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<td>Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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AGAM-P (M) (9 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682329 4 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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USAF Air Ground Operations School
Senior Army Representative, Ed Center, Marine Corps Develop & Ed Command
Subject: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period Ending 30 April 1968, (RCS CSFOR-65) (Rl)


Section I (c)

A. Significant Unit Activities: The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was alerted for deployment to a combat area on 12 Feb 68 and deployed from CONUS to CHU LAI, RVN. In-country orientation and training began as soon as brigade elements arrived in CHU LAI. One battalion was airlifted from CHU LAI to HUE/PHU BAi on 23-24 Feb 68 and the brigade (-) conducted a road movement to the same area eight days later. From 9 March 68, the entire brigade was involved in combat operations. This reporting period has been divided into five phases which are referred to in the various subparagraphs when applicable. The five phases are as follows:

   PHASE I - Deployment 13 Feb - 27 Feb 68
   PHASE II - In-Country Orientation/Training 18 Feb - 2 Mar 68
   PHASE III - Movement and Base Development 3 Mar - 8 Mar 68
   PHASE IV - CARENTAN I 9 Mar - 31 Mar 68
   PHASE V - CARENTAN II (CONTINUING) 1 Apr - 30 Apr 68

B. Operations

1. Phase I

   a. Mission: To deploy the brigade TF by air from Ft. Bragg, N.C. to CHU LAI, RVN.

   b. Forces: After all attachments were identified, it was decided to create five Task Forces in order to facilitate control during deployment. The brigade deployed in the following configuration and sequence:

   (1) Task Force PRIVETTE

   2nd Bn (Abn) 505 Inf  
   Bde Cmd Group  
   A/2-321 Arty  
   Plat, C/307th Engr  
   Sqd, 82d MP Co

   IFW Tm, 82d MI  
   Tm, 358th RRD  
   Tm, 82d Admin  
   TACP

   For OT RD

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   DEPARTMENT OF THE ARM
   HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
   APO San Francisco 96228

   12 May 1968
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(2) Task Force CARPENTER
1st Bn (Abn) 506th Inf
C/2-321 Arty
FlaGp/307th Engr
Sqd, 82d MP Co
TACP

(3) Task Force HALE
HHC (-) 3rd Bde, 82d Abn Div
3d Plat (-), 82d MP Co
3d FSP, 82d Sig Bn
82d MI Det (-)
Plat (-), 358th RRD
AG
SJA
ID

(4) Task Force JELINEK
2-321 Arty (-)
C Co (-), 307th Engr
B/1-17th Cav
Avn Plat, 82d Avn Bn
D/307th Med Bn
Det, 782d Field Bn
Det, 582d Sup Co

(5) Task Force JAWSON
1st Bn (Abn) 509th Inf
B/2-321 Arty
Plat, C/307th Engr
Sqd, 82d MP Co
TACP

c. General: The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div was alerted for deployment to a combat area at 121730 Feb 68. Identifying attachments presented no serious problem as they were, for the most part, the same ones that the brigade worked with during field exercises. Also, the fact that the brigade had, two weeks earlier, begun preparations for deployment during the "Pueblo Crisis" made this task easier, since the procedures were established even though actual circumstances and results differed. One example was the aircraft load tables which before had been prepared for C-130 but had to be reconfigured for C-141 aircraft. A team of specialists was dispatched from XVIII Abn Corps to assist in preparing the load tables and other related details. The 82d Airborne Division Readiness SOF was followed in the outloading as checkpoints and movement schedules were established for personnel and vehicles. The brigade was instructed to deploy at TOE strength or as near there to as possible. Fillers were received from within the division beginning on 13 Feb to meet this requirement. Unit integrity, mostly by platoon, was maintained to the greatest extent possible.

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d. Execution: Since the brigade's exact destination was unknown, the brigade commander decided to depart with the advance party, which left Pope AFB at 131900 Feb 68. The party consisted of 23 personnel including representatives from the brigade principle and special staff sections and the five main contingents outlined in para 3,1,b, above. They arrived in CHU I, I, RVN at 151100 Feb 68. The Americal Division at CHU I had not been given any prior notice of the brigade's arrival, but preparations were begun immediately for the reception of the main body scheduled to arrive approximately 24 hours later. Americal Division worked around the clock in formulating a plan for transporting, billeting, and training, plus numerous other details involved in receiving a unit of this size. The plan called for brigade elements to be initially staged separately in the 196th LIB "stand down" area and organize training packets for training at America's Combat Training Center. The billeting arrangement was primarily solved with one element moving out of the staging area for training as the next one began to arrive. This was accomplished with a minimum of crowding of the units. All the details of transportation, rationing, maintenance support, and training were outlined to each unit commander by his respective representative from the advance party. Staff briefings for each commander were given as they arrived, in order to orient them on the situation. Also during this period, brigade staff representatives were meeting with their counterparts in Americal Division to determine specific requirements for operations in RVN.

e. Deployment Data: The brigade TF arrived in CHU I, RVN beginning at 151100 Feb 68 with the advance party and closed 270800 Feb 68. The entire move utilized 160 C-141 aircraft and 6 C-133 aircraft. Bad weather and mechanical difficulties caused the aircraft to arrive at irregular intervals as well as out of sequence. Unit personnel accountability was made difficult by several instances of reshuffling personnel during forced stop overs enroute. The dates of arrival of the main contingents were as follows:

| TF PRIVETTE | 16-19 Feb 68 |
| TF CARPENTER | 19-21 Feb 68 |
| TF HALE | 20-21 Feb 68 |
| TF JELINEK | 21-23 Feb 68 |
| TF JAMESON | 23-25 Feb 68 |

The 6 C-133 aircraft were scattered throughout the deployment. They contained heavy equipment and usually 3-5 personnel. The final one arrived at 270800 Feb 68.

2. PHASE II

a. Mission: To conduct in-country orientation and training as required by USARV Reg 350-1.

b. Location: QUANG-NHAI and QUANG-TIN Provinces, RVN.

c. Concept of Operations: During this phase, all elements of the brigade completed in-country orientation and training at the America's Combat Training Center. After each battalion completed this 2 day course, they were placed OCPON to the 198th LIB for on-site training under the sponsorship of the 198th LIB battalions. Upon completion of training, the 2-505th Inf deployed north by air to vic HUE/THU BAI and operated under OCPON of the 1st Marine Division in that area. While continuing to train, the brigade (-) prepared for movement by
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road and/or air to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI.

d. Execution:

(1) Elements of the brigade attended the Americal Division Combat Training Center during the following times:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-505th</td>
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<td>1-505th</td>
<td>20-23 Feb 68</td>
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<td>22-23 Feb 68</td>
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<td>24-25 Feb 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/307th Engr</td>
<td>25-27 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(2) After completion of this two days of formalized training, each unit conducted on-site training and limited operations with assistance from elements of the 198th LIE and Americal Division.

(3) On 20 Feb 68, The 2-505th Inf moved to occupy a battalion base camp at FAT CITY (34A35079) under sponsorship of 1-56th Inf. Platoon and company size day and night operations were conducted until 22 Feb 68. At that time, the battalion was alerted for air movement north to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI beginning on 230930H Feb 68 and ending 241030H Feb 68. 1/2-321st Arty moved with the battalion and provided DS at the destination. One Platoon from C/307th Engr also accompanied the battalion. A total of 16 personal and mission essential equipment conducted the move. Approximately 55 personnel and 89 vehicles remained as the battalion rear detachment in CHU LIE. Upon arrival in the HUE/PHU BAI area, the battalion established a fire support base in the PHU BAI base defense perimeter, and conducted search and destroy operations in the immediate area under OPCON of the 1st Marine Division.

(4) The 1-508th Inf occupied a battalion base camp at LZ GATOR (35575975) under sponsorship of 1-52d Infantry. A small area of operations was assigned to the battalion and it conducted platoon and company size day and night operations from LZ GATOR during the period 23 Feb until 2 March 1968. On 2 Mar 68, the battalion began preparations for movement north to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI.

(5) Upon the departure of the 2-505th Inf, the 1-505th Inf moved to occupy the battalion base camp at FAT CITY (34A35079) under sponsorship of 1-56th Infantry. The 1-505th Inf also conducted platoon and company size day and night operations from the FAT CITY base during the period 27 Feb to 2 Mar 68. On 2 Mar 68, they began preparations for movement north to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI.

(6) The 2-321st Arty provided DS to the brigade during this training phase. 3 batteries completed training at the Americal Division Combat Training Center. On-site training was conducted under OPCON of the 1-14th Arty BN, which provided control of fires for each battery. A battery provided DS to the 2-505th Inf initially from a position at FAT CITY fire base and then moved north with the battalion and provided DS from position at HUE/PHU BAI. B Battery provided DS to 1-505th Inf from position at the FAT CITY fire base. C Battery provided DS to 1-505th Inf from position at LZ GATOR. On 2 Mar 68, began preparation for movement north to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI.
(7) During this phase all other attachments conducted training with their respective counterparts in the Americal Division. The overall evaluation of both the formalized and on-site training provided by the Americal Div was considered of the highest caliber. Cooperation with this brigade by the Americal Division was indeed exemplary in preparing this brigade for immediate combat operations. For additional information on training, see paragraph D.

3. PHASE III

a. Mission: To move the brigade (-) to a forward operational base, begin base development upon arrival and conduct operations upon order.

b. Location: QUANG-NGAI, QUANG-TIN, QUANG-NAM, THUA-T'IN Provinces, RVN

c. Concept of Operations: 3d Brigade (-) and attachments conducted an overland movement from CHU LAL, RVN to vicinity HUE/PHU RAI, RVN beginning on 3 Mar 68. Road convoys remained overnight at DA NANG and proceeded to HUE/PHU RAI the next day. Elements began base development at CAMP RODRIGUEZ (YD81747) upon arrival.

d. Execution: The Brigade (-) moved by road (Route GLI) from CHU LAL to GLI LE utilizing three separate convoys departing CHU LAL on 3, 4 and 6 Mar and arriving at GLI LE on 4, 5 and 7 March respectively. Each convoy spent one night at CAMP DAVIS (USMC FLC), DA NANG. There was no enemy initiated incident during the move. Troop transport required beyond organic capabilities was provided by the Americal Division. Upon arrival at GLI LE the Brigade began base development of CAMP RODRIGUEZ (named in honor of Staff Sergeant Jose Rodriguez, Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 505th Infantry, who was killed by a booby trap in the vicinity of FAT CITY to become the first KIA of the 3d Brigade).

During the remainder of this phase, brigade elements conducted limited operations and secured their assigned sector of the brigade base defense perimeter. The 2-505th Inf returned to brigade control at 051600H Mar 68 and prepared to move to and develop LZ PANTHER at vicinity of YD795172. The brigade became OPCON to the 101st Abn Div effective 082400H Mar 68 and prepared to initiate operations in CAIENT: N I. See Inclosure 2 for brigade AO prior to beginning Operation CARENT: N I.

4. PHASE IV (Operation CARENT: N I) For clarity, CARENT: N I has been divided into 4 parts as follows:

Part 1 - 9 Mar to 11 Mar 68
Part 2 - 12 Mar to 19 Mar 68
Part 3 - 20 Mar to 27 Mar 68
Part 4 - 28 Mar to 31 Mar 68

a. Part 1: See Inclosure 3

(1) Mission: To initiate search and clear operations in AO's FRENCH and B.S5 and prepare for operations in AO CoR. Provide security for major routes in assigned AO and sensitive areas in CQL CO BEACH and HUE area. Upon order, provide security for Highway #1, both banks of SONG HUONG (FRENCH) River and rock quarry.

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(2) Locations: THUA-THIEN Province, RVN.

(3) Concept of Operations: All initial operations and troop deployment were undertaken with the primary objectives of providing immediate external security for the installations at CAMP EAGLE until such time as the occupants had prepared their own defensive system. This task included not only the occupation, by combat units, of commanding terrain to the west of CAMP EAGLE, but also the conduct of search and clear operations through known and suspected enemy locations between Highway 1 and the CAMP EAGLE/GT LE complex. Other primary objectives include COL CO BEACH, designated bridges and installations in and around HUE, designated bridges along Highway 1 and 551, the pontoon bridge near the rock quarry (YD755144), and the rock quarry fire base (YD746130), preparing for thorough search and clear operations throughout the western portion of the AO, with emphasis on NVN approaches to HUE from the south.

Upon completion and initiation of the aforementioned tasks, operations north of Highway 1 were to be initiated in coordination with RVN elements. Simultaneously, responsibility for the defense of the fixed locations in sector would be progressively turned over to indigenous military forces, as they became available.

(4) Execution: The 2-505th Inf was responsible for the external security of CAMP EAGLE, the conduct of operations to the north of CAMP EAGLE, and the opening of the 1/101 HNS in sector. The 1-505th Inf reinforced with B/1-17th Cav was responsible for all fixed locations and maintenance of security along Highways 1 and 551. The 1-508th Inf occupied the highground at YD775177 (LZ DEVIL) and began road clearing and recon in force operations in AO DASS with emphasis on infiltration routes and lines of communication into HUE.

b. Part 2: See Inclosure 4

(1) Mission: To initiate recon in force operations in adjusted AO. Provide security for major routes in AO and sensitive areas in COL CO BEACH and HUE area. Provide security for Highways 1 and 551 and security for road/bridge repair work and pipeline installation crews during daylight hours.

(2) Execution: The 1-505th Inf provided security for fixed locations, Highway 551, and COL CO BEACH in AO CAD. On 12 March, the battalion displaced to a new fire base vicinity YD730270 (LZ DETROIT) and began recon in force and cordon and search operations in AO CAD. The 2-505th Inf continued with the same general operations outlined in part 1 above. The battalion developed a new fire base (LZ PANTHER) vicinity YD768167 from which to conduct operations. They conducted recon in force and cordon and search operations in AO BEACH in addition to security missions throughout this period. The 1-508th Inf developed a fire base (LZ DEVIL) on highground vicinity YD775177, provided bridge and ramp security in the vicinity of HUE, and initiated recon in force operations in AO B SS. C/307th Engr provided mine sweep/demolitions teams to the maneuver battalions for sweeping and clearing roads in their respective AO's. The battalion AO's were adjusted slightly on 16 Mar 68 (Inclosure 5).

c. Part 3: See Inclosure 6
(1) Mission: To continue recon in force operations in assigned AO and provide security for major routes in assigned AO and sensitive areas in COL CO BEACH and HUE area. Initiate 2 battalion (-) search and clear operations.

(2) Concept of Operations: This part of the overall brigade undertaking called for a step-up in operations in the northeastern part of the brigade AO. The 1-505th Inf was to continue security of route 551 and sensitive areas in COL CO BACH and conduct an overland assault to search and clear assigned objectives. The 2-505th Inf with 1 platoon of NIFF was to continue operations in southern portion of AO PERCH and conduct an overland assault to search and clear assigned objectives and establish a blocking position for the 1-505th (-), B/1-17th Cav and Mechanized Platoon from B/2-17th Cav were OPCON to 2-505th Inf and were to provide security for the left flank. The 1-508th Inf was to continue its present missions in AO BASS and provide 1 company as RF for the operation.

(3) Execution: Beginning 20 Mar 68, A and C companies, 1-505th Inf moved east on Highway 552 and made heavy contact vicinity TDF 17247. C Co was unable to advance, and moved to the rear of A Co, crossed the canal south of Highway 551 and again received heavy fire. Contact continued throughout the day, then both companies broke contact and returned to their CP's. During the afternoon of the 20th, B Company (-), 1-508th Inf was placed OPCON to the 1-505th Inf. A Co 1-505th Inf and S Co (-) 1-508th Inf continued operations in the same area until 23 Mar 68 against enemy dug in along a line of camouflaged trenches parallel to the canal south of Highway 552. Airstrikes, artillery, and gunships supported this 3 day operation and destroyed most of the enemy fortifications.

4. Part 4: Inclosure 7

(1) Mission: To continue operations in assigned AO and assume responsibility for 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div AO.

(2) Attachments: 1-501st Inf OPCON to Bde effective 292400H Mar 68; 5th NIFF OPCON effective 270800H Mar 68.

(3) Concept of Operations: 3d Bde with 4 battalions conducted recon in force and cordon and search operations and continued security, road clearing, and convoy escort missions in assigned/adjusted AO.

(4) Execution: 1-501st Inf conducted extensive recon in force operations in AO Trout with priority initially to area north of SONG BA and west of PERFUME Rivers, cleared and secured Highway #1 in sector, secured AN LO bridge (YD623502) and provided convoy escort on Highway #1 when required. Battalion continued OPCON to bde into CARNIVEL II. 2-501st Inf was OPCON to Bde for 3 days and conducted recon in force operations in AO TROUT. The 1-505th Inf continued previous operations in AO CALL with initial priority to recon in force operations to area south of Route 552, and prepared to displace to new fire base for beginning of operation CARNIVEL II. The 1-508th Inf continued security missions and recon in force operations in AO BASS with emphasis on infiltration routes and lines of communications into HUE and area vic LZ PINKY (YD689254). On 29 Mar 68, 1-508th Inf conducted a 2 company heliborne assault and cordoned 2 villages vicinity TD7730 while 5th NIFF conducted a search.
5. PHASE V (Operation CARIBUAN II continuing) There was no break between CARIBUAN I and CARIBUAN II with the general concept of operations remaining the same. There was a gradual shift of the brigade AO to the south and west and battalion AOs were changed or adjusted accordingly. See Inclosures 8-12.

   a. Mission: To continue static security of critical areas, road clearing, convoy escort missions, and to orient recon in force operations toward enemy infiltration routes and lines of communication into the HUE area.

   b. Concept of Operations: The brigade retained OPCON of the 1-501st Inf until 14 Apr 68. The battalion conducted recon in force and security missions generally north of HUE in AO TRAUTH. The 3 organic battalions of the brigade continued primary missions of recon in force, road clearing and security in assigned AOs. They displaced to new operational bases as their AOs were changed or situation required. There were 5 changes in brigade and/or battalion AOs during this period. See Inclosures 8-12.

   o. Execution:

   (1) On 1 Apr 68, the 1-505th Inf was relieved in place by 1-27th Mar at LZ DETAIL (YD7827) in AO CARP and moved to LZ SILLI (YD640275) to begin operations in new AO CTFISH. Activities during the period 1-13 Apr 68 included a company heliborne assault to vicinity YD85289 for a recon in force operation, and similar operations in coordination with NFFF units. From 14-17 Apr 68, the battalion was OPCON to the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div in coordination with 1-501st Inf which also operated from LZ SILLI until termination of OPCON to Bde on 14 Apr 68. When the 1-505th Inf returned to brigade control on 17 Apr 68, it displaced to LZ GERONIMO (YD694204) and relieved the 1-508th Inf of HUE security.

   (2) The 2-505th Inf continued security, road clearing, and recon in force operations in assigned AO throughout this period. Significant operations included a 2 company heliborne assault on 6 Apr 68 to vicinity YD796070 for a recon in force, and numerous operations in conjunction with NFFF units. On 17 Apr 68, the battalion moved to LZ BOYD (YD7413) and on 20 Apr 68, a company conducted a heliborne assault to vicinity YD696076 for a recon in force to the south.

   (3) The 1-505th Inf moved its operational base three times during this period. On 1 Apr 68, it moved from LZ DEVIL (YD672226) to LZ GERONIMO (YD690203) and continued security of HUE and recon in force operations in assigned AO B. On 17 Apr 68, it was relieved in place by the 1-505th Inf at LZ GERONIMO and displaced to LZ BENNINGHAM (YD705102) to begin operations in new AO BLACK.

   (4) D/1-17th Cav continued to provide convoy escorts, reaction forces as required, and security for designated sites in brigade AO. On 17 Apr 68 the troop assumed responsibility for AO YULLU and began recon in force operations to deny enemy movement within AO.

   (5) The 3d Bde during this operation continued to sweep and secure the main routes in assigned AO. This was done by nine-sweep teams attached to the maneuver battalions from the D/307th Engr. Roads were generally cleared each morning by 0830 hrs. There was a marked decrease in the number of mines and booby-trapped roadblocks encountered as the operation progressed. This was contributed to the errorless discovery of these obstacles by the teams coupled with numerous night ambushes established by the battalions in their assigned sectors.

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C. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

1. When the brigade first began combat operations in the vicinity of HUE, the maneuver battalions were given relatively small areas of operations. These were gradually expanded and adjusted as the situations changed. The method of operation was the establishment of battalion size firebases and the conducting of recon in force operations from these bases. Air mobile assaults of varying size (the largest being 2 companies) were conducted by the battalions to exploit the enemy situation. These usually were recon in force operations from the LZ along a predesignated route. Frequently, this predesignated route would be altered to react to intelligence leads. These operations usually lasted from two to four days. In addition, the brigade maintained the flexibility of supporting and/or reinforcing units by cross attaching, extracting and inserting units within the brigade AO.

2. On one occasion the 1st BN (Abn) 505th Inf, in conjunction with the 12th Coastal Group (RN) and the River Patrol Boat Command (USN), conducted an amphibious operation using motorized junks which have a capacity of approximately 45 US troops. This means of transportation proved effective when helicopters were not available.

3. The requirement to secure fire support bases with combat troops combined with the numerous static and route security missions within the AO resulted in each infantry battalion having no more that two companies available for offensive operations at any one time, and it became readily apparent that a 4th Rifle Company is mandatory. The battalion commanders, however, devised various means to make maximum utilization of forces available. The 1-505 created a 60 man "Delta Company" using the Recon Platoon (dismounted) and augmenting it with elements from headquarters company and the line companies. The 2-505 organized a "Strike Force" of 40 men using the Recon Platoon and AT Platoon (both dismounted). The 1-505 cross attached Recon and AT sections to form two balanced "Panzer" Platoons.

4. In an effort to take the night away from the enemy, the elements of this Brigade utilized small unit night ambushes in conjunction with company night defensive positions (NDP). As a matter of policy the units always closed their final NDP's and ambush sites after the hours of darkness. Night ambushes were most successful along major streams. While operating in the coastal lowlands of the VUNG District the 1-505th Inf utilized platoon size hunter/killer teams which conducted night patrols as a technique to protect the JTF pipeline and route 551. These mobile Platoons, accompanied by two to four Popular Force Guides, moved with relative ease on routes adjacent to the pipeline and route 551.

III. TRAINING

1. The majority of this period was spent in the conduct of combat operations. However, Phase II was used primarily for the in-country orientation and training required by USARV. Personnel from all units attended the Americal Division Combat Training Center. This training was of the highest professional caliber and consisted of 2 days of thorough instruction. The instruction included the following:
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<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Geneva Convention</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>Geneva Convention as it applies to U.S. Army in RVN; handling of VC's and detainees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security and Sentry Duty</td>
<td>¼</td>
<td>VC tactics and techniques concerning sabotage, espionage, pilferage and terrorist activities; sentry duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Sanitation, Combat First Aid</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>Field sanitation, prevention of disease, battlefield police, construction of latrines and garbage sumps, mosquito control, malaria prevention and water purification, basic lifesaving techniques, type wounds, snake bites, disease, heat exhaustion, evacuation of wounded, and the use of morphine and other drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive and Defensive Tactics</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>Introduction to VC/NVA offensive and defensive tactics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons Familiarization and Zeroing</td>
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<td>Rifle zeroing; M16; M79 grenade launcher; M60 machinegun, Familiarization firing.</td>
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<td>Mech Tng, Care and Cleaning, M16 Rifle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Characteristics, nomenclature and employment of weapons; proper procedures in care and cleaning equipment, and FM indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Safety</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>Safety procedures with small arms, grenades and demolitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Safety</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>Safety procedures with small arms, grenades and demolitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines and Booby Traps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Characteristics, casualty producing effect, employment, detection and comparison of US and NVA mines and booby traps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Procedures and Safety</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>Convoy procedures; vehicle safety; accidents; injuries; fatalities and accident prevention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is

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SUBJECT
Mines and Booby Traps
Confidence Course

HOURS
2

SCOPE
FB requiring students to negotiate a confidence course marked with trail markers; avoidance, detection and destruction techniques; mines; booby traps; bunkers and other emplacements.

Claymore (M81)

1

Characteristics, safety employment, firing demonstration of M81 Claymore.

M26 and M33 Grenades

1

Characteristics, safety, casualty producing effects and employment.

2. In addition to the above training, brigade units and staff sections coordinated with their counterparts in Americal Division and 198th LIB. The maneuver battalions under their respective sponsors received on-site training such as:

a. Ambush training to include demonstrations of rehearsal and conduct of an ambush. Ambush tips.

b. Techniques of night logger for sqd, plat, and company. Use and preparation of decoys.

c. Movement and conduct of atk against fortified positions.

d. Rules of engagement.

e. Helicopter load training with emphasis on types of loads, .22 bags and sling techniques.

3. The 2-321st Arty Bn was briefed by the staff of the 1-14th Arty Bn on artillery and mortar ground rules and procedures for obtaining military and political clearance. Control of fires for their batteries was provided by the 1-14 Arty. All brigade staff sections were instructed in reporting procedures and requirements peculiar to their respective sections.

3. OPERATIONS PUBLICATIONS: The following operations publications were published during the reporting period. The brigade was called upon to execute its Readiness SOP in the deployment to RVN.

1. Letter of Instruction, 3d 3de TF DDF Exercise data 13 Feb 68. This LCI covered additional details on outloading procedures and equipment requirements that were changed or were not covered in the ASOF. It also included the task organization for the deployment, an aircraft commanders checklist, and unit Force Requirement Numbers.
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2. Letter, SUBJECT: In-Country Orientation and Training Assistance Program, dated 18 Feb 68. This letter covered details for bde elements attending Americal Division Combat Training Center and subsequent on-site training sponsorship. It included a program of instruction and a schedule of attendance for the various units.

3. Movement Order 1-68 (U) dated 270001H Feb 68. This order was published when the brigade at CHU LAI was alerted for air movement to a forward operational base. It was published but was never executed as such, but the basic concept was used in FRAGO 1 below.

4. FRAGO 1 to Movement Order 1-68 (U) dated 021600H Mar 68 covered the road and air movement of the brigade (-) to a forward operational base vicinity HUE/PHU BAI, RVN. It established Serials and March Units and gave detailed instructions for convoy movement, control, and security.

5. Operations Overlay to Verbal Order 1-68 (U) dated 071200H Mar 68 covered the initial employment of the brigade in the HUE/PHU 3.1 area. See Inclosure 2

6. OCPORD 1-68 (U) dated 091700H Mar 68 initiated operations under OPCON of the 101st Abn Div and assigned AO's and missions to units. See Inclosure 3.

7. FRAGO 1 to OCPORD 1-68 (U) dated 111700H Mar 68 covered slight adjustment of brigade and battalion AO's and assigned additional missions to units. See Inclosure 4.

8. FRAGO 2 to OCPORD 1-68 (U) dated 162000H Mar 68 changed 1-505th Inf and 2-505th Inf AO boundaries. See Inclosure 5.

9. OCPORD 2-68 (U) dated 191600H Mar 68 covered overland assault of 1-505th Inf and 2-505th Inf in northeastern part of bde AO. See Para 3 (Phu SE IV, Part 3) and Inclosure 6.

10. OCPORD 3-68 (U) dated 271200H Mar 68 covered OPCON of 1-501st Inf and AO boundary and mission changes. See Inclosure 7. FRAGO 1 was never published.

11. FRAGO 2 to OCPORD 3-68 (U) dated 311800H Mar 68 covered adjustment of AO boundaries, movement of battalions to new fire bases and assigned priority areas for recon in force operations. See inclosure 8.

12. FRAGO 3 to OCPORD 3-68 (U) dated 021200H Apr 68 adjusted AO boundaries of the battalions and defined additional security requirements. See Inclosure 9.


14. OCPORD 4-68 (U) dated 151600H Apr 68 adjusted AO boundaries and assigned new AO's to battalions. Designated 1-505th Inf OPCON to 2/101 from 141500H - 171200H Apr 68. Also assigned AO to B/1-17th Cav. See Inclosure 11.

15. FRAGO 1 to OCPORD 4-68 (U) dated 171430 Apr 68 adjusted AO boundaries and assigned LAV responsibility for AO to 1-17 PANTHER II. See Inclosure 12.

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F. ORGANIZATION

See Inclosure 1.

G. INTELLIGENCE

1. PHASE I: Prior to the alert, the brigade S-2 section consisted of two newly commissioned 2LT's, assigned as S-2 and assistant S-2. The intelligence and assistant intelligence sergeant positions were occupied by experienced NCO's with a SP4 assigned as clerk/driver. Following alert notification, the section was augmented by the addition of a captain (RN returnee) assigned as brigade S-2 from the 82d Abn Div G-2 staff. Actions upon notification of an immediate deployment included establishing liaison with two intelligence organizations designated to accompany the brigade, i.e., the 82 MI Detachment and the 358th RRD. These organizations provided necessary information to ensure essential personnel and material were available for orderly, efficient deployment. The decision was made to follow the division and brigade Readiness SOP allowing elements designated DRF (Division Readiness Force) components to accompany the DRF until after arrival at the then unannounced destination. The main body manifested for travel with HHC, 3d Bde. Due to the lack of information concerning both the destination and tactical disposition of our anticipated landing sites, personnel were included in the advance party. Consequently, the brigade S-2 and the assistant intelligence sergeant arrived in RVN on the first aircraft of the brigade task force.

2. PHASE II: On arrival in RVN, an immediate intelligence gathering effort was initiated by the S-2 and assistant intelligence sergeant to provide a data base covering hostile operations and possible deployment areas. Liaison effected with the G-2 staff of the Americal Division proved to be of great value during initial orientation. Remaining personnel of the section closed with the section on subsequent airlifts. The intelligence sergeant remained behind initially. Due to his experience and position as alternate classified material custodian, the intelligence sergeant was able to sign over material and close out the staff section in a minimum time period and quickly rejoined the section. This technique worked quite well. The brigade S-2 staff was co-located with the 198th LIB of the Americal Division. This period enabled the section to orient themselves, reorganize, and learn the essential procedures required to move north and operate in the HUE/PHU BAI area.

3. PHASE III: The brigade base moved from CHU LAI to vicinity HUE/PHU BAI. In preparation for the move, the S-2 staff first determined route, destination, method of transport, and ETA at the new location. The brigade S-2 and OB officers then made several trips to the new area for the purpose of gaining specific intelligence concerning routes, hostile activity, and proposed base camp sites. Coordination was effected with III MAF, 101st Abn Div, and MACV Forward. The information thus obtained, enabled the section to assemble an intelligence study concerned with routes and base development. The early trips and personal contact with other agencies assisted greatly in establishing the intelligence gathering network.

4. PHASE IV: Operation CARENTAN I was characterized by numerous small contacts throughout the area of operations. Several instances of road mining and vehicle ambush took place. Mines were placed off main roads in soft soil from
road construction. Vehicle ambushes generally occurred with convoys of four (4) or less vehicles. Hostile forces seemed to prefer the use of B-40 rockets employed against single or lead vehicles. The technique was employed in villages and roadways with the B-40 gunner suddenly appearing from a doorway or other place of concealment and discharging his weapon at ranges of thirty (30) feet or less. The RPG position is generally supported by 1 to 3 riflemen and 1 automatic weapon. Primary concern during operation CAPNTAN I was given over to thwarting enemy attempts to conduct a second HUZ offensive. In this vein, intelligence assets concentrated on discovery of hostile supply routes, assembly areas, and avenues of approach. Company and larger size aggressor units were plotted throughout the area of interest (AI). Response to this intelligence resulted in heavy artillery H & I programs on FSR's and assembly areas. Enemy retaliation was directed at friendly artillery positions and landing zones utilizing rocket and mortar attacks. Enemy units identified in contacts were:

- 90th Regiment 324B Division (NVA)
- 803d NVA Regiment 1st Bn
- 29th NVA Regiment 7th, 8th and 9th Bn's
- 812th NVA Regiment 4th Bn
- Tri Thien Control Group
- 4th NVA Regiment

5. PHASE V: Due to enemy attempts to maneuver into attack positions on HUE City, contacts during operation CARENTAN II were characterized by battalion size elements notably in vicinity YD6298 and via YD6292. Numerous small contacts continued throughout the AO. Operations strove to contain enemy units and disrupt supply routes. Fire Support Bases were emplaced along Hwy 547 to interdict supply routes and block the northeastern exit of the ASHAU VALLEY. Search and destroy operations conducted from the FSB's have resulted in discovery of caches and clandestine NVA mass grave sites in addition to interdicting NVA route 12 i.e., Hwy 547 in itself an enemy MSR. Location of the FSB's have resulted in curtailment of hostile activity along the principle rivers (SONG TA TRACH and SONG HUU TRACH) which were used during the TET offensive. Retaliation of enemy forces was again characterized by rocket and mortar attacks, this time directed at the FSB's as well as artillery and aircraft storage sites. Heavy artillery H & I concentrations have been placed south of YD10 along food supply routes with the result that POW'S taken in recent contact have been relatively well clothed and armed, however were noticeably lacking in food and medical supplies. This would seem to indicate that resupply of fighting equipment was accomplished using prepared caches while more perishable items are being restocked with difficulty, indicating successes of interdiction. Notable enemy additions in battle capability are the capture of small artillery pieces of 37mm, 76mm, and the discovery of tracked and wheeled vehicles apparently driven out of the Ashau Valley by the advance of free world forces. Enemy contacts reveal no new units at this time; reinforcements being directed toward identified units.

6. The following is a recapitulation of enemy losses per PHASE for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE I &amp; II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>PHASE V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (C)</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>87/22</td>
<td>101/278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (G)</td>
<td>20/0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA: PW</td>
<td>6/0</td>
<td>5/7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
b. Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE I &amp; II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>PHASE V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wpns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S Wpns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. PERSONNEL.

1. The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div deployed from Ft. Bragg, N.C. to RVN with a total of 3,650 personnel. This included 247 officers, 23 warrant officers and 3,380 enlisted men, and was 99.4% of the authorized strength.

2. The authorized strengths of the brigade units are as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505th Inf</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508th Inf</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505th Inf</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-521st Arty</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Trp, 1-17th Cav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/307th Engr</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/307th Med</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The assigned strengths of the brigade units at the close of the reporting period are as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505th Inf</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505th Inf</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508th Inf</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-321st Arty</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Trp, 1-17th Cav</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/307th Engr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/307th Med</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The present for duty strength of the brigade units at the close of the reporting period are as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505th Inf</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505th Inf</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508th Inf</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-321st Arty</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Trp, 1-17th Cav</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/307th Engr</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/307th Med</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
5. Casualties: As a result of hostile action, the following casualties were reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KH</th>
<th>NSA</th>
<th>PHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. As a result of non-hostile action, the following casualties were reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KND</th>
<th>NBI</th>
<th>DIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Personnel Programs:

a. Awards and Decorations: Recommendations for the following awards and decorations were submitted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>AM &quot;V&quot;</th>
<th>AM &quot;V&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Postal Activities: There was a total of 1,132 sacks of parcels and letters received by the servicing APU, and a total of 684 sacks of parcels and letters dispatched during the reporting period. Money orders sold during the reporting period totaled $223,515.75.

c. Red Cross Services: There were 322 cases served by the Red Cross representative with the following breakdown:

1. Emergency leaves 42
2. Health and welfare 192
3. Request for report on SM 85
4. Reports to assist CO 3

7. Staff Judge Advocate: a. During the reporting period the following courts martial were tried:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Special</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The brigade processed 24 Article 15's.

c. The SJA completed action on 64 Congressional Inquiries.
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d. The SJA legally assisted 217 individuals during the reporting period.

8. Chaplain Activities: The brigade chaplains conducted the following services:

a. Protestant
   Attendance: 4,773

b. Catholic
   Attendance: 77

9. Public Information Officer: During the reporting period, 600 hometown releases were processed, but all were returned due to the embargo put upon the brigade. 28 news stories were released of which 5 were published.

10. Commanders and principle staff:

Brigade CO         COL Alexander R. Bolling, Jr.
Brigade XO         LTC James R. Belan
Brigade SI         MAJ Ronald G Holly
Brigade S2         CPT Harold Moore
Brigade S3         MAJ Kerwin D. Llewellyn
Brigade S4         MAJ John L. Lorns
Brigade S5         CPT Wesley W. Ford
1-505 Inf         LTC John G Jameson Jr
2-505 Inf         MAJ Jake Privette
1-508 Inf         LTC Arch S Carpenter
2-321 arty        LTC Howard C Jolinek
B/1/17 Cav         CPT Dennis P Malcor
C/307 Engr        CPT John D. MacMillen
D/307 Med         CPT Armand J Yelle
HHC, 3d Bdc       2LT David R. E. Hale

I. LOGISTICS

1. PHASE I: Upon notification of deployment to Viet Nam, the following actions were taken:

a. All personnel were issued Jungle Fatigues and boots, Ruck Sacks, Mosquito bars, and other tropical items.

b. Shortages of major items of equipment and other TO&E equipment were submitted to Division. These shortages were replaced by Division and all items that were outdated and would not be repaired before deployment, were also replaced.
c. Shortages of M50-901 were submitted and before the units deployed those shortages were replaced by Division.

d. All new M26 rifles were issued. Those rifles contained the new buffers and the chrome-plated barrels.

e. All winter equipment was turned in.

f. A seven day supply was issued prior to deployment.

g. Basic load of small arms ammo was issued and vehicles deployed with 1/2 tank of fuel.

h. The quantities of repair parts on hand in the 782nd Forward Support Platoon were increased from Division assets.

2. PHASE II:

a. During this period, all logistical support came from the Americal Division except for repair parts. The 782nd Forward Support Platoon utilized most of the repair parts they deployed with in maintaining the vehicles and equipment.

b. During this period, the remaining portion of the Class V was drawn to bring the Brigade up to a full basic load.

3. PHASE III:

a. Transportation for the move to GIA LE Combat Base was provided by organic assets augmented by transportation from the Americal Division.

b. Units carried a five day supply of "C" rations, a basic load of small arms ammunition and a somewhat reduced load of other Class V.

c. Upon arrival in the GIA LE area, logistical support was received as indicated below:

   (1) CLASS I - FLSG-A provided all CLASS I on a supply Point distribution basis.

   (2) CLASS II & IV - Fast moving items were provided by 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division's Forward Support Element. The majority of items were provided by FLSG-A.

   (3) CLASS III - All types of CLASS III were provided by FLSG-A initially and then by Task Force Lane.

   (4) CLASS V - Provided by FLSG-A.

   (5) MEDICAL TREATMENT & EVACUATION: Provided by D Company 307th Medical Battalion and 22nd Surgical Hospital.

   (6) BATH & LAUNDRY SERVICES: Provided by 1st Logistical Command.
(7) OVERVIEW: Provided by 1st Logistical Command and 22nd Surgical Hospital.

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. MATERIAL & SERVICES: All classes of supply were provided by the Airlift Support Command, 101st Airborne Division on a supply point distribution basis.

(1) TRANSPORTATION:

(a) C-123 & C-130 provided the majority of the airlift support from Bien Hoa to Hue/Fu Bai airfield. CH-47's and UH-1D's were utilized to supply the units in the field. Helicopter assets from the 101st Airborne Division were used to augment the brigade's organic transportation.

(b) LAND: Numerous major convolys were conducted from Da Nang to C. Rod to Hue carrying all classes of supply. In addition land convoy was the major means of resupplying the battalion's fire bases. Total miles driven for the reported period were 366,629.

(c) SEA: LST's were utilized to move the brigade rder from Chu Lai to Bien Hoa to ship the remainder of the brigade's vehicles from Chu Lai to Da Nang. A total of 3 LST's were used during the reporting period.

(2) MAINTENANCE: Maintenance was provided by the 782d Forward Support Platoon and the 801st Maintenance Battalion, 101st Airborne Division. Contact teams were sent out on a daily basis to oversee the maintenance of vehicles and equipment. Equipment was repaired as far forward as possible and evacuated to 801st Maintenance Battalion as needed. No major maintenance problems occurred during the reporting period.

(3) MEDICAL EVACUATION & TREATMENT: D Company 307th Medical provided medical treatment and evacuation. Initial treatment was given at company level by aid men. Severe casualties were evacuated by Medevac aircraft and organic helicopters.

(4) BATH & FACILITY SERVICES: Were provided by the 1st Logistical Command at CL. LE Combat Base.

(5) GRAVES REGISTRATION: Was provided by the 22nd Surgical Hospital.

b. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

(1) 582d Supply Platoon: Received, stored and issued all classes of supply except CLSS I & V. They also received, consolidated, and submitted requisitions for all units.

(2) 782d Forward Support Platoon: Provided a repair capability for all automotive, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster and signal items.

(3) D Company 307th Medical Battalion: Provided clearing station facilities including surgical, dental, holding and emergency treatment section.
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c. The unit supply system was used by all subordinate battalions for all classes of supply.

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. The S-5 section was established on 11 Mar 68 and immediately became involved in CARENT.N I and CARENT.N II. Civil Affairs activities were undertaken in PHU VANG, HUONG TRU, HUO NOI, TROM THUY, and HUO HO Districts. The brigade S-5 was mainly concerned with the following categories: projects for community welfare; radical attention and assistance through MEDCFS.

2. The type and amount of supplies distributed during the quarter is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oatmeal</td>
<td>3700 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>4300 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornmeal</td>
<td>500 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgur Wheat</td>
<td>200 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean Oil</td>
<td>2500 lbs (50 x 6 gal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scap</td>
<td>280 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothbrushes</td>
<td>150 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothpastes</td>
<td>150 tbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Bags</td>
<td>100 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Kits</td>
<td>180 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies</td>
<td>12,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Repair of schools and other public buildings; In all cases construction supplies were obtained through CORD; transportation was provided by the 3d Brigade, and Vietnamese provided the labor. Materials provided included:

a. 1,370 sheets of Aluminum.

b. 23,600 lbs of cement.

4. Projects for Community Welfare:

a. 1,100 lbs of cement donated to the people of TP N HOA village for repair of their homes damaged during the TET offensive.

b. 20 tons of harvested rice were transported for farmers of NAM HOA District.

5. Medcaps: 22 planned MEDCAPS were held in which approximately 2,100 people were treated. In addition, numerous small, on-the-spot MEDCAPS were conducted by individual medics. Often MEDCAPS were held in conjunction with PSYOP and/or intelligence programs.

6. In addition to the above mentioned areas, medical evacuation assistance was provided for 7 children in the TP N HOA village area (TROM TH District) who were wounded in a VC attack.

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K. MEDICAL

1. PHASE I
   a. General: When the brigade task force was alerted for deployment on 12 Feb, Company D, 307th Medical Battalion and all organic battalion medical platoons were brought to full strength in both personnel and equipment from resources within the 82d Airborne Division (with the exception of one surgeon from Womack Army Hospital).

   b. Specific medical staff actions:
      (1) Immunization records for all deploying personnel were reviewed and shots administered as required.
      (2) All personnel with temporary physical profiles were re-examined by a surgeon to determine if they were qualified for duty in SE Asia.
      (3) Special classes on the prevention of malaria and heat injuries were given to all deploying personnel and the oral malaria prevention program was begun prior to departure from Fort Bragg.

2. PHASE II: During the initial in-country orientation/training period at CHU LII the four Battalions were supported by their organic medical platoons. The Brigade Headquarters Company with attachments and separate companies were supported by the D/307 Med, and back-up support was provided by the 82d Medical Division. All personnel received plague shots. No significant medical problems were encountered.

3. PHASE III: Support requirements were limited to organic capabilities and no significant problems were encountered. On 5 March 1968 Company D 307th Medical Battalion established a clearing station at C.MF RODRIGUEZ (YDS17147) with the mission of providing medical support on an area basis to the battalions of the brigade and unit level support to the elements of the brigade base area.

4. PHASE IV and V.
   a. The clearing station of D/307 Med continued support as described in paragraph 3, above.
   b. The battalions of the brigade established forward aid stations in the vicinity of their fire support bases and/or in the vicinity of their TSC CP's. These aid stations were moved several times as AO boundaries were changed.
   c. Back-up support has been provided by the 572st Helicopter Ambulance Detachment, the 22nd Surgical Hospital, the 67th and 65th Evacuation Hospitals, and from the Hospital Ships SANCTUARY and REPOSE.
   d. The primary means of evacuating battle casualties has been by helicopter "Dust-Off" and C & C/Logistical helicopters, however, some units have utilized surface evacuation when the patient's condition, terrain, and tactical situations permitted.
5. Summary:

a. Significant Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Respiratory Infection</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatitis</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuropsychiatric</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Preventive medicine: The Brigade Surgeon, in conjunction with the 101st Airborne Division Surgeon, has initiated a vigorous preventive medicine program. Specific actions include:

1. Aerial spray for mosquito control.
2. Inspection of unit messes.
3. Inspection of Engineer Water points.
4. Continued emphasis on oral malaria prevention program.

L. SIGNAL:

1. PHASE I:

   a. The 3d Brigade deployed to SVN with communications equipment authorized under the "F" Series TOE and was augmented by the 3d Plt, Co E, 82d Signal Battalion. While planning for deployment, it was apparent that the AN/SSB and R/T equipment on hand would not be adequate to support the brigade in the extended operation anticipated. Thus emergency requisitions were submitted for 1 AN/VSC-2 for each organic infantry battalion, brigade artillery, and the Headquarters Company communications platoon. The 3d Plt, 82d Signal deployed with its 3 AN/VSC-2's bringing to 8 the total number on hand in the brigade. The old AN/VSC-1's and AN/GRC-46's were turned in prior to departing Fort Bragg. 4 AN/GRC-106's were also provided to the brigade to be mounted on various vehicles in the brigade Headquarters Company. Finally, the 3d Plt deployed with 3 AN/GRC-63's; one more than authorized to the platoon.

   b. The brigade communications elements deployed in essentially 3 elements. The brigade signal officer accompanied the advance party which left Fort Bragg on 13 Feb 68. The Brigade Headquarters Company communications platoon leader deployed several days later with the command group and was followed a short time later by his platoon under the control of the brigade communications chief. The final element to depart was the 3d Platoon.

2. PHASE II:
2. PHASE II:

a. The first brigade base camp was established at CHU L.I., RVN in conjunction with the Americal Division. No significant wire lines were installed as the Americal Division provided the base camp with telephones and land lines. The brigade began operation of the internal command, operation/intelligence, and administrative/logistics FM radio nets using frequencies provided by Americal Division. Motor messenger was used for internal CP distribution.

b. Shortly after arrival in-country, the brigade moved to the 198th Light Infantry Brigade area where once again no significant wire communications were installed, as the 198th LIB provided local telephone service and installed a 4-channel VHF system to the area where the battalion CP’s were located. While in this area, the first brigade SOI was drafted and placed into operation. All equipment was given operational checks in preparation of employment and a secure radio teletype net was placed into operation from the forward area to the base at CHU L.I.

3. PHASE III: On 3 Mar the brigade began a road convoy from CHU L.I. to HUE/PHU BV/1 via Da Nang. FM radio was the sole means of communications during the move. On 5 Mar the brigade began development of what was to be the forward base camp. Local land lines were laid and overheaded to the staff, battalion rear, 307th Medics, 307th Engineers, B/1-17th Cav, 762 Maint Bn and 82d En Bn. 4-channel VHF telephone systems were installed to battalion T/C CP’s when the installation of landlines would have been impractical. It has become SOP to install 3 channels to each battalion T/C CP as follows: 1 switchboard to switchboard common user; 1 TOC to TOC hotline; and 1 artillery firing battery to FSCC hotline. 2 landlines were laid to the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div. The brigade operated the command, Ops/Intell and Adm/Log internal FM nets and entered the 1/101 FM Ops/Intell nets.

4. PHASE IV: During this phase landline/telephone service provided, remained as previously described. FM radio nets also did not change. When the brigade was placed under the operational control of the 101st Abn Div, it ceased operation in the 1/101 CPs/Intell radio nets. 4-channel VHF system was activated to 5’s EAGLE in conjunction with landline. Through these means the brigade has 2 common user lines, 2 hot lines, and two teletype circuits to the 101st Abn Div. VHF system to the battalion T/C CP’s remained in effect. Initially, FM radios were remoted into the TOC from their vehicle location. As this has proven to be very impractical, the radios have been unmounted and installed in the TOC itself. Power is provided from the HQs Company central AC power generators through an AC to DC rectifier.

5. PHASE V: Communications described in PHASE IV continued in effect. When the brigade rear moved from CHU L.I. to Bihn Hoi, an FM/VSC-2 accompanied the element and is employed passing secure Adm/Log traffic to and from the forward CPs. Maintenance problems are being experienced in the operation of the FM/VSC-106 (also a component of the FM/VSC-2). Power amplifiers are being delivered at an excessive rate with no repair parts available to repair them.

M. ARTILLERY

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1. PHASE I: The 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 321st Artillery was alerted and deployed to Vietnam in conjunction with the 3rd Bde, 82nd Airborne Division. The brigade was alerted on 12 Feb 68 and the first battalion elements departed Ft Bragg, N.C. on 15 Feb 68. The most serious problem was the outloading phase at Fort Bragg, due to the short notice and influx of replacements, manifesting was accomplished with difficulty. The problem was resolved by requesting Division Artillery assistance in outloading, thereby allowing the battalion to concentrate on internal matters rather than working full time on outloading. At the time of the alert the battalion was operating at 50% strength. Within sixteen hours after the alert, 211 personnel were transferred from the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery bringing the battalion to 100% strength.

2. PHASE II:

a. In many cases the observations contained in Lessons Learned were invaluable in establishing Unit SOP's. Techniques for double checks of firing data and clearance procedures were developed. In addition, the large number of Vietnam returnees in the battalion contributed directly to the combat effectiveness of the batteries. Liaison visits to artillery units were also beneficial in the development of SOP's.

b. The first kill credited to the brigade was accomplished by C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery, on 26 Feb 68.

c. The unit engaged in training for six days, followed by troop movement for three days, then conducted operations for ten days. Training was integrated into combat operations. This is possible because of the artillery fire base concept of operations.

3. PHASE III:

a. Beginning 3 Mar 68 the battalion departed for S.W. B. I. During this time the battalion had not developed any major tactical or technical innovations. The time has been spent incorporating procedures that are common to Vietnam but not used in CONUS. The result is that the battalion now operates based on SOP's of similar units in Vietnam. At the completion of the move the 3rd Brigade was assigned an area of operations and commenced combat operations.

b. The convoy was fully coordinated and was covered by air, artillery and a reaction force over the entire route. Upon closing at HMM I, the battalion commenced base camp construction and combat support operations. Firing batteries were deployed within the area to support operations of the maneuver battalions.

c. At such time that the brigade was assigned an area it was necessary for the battalion to establish liaison with Vietnamese for political clearance to fire. The finalization of SOP's and the establishment of an air warning net were also accomplished at that time.

d. Resupply continued to be a problem throughout this time. Initially the battalion did not have a firm resupply channel due to the separate status of the 3rd Brigade.

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e. Once OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division a firm resupply system was initiated. However, the system did not produce supplies in adequate quantities. Areas of particular concern were field sanitation supplies, cleaning materials and clothing.

f. Maintenance was hampered by the lack of repair parts. The critical area, at the time were repair parts which are normally kept on hand. The 101st Airborne Division has M102 Howitzers and parts for the M109A1 were not in its system.

g. At the end of this phase the battalion had fired 28,462 rounds and received credit for numerous enemy casualties. Furthermore the battalion had not had an artillery incident. Particular attention to double check systems and a battalion fire direction first round check are the major reasons for this fact.

4. PHASE IV & V:

a. The 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery provided artillery support to the 3d Brigade 82nd .Airborne Division during Operation CARNIVAL. B Battery, 2-321st Artillery supported the 2nd Battalion 505th Infantry from FSB PaNTHER (Y778126), B Battery 2-321st artillery initially provided support to 1st Battalion 505th Infantry from FSB W30082 (Y759271). Upon expansion of the brigade AO, B Battery moved to FSB SALLY (Y639273). B Battery 2-321st artillery provided support to 1st Battalion 505th Infantry during the time of their attachment to the Brigade. Support was provided from FSB SALLY. Countermortar radar (SK/22-2) was supported from C/LF RODRIGUEZ (YD81747).

b. On 9 Mar 68 the battalion commenced support of the 3rd Brigade from the respective Fire Support Bases. On 28 Mar 68, at 1919 hours, C Battery 2-321st Artillery received 20 rounds of 122mm rocket. One (1) man was wounded and two (2) 7½ ton trucks were damaged. The battalion fired its counter-rocket program and radar sighting. The hostile rocket fire ceased. Two days later on 30 Mar, at 0200 hours, C Battery 2-321st artillery received eight (8) rounds of 82mm mortar. Three men were wounded. The mess tent and equipment were damaged. Countermortar fire was directed at the mortar flashes and the mortar fire ceased.

c. On 3 April C Battery moved ro d to fire support base GERONIMO (YD691201). This move rendered the battery to support the 1st Battalion 508th Infantry in its newly assigned area of operations.

d. B Battery provided support from Fire Support Base SALLY (YD639273). The battery gave direct support to the 1st Battalion 509th Infantry in its new AO. Naval gunfire support was provided by destroyers on station off the coast.

5. In summary the battalion has fired 1,437 missions expending 21,564 rounds during the reporting period.

N. ENGINEER

1. PHASE I: Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion (CE) was alerted for deployment to an unspecified combat zone on 12 Feb 68. During the period from 13
Feb to 23 Feb, the company prepared for and conducted air movement operations in compliance with the alert notification. Preparations for deployment included:

a. The transfer of 33 non-deployable personnel from the company and the transfer of 85 deployable personnel into the company.

b. The issue of all additional T-50 equipment necessary for operations in a tropical environment to all personnel assigned or attached to the company.

c. The augmentation of the company with an engineer equipment package from HHC, 307 Engineer Battalion (-bn).

d. The transfer of all organic and attached equipment to the company PBO.

e. The turn-in of all M16A1 rifles assigned to the company and the issue of M16A1 rifles.

f. The administrative and medical FOR qualification of all personnel assigned or attached to the company. In order to facilitate command and control, the company was attached in the following manner to the indicated units and deployed on the dates listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platoon</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Platoon</td>
<td>2-505th Inf</td>
<td>17 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Platoon</td>
<td>1-508th Inf</td>
<td>19 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company HQ</td>
<td>Prov Bn</td>
<td>20 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Platoon</td>
<td>1-505th Inf</td>
<td>23 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. PHASE II: During the period from 18 February to 2 Mar 68, Company C took part in the brigades in-country orientation/training program at CHU LAI, RVN. All members of the company without prior service in RVN received two days of in-country orientation at the Americal Division Combat Training Center. During this period, all elements of the company, with the exception of the 2d Platoon, were returned to company control. While at CHU LAI, all organic weapons, vehicles, and items of engineer equipment were subject to extensive in-country operational trials. During this period, Company C supported the 3d brigade's operations by constructing bunkers, wire obstacles, gun emplacements, and a brigade TOC.

3. PHASE III: On 23 Feb 68, the 2d Platoon moved by air from CHU LAI to PHU BAI and provided direct support to the 2-505th Inf. On 3 March, the 2d Platoon reverted to company control and undertook the task of aiding the brigade advance party in sweeping the proposed brigade base camp site for mines and laying out the unit locations within the site. Company C (-) closed the HUE/PHU BAI area with the first serial of brigade convoy from CHU LAI on 4 Mar 68. Due to road conditions between DA NANG and HUE/PHU BAI, the company's entire equipment package was dropped from the convoy at DA NANG and traveled to the HUE/PHU BAI area by LST. On 5 March the company (-) began the base development of the brigade base camp (CAMT RODRIGUEZ) using engineer equipment on loan from the 326th Engineer Battalion (-bn) and the 9th USMC Engineer Battalion (FMF). The company's equipment package closed CAMT RODRIGUEZ on 9 Mar and the company became completely operational assuming all of the engineer support of the 3d Brigade in the HUE/PHU BAI area. During this period, the company provided direct combat support to the bri-
4. PHASE IV: During Operation CARENTAN I, the 1st Platoon provided a mine sweep team and two demolitions teams to the 1-505th Infantry. These teams were augmented by a bulldozer and water purification unit from the company headquarters. In the course of bunker and trench destruction operations, the bulldozer assisting the demolitions teams came under intense enemy small arms and claymore fire causing moderate damage to the dozer and lightly wounding the operator. With the aid of supporting fires from the infantry, the dozer was evacuated and subsequently repaired. Direct support to the 2-505th Inf and 1-508th Inf was supplied by the 2d and 3d Platoons in the form of mine sweep and demolitions teams. Company headquarters supplied general support to the brigade with its attached equipment package being employed to continue base camp development and fire base/patrol base construction. Additional general support missions were generated by requirements of the 101st Abn Div to aid in the construction of FSB's BIRKENHEAD and BASTOGNE.

5. PHASE V: During Operation CARENTAN II, the line platoons continued in direct support of their respective infantry battalions while company headquarters continued in general support of the 3d Brigade, 82d Abn Div and 101st Abn Div operations. The adjustments of AO’s with the brigade TOAR brought about the requirements to displace the water purification unit and change its attachment from the 1-505th Inf to the 1-508th Inf. In addition, the company was called upon to assist in the movement of the 1-505th Inf from LZ DETROIT to LZ SALLY, 1-508th Inf from LZ DEVIL to LZ BIRKENHEAD, 2-505th Inf from LZ PANTHER to LZ BOYD, 1-508th Inf from LZ BIRKENHEAD to LZ BASTOGNE, and 1-505th Inf from LZ SALLY to LZ BIRKENHEAD. Support of these moves was in the form of 2½ ton dump trucks used to haul troops and equipment and construction of battalion TOC’s and artillery positions. Direct combat engineer support was given to elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div when C/307th Engr was called upon to heli-lift a land clearing team into the then heavily contested LZ VAGHEL. This team was released after 4 days when the LZ had been sufficiently cleared to accept heavy sling loads of artillery pieces and general supplies.

6. Summary of Operations:

a. Type Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>CARENTAN I</th>
<th>CARENTAN II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter landing zone cleared</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8d and 2n TOC’s constructed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox compounds constructed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual dwellings raised</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels and tunnel complex destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Explosive Ordnance Demolition

- 750 lb bombs: 1
- 250 lb bombs: 3

CONFIDENTIAL
CO/P/T

C. Mine Sweeps: A total of 1240 miles have been covered. All mines found had some type of marking system. The marking system most commonly found were sticks lined up pointing to the first mine, and rocks piled up at the side of the road along with broken twigs.

O. ARMY AVIATION

1. PHASE I:

   a. When the brigade was alerted for deployment on 12 Feb the Aviation Sector was at zero strength in personnel and aircraft.

   b. Although the Aviation Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division was critically short of both personnel and aircraft, the CG directed that a brigade slice of division assets be made available to the Brigade Task Force. Initial guidance provided that six UH-1 aircraft and four H-23 aircraft would accompany the Brigade Task Force, this was later modified and the final configuration of the Aviation Section upon deployment was as shown below:

   \[
   \begin{array}{ccc}
   \text{AIRCRAFT} & \text{OFF} & \text{WO} & \text{EM} \\
   \text{6-UH-23} & 6 & 8 & 23 \\
   \text{4-H-23} & & & \\
   \end{array}
   \]

2. PHASE II

   a. Upon arrival at CHU LII the first mission of the Aviation Section was to reassemble the aircraft, test fly them and process the personnel for the necessary in-country orientation.

   b. During this phase the section provided the brigade with the following support:
c. Limited airlift support as well as back-up maintenance was provided by the 101st Airborne Division during this phase.

3. PHASE III

a. The section provided a UHID to each of the three convoy commanders for C & C of the move and in addition lifted a limited amount of high priority cargo to GL, LE.

b. Specific missions were as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>A/C HITS</th>
<th>MID EV: C</th>
<th>LBS CARGO</th>
<th>FIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UHID</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7620</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH23</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9620</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. PHASE IV and V

a. Upon arrival in the GL, LE area the section immediately began to support the combat operations of the brigade. The goal of the support plan was to provide, on a daily basis, one UHID for C & C, one OH23 for C & C, one OH23 for C & C, one OH23 for C & C, one OH23 for C & C, and additional OH23s for use by engineers, liaison officers, and other missions as required. Since this goal obviously exceeds the section's capabilities, additional resources were required. The additional aircraft requirements were provided from assets available to the 101st Airborne Division and the support goal was generally met, however, on occasion one of the Infantry Battalions was furnished an OH23 instead of a UHID.

b. All aircraft for combat assaults as well as CH47 support was provided from assets available to the 101st Airborne Division.

c. Support Level Maintenance was provided by the 801st Aviation Battalion.

d. Support provided by the aircraft organic to the section during this period as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>A/C HITS</th>
<th>MID EV: C</th>
<th>LBS CARGO</th>
<th>FIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH1D</td>
<td>426.1</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>266,905</td>
<td>2415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH23</td>
<td>433.7</td>
<td>1711</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>859.8</td>
<td>3526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>273,005</td>
<td>4125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Summary:

CONFIDENTIAL
a. The status of personnel and aircraft at the close of the period is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-OH23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-UH1H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note this figure includes four door gunners who are not qualified as aviation mechanics.

b. The current status is contrasted with the authorization for the aviation section of a separate airborne brigade (TCS 57-102G) which is as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-OH23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-UH1H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note this figure does not include eight door gunners (one per UH-1 A/C) authorized within RVN.

c. It should also be noted that the aviation section described in paragraph b, above would normally have an aircraft maintenance section from a support battalion (TCS 20-109G) in direct support.

d. Total support provided the brigade by elements organic to the aviation section during the period of this report is as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE A/C</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>A/C HITS</th>
<th>MED INV</th>
<th>LBS CRGO</th>
<th>F/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH1D</td>
<td>503.4</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>283,425</td>
<td>2729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH23</td>
<td>475.0</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>978.4</td>
<td>3919</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>293,625</td>
<td>4540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Special operations of the brigade during the reporting period were supported by the 7th Psy Ops BN and the 9th ACS utilizing UH-1D helicopters, O-2-B loudspeaker aircraft, and C-47 leaflet/PSYOP aircraft. Armed Propaganda Teams were used four times by the brigade in an intelligence gathering role.

2. A total of 1,644,000 leaflets were dropped and 85½ hours (60 ground and 25½ aerial) were broadcast in support of brigade combat operations. Themes utilized in both the leaflet and loudspeaker missions were:
   a. Chieu Hoi
   b. Anti VC
   c. Pro GVN

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3. Two returnees from the Viet Cong were used in PsyOps during the period. Their statements urging acceptance of the SVN were printed on leaflets and recorded for broadcasting. The broadcasts and leaflets were then employed over hostile village areas and suspected VC concentrations.

Q. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. During the reporting period, the brigade chemical section consisted of one officer and 1 NCO and supported by the 20th and 36th Chemical detachments of the 101st Abn Div. Aerial deployment of CS was provided by the 101st Abn Div to the maneuver battalions of the brigade on request.

2. Significant chemical operations conducted during the period included the following:

a. On 22 Mar 68, the 1-505th Inf began destroying bunkers and huts discovered in the vicinity of YD794245 during search and clear operations in AO CARP (PHASE IV, part 3). 75 bunkers and 36 huts were "seeded" with bags of CS crystals wrapped with detonating cord in conjunction with C4 explosive. This was very effective in denying the enemy reuse of the positions.

b. On 6 Apr 68, the 1-505th Inf encountered dug-in NVA in the vicinity of YD677297. 20 4.2 in CS rounds were placed on the enemy positions prior to artillery, gunships, and airstrikes resulting in 5 NVA KIA when they fled the bunkers.

c. On 16 Apr 68, the 2-505th Inf employed an EB CS launcher on a cordon and search operation of the village of THON CHAU CHU resulting in 1 VC captured.

d. On 9 Apr 68, the 1-505th Inf employed CS grenades dropped by helicopter on fortified NVA positions in the vicinity of YD883284. Following the CS mission, a ground assault was made resulting in 6 NVA KIA. The NVA appeared to be stunned by the CS and there were no friendly casualties.

e. Five hand sprayers and defoliant obtained from the 1st ARVN Div in HUE were used to defoliate around bunkers of the 2-505th Inf guarding the pontoon bridge vicinity YD753144. The heavily vegetated area around these positions denied the occupants clear observation of enemy avenues of approach and the subsequent defoliation successfully killed the vegetation and facilitated its removal.

3. Activities of the brigade chemical section included the following:

a. A two hour class was given on 8 Apr 68 to representatives from each company of the battalions, 2-321st Arty, and B/1-17th Cav on the 88 multiple tube CS launcher. The class included the firing procedures, tactics and techniques of employment with a practical exercise, safety procedures, and the technical functioning of the launcher. Since that time, units have used the CS on cordon and search operations and most notably, on convoy security and escort missions. B/1-17th Cav has experimented with various methods of rigging the launcher on its vehicles and carries them on all convoy escort missions.
b. An inspection of chemical equipment was conducted with emphasis on the ABG-M17 protective mask. The following units were inspected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>82d MI Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/307th Engr</td>
<td>358th RRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-127th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 2-321st Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/307th Med</td>
<td>A/2-321st Arty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Assistance was given to the 3-505th Inf and HHC, 3d Bde in constructing fougasse and 55 gallon flame mines on the CAMP RODRIGUEZ defense perimeter. At the close of the reporting period, the 3-505th Inf has two 55 gal fougasses, two 5 gal fougasses, and four 55 gal flame mines on its sector of the perimeter. HHC, 3d Bde has completed six 55 gal fougasses and one 55 gal flame mine.

R. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

1. During the reporting period, the 7th Air Force flew 148 sorties in support of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division troops and attached units. 122 of these missions were close air support.

2. The total ordnance expended during this period included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>495,500 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>495,500 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Pods</td>
<td>88 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEU</td>
<td>10 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>69,930 rds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Brigade Forward Air Controllers flew 171 sorties, controlling air strikes, adjusting artillery, and visual reconnaissance missions.

SECTION II (C)

Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

A. PERSONNEL

1. Deployability Criteria

a. OBSERVATION. The Division Ready Force (DRF) deployability criteria as currently directed by higher headquarters and implemented by the 82d Airborne Division is not suitable to measure a unit's strength in terms of deployability for Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION. Normal DRF deployability considers only 30 days losses and profile personnel, while these criteria are adequate for short term "show of force" missions and deployment to areas where prior service in RVN is not a consideration, they were completely unrealistic for the move of this Brigade from Fort Bragg to Vietnam. As a result, all previous prepared rosters of deployable personnel became invalid and valuable time was required to prepare personnel requisitions based on the deployability criteria specified for this move.
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c. RECOMMENDATION. As long as the possibility exists of other AIRRIKE units being deployed to RVN on short notice, DA should establish firm criteria for deployment and a given unit’s status could then be maintained current at all times.

2. Officer Grade Structure.

a. OBSERVATION. This brigade deployed with an excessive number of 2LT’s in key positions.

b. EVALUATION. Seven of the thirteen infantry company commanders were 2LT’s. With the exception of the S-3’s, almost all the infantry battalion staff officers were 2LT’s and all assistant staff officers in the brigade headquarters were also 2LT’s. Although these officers, both individually and as a group, were outstanding young officers and could meet most CONUS requirements without undue difficulty, they lacked the experience necessary for combat operations. It should be noted that the situation would have been even worse had not the 82d Airborne Division made several captains and majors available from its limited resources.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Every effort should be made by DA to staff combat units deploying to RVN at the authorized grade level.

B. OPERATIONS

1. Mobility

a. OBSERVATION. Use of water transportation can enhance the mobility of the infantry soldier.

b. EVALUATION. The use of helicopters to increase mobility is (with complete justification) widely recognized as an effective and desirable method of transportation, however, there are never sufficient helicopters available to satisfy all requirements. In some areas within RVN (other than the Delta), there are many opportunities for the use of water transportation. River crossings and amphibious assaults may be conducted using native sampans, motorized junks, engineer assault boats, flat bottomed skimmers, “Mike” boats, LCUs, or any combination of these. One battalion within this brigade conducted a highly successful amphibious operation using motorized junks provided by the Vietnamese Navy. This operation required no special training and only normal planning/coordination.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders and staff planners should be alert for situations that favor the use of water transportation to support combat operations.

2. Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

a. OBSERVATION. There appears to be a generalized feeling among many commanders that ¼ ton trucks mounting machine guns and 106 recoilless rifles can only be employed on roads.

b. EVALUATION. Experience within the infantry battalions and the cavalry troop of this brigade has shown that there are many areas and situations where these vehicles can be employed to support foot troops in the normal cross-country method. Well trained personnel and junior leaders with imagination can effectively move these vehicles through rice paddies, along dikes, over grassy rolling terrain and even through light brush and timber areas.
C. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders and staff planners should be alert to utilize
the tremendous fire-power afforded by these fighting vehicles.

3. MARKING ROUNDS FOR DIRECT FIRE AT NIGHT.

a. OBSERVATION. Initially the artillery battalion encountered problems in
adjusting accurate counter-mortar (direct) fire during the hours of darkness.

b. EVALUATION. Enemy units encountered by this brigade have usually required
direct line of sight to employ accurate mortar fire. The mortar flashes are usu-
ally dim and difficult to locate by use of the elbow telescope. Initially white
phosphorous rounds were fired by the base howitzer, however, these rounds were
so brilliant as to spoil night vision and did not last long enough for the battery
to orient the direct fire telescopes. After considerable experimentation, it was
determined that the best marking round was an illuminating round set for point
detonation. This round provides sufficient light to orient the direct fire sights
but not enough to spoil night vision. If the initial round is not on target
corrections from the marking round may be given in the normal manner.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Artillery commanders should consider the use of an illumi-
inating round for rapid massing of fire on enemy mortar positions at night.

4. JOINT OPERATIONS WITH RVN FORCES.

a. OBSERVATION. Some commanders are reluctant to engage in joint operations
with RVN forces because of anticipated problems in coordination or preconceived
ideas about the effectiveness of RVN forces.

b. EVALUATION. There are numerous occasions when utilization of RVN forces
can greatly enhance mission accomplishment. Operations involving ARVN combat units
have the obvious advantage of providing additional pressure on enemy forces,
however, utilization of small RVN elements can also be beneficial. For example
National Field Force Police units can be of considerable assistance in searching
populated areas for weapons, food etc. NF/PF elements of even five or six men
operating with American Companies are very useful as guides. ARVN sector and
sub-sector intelligence officers can often provide significant and timely intel-
ligence to battalion S-2's and company commanders.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders and staff officers should be constantly alert
to improve the capability of their unit by the utilization of all available RVN forces.

C. TRAINING. None

D. INTELLIGENCE.

1. MAP DISTRIBUTION.

a. OBSERVATION. The proper distribution of maps requires coordinated plan-
ing between the S-2 and S-3.

b. EVALUATION. The scope of operational outlook decreases in direct pro-
portion to unit size as does the unit's capability to adequately store map sheets.

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A rifle platoon leader or squad leader normally requires only two to four map sheets (1:50,000) and has no capability to store adjoining or extra sheets. While a company has limited storage capacity, the requirements for daily usage at company level are normally similar to those of the platoon. Also there is a tendency on the part of many personnel to assume that if map sheets are lost or damaged, replacements will be immediately available.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Extra map sheets should be stored at battalion level and supply economy for maps should be enforced just as for any other item.

2. Flow of Intelligence

a. OBSERVATION: If the full value of intelligence is to be realized, the flow must be both up and down.

b. EVALUATION. Because of the constant demand by higher headquarters for "spot reports," "situation wrap-ups," "updates," etc, each echelon of command soon develops procedures for reporting information up the chain. All too often, however, the passing of information down the chain is neglected and thus the smaller unit commanders and individual soldiers are not kept adequately informed.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders and staff officers should examine their procedures to insure that appropriate information is passed down the chain.

E. LOGISTICS

1. Feeding of hot meals in the field

a. OBSERVATION: Although well trained troops can exist almost indefinitely on "C" rations, there is generally no requirement that they do so.

b. EVALUATION. The experiences of this brigade have indicated that there are a great many situations wherein it is possible to provide troops in the field with at least one hot meal per day without adverse effect on tactical operations. Normally this hot meal should be fed at noon. This gives the troops a chance to take a break near the hottest part of the day and also reduces the likelihood of a compromise of a night defensive position or ambush site by the late afternoon arrival of a helicopter.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commander should always consider the advantages to morale and energy they gain by feeding at least one hot meal per day.

2. Over-dependence on logistical helicopters

a. OBSERVATION. It is fairly easy for commanders and staff planners, especially those newly arrived in RVN, to become over-dependent on logistical helicopters.

b. EVALUATION. The extensive use of the helicopter in RVN has provided greater logistical flexibility than ever before and has, to some extent, made logistical
limitations on tactical operations less binding. There are times, however, when
helicopters will not be available for logistical support to forward companies due
to weather, terrain, the tactical situation or higher priority missions.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS. Commanders and staff planners should always develop
plans for alternate methods of logistical support as well as programs to reduce
logistical requirements.


a. OBSERVATION. The Remington Model 754G chain saw is not suitable for use
in backwood jungle areas of RVN.

b. EVALUATION. This unit has experienced serious and consistent problems
with this model chain saw. Primary defects are in the hardness of the cutting edge
the rewind starter assembly and the starter housing mounts. Thorough investiga-
tion by experienced Engineer personnel eliminated the possibility of poor main-
tenance or improper use as contributing factors. All of the saws involved had been
found in excellent condition by third USA CHI inspectors just prior to deployment.
All were properly broken in and an examination of the chain links revealed none
of the defects listed on page 41 of TM 5-2695-213-15.

c. RECOMMENDATION. That the Remington Model 754G be replaced by another model
with a more dependable starting system, self sharpening features and a harder
cutting edge.

4. WABTOC Items

a. OBSERVATION. When the Brigade initially arrived in the GIA LE area great
difficulty was experienced in obtaining WABTOC items such as tents, barrier mater-
ials, reefers, generators and other base development items.

b. EVALUATION. While the Brigade was at CHU LAI adequate support was pro-
vided by the Americal Division and as it was anticipated that the stay there would
be of short duration and that transportation to the ultimate operational area
would be a problem, no WABTOC items were procured. Upon arrival at GIA LE, the bri-
gade was initially OPCON to Task Force L-Ray and there seemed to be some con-
fusion as to who should provide logistical support. In addition to the aforementioned
problems with WABTOC items, there were minor problems with Class I items. When the
brigade was attached to the 101st Airborne Division, the Support Command and the
DA NANG Support Command began to accept requisitions and the situation has steadily
improved.

c. RECOMMENDATION. The responsible support elements for units deploying to
RVN should be designated in advance in order that they can program WABTOC items
to be available upon arrival.

F. ORGANIZATION.

1. Staffing of the brigade and battalion headquarters.

a. OBSERVATION. Current TOE’s do not provide adequate staffing for the head-
quarters of battalions and brigades operating in RVN.

b. EVALUATION. Administrative requirements are greatly increased in RVN in comparison with CONUS operations. Brigade and battalions are required to establish S5 sections. The S1, S2, S3 and S4 sections each required additional personnel to accomplish all mandatory functions. There are only two clerk-typists authorized in the Brigade Headquarters (TOE 57-42F) and in the Battalion Headquarters (TOE 7-36F). While specific augmentations requirements will vary from unit to unit, an increase of 22 personnel (12 officers; 10 EM) at brigade level and 14 personnel (6 officers; 8 EM) at battalion level is considered to be the minimum requirement.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders of brigades and battalions deploying to RVN should be prepared to increase their headquarters staffing from within their own resources, pending publication of realistic TOE's.

2. Infantry Combat Support Companies.

a. OBSERVATION. A combat support company is not required in an Infantry Battalion.

b. EVALUATION. The employment of the three combat platoons is based on tactical considerations and the desires of the battalion commander (and on occasion guidance from higher commanders). These considerations are not affected by the transfer of these platoons from the battalion headquarters company ("F" and "G" series TOE) to a combat support company (HTOE). The creation of a combat support company requires additional "overhead" personnel that the Army can ill-afford. The administrative support of the three combat platoons can be adequately provided by the headquarters company as presently configured in the "G" series TOE.

c. RECOMMENDATION. That the three combat platoons remain organic to the battalion headquarters company.

3. Infantry battalion radio requirements.

a. OBSERVATION. Infantry battalions require additional PRC 25 radios pending receipt of a suitable replacement for the PRC 6.

b. EVALUATION. It is extremely difficult for a platoon leader to control his squad without radio communications. The problem is intensified when the platoon is operating in dense jungle, in built-up villages, on multiple small unit static security missions or when conducting small ambush operations. In addition, the battalions (and sometimes the companies) are frequently required to monitor additional nets such as ARVN nets, advisory nets, other service nets. Other requirements peculiar to operations in RVN include base defense nets and use of PRC 25's for airborne CP's.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Each infantry battalion deployed to RVN should be issued 20 PRC 25 radios above current TOE authorization.

4. Employment of Reconnaissance platoons and anti-tank platoons.
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a. OBSERVATION. There are many situations when it is desirable to cross-attach Recon and AT Platoons elements.

b. EVALUATION. The recon platoon operating alone lacks the heavy caliber fire-power that may be required in some situations and the AT platoon operating alone lacks the automatic weapons fire-power required for close-in security. By cross-attaching elements of these two platoons, two "panzer" platoons can be formed, each possessing a mix of automatic and long range heavy fire-power. This provides additional flexibility when assigned escort and route security missions. These two "panzer" platoons may also be used to reinforce rifle companies with heavy fire-power using minimum personnel.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Commanders should be alert for the most effective utilization of their Recon and AT Platoons.

G. OTHER: Unit Sponsor System

1. Observation: The sponsorship of this brigade by the Americal Division (and specifically by the 198th Infantry Brigade) greatly facilitated the orientation and adjustment of this unit into the operational climate of RVN.

2. Evaluation: When this brigade arrived at CHU LAI the Americal Division reacted in truly magnificent fashion to receive, process, billet, support and generally assist this brigade. The support rendered is even more significant in view of the fact that the CG of the Americal Division was completely unaware of the brigade's deployment until the brigade commander arrived at Division Headquarters. The Americal Division arranged for the Brigade elements to attend the two-day individual proficiency training course and provided complete support so that this brigade only furnished the students. This Brigade TOC was colocated with the 198th TOC. The 2-321st Arty Bn FDC was colocated with the 1/14 Arty FDC and was able to immediately fire in support of combat operations while concurrently becoming familiar with artillery procedures peculiar to RVN. The 198th conducted staff briefings for the commanders and staff (to include staff NCO's) of the infantry battalions as they arrived and then each battalion was assigned a sponsor battalion from the 198th. The only disadvantage to the entire procedure was that this brigade's ultimate area of operations was so far removed from the sponsoring unit and site.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That each unit deploying to RVN be sponsored by a similar type unit, as close to the ultimate area of operations as possible.

Gp. 6

SECTION 3 (C)

Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information

Cover and Deception Activities: Negative Report

ALEXANDER R. BOLLING, JR
COLONEL, INDIANTRY
Commanding

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3 - AO Boundaries 10 Mar 68
4 - AO Boundaries 12 Mar 68
5 - AO Boundaries 17 Mar 68
6 - Opn Overlay 20 Mar 68
7 - AO Boundaries 28 Mar 68
8 - AO Boundaries 1 Apr 68
9 - AO Boundaries 3 Apr 68
10 - AO Boundaries 8 Apr 68
11 - AO Boundaries 16 Apr 68
12 - AO Boundaries 18 Apr 68

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2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-0T APO 96558 (AIR MAIL)
3 - CGUSARV, ATTN: VWGC (DST), APO 96222 (AIR MAIL)
10 - CG 101st Abn Div, APO 96383
5 - CO 22d Mil Hist Det, APO 96383
1 - ea Staff Section, this HQs
1 - CO 1-505 Inf
1 - CO 2-505 Inf
1 - CO 1-508 Inf
1 - CO 2-321 Arty
1 - CO B/1-17 Cav
1 - CO C/307 Engr
1 - CO D/307 Med

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION:
5 - CG, 82d Abn Div, Ft. Bragg, N.C. 28307 (AIR MAIL)
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AVDG-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQ, 101st Abn Div, APO US Forces 96383

TO: Adjutant General, Department of the Army

THRU: Channels

MAJ Welch/rkd/113

RAJ

FOR: 29 May 1968

1. Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division.

2. The following comments refer to stated paragraphs in Section I.

a. Ref para M, 3, d. At no time was the battalion's ability to perform its mission hampered for lack of supplies. The initial phase mentioned in para M, 3, d applies only to the movement phase from Chu Lai to Gia Le. Upon the battalion's closing Gia Le, a firm resupply system was established as outlined in paragraph I 3d (logistics). Contributing factors to the resupply problem were: inexperience on the part of the Brigade FSE in the procedures required in the area and the lack of a support battalion within the 3d Brigade.

b. Ref para M, 3, e. Once OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division a firm resupply system was established. The battalion was adequately supplied in Class I, III, and V fields. Due to a general shortage of cleaning materials, clothing and sanitation supplies in this area, the battalion experienced some shortages in these areas.

c. Ref para Q, 2, d. The action on 9 April also included aerial delivery of E158 CS Cannister Clusters. The E158 clusters were dropped from 1500 feet to place an initial concentration of CS on the target to provide fire suppression for the low-level grenade drops.

3. Pertinent Comments to Section II of Subject Report follow.

a. Ref para B, 3. Concur, additional comments of this same subject are in 101st Airborne Division Artillery ORL for period ending 30 April 1968.

b. Ref para E, 1. The observation and recommendations are true in part however, this headquarters has experienced that feeding a hot meal at noon should not be a norm. Mission, terrain, and weather are significant factors affecting when and if a hot meal (A-rations) should be fed. Early afternoon is typically the hottest part of the day. Care must be exercised not to induce stomach cramps or other maladies by feeding a big meal at noon when strenuous physical exertion will be continued throughout the remainder of the day. When operating in dense jungle daily logistical sorties severely hamper movement because of the time that must be taken to prepare LZ's for the helicopters.

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AVDG-OC
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

It has also been found that in dense jungle terrain, unit security is increased when logistical operations are reduced as much as possible. This has led to units, at times, carrying several days supply of C-rations with them and resupply being conducted only once every 3 to 5 days. This technique not only reduces logistical transportation requirements but adds significantly to unit security and the chances for a safe, successful operation. When operating in the coastal plains area resupply is much easier and daily A-ration meals may be fed on a more frequent basis when units are on a static security type mission.

c. Ref para E, 3. At the present time, the 326th Engineer Bn of this Division is testing a new chain saw which has carbide tips and the self sharpening capability. Within 45 days the test will be complete and a valid comparison can be made between the two items.

d. Ref para F, 1. This headquarters experienced the same problem upon initial arrival in RVN. Not only are daily administrative requirements heavier than in CONUS but base camp operations create an additional administrative personnel requirements at battalion and brigade level in RVN in excess of what is now authorized.

e. Ref para F, 2. The experience of this headquarters has shown that the Headquarters Company does not have the capability to support these combat platoons adequately. This inability is exemplified in RVN when the Headquarters Company is often spread over a considerable distance and its present organic elements are difficult to support. The additional Company Headquarters is a definite asset to these three combat platoons, particularly in the areas of administration and logistics.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. P. FALLON, JR.
Colonel, G3
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL
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AVII-GCT (12 May 68) 2d Ind  NAJ Sanderson/Jun/2506
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The inclosed ORML, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comment on Section 1, Operational Significant Activities. Item: Shortage of field sanitation supplies, cleaning materials and clothing, page 25, para M3e and 1st Ind, para 2b. Supply support procedures for separate brigades and divisional units are now established by USASUPOOM, Da Nang (Prov) and are adequate to meet the re-supply requirements of this unit.

3. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations are below.
   b. Item: Officer grade structure, page 33, para A2. Concur.
   e. Item: Marking rounds for direct fire at night, page 34, para B3, and 1st Ind, para 3a. Concur.
   f. Item: Joint operations with ARVN forces, page 34, para B4. Concur. One of the most effective operations with ARVN forces has been the use of ARVN sector and subsector intelligence officers as sources of significant and timely intelligence for battalion S2's and company commanders. These agencies are prime sources of intelligence available to tactical commanders, and they are frequently consulted by this headquarters.
   g. Item: Map distribution, page 34, para D1. Concur. To keep each battalion from having an unmanageable amount of maps, only those maps of the battalion's TAOR and proposed contingency area should be stocked.
   h. Item: Flow of intelligence, page 35, para D2. Concur. G-2, PCV has on many occasions produced studies for units OOPK to this Corps or operating in the Corps TAOR. Widest dissemination of intelligence is accomplished not only via INTS1W and PERINTREP, but also by special courier to units with immediate requirements. Dissemination is complemented by informal liaison among MI detachments.
   i. Item: Feeding of hot meals in the field, page 35, para E1, and 1st Ind, para 3b. Concur with recommendation as modified by the 1st Ind.

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AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSPCR-65) (R1) (U)


k. Item: Saw, chain, portable GSH 18" cut, Remington model 754G, page 36, para E3, and 1st Ind, para 3c. Concur with comments contained in 1st Ind. Recommend action be deferred until current testing is completed and evaluated.

l. Item: WABUC items, page 36, para F4. Concur. In addition to designation of support elements, thorough and timely coordination between supported and supporting elements is required.

m. Item: Staffing at brigade and battalion headquarters, page 36, para F1, and 1st Ind, para 3d. Concur in recommendation that deploying commanders should be prepared to augment headquarters staffs from within their own resources to meet requirements of combat operations. MDE's should be submitted as soon as practicable to provide the required additional spaces.

n. Item: Infantry combat support companies, page 37, para F2, and 1st Ind, para 3e. Nonconcur with recommendation for infantry battalion combat support companies. Concur with 1st Ind; the administrative and logistic assets required to support the three combat platoons can best be achieved by organizing the combat support company which includes the combat platoons, plus necessary administrative and logistical support personnel.

o. Item: Infantry battalion radio requirements, page 37, para F3. Concur. This same problem has been experienced by other battalion size units in RVN. Requirements peculiar to operations in RVN have shown that battalion size units must have additional radios to permit adequate command and control communications. Unit should request additional radios by MDE submission.


q. Item: Unit sponsor system, page 38, para G. Concur. Effective unit sponsorship has a tremendous effect on the sponsored unit's morale and reduces the time required for the new unit to start combat operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
R. L. MURDIN
MAJ, AG
Asst AG

Ct furn:
CG, 101st Air Cav Div
CG, 3/82d Abn Div
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (12 May 68) 3d Abn Div (C)  CPT Arnold/mn/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period Ending 30 April 1968, (RCS CSFOR-65) (RL)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 18 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division.

2. (C) Reference item concerning unit sponsoring system, page 38, paragraph G3. Concur that each unit deploying to RVN be sponsored by a similar type unit, as close to the ultimate area of operations as possible. This has been, and will continue to be, the policy of this headquarters. It should be noted that the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division deployed on very short notice in a temporary change of station status, as opposed to a normal Program 5 deploying unit. At the time the American Division was appointed sponsor the final area of operations to be assigned to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division had not been determined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C.S. NAKATUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
HQ, PCV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Army AG
Reference: Map, 1:100,000, RNW, Sheet 6541

Inclosure 5
Inclosure 6

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Reference: Map, 1:250,000, RVN, Series 1501, Sheet NE 48-16

Inclosure 7

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52
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Div

Expriences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968 (U)

CO, 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1
* SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________
** FOR OT RD # ____________________________
***PAGE # ____________________________

ITEM 2
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________
PAGE # ____________________________

ITEM 3
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________
PAGE # ____________________________

ITEM 4
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________
PAGE # ____________________________

ITEM 5
SUBJECT TITLE ____________________________
FOR OT RD # ____________________________
PAGE # ____________________________

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
Department of the Army

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

ATT: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Data
I. Apr 04

I. FOEVIOUS COINS OF TM41 LASEL ARE OBsolete

- FOED -