Bde) | 68X045 |
** 25. COAAR Operation QUYET THANG (3d Bde) | 68X046 |
* 26. COAAR Operation WORTH (3-5 Cav) | 68X047 |
** 27. COAAR's Operation KILO (3-5 Cav) | 68X048 |
| a. COAAR Operation KILO Phase I (3-5 Cav) | |
| b. COAAR Operation KILO Phase II (3-5 Cav) | |
* 28. COAAR Operation CHARLTON (3-5 Cav) | 68X049 |

* Withdrawn, HQ, DA; not published
** Withdrawn, HQ, DA; published separately

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Introduction.

   (1) During this reporting period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68, the 9th Infantry Division continued operations in support of missions and tasks either specified or implied by the III Corps/II Field Force Combined Campaign Plan 1968, 15 Dec 67, and the RVNAF, JGS/MACV Combined Campaign Plan 1968 AB 143, 1 Nov 67. The 9th Inf Div also conducted operations specified by II FFORCEN either during (1 - 10 Feb 68) or as a result of (10 Feb to date) the VC/NVA Tet Campaign. Division Headquarters remained at Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) except when control of major operations in the Dinh Tuong Province within the division's tactical area of interest (TAOI) dictated displacement of a tactical forward command post to Don Tam Base Camp (XS 4143). On 21 Apr the division's TAOI was increased to include the Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces and reduced by the loss of the Rung Sat Special Zone as depicted on Inclosure 3, Map of Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).

   (2) The mission of the 9th Inf Div is to conduct strike operations to locate and destroy the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) main and local force units and their installations and infrastructure in the TAOI; conduct consolidation and pacification operations to identify and destroy VC guerrilla units and infrastructure and secure population centers and lines of communications in close coordination and cooperation with government of Vietnam (GVN) Forces; conduct support operations to further assist the government of Vietnam Pacification Program by enhancing
the capability of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Popular Force (PF), and Regional Force (RF), and by contributing to the health and welfare of the civilian population. The 9th Inf Div has successfully accomplished this mission by conducting stability operations in Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh, Long An, Kien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, Go Cong, and Ba Xuyen Provinces.

(3) The 9th Inf Div was involved in 90 days of combat while conducting twelve major operations that commenced, terminated, or continued during the reporting period: CORONADO X, CORONADO XI, TRUONG CONG DINH, KITTYHAWK, HOPTAC, HOPTAC I, ENTERPRISE, QUIET THANG, RILEY, NARASUAN, DUONG CUA DIN, and TOAN THANG.

(4) In addition to the above listed operations, an element of the 9th Inf Div participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) for the first time. The 3d Squadron 5th Cavalry (-) was attached to the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM), further placed OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division and 3d Marine Division from 15 Feb 68 to 14 Apr 68. Effective 15 Apr 68, the squadron was attached to the Provisional Corps Vietnam. The squadron participated in Operation KILO based at Dong Ha Combat Base, Operation WORTH in Quang Nam Province and Operation CHARLTON in Quang Tri Province. The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in areas as designated. Troop D remained at Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat) and participated in missions as assigned by division headquarters.

(5) The arrival of the 6th Battalion 31st Infantry as a new member of the 9th Inf Div, the attachment of the 3-5 Cav to the 1st Air Cav Div (AM) less D Troop 3-5 Cav, and the exchange of two battalions within the 1st and 3d Bdes are considered the significant organizational changes occurring during the quarter. These changes are discussed in para 1b(2).

(6) On 25 Feb 68 MG Julian J. Ewell replaced MG George G. O'Connor as Division Commander. Four additional significant personnel changes took place during this quarter. COL Robert E. Baden, Chief of Staff, departed 7 Apr 68 and LTC Myron E. Lee Jr. became the acting Chief of Staff. COL George C. Benson assumed command of the 3d Bde vice COL George W. Everett on 4 Feb 68. COL Josiah A. Wallace assumed command of Div Arty upon the departure of COL Stuart C. Meyer on 5 Mar 68, and COL Henry E. Emerson assumed command of the 1st Bde from COL Harry O. Williams on 18 Mar 68 (See Inclosure 2, Roster of Key Personnel).
b. (C) Organization. (Organizational Structure - refer to Inclosure 1a. Location of Units - refer to Inclosure 1b.)

(1) In addition to the three brigades of the 9th Inf Div, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) remained OPCON to the division during the quarter; and Task Force Forsyth and Task Force Funston, provisional headquarters formed by the division, continued with the responsibility of the defense of Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) and Dong Tam Base Camp (XS 4143) respectively. On 18 Feb 68 the 2-3 Inf, 199th Light Inf Bde became OPCON to the division. This battalion was further placed OPCON to the 3d Bde for operations in Gia Dinh Province, south of Saigon.

(2) Organizational changes that have occurred since the last Operation Report - Lessons Learned (ORL-) was submitted:

(a) On 31 Jan 68 a Division Forward Command Post was established at Dong Tam Base Camp (XS 4143) in Dinh Tuong Province and has remained fully operational as a tactical operations center to date. This displacement was necessitated by the Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army (VC/NVA) Tet Campaign attacks on major province and district capitals within the IV Corps Tactical Zone, in particular the cities of My Tho, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, and Can Tho. In response to the Tet Offensive, the 5-60 Inf (M) became OPCON to Task Force Ware on 31 Jan 68 for operations in Gia Dinh Province. On 1 Feb 68 increased enemy activity occurred near the city of Ben Tre, Dinh Tuong Province, and elements of the 3d Bde were inserted into the area. The 2-39 Inf was placed OPCON to the 3d Bde until 4 Feb 68. In mid Feb the Forward Command Post was reduced in personnel with the CG and key staff members returning to Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799); however, the Forward Command Post continued to function as a tactical operations center under the command of BG William A. Knowlton, Assistant Division Commander. On 10 Feb 68 the 1st Bde conducted an airlift of headquarters elements from Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) to Dong Tam Base Camp (XS 4143) and assumed OPCON of the 5-60 Inf. The purpose of this displacement was to conduct clearing and roadrunner operations on Highway QL 4 from the junction of Highway LTL 6A west to Cai Lay. Task Force Forsyth assumed the RILEY mission in the Bien Hoa Province with the 2-47 Inf (M) as its maneuver element. On 18 Feb 68 the 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 4-39 Inf from the 1st Bde and the 2-3d Inf from the 199th Light Inf Bde to conduct operations in Gia Dinh Province. The 2-60 Inf became OPCON to the 1st Bde on 7 Mar 68, and the 9th Inf Div with elements of the 1st and 2d Bdes initiated Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in Dinh Tuong Province. Once again the Division Forward at Dong Tam (XS 4143) became a fully staffed tactical operations center with the CG returning to direct this operation. The division was directed
CONFLICT

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIE-Mh

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

by COMUSMACV to begin Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD) on 16 Mar 68. The 1st Bde with three maneuver battalions, the 2-39 Inf, 2-60 Inf and 5-60 Inf, was selected. On 24 Mar 68 the Division Forward was again reduced in strength with the Commanding General returning to Camp Kartin Cox (XS 1799). The organizational arrangement lasted until 19 Apr 68 when 5-60 Inf (M) returned to OPCON 3d Bde.

(b) On 31 Mar 68 the 9th Inf Div received the advance party of the 6-31st Inf (four rifle companies) designated by COMUSMACV to be assigned to the 9th Inf Div. The first increment of the main body arrived on 3 Apr 68 with the battalion closing Camp Martin Cox (YS 1799) on 7 Apr 68. The division initiated action to integrate the battalion into the 9th Inf Div by conducting orientation, acclimation, and indoctrination training. The battalion completed this training on 24 Apr 68, at which time it participated in its first operation OPCON to Task Force Tower in Bien Hoa Province. On 27 Apr 68 the 6-31st Inf became OPCON to the 3d Bde as brigade mobile reserve.

(c) Other organizational changes that have occurred during this quarter, The 9th MI Det and 19th NE Det, 16th and 19th PI Det and 39th Cml Det were assigned to the 9th Inf Div effective 15 Feb 68. The 65th Inf Plt (CT) was assigned effective 15 Feb 68 by USARV GO 821 dtd 21 Feb 68. Effective 15 Feb 68 the 47th MH Det was assigned on USARV GO 526. These units were formerly attached to the division.

c. (U) Personnel and Administration.

(1) General data: See Inclosure 4 for information and statistical data concerning the following:

   (a) Maintenance of Unit Strength.

   (b) Personnel Management.

   (c) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

   (d) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(2) Significant Activities:

   (a) Adjutant General:

   1 The Adjutant General Service Unit was established on 1 Apr 68 under the operational control of the Personnel Services Division. This
unit was organized in preparation for the change from the present reporting system to the PERMACAP Reporting System effective 1 May 68.

2 The large number of casualties sustained and replacements received as a result of the Tet Offensive caused primary attention during this period to be focused on actions required to process these personnel. Every facet of the AG operation was affected; however, the greatest impact was in the following areas:

a) Casualty reporting.

b) Assignment and inprocessing of replacements.

c) Review and preparation of awards and decorations.

(b) Judge Advocate General:

1 Courts and Boards Clerks Meeting. During this quarter meetings were held at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for courts and boards personnel from the various commands exercising special court-martial jurisdiction. The clerks were briefed on various subjects pertaining to military justice activities. Emphasis was placed on use of Article 15, UCMJ, administrative procedures in disposing of court-martial charges by summary and special court-martial, and actions required by units in cases where trial by general court-martial is recommended. Increased quality in the administrative preparation of cases submitted to this headquarters since these initial briefings has been noted.

2 Courtroom. In April 1968 a new courtroom for general court-martial was completed to include wall paneling and air conditioning. The wall paneling has allowed for more thorough trials with fewer interruptions by eliminating outside noise from generators and helicopters. Visiting law officers have commented favorably on the courtroom, indicating that it is one of the finest in Vietnam.

3 Claims. Since the Tet Offensive numerous claims were made resulting from the destruction of personal property lost in billets which were either partially or completely destroyed during hostile actions. These claims were expeditiously processed by dispatching claims teams from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, to assist unit claim's officers at the site of the destruction. Claimants were placed in groups and instructed in the preparation and completion of appropriate claim's
forms, thus eliminating many of the errors normally found in a claim file. As a result of these claim's teams, over 382 personal claims were received by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate during this period. Of these, 200 were processed.

(c) Surgeon: During this quarter a program entitled "Operation SAFESTEP" was implemented to reduce the incident rate of foot problems among troops on combat operations in the Mekong Delta. The majority of these foot problems have been attributed to prolonged operations in inundated terrain. Operation SAFESTEP involves the following:

1. Continued use of proven preventive measures.

2. Treatment and prophylaxis utilizing old and new drugs.

3. Testing of new equipment and clothing, i.e. the specially designed Paddy Boot, nylon mesh boot socks, etc. With the advent of the rainy season, this equipment will undergo a thorough test. Unit surgeons have been responsible for implementation of the program at unit level. However, command emphasis down to squad leader level has been the ostensible reason behind the success of the program to date.

(d) Provost Marshal: During this quarter 9th Inf Div Military Police, given operational control over GVN National Police, ARVN, and non-divisional American military policemen, played a very significant role in Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD). The efficient handling of traffic and defile control points made it possible for an average of 1200 vehicles per day to use the highway. In addition, joint population and resources control points also established by the MP's contributed greatly toward inhibiting the daylight movement of the Viet Cong along Highway QL 4 and other major routes. During the last three months, the military police have also participated in many psychological operations and civic action programs conducted by divisional units.

(e) Chaplain: During Easter, Holy Week, and Passover, the division conducted a total of 161 services: 55 Catholic, 100 Protestant, and 6 Jewish. Despite heavy operational commitments, 6,970 persons were able to attend these services.

(f) Red Cross: On 10 Apr 68, a Red Cross sub-office was opened at Tan An to provide Red Cross services to 3d Bde personnel in that area. This has provided a more effective Red Cross Program within the 3d Bde area by greatly reducing the amount of time required to handle individual cases.
AVIÉ-MH
CONFI DENTIAL
12 May 68
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Discussion and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle (See Inclosure 5 for Enemy Unit Locations).

(a) Discussion.

1 Since the Tet Offensive the enemy has increased the fire power capability within his units. His resupply of arms and ammunition has steadily been replacing the older series with a new, modern and sophisticated one. Almost all battalions are fully equipped with AK-47's. The number of RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket launchers per unit has increased. The ratio of RPG-7's to RPG-2's has increased. Camp Martin Cox received 120mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire for the first time on 20 Feb 68. Dong Tam base camp frequently received 120mm mortar fire since the Tet Offensive. The VC altered their tactics in that attacks by fire during daylight hours were increased to prevent the detection of their firing positions. There have been reports that the VC have 122mm rockets in Dinh Tuong Province, but no rockets have been used against allied forces in that area.

2 In Dinh Tuong Province of VC Military Region (MR) II, there has been a reorganization of the enemy tactical command structure. MR II has organized at least two "Mobile Battle Groups". The composition of these "Battle Groups" is not clear, but it is believed that they consist of at least two battalions and weapon support units. These appear to be tailored to assure a proper balance of ground forces and combat support.

3 There are several new units within the 9th Inf Div TACI. The 265 Main Force (MF) Battalion was formed as early as Jul 67 but was not confirmed until March 68. It operated in Dinh Tuong Province until April when it moved into central Long An Province. The K-3 MF Bn is believed to have participated in an attack against US Forces at Tan An in Long An Province on 10 Feb 68. This unit was formerly the 3d Bn of the Dong Nai Regt, northern Bien Hoa Province. This battalion is still believed to be located in Long An Province. The Phu Loi II Bn formerly operating in northwestern Bien Hoa Province has been contacted and identified through documents and FW's. This battalion is currently believed to be operating in the vicinity of the Long An/Gia Dinh Province boundary. Southeast of Camp Martin Cox, in the vicinity of the Bien Hoa/Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy Province boundaries, an artillery battalion has been identified as K-34. It is believed to have entered the area approximately 1 Apr 68.
In order to replenish the tremendous losses suffered during the Tet Offensive, the VC made a massive effort to locally recruit personnel. They have not been able to recruit sufficient people to accomplish this, even though they have resorted to force. An increasing number of VC unit replacements are North Vietnamese Army (NVA) personnel.

In order to have larger combat units and have them controlled at a higher echelon, the VC have begun to upgrade some of their units.

In Thu Thua District, Long An Province, it is believed that cadre taken from the C312 Local Force Company and local guerrillas were used to form three new local force companies, C1, C2, C3. The existence of C1 and C3 was confirmed by a captured document that assigned each a letter box number effective 18 Apr 68. There have been agent reports indicating that the remainder of the local force companies in Long An Province intend to do the same.

The Long An Sector Advisor reported that documents taken from a VC body on 13 Apr 68 stated that a Sapper Company, code number 5785, was located south of Ben Luc (XS 602692). This company has a 30 man highway engineer section and a 34 man water engineer section.

A captured document stated that three new local force companies were to be formed in Nhon Trach and Long Thanh Districts, Bien Hoa Province. There has been no confirmation of this.

A PW, the executive officer of the 462 LF Co (Cai Lay District, Dinh Tuong Province) stated on 25 Apr that the entire company was transferred to the 514C Bn. At that time a recruiting campaign was under way to get personnel to replace the 462 LF Co.

In Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces new units have been formed. It is believed that a "new" 261 MF Bn was formed with cadre from the "old" 261 MF Bn, new recruits, and some infiltrators from the NVA. Order of Battle accepts 261A and 261B Main Force Battalions based primarily upon PW reports.

It is believed that there are three 514 Bns operating principally in Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces. The exact time and method of their formation is not known. In March 68 there were PW's that stated that they were from 514B Bn. During this time agent reports consistently reported the 514 LF Bn in both eastern and western Dinh Tuong Province at the same time. A Hoi Chanh who rallied to ARVN elements in Cai Lay
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPUR-65 (R1) (U)

District, Dinh Tuong Province on 21 Apr 68 stated that he was from the 514C Bn. A PW stated on 25 Apr 68 that the old Cai Lay District Company was transferred to the 514C Bn on an unknown date.

A PW who was the Co 3d Co, 263 MF Bn stated on 13 Mar 68 that he had heard that there were plans to form a 263B Bn and that recruitment was to be in Dinh Tuong Province. A PW on 6 Apr 68 stated that he was from the 263B Bn and his platoon was being transferred to the 514 LF Bn. He stated that time the 263B MF Bn was located near Go Cong. No further information has been received pertaining to that unit.

In north-central Bien Hoa Province, it is believed that the 274th VC Regt has received replacement personnel from the D/251 infiltration group. It is believed that this group will form another battalion to replace the 2d Bn which is currently believed to be operating in Thu Duc District, Gia Dinh Province. Analysis of captured documents revealed that D/251 is possibly a code name for the 4th NVA Sapper Bn. If this is true, the combat effectiveness of the 274th VC Regt has increased significantly.

(b) Recapitulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Div</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>Marginally Combat</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274 MF Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275 MF Regt</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Regt</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP 84 Rear Services</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D440 MF Bn</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>Marginally Combat</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D445 MF Bn</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-34 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>122mm Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th LF Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority believed to be equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan 10</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns. Good mining capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ind Bn</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th LF Bn</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th LF Bn</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th LF Bn</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Non Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loi II Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new family of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-3 MF Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Believed to be equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265 MF Bn</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVDE-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>261A MF Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261B MF Bn</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Partially equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263 MF Bn</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514A LF Bn</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514B LF Bn</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Non Combat Effective</td>
<td>Mixture of old &amp; new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514C LF Bn</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516 LF Bn</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
<td>Majority equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518 LF Bn</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Partially equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267 MF Bn</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269 MF Bn</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>Equipped with new series of wpns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

During Tet the enemy utilized the majority of his major combat elements to launch an all-out offensive against key US/GVN installations, provincial and district capitals. It was apparent that his objectives...
were to seize and hold these installations, at least temporarily, to gain psychological and propaganda victories perhaps to be employed in a subsequent offer to negotiate peace terms. The primary attacks were conducted against Saigon, Cholon, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, II Field Force HQ, III Corps HQ, and Bien Hoa Air Base. The Viet Cong offensive failed militarily, but it must be viewed as a psychological success.

2 In Sub-Region E-4 no major ground attacks occurred, and no units were identified in contact. The VC did successfully interdict Highway QL 15.

3 In Sub-Region E-3, no major ground attacks occurred, although attacks by fire including mortars, small arms, and automatic weapons were conducted throughout the sub-region.

4 In Sub-Region E-2 on 10 Feb 68, Tan An came under a major ground and indirect fire attack by an unknown size force. Later it was determined that local forces, personnel from recent infiltration groups and probably the K-3 MF Br, formerly subordinate to the Dong Nai Regt, participated in the attack.

5 In Dinh Tuong Province the VC attacked the provincial capital of My Tho with a multi-battalion force on 31 Jan 68.

6 The enemy entrenched himself in the major urban areas, and the resultant fighting created much property damage and the loss of many innocent civilian lives. Apparently, the VC had expected a popular uprising to assist them in overthrowing the South Vietnamese Government. The popular uprising did not materialize. The VC's disregard for the Lunar New Year Holidays, property, and human life further alienated the people of South Vietnam from the VC.

7 Instead of withdrawing to his base areas after being routed from the cities, his units remained near the heavily populated areas. It was later determined that he left only sufficient forces to maintain pressure on the cities. This was probably done so that allied forces, too, would remain close to the cities. This left the rural areas relatively free for the VC to recruit personnel and collect taxes. This was especially true in Dinh Tuong Province.

8 According to captured documents, the VC attempted to renew their offensive with Phase II in mid-February. Due to the acute shortages of personnel and supplies, they accomplished practically nothing.
CONIIF DENTIAL

12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

The VC activity was then designed to disrupt the economy, further discredit the GVN, and convince the populace that the VC were still in control. The primary method used in their attempts was the interdiction of primary lines of communication (LOC). This was primarily true in the rice-rich Delta region. With the lines of communication disrupted, the people were unable to market their goods, thus, hurting the economy and keeping foodstuffs in the rural areas where the VC had easy access to it. The primary target for interdiction was Highway QL 4, especially from My Thuan Ferry (at the Mekong River) east to the junction of Highway QL 4 and Highway LTL 6A (northwest of My Tho). This area was probably selected because of the large amount of civilian traffic, large amount of produce transported, and because the VC had numerous waterways for their own travel.

For these interdictions they increased the use of their sapper units. The local guerrillas were used to mine, crater and block the highways but had the technical advice and munitions support of sapper personnel. Larger destruction tasks, such as the bridge at Can Giooc (XS 3373) on Highway LTL 5A, were probably carried out solely by sapper units. The Can Giooc Bridge was blown at the end of February and is still 100% impassable to vehicular traffic. The VC has increased his water mining capability and river ambushes in the Mekong River area.

(2) Enemy Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>2938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETAINNEES</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW's</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEU HOI</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW-SERVED WEAPONS (C/S)</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMALL ARMS (SA)</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMO</td>
<td>394699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINES</td>
<td>9232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAIN (IN TONS)</td>
<td>78.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 13

CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Progress continued during the reporting period in the identification of members of the Viet Cong infrastructure operating within the division TA0I. A total of 617 personalities were added to the Counter-intelligence (CI) Section's blacklist. Of this total, 230 were identified in Bien Hoa Province, 176 in Long An Province, 156 in Dinh Tuong Province, 39 in Kien Phong Province, 16 in Kien Hoa Province, 11 in Go Cong Province, and 9 in Kien Tuong Province. These 617 political personalities included 133 military intelligence cadre and agents, 32 commissar agents, 63 finance and economy cadre, 37 proselyting cadre, 68 military-political officers, 4 supply cadre, and 280 local Viet Cong government leaders and party secretaries. Viet Cong propagandists in Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces continued their campaign to discredit US and GVN political programs, to rally local residents to the Viet Cong cause, and to capitalize on the results achieved during Tet. Viet Cong intelligence cadre continued their efforts to gain information on FWSAF operating within the divisional TA0I, specifically to include elements of the 9th Inf Div. Five such Viet Cong agents directly targeted against divisional elements in Tan An continued to be subjects of covert counter-intelligence operations. Viet Cong intelligence also increased their use of penetration agents. They appeared to be concentrating their efforts in the use of ARVN soldiers and local indigenous laborers. However, no such penetration agents were specifically identified as operating on any of the 9th Inf Div base camps at Bearcat, Dong Tam, and Tan An.

(b) During the quarter, the number of confidential informants reporting to the CI Section increased to 37. This number included 18 coded informants, 12 uncoded casual informants, and 7 installation informants. Liaison with 35 US and Allied intelligence and government agencies resulted in an average flow of approximately 1500 intelligence reports per month into the division.

(c) Modifications were made in the CI Section's blacklist distributed to division S2's. Previous to the reporting period, all names reported to the CI Section of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and guerrilla personalities were included in the blacklist regardless of their rank or position.
as long as they were operating in the division's TAOI. This resulted in an average input to the blacklist of about 1000 names per month. Six months of usage showed that the blacklist was rapidly becoming quite large and therefore cumbersome and unused due to the necessity for publishing it on the large 11" by 15" machine records printout. No changes were possible in the size of the machine printout, and no other system than that of ADP was feasible in view of the limited special agent resources available for maintaining the blacklist, so the criteria for adding names to the list was re-evaluated. A new criteria was established whereby only the names of leading personalities in the VCI from the hamlet level on up operating in the division's TAOI were included. This eliminated the inclusion of hamlet and village guerrillas in the blacklist as well as many low level Viet Cong personalities who, though residing within our TAOI, were in areas where elements of the division seldom conducted any operations against the VCI. The new criteria resulted in a decrease of the average input per month during the reporting period to 205 names per month and an increase in the number of blacklists requested each month by unit and non-divisional S2's. In addition a system of in-depth dossiers on selected villages and hamlets located in the high priority areas immediately surrounding each of the division's three base camps at Bearcat, Dong Tam, and Tan An was established within the section. Each dossier included all information acquired on Viet Cong activities and personnel operating within that village or hamlet to include both low level VCI and guerrilla personalities. The two systems, together, the new broadbased but less cumbersome counterintelligence blacklist covering the entire TAOI published for the use of unit S2's and the in-depth village and hamlet dossiers maintained for the use of counterintelligence collection and reaction personnel, appeared to provide a more effective means of supporting that part of the division's mission to identify and neutralize members of the VCI.

(4) During the reporting period, there was an expansion of the weekly G2/S2 intelligence planning conference held by the division G2 at Bearcat. In addition to the division's major subordinate unit S2's, attendance was enlarged to include representatives of the following FWMAF, ARVN and GVN agencies:

1 16th Inf Div (ARVN) - Xuan Loc.
2 7th Inf Div (ARVN) - My Tho.
3 1st Australian Task Force - Nui Dat.

5. Long Khanh Sector.

(a) This conference has proved to be an excellent vehicle for the vis-a-vis exchange of intelligence and for the joint development of targets for strike or surveillance operations. Not only has the conference furthered the exchange of intelligence, but it has also assisted in bringing the enemy situation into perspective throughout the division's sprawling tactical area of interest.

(4) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Activities.

(a) The LRP employed nine (9) Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Scouts and found them to be highly qualified for reconnaissance missions. Their knowledge of the terrain and VC methods of activity has been valuable to LRP operations. PRU's are integrated into LRP teams and also operate as PRU heavy teams. PRU's have developed a high degree of esprit. Their English is limited but is being overcome by training within the LRP Company. PRU's have the additional advantage of interpreting overheard VC conversations while on trail watch and if spotted by the VC have been considered friendly.

(b) The LRP sustained 3 combat fatalities during the period for a total loss of 4 US KIA since Jun 67 when the unit was formed.

(c) The LRP accumulated 74 VC KIA (BC) during the period as opposed to 49 VC KIA (BC) during the previous reporting period.

(d) New methods of operation were devised, and the concept of LRP operations in the Delta region was realized. Inserting into and extracting from an AO using Navy River Patrol Boats (PRB) has proven to be most successful. The length of stay in the majority of LRP AO's in the Delta has been less than 24 hours because of lack of concealment and dense population.

(e) Several successful joint operations were conducted with Navy SEAL teams.

(5) Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance.

(a) Night visual reconnaissance missions have increased in quantity and were enhanced in quality with the aid of night observation devices.
(b) Personnel Detector (people sniffer) missions diminished due to higher priorities on aircraft and operations in the Delta region. There were a total of 15 missions flown over the three-month period.

(c) The Imagery Interpretation Section accomplished the following during the reporting period: 60 aerial photography missions were received, processed and interpreted. From these photo missions a total of 59 Imagery Interpretation Reports were prepared and distributed. In response to specific requests, the section prepared 16 photo mosaics, 46 defense overlays and two special studies. The section also flew 47 visual reconnaissance missions and 15 Personnel Detection missions.

(d) Tet Offensive: During the period 30 Jan to 10 Feb 68, there was a marked increase in the number of visual reconnaissance missions flown. Nineteen missions were flown during this period. There was, however, a sharp decrease in photographic missions processed and reports disseminated due to the disruption of photo deliveries from Det A, 1st MI Bn (ARS) and the Air Force.

(e) Weather and Terrain. Weather had very little adverse effect during the reporting period. Trafficability reached its peak and will worsen as the wet season approaches. The most adverse effects which hampered air movement were the early morning fog and dust on the landing zones. Foot troops experienced some difficulty in maintaining stealth and concealment in the jungle areas because of dryness.

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) The enemy's firepower capability has increased significantly because of the continued introduction of better weapons in increased numbers to the local guerrillas. In so far as his personnel strengths are concerned, the enemy suffered substantial losses during the reporting period; however, he has continually striven to overcome this by a concerted program of impressing civilians into his ranks and the integration of local force and guerrilla elements into his main force units. In some cases, such as in Dinh Tuong Province, the Viet Cong battalions have been fragmented, providing nuclei around which new battalions were formed. In example of this is the formation of the 514A, 514B, and 514C Battalions, which were made up of newly impressed personnel and integrated units.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) In all provinces of the division's TAOI, the enemy is capable of mounting multi-battalion attacks against targets of his choosing. There has been an increase in the total number of VC battalions operating in the TAOI, and the identification of two new units in Bien Hoa Province significantly increases the capability to conduct special type operations. These units are the K-34 NVA Artillery Battalion and the 4th NVA Sapper Battalion. In addition, intelligence indicates the formation of a sapper battalion in Sub-Region E-2. The enemy's most significant vulnerability lies in the fact that to attack the targets which he has chosen as objectives, he must mass his forces, increasing his vulnerability to allied firepower. Based upon an analysis of all recent intelligence, the enemy's most probable course of action is a renewal of his offensive, striking fewer, more carefully selected and reconnoited target's than during his Tet Campaign.

e. (C) Operations.

(1) There were a total of twelve major operations either completed or in process by the 9th Inf Div during the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68. Highlights included counter operations to the VC Tet Offensive and the termination of Operations KITTYHAWK and ENTERPRISE after more than one year of continuous combat resulting in tremendous strides in the pacification program. Operations during the period 30 Jan - 10 Feb 68 resulted in some of the heaviest combat experienced by the division since its arrival in Vietnam. Units were deployed with minimum advance warning and demonstrated their flexibility to operate in many different areas and types of terrain to include encounters with the enemy in built-up areas in the major cities within the division TAOI.

(2) At the end of the previous reporting period, the VC/NVA forces had just commenced their Tet attacks with multi-battalion size forces attacking major US/FWMAF/GVN installations and province and district capitals within the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). During the period of 31 Jan - 10 Feb 68, the cities of Bien Hoa, Saigon, Long Binh, My Tho, Ben Tre, Tan An, Vinh Long, and Xuan Loc were subjected to major enemy attacks. In each city elements of the 9th Inf Div, in coordination with GVN forces, set the VC/NVA attacks head on and drove the enemy out of the cities by the 10th of Feb. Elements of all three brigades saw action in the Mekong Delta where the 9th Inf Div is the only sizeable US combat force.

(3) After 10 Feb enemy tactics included small unit actions and increased stand-off mortar attacks on US installations, major cities and
villages. The VC also increased attacks by fire and ground assaults on division fire support/patrol bases (FS/PB). On 25 Feb elements of the 265th MF Bn launched a heavy mortar and ground attack against FS/PB Jager (vic XS 3549) located 3km west of Long Dinh along Highway QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province. On 9 Mar the VC initiated a heavy mortar attack on FSB Halloran, a floating artillery base of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) which was positioned east of My Tho (XS 5740) along the north bank of the My Tho River. This marked the first time that the VC achieved success in attacking this type of FSB.

(4) From 10-29 Feb the 9th Inf Div continued to react to the presence of enemy forces south of Saigon and in the immediate areas around provincial and district capitals.

(5) Beginning 1 Mar the division developed plans for major reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations designed to locate, destroy, and fragment VC main force battalions and their supporting units while continuing to maintain, secure and open or lines of communications - principally Highway QL 4 - within the division TA0I.

(a) On 7 Mar, the 1st and 2d Bdes began Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) principally in Dinh Tuong Province to drive enemy forces away from My Tho and to eliminate enemy interdiction of Highway QL 4 in the provinces. On 17 Mar the 1st Bde commenced Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE’S ROAD) to protect and upgrade Highway QL 4 between Cai Lay and the junction of Highways QL 4 and LTL 6A north of My Tho and to conduct RIF operations in coordination with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) and RF/PF forces on either side of Highway QL 4. The 2d Bde continued TRUONG CONG DINH, expanding operations into Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces. In both of these successful operations, emphasis has been placed on combined operations with ARVN and RF/PF units. At the end of the quarter, the 2d Bn Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMC) joined the 2d Bde in riverine operations.

(b) From 11 Mar - 7 Apr the 3d Bde participated in Operation QUYET THANG in Long An and Gia Dinh Provinces south of Saigon in cooperation with Capital Military District (CMD), 5th Ranger Gp, 25th Inf Div (ARVN) and provincial and district forces to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces threatening Saigon from the south and southwest and to secure major lines of communication. Here again, coordinated operations with Vietnamese forces were stressed.

(c) On 8 Apr the 9th Inf Div commenced participation in Operation TOAN THANG with the 3d Bde in Long An and Gia Dinh Provinces, Task Force
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Fortyth and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment in Long Thanh and Nhon Trach Districts, Bien Hoa Province and western Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province. These operations are conducted in coordination with 25th and 18th Inf Divisions (ARVN) and RF/PF forces. The purpose of the operations is to locate and destroy the VC/NVA units in the vicinity of Saigon/Bien Hoa and to keep them fragmented, so they cannot mass for renewed attacks on these major strategic population centers. The operation had been effective to the end of the reporting period in that the anticipated renewed VC/NVA offensive had not materialized by 30 Apr 68.

(6) Operations commencing, continuing and terminating during the period 1 Feb to 30 Apr 68 are summarized as follows:

(a) Operation CORONADO X (18 Jan 68 - 13 Feb 68). The purpose of this operation was to locate, fix and destroy the 263d MF Bn, 514 LF Bn, and Cai Be District Forces. On 31 Jan the MRF, consisting of 2d Bde Eqs, 3-47 Inf, and 3-60 Inf, became OPCON to the Senior Advisor IV CTZ and moved from their pre-Tet positions in western Dinh Tuong Province to the vicinity of My Tho in response to multi-battalion VC attacks on that provincial capital city. On 1 Feb the two US battalions attacked north into the city from the My Tho river. They engaged in battle with the 261st, 263rd, and 265th VC battalions which had occupied the city. The MRF and elements of the 7th Inf Div (ARVN) continued the battle on 2 Feb and by mid-day had driven most of the VC from the city. The MRF accounted for 116 VC KIA (SC) while 7th Inf Div (ARVN) reported 406 VC KIA. On 4 Feb the MRF moved to the vicinity of Vinh Long, provincial capital city, where during the period 5 - 8 Feb they engaged the 306th, 308th MF Bns and 5587 LF Bn which were attempting to seize the city. Results of this battle of Vinh Long were 138 VC KIA, 4 POW versus 5 US KIA and 92 WHA (18 of which were USN). On 11 Feb the 2d Bde returned to the vicinity of Cai Lay on Highway QL 4. Elements of 2-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) became OPCON to the 2d Bde for this two day operation. Results for 11 - 12 Feb were 2-39th and 5-60th 51 VC KIA and 2d Bde 33 VC KIA. This operation terminated on 13 Feb 68. (See Inclosure 13, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 21, Combat Operations After Action Report, CORONADO X.)

(b) Operation CORONADO XI (13 Feb - 6 Mar 68). This operation was initiated in coordination and cooperation with the 9th Inf and 21st Inf Divisions (ARVN) to locate and destroy the 305, 306, and 309 MF Bns and Tay Do Bns I and II, in the vicinity of Can Tho, Phong Dinh Province, to relieve the pressure on the city which holds the headquarters of IV CTZ. The MRF remained OPCON to the Senior Advisor IV CTZ. On 14 Feb the MRF...
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Bns, 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf, made beach landings and conducted sweeps north along the Kinh Truong Tien Canal, south of Can Tho. ARVN elements of the 9th and 21st Divisions conducted operations north of the city sweeping to the southwest. A/3-47 Inf found a sizable ammo cache in the morning including, in part, 460 B-40 rounds, 200 pounds of explosives, 89 120mm mortar rounds, plus 500 pounds of medical supplies. Sporadic contact was established and continued in varying degrees of intensity through 20 Feb. Results for this period were MRF: 14 US KIA and 73 WHA (evac), VC: 82 KIA. On 22 Feb, in response to new intelligence, the MRF and ARVN forces initiated a riverine/airmobile attack in Phong Hiep District, Phong Dinh Province and Thuat Hoa District, Binh Xuyen Province to locate the VC III MF Headquarters. This riverine movement appeared to have caught the VC by surprise when B and C/3-47 Inf beached along the Kinh Lai Hien Canal, vicinity WS 8481. The enemy were in bunkers along the canal, but the fighting ports were oriented towards the open rice paddies and away from the canal in anticipation of airmobile attacks. The VC became confused and ran into the open fields away from the MRF forces where they were easy prey to artillery, gunships, and infantry fires. The VC lost 60 KIA in this engagement against negative US casualties. This operation in Phong Dinh and Binh Xuyen Provinces marks the deepest penetration of US Forces into the Mekong Delta to date. On 24 Feb the MRF conducted a waterborne cordon, search and clear operation on the island of Cu Lao May (vic XS 009) Binh Dinh District, Vinh Binh Province which netted over 450 detainees. During the operation, the 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf conducted MEDCAP and DENTCAP operations at the detainee collection points. There was no enemy contact in this one-day operation. On 25 Feb the MRF returned to the vicinity of Can Tho in expectation of renewed VC attacks by the 303, 306, and 309 MF Bns. On 26 Feb, elements of 3-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf became heavily engaged approximately seven km northwest of Can Tho. B/3-60 Inf airmobiled into a hot LZ, with significant damage to helicopters and many wounded. Other elements of the MRF moved to support B Company. The contact with the VC in entrenched positions lasted throughout the day until about 2200 hours. A sweep of the battle area revealed 22 VC KIA. US losses were 14 KHA and 51 WHA. During the night the VC continued harassing the MRF Bns with probing attacks and sniper fire. On 27 Feb the area was swept again with an additional 40 VC KIA discovered from the previous day's contact. B, C, and E/3-60 Inf found ammo caches including 5 crew served (C/S) weapons, 16 small arms (SA), over 15,000 rounds of SA ammo, 161 RR rounds, 193 artillery/mortar rounds, plus other items. Results of the two day operation were: 85 VC KIA, 22 US KHA, and 83 US WHA. On 1 Mar the MRF and three ARVN Ranger battalions conducted RIF operations approximately five km southwest of Can Tho along the Rau Ram and Cai Son Canals. Heavy contact developed...
in the afternoon and continued into the night, and scattered contact occurred the following day. As a result of the engagement, the enemy suffered 63 KIA while the MRF sustained 6 KIA and 37 WIA. The operation terminated on 6 Mar 68. (See Inclosure 13, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 22, Combat Operations After Action Report on CORONADO XI.)

(c) Operation TRUONG CONG DINH (7 Mar - to date): On 7 Mar the 9th Inf Div initiated Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination and cooperation with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) and elements of the 1st and 2d Bdes, 9th Inf Div, and TF 117. The purpose of the operation was to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces located in Dinh Tuong Province and to relieve enemy pressure on Highway QL 4 and the city of My Tho. In the initial stage of the operation, elements of the 1st Bde, 2-39 Inf and 2-60 Inf, conducted airmobile assaults into an area near the village of Binh Phouc, 14 km northeast of My Tho, and then conducted reconnaissance in force operations north and northeast in zone. The 5-60 Inf (M) conducted diversionary reconnaissance in force operations west along Highway QL 4 and then returned to resume road security for the complete length of QL 4 within the AO. 2d Bde elements, 4-47 Inf and 3-60 Inf, conducted airmobile and beach landings 12 km and nine km east of My Tho while the 7th Inf Div (ARVN) operated in the area generally north of My Tho and east of Highway QL 4 with three infantry battalions, a ranger battalion, a cavalry squadron, and several regional force companies. During this phase only light contact was established with the enemy; however, action was characterized by many sightings and destruction of enemy bunker complexes. MRF forces commenced airmobile assaults six km northeast of My Tho. At 1845 hours on 7 Mar, B/4-47 Inf landed in an LZ and was engaged with heavy SA and AW fire from bunker positions along the rice paddy dikes south of the LZ. The heavy fire resulted in five downed helicopters. Fighting continued until 2400 hours when the VC broke contact. At 0300 hours 9 Mar FSB HALLORAN, located 10 km southeast of My Tho along the northern bank of the Cuu Tieu River, received heavy mortar and RPG fire for approximately three quarters of an hour. Two light fire teams (LFT) supported the action. Results of the enemy attack were two artillery barges destroyed, four M-102 howitzers destroyed, one US killed and six US wounded with unknown enemy losses. The 7-9 Mar engagements resulted in 15 US KIA and 100 WIA while the enemy sustained 53 KIA, 9 detainees and 9 SA's, 2 AV's, and many other items of equipment captured. Numerous bunker complexes were also destroyed. On 10 Mar the area of operation shifted to the southern area of central Dinh Tuong Province in Long Dinh and Cai Lay Districts to locate and destroy VC elements and to relieve enemy pressure along Highway QL 4. Elements of the 1st and 2nd Bdes operated in this general vicinity from 10 - 16 Mar with extensive day and }

Page 22
night patrolling along Highway QL 4 as well as reconnaissance in force and strike operations into suspected VC locations; also, extensive upgrading of Highway QL 4 by engineer work parties was initiated. Moderate to heavy contact was established during this period, and many bunkers were destroyed and items of equipment captured. On 162400 Mar 68 the 1st Bde terminated participation in this operation and commenced operation DUCONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD). Elements of the 2d Bde continued operation TRUONG CONG DINH in the Cai Lay, Rach Be Rai, Cai Be Districts, and central Dinh Tuong Province. On 17 Mar, 5 km northeast of Cai Lay, Task Force Saber-wing (Trp C/3-17 Air Cav Squadron; D/3-5 Cav Squadron; and E/3-47 Inf) conducted aerial reconnaissance and eagle flights into AO Hatchet north of Highway QL 4. At 1530 hours elements of Company E came under heavy SA, AW and .50 caliber MG fire. Light fire teams (LFT) and artillery supported until the VC broke contact at 1920 hours. Results of this engagement netted 22 enemy KIA while friendly forces sustained 2 KIA. On 4 Apr 68 the 2nd Bde commenced RIF operations in Truc Giang and Giong Thom Districts, Kien Hoa Province. An assault craft, transporting 5-47 Inf, received B-40 rockets, .50 Cal MG and AW fire from the south bank of the Song Ba Lai as the boats proceeded toward pre-selected landing beaches. Infantrymen of the 3-47 Inf assaulted the river bank under covering fire of naval assault craft. The enemy, reluctant to yield to the infantry attack, stubbornly held their position. The 3-47 Inf suffered moderate casualties during the fierce battle, 17 KIA and 67 WHA; wounded were rescued by navy assault craft while the remainder of the company remained under heavy fire. The 4-47 Inf, several times during the afternoon, came under heavy fire as they advanced toward the enemy positions. Contact broke prior to darkness. C/7-1 Air Cav, flying aerial recon, had numerous contacts; accounting for 16 VC KIA. On 5 Apr the operation continued with the 3-47 Inf sweeping the battle area with no contact; however, 24 VC graves with flags were uncovered. Throughout 6 and 7 Apr sporadic contacts were made with the enemy as elements of the 2d Bde continued sweeping the area. Results of the four day operation: 39 US KHA, 166 WHA with enemy losses at 85 KIA and assorted equipment captured. During operations on 12 Apr, elements of the 2d Bde found and caused destruction of 366 enemy bunkers. On 15 Apr 68 the Mobile Riverine Base (MRB) received 57mm and 75mm fire. The USS Benewah received three hits, and the Tom Green received eight, both with minor damage. A specially configured LCM-6 tanker was also hit, set on fire, and eventually sank. The suspected area of hostile fire was searched with negative results. Another operation conducted by the 3-47 and 4-47 Inf on 17 Apr netted the battalions 78 enemy killed. On 20 Apr, the 2d Bn VNMC joined in Operation TRUONG CONG DINH in coordination and cooperation with 2d Bde. The 2d Bn VNMC, although shore based, conducted riverine operations as a third battalion with the MRF. On 23 Apr the MRF
conducted a three battalion riverine operation at the western end of Dinh Tuong Province with 3-47 Inf on the west, 2d Bn VNMC in the center, and the 4-47 Inf in the east. The VNMC Bn came into contact with the enemy by mid-morning, vic WS 9442. By noon elements of the VC were moving to the east towards 4-47 Inf, E Co of which was moving towards the VNMC contact. The two battalions remained in light to moderate contact until dark. Contact continued on 24 Apr with VC probing attacks during the night against A/3-47 Inf and E/4-47 Inf night defensive positions. The VNMC Bn had light contact during the morning hours. This two day operation resulted in 5 KHA and 33 WHA (evac) against 59 VC KIA. During the quarter, Operation TRUONG CONG DINH accounted for 492 VC KIA and 52 POW while US forces sustained 81 KHA, 450 WHA (422 evac) and 3 MIA. The 2d Bn VNMC lost 4 KHA and 22 WU (See Inclosure 13, 2d Bde ORLL and Inclosure 23, Combat Operations After Action Report, TRUONG CONG DINH - Phase 1.)

(d) Operation KITTYHAWK (14 Feb 67 to 15 Feb 68): Operation KITTYHAWK was continued from the previous reporting period by the 3-5 Cav Sqdn, 9th Inf Div until 15 Feb when the mission was assumed by the 11th ACR. The purpose of this operation was to secure LOCs and selected installations within Long Khanh Province, conduct reconnaissance in force operations and cordon and search of selected hamlets within the AO; secure Blackhorse base camp and the Gia Ray rock quarry, and provide ready reaction forces along Highway QL 1. On 31 Jan, in reaction to the VC Tet Offensive, the 3-5 Cav was alerted to respond to enemy activity in the Long Binh, Bien Hoa area. At 0512 hours A/3-5 Cav (-) departed FS/PB Apple, and while enroute to Bien Hoa, the unit became heavily engaged with an unknown size VC force. The Cav troop returned fire with organic weapons, bypassed several roadblocks, broke through the enemy forces and continued west to the Bien Hoa airfield. Upon reaching the airfield, heavy SA and AW fire was received from a nearby woodline. Elements of A/3-5 Cav deployed and swept the area routing the enemy from their positions. By nightfall A/3-5 Cav had accounted for 40 enemy killed, while sustaining three killed and 24 wounded. On 2 Feb the enemy launched intense ground attacks against Xuan Loc, the Long Khanh provincial capital. Elements of the 3-5 Cav were reacting to an enemy attack at the west side of the city when they became heavily engaged by SA and AW fire. Fire was returned by organic weapons, and LFT's supported the attack. The enemy was driven out of the positions leaving 36 bodies behind. US losses were one killed and three wounded. On 3 Feb at 0233 hours, C/3-5 Cav killed 13 more VC during an enemy attack at the north-west gate of Xuan Loc. US losses were seven wounded. Over this two day period, the combined ARVN and US effort accounted for over 125 enemy killed. Only minor contacts occurred from 5 - 12 Feb when the KITTYHAWK mission was assumed by the 11th ACR. The 3-5 Cav (-D trp) was directed by HQ, USARV to deploy to Da Nang, I CTZ, RVN and became OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM).
On 15 Feb Operation KITTYHAWK terminated. Results of the operation were 201 VC/NVA KIA, 7 POW, 1 Ho Chanh, 5 C/S weapons, 34 SA and 605 tons of rice. US losses were 62 KWA, and 224 WHA. (See Inclosure 15, 3-5 Cav ORLL.)

(e) Operation HOITAC (1 Jun 67 - 7 Feb 68): During the period 1 Feb to 7 Feb, Operation HOITAC was continued in Dinh Tuong Province. The purpose of this operation was the defense of the Dong Tam base. One battalion, 4-47 Inf, of the 2d Bde was employed under the OPCON of TF Funston for the actual conduct of this mission. During the period 1 - 7 Feb, elements of this battalion conducted extensive patrolling, ambushes and strike operations against VC forces in the area adjacent to the Dong Tam base complex. In most cases contact with the VC was characterized by light fire fights and sniper fire. The battalion provided land and waterborne security for engineer dredging equipment and maintained a ready reaction force to assist local GVN units and installations if needed.

On 1 Feb, due to increased enemy activity in the 9th Inf Div TAOI and IV Corps areas, the Division Forward CP moved to Dong Tam to control strike operations against known enemy locations. Just prior to the Div Fwd elements moving to the base, early the same morning, a heavy enemy mortar and recoilless rifle (RR) attack was launched against the base. Over a period of approximately three hours, the enemy fired more than 170 82mm mortar and 75mm RR rounds into the base resulting in minor damage to buildings and 11 US wounded. During the attack light fire teams (LFT) and countermortar fire were directed against suspected enemy positions with unknown results. In the early morning hours of 3, 4, 5 and 7 Feb, the enemy continued to attack the base with mortars, RR and RPG fire. The heaviest attack came on 7 Feb with an estimated 200 rounds fired at the base. Damage to the base was again light, but two US were killed and five wounded. Artillery, LFT's and countermortar were employed against suspected enemy positions with unknown results. On 7 Feb elements of the 5-60 Inf (M) and 2-39 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and RIF operations eight km east of Dong Tam near the city of Ny Tho. At 1505 hours B and C/5-60 Inf (M) came into heavy contact with an estimated two VC companies. Six airstrikes were delivered, and artillery supported throughout the contact until 1700 hours when the VC broke contact. Elements of the 5-60 Inf (M) sustained five KHA and 19 WHA with enemy losses totaling 23 KIA. At 1230 hours, just south of the 5-60 Inf (M) contact, B and C/2-39 Inf came in heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force and returned fire with organic weapons with artillery and LFT's supporting. The fighting continued throughout the afternoon until the VC broke contact at 1700 hours. Elements of 2-39 Inf sustained 3 KHA and 16 WHA with enemy losses totaling 54 KIA (25 by artillery). At 2400 hours 7 Feb Operation HOITAC terminated. Operation HOITAC lasted for one-half year and resulted in numerous successful
pacification and revolutionary development activities within the AO. Close coordination and cooperation was achieved with local GVN forces in the area, and adjacent to Dong Tam base many areas were neutralized by US/GVN forces. Numerous roadrunner and convoy escort missions resulted in a smooth flow of military and civilian traffic over the principal routes in the area.

Cumulative results for Operation HOPTAC were: VC: 296 KIA, 11 POW, 3 HOI Chanh. US: 37 KIA, 364 WIA (225 evac).

(f) Operation HOFTAC I (8 Feb - 30 Apr 68): Operation HOFTAC I was initiated on 8 Feb with no basic change in the primary mission of defending Dong Tam Base Complex. In the initial stage, TF Funston (with 4-47 Inf), 2-39 Inf, and 5-60 Inf (M)(-) were OFCON to 9th Inf Div, and operations were controlled by Div Fwd at Dong Tam. Additional missions for TF Funston were to conduct limited strike operations in coordination and cooperation with ARVN/GVN authorities, destroy VC guerilla forces within the Dong Tam TAOR, conduct roadrunner operations, and secure Highway L4.

On 8 Feb 4-47 Inf continued security of dredge, draglines, shoreline, and operations in the AO while 2-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) continued operations eight kilometers east of Dong Tam near the cit. of My Tho. At 1215 hours, Recon Platoon, 5-60 Inf (M) was dispatched to check a report of two VC companies near the village of Long My along the Ben Chua Canal. As the recon platoon approached the village, they received a heavy volume of fire from the canal line. Companies B and C/5-60 Inf (M) moved to the area of contact and became engaged receiving SA and AW fire from the enemy who occupied heavily fortified positions. Friendly elements returned the fire with organic weapons, and LFT's supported the action. 2-39 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into the area just north of 5-60 Inf (M) contact and swept south in the direction of the Ben Chua Canal. Upon approaching the canal, 2-39 Inf came in contact with the enemy; heavy fighting lasted throughout the afternoon with friendly forces being supported by airstrikes, artillery, and a CS drop. The enemy broke contact at 1945 hours. Friendly losses were 4 KIA and 28 WIA (22 evac) while the enemy sustained 91 KIA. Intelligence obtained from 3 VC POW's captured the next day by 1-11 ARVN Regt revealed that friendly forces had engaged elements of the 265 VC BN. On 10 Feb the 1st Bde Eqm was airlifted from bercent to Dong Tam. Elements of 2-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (B) became OFCON to 1st Bde with the missions of opening Highway L4 from My Tho to Gai Lay, conducting recon in force operations within the AO, and providing security for engineer work parties. During the period 10 - 24 Feb operations were characterized by numerous escort missions, road clearing and roadrunner operations. Operations along Highway L4 consisted of extensive day and night ambush patrolling, RIF operations, and cordon and search operations in the populated areas of Qui Than, Ap Dong, Ap Thuan, and Dong Hoa. Enemy
contact during this period was light with friendly forces engaging only platoon size elements. At 0315 hours on 25 Feb, FS/PB Jager, located 14 kilometers east of Cai Lay along Highway QL 4, came under a heavy enemy attack by the 263d MP BN. Elements maintaining the FS/PB were B and C/5-60 Inf (M), one platoon A/2-39 Inf, one platoon B/15 Engr and Btry B/1-84 Arty. In the initial stage of the attack, the VC fired a substantial number of RPG-2 and RPG-7 rounds along with SA, AW, and mortar fire. A heavy ground assault followed with enemy forces attacking from the southwest and northwest using bangleore torpedoes and turtle mines. Artillery, LFT’s, and airstrikes supported friendly elements. During the fierce attack the VC partially penetrated the perimeter where the artillery battery was located, but a heavy volume of friendly fire plus reinforcing elements of A and C/2-39 Inf and Recon Platoon 5-60 Inf (M) caused the VC to withdraw and break contact. Friendly losses during this engagement were 20 KHA, 68 WHA, 9 APC’s destroyed and two 155mm howitzers damaged. Enemy losses were 105 killed and 37 weapons captured. On 5 Mar, 3-47 Inf replaced 4-47 Inf under operational control of TF Funston and continued the HCPTAC I mission. 4-47 Inf joined the 2d Bde and 7th Inf Div (ARVN) in Operation TRUONG CONG DINE. On 4 Apr 68, 3-47 Inf returned to the 2d Bde, and the 3-60 Inf became OPCON to Task Force Funston. During the remainder of this reporting period, TF Funston continued the mission of defending the Dong Tam base with only sporadic contact being established with small enemy elements. Although the enemy continued their tactics of harassing mortar attacks on Dong Tam, the base continued to be developed to receive additional 9th Inf Div units; many new structures and facilities to include base defense measures were completed. Counter-mortar, quick reacting artillery and LFT’s reduced the enemy capability to fire into the base complex for extended periods. Operation HOPTAC I terminated on 30 Apr 68. Results of this operation were: 345 VC KIA, 9 IFWs, and 1 Hoi Chanh; 51 US KIA and 402 WHA (388 evac).

(g) Operation ENTERPRISE (13 Feb 67 - 10 Mar 68): The 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div continued Operation ENTERPRISE in coordination with the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) and RP/PP forces in Long An Province. This operation was initiated to destroy VC/NVA forces, supporting units and installations; VC infrastructure; and bring under control that portion of the population dominated by the VC while extending GVN control through support of revolutionary development. In response to the Tet Offensive, the 5-60 Inf (M) became OPCON to TF Ware on 31 Jan for operations in Gia Dinh Province. During the period 1-5 Feb, elements engaged in heavy fighting southwest of Saigon, and in this action the battalion killed 128 VC while losing 7 US KHA. On 1 Feb increased enemy activity occurred near the city of Ben Tre in Kien Hoa Province, and elements of the 3d Bde were inserted into the
CONFIDENTIAL

AVN-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

area to capture and destroy VC elements which had been attacking the city.
B/3-39 Inf with OPOON B/2-60 Inf airmobiled into the center of the city
adjacent to the MACV Compound and set up defensive positions to protect
that compound and the provincial capitol during the night. On the
morning of 2 Feb, these units swept through the city toward the eastern
edge of Ben Tre to clear the city of VC. Sporadic fire was received during
the movement to the east, and at 1145H an estimated VC company was engaged.
The 3-39 Inf crossed the north-south river with B/2-60 Inf sweeping north
of the road and B/3-39 Inf sweeping south. As the elements crossed the
river at 1355H, they came under heavy attack from SA, MGs, AW, and mortars.
Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and LFTs. After maintaining
contact throughout the afternoon, the battalion withdrew to a position in
the southeast portion of the city to regroup, consolidate, and establish a
defensive perimeter. The 2-39 Inf OPOON to 3d Bde conducted airmobile
assaults into an LZ three km east of Ben Tre and conducted an RIF operation
sweeping west toward the city, where at 1839H they became heavily engaged
by an estimated VC battalion with SA, AW, B40 rockets, and mortars. Fire
was returned with organic weapons, and LFTs, artillery and airstrikes
supported the battalion. The 2-39 Inf continued moving south and to the
west and closed with 3-39 Inf at 2100H. The following morning, 3 Feb,
all elements conducted an RIF mission throughout the Ben Tre area. This
action continued through 4 Feb. On 5 Feb 3-39 Inf returned from Ben Tre
closing Rach Kien at 1048H, and B/2-60 Inf and 2-39 Inf were released to
their parent units. LFTs and airstrikes accounted for 15 VC KIA; 5 weapons
were captured, and a small amount of equipment and supplies were captured.
At 0255H on 10 Feb, the 3d Bde located at Tan An came under attack. The
VC made a simultaneous attack on the Bde Hq and Tan An South using 82mm
mortar, B 40 rockets, M 79 rounds, RR fire, AW; and SA fire. Fire was
returned using organic weapons, and a LFT supported the Bde. Fighting
continued until 0550H at which time the VC broke contact. The VC lost 33
KIA, 9 SA, 1 Russian MG, 4 RPG-7 rocket launchers, and 6 mines. US
casualties were 4 KIA and 53 WMA. On 2 Mar elements of 2-3 Inf and 4-39
Inf began "Aquabush" operations along the numerous canals south of
Saigon. The aquabush patrols were established to deny enemy use of the
waterways in the Binh Chanh and Nha Be Districts, and during their first
three nights of operation (2-4 Mar), these patrols achieved the following
results: 8 VC KIA; 24 AK 47s, 1 cabine, 1 pistol, 1 82mm mortar complete
with 1 extra bipod, 15 Chicom claymores, 13 boxes of AK 47 ammunition, 16
cartridge belts captured; and 5 sampans destroyed. Operation ENTERPRISE
terminated on 10 Mar after 13 months. Throughout the period, Operation
ENTERPRISE resulted in tremendous strides in the pacification program in
Long An Province. However, during the VC Tet Offensive, there was a
significant decrease in pacification activities as continuous combat
CON

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

operations dealt the enemy severe losses in personnel and equipment. Many civic action projects were completed, and the revolutionary development program was raised to a high level. (See Inclosure 14, 3d Bde ORLL, and Inclosure 24, Combat Operations After Action Report, ENTERPRISE)

(h) Operation QUET THAN (11 Mar 68 - 7 Apr 68): This operation was conducted in close coordination and cooperation with the Capital Military District (CMD), 5th Ranger Group, 25th Inf Div (ARVN), and province and district chiefs. The purpose of the operation was to conduct consolidation operations to destroy the enemy, his infrastructure, installations, supply caches, LOCs and conduct pacification and revolutionary development throughout Long An Province and specified areas of Gia Dinh Province. Task organization for the conduct of this operation consisted of the 3d Bde with 3-39 Inf, 4-39 Inf, A/2-60 Inf, C/5-60 Inf (M), and 2-3 Inf (199 LIB) OPCON to 3d Bde. In the initial stage of the operation, elements of the 3-39 Inf conducted airmobile assaults and reconnaissance in force operations within the AO. Elements of 4-39 Inf and 2-3 Inf continued extensive day and night operations along the many canals in Binh Chanh and Nha Be Districts of Gia Dinh Province to deny the enemy use of the waterways as infiltration routes in and out of the Saigon area. There were no significant contacts with the enemy; however, by conducting extensive airmobile assaults and footmobile patrols and ambushes, small enemy elements were engaged with significant results. In a period of only two weeks, the enemy sustained over 120 killed, and a large amount of equipment was captured. On 7 Apr the 2-3 Inf conducted waterborne and airmobile assaults and RIF operations destroying 46 enemy bunkers. The operation was successful in preventing the enemy from moving personnel, equipment and supplies near the Saigon area. Additionally the operations conducted kept the enemy off balance and prevented him from grouping his forces for a coordinated attack against the capital city from the south. On 8 Apr Operation QUET THAN terminated. (See Inclosure 14, 3d Brigade ORLL, and Inclosure 25, Combat Operations After Action Report, QUET THAN.)

(i) Operation RILEY (3 Jul 67 - 7 Apr 68): Operation RILEY continued from the last reporting period. The purpose of this operation was to effect internal defense and revolutionary development activity in support of Bien Hoa Province. Major objectives were to provide security for Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat) base camp, provide ready reaction forces for RF/PF outposts and conduct strike operations against VC main forces in the AO. Operation RILEY was controlled by the 1st Bde during the period 1 Feb through 10 Feb, at which time the 1st Bde HQ moved to Dong Tam. The RILEY mission was then assumed by TF Forsyth. On 31 Jan in response to the VC Tet Offensive, elements of the 2-47 Inf (M) and 4-39
Inf moved to Long Binh post for perimeter security. At 1000H C/4-39 Inf conducted a motor march to a location east of Highway QL 15 and approximately five km north of Long Binh perimeter where the company established a blocking position. At 0930H A/2-47 Inf (M) and the 4.2" mortar section moved to Hoi Nai Village two km north of Long Binh, and working closely with one company 2-3 Inf, they made contact with an estimated VC battalion. These two companies received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire and returned fire with organic weapons while LFTs and artillery supported. Heavy contact continued throughout the day until the VC broke contact at 1800H withdrawing to the north. At 0700H C/2-47 Inf (M) moved to vicinity of III Corps HQ and established contact and received RPG fire. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and LAW. At 1100H B/4-39 Inf conducted an airmobile assault in an LZ near Widow's Village (located northwest of II FFORCEV BQ) and became OPCON to 2-47 Inf (M). The Scout Plt 2-47 Inf (M) became OPCON to B/4-39 Inf, and jointly, they made contact with an estimated VC battalion in the village. Conducting a joint mech/infantry house to house sweep, they maintained heavy contact until 1700H at which time the dug-in VC withdrew. During these multiple contacts the enemy sustained a severe loss in personnel and equipment. Final results of this engagement were: US losses—4 KIA, 23 WHA; Enemy losses—213 KIA, 32 IW, 25 WIA, 10 IMG, 19 AK 47, 4 carbines, and 3 .50 cal MG captured. Operations continued the next day in the Long Binh area and additional items of equipment were captured which included 6 AK 47, 3 IMG, 9 9mm pistols, 9 rifles, 1 82mm mortars and 1 .50 cal MG mounted on wheels. On 10 Feb elements of 1st Bde were released from the RILEY mission and moved to the Dong Tam area for future operations. TF Forsyth continued the RILEY mission with 2-47 Inf (M). During the remainder of this reporting period, 2-47 Inf (M) conducted extensive local day and night patrolling, provided security for 46th and 15th Engr work parties, conducted roadrunner patrols and established ambush patrols. On 4 Apr TF 123, consisting of three companies of the RTAVR, conducted airmobile assaults and reconnaissance in coordination with 18th Inf Div (ARMY) and 1-11 ACR. No contacts with the enemy were made during the operation. On 7 Apr Operation RILEY terminated. Operation RILEY accounted for 472 VC KIA, 41 POW and 2 Hoi Chanh, 72 C/S weapons and 152 SA. US losses were 64 KIA and 315 WHA (226 evac). See Inclosure 12, 1st Bde ORLL and Inclosure 20, Combat Operations After Action Report, RILEY.

(j) Operation NARASUAN (20 Oct 67 - 7 Apr 68): Operation NARASUAN was continued from the last reporting period by the RTAVR. The purpose of this operation was to conduct combat operations, PSYOP and revolutionary development support in the Nhon Trach District to reduce VC/NVA influence and to enhance the long range pacification effort inBien Hoa.
Province. During this reporting period the RTAVR supported the RVN Revolutionary Development (RD) Program through civic action projects and military operations that contributed to village and hamlet security. Numerous local combat and ambush patrols, waterborne patrols, and reconnaissance in force operations in the Nhon Trach District, in addition to the roadrunner and clearing operations along Highway QL 15 in Long Thanh District, contributed significantly to the overall pacification effort. The RTAVR conducted these operations in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 16th Inf Div (ARVN). Throughout most of this period, enemy contact was limited to infrequent squad/platoon size encounters. On occasion the RTAVR made contact with company size enemy forces, but the VC elected to withdraw immediately or not become heavily engaged. Waterborne operations using airboats along small canals blocked the most probable southern VC LOC from west of Bearcat into Thu Duc District and successfully reduced the amount of supplies and equipment moving through the area. Operation HARASUAN terminated on 7 Apr 68. VC losses during the operation were 158 KIA, 5 POW, 30 C/S weapons and 106 SA. Friendly losses were: RTAVR: 28 KIA and 99 WA (75 eva.) US losses: 9 WHA (evac).

(k) Operation DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD) (17 Mar 68 to date): On 17 Mar 68 the 9th Inf Div initiated Operation DUONG CUA DAN in cooperation and coordination with the 7th Inf Div (ARVN). The mission is to conduct operations in Dinh Tuong Province to prevent VC interdiction of Highway QL 4, to provide security to allied military and civilian traffic, and to upgrade the surface and make repairs from Cai Tua to the junction of Highways QL 4 and LQN 6A. The operation emphasizes coordination with all levels of Vietnamese military and civil governmental organizations within the AO. Present planning calls for the local RF/PF elements to assume the highway security mission on or about 1 Jul 68. To date the operation has been significant in the increased participation by RF/PF units in integrated ambush patrols and the commitment of company sized units to daylight operations. Maximum utilization has been made of surveillance devices such as starlight scopes, seismic intrusion devices, radar, searchlights, infrared equipment, scout dogs, tracker dog teams, and night observation devices. Extensive sweeping operations were employed by these forces not conducting night activities. Elements of the 15th Engr and 86th Engr Bns made extensive repairs and upgraded the highway in coordination with ARVN engineers, as well as, performing daily mine clearing operations and bridge repairs. On 2 Apr 68 C/2-39 Inf inserted in vic XS 310522 and conducted recon in force operations to the east. LPT's from the 128th AEC spotted a VC force in the open at 1207H in the vicinity of XS 318519 and engaged the VC. C Company followed up with an assault, and at 1418H A/2-39 Inf inserted to reinforce vic XS 330523. Results were 12 VC KIA (BC) and
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

94 detainees. On 8 Apr 68 C/2-60 Inf located a large weapons' cache. At 0955H B/2-60 Inf via XS 365545 found a US carbine, 54 crating charges, and one case of blasting caps. At 1000H C/2-60 Inf found 1 120mm mortar with bipod and no baseplate, 60 57mm RR rounds, 40 RPG rounds, 50 grenades, 14 7.62 SA rounds, 1 82mm mortar round, 600 pounds of TNT, 50 Bangalore torpedoes, 28 fuse devices, and 72 mines. At 1730H via XS 320433 C/2-39 Inf found 1 .38 cal pistol, 7 57mm RR rounds, and 24 pounds of C4 explosives. On 11 Apr 68 A/2-39 InfLt 0815H via XS 310510 policed up 20 detainees from a large group of people. By 0930A, B, and E/2-39 Inf had detained some 90 detainees in the same general area. At 1417H Co A/2-39 Inf was airlifted in response to a call for assistance from a CIDG company via XS 196557. The CIDG unit had been ambushed, resulting in one KIA and two WOAs. C/2-39 Inf assailed into an LZ via XS 200546 at 1420H in support of the CIDG. Companies B and C reinforced later in the day around 1600H after A/2-39 Inf received AW fire in the vicinity of XS 200546. Sweeping through the area with the CIDG unit on the right flank, the units came under heavy SA, AW and 82mm mortar fire. Company B engaged 15 to 20 VC in khaki shirts and trousers and some dressed in short black or grey trousers, none wearing hats. The 2-39th Inf reported 19 VC KIA and supporting gunships had 6 VC KIA. On 29 Apr 68, A and B/2-60 Inf established heavy contact with an estimated VC En via XS 233573. Artillery, TAC Air, LPT's, Spooky, and a CS drop were used in support. Results of the action were 9 US KIA and 6 US WOAs (evac). VC losses were 4 KIA. Contact was broken at 2345H. The following day A/2-39 Inf and B/2-39 Inf conducted recon in force operations in the vicinity of the previous day's contacts by 2-60 Inf. At 1300H C Company discovered a weapons' cache via XS 265568 containing 23 AK-47's, 1 60mm mortar, 36 empty AK-47 magazines, 90 60mm mortar rounds, 3 five pound cans of grease, 6 25 pound CHICOM claymore mines, and 1 electrical blasting cap. A Company located a cache at 1325H via XS 269568. The cache contained 1 cal .30 Browning MG, 1 RPG launcher, 200 Bangalore torpedoes, 10 SK rifles, 500 feet of electrical cord, 3 cans of fuse, 39 RPG-7 charges, 25 RPG-7 rounds, 55 fragmentation grenades, and 13 concussion grenades. Also, A and B/2-60 Inf returned to the area of contact and recovered 13 VC KIA (BC), 5 AK-47's, 1 magazine with an unknown amount of ammo, an AK-47 cleaning kit, 1 CHICOM grenade, and 10 pounds of medical supplies. Materially contributing to the success of the operation to date has been the willingness of the local population to come forward and volunteer information on the enemy compared to past experience in the same area. A deliberate campaign has been directed towards instilling in the local population the importance of keeping the road open and its relation to the economy of the Delta area. In many cases the people have assisted in actual repairs showing their growing concern over the impact on their
general well being and prosperity. Of note in this vein were the dangers risked by an elderly couple living in close proximity to the highway. A 9th Inf Div company was engaged in a fierce firefight several hundred yards from their home. An infantryman was badly wounded yet managed to take it to their home. The couple took him in and hid him, assisting him as well as they could and risking their lives by doing so. Later after the battle was over and an element was searching the vicinity, they openly approached the element commander and led him to their house where the man was hid.

(1) Operation TOAN THANG (8 Apr 68 to date): The 9th Inf Div participates in this operation which includes all US/FNAR/GVN units in the area surrounding Saigon as a follow up to Operation QUIET THNK. The operation is aimed at the location and destruction of VC/PAVA elements of the 5th VC Div and VC Sub-Regions 2, 3, and 4 in the division TAOI and also the interdiction of VC/NVA LOC into the Saigon area. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) and Task Force Forsyth with the 2-47 Inf (M) and the 6-3 Inf conducted operations in coordination and cooperation with the 16th Inf Div (AVN) in Binh Hoa, and Long Thanh Districts, Bien Hoa Province and western Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province. The 3d Bde with the 4-39 Inf and 2-3 Inf (199th INF) in the Binh Chanh Districts, Gia Dinh Province and with the 3-39 Inf and 5-60 Inf (M) in Long An Province conducted operations in coordination and cooperation with the 25th Inf Div (AVN) and other ARVN, Ranger, and Marine elements. All 9th Inf Div elements worked closely with local EP/FP units and the national police. Significant tactical techniques employed, especially by the 3d Bde forces, have been the extensive use of artillery radars (AN/TPS-25) to detect large scale enemy movements to identify enemy LOC, and the "Aquashish" or night ambush patrols on water LOC leading into Saigon. Throughout most of this operation, enemy contact has been limited to squad or platoon size encounters. From 3 - 20 Apr there were no significant contacts established by elements of the 9th Inf Div participating in this operation; only sporadic and light contact was established resulting in 5 US KIA, 28 WHA and 7 VC/NVA KIA. Or 22 Apr 2/3-5 Cav, the Air Cav Troop, conducted aerial recon and airborne assaults in northern Tam Tru District, vic XS 604704. A Troop inserted 1st Air rifle Platoons (ARP) in the afternoon which became immediately heavily engaged with an estimated enemy battalion and sustained heavy casualties. LTF's and fighters supporting the contact received heavy AW fire resulting in damage to several helicopters. A tactical emergency was declared at 1800. Elements of the 5-60 Inf (M) moved by APC to support the contact, while elements of 2-3 Inf, 3-39 Inf, and 7-39 Inf conducted night airborne insertions into the area. All units were engaged in heavy contact.
In the early morning hours of 23 Apr, the ARP was extracted under a heavy smoke screen created by artillery. The squad establishing initial contact suffered 100% killed (6 KEA) after it had advanced to within 30 meters of the enemy bunkers before receiving fire. D/3-5 Cav was credited with 35 enemy KIA. The enemy dead were found wearing blue uniforms and steel helmets indicating NVA troops. On 24 Apr TF Tower with the 2-47 Inf (M) and 6-31 Inf in coordination with the 1st ATF conducted a spoiling attack sized at a reported NVA artillery battalion in the Hot Dieu area of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. This operation continued with negligible contact until 26 Apr. On 27 Apr the 6-31 Inf became OPCON to the 3d Bde to act as a mobile reaction force in southern Gia Dinh and northern Long An Provinces. On 30 Apr 3-11 ACR and B/7-1 Air Cav became OPCON to 2d Bde to increase the protection of the southern flank of Saigon in Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces in anticipation of renewed VC/NVA attacks. The measure of success of Operation TOAN THAW is that up to the end of the quarter, the enemy had not been able to renew his offensive attacks against Saigon despite rumors and intelligence reports that such attacks had been planned. Results for 9th Inf Div units for the quarter were: 183 VC/NVA KIA, 4 POW, 11 G/S weapons and 42 SA captured; 25 US KEA, 97 US WA (49 evac), 1 MIA and RTAVR 1 WHA. (See Inclusion 12, 3d Bde ORLL.)

(7) Combat Support Activities.

(a) Artillery Support.

1 Several firing batteries and battalions of artillery with the 9th Inf Div were required to operate both in the rugged jungle terrain of the Bien Hoa Province and in the rice-paddies of the Mekong Delta. Timely and continuous fire support was provided to divisional elements, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, and Regional Force/Popular Forces Outposts. Twelve firing batteries from II Field Forces Vietnam Artillery were used at various times throughout the quarter to supplement the fires of 9th Div Artillery in support of division operations. These figures do not reflect support from adjacent firing elements as figures were not obtainable for those fires. A chart reflecting a breakdown of rounds fired by artillery with the division is attached as Inclusion 6. Reference also 9th Inf Div Artillery Operation Report—Lessons Learned for the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68 which
subject: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPUR-65 (R1) (U)

is being forwarded under separate cover.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support. The 9th Aviation Battalion gunships flew 2,929 sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flights, aerial displacement of artillery by cargo helicopters, medical evacuations, river and road convoys, countermortar/rocket standby and suppressive fire support for units in contact. These light fire teams (LFT's) accounted for 33 VC KBA (B7); destroyed 182 structures and damaged 74 others, destroyed 163 sampans and damaged 56 others. D/3-5 Cav, under operational control of the 1st Bde, supported long range patrol (LRP) insertions/extractions and provided nightly countermortar/rocket standby at Tan An and Dong Tam base camps. C/7-1st Air Cav provided support principally for 1st and 2d Bde operations in Dinh Tuong Province throughout much of the quarter.

(c) Tactical Air Support.

1 Normal air support was received from fighter aircraft. The Combat Sky Spot was proven very effective against enemy base camps. The sky spot is a radar controlled fighter and these missions are flown during the hours of darkness.

2 A summary of tactical air support for the quarter is given in Enclosure 7.

(d) Strategic Air Support.

1 This air support during the quarter consisted of two strikes. On 271900H Feb 68 a mission was flown resulting in 3 AK 47s, 1 five pound bag of rice, 1 pound of medical supplies, 1 NVA uniform, 1 OD uniform, 300 pisters, and 1 song book captured. The second mission was flown on 291300H Feb 68 and 25 bunkers destroyed.

2 Strategic Air Support was limited due to the higher priorities in I and II CTZ areas during this period.

(e) Naval Fire Support. There has been no Naval fire support rendered except that given to the 2d Bde as part of the Mobile Riverine Force.

(f) Chemical Support.

1 E63 Personnel Detector: This quarter the Division Chemical Section flew a total of 38 hours covering 23 missions using the E63 Manpack
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Personnel Detector (People Sniffer). This represents a decrease of approximately 55% from the previous quarter. The primary reason for this decrease has been the non-availability of aircraft to the section. Results were reported to the G2 for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence indications.

2. Riot Control Agents: Bulk CS was dropped from CH-47's contaminating VC base camps, lines of communication and infiltration routes. Over 26,500 pounds of bulk CS were dropped (325 drums). This represents a 40% decrease in the amount of CS used this quarter from last quarter. A total of 54 E158's were employed this quarter. This is an increase of 22% over last quarter. Last quarter there were 41 E158's employed. There would have been an even greater use of the E158 except for the non-availability of the munition. Since this is an experimental item, the production rate has been low.

3. Defoliation: There were no defoliation missions flown by the 9th Inf Div Chemical Section this quarter; however, 7th Air Force has been carrying on defoliation missions in the Rung Sat.

f. Training.

(1) During the reporting period, division training consisted of the following:

(a) Replacement Training.

(b) NCO Leadership Training.

(c) Battalion Refresher Training.

(2) Replacement Training consists of five and one half days of intensive orientation designed to prepare the individual for combat in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed by the 9th Inf Div, conducted all replacement training. The following table shows the number of personnel trained during the report period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 36
In addition to receiving the normal replacement training, company grade officers and non-commissioned officers received an additional three day orientation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment in use in Vietnam is demonstrated when practical, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed. Two hundred forty-seven officers and 637 NCO's attended this course.

The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership and instruction and practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialist and junior NCO who have not had the benefit of prior formal leadership training and who will probably be required to assume a leadership position during combat. During the past three months, 660 personnel have completed the NCO Leadership Course.

Battalion refresher training is conducted by the maneuver battalion on a schedule of one day training per company per week. This flexible scheduling allows timely instruction and also permits each maneuver battalion to complete its refresher training each month.

The 9th Inf Div continued during this reporting period to qualify personnel in specific MOS's by sending them to courses being conducted for this purpose by support units.

During the quarterly period ending 30 Apr 68, logistical activities continued in support of the 9th Inf Div and its operations. There were several significant problems in providing resupply of all classes of supplies during the initial phase of the VC Tet Offensive. During this phase of the Tet Offensive, all classes of supply furnished to 9th Inf Div base camps at Camp Martin Cox, Tan An, and Dong Tam were reduced because of intense combat operations in the Saigon area, where the 506th General Depot is located, and the interdiction of main supply routes that lead to 9th Inf base camps. To alleviate the shortages of Class I, II, & IV, the 9th Inf Div provided its own logistical convoys with tactical security to make scheduled pick-ups at the 506th General Depot and deliver these supplies to Camp Martin Cox, Tan An, and Dong Tam. During the period 31 Jan 68 - 10 Feb 68, perishables normally received from Saigon were not available. Meal Combat Individual Rations
were airlifted from Camp Martin Cox to Tan An and shipped by barge from Vung Tau to French Fort vic XS 895615. During this period the lack of fuel created a significant problem at Tan An. This resulted from failure of the contracted commercial carriers to deliver fuel to Tan An during the Tet Offensive. The 9th Inf Div filled its fuel supply at Tan An in advance of Tet and positioned two JP4 5000 gallon tankers, one MOGAS 5,000 gallon tanker, and one diesel 5,000 gallon tanker at Tan An with the idea to fill at Nha Be or Tan Son Nhut during the Tet period. In addition to the fuel tankers, two 10,000 gallon bladders were placed on the ground at Tan An to increase the storage capacity of MOGAS and diesel fuel. The 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion closely monitored issues and on hand amounts and was in a position to adequately resupply Tan An utilizing organic transportation.

(1) Operations RILEY, TOAN THANG, and MARASUAN were supported from Camp Martin Cox by surface line of communication (LOC) and emergency by air.

(2) Operation KITTYHAWK continued to be supported from Blackhorse Base Camp.

(3) Operation ENTERPRISE and QUET THANG continued to be supported from Tan An. Elements of the 3-39 Inf and one battery (-) of the 1-84 Arty continued to occupy French Fort vic XS 895615.

(4) Operations CORONADO X, XI, and TRUONG CONG DINH were supported by the Mobile Riverine Base (MRB) and from Dong Tam Base. HOPTAC, HOPTAC I, and DUONG CUAN DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD) were also supported from Dong Tam Base.

(5) On 15 Feb 68 the 9th Inf Div deployed the 3-5 Cav (-) in the I CTZ near Da Nang. Subsequently they were deployed further north near Dong Ha. The mode of transportation was LOC water from New Port to Da Nang utilizing six landing ships tank (LST's). Major items of equipment shipped were 31 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, 6 M88VTRs and several wheeled vehicles. While the 3-5 Cav (-) operated in I CTZ, they were under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) then later placed under the operational control of the 3rd Marine Division. Logistical support was provided by both the Da Nang Support Command and the 9th Inf Div. A distance of more than 300 miles separated the 9th Inf Div from the 3-5 Cav (-); therefore, responsiveness was limited. However, from 20 Feb until present the 3-5 Cav (-) has been supported in a satisfactory manner. The 9th Inf Div is currently replacing combat loss
equipment such as M113 armored personnel carriers and tanks. Twelve C130 airplanes have been utilized to transport nine M113 personnel carriers from Long Thanh North to Dong Ha, and six tanks have been shipped by LOC water from Saigon to Dong Ha. In addition, TO&E equipment and repair parts are shipped to the 3-5 Cav (-) on an as required basis.

(6) On 3 Apr 68 the 6-31 Inf joined the 9th Inf Div. This unit arrived from CONUS. On 12 Apr 68 the 6-31 Inf received its vehicles and cargo by ship from Saigon port. Vessel cargo consisted of 39 wheeled vehicles, 39 conex and 27 crates, a total of 350 short tons. Cargo was discharged and hauled to Camp Martin Cox without problems.

(7) Maintenance service on 9th Inf Div aircraft was significantly improved during this quarter by the acquisition of 13 civilian aircraft mechanics from Lockheed Aircraft Service Company Midwest City, Oklahoma. These 13 mechanics were assigned to B Company 709th Maintenance Battalion on 3 Mar 68 and are scheduled to depart on 21 Aug 68.

(8) Maintenance service of the close loop support program improved significantly during this quarterly period. Major items received were 60 M113A1 armored personnel carriers. These 60 personnel carriers are for exchange of gas engine M113 for diesel engine M113A1.

(9) See Inclosure 16, Support Command ORLL for logistical support in depth.

h. (U) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) General. The period covered by this report, 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68, was particularly significant in that the Viet Cong Tet Offensive, which began 30 Jan 68, necessitated the most intensive PSYOP effort ever implemented by the 9th Inf Div. A significant aspect of the Tet Offensive was the psychological impact which the VC attacks against population centers had upon the civilians of the Republic of Vietnam. People living in government controlled areas, the largest population centers of Saigon, My Tho, Vinh Long, Can Tho, Tan An, etc, had no real exposure to the full wrath of the VC soldier until the Tet Offensive. The ferocity of the attack and the initial short lived successes which the Viet Cong enjoyed left the people in provincial and district towns within the TAOI stunned. During the few days early in Feb in which the Viet Cong controlled portions of the city of My Tho, the enemy launched an extensive face to face PSYOP campaign with the intent of convincing the civilian population that a coalition government had
been placed into effect, that the Viet Cong had managed fantastic successes elsewhere in the country, and that the population would do well to rally to the support of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front. Although the rumors of a coalition government were easily put down, in My Tho for example by elements of the 403rd POLWAR company using truck-mounted loudspeakers as well as the eventual ejection of all remaining VC elements in the northwestern portions of the city, the campaign none the less had its effect. The viability of the GVN had indeed been put to question in the minds of many of the refugees and victims of the attack. As the dust began to settle, however, and psychological victory which the VC might have achieved initially began to wane, life began to return to a state of normalcy. Citizens in the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area roundly denounced the Viet Cong as much for their desecration of Tet as for their acts of violence against the very people they claimed to be "liberating". The Tet Offensive had the ultimate psychological effect of showing the civilian population the true colors of the VC/NLF movement. Rather than supporting the Viet Cong out of fear, they began to rally their support even more ardently behind the GVN. It was in the provincial and district capitals that popular rejection of the VC movement was most evident. The weakly PSYOP attitude reports for the period immediately following the offensive indicated that many had seen for the first time the vindictive, untempered use of violence so characteristic of the Viet Cong. The impact of the GVN recovery program in the areas hardest hit contributed significantly toward improving the GVN image. In the rural areas, however, the civilian population was evidently not so quick to respond to GVN appeals for public support. Because of operational necessity, many of these areas were left unsecured by the ARVN troops deployed in the defense of the larger population centers. In late Feb, as US and ARVN units in Dinh Tuong Province moved back into the rural areas to destroy VC units, reopen Highway QL 4, and attempt to regain public trust and support, most efforts met with a cold response. Whereas the provincial radio station in My Tho was on the air telling of VC losses during the offensive and explaining GVN and POLWAR successes in regaining all population centers, the radio-less rural population went unadvised except as the VC chose to advise them. That then was the situation facing the 9th Inf Div with respect to PSYOP and the civilian population. The principal task appeared to lie in the rural areas and required that the population there be told as quickly as possible of the VC defeats, the GVN recovery program, and the concern which the government felt for their well-being. Their cooperation in providing information on Viet Cong activity to assist the GVN was identified as a major objective of our PSYOP as well.

(b) There have been increasing reports through intelligence channels
that due to the heavy losses incurred by main force Viet Cong units, VC
commanders and military proselyting sections within the Viet Cong Infrac-
ture have been forced to recruit not only guerrillas but civilians,
including women and children, to serve in combat and combat support
units. It is becoming increasingly evident that low morale and severe
disillusionment plague many Viet Cong units. The failures of the Tet
Offensive, the staggering losses sustained, the non-arrival of promised
reinforcements and "super weapons" have all contributed to further lower-
ing the morale of the Viet Cong soldier. Perhaps most significant among
the many failures of the Tet Offensive was the utter lack of public
support engendered by the VC/NLF movement. The Viet Cong in pre-Tet
propaganda targeted at their troops made much of the anticipated up-
raising of the people and the supposed rallying of public support behind
the Viet Cong movement. As the Viet Cong made their attacks against
provincial and district capitals, it had been expected that a general
uprising of the population would follow, heralding the Viet Cong and
the NLF as the liberators of South Vietnam.

(c) There is considerable evidence of deteriorating morale on
the part of North Vietnamese soldiers infiltrated into the south to
participate in what they were told would be the coup de grace. The
winter-spring offensive was to have achieved fantastic success, and NVA
soldiers were supposedly needed only to finish off isolated pockets of
resistance and then would ride forward on the crest of the wave of
victory into the welcoming arms of the liberated people of South Vietnam.
Their disillusionment has been profound.

(d) In a recent policy guidance received from the Joint United
States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), a country-wide program of
psychological operations targeted at Viet Cong and NVA units was out-
lined. This program is currently being implemented to fully exploit
the failures of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive and the many other PSYOP
vulnerabilities which are now in evidence. In leaflet and loudspeaker
propaganda, the enemy is told of the failures of the winter-spring
offensive and of the inevitable defeat of the Viet Cong and NVA
forces. The enemy is also told of the Chieu Hoi Program and is encourag-
ed to rally to the government of South Vietnam as his only hope for
survival. Yet, statistics indicate a record low in the number of ral-
lies to come into the program since the beginning of the offensive.
While it may be expected that these statistics will improve as the
winter-spring offensive loses momentum, the fact remains that for the
present the Viet Cong or NVA soldiers are being kept too busy to make
escape possible or feasible in most cases, regardless of how much they
may desire to do so. Whereas the nation wide campaign of PSYWAR
presently being implemented in accordance with current JUSMAO guidance may well engender the desire to surrender or rally to the GVN, the campaign does not afford the enemy the opportunity. As psychologically correct as the moment might be, events have precluded him from acting. It would appear that in consideration of this, a deliberate plan to provide an otherwise docility enemy with the opportunity to surrender could well achieve a good measure of success.

(e) In light of the 9th Inf Div's assigned mission in Dinh Tuong Province of securing and up-grading Highway QL 4, Division PSYOP personnel were in an advantageous position to conduct an intensive face to face PSYOP campaign targeted at the civilian population in the rural areas along the highway. Having identified the immediate requirement of keeping the civilian population informed as to VC losses during the offensive, the successes of ARVN and FWYAF troops, the re-establishment of security in the population centers, and the efforts and accomplishments of the GVN recovery program, new propaganda had to be developed as quickly as possible. During the first two weeks following the offensive, the 9th Inf Div developed 15 quick reaction leaflets and ten quick reaction tapes to accomplish these objectives. To provide more complete coverage, a special newsletter, "Ban Tin Tuc Mien Tay" ("The Delta Bulletin") was written and printed in 10,000 copies by the division and was distributed, primarily by hand, by mobile PSYOP teams operating along Highway QL 4 in Dinh Tuong and Long An Provinces. In all, three editions of the newsletter were printed and disseminated during the two month period following the Tet Offensive. (A copy of the second edition is attached as Inclosure 9 to this report). News items were also disseminated by loudspeakers using the 100K watt AEM-425S-4 mounted in utility helicopters. The face to face PSYOP effort was fully coordinated with CORDS PSYOP personnel at province level, and through coordination and cooperation with 7th Inf Div (ARVN) operating out of My Tho, arrangements were made with the US advisor to 407th POLWAR Company to provide a political warfare team of three Vietnamese to augment our efforts. In March the team was increased to five men, and arrangements were made with province officials to field a ten man Armed Propaganda Team in support of division activities along Highway QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province. These face to face activities began to gain the confidence of the people, and shortly after their deployment, they were successful in gaining information that proved to be of intelligence value as well as indicating that the local civilian population was becoming more responsive to our efforts. VC interdiction of Highway QL 4 began to drop sharply due to US presence in the area. Established curfews along the highway were respected by the people, and they began to slowly indicate...
a desire to volunteer information. Previous offers of rewards for information had gone apparently unnoticed as the population began to voluntarily respond to the questions of psyoperators in the area. In April the face to face program was further augmented with two more political warfare teams from the 50th FOLWAR Battalion in Can Tho. A 23 member cultural drama team was also deployed in the area to add to our capabilities.

(f) In addition to the Volunteer Informant Program, leaflet propaganda was developed to support the upgrading operation on QL 4. Hand distributed leaflets at checkpoints explained the project, listing the advantages the improved road surface would hold for the people of the Mekong Delta. Administrative instructions incident to traffic control in the construction areas were also disseminated in this manner. To make the delays more palatable at congested work sites, Koolaid drinks were provided to the waiting drivers and passengers by members of the Mobile PSYOP Team at the same time that they passed out leaflets apologizing for and explaining the reasons for the delay. QL 4 bumper stickers are being printed, GVN flags are attached to antennas, and billboards are working toward generating public enthusiasm for the project and for the GVN effort in behalf of the people. The military importance of Highway QL 4 to the ARVN and US troops is not mentioned. To assist in developing meaningful propaganda, Nghia, a former VC propaganda minister from Long An Province who rallied to the GVN in 1967, was brought to Dong Tam. He prepared two tapes and leaflets for our use along the highway and in support of the Chieu Hoi program.

(g) During the period 1 Feb through 30 Apr, the division captured 853 detainees who were eventually classified as innocent civilians. The face to face PSYOP effort targeted at these innocent civilians during the period in which they are in our custody is a significant part of the PSYOP program to rally public support for the GVN. The program centers around fair treatment, good food, medical care if necessary, and expeditious return, by helicopter or boat, to the district capital nearest their home. While at the detainee center, they are provided with reading material prepared by JU FAO and V-IS (Vietnam Information Service). Movies are shown, and a television set is provided for their viewing during the evening hours. Prior to their departure, they are given a small quantity of soap, cigarettes, candy and other small items together with 100VN. Through an interpreter, the civilians are told of our regrets at having detained them, encouraged to avoid assisting the Viet Cong, and asked to report all Viet Cong activity to the nearest GVN agency or US unit. The Mobile Riverine Force has a similar program involving its "Detainee Boat"; the theory being that good treatment during the short time these individuals are
exposed to the US/GVN will go farther in enlisting their support than any amount of leaflet propaganda.

(b) PSYWAR targeted at the Viet Cong units received second priority during the period following the Tet Offensive primarily because policy guidance received from JUSPAO identified the civilian population as the principal target group. Prior to 1 Apr only approximately 15% of all propaganda developed and disseminated was targeted at the Viet Cong/NVA Soldier. During Apr, however, sharp increases in this percentage took place as quick reaction leaflets were developed stressing the futility of the continued Viet Cong effort, losses during the Tet Offensive, recruiting difficulties, low morale, and the lack of public support.

(1) PSYOP Activities 1 Feb through 28 Apr 68.

1 Total missions: 353

2 Leaflets: Total dropped: 10,147,850. Total hand distributed: 387,000. Total Rapid Reaction’s produced: 41

3 New leaflets produced by division: 9. Distributed 107,000

4 Speaker: 205.35 total hours

5 Movies shown: 19

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) Self-Help Program. A substantial increase in the degree of civilian participation in 9th Inf Div Civic Action Programs was noted during the reporting period. The percentage of Vietnamese self-help for the month of February was 71%. The people have shown that they want to be helped, and if we do help them, no matter what the threat may be on their lives and the lives of their families, they will try to help themselves. Even through the Tet Aggression dampened some aspects of Civic Action during the beginning of the reporting period, it also served to strengthen the overall effectiveness of the program as the population is now much more receptive to our acts and deeds and much more willing to get out and work with the Americans. With the 2-47 Inf (M) supplying the materials and supervision, the villagers of Binh Son Village have performed all the labor to construct a barrier around their village to keep the Viet Cong from continually entering. It has been noted in several instances that the Vietnamese do not respect the dwellings
that are built by Americans as much as they do the dwellings that they construct themselves. "If you build a house for them (Vietnamese Civilians) they won’t live in it, but if you supply the materials and let them build their own house, they're very content" - Senior District Advisor, Nhon Trach District. With this in mind, the division is turning more and more to simply supplying the materials to the people and, when needed, the supervision.

(b) Repair & Construction Efforts. Repair and construction projects as part of the 9th Inf Div's Civic Action Program fluctuated widely during this reporting period due to the enemy's Tet Offensive. Tactical commitments for the month of Feb precluded the number of repair and construction projects desired. Most of the repair and construction effort went toward orphanages, churches, pagodas and dwellings which were damaged because of the Tet Offensive. Efforts to improve land routes of communication achieved dramatic results during this reporting period. Highway QL 4, from the Delta to Saigon, known as the "Lifeline of the Delta" has been kept open and is being resurfaced by the 9th Inf Div (See Para 1h(2)(f)3, below). Due to the type of work being performed and the type of equipment being used on Highway QL 4, most of the labor load has been carried by US personnel. However, all other repair and construction projects have been carried out on a "self-help" basis.

(c) Commodity Distributions. Commodity distributions of foodstuffs conducted by divisional units in conjunction with "Operation KANSAS" again reflected a substantial increase over the previous quarter's achievements. During Feb the quantity of foodstuffs distributed nearly doubled the total for the entire last reporting period. This can be attributed to the enemy Tet Offensive which produced so many homeless refugees. The "Operation KANSAS" distribution facility at divisional level was able to respond to the units' requests in nearly all instances up to the last month of the reporting period.

(d) Medical Civic Action Program. During this reporting period, the 9th Inf Div Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) treated only 50% of the number treated during the last reporting period. This sharp decline can be attributed to several factors. The Tet Offensive hurt the division MEDCAP program considerably as many areas were put "off limits" to MEDCAP teams for as much as two of the three reportable months. The relocation of major units within the division also hindered the program as the people in many of the areas to which the units moved had never seen Americans before and were quite hesitant to come out and be treated. Also, during the Tet Offensive and for some time thereafter, US medical personnel were
 used largely to treat the increased combat casualties. As the effects of the Tet Offensive diminish and the people become more accustomed to American presence, more people are turning out for division MEDCAPs. On 24 Apr 68 two MEDCAPs conducted by the 1st Bde on QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province treated a total of 500 patients, indicating that the people are putting more trust in the Americans now. Coordination of MEDCAP programs with GVN officials and MACV Advisors is accomplished in some instances in secure areas. However, it is now felt that prior notification of a coming MEDCAP could result in endangering the MEDCAP team. Specialized medical treatment continues to be provided in conjunction with the 9th Medical Battalion and the 3d Surgical Hospital at Dong Tam, the 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh, and with Saigon's Cho Ray Hospital.

(e) Tet Offensive Reaction. During the Tet Offensive, there were many hungry, homeless, and in many cases wounded Vietnamese civilians. The 9th Inf Div reacted with emergency relief and refugee support. In the Dinh Tuong Province city of My Tho, the division worked in close coordination with GVN and CORDS officials to achieve significant results. Through the Province Minister of Social Welfare, nearly 70,000 pounds of division-provided foodstuffs were equitably distributed to 6,000 homeless civilians and refugee families. In addition, 3,000 gallons of potable water were delivered each day through division resources to three refugee camps, hospitals, and orphanages in the area. The My Tho Provincial Hospital was practically paralyzed by the influx of some 2,000 wounded civilians. As a result of a request submitted by the Province Chief of Dinh Tuong Province, a medical assessment team from the 9th Inf Div was dispatched to the hospital. They found the hospital staff to be over extended. Additionally, they noted that there was an insufficient quantity of medical supplies on hand to meet the requirements posed by this mass casualty situation. The Division Surgeon and an augmentation team from Company D, 9th Medical Battalion re-organized the hospital on a 24 hour basis, performing triage and emergency operations while savage fighting flared throughout the city. The 5th AA Platoon, 2d CA Company provided two trained medical assistants and supervised the construction of sorely needed intravenous feeding stands, traction racks, and leg elevators. Officers and men of the Division Support Command contributed 24 pints of whole blood to meet immediate needs. One complete field kitchen was provided to facilitate regular feeding of the hospital's patients. The success of this emergency relief was a direct result of the 9th Inf Div's prompt response to the request of GVN officials, in conjunction with guidance provided by CORDS representatives.
(f) Civic Action Highlights.

1. Orphans' Village. Located two miles from the division's Bearcat base camp is Orphans' Village. Shortly after the Tet Offensive, a group of 70 Buddhist monks from Gia Dinh Province gathered more than 300 youngsters from all over the Mekong Delta who had been orphaned because of the Tet Offensive and set out to build an orphanage. High on hope and willing to work, the monks found themselves short on supplies. They turned to the 9th Inf Div at Bearcat, and the results were overwhelming. The village received enthusiastic support from numerous units at Bearcat. Within a short time, buildings began to spring up, a playground was completed, and transportation was provided weekly to pick up any and all supplies that the monks might need. On 17 Apr 68, Nguyen Van Su, director of the orphanage presented General Roseborough, Asst Division Commander, with a plaque symbolizing their appreciation of the help given them by the officers and men of the 9th Inf Div.

2. Responding to the Tet Aggression Relief Project (TAR), the officers and men of the 9th Inf Div contributed more than $2730.00 to be used for such things as building a new school house at the Dong Tam Base, repairing two orphanages at My Tho that were damaged during the Tet Offensive, and constructing a high school in Long Thanh District, just to mention a few. Each contributing unit picked the project that they wanted to finance, resulting either directly or indirectly from the Tet Aggression.

3. Elements of the 9th Inf Div have undertaken the project of clearing, maintaining and repaving QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province. General William C. Westmoreland, COMVCSOV, commented on the significance of Highway QL 4: "There is only one major route into Saigon from the Delta; that's Highway 4. The people depend on this communications link with the capital, and the commerce that travels the road is important to the economy of Saigon, so we must keep Highway 4 open." Knowing the importance and the significance of the work that the 9th Inf Div is doing on QL 4, the people of the area have offered not only to help in the repair of the highway but have also offered information about the VC and VC Saigon teams operating in that area.

(g) Table of Accomplishments. Civic Action 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDCAP II</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>721</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patients</td>
<td>49,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Efforts to Improve LOC:
- Bridges Constructed: 36
- Bridges Repaired: 24
- Roads Constructed: 15 km
- Roads Repaired: 337 km

Repair and Construction:
- Schools: 8
- Dispensaries: 6
- Playgrounds: 10
- Other Major: 126
- Other Minor: 37

Commodities Distributed:
- Cement: 71,370 lbs
- Lumber: 325,763 bd ft
- Clothing: 3,201 lbs
- Health and Sanitation Items: 3,115 lbs
- School Kits: 2,070 ea
- Tin (sheets): 2,773 ea
- Foodstuffs: 202,940 lbs

1. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training.

(1) The Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Battalion Retraining Program which was initiated on 31 Jul 67 and expanded in Sep to include Artillery, Cavalry and Engineer units continued during this reporting period. Scheduled training was interrupted primarily during the Tet Offensive due to both US and ARVN elements being totally committed. Upon diminishment of enemy activities, the training was again instituted but not with the enthusiasm previously exhibited by the Vietnamese. The fact that the 9th Inf Div was fragmented and positioned in different locations than that experienced prior to Tet also made our refresher training progress more difficult. Although every effort was made to continue training while ARVN units were in the field, this achieved but limited success. The status of ARVN refresher training as of 31 Mar 68 is as reflected on Inclosure 10a.

(2) Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/FF) Upgrading Program, initiated by the 9th Inf Div in May 67, continued with renewed emphasis. A survey of all RF/FF outposts within the 9th Inf Div TAOI progressed with excellent results. This survey included classifying each post, surveying or firing DEFCONS, preparing contingency plans for reaction forces, and supplying required materials. Specific teams employed to support the upgrading program were: Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS),
Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CHIR), Improvement Action Teams (IMATT), and the Logistics Administration Advisory Teams (LAA'Ts).

(a) The MATS continue to be the most successful of the upgrading teams employed. This group, by living with the local RF/PF force, was able to recommend outpost improvements, increase the unit's combat effectiveness and encourage more offensive operations. Positioning the MATS at a particular post enabled the group to exercise daily supervision of the RF/PF force. Greater RF/PF morale, more offensive operations and definite outpost defensive improvements resulted from this team's presence. As of 31 Mar 68 the seven MATS deployed in the division TACI were located at:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>YT 933250</td>
<td>Binh Tuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YT 350264</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>YT 278101</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YS 060676</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>XS 540720</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XS 740659</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XS 856806</td>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) In Nov 68 the division was tasked to organize and deploy IMPACT Teams. This group was formed to further the RF/PF upgrading efforts and was primarily targeted to provide high impact, short length visits to RF/PF outposts. The IMPACT Teams complimented the MATS but were utilized so that a greater number of outposts could be assisted than that afforded by the MATS. The IMPACT Teams were highly successful and were instrumental in improving the general defensive posture of RF/PF outposts in the division TACI. At the end of this reporting period IMPACT Teams were located at:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>Binh Loc</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>Long Thanh</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nhon Trach</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tam Thu</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The effectiveness of the RF/PF outpost upgrading is as reflected on Inclosure 10b. The amount of RF/PF IMPACT support is as shown on Inclosure 10c.

(c) The CRIP, organized initially in Long An Province in Oct 67 and expanded to Bien Hoa Province in Dec 67, continued to be employed with marked success during this reporting period. The CRIP's continued to perform their multi-purpose missions to exploit current intelligence, conduct reconnaissance and combat patrolling and destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure. This combined US-VN force of 42 men proved invaluable. When the RF/PF's knowledge of the enemy, terrain and local language was combined with the firepower and mobility of the US element, a highly effective and versatile force was formed. Particularly successful during this period was the Long An CRIP.

(d) The LAATS Teams were organized in Dec 67 for deployment in Jan 68. These teams were formed to augment the Province Senior Advisor Staff and, specifically, to provide expert administrative and logistical advice to the RF/PF Administrative and Direct Support Logistical Company (A&DSL). These teams performed outstandingly and easily attained the goals for which they were organized. The enthusiasm and professional knowledge exhibited by LAATS members enabled this group to achieve success in providing the guidance and assistance needed by the A&DSL Company. LAATS were located at:

```
UNIT LOCATION PROVINCE
11th ACR Xuan Loc Long Khanh
DISCOM Ham Tan Bien Hoa
Bien Hoa
Tan An Long An
```
AVDE-ME

CONFIDENTIAL 12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)


1. (C) Engineer Support. During the reporting period the 15th Engr Bn was engaged in the following major tactical operations: RILEY, ENTERPRISE, CORONADO, DUONG CUA DAN (PEOPLE'S ROAD), TOAN THANG, and TRUONG CONG DINH. The battalion's principle mission in each operation centered around combat demolitions, land clearing, road repair and upgrading, bridge construction and repair, and construction and upgrading of defensive fortifications. The rest of the battalion's effort has been directed towards base camp development. This has been accomplished by direct support and engineer guidance for self help projects of various units and activities within the division. Of significant note was the support rendered in Operation PEOPLE'S ROAD. Working in coordination with 86th Engr Bn and ARVN Engineer units also maintaining Highway QL 4, this critical artery from the Delta to Saigon was cleared and repaired on a day to day basis allowing civilian and military traffic to flow with minimum delay. During the period 9 Feb 68 thru 13 Mar 68, battalion elements repaired over 200 craters, made numerous expedient repairs to bridges, cleared roadblocks, and neutralized numerous mines and booby-traps. (See Inclosure 17, 15th Engr Bn's ORLL). The 93d Engr Bn continued to provide direct support to the division during the quarter.

2. (U) Signal Support. During this quarter the communication electronic resources of the division were taxed more than any time since the division's arrival in Vietnam. Support had to be provided for the Division Forward which was activated in Dong Tam in February and to support the Mobile Riverine Force which operated as far south as Can Tho. (Reference is made to Inclosure 12, 9th Sig Bn's ORLL).

   (1) A new SOI was implemented changing call-words division-wide for the first time since the division arrived in RVN. Many transmission compromises connecting old and new call-words were committed; however, the number will decrease as operators gain experience and practice when periodically changing call-words and frequencies.

   (2) Using the KY-8 Security Device, an FM secure voice radio link was established between division headquarters at Camp Martin Cox and the Division Forward Command Post at Dong Tam. This link is over 90 km in length. In order to obtain a usable system with any degree of reliability, the antennas for the radios are mounted on top of 200 foot AB-216/U communication towers.

   (3) Frequency allocation and control has proven to be a full time job and much more difficult than anticipated. The deployment of the FWMAF in Vietnam is such that units sharing a frequency often find
that they interfere with one another. The increased range of the FM radio when airborne and the increased use of FM radios in aircraft have increased considerably the frequency management problems. Additionally, those elements of the division that are employed with the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) must be given special consideration when allocating frequencies so as not to interfere with Naval communications. Generally, prior to authorizing a unit a frequency, that frequency must be monitored from 24 to 48 hours to insure its usability in the area in which the unit is operating.

(4) Many vehicular mounted FM radios have been dismounted and installed in hardened Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) at division, brigade, and battalion level. In these locations large alternating current (AC) generators are brought in to provide power. There is a requirement division-wide for power supplies capable of converting 110 volts AC to 28 volts direct current (DC). These power supplies would be used for the sole purpose of operating FM radios in a dismounted situation using AC as the primary source of power.

1. (C) Army Aviation. Army Aviation supported division operations daily. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH was characterized by the use of multiple assault helicopter companies, armed helicopter platoons, and medium and heavy helicopters for movement of artillery and supplies. Armed helicopters were utilized to conduct reconnaissance by fire in support of operations. The 9th Avn Bn provided general support to the division and responded to requests from units in contact for close support and troop lifts. II FFORCEN supported the division by providing an average of 1.45 assault helicopters and two (2) CH-47's for resupply, artillery movement and troop lifts daily (See Inclosure 19, 9th Avn Bn's ORLL).

a. (C) Chemical Operations.

(1) E63 Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD) (People Sniffer):

(a) During the reporting period there were 23 MPD missions flown for a total of 36 hours. All missions were flown using UH-1 aircraft. Results were reported to the division for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence indications. Total flying time during the previous quarter (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68) was 83 hours covering 62 missions. This represents a 53% decrease in usage of the MPD. The primary reason for this quarter's decrease was the non-availability of aircraft due to the tactical situation during the Tet Offensive and the following weeks.
(b) Problems are still being encountered with maintenance of the MPD. The MPD required about two hours of maintenance for each hour that it functioned. This high ratio is due to the intricate pre and post-flight maintenance requirements, constant inspection, repair of minor parts and non-availability of parts. The largest single problem area encountered this quarter has been the non-availability of repair parts coming in from CONUS. This parts' deficiency problem has caused delays upward of two months, keeping MPDs from returning to a functioning status.

(2) Riot Control Agent Operations:

(a) During the reporting period there were eight missions flown utilizing bulk CS. Over 26,500 pounds were dropped covering over 150 hectares. There were five missions flown utilizing the E158 CS Canister Cluster, employing 54 E158 munitions. There were two missions flown utilizing the M5 CS Dispenser which disseminated over 360 pounds of bulk CS. The most significant employments were:

1 5 Feb 68: 30 E158 CS munitions were dropped in support of a 41st Ranger (ARVN) operation in the Cholon area, at XS 792868 to XS 795871, as directed by COMUSMACV. The drop was not exploited by the Rangers; therefore, results are not known as to the effectiveness of the CS in the area.

2 21 Mar 68: 30 drums of bulk CS were dropped in the vicinity of XS 996596, XS 996577; and XS 021578 in the Rung Sat area in support of a Vietnamese Marine waterborne beach assault. The CS was dropped in the late afternoon; therefore, due to very poor climatic conditions present (warm thermal air currents rising off the ground), most of the agent was lost to the atmosphere.

3 25 Mar 68: Six E158 munitions were dropped from UH-1 aircraft, at XS 254547, in support of 2-39 Inf. The VC were in fortified defensive positions, i.e. bunkers, along a wooded stream line. After the munitions were dropped, the VC abandoned their bunkers and fled, exposing themselves to artillery, gunship airstrikes and ground infantry fire. The results were 15 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (BC).

4 25 Mar 68: Using an M5 dispenser, 180 pounds of bulk CS were dropped over an area approximately ten meters wide and five kilometers long, at XS 570400 to 425400, to restrict the enemy use of suspected recoilless rifle sites. Results are unknown; however, the aircraft drew automatic weapons' fire during the mission.

Page 53
AVDE-ME
12 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

5 11 Apr 68: Eight E158 munitions were dropped from UB-1 aircraft, at XS 181550, in support of 2-39 Inf. The VC were occupying well fortified defensive positions, i.e., bunkers, along a wooded stream line. After the CS was dropped, the VC abandoned their positions and fled into the open where infantry killed five VC (BC). The 2-39 Inf swept the area killing 19 more VC (BC), and gunship fire killed another six VC (BC).

(b) On 17 Apr 68: The 9th Inf Div Chemical Section held a conference for all chemical officers in MACV. Ten drums of bulk CS were dropped at XS 703673 to XS 707677 using a new explosive burst: an a new fuse bomb designed to blow CS drums at pre-set heights-of-burst. The primary advantage of a pre-set fuse, for a specific height-of-burst, is that the agent will be disseminated as close to ground level as possible, thereby losing less agent into the atmosphere. Only 10 units were tested out of 120 units that were received. Further testing and evaluation will be conducted throughout the next reporting period, and the results will be reported in the next ORLL. Since this drop was a test of a new munition, there was no tactical requirement for the drop. However, due to a strong downwind drift, the local population in Ben Luc was made somewhat uncomfortable by the CS. There were no incapacitating effects reported. The distance from the target area to Ben Luc is approximately 10 kilometers.

(c) The 4.2 Cartridge CS XM630 round is proving to be an effective munition when used in close support of troops. During the reporting period, 52 rounds were expended in a 1st Bde operation against VC in bunkers. The VC were forced to abandon the bunkers, and US ground troops inflicted moderate casualties. CS is an effective means of flushing the enemy from entrenched and fortified positions.

(d) The 40 MM CS XM651 round for the M-79 launcher is presently being tested and evaluated in Vietnam. No detailed reports have come into this section yet on the effectiveness of this CS munition. However, one short report received from the 2d Bde states that they are using the 40mm round in a dual role: first, the agent flushed the enemy from fortified positions, and secondly, the dense cloud served as a spotting round for gunships in the area. The 40mm CS round gives ground troops an on-the-spot capability to employ CS at any given time.

(e) Observations:

1 Bulk CS is best used when disseminated as close to the ground as possible. The higher above ground that the agent is disseminated, the less effective it is likely to be due to dissipation in the atmosphere.
2. The M5 Dispenser has proven to be an effective means of CS dissemination over linear type targets. This system is effective because it disseminates the agent ten to twenty feet off the ground. More agent is placed onto the target, and less is lost into the atmosphere.

(3) Defoliation.

(a) During the reporting period there were no defoliation missions flown by the 9th Inf Div Chemical Section. Initial requests for local province chief’s approval that were submitted in Jan 68, have not yet been returned. One request has been approved in Long Khanh Province with an estimated spraying time of December of this year. The long delay between request approval and actual spraying is due to the fact that defoliation is most effective when carried out after the rainy season – during the peak growing period.

(b) The section is currently reviewing all areas that have been submitted as possible defoliation areas. An attempt is being made to submit new areas and to downgrade old areas that are no longer considered necessary to the defoliation plan.

(c) Large areas in the Rung Sat have been defoliated this quarter by the 7th Air Force under their Trail Dust program. The Air Force flies these missions with C-123 “Ranch Hand” aircraft. The 9th Inf Div Chemical Section receives a teletype message once a month with the coordinates of the areas defoliated.

(4) Enemy CBR Activity:

(a) There have been no significant enemy CBR activities within the 9th Inf Div TA01 during the past three months. G2 reported that during a planned attack on My Tho, on 20 Apr 68, an asphyxiating gas would be used against friendly troops. However, the attack never came about.

(b) The enemy probably does not possess the capability for CBR warfare with possibly the exception of the employment of a Riot Control Agent such as CS.
2. (2) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel.

(1) Preparation of Morning Report and Personnel Information Roster.

OBSERVATION. Special Purpose Teams are periodically needed to assist units in preparation of Morning Reports and Personnel Information Rosters.

EVALUATION. The Morning Report is furnished to this headquarters daily and is the basis for reflecting the official daily personnel status of the reporting organization. It is also the source of data for official strength and all other statistical reports produced by this headquarters. The Personnel Information Roster is a monthly roster listing basic information on all officer and enlisted personnel assigned to each unit of the division. It is also a means of communication between the Personnel Services Division and a commander or staff supervisor concerning personnel management activities. Lack of knowledge and a disinterest among units resulted in erroneous information, improper remarks, and late submissions of these reports. Also attributed to this is the recent loss of administrative personnel who were knowledgeable of the requirements and contents of these reports. However, there has been an improvement shown in the quality of Morning Reports due to increased command emphasis.

RECOMMENDATION. That AG Special Purpose Teams be organized and sent to divisional units to assist personnel in preparation of Morning Reports and Personnel Information Rosters.


OBSERVATION. Inventories of enlisted MOS's are normally furnished by the Administrative Machine Branch of the Personnel Services Division. This information is obtained from unit Morning Reports submitted by units in the field. MOS inventories are prepared and distributed once monthly. The primary user of the MOS inventory is the Personnel Management Branch. The information is used for determining overages and shortages in units by grade and MOS, requisitioning and assigning personnel, and furnishing information to commanders relative to assigned strength.

EVALUATION. Timely receipt of unit Morning Reports is often difficult due to distance between headquarters. This delay in Morning Reports results in incomplete data for the automatic data processing system. Projected EDOSA's for gains and losses also present an unrealistic picture.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSGOR-65 (R1) (U)

of MOS and strength status. Use of automatic data processing equipment in strength accounting saves man-hours and provides accuracy through mechanical checks. However, the reporting system which provides data for the automatic processing equipment does not allow for timely and up-to-date statistics required in managing personnel in a combat situation. This is especially true with infantry and armor MOS's where the strength picture may change drastically from one day to the next.

RECOMMENDATION. That Personnel Services Division, AG, maintain up-to-date statistical data on 11 Series MOS's manually utilizing casualty reports, consolidated assignment orders, and daily hospital admission and disposition blotters.

(3) Medical Assistance to Local Vietnamese Hospitals.

OBSERVATION. Consideration must be given to providing appropriate medical facilities for treatment of civilian casualties during sustained fighting.

EVALUATION. During the recent Tet Offensive, many civilian casualties were sustained as a result of the heavy fighting in Ky Tho. The provincial hospital with its understaffed staff proved inadequate in handling these mass casualties during the first few days of fighting. In an effort to provide assistance, the Division Surgeon and a small hospital staff was sent to Ky Tho to complement the understaffed Vietnamese medical staff. Within a few days over 900 patients had been treated and almost 400 surgical procedures had been performed.

RECOMMENDATION. That Vietnamese provincial hospital staffs be instructed in mass casualty procedures by local US medical units where feasible.

b. (C) Operations

(1) Use of Supporting Fires.

OBSERVATION. Recent contacts with VC/NVA forces by 3d Bde units have indicated the enemy has shifted the location of bunker positions from vegetated areas, the site most often selected in the past, to positions just forward of tree lines and other areas affording natural concealment. Normally bunkers are now constructed in the line of paddy dikes immediately forward of vegetated areas.
RECOMMENDATION. Supporting fires should be directed against both the natural foliage in an objective area and the areas adjacent to and forward of wood lines and nipa palm groves. Rice paddy dikes bordering vegetated areas should be selected as primary targets.

2) Use of Moving Target Detection Radar in Conjunction with Ground Forces.

OBSERVATION. The TPS 25 moving target detection radar can be employed in conjunction with ground forces to locate, fix and destroy the enemy. This concept is particularly suited to interdiction operations along major land and water LOC's.

EVALUATION. The 3d Brigade has tested the TPS 25 radar in conjunction with ground forces to identify and destroy enemy targets in Long An Province. The test was conducted with a battalion-sized maneuver force operating from a field base and the following considerations developed:

(a) Successful pursuit and location of enemy forces is difficult at best during the day and nearly impossible at night. The radar has detected numerous enemy troop concentrations at night, and artillery fire has been successfully directed against such targets.

(b) Navigation for a friendly pursuing element at night is extremely difficult as maps cannot be used and direction must be maintained by use of compass readings based on azimuths obtained by radar operators.

(c) The technique of moving to a predetermined point and ambushing a target traveling in a known direction is enhanced when used in conjunction with the TPS 25 radar.

(d) The radar can be used to vector a unit into ambush locations and provide flank security during the move.

RECOMMENDATION. That a TPS 25 radar be made readily available for each brigade utilizing forces no larger than company size deployed throughout the brigade area to establish ambushes at locations selected by radar sightings. The TPS 25 radar should be operated and controlled by Division Artillery working closely with the brigade maneuver elements.

3) Anti-Intrusion Device, AN/PSR-1 and AN/GSS-9.

OBSERVATION. The anti-intrusion device can be effectively employed
in organizing a defensive position. The proper employment and utilization of the anti-intrusion device can substantially bolster the early warning system of a perimeter defense.

EVALUATION. The AN/PSR-1 has been effectively used in both the FS/PB location at Binh Phuoc and recently at a forward field location - FS/FB Jager (X.S, 541490). At the latter location it was employed at a 400-500 meter distance and effectively monitored personnel attempting to infiltrate on two specific occasions. One problem encountered was the requirement for burying wire approximately six inches beneath the surface when APC's are going to be employed in the area.

RECOMMENDATION. H. C. anti-intrusion devices should be used to the maximum extent by units in a defensive posture to add depth to the position.

4) Xeon infrared Search Light.

OBSERVATION. The use of the infrared search light has greatly reduced the amount of illuminations used over suspected VC positions, and it has proven to be invaluable to both the ambush patrol and the defensive perimeter when used in conjunction with organic infrared detection devices.

EVALUATION. For the last two months, the infrared search light mounted on the M131 jeep by the 5-60 Inf (K) has been used extensively both in perimeter defense and on ambush patrols. When used in perimeter defense, the infrared binoculars and the infrared periscope on the M13 APC proved very effective in scanning the area. With the infrared search light mounted on a quarter ton truck, it can easily be moved within the perimeter to react to any situation. When loaded on a cargo carrier, it can accompany the mechanized unit. This enables the xenon search light to displace and provide an infrared capability to areas inaccessible to wheeled vehicles. This capability enables the battalion to greatly extend its areas of operations by interdicting and ambushing roads, trails, waterways and crossing points.

RECOMMENDATION. That infrared search lights be made part of the TO and E of the mechanized battalion, or that such equipment be made readily available for OPCON to such units.

5) Utilization of Wire Teams.

OBSERVATION. The 9th Signal Battalion is authorized eight five-man cable teams by MTOE. Upon employment in Vietnam, it was initially
believed that these teams would not be utilized to their fullest capacity; however, subsequent evaluation has indicated that these teams are fully committed although in a modified mission.

EVALUATION. Doctrine calls for the eight cable teams assigned to the Signal Support Operations Company to install, maintain, and recover spiral four cable. Normally this cable is installed from division main to each of the brigades, support command, and Division Forward if employed. In Vietnam it is not feasible to install spiral four beyond base camp locations; consequently, the cable teams have been employed in a different method. Cable teams have the responsibility for the internal defense wiring of base camps at Bearcat, Dong Tam, and Tan An. Cable teams are also employed at Dong Tam and Tan An to install and maintain base camp communication lines on a 24 hour basis. On large communication operations, cable teams supplement company wire teams during installation and recovery procedures. Although not employed as prescribed by doctrine, the cable teams of the 9th Signal Battalion are extensively used and are an integral and important part of the division communications system.

RECOMMENDATION. That the eight cable teams not be deleted from the Signal Battalion MTOE as experience has shown a critical requirement for these teams in Vietnam today.

(6) The JITTERBUG Concept.

OBSERVATION. The JITTERBUG Concept, when properly employed, is a highly effective procedure and conserves troop strength and flexibility.

EVALUATION. The JITTERBUG Concept is a four-step procedure used to locate, fix, develop and finally destroy an enemy target. With absolutely no pre-reconnaissance, the Command and Control (C & C) aircraft of the maneuver element and an LFT enter an AO. Working as a team, they attempt to confirm intelligence target locations or locate new targets. When a target is located, five of the troop-lift aircraft (already loaded and airborne) are inserted to engage the target. If contact is made or enemy movement out of the area is detected, a second set of five lift ships is inserted to block enemy evasion tactics. As the situation develops, additional troop lifts of five or ten aircraft are inserted. By not committing the airmobile maneuver elements until a definite target has been located, troop strength is conserved and the flexibility to react to any enemy move is retained.

RECOMMENDATION. That maneuver battalions and airmobile helicopter
companies be made aware of this technique.

(7) RRF on Strip Alert When Supported by Air Cavalry Troop.

OBSERVATION. It is imperative to have at least a company size rapid reaction force (RRF) on strip alert when supported by an air cavalry troop.

EVALUATION. Unless at least a company size force is on strip alert, the opportunities afforded to a brigade or battalion by an air cavalry troop cannot be fully exploited. The first element to be committed will be the aero rifle platoon, organic to the air cavalry troop. If a significant contact is established and a sizeable reaction force is not available, the troop commander has no alternative but to extract. These circumstances result in the wasteful loss of a lucrative target.

RECOMMENDATION: That all units retain a rifle company on strip alert whenever supported by or supporting an air cavalry troop.

(8) Secure Communications on Operations Keyed to Fresh Intelligence.

OBSERVATION. Operations keyed on intelligence not more than 24 hours old require constant "secure" communications with maneuver battalions.

EVALUATION. Reacting to intelligence reports or sightings generated during the previous 24 hours requires that the assets available, nature of the target, and command guidance be transmitted by secure means. This is often necessary during the hours of darkness when courier aircraft are not available. Plans must be transmitted back to the brigade headquarters to facilitate further support coordination. These transmissions could compromise the entire operation if not handled on secure communications.

RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that all commanders recognize the importance of and utilize secure communications to discuss and confirm their 24 hour cycle operations. Command emphasis must be placed on the installation, maintenance, and utilization of secure voice communications if its real value is ever to be recognized and fully exploited.

(9) Use of CS Against Bunkers.

OBSERVATION. Employment of CS against fortified fighting positions caused the enemy to abandon the positions and expose himself to friendly fires.
EVALUATION. During several offensive operations against well-constructed/fortified fighting positions, the employment of CS 40mm grenades has dislodged enemy personnel from the positions when artillery and other indirect fires could not. This does not imply that artillery or air-strikes are not effective against well constructed fortified positions. Neither does it imply that CS employment is the most effective means of driving enemy forces from bunkers. The employment of 40mm CS grenades complemented all fires directed against the positions and caused the enemy to become confused and desperate, not only to evade the friendly forces, but also the irritant agent. The CS grenade employed by the 40mm grenade launcher affords the commander the capability of employing CS at a long (300 meters) and close range. Presently the 40mm CS grenade is an "Insure" item.

RECOMMENDATIONS. (a) That the 40mm CS grenade be classified as a "Standard" item, and a basic load be determined and issued.

(b) Further, that during the interim period (pending standardization) more 40mm CS grenades be issued to afford maximum use.

(10) Employment of Armed Propaganda Teams.

OBSERVATION. Armed propaganda teams enhance both psychological operations and intelligence collection efforts.

EVALUATION. An armed propaganda team was employed in support of the 2d Brigade during combat operations conducted in Kien Hoa Province. The team made valuable contributions not only in the PSYOP area but also in the intelligence collection effort. On several occasions timely and accurate intelligence was provided by the team after their interrogation of local civilians. The intelligence collected resulted in the brigade establishing contact with the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION. That an armed propaganda team be attached to the 2d Brigade.

(11) Hull Defilade of APC's.

OBSERVATION. In several battles the Viet Cong's RPG rocket launcher has proven to be a great equalizer when used at close range against APC's. Any time a mechanized unit is to remain in a defensive or static position for any length of time, all tracks should occupy a hull defilade position.
EVALUATION. APCs in hull defilade are extremely difficult targets for RPGs or other direct fire weapons; moreover, the defilade position places the main fire power (the .50 cal MG) of the APC at ground level, permitting effective long range grazing fire against any ground attack. Even though hull defilade is highly recommended and a proven method, during the monsoon and high water season, it is impractical.

RECOMMENDATION. Whenever terrain and weather permit, all APC's should be placed in hull defilade. This not only makes the APC less vulnerable to small arms and rocket fire, but also strengthens the defensive position. During the monsoon season revetments must be constructed.

(12) Traffic Control.

OBSERVATION. Traffic control points must be set up whenever engineer work parties are repairing interdictions.

EVALUATION. During the period immediately following the Tet Offensive, daily engineer work parties were required to repair serious interdictions along the major Delta artery, Highway 4L4. Civilian traffic would follow the work parties right up to the interdiction and severely hamper the work effort while making evacuation of the area impossible in the event of enemy harassing activity. Often the civilian vehicles would attempt to negotiate the interdiction and become stuck or disabled. This would result in additional lost time and effort to remove the vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION. That whenever an operation of this type is necessary, traffic control points consisting of Military Police in conjunction with Vietnamese Police be set up to prevent the movement of any civilian traffic until all interdictions have been repaired.

(13) Construction of Bunkers.

OBSERVATION. Savings in money and engineer effort can be achieved by using revetment walls instead of sandbags for many types of protective shelters.

EVALUATION. It has been standard usage in Vietnam to construct above ground protective shelters with sandbags over a wood frame. Bunkers constructed with sand filled timber revetting walls afford equal or greater protection and result in saving the difference between the cost of the lumber and sandbags, take less time to construct and there
is no replacement cost for resandbagging periodically. The wood revetted shelter is particularly suitable for semi-permanent base camps in the Delta. It is important that engineer technical assistance be utilized to insure adequate design and construction.

RECOMMENDATION. "At protective shelters be constructed where feasible with revetment walls rather than sandbags.

(14) Aerial Delivery of Bridge Erection Boat.

OBSERVATION. The most efficient use of the Chinook aircraft in transporting the bridge erection boat is achieved by airlifting in its assembled configuration.

EVALUATION. On previous missions, the boat has been airlifted in two sorties, one for the bow section and one for the stern section. It is more efficient to assemble the boat and lift it in its assembled state in one lift. The pilots of the Chinook aircraft agree that the assembled 6800 pound load flew better than the two sorties.

RECOMMENDATION. That when the 27 foot bridge erection boat is airlifted, it be done in an assembled configuration in one sortie.

(15) Bees Hindering Clearing Operation.

OBSERVATION. Protective measures against bees must be planned for clearing operations.

EVALUATION. Several times during jungle clearing operations, areas of the jungle to be cleared could not be entered because of the high density of bees in the area. Several individuals were casualties from numerous bee stings. Operators were instructed to roll down their sleeves, wear gloves, and wear their mosquito headnets in these areas. In addition the clearing team carried portable flame throwers and stocks of napalm fuel as the best weapon to use against the bees.

RECOMMENDATION. That land clearing teams take the protective measures outlined above.

(16) Viet Cong Operating Techniques in the Delta.

OBSERVATION. During the reporting period many valuable lessons were learned about the Viet Cong operating methods in the Delta.
EVALUATION.

(a) VC ambushes and harassing operations against engineer work parties occurred daily and consisted of firing from concealed positions with no attempt to attack or overrun the work parties. In almost every instance the ambushes were triggered by detonating a mine under a lead security APC or a lead engineer vehicle or disabling the vehicle with an RPG. Once the convoy was halted, the remainder of the convoy would be hit with small arms and automatic weapons fire.

(b) Extensive use was made by the VC of command detonated mines. The best method of neutralizing them was found to be the use of sweep teams in the rice paddies searching for the wires which were often poorly concealed.

(c) Following the wires from mines which were detonated and others which were not, revealed that the VC would place the mines in the road at a point where a dike is perpendicular to the road. The VC could then move several hundred meters away from the road along the dike and sight down the dike, detonating the mine as the vehicle moved into his line of sight. Another method that was detected was the use of a piece of bamboo or other suitable stick placed vertically on a dike and used as an aiming stake in the same manner. Caution must be exercised when following wires as the VC will frequently employ grenade booby traps along the wire.

(d) Occasionally pressure type mines were used. These were placed along the shoulders of the road or put in the bottom of freshly blown craters, designed to detonate when the fill material was jumped into the crater.

(e) During the initial stages of Operation PEOPLE'S ROAD, the VC did not booby trap their mines. As the engineers began detecting and removing more and more of the mines, the VC began to booby trap them. In all cases the booby traps consisted of grenades placed under the mines with the pin pulled, such that detonation would occur upon movement of the mine.

(f) Other booby traps were employed individually and in road blocks. All booby traps found during Operation PEOPLE'S ROAD were grenades either with a trip wire on the pin or the pin removed and a weight holding the handle down.

(g) The presence of Vietnamese civilians in no way limited the VC harassing operation. In many instances civilian casualties resulted from VC ambushes of engineer work parties.
(h) Occasionally the VC wait until the daily mine sweep team has passed and then emplace the mines in the road, generally in the loose fill of a fresh crater.

RECOMMENDATION. That the above information receive widest dissemination.

c. (c) Training.

(1) Ground Surveillance Radar Training.

OBSERVATION. Ground surveillance radar, when used in a defensive situation, has proven invaluable for early warning. The major problem is a lack of qualified and trained operators.

EVALUATION. The average infantryman can become very proficient with ground surveillance radar equipment with a minimum amount of training. The use of radar greatly strengthens the defense by providing early warning and detecting movements to the front which would otherwise go unobserved. Trained radar operators down to the rifle platoon level would strengthen defensive positions. The normal manner of radar employment is to have the radar accompany ambushes to permit long range interdiction of avenues of approach, lines of communication, roads, and waterways, thereby greatly extending the area under friendly control during the hours of darkness.

RECOMMENDATION. All infantrymen should receive ground surveillance radar training to insure continued radar surveillance when school trained operators are not available.

(2) Aviator Proficiency for Night Combat Support Operations.

OBSERVATION. The influx of numerous inexperienced aviators during the months of Nov and Dec 67, created an aura of doubt in the minds of aviation commanders as to the capability of the unit to meet its night combat support mission requirements.

EVALUATION. Company A is the 9th Inf Div's sole airmobile inhouse asset; therefore, the unit must necessarily be responsive to all the division's needs, particularly tactical emergencies, day or night. A night training program was initiated to provide each aviator with a thorough night orientation flight in the division TAOR. In addition, a program was developed to train aviators in night formation flights which were
to be coupled with security force and patrol insertions and extractions. Subsequent night operations were conducted in support of divisional units in contact with the enemy, and barring a few minor operational problems (problems generally localized in the area of appropriate illumination in PZ's), all missions were successfully completed. Initial estimates of aviator proficiency were somewhat conservative. Company A responded to night tactical commitments in a typically outstanding fashion.

RECOMMENDATION. Aviator night combat training will continue to be an area of command interest, and when possible, appropriate night training will be conducted. Further, it is anticipated that pathfinders will be employed in future night tactical operations to improve illumination and traffic control in PZ's & LZ's.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Engaging Targets Detected by Personnel Detection Missions.

OBSERVATION. When a target is detected on a "people sniffer" (PS) mission, a delay of from 15 to 60 minutes is often incurred while awaiting clearance to have the gunships or artillery in the target area. The past procedures have been to drop smoke on the target to identify the target and circle the area until the arrival of an artillery forward observer or until clearance is granted for the gunships to fire.

EVALUATION. The dropping of smoke and the circling of the target area by the gunships and sniffer aircraft alerts the enemy that he has been spotted, and the delay involved in getting clearance to fire affords the enemy time to evacuate the area or seek better cover.

RECOMMENDATIONS. (a) That smoke only be dropped on targets in a free fire zone where the targets can be immediately engaged by the gunships or artillery.

(b) When the area to be covered has not been declared a free fire zone, that the following procedures be followed:

1. Areas of maximum readings be marked by the navigation ship and clearance to fire be requested while the ships continue their normal flight plan. This would be repeated each time a target is detected.

2. Upon completion of the entire area of search, the PS aircraft would be released while the navigation ship and gunships would return to the targets for which clearance to fire had been granted, and conduct a low
level search, immediately engaging any targets sighted.

(2) MI Detachment Language Capability.

OBSERVATION. The 9th MI Detachment is hampered by a lack of Vietnamese linguist capability.

EVALUATION. ARVN interpreters presently assigned to the 9th MI Detachment provide the only dependable linguist capability. US personnel who attended the 12 week Vietnamese course do not possess sufficient fluency in the language to be able to work without the assistance of an interpreter. Personnel from the 47 week course have a higher degree of ability with the language and with continued study and experience would reach a reasonable degree of self sufficiency within a month or two after arrival in Vietnam. Experience has proven on occasions that certain sources will not work through an ARVN interpreter.

RECOMMENDATION. A minimum of one of every three Intelligence Corps agents assigned to the 9th MI Detachment should be graduates of the 47 week Vietnamese Language Course of the Defense Language Institute. Ideally, all agent personnel should be language qualified.

(3) Intelligence through Civil Affairs Program.

OBSERVATIONS. A great deal of enemy information is gained during MEDCAPS or through the visit to villages by PSYWAR teams and S-5 Personnel.

EVALUATION. To use Civil Affairs Programs to gain intelligence information, there must be close coordination between S-2 and S-5. Maximum exploitation of the civil populace as an intelligence source will be attained if intelligence trained and/or briefed personnel actually participate on MEDCAPS and face to face PSYWAR programs.

RECOMMENDATION. That intelligence trained and/or briefed personnel participate on MEDCAPS and all other Civil Affairs Programs that will bring them into contact with the civilian populace.

(4) Reliable Spot Reports.

OBSERVATION. Reliable spot reports are reports generally rated B-3 or better by US Forces. This is a significantly reliable report that enemy forces are located in the area reported.

EVALUATION. US maneuver units are capable of reacting to new airborne assault missions on a dead run with a frag order that can be delivered orally in a few minutes time. Reliable reports are received
anywhere from one hour to 48 hours after the event initiating the report occurs.

(5) Air to Ground Surveillance.

OBSERVATION. The use of the mounted starlight scope on a UH-1D has greatly increased the capability to restrict VC movement by night. The device is particularly useful in the surveillance of VC travel on major rivers and canals. Over 300 sampans have been destroyed as a direct result of the use of these devices. The employment of starlight scopes in air to ground surveillance has primarily been used in the Binh Chanh, Nha Be and Can Giuoc Districts where VC sampan travel is the greatest. The UH-1D employs 2 observers, and 2 intelligence officers who have pre-cleared areas of fire and have direct communications with clearing units in the areas. The observers pick up a target, and the officer identifies it. The target is then cleared and engaged with artillery or gunships.

EVALUATION. The use of the system of night surveillance has proven effective in denying the VC their one major asset. The amount of sampan activity has been reduced greatly, and the amount of supplies lost is felt to be a major contributing factor in the failure of the VC 2d offensive to commence.

RECOMMENDATION. The UH-1D used in this role be equipped with a xenon searchlight to assist in identifying the target for supporting gunships. The UH-1D should have permanent mounts to assist in providing a stable support for the scopes.

(6) Possible Compromise of Projected Combat Operations.

OBSERVATION. Early coordination and dissemination of operation plans and orders may tend to provide the enemy with advance/adequate warning of the intended AO or target.

EVALUATION. The Mobile Riverine Force operates throughout the central Mekong Delta as a mobile striking force seeking targets developed by timely and effective intelligence. As such, the 2d Brigade does not have a specific tactical area of operation and is therefore required to effect coordination for AO's and specified strike zones. Early coordination and dissemination of this information, prior to the commitment of friendly forces, is a particular disadvantage because it allows adequate time for enemy forces to exit the area or prepare to defend against the introduction
of friendly forces into the AO. In addition the desired flexibility for committing forces in any area of operation selected/designated, as a result of immediate and concrete intelligence, is unobtainable due to the coordination required.

e. (C) Logistics.

(1) Maintenance of the Mask, Protective, Field, ABC M-17.

OBSERVATION. Recent reports have indicated that the Protective Mask, ABC M-17, becomes ineffective against Riot Control Agent (RCA) CS once the cheek filters become wet.

EVALUATION. Twelve new ABC M-17 masks were obtained and 11 different test conditions were set up for each mask. One mask was used as a control mask and exposed only to normal atmospheric conditions. The test masks were soaked in water from six to 24 hours per day to simulate different conditions in the Delta. Some masks were soaked in the water without the carrier; some were soaked in the carriers, and some were placed in the waterproof plastic bags and then placed in the carrier and soaked. All masks were subjected to CS daily. The CS was produced from E49 CS Tactical Canisters which were extracted from a recovered dud E158 munition. The E49 canister produced a cloud of CS for approximately six to 14 seconds. The masks that were tested with wet filters did not protect the personnel against the CS. No air could be drawn through the filters, and the CS leaked in from the facepiece. The filters were then removed and allowed to dry from 12-24 hours each and tested with CS again. During each subsequent test performed with dried filters, test personnel were completely protected against the CS. It was also found that the M1 Waterproof Plastic Bag was an excellent means of keeping the mask dry from external moisture.

RECOMMENDATION. That when the filters of the ABC M-17 mask become wet the filters be removed and allowed to dry and then be replaced into the mask. That the M1 waterproof plastic bag be used to protect the ABC M-17 mask from moisture as prescribed. That the ABC M-17 mask be worn in the prescribed shoulder or under-arm carry, instead of the hip carry, in order to place the mask as far above a water source as possible.

(2) Employment of the M-548 Cargo Carrier.

OBSERVATION. The M-548 full track cargo carrier is extremely well suited for Delta operations, and it has expedited combat supply.
EVALUATION. It has been found that the M-548 cargo carrier with its cross country mobility capabilities can greatly improve the combat resupply of line units. The vehicle is not restricted to roads; it has the ability to bypass road blocks and is capable of reaching locations that were formerly inaccessible by any other means than air. The 5-60 Inf(M) has employed these vehicles to great advantage. The vehicles assigned to the battalion support platoon transportation section were able to resupply the forward rifle companies from the battalion trains area located in Tan An South, to the units operating in the vicinity of My Tho. Traveling across rice paddies and dikes from the closest roadway, the vehicles on a daily basis affected unit distribution directly to the rifle companies.

RECOMMENDATION. That maneuver battalions currently operating in the Delta region without this vehicle be permitted to request the M-548 cargo carrier through appropriate channels when in the opinion of the battalion commander a need for the employment of this vehicle exists.

(3) Collapsible Water Jugs.

OBSERVATION. Five gallon water jugs often collapse when filled to their capacity from the stress endured.

EVALUATION. The plastic collapsible water jug permits maximum quantities of fluids to be transported in a container of minimum weight. However, the weight of the water causes considerable stress on the plastic material when the jugs are filled, which in turn subsequently causes the jugs to collapse and break after frequent use. A two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity collapsible jug, made of the same composition, would be more practical in terms of reducing the stress on the plastic material.

RECOMMENDATION. That a two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity plastic water jug be procured for field use.

(4) Logistical Support for Armored Units.

OBSERVATION. The logistical requirements of an armored cavalry squadron are unique in an infantry division, and the type of infantry division found in I CTZ (e.g., 101st Abn Div, 1st Cav Div (AM)) and 1st and 3d Mar Div) does not have the necessary equipment or demand histories for parts to fully support such an organization.

EVALUATION. Transfer of the 3-5 Cav to I CTZ has resulted in a
degradation of the unit's combat capability through a rising deadline rate. Tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) are foreign to the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the 101st Abn Div, and the Marine divisions have no APC's. Therefore, the organization of the support elements of these units has not been readily adaptable to higher echelon maintenance and services on armored cavalry vehicles. Replacement parts for these vehicles were practically non-existent upon 3-5 Cav's arrival in I CTZ. Thus, while a cavalry squadron possesses great tactical mobility when in the shadow of its rather extensive logistical umbrella provided by its parent organization, a restriction is placed upon all capabilities of the squadron when it moves too far from its logistical base.

RECOMMENDATION. That when the Cav squadron is separated a great distance from its parent unit to a location where no similar organization exists to provide required logistical support, commensurate maintenance support accompany the unit. This means that an appropriate maintenance element, complete with a reserve of parts on the authorized stockage list, must be placed in direct support of and move with the squadron.

f. (C) Organization.

(1) (C). Detachment of Air Cavalry Troop.

EVALUATION: The detachment of the Air Cavalry Troop (Troop D) from the 3-5 Cav Squadron has resulted in a decrease in the ground capabilities of the squadron.

EVALUATION: Due to the fluid and wide ranging nature of cavalry operations, the role of the air cavalry troop in the armored cavalry squadron cannot be satisfactorily fulfilled by miscellaneous helicopters temporarily in support of the squadron. The problems in command and control have been solved by the attachment of four OH-23's, but the squadron has experienced difficulty in finding the enemy, fixing him with light airmobile forces, and blocking or screening avenues of expression with aerial fires until the combat power of the bulk of the squadron can be brought into play through ground mobility. Conversely, this ground mobility is also vital to the operations of the air troop, particularly the aero-rifle platoon. This element should not be employed outside the capability of forces in the area to react to heavy contact, and the squadron provides more of that capability on an hour-to-hour basis than other type units. The conclusion is that the squadron is the unit most able to utilize the capabilities of the air cavalry troop.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH
12 May 68
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

while at the same time protecting the troop's vulnerabilities.

RECOMMENDATION. That the air cavalry troop of the 3-5 Cav Squadron
be detached in the future.

(2) (U) Inadequate Photographic Section H.

Inadequate. The 9th Signal Battalion Photographic Facility has
the mission of providing all black and white photographic coverage
for the 9th Inf Div and attached units, except aerial photography.
This coverage includes the shooting and processing of pictures of
combat operations, both still and motion picture, public information
functions, intelligence activities, accident investigations, and
identification photographs. The present MTOE calls for one officer,
17 EM and 18 cameras, ten of which are still cameras, and the rest
motion picture cameras. Processing service is provided through the
use of one photographic darkroom group, AN/TPQ-7, with two still
photographic lab specialists to process the film.

EVALUATION The present MTOE does not authorize the necessary
personnel and proper equipment required to successfully accomplish
the mission of this facility. For example, the type of cameras
authorized are totally unsuitable for coverage of combat operations
in the Republic of Vietnam. During combat operations cameras easily
become damaged, and the existing repair facilities lack the necessary
repair parts and qualified personnel to repair them. The one 35mm
camera authorized, while suitable in size and format, is too fragile
for use in tactical situations. The other cameras, both 4x5 and 70mm
combat cameras, are too bulky, cumbersome and fragile for use in combat
operations. During combat operations black and white processing is
hindered by a lack of equipment and shortage of lab specialists. The
AN/TPQ-7 is physically too small and lacks the adequate space and the
necessary equipment to reproduce the number of prints required by the
division. It has been determined that two still photographers and one
motion picture photographer should be assigned to each brigade as well
as four photographers assigned to provide division base camp coverage.
Due to the inadequacy of the MTOE to provide these personnel, proper
combat photographic coverage cannot be provided.

RECOMMENDATION. (a) That the MTOE be increased to provide nine
still photographers, four motion picture photographers, six still
photographic lab specialists and one office clerk.

(b) That the authorized photographic equipment be changed to include

Page 73

CONFIDENTIAL
ADVS-M8

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

ten 35mm cameras with one 35mm lens, one 50mm lens and one 135mm lens
for each camera. The KS-5 motion picture camera should be deleted and
four KS-10's (16mm motion picture cameras) added. There should be three
KS-19's (camera, identification polaroid) and one view camera for studio
work. The different types of cameras are needed to fulfill the diversi-
plied missions assigned this section. Processing equipment should be
increased to allow three projection printers, two print driers and one
dust proof film drier.

(c) An MTCE was submitted on 4 Mar 68.

g. (U) Other.

(1) Unsuitability of the KS-6 (70mm Combat Camera) for Tactical
Deployment.

OBSERVATION. The 9th Inf Div Photographic Laboratory was issued the
KS-6 prior to deployment to Vietnam. This camera set includes three
lenses, and a flash unit. After one and one half years of utilization,
the KS-6 has been found to be totally unsuitable for combat photography
in Vietnam.

EVALUATION. The KS-6 is designed to utilize 70mm film in fifty
exposure casettes. It is necessary to carry an empty casette for each
full one carried to properly load the camera. This cuts in half the amount
of film the photographer can carry with him. The camera is focused with
a split-image type rangefinder which is easily knocked out of adjustment.
The focal plane shutter is made of cloth and is often torn or damaged
causing the camera to become inoperable. Combat photographers operating
in the Delta region are continually encountering swamps, rice paddies,
and marshes, terrain which causes the KS-6 to quickly rust and corrode,
necessitating frequent cleaning which is often impossible under tactical
situations. The camera is spring operated, wound by a hand crank and is
extremely susceptible to jamming, thereby rendering the camera inoperable.
Due to inadequate repair parts, facilities and trained personnel, the
camera usually cannot be repaired in Vietnam. Probably this camera’s
main disadvantage is its physical size. It has been found to be entirely
too bulky and cumbersome for the support of combat operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS. That the 70mm be used as a combat camera only when
other cameras are not available. 35mm still cameras should replace the
70mm combat camera, due to their sturdier construction, relative inexpen-
siveness, ease of operation, and small physical size. These 35mm cameras
are easier to maintain, and a greater amount of film and accessories

Page 74
can be carried to the field.

(2) Potable Antennas for Tracking the MRF C and C Ship.

OBSERVATION. Maintaining VHF communications with the USS Benewah as it moves up and down rivers and waterways is a difficult and dangerous task.

EVALUATION. Since the activation of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), considerable difficulty has been experienced in maintaining very high frequency (VHF) communications with the USS Benewah as it moves from location to location. The current procedure calls for two men to climb the AB-216 communication tower at Dong Tam and rotate the VHF antenna in accordance with instructions received from an operator located inside the VHF rig on the ground. This operator watches his received strength level meter and directs the movement of the antenna via an AN/PRC-25 radio to obtain a maximum signal level reading. This procedure is extremely dangerous due to high frequency voltage on the transmitting antenna and the height of the antenna, about 150 feet. During the monsoon season the problem of tracking the USS Benewah is further compounded by high winds and rain thereby increasing the possibility of serious injury or death to the personnel on the tower. To solve this problem a rotatable antenna utilizing a heavy duty antenna rotor obtained from the division MARS station has been constructed. This unit can be easily controlled from the ground and is now ready for operational employment.

RECOMMENDATION. That six additional antenna rotors be procured for the signal battalion to be mounted in alternate locations around the periphery of areas designated for future MRF operations. Additional rotors were requested under INSURF action on 10 Apr 68 through 9th Inf Div to USARV.
3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover and Deception.

a. (C) Introduction of Stay-behind Patrols.

OBSERVATION. It is highly desirable that reconnaissance and combat patrols be introduced into an area without the knowledge of any civilians or enemy forces in the area. A typical method is to have a company leave behind a platoon during a routine operation.

EVALUATION. The following techniques were developed to aid in cover and deception:

1. Introducing a patrol to an assigned area from a direction other than the normal base camp area by "PLANTING" the patrol in an ARVN or RF/PF outpost. Two of these ruses resulted in contact with the enemy.

2. Inserting the patrol with a larger force and then extracting the cover force with the same number of aircraft utilized in the original insertion by thinning out the loads and using smoke to screen the extraction.

3. Use of dummy radio transmissions indicating the stay-behind unit is in fact extracting and closing home station.

4. Heavy emphasis was placed on light and noise discipline.

RECOMMENDATION. Units adopt these techniques as desired; however, patterns should not be set.

b. (C) Base Camp Defense Ruses.

OBSERVATION. Enemy forces have detailed maps and information on friendly outposts and base camps. An excellent map of the Rach Kien base camp was captured from the Viet Cong.

EVALUATION. Construction of dummy bunkers, hidden firing positions, frequent changes to the defense plan and allowances for the enemy's knowledge in planning reaction force movement and defensive fires will aid in thwarting the enemy. False maps of the base can be discarded in concession areas and waste baskets. Positioning of APC's, radar, tanks, twin 40's, quad 50's, and searchlights after dark and frequent changes will frustrate the enemy.
RECOMMENDATION. Deception and cover be continually applied to base camp defense programs.

c. **Airmobile Feints.**

**OBSERVATION.** Tactical cover and deception have not been particularly successful in 1st Bde operations.

**EVALUATION.** On 6 Mar an airmobile feint was conducted north of Cai Lay in support of the initiation of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH the following day. It did not appear to have any great effect on the enemy reaction since the actual operational area was located 15 kilometers northeast of My Tho. The enemy was believed to have withdrawn to the east toward Go Cong. It is possible that the feint did cause enemy movements, but to what extent is not known at present. A second feint was conducted by 2-60 Inf to compliment an airmobile operation on 8 Apr. Significant contacts were not established in the objective area. Again, it is difficult to assess the value unless POW's are taken, or valid post operational intelligence is made available.

**RECOMMENDATION.** The idea of tactical cover and deception is an effective counter-intelligence method. It is felt that feints closer to the objective area would have a much greater effect on enemy movements. This idea deserves greater study and use with stress on feinting on multiple LZ's and varying the distance of the feint from the suspected target.

d. **Deception Measures Employed by the NLF.**

**OBSERVATION.** During the reporting period the enemy employed sophisticated electronic and receiver/transmitter equipment to intercept, jam, monitor and transmit on the 2d Bde's command and operation and intelligence nets. The enemy's activities were designed not only to intercept the brigade's communications but also to gain information in detail of combat operations. Several measures were employed to deceive the enemy of actual situations and activities occurring during the conduct of operations. Those deceptive measures employed included:

1. Spradic dissemination of "fake" operation orders throughout an area by aircraft.

Dissemination of deceptive radio transmissions of tactical information concerning deployment/employment of forces. Schemes of
maneuvers were transmitted in the clear to confuse the enemy as to actual plans.

(3) Requesting two or more areas of operations (AO) for each operation planned.

(4) Employment of artillery and air strikes in areas other than the "true" AO.

(5) Deceptive movement of river assault crafts to and throughout waterways in areas other than the intended AO.

(6) Overflight of deception AO by OH-23 aircraft while limiting reconnaissance of actual AO.

(7) Collaboration with sector and district advisors to pass deceptive information as to actual AO.

EVALUATION. Although the countermeasures employed were generally basic in nature, they were effective.

RECOMMENDATION. None.
AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

15. 3-5 Cav ORLL
16. DIXCOM ORLL
17. 15th Engr Bn ORLL
18. 9th Sig Bn ORLL
19. 9th Arm Bn ORLL
20. COAR Operation RILEY (1st Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA
21. COAR Operation GORGADO X (2d Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as 68X042
22. COAR Operation GORGADO XI (2d Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as 68X043
23. COAR Operation TRUONG CONG DINH (2d Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as 68X044
24. COAR Operation ENTERPRISE (3d Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA
25. COAR Operation QUYET THANG (3d Bde) Withdrawn, HQ, DA; pub sep as 68X046
26. COAR Operation WORTH (3-5 Cav) Withdrawn, HQ, DA
27. COAR Operation KILO (3-5 Cav) Withdrawn, HQ, DA
28. COAR Operation CHARLTON (3-5 Cav) Withdrawn, HQ, DA
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division, Volume I and II, and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/O. B. Forry
/t/O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

ARTHUR K. ARNOLD
CPT, GS
Op Off, Doc Br, DST Div
OACofS, 03
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning medical assistance to local Vietnamese hospitals, page 57, paragraph 2a(3): Nonconcur. Assistance of this type is part of the mission of the Province Health Assistance Program (PHAP) conducted by USAID.

   b. Reference item concerning Xenon Infrared Search Light, page 59, paragraph 2b(4). A message was prepared and dispatched by this headquarters recommending BOI for Xenon Search Lights as one per APC in armored, mechanized armored cavalry scout units.

   c. Reference item concerning Utilization of Wire Team, page 59, paragraph 2b(5). The Signal Support Operations Company deployed under MTOE II-39E, USCONARC 1/67 dated 12 August 1966. Under this MTOE, the company is authorized six cable teams. The division base was not standardized because of its impending riverine configuration. When the unit is reconfigured, eight cable teams should be included in the MTOE that is developed.

   d. Reference item concerning the use of CS against bunkers, page 61 paragraph 2b(9): Concur. Operational quantities of the experimental version of the Cartridge, 40mm, Tactical CS, have been requested pending type classification of an improved cartridge.

   e. Reference item concerning ground surveillance radar training, page 66, paragraph 2c(1): Nonconcur. The recommendation that all infantrymen receive ground surveillance radar training is not feasible. School trained radar operators can best be supplemented by personnel at the unit level, where training can be conducted in view of specific needs, environment, area of operations, and mission of the unit. As an interim measure before school trained operators become available in-country, USARV has established a GSR training team which is available to the Field Forces and Provisional Corps Vietnam.
f. Reference item concerning Military Intelligence Detachment language capability, page 68, paragraph 2d(2): Concur. The present shortage of linguists throughout USARV has precluded the assignment of the desired number of linguists to MID's. Beginning in September 1968, a considerable increase in the input of US linguists is expected. The organization of division MID's within USARV has recently been standardized at a strength of 96; included in this standard organization is a requirement for 66 linguists (11-Off, 4-WO, 31 EM). These linguists have been included in the FY 1971 projected requirements and it was recommended that 29 of these linguists be graduates of the 47-week course, 13 be graduates of the 32-week course, and 4 be graduates of the 12-week course.

g. Reference item concerning air to ground surveillance, page 69, paragraph 2d(5).

(1) Twenty-one 2.2 KW Airborne Xenon Searchlights (AN/ASS-1) were received in July 1967. 9th Infantry Division was issued one for evaluation. Although a formal evaluation was not conducted on these searchlights, general comments gathered by ACTIV were not favorable. A lightweight 30 KW Xenon Searchlight (white light only) is expected to arrive in a few months for evaluation. This system, without IR capability, may prove to be a better system.

(2) The value of fabricating a permanent mount to assist in providing a stable support for the starlight scope is questionable since vibrations of the aircraft will be transmitted directly to the scope and may render it unusable.

h. Reference item concerning five gallon water jugs, page 71, paragraph 2e(3): Nonconcur. A three gallon, free drop water container is currently available in the supply system.

i. Reference item concerning logistical support for armored unit, page 71, paragraph 2e(4): Concur. Recommend the parent organization attach commensurate maintenance support from the Division Base to provide required logistical support and deploy the unit complete with attached maintenance capability to include ASL drawn from the division basic load. Nondivisional Direct and General Maintenance Support requirements are available in I CTZ. Appropriate coordination for DS/OS maintenance support should be effected with the CG, Da Nang Support Command.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (12 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR (R1) (U)

j. Reference item concerning the detachment of the air cavalry troop, page 72, paragraph 2f(1): Concur. Maximum combat effectiveness is obtained when the cavalry squadron is employed as a complete tactical unit.

k. Reference item concerning inadequate photographic section, MTOE, page 73, paragraph 2f(2): Concur. An increase is justifiable in view of the operational use being made of the photographic section.

l. Reference item concerning unsuitability of the KS-6 combat camera for tactical employments, page 74, paragraph 2g(1). Comments in this paragraph and in paragraph 2f(2) on authorized combat cameras in general appear overly severe in view of the fact that other units find them satisfactory. It is possible that operator unfamiliarity with equipment and carelessness in handling might be contributing causes. Recommend that units submit unsatisfactory equipment reports in accordance with provisions of TM 38-750. It should be noted that the KS-6 and KS-14 cameras are being replaced in the system.

m. Reference item concerning rotatable antennas for tracking the MRF C and C ship, page 75, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. The following action has been taken to procure the subject items:

1. USAECOM was contacted to determine if suitable replacement items were available in the supply system.

2. An ENSURE request is now being processed for operational quantities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HC, 9th Inf Div
HQ, II FFORGEV
GPOP-DT (12 May 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC 9th Inf Div
HHC 1st Bde
HHC 2d Bde
HHC 3d Bde
HBE Div Arty
2-39 Inf
3-39 Inf
4-39 Inf
2-47 Inf (M)
3-47 Inf
4-47 Inf
2-60 Inf
3-60 Inf
5-60 Inf (M)
3-5 Cav
6-31 Inf
1-11 Arty
2-4 Arty
1-84 Arty
3-34 Arty
9th Avn Bn
15th Engr Bn
9th Sig Bn
9th MP Co
43d Inf Plt SD
45th Inf Plt SD
1st Air Boat Plt
2d Air Boat Plt
E/50th Inf (LRF)
Task Force Forsyth
Task Force Funston
HHC & Band, DISCOM
9th S&T Bn
709th Maint Bn
9th Med Bn
Reliable Academy
9th MI Det
59th Chem Det
19th Mil Hist Det
47th Mil Hist Det
18th PI Det
19th PI Det
65th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
ATTACHED UNITS

11th ACR
335th RRC
137th Med
5-2 Arty (AWSP) (DS)
OFCON CENT
Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR)
2-3 Inf

DOWNGRADED AT THREE YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER TWELVE YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
### Task Organization and Unit Locations as of 0600H

**9th Inf Div Main**
- D/3-5 Cav

**9th Inf Div Pwd**
- 15 Engr Bn (-)

**9th Inf Div Arty**
- 1-84 Arty (-)
  - A/1-84 Arty
  - B/1-84 Arty (4 Tubes)
  - (2 Tubes)
  - C/1-84 Arty (3 Tubes)
  - (3 Tubes)
  - D/1-84 Arty (2 Tubes)
  - (2 Tubes)
  - A/7-8 Arty (GSR)
  - 7-9 Arty (-) (GSR)
  - C/7-9 Arty
  - D/2-13 Arty (GSR)
  - B/1-27 Arty (GSR)

**BEARCAT**
- YT 1600
- YT 1600
- DONG TAM
- DONG TAM
- BEARCAT
- DONG TAM
- BEARCAT
- DONG TAM
- BEARCAT

**BERCAT**
- YT 1600
- XS 4143
- BEARCAT
- XS 4143
- DONG TAM
- XS 4143
- BEARCAT
- XS 4143
- BEARCAT

**FSPB PARKER**
- XS 2051
- FRENCH FORT
- XS 8962
- TAN AN
- XS 5565
- FSPB SMOKE
- XS 7977
- LONG THANH
- XS 1292
- FSPB PARKER
- XS 2051
- BEN LUC
- XS 6376
- BEARCAT
- XS 1699
- FSPB GREY
- XS 2093
- NHA BE
- XS 9182
- FSPB SMOKE
- XS 7977

**INPER**

**DECLASSIFIED AFTER TWELVE YEARS**

**DOD DIR 5200.10**
### OPERATION PEOPLES ROAD (DUONG CUA DAN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-39 Inf (-)</td>
<td>FSPB MOORE</td>
<td>XS 4049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-39 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 2650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-39 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 2955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/2-39 Inf</td>
<td>FSPB LAMBERT</td>
<td>XS 3349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/5-60 Inf (M)</td>
<td>FSPB LAMBERT</td>
<td>XS 3349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-60 Inf (-)</td>
<td>MY PHUOC TAY</td>
<td>XS 2059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-60 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 2357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/C/2-60 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 2358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-11 Arty (-) (GS)</td>
<td>DONG TAM</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1-11 Arty</td>
<td>FSPB MOORE</td>
<td>XS 2650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-11 Arty</td>
<td>MY PHUOC TAY</td>
<td>XS 2059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1-11 Arty</td>
<td>DONG TAM</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OPERATION TRUONG CONG DINH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd Bde</th>
<th>MRB</th>
<th>XS 4041</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-47 Inf (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 4041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/4-47 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 3543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/E/4-47 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 3544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-47 Inf (-)</td>
<td>MRB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 4041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

30 April 1968

A/3-47 Inf
B/3-47 Inf
C/3-47 Inf
E/3-47 Inf
3-34 Arty (-) (Atch 2nd Bde)
A/3-34 Arty
C/3-34 Arty

OPERATION TOAN THANG

3d Bde
3-39 Inf (-)
A/3-39 Inf (-)
B/3-39 Inf (-)
C/3-39 Inf (-)
5-60 Inf (M) (-)
A/5-60 Inf
4-39 Inf (-)
A/4-39 Inf
B/4-39 Inf
2-3 Inf (-)
B/D/2-3 Inf
6-31 Inf (-)
A/6-31 Inf

TAN AN
BACH KIEN
FRENCH FORT
AN NHUT TAN

CONFIDENTIAL

88
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit/Unit Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/6-31 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 6472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/6-31 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 7481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/6-31 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 7080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/15 Engr Bn</td>
<td>TAN AN</td>
<td>XS 5565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 Arty (DS)</td>
<td>TAN AN</td>
<td>XS 5565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-4 Arty (-) (4 Tubes)</td>
<td>RACH KIEN</td>
<td>XS 7469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 Tubes)</td>
<td>BEN LUC</td>
<td>XS 6376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-4 Arty (-) (4 Tubes)</td>
<td>BINH PHUOC</td>
<td>XS 6155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 Tubes)</td>
<td>BEN LUC</td>
<td>XS 6562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-4 Arty (-) (4 Tubes)</td>
<td>TAN TRU</td>
<td>XS 6562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 Tubes)</td>
<td>TAN AN</td>
<td>XS 5565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-40 Arty (DS 2-3 Inf)</td>
<td>FSPB SMOKE</td>
<td>XS 7977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAVR</td>
<td>BEARCAT</td>
<td>YT 1601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/RTAVR</td>
<td></td>
<td>YS 1082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/RTAVR</td>
<td></td>
<td>YS 1486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/RTAVR</td>
<td></td>
<td>YS 1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry RTAVR (DS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YS 1386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF Forsyth</td>
<td>BEARCAT</td>
<td>YS 1799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-47 Inf (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YT 0802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-47 Inf (M)</td>
<td>BINH SON</td>
<td>YS 2193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-47 Inf (K)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/15 Engr Bn</td>
<td>BEARCAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION HOPTAG I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF Funston</td>
<td>DONG TAM</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-60 Inf (-)</td>
<td>JONG TAJ</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/3-60 Inf</td>
<td>VINH KIM</td>
<td>XS 3644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/3-60 Inf</td>
<td>FSPB PARKER</td>
<td>XS 2051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/3-60 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XS 4345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rcn/5-60 Inf (N)</td>
<td>DONG TAM</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. (C) Maintenance of Unit Strength:

a. Division Strength:
   (Comparison as of 1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>Assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>14872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>15002</td>
<td>15291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>15913</td>
<td>15888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Strength by Month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF WO ENL</td>
<td>OFF WO ENL</td>
<td>OFF WO ENL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1023 183 15000</td>
<td>1061 148 14872</td>
<td>1211 162 14999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1025 183 15002</td>
<td>1048 153 15291</td>
<td>1194 165 15092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>1081 184 15913</td>
<td>1106 154 15888</td>
<td>1202 153 15809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Gains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF WO EM AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>54 6 1393 1453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>89 9 1739 1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>93 7 2170 2270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 4

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10
c. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NBO</th>
<th>NBI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Analysis of Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MINES</th>
<th>SMALL BOoby</th>
<th>MINES</th>
<th>SMALL ARMED</th>
<th>MORTAR</th>
<th>BOOBY TRAPS</th>
<th>SNIPER</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Flight</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Situation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booby Traps</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Location of Wound)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) Personnel Management:

a. An artillery lieutenant infusion program was successfully completed with the 108th Artillery Group. This action reduced a September rotational hump within the Division Artillery. Another infusion program is being planned with the 1st Infantry Division to reduce an October rotational hump for artillery lieutenants.

b. The assignment of a complete new infantry battalion will cause a rotational hump during March of 1969. Intra-division infusion will begin during the month of August and continue until the rotational peak is within the USARV standard.
3. (U) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

   a. Morale continues to be high in all units.

   b. Special Services Activities.

   (1) Facilities:

      (a) Swimming Pool - The swimming pool at Dong Tam received direct
          mortar hits on 7 February 1968, causing extensive damage to the
          liners. It was repaired and reopened; however, a new liner is on order and should
          arrive on or about 15 June 1968.

      (b) Craft Shop - The Craft Shop at Dong Tam was formally opened on
          12 February 1968. The shop includes facilities for woodwork, photography
          development, and a sales outlet. On 18 February 1968, the sales outlet
          received a direct mortar hit. The damage was not extensive, and the outlet
          reopened within a few days.

      (c) Golf Course - An eighteen hole miniature golf course was erected
          at Dong Tam Base. Opening day was 5 April 1968.

      (d) Library - A 4,000 square foot air conditioned library was opened
          on 13 February 1968 at Dong Tam Base. On 18 February 1968, it received
          direct hits from mortar and recoilles rifle fire. The library was re-
          paired and reopened within a few days.

      (e) Service Club - The Service Club at Dong Tam Base received direct
          hits from mortar fire on 7 February 1968 and 8 February 1968, However,
          it remained open during repairs.

   (2) Entertainment:

      (a) USO Handshake Tours.

         Professional Football Players  [5 Feb 68]
         Robert Bray  [10 Feb 68]
         Ed Besley  [25 Mar 68]
         Cal Tinney  [12-14 Apr 68]

      (b) USO Shows

         Berri Lee - Melody Engle Magic Show  [5 Apr 68]
RFD Hollywood Show

30 Apr 1968

22 Apr 68

(3) Rest an Recuperation Allocation and Utilization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
<th>TOTAL USED</th>
<th>% OF UTILIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of utilization was low because of the peak rotation period and the Tet Offensive.

(4) Sports. Softball - A new softball field, located at 5th and G streets, Bearcat, was completed for the division softball season which began on 15 February 1968 and ended 13 April 1968. Twenty one teams participated in the program with the 709th Maintenance Battalion winning the division championship followed by the 9th Administration Company placing second.

c. Postal Services. During this quarter, mail and financial business of APO 96370 reached its peak and subsequently began to decline for the first time since the arrival of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam. Air delivery to Tan An to sevice troops of the 3d Brigade was initiated using Air Force C7A (Caribou) aircraft. A permanent finance unit was established aboard the USS Benewah to sevice personnel of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). A mobile finance service to other ships of the MRF was also initiated. The manning level of the Dong Tam finance unit was increased to cope with the large number of units relocating to that area. A new AG administration replacement mail room was opened at the Reliable Academy. This is staffed by personnel of APO 96370 and delivers mail daily to incoming replacements. A method of screening incoming and outgoing parcel post for contraband was initiated at APO 96370. This was such a success in the 9th Inf Div that it was soon adopted by USARV as standard operating procedures for all USARV postal units. The 48th Army Postal Unit (APU) arrived and began a period of training under the technical supervision of APO 96370 personnel. The 48th APU, operating APO 96370, will serve non-divisional units assigned to Bearcat. The Tet Offensive resulted in a three day curtailment of mail service for the 9th Inf Div. However, through coordinated utilization of available air and ground transportation assets, normal mail service was resumed within the 9th Inf Div prior to most other postal operations in USARV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MH</th>
<th>DSG</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>LM</th>
<th>DPC</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>BS(V)</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>AM(V)</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>ACK(V)</th>
<th>ACM</th>
<th>PH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/39 Inf</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/39 Inf</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/47 Inf</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/60 Inf</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/60 Inf</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335 Rad Res Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Cal Rad Det</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 PI Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 MI Det</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mil Hist Det</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Inf Pit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Inf Pit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Arty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11 Arty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4 Arty</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/34 Arty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/84 Arty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHCBD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Admin</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 S &amp; T</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>LN</td>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>SN</td>
<td>BS(V)</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>AM(V)</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>ACM(V)</td>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>PH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Med</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>709 Maint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Avn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>436</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5 Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sig</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 HF</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Div</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Co 50 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 ACR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1097 Trans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL: 4842

e. Religious Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Services</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>1,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>19,012</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>32,179</td>
<td>51,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

98
There are no Jewish Chaplains assigned to the division; however, Chaplain Breslau from the 101st Airborne Division visited Camp Mart'n Cox on 15-18 February 1968 and Dong Tam Base on 21-25 February 1968.

f. Red Cross

(1) The Red Cross support rendered during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases Handled</th>
<th>Loans/Grants</th>
<th>(Am)</th>
<th>Emergency Leave</th>
<th>Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>($2135.00)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>($1695.00)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>($2675.00)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The number of cases handled each month remained constant during the quarter, averaging slightly more than 1250 per month. There continues to be a large number of requests for reports of family members in CONUS. Most of the requests are due to non-receipt of mail or delayed mail. The figures shown above are not considered high for a command of this size.

(3) The 6 Red Cross Clubmobile girls made a total of 505 visits to units throughout the 9th Inf Div during this period.

g. Education Center

(1) During this quarter the following number of soldiers participated in the division education program:

- GED Tests (completed) 132
- GED Tests (1 or more parts) 114
- High School Courses 85
- College Courses 230
- Technical Courses 8
- College Comprehension Test 72
- Total Number of Registrations 323
Total Number of Participants 584

(2) The following additional educational material and equipment has been received by the Education Center:

(a) Seven automated reading machines.
(b) New Testing materials, Aptitude Classification Battery.
(c) Reference Materials.
(d) USAFI instructional materials for 25 students in the following Group Study areas:
   1. English H.S.
   2. Mathematics H.S. - College
   3. Natural Science H.S.
   4. Business H.S. - College
   5. Accounting - College

(3) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.
   a. Discipline.

(1) Crimes Against Persons and Property: The division has experienced a decrease in these types of crimes. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons and Property</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnal Knowledge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agg. Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Persons and Property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary &amp; Housebreaking</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (over $50)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (under $50)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongful Appropriation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Miscellaneous and Military Offenses: The division has experienced a significant increase in this category. This indicates a need for increased emphasis by unit commanders in the enforcement of these rules and regulations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Misc</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Offenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly Conduct</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Narcotic Abuse Drugs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Market</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offenses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
### (3 mos) Traffic Offenses

The division experienced an increase in the number of traffic offenses in almost every category. The only significant reduction was noticed in reckless driving (from 19 to 2). This increase in traffic violations can be attributed to the increased amount of traffic on the highways and also to the many convoys moving to and from Dong Tam.

Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic Offenses</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Traffic Offender (Mil)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veh Homicide Invol. manal (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligent Homicide (Mil)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunk Driving (Mil)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

Traffic Offenses (3 mos) (3 mos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offenses</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reckless Driving (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reckless Driving (Mil)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding (Mil)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Moving Violations (POV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Violations (except parking) (Mil)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleeing Scene of Accident (Mil)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The prisoner population during this period remained within the normal range of experience. The division prisoner population in the USARV Stockade is 49, the same as for the preceding quarter. Of this total, 8 are in pretrial confinement, 7 have been sentenced by general court-martial, 33 have been sentenced by special court-martial, and 1 has been sentenced by summary court-martial.

(5) Sixty-two CID Reports of Investigation were received this quarter. Very noticeable is the number of cases closed this quarter, six more than during the preceding quarter.

Military Justice: During this period, five enlisted members were tried by general court-martial. This is a decrease of four cases tried by general court-martial from the previous quarter. No significant disciplinary trends or problem areas were noted. In some cases more than one offense was charged and a breakdown of the offenses charged and tried by general court-martial during this quarter follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
### Confidentail

#### Offenses Charged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Number Charged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary manslaughter:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt to escape from lawful confinement:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspiracy (to escape from confinement):</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Prisoners of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PW Report</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PW's</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Evacuated</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ref to 1:50000 Map
Series L7014 Sheets
that comprise TAOI

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
6228 I, II, III, IV
6328 III, IV
6129 I, II, III, IV
6229 I, II, III, IV
6230 III
6329 I, II, III, IV
6330 I, II, III
6331 IV
6430 I, III, IV
6430 I, II
6431 I
6530 I, IV
6531 I, II, III, IV

LECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 5

1

105

CONFIDENTIAL
ARTILLERY SUPPORT

SUMMARY OF ROUNDS FIRED

ARTILLERY WITH THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1 February 68 - 30 April 68

DIVISION ARTILLERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Howitzer</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm H.</td>
<td>15467</td>
<td>280862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm H.</td>
<td>6279</td>
<td>59168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; H.</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>8953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NON-DIVISION ARTILLERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Howitzer</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm H.</td>
<td>4859</td>
<td>32798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm H.</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>28234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIRED IN SUPPORT OF ARVN - RP/PP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Howitzer</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm H.</td>
<td>3003</td>
<td>13491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm H.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>3406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 6

DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
LOD CIR 5200,10

107

CONFIDENTIAL
### G3 Air Operational Support Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>367.50</td>
<td>486.25</td>
<td>285.50</td>
<td>1139.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPALM (Tons)</td>
<td>241.25</td>
<td>187.50</td>
<td>157.50</td>
<td>582.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLDG Dest</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLDG Dam</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Dest</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Dam</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (PC)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (POSS)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec Expl</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Dest</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Dam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidential

Inclosure 7
### Class V Supply

**1 February - 24 February 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81MM Illum</td>
<td>4,664</td>
<td>4,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81MM HE</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>13,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105MM HE</td>
<td>75,342</td>
<td>58,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren HD Smk Yel</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>4,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Claymore</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>3,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 Illum :D WS Clust</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD WS Para</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare, Surface Trip</td>
<td>8,571</td>
<td>4,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**25 February - 24 March 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mini Gun Ammo</td>
<td>170,679</td>
<td>279,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40MM HE</td>
<td>45,847</td>
<td>36,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81MM Illum</td>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>1,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81MM HE</td>
<td>14,355</td>
<td>8,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105MM HE</td>
<td>72,035</td>
<td>59,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren HD Frag</td>
<td>26,420</td>
<td>12,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren HD Smk Yel</td>
<td>6,370</td>
<td>5,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl. 8

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS**

**DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS**

**DOD DIR 5200.10**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66MM HE At</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>1,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minc Claymore</td>
<td>4,902</td>
<td>2,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent CS-1</td>
<td>25,370</td>
<td>32,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD WS Clust</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD WS Para</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>1,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare Surface Trip</td>
<td>12,446</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot; HE w/Fuze PD</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot; Illum</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105MM SK WP</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75 HE W/MTR</td>
<td>Drawn as Required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 March thru 24 April 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40MM HE</td>
<td>46,562</td>
<td>28,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81MM Illum</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>2,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81MM HE</td>
<td>27,308</td>
<td>14,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105MM HE</td>
<td>50,754</td>
<td>74,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105MM Illum</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'05MM SK WP</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>1,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot; Illum</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chg Prop 8&quot; GB</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren HD Frag</td>
<td>19,431</td>
<td>11,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONFIDENTIAL

**30 April 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gren HL Off</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren HD JK Yel</td>
<td>6,330</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt. HE 66MM AT</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Claymore</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>2,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical CSI</td>
<td>15,440 lbs</td>
<td>15,600 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD Ws Clus</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD Ws Para</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare A/C Para</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Ammunition Drawn**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>AMOUNT DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 81MM HE w/o Fuze</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 81MM SMK WP w/Fuze PD</td>
<td>1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 81MM HE w/o Fuze</td>
<td>1,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 81MM SMK WP w/Fuze PD</td>
<td>3,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 90MM Cannister</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 90MM HE w/Fuze PD</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 90MM HVAP-T</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 9MM HEAT w/Fuze PID</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## NOMENCLATURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount Drawn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 90MM Cannister AP f/rifle</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105MM Illum</td>
<td>10,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105MM Leaflet</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105MM SMK, HC</td>
<td>2,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105MM SMK, Red</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105 SMK, Yellow</td>
<td>6,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 105MM AP w/Fuze HT</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 106 MM HEAT f/rifle</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 106MM HEP-T f/rifle</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; Mortar HE w/Fuze FD</td>
<td>18,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; Mortar HE w/o Fuze</td>
<td>3,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; Mortar Illum</td>
<td>3,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; Mortar SMK, WP, WP</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; Mortar SMK, WP</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proj, 155MM Illum</td>
<td>2,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chg, Prop, 155MM White Bag</td>
<td>46,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proj, 155MM HE w/o Fuze</td>
<td>58,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proj, 8&quot; HE w/o Fuze</td>
<td>9,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Experimental Ammunition During Period

**NOMERCLATURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>DRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 40MM Multishot</td>
<td>8,277</td>
<td>3,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 40MM CS</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS Launcher E-8</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 90MM RR, HE</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 4.2&quot; CS</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, SMK White</td>
<td>3,831</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, SMK, Green</td>
<td>6,174</td>
<td>1,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, SMK, Red</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, SMK, Yellow</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial SMK Marker, White</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial SMK Marker, Colored</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-158 Cannister Cluster</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap, Desensitizing Fuze, XM5</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg, 106MM, APERS</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96372

AVDE-47MH-.

29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

TqRU: Commanding General 9th Infantry Division APO San Francisco 96370

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of the Army Washington, D. C. 20310

Reference: AR 525-15, dated 26 January 1968

SECTION I

Operations: Significant Activities

1. (C) Introduction: The MOBILE HIVE FORCE (MRF) is a joint task force composed of RIVER FLOTILLA ONE and elements of the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The Army element is composed of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade, two infantry maneuver battalions, and a direct support artillery battalion. The Brigade's third maneuver battalion is used to provide a security force at DONG T.H Base Camp. Each maneuver battalion spends approximately two months with the MRF and then approximately one month under the operational control of Task Force Funston at DONG T.H. The MRF normally engages in strike operations lasting normally from one to three days. During the period covered by this report, the MRF has operated in six provinces of the Mekong Delta: Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Long, and Dinh Dinh. The 2nd Brigade was involved in combat operations during the entire period with the exception of 13 to 14 February 1968, when the MRF
moved from DONG Tam to Cao THO and 4 to 6 March 1968, when the MRF returned to DONG Tam from Cao THO. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations and during periods when the battalions were rotated on base defense at Dong Tam or preparing for future operations.

2. (C) Organization:

a. As previously stated in paragraph 1 of this report, the Army component of the Mobile Riverine Force consists of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two of its three maneuver battalions and a direct support artillery battalion minus one firing battery. The Brigade's third maneuver battalion is employed as a security force at DONG Tam Base - the 9th Infantry Division Forward Command Post. The third artillery battery is direct support to this battalion.

b. Presently, the Brigade's organization for combat is the resultant of two significant factors; the first being insufficient quantity of berthing spaces on the MRF's barracks ships to accommodate a third maneuver battalion, and secondly, the Brigade's mission of providing DONG Tam Base with a battalion-size security element. Future (short-range) plans for the MRF provide for the addition of two Auxiliary Personnel Barracks, Ships (APB) and one Auxiliary Personnel Lighter (APL) to house and transport the Brigade's third maneuver battalion, along with additional berthing for two more River Assault Squadrons.

c. The characteristics and nature of the MRF, as a "Mobile Striking Force", are such that both of the Brigade's maneuver battalions are fully committed in offensive initiatives against concentrations of sizable enemy units. In addition, one maneuver battalion is always tasked to provide one Infantry company to secure the MOBILE RIVERINE BASE while the second maneuver battalion is tasked to provide up to one company to secure the fire support base (FSB). With the active participation of a third maneuver battalion in MRF operations, the MRF would be capable of intensifying its strikes, with maximum tactical flexibility to sever enemy routes of withdrawal, fix and destroy him.

3. (C) Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Unit Strength: The average assigned strength of major subordinate units of the Brigade during the period 1 February thru 15 April 1968 was:

CONFIDENTIAL

2
29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2nd Brigade</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 47th Infantry</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 47th Infantry</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 60th Infantry</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 34th Artillery</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The field maneuver strength of each infantry battalion was approximately three-fifths (3/5) of its assigned strength. The remaining personnel were involved in administrative and other matters such as hospitalization, details, R&R, leave, in transit, sick call, profiles and light duties as a result of wounds. To improve and increase the field maneuver strength, commanders and their staffs were directed to initiate aggressive administrative measures to improve their personnel management programs.

(3) Casualties as a result of hostile action for the period (1 February thru 15 April 1968) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>WH.</th>
<th>KH.</th>
<th>MH.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 47th Inf</td>
<td>1 thru 29 Feb</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 Mar</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 15 Apr</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 47th Inf</td>
<td>1 thru 29 Feb</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 Mar</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 15 Apr</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 60th Inf</td>
<td>1 thru 29 Feb</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 31 Mar</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 thru 15 Apr</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDI--47MH-A 29 April 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

(4) Total casualties as a result of hostile action for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KH</th>
<th>WH</th>
<th>MH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Administration.

(1) Awards and Decorations.

Number of Awards and Decorations recommended, (pending approval)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMH</th>
<th>DPC</th>
<th>CM (V)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>SBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>BSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) To minimize requirements for troops to return to the division headquarters to solve personal and administrative problems, representatives of the division special staffs were attached to the Brigade to augment its administrative capabilities. The staff representation consists of a postal section, finance team, public information detachment and a re-enlistment NCO. Periodically, other teams such as AG, J.G and IG are dispatched from division to serve the troops as required.

(3) Insufficient administrative transportation impaired the attainment of timely responses and services concerning postal activities, administrative personnel movement, and other administrative requirements. Individuals participating in a five day out of country R&R could be expected to be absent from their unit for a period of ten to thirteen days due to inadequate transportation assets and/or arrangements. Close and extensive coordination is presently being undertaken to reduce and subsequently eliminate the noted problem areas.

(4) Health remained "excellent" throughout the period.

117

CONFIDENTIAL
The Brigade's malaria rate was extremely low and most of the man- 
days lost were due to foot problems. A surgical facility with a 30 
bed capacity was installed on one of the barracks ships (USS 
Colleton). This facility is used primarily as a medical clearing 
station for the MAF.

(5) Morale remained "excellent" throughout the period. 
Excellent living conditions coupled with outstanding leadership, 
and continuous success during combat operations contributed toward 
maintaining an extremely high state of morale throughout the command.

(6) Since the conception of the MOBILE DIVININE FORCE, 
numerous visitors (both military and civilian) have visited the 
MRF to view its features and facilities. To date, the majority of 
these visits have been beneficial to the MRF, in that recognition 
is given to its past accomplishments and present requirements. Per-
sonnel resources were occasionally diverted from other missions in 
preparation for visitors; however, the diversion did not severely 
aflect the accomplishment of their missions.

4. (c) Intelligence:

a. The enemy forces, order of battle and dispositions, 
prior to each combat operation of the Brigade are presented in 
paragraph eight of the Combat After Action Report attached as in-
closures to this Operational Report.

b. During the reporting period, the enemy continued to 
select the time, location and conditions for decisive combat engage-
ments with friendly forces. He further demonstrated his will to 
accept combat only when he occupied well prepared defensive positions 
and/or during late periods in the afternoon. This reporting period 
was characterized by a significant increase in his employment of 
automatic weapons and in the calibers of direct and indirect fire 
weapons. Enemy raid type operations increased against isol-
ated fire bases and district towns.

c. The Viet Cong's psychological warfare effort, that of 
recruiting and proselyting activities directed against the rural 
population, increased significantly, concurrently with his threats 
against major urban areas. Indications are that the enemy is con-
centrating on controlling the rural population.
d. Complete reorganization of enemy forces has also occurred during the period of this report. Intelligence indicates that all Main Force and Provincial Mobile Battalions have split into at least two elements. This, coupled with the increased recruiting efforts, has allowed him to increase his effective combat strength by approximately one-third, recovering the losses of the TET period. These troops, however, are not the equivalent caliber of those lost. It is interesting to note that District Companies are recently referred to as Battalions with the probable intention of creating an atmosphere of additional strength. In most cases, the strength of the company has not significantly increased. There have been numerous reports of NVA units operating or passing through KIEN TUONG Province and massing along the LONG ...N, KIEN TUONG and DINH TUONG border area. The enemy is attempting an economic strangulation of provincial towns and to disrupt the economic stability of the present GVN. There are increasing reports of underground political organizational meetings in order to prepare for the eventual take over of the government. More recently the enemy has been concentrating his efforts in training troops and resupply activities with less emphasis on stand-off rocket and mortar attacks. Also there has been an increase in swimmer/sapper and sapper activity.

e. Information and intelligence is exchanged liberally between all agencies and the Brigade by means of liaison officers, message traffic, and personal (staff) coordination and liaison. Significant intelligence information/material was obtained from the following sources: the 9th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment located at DONG T. M, Prisoners of war (POW's) and sympathizers, 7th RVN Division agent net, 525th MI Detachment, Field information reports from Naval Intelligence Liaison Office, spot reports, intelligence summaries, and electronic means. In most cases, information and intelligence were not particularly effective because they were not timely.

f. Enemy capabilities and limitations exhibited during the reporting period remain the same. The enemy retains the capability of conducting platoon and company size attacks on outposts and villages as well as battalion size attacks on District and Provincial Towns and military installations. He can also conduct stand-off mortar and rocket harassing attacks. Indications are infiltration, proselytizing and resupply activity will also continue on a large scale, in addition to the interdiction of major lines of communications. His desire to gain control of rural population...

CONFIDENTIAL
will continue to be a priority mission, even though he is not capable of maintaining the desired degree of political and military control. Despite his military and political objectives, the enemy remains vulnerable to massed artillery fire, aerial observation and electronic surveillance. Considering the enemy's capabilities it is thought that his possible courses of action will include continued recruitment, training and resupply activities, in addition to the initiation of attacks against minor targets in strength, intensifying harassment of major lines of communications and military installations. If at all feasible, the enemy will initiate an offensive on the same scale as his TET offensive.

5. (C) **Combat Operations**: A summation of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade operations is presented as follows:

   a. **Operation COBRA DO X**.

      (1) **Dates**: 18 January thru 12 February 1968.

      (2) **Mission**: To conduct riverine, search and clear, patrolling and interdictory operations before, during and after the TET Truce, in Gia Dinh District, DINH TUONG Province, and My In District, East KIEN PHONG Province; to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces before and after the Truce period and to deny or disrupt enemy lines of communications during the Truce.

      (3) **Location**: DINH TUONG Province, and KIEN PHONG Province, Republic of Vietnam.

      (4) **Commander**: Colonel Bert A. David.

      (5) **Forces involved**:

         (a) US:

            1. 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.


         (b) **Others**: 7th ARVN Division
AVDE-474H-a

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

(6) Concept and execution:

(a) See Inclosure #2 (Combat Operations After Action Report CORONDO X).

(b) The latter period for which this Combat After Action Report is prepared coincides with the beginning of the TET offensive. The Brigade operated during the offensive in three general areas: MY THO and its environs; the area around CIA LUY, and in VINH LONG and the areas south and west of the city. From 29 January thru 6 February, the Brigade accounted for 252 VC killed (by body count) at a loss of 11 US. killed. On 31 January the Brigade, minus one company (which deployed to VINH LONG airfield) moved from the CIA RUONG to MY THO city. Following beach assaults on 1 February, the Brigade undertook to clear the western portion of the city of all enemy elements, and within thirty-six hours it had completed its mission. On the 2nd of February the Brigade moved into the CIA LUY area to cut off enemy escape routes and engage enemy elements moving into the 470 Base area. On 5 February it relocated to VINH LONG, where for the next three days, before returning to another search and clear mission north of MY THO, it engaged and destroyed major elements of the VC 306th MF Battalion, relieved enemy pressure on the city from the south, and reopened major waterways extending south from the TIEN GLANG River.

b. Operation CORONDO XI.

(1) Dates: 13 February thru 4 March 1968.

(2) Missions: Conduct riverine, airmobile, search and sweep operations in CIA LONG District, PHONG DINH Province to locate, fix and destroy elements of VC 303, 306 and 309 MF Battalion and TuY DO, Battalion I and II in zone.

(3) Location: PHONG DINH Province, Republic of Vietnam.

(4) Commanders: Colonel Bert A. David.

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US:
SUBJECT: Operatio nal Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol C5FOR-65 (R1)

1. 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.


(b) Others: 21st RVN Division.

(6) Concept and execution:

(a) See Inclusion #3: "Combat Operations After Action Report CORONADO XI".

(b) Operation CORONADO XI, as originally conceived, would be conducted in three phases involving deployment, employment and redeployment of the Mobile Riverine Force. The first phase consisted of deployment of the MRF from DONG T.M to C.I.N T.HO, after which both Army and Navy elements were employed in tactical operations. The employment phase terminated with the redeployment phase; thereafter the MRF returned to the DONG T.M area.

(c) During the period 13 February thru 3 March, the MRF anchored off C.I.N T.HO and the Brigade operated continuously in C.I ENG District, PHONG DINH Province. Operation CORONADO XI began with the implementation of OPORD 15-68 and employment of waterborne (Riverine) insertions of Infantry units along the BACH C.I.N T.HO. During subsequent operations, the MRF engaged Viet Cong Main Force Battalions which had massed on the western periphery of C.I.N T.HO city. These operations accounted for 297 VC killed (body count) resulting from a series of riverine and airmobile insertions and sweeps throughout difficult terrain west and southwest of the city. On 22 February the MRF made its deepest southern penetration into Phong HIEP District where it engaged headquarters and support elements of the VC MR III Headquarters along the KINH SAINTENONY. In six hours of fighting the MRF accounted for 66 enemy killed at a loss of three wounded. Complete tactical surprise was achieved when elements of the VC company securing the MR III Headquarters were caught unaware by the MRF deployment some 20 miles inland from the Bassac River.

(d) On 24 February, the MRF employed the cordon-and-search technique to seal off the island of CU LUO XI, close to the eastern shore of the Bassac River, ten kilometers south of C.I.N T.HO. Large-scale Naval participation established the cordon by deploying River Assault Craft (RAC) around the island before dawn.
29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (RI)

The Brigade's maneuver battalions (3-47th and 3-60th Infantry) were introduced into the northern and southern ends of the island, respectively; a complete search of island followed. The inhabitants were directed to go to one of two collection points established on the island. Before the operation was completed 435 detainees were processed; two were classified as POW's and 23 were classified as civil defendants. In addition 49 bunkers were destroyed. The joint cordon and search operation represented a significant innovation in MRF operations.

(c) Combat operations in Operation CONG-DOD XI terminated on 3 March 1968, at which time the MRF redeployed from CAN THO to the vicinity of DONG T.I., The operation terminated on 4 March 1968 with the MRF assuming a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) mission while rotating two of the Brigade's maneuver battalions. The 3-47th Infantry debarked from the US Ship Colleto and the 3-47th Infantry started embarkation aboard the same

(c) Operation TRUONG CONG DINH.

(1) Dates: 7 March 1968 thru Present.

(2) Mission: In coordination and cooperation with elements of the 9th Infantry Division (U.S.) and 7th ARVN Division, conduct tactical operations in east, south central and central T.I N H PROVINCE to locate, fix and destroy enemy elements in zone.

(3) Location: D.I N H PROVINCE, Republic of Vietnam.

(4) Commander: Colonel Bert A. David.

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US:

1 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division,
2 Task Force 117 - U.S. Navy element.
3 Element of 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

(b) Other: 7th ARVN Division

(6) Concept and execution: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
For Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (RI)

(a) See Inclusions # 4 (Combat Operations After Action Report Ta Ong CONG Dinha) (Phase 1)

(b) Operation Ta Ong CONG Dinha, a combined ARVN/US operation, comprised several tactical operations in Dinh Ta On Province, IV Corps Tactical Zone. The 7th ARVN Division participated in offensive operations with elements of the 9th Infantry Division and the MRF to locate and destroy enemy elements within the Province. One of the 9th Infantry Division’s missions was to protect the engineer effort and improve security along route 4 which is the economic life-line of the Delta’s inhabitants and a prime interdiction target of the enemy.

(c) The MRF’s participation in operation Ta Ong CONG Dinha commenced on 3 March 1968, with the implementation of MRF CPORD 20-68. The maneuver battalions were deployed by riverine movement into CHI 9.6 District, east Dinh Ta On Province to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations and destroy enemy elements in zone. The Brigade’s initial operation was amended when intelligence reports of concentrated enemy activity in an adjacent area caused redeployment/employment of the maneuver battalions. Subsequent operations were initiated as the Brigade’s area of operation (AO) was extended west and into central Dinh Ta On Province.

(d) During the first week of operation Ta Ong CONG Dinha, the Brigade established contact with elements of the 261st and 263rd VC Battalions, and possibly the 514th VC Battalion as well. These “contacts” were never exploited to a profound result, due to the nonavailabilty of sufficient troop resources required to provide the commander with tactical flexibility. The enemy would frequently remain concealed until late in the afternoon, and then he would engage friendly forces with heavy volumes of fire. The enemy knows that he can establish contact quickly and then withdrawal at his will under the cover of darkness.

(e) The remainder of the month of March saw little significant enemy contact. Engagements were frequent, but insubstantial. Intelligence reports continued to confirm the enemy’s presence in areas accessible to the Mobile Riverine Force, but the
enemy was never entrapped in large units.

d. General. During the period 1 February 1968 to 31 March 1968, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery, utilizing A Battery in an airmobile and land-mobile configuration and B and C Batteries in a waterborne configuration, participated in 17 different operations, responded to 2567 fire missions and fired 95,514 rounds.

(1) Viet Cong ambush: On the night of 31 January 1968 and early morning of 1 February 1968, B and C Batteries and Battalion Headquarters were ambushed on the Rạch RUỘK Canal after extracting from Fire Support Bases Florida (XS990551) and Alabama (XS944503). Friendly casualties were 1 WIA from the 1097th boat company, 1 WIA artillery, and 1 KIA from naval escort.

(2) Sustained operational movement: On 12 February 1968 the Mobile Riverine Force was engaged in operations in the Ap Bac area of ĐÌNH TUÔNG Province. The barge artillery, consisting of Battalion Headquarters and B and C Batteries, had established a fire support base at the LONG ĐÌNH Bridge vicinity (XS381495). The order for extraction was issued and at approximately 1300 hours the battalion was ordered back to its base in ĐỒNG TÀN. The extraction was initiated, however prior to closing into ĐỒNG TÀN the unit was diverted and given the mission to deploy immediately to CÁN THÔ vicinity (WR850135). Resupply boats were dispatched from the column into ĐỒNG TÀN while the main body proceeded west on the MEKONG RIVER towards CÁN THÔ. A 5000 gallon diesel refueling tanker was procured and loaded on a LCM-8 boat for boat refueling while in route. The naval escort joined the artillery convoy a short time after refueling in ĐỒNG TÀN. The entire movement took approximately 30 hours and the LCM-8 boats did not experience any major maintenance problems. Water navigation especially during the night hours was no hindrance and all elements of the column remained in communications and arrived at their destination. The accomplishment of this long sustained movement without prior notice opens the possibility of supporting operations in the extreme southern areas of the MEKONG DELTA, where it would be difficult to employ regular land based artillery.

(3) Airmobility of the barge artillery. On the morning of 20 February 1968, C Battery was informed to prepare for an airmobile operation from the fire support base near the CÁN THÔ Airfield (WR853114) to PHONG ĐÌNH Province (WR947726). Airmobile
equipment to include a 1/4 ton truck and 3/4 ton trailer were flown in from DONG TAN on the evening of 20 February 1968. The battery prepared for the operation on 21 February 1968 and it was decided to lift all equipment, with the exception of the fire direction center vehicle, from the barges themselves. At 0100 hours 22 February 1968 the battalion along with both batteries (B & C) displaced from the CAN THO Airfield site and proceeded to a beaching site vicinity WR961997. This move was made for tactical reasons and to expedite the airlift by providing a shorter turn around time for the CH-47 helicopters. The battery reached in position at 0645 and was anchored by 0700. The first aircraft sortie arrived at 0710 for the battery commander and his party of 33 men. The remaining sorties arrived at 0800 hours. The battery closed into its airmobile site at 0930 hours and was completely laid and ready to fire at 1030 hours. Many problems were encountered on this first airlift such as early arrival of sorties and an occupation site which would not support the howitzer bases (a new one was selected upon arrival). The operation illustrated the versatility of barge artillery. The actual pickup of the guns and equipment was made directly from the barge decks. Initial Class V and resupply sorties were lifted off the decks of the MRB LST. The accomplishment of this airmobile mission demonstrated that deep penetrations into the MEKONG DELTA can be accomplished by airlifting artillery in the above manner.

(4) Land deployment of battalion operations centers
During the later part of March the 2nd Brigade conducted operations in DINH TUONG Province north of HØI THO. Since the maneuvering elements deployed a considerable distance inland, it was not feasible to employ the barge artillery batteries (B & C). As a result, Battery and the Battalion Headquarters and Operations Center deployed by road at dawn to the soccer field south of Tan Hiep on Route 4 (XS474551). The road march took approximately 1 1/2 hours and proceeded without incident. Duster elements (twin 40mm cannons on trucks) and quad 50 caliber machine gun vehicles were employed as FSB security along with two Platoons of infantry. Command bunkers were built. During their construction the fires of artillery from fire support bases at TAN HIEP, T.N.N and BINH PHUOC were controlled by the use of radars mounted in three 1/2 ton trucks. Headquarters 2nd Brigade was co-located with the artillery battalion headquarters.

(5) Enemy mortar attack on Brigade FSB
In the early morning hours of 9 March 1968 the Brigade and Artillery Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

and B Battery were mortared at Fire Support Base Halloran (XS576408). Two artillery breges were destroyed along with four M102 howitzers. Bravo Battery had 1 KIA and 6 WIA.

0. Tactics and Techniques. The missions assigned the Brigade during the reporting period were search and clear, search and destroy, and cordon and search missions against VC guerrilla and Main Force units within the Delta. The Mobile Riverine Force, of which the Brigade represents the Army complement, is ideally suited for its role in eliminating the enemy in the Mekong Delta. To accomplish the Brigade's assigned missions and defeat the enemy in his environment, the Brigade made maximum use of the mobility provided by the ships and boats of Task Force 117 to assure that full support for Infantry Battalions was provided during operations. Within hours of receipt of movement orders, the ships and boats of TF 117 carried the Brigade's combat and combat support elements into AO's located virtually throughout the control Delta area. Upon employment of the Infantry elements within the AO, Naval boats of the task force provided direct and indirect fires to the maneuvering elements, in addition to establishing blocking positions on waterways adjacent to the AO.

(1) Tactics. The tactics employed included reconnaissance-in-force operations (formerly titled, search and destroy), cordon and search and combat air assaults.

(a) Reconnaissance-in-force. Both battalions of the Brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance-in-force operations. When air mobile assets were available, the battalions air assaulted into multiple landing zones, and once on the ground, they began sweeping on two or more axes with a company size force on each axis. All companies were normally kept within supporting or reinforcing distance of each other. This technique of sweeping an area, provided the Battalion Commander the flexibility to reinforce, attack or encircle an enemy force once a company made contact.

(b) Cordon and search. The conduct of a joint Army and Navy cordon and search operation was one of the highlighting features of combat operations conducted during this reporting period. The characteristics of this type of operation have demonstrated a unique technique of the MRF. In addition to "sealing off" an area, the assault support patrol boats of the MRF are positioned to reinforce/support infantry elements during their search. with
both indirect and direct fires.

(c) Combat air assaults. Operations during this period continued to illustrate that aircraft assets, when readily available, may influence the course of a tactical situation. Combat air assaults complemented riverine operations and made more effective the introduction of Rapid Reaction Forces into AO's to reinforce a unit in contact, exploit the enemy situation, and established blocking positions. The Brigade also expanded its employment range within AO's by employing its elements in combat air assaults. During several operations, battalions and companies conducted riverine movement to pick-up zones (PZ's) located near accessible waterways whence they prepared for and executed airmobile assaults into the AO. The combination of riverine and airmobile deployment permitted the Brigade to introduce its fighting elements into areas where existing waterways were not navigable. Frequently, PZ's were co-located with fire support bases; from these PZ's, one battalion conducted a rapid airlift into landing zones which tactically complemented beach locations for the other battalion.

(2) Techniques.

(a) "Eagle Float" - This technique involves employing infantry elements on Armored Troop Carriers (ATC's) in waterways adjacent to and within the AO. A series of multiple insertions are made at random, and not at preselected locations, to deceive the enemy as to the true area of intended beaching (assault landing). This technique also permits the commander to exploit targets of opportunity which develop during deployment to the objective area.

(b) Another new technique which enhances the Brigade's capabilities is one which Navy boats (monitors and/or ASPB's) employ during movement of troops through waterways and canals. This technique is similar to the role armored cavalry plays in its conduct of route reconnaissance missions. It involves stationing a Riverine Assault Reconnaissance Element (BARE) in the van of convoys of troop-laden ATC's. The BARE directs reconnaissance fires into likely ambush positions and has frequently drawn enemy fires from the banks of canals being transited. Its fire power is substantial and more than adequate to suppress fires from enemy positions when and if they are detected.
AVDE-47MH-A

29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol
CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) Employment of Fire Support Bases (FSB). The artillery FSB (floating barge-mounted artillery and Forward Brigade Command Post) is always moved into its support position at the latest possible time, and its movement is planned as much as possible along routes which lead into more than one possible area of operations. The artillery fire support bases are sited where their range will provide coverage to more than one area of concentration. It is not until the actual entrance of the riverine assault craft and their embarked infantry that the enemy can be sure which force is going. The foregoing is a "technique" the refinement of which has materially helped the infantry to achieve surprise in an area of operations. When self-propelled artillery units are employed in support of the Brigade to reinforce its fires, Landing Craft Utility (LCM) are used to deploy the artillery units by riverine movement to either a FSB or to a beach site from whence the units conducts an overland movement to preselected FSB which affords coverage of the A0.

6. (c) Training:

a. During brief periods, when the Brigade rotated its maneuver battalions and/or prepared for future combat operations, training was conducted in areas demanding improvement noted during previous operations. Command emphasis was placed on small unit tactics and weaponry. All elements of the Brigade held training in care, cleaning, maintenance and inspection of the M16 Rifle. Weapon training included zeroing of individual weapons, and zeroing, bore-sighting and familiarizing firing of other organic weapons.

b. The Brigade also conducted training in "Flame" and Riot Control Agent "CS" employment techniques. Flame training was conducted to familiarize personnel with the M7A2 Portable Flame Thrower, and methods of fixing and firing thickened fuels. Training conducted on Riot Control Agent - CS employment, during tactical operations, emphasized techniques for employing the E8 (16 tube) Tactical CS Launcher and the E158 Tactical CS Cannister Cluster.

(1) Navy elements of the MAF experimented in mounting E8 Launchers on turrets of their assault boats. This technique, though not yet employed in actual combat, would complement Naval fire employed against likely ambush positions established on or near waterways. This employment technique is also capable of routing enemy forces from fortified fighting positions on or in close proximity to beaching sites.
(2) Battalion commanders and their staffs were familiarized with techniques of employing the E158 Tactical CS Cannister Cluster to complement direct and indirect supporting fires. Instructions were also presented in delivery and arming procedures. As a result of the commanders' expressed interest in this munition, E158's are prepositioned aboard the logistical ship and at the Brigade's FSB for immediate pick-up and employment.

7. (C) Logistics:

a. General. Logistics support for the 2nd Brigade is characteristic of the force which it supports. Army logistics are inseparable from Navy logistics within the Mobile Riverine Force. Overall responsibility (per Army/Navy agreement) for logistical support of the Mobile Riverine Force is with the Navy. This concept/theory and practice have come closer together through the months. The theory of naval logistics support was prompted by a desire to provide the composite (Army/Navy) strike force with regular high volume flow regardless of the location of the operating base. This theory (of maintaining a water LOC) has proved to be both an asset and a liability to the MRF. The Navy is supported by the Army through the 34th Support Group and the 1st Logistical Command at VUNG TAU. Logistics support within the 2nd Brigade is provided by a forward detachment of 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion which is located aboard the support Loading Ship, Tank (LST) within the Mobile Riverine Base, and by a detachment of the 799th Maintenance Battalion which is located aboard the USS Askari. Supplies are sent by a resupply LST from VUNG TAU to the Mobile Riverine Base located at any suitable anchorage in the MEKONG DELTA; they are then off-loaded onto the MRF's organic support LST and placed under the control of 9th S & T Detachment (Forward). By exception, the 2nd Brigade also receives support from 9th S & T Battalion at CAMP MARTIN COX. TOE items and critical shortages are obtained through S & T, directly from CAMP MARTIN COX or after subsequent shipment to DONG TAN Base. During the reporting period, almost all classes of supply were delivered from VUNG TAU by resupply LST. Several exceptions occurred which required assistance from higher headquarters to eliminate specific critical shortages in II and IV items. Fatigues and jungle boots were delivered from CAMP MARTIN COX, through DONG TAN, to the MRF to relieve critical shortages. Because of the tempo of operations during the reporting period, certain temporary shortages in Class I and Class V items occurred; these shortages were also dealt with on an exception basis.
b. During the reporting period tactical operations were intensified due to the enemy TET offensive; logistical activities increased concurrently. Greater volumes of supplies and maintenance were handled than in previous periods. Normally, approximately ten days of supplies are maintained aboard the support LST to meet requirements of the Army and Navy. This includes a three-day safety level which allows for changes or delays in the resupply schedule from VUNG Tau. The stockage objective for Class V items maintained aboard the support LST was increased by approximately 25%, and 3,249 tons of all classes of supply were handled the S & T detachment aboard the LST. Of the 3,249 tons of supplies, 2,778 tons or 85% were Class V supplies and 391 tons or 12% of the tonnage were operational Class I supplies. The massive volume of Class V consisted of nearly 60% 105mm artillery requirements for the firing batteries of the 3-34th Artillery. The remaining small tonnage consisted of Class III, II and IV items; Class III products were handled directly by the Navy. Large volumes of Class III (AVGAS and MOGAS) arrive at the MRB by the Army elements, and are issued directly to using units from floating refuelers or tankers.

c. Internal Supply and Resupply.

(1) All classes of supply are stocked on board the support LST from which the two waterborne maneuver battalions requisition through the 9th S & T Detachment. The third maneuver battalion of the Brigade also has begun to channel supplies through the LST in anticipation of the Brigade's plans for employing all three maneuver battalions with the MRB. Although supplies (TOE and individual replacement items) for this battalion have already entered into the system, Class I, III, V, and expendable II and IV daily operational items are not included. These supplies are obtained through DONG TAM.

(2) Resupply within the Brigade varies according to the operational requirements and the transportation available. Two major means were used with many variations. Basically, combat units were either resupplied by boat or by helicopter. Depending on circumstances, units were sometimes resupplied directly from the support LST by helicopter, or the supplies were pre-staged at a designated location (either by boat or helicopter) and then flown to the combat units. A combination of direct airlift from the LST and staging sites was used with success. The staging site was generally within the area of a secured Fire Support Base or at some fixed install-
AVDE-47MH-A
29 April 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (RI)

operation such as VINH 'LONG, CAN THO, or DONG TAM. Resupply boat was often augmented by use of Boston Whalers to beach supplies for waiting units. In any event, resupply by boat can be effected only if the units are located close to a navigable waterway.

d. Material and Services.

(1) Supply.

(a) Class I: A total of 346,064 meals (combat individual) were issued, reflecting a peak operational period for both Army and Navy elements. On two occasions Class I stocks of "C" rations diminished to the extent that it was necessary to obtain a resupply from the 1st Logistical Command at CAN THO and the 9th S & T at DONG TAM. Operational rations were supplemented by issue of 46,742 cans of chocolate milk and 178 "PA" sundry packs.

(b) Class II and IV: The MRF drew items of II and IV supplies from VUNG Tau, CAMP MARTIN COX and DONG TAM. The bulk of these items was obtained from VUNG Tau. A number of critical shortages in individual clothing and equipment occurred during the early phase of the reported period. However, almost all shortages had been relieved by the end of the period. Some of the shortages resulted from a heavy influx of personnel replacements in December and January. These shortages had no severe impact until local sources were depleted. The only shortages which were not completely relieved were small regular trousers, and 108 jungle boots. It is anticipated that these items will arrive near the end of this reporting period.

(c) Class III: No significant problems were encountered, although a Navy AVGAS tanker was sunk by enemy fire on 15 April. The AVGAS tanker is used to refuel Army H-23 helicopters in the area of operations to minimize "down-time" for refueling.

(d) Class V: These supplies presented no problems during the reported period. From time to time brief shortages were experienced which required assistance from 1st Log Command or 9th Division Support Command Forward at DONG TAM. Shortages were caused by higher expenditures during the VC TET offensive. Required loads were reconstituted in all cases and operations were not adversely affected.
AVDE-47mH-A
29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) Water: Fresh water is produced by chlorination and distillation processes on board each barracks ship; it is then loaded on board each Armored Troop Carrier (ATC) as a part of the basic load. Collapsible water plastic water jugs have proved useful to provide water to the troops. Also supply of water to troops using the five gallon collapsible jugs permits maximum water to be carried with minimum weight. Unfortunately, the plastic jugs often collapse under their own weight. A 2½ gallon collapsible jug would be more practical since the stress on the plastic material would be greatly reduced. The additional weight incurred would be negligible. Troops carry empty jugs which are then refilled. Presently, five gallon water cans must be used to effect resupply, due to the quantity of plastic jugs broken during the past month. If fewer jugs were broken, the weight of essential water could be greatly reduced.

(2) Services,

(a) Laundry, showers, and PX facilities are provided by each ship.

(b) Graves registration services were provided from aboard the support LST by Army personnel from the 9th S & T Battalion. During the reporting period, a shortage of reefer space developed when as many as 23 bodies were handled simultaneously. Experience indicated that two reefer spaces were required, giving the MRF a capacity of storing 10 bodies until transportation can be secured (or 20 bodies if doubled up in each reefer box for short periods). In addition to reefer space, some problems were apparent when the MRF had no organic transportation to evacuate remains to the Saigon mortuary. Headquarters IV Corps provided transportation assistance when the 2nd Brigade was OPCON to IV Corps (particularly at Can Tho). In other cases, only makeshift arrangements could be made despite assistance requested from higher headquarters. Initially transportation was provided by the Brigade utility helicopter, but the practice of providing the Brigade with a utility helicopter was discontinued early in the reporting period. Evacuation procedures were modified during this period. Initially KHAs were evacuated directly to the support LST with subsequent verification of death by a physician. Coordination for obtaining a physician to verify death became tenuous so that during the remainder of the period, KHAs were evacuated with wounded through medical channels so that death was verified by a physician. This has proved more satisfactory.
and will prevent death from being declared except by competent medical authorities.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) During the reporting period, Brigade maintenance was handled on a priority basis due to the lack of space aboard the ARL 30 (USS ASKRI). Maintenance was performed on board whenever possible but some maintenance items were evacuated to DONG Tm or CAMP MARTIN COX when space or equipment on hand precluded on board maintenance. A special solution of on-site maintenance for deadlined artillery howitzers proved useful in continuing availability of artillery despite intensified operations.

(b) Maintenance services during the reporting period were remarkably effective despite some basic problems. A limited size detachment with grossly inadequate space and certain repair parts shortages performed the herculean task of the Brigade's maintenance—including maintenance for the attached floating artillery units. The vigor of supporting elements of the 709th Maintenance Battalion characterized the maintenance effort. One notable and persistent shortage was that of repair parts for Boston Whalers. The transistorized ignition system has plagued all attempts to maintain an acceptable level of operational motors. Repair of boats and other equipment has been hampered by lack of space. Only one boat at a time can be handled because of space limitations. A floating maintenance barge was obtained, but because of its size too large it could not be towed alongside of the ARL 30 (USS ASKRI) consequently maintenance space remains a severe problem.

(4) Transportation:

(a) As a result of the Brigade's continuous operations and movement throughout the Mekong Delta, administrative transportation requirements presented a significant problem due to the absence of regular utility flights. Periodically, no or insufficient air assets were available for administrative flights. All available air assets, including command and control aircraft, utility aircraft and light helicopter companies in support of the Brigade, were used to transport personnel, equipment and mail items. All requirements were eventually fulfilled.
8. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. CA OPERATIONS. Civil Affairs activities for the MRF were planned and developed to meet the requirements and limitations imposed by the force's unique organization and method of employment. The following major activities were conducted during the period covered by this report.

(1) Disaster Relief. The MOBILITY DIVISION (MRB) was positioned on the SON GHI DIV. near the City of VINH LONG on 6 February 1968, the first day that SVN officials and US advisory personnel were able to reoccupy the city following the VC TET offensive. The MRF Civil Affairs officer contacted the Province and City GVN officials and the CORDS Province office to assist in planning for disaster relief and refugee control. It was determined that the established CORDS agencies could meet all of the immediate needs of the city of relief with the following exceptions. Additional quantity of ten medium general purpose tents were required for refugee shelter and rations were required to feed 900 persons for a period of two weeks at the VINH LONG MILPH Hospital. These items were requested from 9th Division Resources, and were received at VINH LONG within three days of the request. On 8 February 1968, one of the maneuver battalions assisted approximately 400 refugees who sought shelter on four ferryboats anchored at a safe location on the river. Medical treatment was provided for 90 patients and 850 pounds of food was distributed.

(2) MEDCAP's. The long range mobility of the MRF, combined with the fact that it is the only US maneuver force operating in this portion of the Mekong Delta, enables the force to frequently conduct MEDCAP's in locales where the population has never received modern medical or dental treatment. No attempt can be made by the MRF to establish periodic medical support for the population of any given location. However, it is felt that the political benefits gained by these operations merit their continuation even if the definitive medical benefits do not. During this period, 29 MEDCAP's were conducted treating 1885 patients.

(3) Commodity Distributions. Distributions of commodities were normally limited to foodstuffs, health items, and tools. Except in the case of minor health items distributed in conjunction with MEDCAP coordination is affected with local GVN.
officials prior to making commodity distributions. Totals of 12,793 pounds of food, 471 individual health kits, and 500 farm tools were distributed during this period.

(4) Cordon and Search. On 24 February 1968 a cordon and search operation unique to the capabilities of the MRF was conducted on CU LACO NY ISLAND, VINH LONG Province. All civilians on the island (approximately 6000 persons) were directed to move to two collection points, after which a complete search of the island was conducted by the maneuver battalions. Initial screening was conducted at these points which resulted in 433 detainees being transferred to the mainland for further interrogation. Those who remained at the collection points were provided with food and the opportunity to receive medical care, if they so desired. The MEDEVAC's and DSMC's were interested in that the people living on this island probably had never seen a doctor or dentist before (according to the Senior Sub-Sector Advisor). While the medical value of this isolated visit might be questioned, it was well received and served as a valuable indication of the friendship of US personnel.

(5) Processing Innocent Civilians. The unusual terrain of the MEKONG Delta and the unique concept of employment of the MRF necessitate the use of a converted landing craft for the Combined Tactical Screening Center (Forward Collection Point). While the overall operation of this facility is essentially an S2 function, the S5 must maintain a considerable interest in the humanitarian aspects of the operation and also avail himself of the opportunities for psychological operations. Following initial screening of detainees, the S5 assumes control of those persons declared to be innocent civilians. The ultimate goal is to return these civilians safely to their homes. However, there is a variable period of time ranging upward to several hours during which these persons must be detained for their own safety or because of a temporary lack of transportation. During this period innocent civilians are assured of fair and humane treatment through the use of signs and leaflets as well as the use of an ARVN interpreter. The detainee is made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances by providing him with adequate food, medical treatment if required, washing facilities, and individual health kits containing a toothbrush, toothpaste, comb, and soap. A tape recorder is used to provide Vietnamese and American music, which is interrupted periodically for PSYOP messages. In addition, PSYOP movies provided by JUSPRO are shown during the detainee's stay at the center. When the detainee is released in
order to be transported to the area of his home, he is given a leaflet containing one hundred piasters and a letter explaining the reasons why he had to be detained. A total of 528 innocent civilians were processed during this period.

(6) TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP). Soldiers and sailors of the MRF contributed $404.74 for disaster relief for the people of Vietnam. This project specifically concerned relief from the destruction caused during the VC TET offensive. The MRF participated in the heaviest fighting in the city of MY THO during the TET offensive and it was decided to use this money for relief projects in the MY THO area. An orphanage/school complex received heavy damage during the battle for MY THO. Prior to the TET offensive there were 25 orphans and approximately 400 other children (mainly refugees) attending this school. Currently, there are 20 orphans and only 200 refugee children attending the school. All of the money collected, as well as additional food, clothing and school supplies has been turned over to the school's officials. All facets of this project have been coordinated with local US advisory elements as the transient status of the MRF precludes its providing the constant liaison required by a project of this nature. It is anticipated that this will be a continuing project until the Vietnamese school officials become self-sufficient once again.

(7) IMPACT Teams. Enemy activities during the TET offensive damaged or destroyed many of the RF/PF outposts along Highway 4 in ĐỊNH TUONG Province. Three Improvement action Teams (IMPACT) were formed from 2nd Brigade resources to assist in the upgrading of these outposts. Each team consisted of an experienced Infantry Lieutenant and NCO. The teams deployed throughout the Province and conducted detailed surveys of each outpost. Requisitions were submitted through US channels for required barrier materials including 144,500 sandbags, 867 rolls of concertina wire, 467 rolls of barbed wire, 12,850 pickets, 1100 sheets of steel roofing, 27,706 board feet of lumber, and various munitions. The teams are currently monitoring the receipt of these supplies and assisting the RF/PF troops in constructing 49 outposts.

b. LIMITATIONS. The following limiting factors affect civil affaires operations conducted by the MRF:

(1) Transportation. Although the MRF is 100% water mobile space limitations on board the assault boats and restricted
airmobile assets reduce the effectiveness of the civil affairs effort. CA teams are normally transported throughout each operation on the medical support boat. This boat must be positioned to provide optimum support of the battalion troops in contact; this may not be the most advantageous location from a CA standpoint.

(2) Security. Most MRF operations are conducted in contested or VC controlled areas. CA teams must be provided with security forces in order to conduct their activities, which reduces the range of their operations from central locations in the battalion area of operation.

(3) Supply. CA teams are limited in the quantities of supplies which they may take into the AO. Space limitations on the medical support boats force the battalion to be exceedingly selective in supplies to accompany his team.

(4) Duration in the AO. Elements of the MRF normally remain in any given AO for one to three days. This time limitation restricts the nature of civic action projects which may be completed.

NEW OR IMPROVED PROCEDURES. As experience is gained in MRF operations and new tools become available, new and/or improved procedures are developed.

(1) Compilations of data from the Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) system are now provided on a monthly basis to the MRF by CORDS for all provinces in which the MRF operates. This data includes estimates of the status of pacification for each non-VC controlled hamlet within each district. This estimate is made by the individual best able to provide it, the District Senior Advisor. HES data is used to determine appropriate tasks to be assigned to each battalion prior to an operation. HES data gives the battalion CA officer and insight into the status of pacification within his AO prior to insertion.

(2) It is impractical for MRF CA officer to establish close liaison with GVN Province and District officials for each of the many areas in which the MRF operates. However, liaison is established shortly after insertion of MRF elements in a given Province/District. Valuable information may be exchanged in this manner without the risk of a security compromise for the operation.
A FSYOP/Civil Affairs Naval Officer was assigned to River Flotilla One in early April. Modifications to existing procedures are now being made to fully exploit the increased capabilities this organizational change has produced.

During the period covered by this report an improved storage facility was made available in the MRB for CA activities. It is now possible to maintain an adequate basic load of CA supplies within the MRB thereby increasing the capabilities of the MRF to perform civic action projects.

Increased command emphasis of civil affairs activities at all levels within the MRF has permitted quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of the overall MRF civil affairs program.

9. (C) Psychological Operations:

a. General: During the reporting period 7,492,083 leaflets were disseminated, 113 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made, 124 hours of VN radio time and 11 hours of movie time were logged in support of Brigade tactical operations. PSYOP support was directed toward Viet Cong units to decrease their effectiveness, increase their defections, and demoralize their units. PSYOP support was also directed toward civilians and detainees to explain the U.S. presence in the operational area, explain the role of the GVN, control the populace activities during operations, induce the people of Vietnam to become informers and gain support for the GVN.

b. Operations:

(1) General: The TET Offensive generally brought Brigade PSYOP activities to a halt. Six rapid reaction leaflets were immediately requested and five new tapes were developed utilizing themes suggested by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). However, there were no means available to employ the new tapes, and the requested leaflet were not available for two weeks. As a result of the TET Offensive, the Brigade's twice-weekly scheduled U-10 missions were also canceled during the first week of February. No organic aircraft were available to the Brigade for PSYOP. Navy Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB's) were used for loudspeaker missions, but the majority of combat operations were near cities, thereby reducing the effectiveness of waterborne broadcasts. It was not until 15 February, when the MRF moved...
in the vicinity of CAN THO that the Brigade PSYOP program was able to gain its momentum.

(2) Operation COMCADO XI.

(e) General: PSYOP missions in support of the Brigade's operations during Operation COMCADO XI consisted mainly of waterborne speaker broadcasts. This proved to be effective since a majority of the people live along the waterways, where most of the Brigade's operations occurred. Themes for the waterborne broadcasts were: "Explanation of U.S. Presence," "VC Desecration of TET," "NLF Suicide Missions," "Curfew Hours," "Clear the waterways," and "Search of sampans." C-47, U-10, and UHIB aircraft were used for both leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts in the area of operation. Aerial leaflet and broadcast themes were: "VC Leaders Dupe Soldiers into Killing Innocent Civilians," "NLF Suicide Attacks During TET," "Return to Your People," and "Compatriots - Did You Ask the VC to Liberate You?" Artillery was also used to employ leaflets (twice) during combat operations.

(b) On 7 February 1968 a PSYOP program was presented to detainees apprehended during Operation COMCADO XI. The Detainee Program has operated consistently since 7 February and has been integrated as a regular part of the Brigade's PSYOP program.

(c) On 21 February 1968, a rapid reaction tape was developed from interrogation of a PW captured during operation COMCADO XI and a UHIB speaker mission was flown against the 303rd MF Battalion in PHONG DINH Province vicinity 'UR7997.'

(d) On 24 February 1968, the Brigade conducted a Cordon and Search operation on CU LAO NAY Island, located just southwest of CAN THO. PSYOP support was provided with aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, aerial leaflet drops, waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts, ground loudspeaker, radio broadcasts and hand distribution of leaflets and magazines. Loudspeaker broadcast themes provided for: an explanation of the Cordon and Search operation, Chieu Hoi Appeals, and instructions to the inhabitants to evacuate the island using one of two established collection points. Leaflets were printed especially for the Cordon and Search operation and the themes were twofold: "Civilians go to Collection Points" and "VC Rally to Collection Points or Die."
AVDE-47MH-A

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

(3) Operation THUONG CONG DINH.

(a) General: During operation THUONG CONG DINH, PSYOP support consisted of Artillery leaflet drops, aerial C-47, U-10 and UH-1B loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, waterborne and ground speaker missions, detention program, and movie and radio missions. On 5 March 1968, posters were placed along Highway 25 between DONG THAP and BAO NGO offering a reward for information leading to the capture of individuals responsible for the mining of a bus carrying Vietnamese orphans.

(b) On 7 March 1968, leaflets were distributed by ground troops in houses, bunkers, and along trails in CHO GAT District, DINHA TUCG Province.

(c) On 14 March 1968, PSYOP support was provided to Navy TF 117 elements during a Riverine Armed Reconnaissance Element (RARE) mission. The object of the PSYOP support was to make a loudspeaker broadcast to induce the Viet Cong to fight or join the legal government of Vietnam (Chieu Hoi). The lead assault support patrol boat (ASPB) was broadcasting the message, as the RARE proceeded west on the SAH GING RIV, R. Approximately 1655 hours the RARE was taken under fire by the VC and one PSYOP team member was wounded in action.

(d) An Armed Propaganda Team (APT) was employed in support of the Brigade's operations in TRUC GING District, KIEN HOA Province on 7 April. On two occasions the APT was able to obtain information which subsequently led to enemy contact with two companies of the 516 Battalion. During this operation, the APT distributed leaflets in numerous villages. One of particular interest was TRUC THAN Village which is a known VC Village. Posters were placed on trees and leaflets spread around the village. Themes were: "End of VC Means Peace," "Freedom for the People," "Death of VC," "9th Division has Returned," and "9th Division will Return."

(c) Support: During the reporting period, the Brigade's psychological warfare program was conducted by an attached Field Team from the 10th PSYOP Battalion. Aircraft support (U-10 and C-47 aircraft) for aerial leaflet missions was provided by the 5th Air Commando Squadron.
AVDE-47MR-A 29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-64 (Hi)

d. Equipment:

(1) The AN/UH15 speaker set was employed extensively in ground and waterborne speaker missions.

(2) The Mobile Audio/Visual Unit (MAVU) was used to present movies aboard the detainee boat and on the ground; it was also used for radio broadcasts. On several occasions, the MAVU was employed on a limited basis for waterborne speaker broadcasts but its performance was inferior to the AN/UH15 speaker set.

e. Problem areas:

(1) Adequate resources (both organic and supporting) continues to pose difficulties in enhancing PSYOPs. Although the leaflets employed are of the highest quality, the reaction time to requests for new or other leaflets is two to three weeks from the date of requests. Several factors have definite influence on this problem; they are: frequent displacement of the MRF, telephone communications difficulties with the 10th PSYOP Battalion, and non-availability of transportation assets to effect personal liaison and direct coordination with same.

(2) Lack of PSYOP intelligence caused problems in that it was difficult to develop good themes without intelligence and an up to date area study. Much of the PSYOP intelligence received centers itself in that Northern Corps. Therefore it is completely invaluable and not suitable to Brigade’s area of operation. The Brigade received very little PSYOP intelligence from Hoi Chanh or PW’s. Limited resources make it impossible for Brigade PSYOP personnel to conduct their own interrogation.

10. (C) Chemical:

a. During the reporting period several chemical operations were initiated to complement tactical operations. All chemical operations and training were conducted under the staff supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

b. Operations conducted during the period were as follows:

(1) E158 bomblet employment: The E158 was employed against enemy fortified defensive positions to cause his abandonm...
AVDE-47HE-A
29 April 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R1)

CONFIDENTIAL

of same and/or to suppress his fires while friendly elements advanced to destroy him. The E158 was employed from UHID helicopters, with a preset altitude initiator setting of 1,000 feet; excellent target coverage was obtained.

(2) CS Persistent Bag drops: Two eight pound bags of persistent CS-1 were wrapped together with detonation cord to which a mechanical time fuse was attached. Several bags prepared in this manner were dropped from an altitude of 1200 feet to deny the enemy access to terrain; particularly in areas where they could engage the boats and ships of the MRB.

(3) CS Grenade Drops: When employment of bulk CS was not feasible and E158's were not readily available, M7A3 CS grenades were employed by air from their packing containers. Upon arrival in the target area, the containers of grenades were dropped from an altitude of 1000 to 1200 feet. The area of target coverage obtained was equivalent to that of one E158 CS Cluster.

(4) Defoliation: As a result of continuous enemy threats to engage ships of the MRB, the decision was made to defoliate the vegetation along the south bank vicinity of DONG TAM. The defoliation mission was performed by Air Force Ranch Hand Teams.

11. (C) Signal:

a. During this reporting period no major communications problems occurred. Single-Side-Band and airborne relay systems were extensively employed during the Mobile Riverine Force's transit from DONG TAM to CAN THO. The Single-Side-Band not provided the Brigade communications with ships of the NRF and the 4th Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at CAN THO. Also, during the period of transit, the Brigade utilized the Radio Wire Integration facilities at DONG TAM to communicate with the Division Forward Command Post located at DONG TAM. No significant communication problems were experienced during the conduct of all operations in the VINH LONG, MY THO and CAN THO areas. The primary means of communication was FM voice, utilizing the AN/VRC-46 radio. The Brigade and battalion's Command and Control Boats (CCB) were also employed to provide manual relay and automatic retransmission when required, but this type of capability was a minimum requirement.

b. While in the CAN THO area the Brigade's multichannel
voice communications system, AN/TRC-24 was centered in a communications terminal located at Can Tho. This terminal was provided and operated by the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division. Using this system the Brigade provided telephone service to Can Tho, Dong Tam, and Camp Martin Cox. Teletype service to Saigon, Camp Martin Cox and Dong Tam was also provided by this system. During the period when the Brigade conducted tactical operations in the Dong Tam/Ky Tho area the AN/TRC24 system was centered in a 9th Signal Battalion—Dong Tam terminal which provided the same service as outlined above with telephone service into 7th ARVN Division TOC at Ky Tho.

One innovation during the period of this report was the installation of an AB-577/G mast on the stern of the USS Benowah. A cross frame was installed on this mast to mount four RC-292 antennae, two of which are used for the 2nd Brigade’s Command Operation and Intelligence nets. The other two antennae are used by the Navy. This system is approximately 90 feet from the waterline and it increased the Brigade’s voice communications range by at least 5 kilometers.

d. Secure FM voice was provided on the 2nd Brigade’s Operation and Intellegence net from the 2nd Brigade TOC on the USS Benowah to all Battalion TOC’s, located on the APL-26 and the USS Colleton, and to the Brigade’s and Battalions’ Command and Control Boats. The Battalions’ Command and Control Boats were utilized as Forward Battalion Command Posts. The Brigade’s CCB was used mainly as a manual relay and/or automatic retransmission station. The 2nd Brigade’s Forward Command Post was located on a 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery CP Boat which housed FM voice radios, AN/VRC-46 radios, and Single-Side-Band equipment, AN/GRC-106. A KY-8 was also installed on this boat to secure voice service on the Brigade Operations and Intelligence Net.
SECTION II

Lessons Learned:

Commanders' Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. PERSONNEL: None.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:
   a. (C) Use of "CS" against bunkers.

   Observation. Employment of "CS" against fortified fighting positions caused the enemy to abandon the position and expose himself to friendly fires.

   Evaluation. During several offensive operations against well constructed/fortified fighting positions, the employment of "CS" 40mm grenades has dislodged enemy personnel from the positions when artillery and other indirect fires couldn't. This does not imply that artillery or airstrikes are not effective against well constructed fortified positions. Neither does it imply that "CS" employment is the most effective means of driving enemy forces from bunkers. The employment of 40mm "CS" grenades complemented all fires directed against the positions and caused the enemy to become confused and desperate, not only to evade the friendly forces, but also the irritant agent. The "CS" grenade employed by the 40mm grenade launcher affords commander the capability of employing "CS" at a long (300 meters) and close range. Presently the 40mm "CS" grenade is an "Insure" item.

   Recommendations.
   (1) That the 40mm "CS" grenade be classified as a "Standard" item, and a basic load be determined and issued.

   (2) Further, that during the interim period (Pending Standardization) more 40mm "CS" grenades be issued to afford maximum use.

   b. (C) Close air support observation.

   Observation. Light helicopter fire teams supporting
friendly forces in contact during hours of darkness often have difficulty in identifying friendly positions.

**Evaluation.** Units in contact during hours of darkness often fail to properly mark their position and establish communications with the light fire team providing close air support. Prior to employing light fire teams the ground force commander must mark the limits of his positions, and verify the enemy force location. In addition the light fire team should establish communications with the ground commander. All friendly units in the immediate area of contact must monitor the radio net controlling/employing close air support.

**Recommendations.** Commanders and small unit leaders should be thoroughly familiar with the ordnance capabilities of light fire teams and proper marking techniques, and if possible, that aviators be briefed on the overall tactical situation prior to establishing communications with the ground force commander. Adjustments of close air supporting fires must be made by the ground force commander.

c. (C) Employment of armed propaganda teams.

**Observation.** Armed propaganda teams enhance both psychological operations and intelligence collection efforts.

**Evaluation.** An armed propaganda team was employed in support of the Brigade during combat operations conducted in Kien Hoa Province. The team made valuable contributions not only in the PSYOP area, but also in the intelligence collection effort. On several occasions timely and accurate intelligence was provided by the team after their interrogation of local civilians. The intelligence collected resulted in the Brigade establishing contact with the enemy.

**Recommendations.** That an armed propaganda team be attached to the Brigade.

3. **TRAINING:** None.

4. (C) **INTELLIGENCE:**

a. (C) Possible Compromise of Projected Combat Operations.
Observation. Early coordination and dissemination of operation plans and orders may tend to provide the enemy with advance/adequate warning of the intended AO or target.

Evaluation. The Mobile Riverine Force operates throughout the central MEKONG DELTA as a Mobile Striking Force seeking targets developed by timely and effective intelligence. As such, the Brigade does not have a specific tactical area of operation and is therefore required to effect coordination for AOs and specified strike zones. Early coordination and dissemination of this information, prior to the commitment of friendly forces is a particular disadvantage because it allows adequate time for enemy forces to exit the area or prepare to defend against the introduction of friendly forces into the AO. In addition the desired flexibility for committing forces in any area of operation selected/designated, as a result of immediate and concrete intelligence, is unobtainable due to the coordination required.

Recommendation: None.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. (U) Use of Bandoleers for ammunition magazines.

Observation. Inadequate protection of magazines caused malfunction of M16 rifles.

Evaluation. Dirt, mud, and other inert matter accumulate in ammunition (magazine) pouches during normal field operations causing a high malfunction rate of the M16 rifle. Troops presently try to carry magazines in cotton bandoleers in order to alleviate the situation, but bandoleers are difficult to obtain and are used beyond the point of serviceability.

Recommendation. That a lightweight nylon bandoleer be issued in sufficient quantities to allow each man to carry 5.56mm magazines high on his body and completely covered. The nylon bandoleer would afford good protection from mud and dirt and would dry and drain quickly if immersed in water.

b. (U) Collapsible water jugs.

Observation. Five gallon water jugs often
collapse when filled to their capacity, by the stress endured.

**Evaluation.** The plastic collapsible water jug permits maximum quantities of fluids to be transported in a container of minimum weight. However, the weight of the water causes considerable stress on the plastic material when the jugs are filled, which in turn subsequently cause the jugs to collapse and break after frequent use. A two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity collapsible jug, made of the same composition would be more practical in terms of reducing the stress on the plastic material.

**Recommendation.** That a two and one-half (2½) gallon capacity plastic water jug be procured for field use.

c. (U) Protective cover for LAW.

**Observation.** The absence of an outer protective cover induces possible damage to, and increases the chances of malfunction of the light anti-tank weapon (LAW).

**Evaluation.** Dirt, brush and constant handling of 66mm rockets M72 (LAW) bend, breaks and fouls many of the exposed small parts of the weapon. Extension of the firing tube and actual firing become difficult and unnecessarily hazardous. Unserviceable LAW's must be destroyed thus creating great expense and loss of time.

**Recommendation.** That a high impact waterproof cover be procured to protect M72 rocket launchers.

6. **ORGANIZATION:** None.

7. **OTHERS:** None.

SECTION III WITHDRAWN, HQ, DA; CONTAINED IN DIVISION REPORT
Inclosure 6 to Section I: Improved Usage of H-BS-4 Aerial Loudspeaker System

The H-BS-4 1000-watt loudspeaker system, a standard item of issue, was modified somewhat to enable its use in different configurations. Two sets of one each amplifier and remote were mounted on plywood bases and attached to two frames, each holding one bank of speakers, which enable the use of a single bank of 250-watt speakers in a vehicular mode on two vehicles. This modification allows greater flexibility in the use of speaker systems to support ground tactical and psychological operations and nodcaps. A diagram of the system is attached as Tab 1.

The remaining 500-watt portion of the system was made into a double bank of speakers to fit on the H-23 helicopter, utilizing a U-frame and brace to fit the landing skids. The two amplifiers and remotes were originally placed in a four-sided box-like configuration which fits easily into the cockpit of the helicopter between the operator's legs, and produces excellent results. An improved version of this is being constructed at this time, consisting of two plywood bases each mounting a single remote and amplifier identical to the 250-watt configuration, mounted back to back on a wooden frame, and paralleled. A diagram of the system is attached as Tab 2.

The systems are designed so that they are, with a 15-minute preparation time, easily converted again into the original 1000-watt configuration, and ready to fit in UH-1D aircraft.

The 250-watt system, vehicular mounted, has been field tested and found extremely effective at distances of 1500 meters.

The 500-watt system, mounted on the skid of an H-23 helicopter, was tested and found to be extremely satisfactory from an altitude of 2000 feet, airing a broadcast at an angle of 45° to the ground. As time and aircraft availability permit, the system will be further tested to determine its limits and performance characteristics.
The speaker bank may be easily turned to face any direction and may be angled up or down.

hook to allow rapid connection to 1000 watt frame or 500 watt frame
The amplifier unit is hooked on one or each side then paralleled by the remotes.

- Carrying handle
- 1/4"x2"x9" aluminum bars both sides
- 2x4x2" frame
- 3" side view
- Aluminum frame
- Aluminum clamps
- Wires to inside helicopter
- 1" angle iron x8' 8"
- Frame and clamps 1/4"x2" aluminum
- Crosses under control
- Helicopter skids
- Bolts
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 9th Infantry Division (U)

Experiences of Units Engaged in Counterinsurgency Operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, 9th Infantry Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
<th>NO. OF REPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 May 1968</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>682266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER REPORT NO. (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________

** FOR OT RD # ____________________________

*** PAGE # ________________________________

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________

PAGE # ________________________________

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________

PAGE # ________________________________

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________

PAGE # ________________________________

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE ______________________________

FOR OT RD # ______________________________

PAGE # ________________________________

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310