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21 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968
RCS CSFOR - 65 (RI)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96384

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ED V. HENDERSON, JR.
COL, AGC
Adjutant General

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FOR OT RD
682276
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Withdrawn, HQ, DA
SECTION I

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
A. (U) COMMAND GROUP. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command completed its first four and one-half months of operation at the Long Tin Post location. Among the important visitors to the headquarters were General Dwight E. Beach, Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific; General Frank S. Beeson, Jr., Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command; and General James F. Collins (Ret), President, American Red Cross. The Commanding General made liaison visits to Headquarters, US Army, Pacific (Hawaii) in February; 2d Logistical Command (Okinawa) in March; and 9th Logistical Command and US Army Support, Thailand in April. The Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff also visited HQ, USARPAC in April. Effective 10 April 1968, the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment was reorganized into Headquarters, Special Troops (Provisional). Continued command emphasis was placed on improved management of resources and more responsive logistical support of combat operations. Efforts to improve the logistics system in US Army, Vietnam have been concentrated on the identification and disposition of excess stocks, the physical cleanup of the 506th Field Depot and its relocation to Long Binh Post. (Complete list of visitors attached at Inclosure 8.)

B. (U) ACofS, COMPTROLLER, Annex A. All elements of the command were furnished the third quarter Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA) Listing on 25 January 1968. The FY 1969 Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) Command Operating Budget of $279.8 million was forwarded to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) on 5 February 1968. A $VN/18.1 million reclamation to the $VN/20 million reduction of the 1968 Annual Funding Program (AFP) for Assistance In Kind (AIK) funds was submitted to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) on 31 March 1968. USARV withdrew $55.2 million for contract dredging, repair of Lines of Communications (LOC), rental and maintenance of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment, real estate rentals and leases, effective 1 April 1968. Reimbursable documents forwarded to United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) Materiel Management Agency, by subordinate units of this command reached an all time high of 13,182 in March 1968. On 12 February 1968 the United States Army Audit Agency (USAAC) validated a cost reduction action (Neal Contract, individual) for $9,038,500 and followed with another (Han Jiu Contract) for $8,506,400 on 13 March 1968. Exit conferences were held on 19 March and 15 April 1968 concerning audits of subsistence management and direct support/general support maintenance in the Qui Nhon Support Command. The formal reports have not yet been received. The command reply to the audit of the 506th Field Depot was forwarded through command channels to the Department of the Army on 12 April 1968.

C. (C) ACofS, PERSONNEL, Annexes B, C, and D. Significant civil affairs activities included support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Civil Recovery Program, the conduct of the Tet Aggression Relief Project, and the evacuation of refugees from Camp Red Ball, all as a consequence of the VC/NVA Tet attacks; the continued progress of the civic action portion of USARV OPLAN 81-68 with the publication of Annex Q (Civic Action) to
1st IC OPOED 1-68; the shipment of 771,221 pounds of commodities through the Civic Action Distribution Point, and the transfer of this activity to the US Army Headquarters Area Command; and the continued efforts by all subordinate units in the conduct of military civic action and community relations programs. The present command strength is 51,196, which represents 94.5% of authorized strength. As a result of USARV revalidating the command's Direct Hire authorizations, an overall decrease in authorizations occurred. This, coupled with the GVN draft of male personnel, will most probably result in an understrength in this area. Manpower surveys of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and the headquarters of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands have been completed. Upon the completion of the survey of the Qui Nhon Support Command in the 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year 1969, all TDAs will be submitted as a single circuit closing package. The number of officer and enlisted clubs remained fairly constant. During the quarter a revitalized education program commenced with the concentration on affording all personnel an opportunity to participate in the program. The Army motor vehicle accident rate continued its upward trend and now exceeds the USARV established expectancy rate.

D. (C) ACofS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Annexes E, F, and G. Security Division, Annex E. Hostile forces conducted 16 major attacks which affected this command: seven convoy ambushes, two against maintenance areas, six ammunition barges destroyed during one attack, two ammunition storage areas, one POL storage area and three billet areas. On 2 April 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-5 was published with guidance concerning the personnel security program, followed on 16 April 1968 by the publication of Regulation 390-5 establishing procedures for the safeguarding of defense information. On 12 March 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-6 was published setting policies and procedures governing access to special category information (COFRAN). Procedures were established restricting access to special category information to the minimum essential number of individuals.

2. Plans and Force Developments Division, Annex F. Representatives from this command serving as logistics advisors on the Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam (USARV) Ad Hoc Committee for Base Development, conducted field trips to survey base camp sites and make adjustments in the base development programs as required. There was continued review and discussion of logistical requirements for OPPLAN 67-64 (Post Hostility Activities). The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) update of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and grade structure for 274 T0E units of the 1st Logistical Command was completed. New temporary loan policies were instituted to curb the drain on depot stocks. Under the Standardization of Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) program, a total of 10 MTOEs covering 46 separate units have been completed and forwarded to USARV G3, Force Developments Division. Five significant combat service support
force packages were developed during February and March 1968. A revised plan was submitted in March 1968 for implementation of depot Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs) at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhơn on 1 June 1968.

3. Operations Division, Annex G. There were no major unit-arrivals in which the command was involved during February, March and April. Command activities during this period were highlighted by the US Force response to the Communist Tet attacks and the establishment of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional) in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). It was assembled from 1st Logistical Command assets located among the other three support commands and this headquarters. A total of 83 detachment, platoon, company, battalion and group-size units were reassigned by this headquarters to the new support command, while 25 other elements of varied size were attached. During the reporting period, 109 emergency airdrop missions were executed in support of US Army, US Marine Corps and Free World Military Assistance Forces. A total of 12,630.14 short tons of all classes of supplies were delivered. The largest recipient was the Marine Corps at Khe Sanh, which received a total of 8,335.70 short tons. The February total of 4229.13 short tons represented the largest single monthly airdrop tonnage in airborne history. This record was short lived, however, when 5,516.67 short tons of all classes of supply were delivered in March. A total of 45 major tactical operations were logistically supported during the three month period. At the end of April, 16 operations were still in progress. Three forward support areas (FSA) were established during the period while four were closed and one was transferred to the Marine Force Logistics Command. Five other previously established FSAs continued operation. At the end of April, seven FSAs were still operating. As a result of the enemy’s extensive Tet attacks, resupply of tactical operations greatly tested the ability of this command to move needed material. Continuous interdiction of land lines of communication resulted in the extensive use of combat essential and emergency resupply air missions. While normal movement of supplies was hindered, this command was continually able to provide the tactical units with essential supplies and equipment.

E. (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION, Annex H. During the Tet attacks and subsequent increased activity by Free World Military Assistance Forces, the Class V supply system successfully met its greatest challenge in the Vietnam conflict. In addition, 1st Logistical Command provided critical backup to the ARVN Class V supply system during the same period. Rapid expansion into I Corps Tactical Zone received close and continuous management which resulted in effective Class V supply to the combat elements deployed to that area. Maintenance and retrograde programs are being implemented that should greatly enhance Class V operations in the 1st Logistical Command. Actions are being taken to further expand the use of automatic data processing equipment and programs in the supply management of Class V. Construction of ammunition storage and maintenance facilities continues with many areas nearing completion.
F. (C) DIRECTORATE OF ENGINEERING, Annexes I, J, and K. Facilities & Engineering Division, Annex I. The recent Tet attack resulted in extensive damage to many ammunition storage pads and considerable losses in ammunition stocks in the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD).

An inspection of the depot was conducted by the Engineering and Ammunition Directorates, and priorities of work leading to the improvement of the facility were established. Further, the ammunition renovation building at that location was severely damaged by an explosion in February 1967. Rather than attempting to modify the existing building, the entire structure will be dismantled and then replaced with a tropical wood frame building. Following revision of the 506th Field Depot layout at Long Binh, several programs were initiated to accelerate construction progress of hardstand areas and warehouse buildings. Although approximately 104,000 square yards of hardstand area in Pleiku is programmed for completion during this construction period, this amount falls short of satisfying the minimum requirement of 116,000 square yards. The short fall includes hardstands for engineer equipment repair and wheeled vehicle maintenance. Considerable emphasis is being placed on completion of the repair work required on the Dong Nai POL Jetty. It is expected that essential repairs can be completed in May by contract. Recent enemy activities reinforced the need for a permanent underground command post at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. A construction request has been submitted for a command post which will be capable of providing working space for 56 personnel, a communications center, and an emergency logistical operations control center. In the interim a temporary underground bunker has been completed. Housing has been provided Korean Nationals employed by the Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay through the construction of two-story tropical wood barracks. A movement of marker buoys at Cam Ranh Bay caused deep draft vessels to run aground as they entered the port. A technical hydrographic survey eliminated the need for dredging and a buoy tender relocated the buoys. Heavy use of DeLong Pier #2 at Cam Ranh Bay has caused the wearing surface to deteriorate. A test section of AN-2 aluminum matting has proven it can be used to provide a suitable surface for the pier. Renovation of Cam Ranh Bay computer buildings and construction of a new computer building at Qui Nhon will provide the 1st Logistical Command with complete computer facilities at these locations.

The base development plans from ten installations for which the 1st Logistical Command has master planning responsibility were updated and forwarded to USAFV. A new USAFV regulation reassigned master planning responsibility on a geographical basis. To retain control of, and proper supervision over, the development of major logistical installations, a request was made that USAFV assign this responsibility to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. A study conducted during this period determined that a depot should be established at Vung Tau. This could alleviate congestion at Saigon Port and Newport, and decrease the load on the 506th Field Depot. The construction of facilities has been requested in two phases. During this period it was decided to relocate the Class IV, construction materials
supply activity from Saigon Area 205 to Long Binh, and the non-standard repair parts activity from the Rice Mill to the Fishmarket area, also in Saigon. Both of these activities are operated by Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PAAE). A new depot is being established at Da Nang to handle the Army peculiar items required to support the recent troop build-up in the I Corps area. The 1st Logistical Command is providing 32 two bedroom house trailers to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam to provide living accommodations for senior officers. The depot parachute maintenance facility at Cam Ranh Bay has been approved by the USARV Ad Hoc Base Development Committee. Design for the rigging and operations building is completed, and a contract for construction should be let in early May 1968. Because of a reduction in Military Construction, Army (MCA) Fiscal Year (FY) 1969 funds, USARV has requested a complete review and resubmission of previous requests for construction (DD Forms 1391) by 15 May 1968. A listing of FY 1970 requirements is also to be submitted.

2. (U) Troop Operations Division, Annex J. Support commands were given authority to coordinate directly with elements of the Engineer Agency to obtain troop labor to expeditiously effect battle damage repair of US Government real property facilities. Dollar limitations for minor new construction were imposed on each support command on a quarterly basis to meet the 25% objective ratio of minor new construction to maintenance and repair set by USARV. Construction for MACV Advisors, required by Program 5, will be accomplished by Engineer Agency troops using MCA materials. Field laundry production rose from 11.8 million pounds to 11.9 million pounds during the reporting period. Two Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) were forwarded to the Navy to provide contract laundry service to Army personnel in I CTZ. Two new commercial contracts were awarded raising the total number of active contracts to 23. Field bath production continued to be commensurate with field requirements.

3. (U) Contract Operations Division (COD), Annex K. Comprehensive technical inspections of B&U contractor operations were conducted at Saigon Port, Long Binh, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku, Camp Keniri, An Khe, Di An and Lai Khe. A new format for the Repair and Utilities (R&U) Contractor Performance Report was used this quarter and proved to be a significantly better aid for monitoring contractor performance. COD prepared the special and technical provisions for the FY 1969 B&U contracts and also prepared the new Schedule B, List of Government-Provided Equipment, for the contracts. Of significance is the change for FY 1969 which opened the Qui Nhon area for a competitive bid contract. An inspection was made of water production facilities at Nha Trang, Dong Ba Thin, Cam Ranh Bay, Pr-ting (Dalat) and Long Binh Mountain (Dalat). The use of herbicides and plant growth retardants was temporarily suspended during this period, but a clarification enabled a resumption of its use for B&U activities. A shortage of rodenticide bait blocks created a problem during the period, but the Defense
General Supply Center advises current production increases coupled with airlift delivery should alleviate the problem. COD personnel assisted Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc. (PA&E) in preparation of a more accurate and meaningful Quarterly Review and Analysis Report. A system was devised to improve the R&U support of MACV advisors in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

G. (C) DIRECTORATE OF FOOD, Annex L. A total of 85,000 short tons of subsistence was received and issued by the three depots during this period. On 30 April 1968, the first air shipment of locally procured fresh fruits and vegetables were flown from Dalat to I Corps Tactical Zone for the support of Army troops in that area. This is scheduled to be a daily flight. During March 1968, a total of 12,596 short tons of subsistence was transferred from 1st Logistical Command stocks to the Navy stocks at Da Nang. This transfer was necessary to assist the Navy in supporting the large influx of Army troops to that area. The first shipment of the new Ration Supplement Beverage Pack was received in early February 1968. This product was developed from suggestions and requirements received from the field in Vietnam. The request to increase the theatre stockage of the combat ration from 10 to 15 days was disapproved. This request was based on erratic shipments of the combat ration from CONUS. Speciality items for the Thanksgiving and Christmas menus, including whole turkey, fruit cake, and assorted nuts have been requisitioned. The commercial milk plant at Qui Nhon became operational on 15 February 1968. This plant provides a highly acceptable filled milk product, ice cream and cottage cheese.

H. (C) DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SUPPLY, Annex M. A conference was held 5-7 February 1968 at the Logistics Control Office, Pacific, Fort Mason, California to discuss existing problems and proposed changes to the Red Ball System in Vietnam, 2d Logistical Command, and in CONUS. Primary agenda item was the utilization of multiple aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to receive Red Ball cargo directly from Travis Air Force Base. The 1st Logistical Supply Data Systems Plan will have an impact on all levels of supply, resulting in improved support to customers through use of maximum automation and increased management capabilities under improved techniques and controls. The 14th Inventory Control Center (14th ICC) is in the process of programming for the conversion to the Standard Supply System 14th ICC (3S14) with a target date for implementation of 15 June 1968. The 3S14 is being monitored to assure compatibility between the 14th ICC and the depots. The 506th Field Depot converted to Standard Supply System Vietnam (SSS) Version 18 on 5 February 1968. The Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) Depot Automatic Data Processing (ADP) renovation project completion date is 8 June 1968. The Qui Nhon Depot is scheduled to convert to the International Business Machine (IBM) 7010/1460 computer configuration on 8 June 1968; the ADP building is 25% constructed. The tactical situation established a require-
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ment for a provisional depot at Da Nang. Department of the Army (DA)
has given final approval for an IBM 1460 computer at the 4th Transportation
Command with an installation date of 15 June 1968. A UNIVAC 1005 will
be diverted to the Vung Tau Direct Support Unit (DSU) as soon as one
becomes available. Micromation equipment is scheduled for implementation
within the command during the next three months. A supply data systems
training program has been established for military personnel and Local
Nationals to bring the level of military skills in ADP operations up to
that point where contractual assistance will not be required. As a result
of the Combat Vehicle Closed Loop Conference, 6-9 March 1968, held at
Headquarters, US Army Tank Automotive Command (USATACOM), Warren, Michigan,
revised programs for support of armored personnel carriers (APC) and tanks
and new programs for support of M98 Recovery Vehicles and M2A1 Dusters
were developed. A Closed Loop Conference was held at US Army Mobility
Equipment Command (USAMECOM), 25 March-3 April 1968. A Free World Assistance
Force (FWAF) Liaison Office has been established in the Plans and
Projects Division, Directorate of General Supply. The Five-Phase Excess
Program has resulted in the identification of $54,580,000 in excess. A
Material Readiness Council has been appointed to assist and advise the
Material Readiness Officer and Commanding General. Two care and preservation
specialists from Tobyhanna Army Depot and one from Letterkenny Depot
arrived on 13 March 1968 to advise and assist in the establishment and
implementation of a viable care and preservation program. The 14th IEC
has initiated an item substitution program. A project officer was appointed
on 8 March 1968 to implement the recommendations for improving the
clothing and textile supply distribution system.

I. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE, Annex N. Marine maintenance
activities were reorganized to facilitate diversified support to include
organizational maintenance as well as scheduled overhaul. A study of
capabilities versus requirements of maintenance units within the command
was completed on 15 February 1968. Emphasis has been placed on maintenance
support of the AN/GRC-106 Radio Set and Radio Teletypewriter Sets AN/GRC-1A2
and AN/VRC-2. There has been an overall improvement of deadline rates of
equipment USARV-wide. A Closed Loop Support Conference attended by direc-
torate personnel, was held in CONUS from 25 to 29 March 1968. Collapsible
Fuel Drum repair facilities have increased production. The M16A2 tank was
introduced into Vietnam. The M109 howitzer has undergone a product improve-
ment program. With the activation of Da Nang Support Command (Provisional),
the repair of tactical wheeled vehicles was hampered due to a shortage of
repair parts and the necessary movement of units to new locations. The
M16A1 rifle Repair/Retrofit Program is progressing satisfactorily.

J. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT, Annex O. Purchase Requests and
Commitment Forms (PR&Cs) processed during the report period, 1 February
through 26 April 1968, totaled 470 at a value of $15.7 million. Total
PR&Cs thus far processed during Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 amount to 224.
valued at $320.8 million. As of 26 April 1968, excluding Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA), 187 contracts valued at $430 million were under the administration of the United States Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USA-PAV). Command efforts were successful in reducing Third Quarter, FY 1967, off-shore procurement to $7.7 million as compared to $6.8 million in Third Quarter, FY 1967. Preparation of a 200-page book entitled "Procurement Support in Vietnam" was completed and is being published in Japan.

A 1St Logistical Command Regulation 715-20, "Advance Procurement Planning," was published. As a result of the Advance Procurement Plan, 71 FY 1969 PRPs were received as of 27 April 1968 with a value of $245.4 million. The first FY 1968 PR&C, valued at $31 million, was not received until April 1967. The Advance Procurement Plan has permitted competitive procurement on nine FY 1968 sole source contracts valued at $42,552,938. The FY 1969 Management Improvement Program estimated savings of $56,579,996, plus the FY 1968 estimated savings of $24,864,355, with an additional sum of $24,351,029 in decommitted or deobligated funds comes to a two-year total of $105,795,380. Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PAE) has assumed the additional Repairs and Utilities (RAU) responsibility of servicing the United Services Organization (USO) and United States Naval Activities in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. PAE's procurement function was eliminated, effective 15 March 1968. PAE's training program resulted in the replacement of 353 Third Country Nationals by Local Nationals, exceeding the original goal of 300. The Agency source list has been expanded by 79 (7% increase). The Pricing Division participated in the negotiation, analysis and award of over $4 million of new contracts and modifications. Pricing personnel began the evaluation and negotiation of approximately $128 million of FY 1969 proposals. The Pricing Division has made several trips in support of Contracting Officers, revised the MACONOMY Reports and initiated an internal training program. The Supplies Division has analyzed the value of BPAs since fragmentation of purchases and disregard of money limitation has occurred. Possible use of other forms of contracts is the result. Improved inspection procedures were developed by the Directorate of Property Administration; however, the number of inspections decreased due to the Tet attack and restricted travel conditions. The program of identification and return to the Government of excess R&U supplies in the hands of PAE reached its goal of $3 million on 29 February 1968. The goal has been revised upward to $4 million. Vinnell Corporation's requisitioning objectives were recomputed using the correct order/shipping time factor prescribed by the 1St Logistical Command. It is estimated that this will permit the turn-in to Army depots of approximately 5000 line items of stock. To insure efficient and economical management of Government Furnished Property (GFP), all Agency contractors were directed to report on a monthly basis all idle or excess GFP with an acquisition cost of $200 or more. These lists will be used to initiate possible redistribution of GFP. The Agency initiated a program to publish a
series of Commander's Policies to clarify the aims, purpose and goals of the commander. A study was conducted on the effects of the Tet attack on the Agency and on contractor operations. Internal Agency operations were impaired for five days; however, minimum staffing was available at all times. Delays in contractor performance resulted due to facilities and equipment being damaged or destroyed, danger to personnel, the general absence of Local National employees, and the imposition of GVN curfews.

K. (C) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM, Annex P. Enemy actions against petroleum facilities continued. T-1 tankers are supplementing Y-tankers in the resupply of Phan Thiet and Vung Tau. Construction continued with new tankage being completed at Long Binh, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku. Approximately 30 miles of new pipeline were laid within the Cam Ranh Bay complex. The Tet attack, although inflicting only minor overall damage on petroleum stocks and facilities, created some concern in the resupply of the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Disruption of contractual deliveries, caused by a combination of insecure roads and waterways, and GVN Government-imposed curfew resulted in serious drawdown of stocks in several locations. Steady progress, however, is being made in reconstituting these stocks in spite of the fact that three of the five military Y-tankers are out-of-country for repairs. Their loss has been offset to some extent by the emergency contract for two barge and tug combinations, operated by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. The "Tiny Tim," a two stage, 12-inch, 8,000 barrel per hour pump, has been installed next to the newly constructed 1,600 feet long T-5 pier at Cam Ranh Bay and is presently undergoing final tests. New airlift procedures for bulk and packaged petroleum products have been developed and have resulted in greater responsiveness to requirements for Priority 01 air deliveries. During April 1968, the US Army Support Command Da Nang (Provisional) began wholesale petroleum operations by operating and maintaining approximately 30 miles of pipeline, two pump stations, and one 3,000 barrel tank.

L. (U) DIRECTORATE OF RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL, Annex Q. In coordination with the Department of the Air Force, action has been taken to procure silver recovery units for installation at all photographic activities in Vietnam. Action has also been taken to procure 14 silver recovery units for installation at Army hospitals capable of generating a minimum of 500 gallons of hypo solutions per year. This action conforms to Department of the Army instructions regarding the recovery and conservation of silver. Retrograde operations, while continuing to expedite the movement of material to off-shore facilities, devoted a significant amount of time to improving other aspects of the retrograde program. Programs initiated or completed were: retrograde via Sea-Land service; removal of high explosives from retrograde vehicles; study of Collection, Classification, and Salvage company requirements versus capabilities; procurement and installation of improved cleaning facilities; and efforts to improve the documentation and packing of retrograde material.
M. (U) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION, Annex B. Newport set a record in March 1968 by handling 141,740 short tons S/T of cargo. Vung Tau also set records during two consecutive months by handling 88,247 S/T in March and 96,132 S/T in April. As of 13 March, the Logistical Over-the-Shore (LOTS) operation at Wunder Beach in I CTZ became completely operational and has proven highly successful. The Sea-Land Container program continued to progress with eight vessels arriving during the period. An average of 700,032 S/T of cargo was moved by highway per month during the period: 326,153 S/T moved by military vehicles and 373,879 S/T by contractor. A total of 12,558 troops arrived in Vietnam via sea and air.

N. (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL, Annex S.

O. (U) CHAPLAIN, Annex T. As of 30 April 1968, 1st Logistical Command had a total authorization of 72 chaplains. Sixty five of these spaces are filled with one Jewish, 54 Protestant, and 10 Catholic chaplains. Eighty chaplain assistants are assigned. The number of services conducted by each chaplain per week was 4.0 which is equal to the USARV goal. A total of 2,920,625 $VN were donated through chapel offerings during February, March and April 1968. Thirty one requisitions for electronic organs were filled. Thirty nine sets of altar brassware were chrome plated.

P. (C) SIGNAL OFFICE, Annex U. Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) is scheduled to be installed in the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters and its four major subordinate commands by mid August 1968, thus facilitating improved command and control. The Command Group key telephone system is to be expanded to include all the Directorates and Staff Sections upon arrival of required equipment from CONUS. A single side band radio net was established between the headquarters and the three most distant support commands allowing instantaneous radio telephone communications. The compartmentalization of the National Security Agency codes was put into effect this quarter, utilizing four small systems as compared to the previous one large system. Communications planning for Da Nang Support Command and it's subordinate units was accomplished and formal requests for sole user circuits in support of this planning were forwarded to USARV for approval. The majority of these critical circuits have been installed, vastly improving command and control communications in the Da Nang area of responsibility. A requirements plan to provide the 506th Field Depot with continuous communications during its relocation from Saigon to Long Binh was developed by a depot planning group and the Signal Office.

Q. (U) INFORMATION OFFICE, Annex V. 1st Logistical Command led all major Army units throughout the world with 10,638 hometown news releases and 661 hometown photo releases. A total of 595 hometown radio tapes were released. News stories totaled 309 and 240 captioned photos accompanied the news releases. Continued emphasis is placed on subordinate
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command information offices to seek out, write, and photograph news in-depth throughout their areas of responsibility. More than 150 press queries were received from media representatives, more than half of these resulted in personal contact with news media representatives. Increased emphasis has been placed on input for the Army Daily Summary with the number of items published steadily increasing. A total of 99 1st Logistical Command articles were published by USARV compared with 89 for the prior period. Four mimeograph newspapers are being published either weekly or bi-weekly by subordinate information offices. Six issues of the command newspaper, "The Vietnam Review," have been published and more than 17,000 copies are printed and distributed of each issue. Work has been completed on updating an informational brochure with a planned publication of 100,000 copies in late May 1968.

B. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL, Annex W. Inspector General assistance was extended to 360 members of the command. Approximately 50% of the requests concerned dissatisfaction with assignment, non receipt of orders, promotion and pay. Of the 23 complaints processed, eight were justified. There were 58 Annual General Inspections conducted, of which 56 of the units inspected received a rating of satisfactory. Supply, maintenance, training and security continued to be major areas of interest.

S. (C) PROVOST MARSHAL, Annex X. Continuing command emphasis is being placed on the control and safeguarding of US supplies and military property through staff liaison visits and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-2 Inspections of major subordinate commands. The third US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Detachment has arrived in-country and is operational in Qui Nhon. The 4458th Transportation Light Amphibious Company (Patrol Boat River) has been organized under MTCE 55-138E and assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade with a direct support mission to provide security to the inland waterways and ports. A complete review of the physical security afforded to Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot was conducted. Provost Marshal statistics indicate a slight decrease in all categories of offenses, except Traffic Offense rates.

T. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES, Annex Y. The number of libraries remained fairly constant, increasing by one to 59. Library use, however, increased to 219,984. There were 13 professional shows and nine handshake tours conducted, as well as three military shows. One additional service club opened and, country-wide, attendance reached 492,814, an increase of 11,089 over the previous reporting period. The 1st Logistical Command R&R utilization rate increased from 72% to 87%, due primarily to a decrease in command monthly allocations.
U. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, Annex Z. During the months of February, March, and April 1968, this command paid $17,656.55 in personal property claims and Judge Advocates handled 3,399 legal assistance cases. The courts-martial rate within the command remained below the Army-wide level. During the past quarter, the command has tried three General Court-Martial cases, 223 Special Court-Martial cases and 84 Summary Court-Martial cases. Non-judicial punishment was imposed in 2,916 instances.
SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: OBSERVATIONS

EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. (U) PERSONNEL
NONE
B. (U) OPERATIONS

1. Finance section capabilities.

   a. OBSERVATION: Troop concentrations in IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and the Vung Tau Special Zone underwent major shifts during the reporting period. This made it necessary to realign the finance capability within Saigon Support Command by concurrent shifts of finance sections.

   b. EVALUATION: These finance sections, in most cases, were single teams organized under TOE 14-500K, which is a cellular type TOE unit capable of performing specific finance functions. These moves were accomplished by General Orders published by the US Army Support Command, Saigon and were made easier by the fact that each team was a separate numbered finance section, thereby permitting a greater degree of flexibility in the area of finance support services.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Comptroller)

2. (U) Protection afforded by barricades.

   a. OBSERVATION: The barricading of Class V stocks is intended primarily as shock, missile and fire protection between adjacent storage pads, and allows the distance between certain pads to be reduced. During the Tet attacks of 31 January – 1 February 1968, enemy forces penetrated the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) and emplaced approximately one dozen satchel charges in the storage area. Ammunition on three storage pads was destroyed. One pad contained approximately 211 tons of eight inch high explosive projectiles which detonated. Several Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and security personnel were in the immediate vicinity of this pad and although thrown violently about, no one was killed. Injuries sustained by personnel included punctured eardrums, abrasions, strained muscles, and burns caused by hot shrapnel. A few projectiles were hurled horizontally into pads a few hundred feet away, but no secondary explosions resulted from the primary explosion.

   b. EVALUATION: Substantial barricades do provide protection from mass-detonating explosives. Although personnel were within 50 meters of the pad, they were protected from direct effect of the concussion and fragmentation by the barricade between them and the detonation. The barricades prevented the loss of adjacent ammunition by eliminating direct fragmentation and shock effects.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Ammunition)
3. (U) Dispersal of stocks.

a. OBSERVATION: On the night of 1 February 1968, the Forward Support Area (FSA) at Phu Bai in I Corps Tactical Zone was attacked with rockets and mortars. One ammunition storage cell containing 155mm propellant charges was destroyed. This cell contained all the 155mm propellant charges in the FSA. The Phu Tai ASD at Qui Nhon was attacked with recoilless rifle fire from the surrounding hills on two successive nights. Some of the ammunition was saved by aggressive fire fighting efforts, but the two areas contained approximately 50 per cent of the small arms ammunition stored at the depot. The Long Binh ASD had most of the Class 7 explosives stored in the same vicinity, Area IV. As a result of enemy-initiated explosions, activity in this area was limited for several hours until all roads in the area could be cleared of explosives by EOD personnel.

b. EVALUATION: Placing all quantities of a single item in the same storage cell or in a relatively small area may result in complete loss of that item during an enemy attack. Activity in an area will be greatly curtailed during secondary explosions after a successful hit by enemy fire. Every effort consistent with the tactical situation, should be made to insure maximum dispersal of stocks to preclude complete loss of any one item and maximum access to some quantities of each item.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir: Ammunition)

4. (U) Ammunition Storage Point at Tan Son Nhut.

a. OBSERVATION: In 1967, the Ammunition Storage Point (ASP) at Tan Son Nhut, near Saigon, was converted to a temporary holding area for Class V received by channel air. Consequently, the stockage objective was eliminated and all ammunition returned to the Long Binh ASD. This action was directed by USARV due to the proximity of the ASP to the Tan Son Nhut airbase.

b. EVALUATION: During the Tet attacks of Saigon and environs, it quickly became apparent that an ASP was required for issuing small arms ammunition, grenades and other small items for units in the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut/Cholon metropolitan area. The nearest available ammunition was located at the Long Binh ASD approximately 25 Kilometers from Saigon. Due to enemy activity between the two areas, it was necessary to airlift the majority of Class V from Long Binh ASD by helicopter. This necessitated numerous retail issues from the Long Binh ASD with considerable congestion at the helipads. Based on this experience, approval was obtained from USARV to reconstitute selected small arms ammunition, grenades, flares, etc., at the Tan Son Nhut ASP as contingency stocks.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir: Ammunition)
5. (U) Cam Ranh Bay Base Depot.

a. OBSERVATION: Except for a few isolated FSA's, ammunition resupply is effected by road. Temporary closure of land lines of communication (LOC) during the VC/NVA Tet attacks coupled with heavy requirements for ammunition throughout Vietnam necessitated more air shipments than normal. Temporary closure of Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Qui Nhon Air Bases resulted in utilization of Cam Ranh Bay as the source of supply to isolated FSA's, and to other AS's. From 29 January to 4 February 1968, approximately 335 short tons of ammunition were airlifted to points ranging from Dong Ha (ICTZ) to Yung Tau in the Delta. Ports at Saigon (Cat Lai) and Qui Nhon were not working at their full discharge capability due to enemy activity. Qui Nhon was affected by the refusal of the Han Jin contractor to haul ammunition at night, reducing receipts at the ASD by approximately 50%. In the Saigon area, only 32 short tons (normally 1000 short tons) were discharged at Cogido Barge Discharge Site on 31 January and nothing was discharged during the next three days. Cam Ranh Bay was the only port that could receive ammunition in quantity during the period 31 January - 4 February 1968.

b. EVALUATION: Cam Ranh Bay was fully operational during the Tet attack and could meet emergency commitments. Besides the port and air base being operational, the Ammunition Supply Depot had the balanced stockage objective and assets available to meet unforeseen Class V requirements imposed by the attacks.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Ammunition)

6. (U) Block Stowage of ships.

a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition is frequently received at 1st Logistical Command Ports with lots mixed in stowage compartments. Ammunition must be stored at ammunition supply depots by type and lot. Consequently, when mixed lots are received, considerable time and diversion of assets is required to properly stow the ammunition.

b. OBSERVATION: Block stowage of Class V, maintaining lot integrity aboard ships, would increase truck utilization, reduce the number of times material handling equipment must be shifted, reduce lighterage turnaround time, and reduce ship off load time.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That CONUS ports block stow Class V by lot aboard ships to the maximum extent possible to facilitate receipt in the Republic of Vietnam. (Dir. Ammunition)
7. (C) Support to Airmobile and Airborne Divisions.

a. OBSERVATION: To support extended tactical operations conducted by airborne and airmobile divisions, which are committed to a conventional infantry role, it is necessary, in most instances, to deploy a forward support area (FSA) to provide combat service support.

b. EVALUATION: The support commands, organic to the airborne and airmobile divisions, are not equipped nor staffed to provide their maneuver units with the daily tonnage of supplies required. This results in a requirement for additional direct support. The organic support command's ability to render necessary support is further reduced because of its requirement to provide certain services and support at the division base camp on a continuous basis.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That this command continue to deploy forward support areas (FSA) for airborne and airmobile brigade size operations; however, where possible, augmentation of the division or brigade Forward Support Element (FSE) should be considered as a course of action prior to deploying an FSA task force. Further, a study should be initiated to determine the feasibility of establishing an MTOE for the airborne and airmobile support commands so that they can be better staffed and equipped to support extended tactical operations in the conventional infantry concept. (ACofS, SP&O)

8. (C) Vulnerability of petroleum pipelines.

a. OBSERVATION: Although frequently damaged by enemy explosive charges and small arms fire, particularly during the Tet attack, pipelines were rapidly repaired. The pipeline proved to be the most reliable and secure means of distribution when tank truck and boat deliveries were curtailed.

b. EVALUATION: Pipelines are the most reliable means of petroleum distribution during enemy offensive operations.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Petroleum)

9. (C) Vulnerability of petroleum storage tanks.

a. OBSERVATION: Major damage was sustained by only one steel storage tank in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Several other tanks sustained minor damage.

b. EVALUATION: It is almost impossible to protect a tank against high trajectory mortar fire; however, damage caused by flat trajectory rockets, automatic weapons, and small arms fire can be limited by
placing defensive perimeters out several hundred meters. Also, a tank painted with a dull, drab paint presents a more difficult target than one painted with white or aluminum paint.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Nohis. (Dir. Petroleum)

10. (C) Centralized control of Priority 01 air shipments of Class III.

   a. OBSERVATION: In the past, 01 airlift requests were scheduled by the 834th Air Division without regard to priorities within the total block of 01 requests. Since the 834th Air Division could not possibly weigh the relative urgency of one support command’s requirements against another, a system was developed to insure the most critical requests were handled first.

   b. EVALUATION: This directorate developed a system whereby assignment of relative priorities for priority 01 deliveries of packaged fuels throughout the theater are determined within this headquarters. This system has proven responsive to the needs of the support commands and is providing timely and adequate resupply where and when it is needed most.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Nohis. (Dir. Petroleum)

11. (C) Security of Binh Loi – Tan Son Nhut pipeline and Binh Loi River Terminal.

   a. OBSERVATION: The Tet attack revealed the lack of security at the Binh Loi River Terminal and on the Binh Loi – Tan Son Nhut pipeline. On two separate occasions, damage to the pipeline by enemy action and inability of repair crews to enter the area, nearly resulted in the complete shutdown of aircraft operations from the Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

   b. EVALUATION: Adequate protection must be given the Binh Loi River Terminal and the Binh Loi – Tan Son Nhut pipeline if Tan Son Nhut Air Base is expected to remain operational during periods of heavy enemy action.

c. RECOMMENDATION: A comprehensive security plan for the area should be developed. This should include the availability of a predesignated helicopter borne force to provide cover for pipeline repair crews. A security force in boats or helicopters to escort and protect Y-tankers and barges navigating the Saigon River in the Binh Loi area during periods of enemy activity is also required. (Dir. Petroleum)
12. (U) Theft of cargo.

a. OBSERVATION: Difficulty has been encountered with the commercial contractors losing cargo due to illegal activities of driver personnel. Drivers have stolen and sold loads, particularly during the night when they were able to pull off the road into alleys or parking areas unobserved.

b. EVALUATION: A program has been initiated to paint fluorescent marking on all Equipment, Inc. and Philco-Ford cargo vehicles for identification. These markings have been applied to 80% of the fleet in the following manner:

- 18" 1st Logistical Command Patch Top of cab
- 4" 1st Logistical Command Patch Both doors of cab
  - 2 on front bumper
  - 2 on rear bumper

No statistics are available at this time to determine the effectiveness of this program.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Transportation)


a. OBSERVATION: Difficulty has been encountered by Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon Support Commands in loading 2½ ton and 5 ton cargo vehicles due to vehicle configuration. Vehicles with drop-sides are more compatible for MHE loading and off-loading than conventional vehicles.

b. EVALUATION: Drop-side vehicles have been requested, but they are not due until the 1st quarter of Calendar Year 1969. To circumvent the loading problem, a program has been initiated to place false decking in the 2½ ton and 5 ton cargo vehicles to raise the bed and allow MHE to load from the side. Saigon Support Command has completed this modification on 80% of its vehicles; Cam Ranh Bay is 100% completed.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Transportation)

14. (C) Nonsecure sole user voice communications.

a. OBSERVATION: During the Tet attack the 1st Logistical Command's sole user (hot line) voice circuits not only provided immediate contact with major subordinate commands but also served as a backup means of contact had the nonsecure, common user area systems become inoperative or unable to respond in a timely manner due to voluminous high precedence.
calls. The same service is provided the major subordinate commands to sub area commands and Forward Support Areas (FSA) under their direction. The sole user circuits were invaluable and enabled rapid response to command required information concerning logistical support to US Army elements and designated Free World Forces.

b. EVALUATION: The use of sole user voice communications as a supplement to the area systems proved to be a most valuable asset.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Signal Office)

15. (C) Radio Telephone Communications:

a. OBSERVATION: A single side band radio net was established during the Tet attack with stations at the Signal Office, 1st Logistical Command and all subordinate support commands except Saigon Support. The radio equipment in the net provides the capability of radio telephone communications. This phone patch capability was utilized by the commander and staff, 1st Logistical Command, when other means of communications became overloaded.

b. EVALUATION: The radio net provides a very essential back up to the nonsecure, common user area voice communications system.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Signal Office)
C. (U) TRAINING

1. Ammunition Record Clerks - MOS 76N.

   a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition Records Clerks arriving in lst Logistical Command generally lack a clear understanding of automatic data processing (ADP) of Class V Stock records.

   b. EVALUATION: Due to the planned automation of all theater stock control records, it is becoming increasingly important that CONUS schools incorporate ADP instruction into their officer and enlisted Class V Supply courses.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: That comprehensive instruction on automatic data processing as pertains to the Class V Supply System be incorporated, to a greater extent, in CONUS service schools. (Dir Ammunition)

2. Ammunition Supervisors.

   a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition supervisors, both officer and enlisted, generally lack adequate experience, or formal training, in Class V surveillance activities.

   b. EVALUATION: Storage of Class V in adverse weather conditions demands close and continuous surveillance of stocks to ensure excessive deterioration is prevented through timely and adequate maintenance. Proper storage compatibility and safety criteria must be maintained at the highest degree possible in a combat zone to minimize losses of ammunition. These aspects of Class V storage are, for the most part, entrusted to Department of the Army Civilian Surveillance Inspectors who specialize in this highly technical field. Military personnel are not normally permitted to attend the Surveillance courses of instruction at Savannah, Illinois.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: That selected officer and enlisted personnel with ammunition supply backgrounds be permitted to attend surveillance instruction at Savannah, Illinois. These personnel should also gain practical experience in CONUS and other overseas locations. This training and experience would prove invaluable during hostilities at locations where enemy actions preclude assignment of civilians. A special prefix to an officer's MOS and a specific MOS for enlisted personnel would readily identify personnel with this specialized training. (Dir Ammunition)


23
a. OBSERVATION: The greatest input of Radio Set AN/GRC-106 series began in October 1967. The steady increase in the quantity of these sets has not been complemented with a corresponding input of trained direct support maintenance personnel to support current densities. A high failure rate is being experienced. Headquarters, USARV, in conjunction with Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, has organized a remedial direct support maintenance training program. The first of six 3-week courses began on 22 April 1968. Training is available to a limited number of technical personnel from all USARV major commands.

b. EVALUATION: The direct support maintenance training program for Radio Set AN/GRC-106 series was established in an attempt to remedy the current high deadline rate for this set. In order to receive this training, a student must leave his parent unit for three weeks. Although this local training program should provide some relief, the optimum situation would be to have qualified personnel assigned from CONUS to RVN to provide adequate direct support for the current densities of this set.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Repairmen for Radio Set AN/GRC-106 series assigned to RVN receive more adequate direct support level maintenance training prior to departure from CONUS. (Dir Maintenance)

4. The Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data.

a. OBSERVATION: With the publishing of DPC #57 and ASPR Revision No. 26, a need exists for orienting contracting officers on the requirements for cost or pricing data and certification thereto, and what such certification means. The orientation would help in insuring better procurements. The Procurement Pricing Division has made a study of the changes in the ASPR affected by the DPC mentioned. On an individual, as required, basis, the division has given advice to the contracting officers.

b. EVALUATION: Coordination is being made to set aside a brief training period for all contracting officers to explain the new pricing requirements. As a result, mutual problems in this area can be discussed and hopefully resolved. The Agency will also insure uniformity of action in this regard.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir Procurement)

5. Chaplain Supply Briefing.

a. OBSERVATION: It was determined that many chaplains needed additional training on supply procedures relating to chaplain and ecclesiastical supplies. Some chaplains were not aware of items available or of requisitioning and follow up procedures. To correct this deficiency, the
Staff Chaplain and Deputy Staff Chaplain prepared a supply briefing which was presented to chaplains and some chaplain assistants of three support commands and three divisional units outside 1st Logistical Command. Coordination was effected with the Staff Chaplain, II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV).

b. EVALUATION: Reports indicate that chaplains who received the supply briefings have a much greater knowledge of, and appreciation for, the supply system as it relates to chaplain and ecclesiastical supplies, they understand requisitioning and follow up procedures and are better able to acquire the items which they need.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Field Force Staff Chaplains in the Republic of Vietnam plan for all Chaplains and chaplain assistants to receive the supply briefings. (Chaplain)
D. (u) INTELLIGENCE
NONE
E. (U) LOGISTICS


   a. OBSERVATION: Many logistics-force packages were developed for proposed deployments of variously structured combat forces. Each of these packages was developed in very short time frames, without benefit of a concept of operations or locations of units. Short suspense dates required development of some of these packages within a few hours, necessitating concurrent planning by all involved. Logistics planners had to make assumptions regarding the composition and location of combat support, other combat service support, and other components.

   b. EVALUATION: Logistics planners must know the concept of operations and location of major combat forces and the composition and location of combat support and other combat service support units in order to realistically plan for logistic support of these units. Force planning should follow this sequence:

      (1) Determination of combat forces and concept of operations to include locations.

      (2) Determination of combat support forces required, including locations.

      (3) Development of the combat service support package required to furnish support to the combat and combat support force, by location, considering the support already available in country. Failure to follow an orderly sequential procedure may result in costly errors.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SPAO)

2. Timely Available Supply Rate (ASR) action.

   a. OBSERVATION: The VC/VNA Tet attack was characterized by extremely high issues of small arms ammunition, illumination items and munitions fired from helicopters. Issues of artillery ammunition was not high initially but increased steadily as units were able to replace basic loads.

   b. EVALUATION: As a result of sudden high demands on the Class V supply system, certain items were quickly identified for intensive management by 1st Logistical Command, and close monitoring was maintained on issue rate and projected receipts. In some instances, extraordinary supply action was required, and expedited shipment from off-shore reserves and CONUS was requested to reconstitute safety levels. Adjusted ASRs were submitted to USARV for approval to insure controlled expenditures by combat units that would result in equitable distribution of stocks throughout the theater.
3. Fuse to Projectile ratio.
   a. OBSERVATION: Issues of Fuse, Point Detonating, M572 (M311) for the 175mm Gun were exceeding projectile issue by considerable quantities. This fuse is authorized for use on only 95% of 175mm Gun ammunition.
   
   b. EVALUATION: Due to the supply posture of M572 fuses, it is mandatory that the fuse only be utilized as authorized. It became necessary in February to request that USARV place the fuse on Available Supply Rate (ASR) to limit issues to 95% of projectile issues. The balance of fuse requirements is met by issues of the variable time (VT) fuse M51A. Although fuses were in critical supply position throughout February, this action has conserved the fuses, and allowed a healthy supply position to be attained while still providing sufficient fuses for 175mm ammunition.
   
   c. RECOMMENDATION: None (Dir. Ammunition)

4. Packing Components.
   
   a. OBSERVATION: Units drawing Class V do not return sufficient quantities of packing components to ASD/ASPs after expenditure of the ammunition. Many boxes, fiber containers and other packing components are required at the ASD/ASP to prepare ammunition in deteriorated boxes for issue or retrograde and to repack loose rounds received as turn-ins from units.
   
   b. EVALUATION: It is to the advantage of firing units if an adequate supply of returned packing components are available at the ASD/ASPs to prepare ammunition for issue. It is recognised that due to the tactical situation and field needs for certain packing components, not all material will be returned; however, as much as possible should be turned in along with fired brass and propellant charge containers.
   
   c. RECOMMENDATION: That firing units are continually made aware of the need for return of packing components to ASD/ASDs in order that the best possible Class V service may be provided. (Dir. Ammunition)

5. Excess material.
   
   a. OBSERVATION: Due to a low troop acceptance there exists in the command an excess of dehydrated Cheddar Cheese.
   
   b. EVALUATION: Upon recommendation from the field, dehydrated Cheddar Cheese was added to the standard bread formula for the field
bakeries. This resulted in not only a means of disposing of the excess cheese, but has provided a varied bread product that has a high troop acceptance. This information has been disseminated to all field bakeries.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Food)

6. Repair Parts for Buda Engines.

a. OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining repair parts for the Buda Engines installed in 45-foot tug boats. Three small tugs (#2139, 2140 and 2066) have been deadlined since February, April and June 1967 respectively, for various Buda engine parts. In a letter dated 13 January 1968, this command requested from US Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMEC) replacement of the engines currently installed in 45-foot tugs with an engine with greater repair parts availability. Failing this, it was recommended that urgent action be taken to establish a more responsive repair parts capability for the Buda engines. Corrective action is reportedly being taken by USAMEC.

b. EVALUATION: The continued shortage of parts for the Buda engine has had an effect on the command's operational capability. Urgent action is needed to either replace the Buda engine with an engine with greater repair parts availability or establish a more responsive capability for the Buda engines.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Maintenance)

7. Repair parts for end items procured under Project ENSURE.

a. OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining repair parts for end items procured under Project ENSURE. For example, on 14 September 1967 this headquarters furnished US Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMEC) a list of parts required to establish an initial PLL and ASL for the 40 horse power (HP) and 80HP Johnson outboard motors then on hand in the Republic of Vietnam. An intra-Army order for reimbursable services was furnished which provided funds in the amount of $23,500. Numerous telephone calls, messages and letters emphasized the urgency of this requirement. On 13 February 1968 the requested parts began arriving in Vietnam. To date, only about 50% of the parts for 40HP motors requested have been received. USAMEC has been unable to furnish information on the exact number of pieces or parts shipped. Attempts to use normal supply procedures have been even less responsive and more frustrating since manual preparation and processing of requisitions is required in each case to meet the exceptional routing and identification requirements. Similar problems have been encountered with Hurricane Air Boats and River Patrol Boats (RPs). Recent telephonic communications with USAMEC indicates that the problems which have caused these
difficulties have been solved; however, this command has not yet received any parts handled under the new procedures which presumably have been established.

b. EVALUATION: Although it is realized that the non-standard nature of end items procured under Project ENSURE will present problems, the present situation cannot be justified. This command cannot accomplish its assigned mission of maintaining these items without a more responsive supply system for repair parts.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That repair parts support for marine peculiar items procured under Project ENSURE be placed under AMC project managership. (Dir. Maintenance)


a. OBSERVATION: Over 500 US Army vessels in RVN require scheduled drydocking and overhaul in accordance with AR 750-29. The majority of these must be evacuated to out of country shipyards. The contracts for overhaul are negotiated and supervised by the 2d Logistical Command. Despite expediting action by all concerned, between four and seven months turn around time has been the rule. Maintenance float requirements have been developed for each type of mission-essential vessel. This command has requested authority to requisition the required vessels by letter, dated 13 March 1968, to the CG, USARV, subject: Authority to Requisition Maintenance Float Vessels. The requirement was relayed by USARV to CINCUSARPAC by unclassified message AVHGD-MD 46014, 200648Z April 1968, subject: Request for Maintenance Float on Marine Vessels.

b. EVALUATION: Approval of the requested authorization will permit requisitioning of the required vessels. Their receipt in turn will insure that the required number of mission-essential vessels is continuously on hand.

c. RECOMMENDATION: none. (Dir. Maintenance)


a. OBSERVATION: All tugs used to tow vessels to, or from, out of country shipyards are scheduled and controlled by US Army Japan (USARJ) and Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East (MSTSFE) even though, with rare exception, the tugs are furnished by the 2d Logistical Command and this command. This system is too inflexible to meet the unpredictable and everchanging requirements of this command. Frequently, it is necessary to make last minute diversions of tugs for reasons such as battle damage to mission-essential vessels, or the failure of equipment which cannot be repaired in-country or removed from the vessel. Under the present system,
requests for tow support, or diversions, must be routed through the local traffic maintenance region to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Traffic Management Agency, USARV, MSTSFE and finally back through the local MSTS office, which directs the diversion. Expensive tug and man-days are lost while the requests are being processed. In addition, there is the expense of high priority communications, the problems caused by confusion when messages cross, and the delay in moving the deadline vessel(s) to and from repair facilities. Normal tug support is similarly inadequate; it is not uncommon for a vessel to await tow for several weeks. On 25 March 1968, this headquarters forwarded, to USARV, a letter recommending that full control of the ocean tugs assigned to 1st and 2d Logistical Commands be given to the respective commands. USARV submitted the request to CINCUSARPAC on 5 April 1968.

b. EVALUATION: The present lack of responsive tug support adversely affects the combat service support capability of this command. Since the majority of the support provided is by tugs assigned to the two commands directly involved in vessels repairs, i.e., 1st and 2d Logistical Commands, the control and scheduling of the tugs can best be accomplished by the commands to which they are assigned, with the coordination necessary for safety being made with the local MSTS office.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That 1st and 2d Logistical Commands be given the authority to control and schedule the tugs assigned to them without prior coordination with USARV or MSTSFE. (Dir. Maintenance)


a. OBSERVATION: The marine maintenance effort in Vietnam continues to be hampered by a critical shortage of facilities for underwater hull repair. At present, the only facility is located at Cam Ranh Bay. Marine railways and repair facilities were requested for Vung Tau and Qui Nhon as early as October 1966. Despite repeated follow-up actions, the facilities were recently disapproved by the USARV Ad Hoc Committee on Base Development. A letter requesting reevaluation, with additional justification, was submitted to USARV on 25 February 1968.

b. EVALUATION: As the US Army marine fleet in Vietnam continues to grow, the need for underwater hull repair capability increases. The current shortage of capability has precluded a significant in-country overhaul program, since the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay have been used almost entirely for emergency repairs. Construction of marine railways at Vung Tau and Qui Nhon would permit maximum use of the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay for their designed purpose of vessel overhaul. The construction costs of marine railways at Vung Tau and Qui Nhon could be amortized within one year by the savings in transportation costs which would result from the increased in-country overhaul capability. In
addition, since vessels frequently wait for lift/tow for several weeks vessel availability would be increased.

o. RECOMMENDATION: That marine railways be constructed at Vung Tau and Qui Nhon as soon as possible. (Dir. Maintenance)

11. Advance Procurement Planning.

a. OBSERVATION: As depicted on the chart shown at Inclosure 9, during Fiscal Year (FY) 1967 and FY 1968, most high dollar value Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&Cs) were received within the last 30 days of the fiscal period. This resulted in "emergency" type procurement actions such as extending contracts, exercising options, or writing letter contracts on a sole source basis.

b. EVALUATION: As a result of Advance Procurement Planning, 71 FY 1969 PR&Cs representing a dollar value of $245.4 million had been received by 27 April 1969. This represents a 60 to 150 day improvement over planning periods of FY 1967 and FY 1968 resulting in an improved procurement package, increased competition, and a material cost reduction accruing to the Government.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Procurement)


a. OBSERVATION: With the inception of FY 1968 P&E contracts and the concurrent increase in US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam manpower, a detailed study was made of P&E supply operations. The results clearly indicated that the contractor had considerable excess R&U supplies on hand as a result of poor supply management, to include the lack of properly computed requisitioning objectives, high initial estimates and forced issues. In September 1967, the Contracting Officer forwarded to the contractor a letter pointing out certain supply shortcomings requiring corrective action. The Contracting Officer directed certain specific redistribution actions for the contractor to take. Simultaneously, command emphasis was placed on turn-in and retrograde of excess supplies.

b. EVALUATION: The dollar value of the contractor's redistribution of excess R&U supplies are as follows:
Returned to Lateral Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Depot Stock</th>
<th>Within PA&amp;E</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1967</td>
<td>$467,446.56</td>
<td>$ 88,626.72</td>
<td>$556,073.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1967</td>
<td>446,268.41</td>
<td>108,997.48</td>
<td>555,265.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1967</td>
<td>655,527.49</td>
<td>40,076.25</td>
<td>695,603.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1968</td>
<td>601,990.55</td>
<td>44,706.26</td>
<td>646,696.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1968</td>
<td>479,455.42</td>
<td>82,546.90</td>
<td>562,002.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1968</td>
<td>413,920.73</td>
<td>124,350.39</td>
<td>538,271.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1968</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 31 March 1968 TOTAL $3,553,913.16

*Final figures will not be available until on or about 10 May 1968.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Procurement)

13. Medical Insurance for Contractor Employees.

a. OBSERVATION: The medical insurance purchased by PA&E during FY 1968 did not include a deductible clause. Consequently, when the charge to contractor personnel for out-patient visits at military hospitals and clinics was raised from $1 to $9 per visit, employees began to submit claims for reimbursement under their medical insurance. Administrative costs relative to the processing of such a claim are approximately $50.00.

b. EVALUATION: The increase in the charge for out-patient visits resulted in a flood of insurance claims. Over 90% of these claims were the $9 variety. In order to alleviate the administrative burden and costs resulting from such claims, the Government recommended that PA&E purchase a deductible policy for FY 1969. A medical plan based on a $25 or $50 deductible minor medical policy is the standard commercial policy. Such a policy will eliminate claims for every out-patient visit.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Procurement)

   a. OBSERVATION: There is no basic authority or formulated guidelines which can be used in determining the number of people or the amount of equipment needed in the operation of the military scrap yard.

   b. EVALUATION: The Defense Scrap Yard Handbook (TM 755-200) points out that an average, or representative, type of scrap yard would not necessarily meet the requirements of every military activity. Rather than arbitrarily establishing a general type to which each military activity would conform, the Defense Scrap Yard Handbook uses three broad categories in classifying disposal yards, i.e., type "A" (small), type "B" (medium), and type "C" (large). No work measurement standards concerning the number of personnel or the amount and type of equipment required to operate the various type of yards are indicated. The technical manual merely emphasizes the fact that there is need for flexibility in the assignment of both personnel and equipment in order to accommodate fluctuations in workloads.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: That the Department of Defense publish specific guidelines concerning the number of people, type, and amount of equipment that is required to effectively operate a scrap yard, using tonnage handled and line items processed as a basis for determining work measurement standards. (Dir. Retrograde and Disposal)

15. Use of returning Special Airlift Assignment Mission (SAAM) aircraft for retrograde cargo.

   a. OBSERVATION: In early March 1968, this command began receiving information copies of messages from US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) indicating that returning SAAM aircraft should be used for Army sponsored cargo. Repeated efforts, however, to obtain the use of these aircraft through coordination with USAMC Customer Assistance Office, Vietnam (CAO-V) and with Headquarters, USARV, met with negative results. Observation of SAAM operations showed that cargo is not handled by Air Force personnel, but must be loaded by the sponsoring unit, and that no single agency coordinates the use of SAAM aircraft in RVN. HQ, USARV unclassified message 46513 to 1st Logistical Command, dated 23 April 1968, concerning the use of returning SAAM aircraft for retrograde cargo is quoted in part:

   "1. SAAM airlift sponsored by the Department of the Army is paid for on a round trip basis unless one of the other services has a backload and requests the aircraft for a return load. In order to backload a specific SAAM aircraft, a request through DA must be processed and approved prior to the effective time of the mission."
2. The specific missions referenced in your message were committed for round trip loads and were not available for assured opportune retrograde cargo. No SAAM mission is available for assured opportune retrograde cargo.

b. EVALUATION: Because of the above it is doubtful that SAAM aircraft usage, under the current system, will benefit the 1st Logistical Command retrograde program. Use is further complicated since constant liaison with Air Force personnel must be maintained to insure that cargo is available for immediate loading since SAAM aircraft are allowed only two hours ground time in RVN aerial ports.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a single agency in RVN be appointed to coordinate the operations of SAAM aircraft in much the same manner as MACV Traffic Management Agency controls all out shipments through regular Military Airlift Command channels. It is further recommended that USAMC commodity commands designate and authorize material, if any, to be moved by SAAM aircraft from RVN. (Dir. Retrograde and Disposal)
F. (U) ORGANIZATION

1. MTOE action.

a. OBSERVATION: Excessive time (approximately 8-12 months) is required from the time a MTOE is submitted by this headquarters to USARV until the MTOE is approved by DA and United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) publishes implementing General Orders.

b. EVALUATION: This lengthy administrative time lag has imposed burdens on combat service support units required to perform missions for which they are not structured and do not have required personnel and/or equipment authorizations. The system of combat service support in Vietnam is such that few TOE units perform functions in strict adherence to the mission statements prescribed in their TOE. Rapidly changing tactical situations, and their effect on combat service support missions, demand that troop basis documents be processed expeditiously. MTOE action is normally initiated as a result of a unit assuming additional, or expanded, missions that were not envisioned when the basic TOE was prepared. The present situation is not acceptable if units are to accomplish their RVN mission without disrupting the authorized equipment and personnel structure of the command.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None (AGofS, SP&O)

2. Standardization of TOEs.

a. OBSERVATION: The DA program of standardization of combat service support units conflicts with attempts to tailor units to the mission by MTOE action.

b. EVALUATION: Geographic location, security considerations, tactical situation, and the type of unit supported make it impractical to attempt to establish uniformity among units. Missions are often dictated by these considerations as much as by their TOE. The commander attempts, by MTOE action, to adjust the configuration of his unit personnel and/or equipment to fit his particular RVN mission; standardization frustrates this endeavor. Several units have arrived in RVN under MTOEs at reduced strength. When required to standardize "up" theater personnel ceilings prohibit such actions. Standardization as directed by DA is inconsistent with the objectives of the USARPAC Combat Service Unit by Unit Survey. This survey considers units as separate entities and recommends manpower reductions based on the unit's particular operation. Standardization of combat service support units in a CONUS type static support situation appears feasible but the fluid tactical situation and changing support mission requirements make standardization impractical in this theater.
a. **RECOMMENDATION**: That 1st Logistical Command be excluded from the Department of the Army standardization program until such time as the support situation in Vietnam is static enough to make standardization feasible. (AGofS, SP&O)

3. Reorganization of marine maintenance activities.

a. **OBSERVATION**: Increased density of U. S. Army watercraft and increased operational requirements have necessitated an augmented marine maintenance capability at the support level to include vessel overhaul. In order to achieve the required responsiveness, the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (USAMNAV) has been directed to review the increased requirements and submit a proposed TDA. As part of this reorganization detachments have been established at Da Nang and Dong Tam. In addition, the detachment at Saigon is being increased from 6 to 30 men. The contract facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are being increased from one drydock and 50 personnel to two floating drydocks, eight shore drydock pads and 194 personnel.

b. **EVALUATION**: The reorganization of marine maintenance activities is expected to result in a far superior program. This forecast is based on the increased efficiency expected from the reorganization and the increased capability expected to result from approval of the TDA for a maintenance float and marine railways. The Fiscal Year availability rate of 70-75% is expected to be increased to 90% in.

c. **RECOMMENDATION**: None. (Dir Maintenance)
1. (U) Military Banking Facilities.

a. OBSERVATION: Military Banking facilities have been located only in the Saigon-Long Binh area.

b. EVALUATION: It is now apparent that similar facilities are needed in other areas with a high troop density. This is particularly true in light of the recent currency controls established by MACV and effective 1 May 1968. Requests for Military Banking Facilities have been forwarded to Headquarters USARV for Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Que Nhon, Pleiku, Vung Tau, and Da Nang. AR 210-135 provided the necessary guidance for the submission of these requests.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (AGcS, Comptroller)

2. (U) Army Cost Reduction Program.

a. OBSERVATION: AR 11-20 requires that supporting documentation be available in the financial and administrative management structures in CONUS, but required in the same degree in active combat areas such as South Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION: The application of the provisions of AR 11-20, Army Cost Reduction Program, July 1967, to lst Logistical Command has resulted in the validation of two major, high dollar value management actions. The total dollar figure validated was $17,544,900. This represents 107% of the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) goal for FY 1968. The success of this command in contributing to the cost reduction program is attributed to intensified review of actions by the Management Division, AGcS, Comptroller, thereby insuring availability of maximum supporting documentation, and a thorough presentation to the auditor. A major obstacle in the preparation of cost reduction actions is the lack of detailed historical records in combat support and combat service support units, necessary to meet the stringent documentation requirements of AR 11-20 for validation by USAAA. The Standard Supply System (SSS) provides for this type data at the depot and inventory control center level. Therefore, in Vietnam, it is at this level the audit trail of requirements, consumptions, requisitioning objectives, demand data, costs and other pertinent information is most completely documented and compatible. The success or failure of the Army Cost Reduction Program in Vietnam rests on the interpretation of what constitutes sufficient supporting documentation for the savings computations. Five actions with a potential dollar value of $21.5 million could not be submitted to USAAA for validation, even though dollars were saved, due to a lack of an audit trail to the combat support and combat service support units involved. The actions were sound, but the record system.
did not provide for retention of vital records necessary for cost reduction validation below the depot level.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That AR 11-20 be changed to accept the records at the inventory control center and depot levels as the end of the audit trail of supporting documentation for USAAA validation. (ACofS, Comptroller)

3. (U) Payment for performance on contracts written in US dollar terms.

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Several contracts have been written in US dollar terms for supplies and services in Vietnam.

   b. **EVALUATION:** On 1 October 1967 the official piaster conversion rate changed from $VN80/$US1.00 to $VN118/$US1.00. This provided a subsidy of $VN38/$US1.00 for transfers of US dollars from abroad to Vietnam. It has been determined that this subsidy was for the benefit of the US Government and was not intended to be passed along to contractors operating in RVN. Since many contractors disputed this belief, an advance decision was requested from the Comptroller General. The April 1968 decision indicated that for those contracts written in US dollars, payments will continue to be made at the rate of $VN80/$US1.00.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** None. (ACofS, Comptroller)


   a. **OBSERVATION:** A need exists for a Manning Guide to be used by the R&U Contractor, the Contracting Officer and each support command to uniformly evaluate R&U Contractor manning requirements at each installation.

   b. **EVALUATION:** DA Pamphlet 20-551, Staffing Guide for US Army Garrisons, serves as a valid basic guide to determine manning requirements, but is not directly applicable in all cases to a civilian R&U contractor. Use of Local Nationals, prevalent dust conditions, subtropical environment, exposure to hostile activities, and contractor manning requirements for functions not normal to a post engineer organization requires modification of the DA pamphlet to adapt it to the "average" installation in Vietnam. This headquarters has prepared a proposed SOP to implement the DA pamphlet by applying appropriate adjustment factors, and proposing staffing guides for functions not contained in the pamphlet. This SOP has been forwarded to each support command and contractor for comment.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** None. (Dir Engineering)
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5. (C) Accuracy of Channel Markings.

a. OBSERVATION: In February 1968, deep draft vessels transiting the main channel at Cam Ranh Bay were grounding as they moved toward the ammunition pier area. Because of this, some vessels had to be off-loaded in the channel. An urgent request was submitted to dredge the channel to its proper depth. A pre-dredging hydrographic survey, however, revealed that adequate channel depths actually existed but that the channel markers had shifted.

b. EVALUATION: The channel marker buoys now in use at Cam Ranh Bay, and elsewhere in Vietnam, are subject to being shifted by wind, tide, current and wave action. This may result in grounding of vessels in shoal water and in unnecessary requests for dredging.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Where buoys are used to mark the channel, they should be surveyed at regular and frequent intervals to assure that they have not shifted; however, wherever possible, the channel marker buoys should be supplemented or replaced by ranges mounted on shore. These provide a permanent means of identifying the channel and are not subject to accidental movement. (Dir Engineering)

6. (C) Repair of Battle Damaged Facilities.

a. OBSERVATION: The increase in enemy actions against base camps and other installations has caused an increase in damage to real property facilities. Previously, to repair such damage, R&U activities would process work order requests and assign a priority to perform the work. When the damage at an installation was extensive, a serious backlog of work resulted because of the limited construction resources of the R&U activity. In order to rapidly restore damaged facilities to a usable condition, units of the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades now provide a major effort in solving this problem. Assistance is coordinated by the local Post Engineer and after-the-fact approval obtained for battle damage repairs.

b. EVALUATION: Essential facilities suffering battle damage will be restored more readily to a usable condition because units of the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades are available to provide an immediate repair capability beyond the limited construction resources of the R&U activity.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir Engineering)
7. (U) Delay in transmittal of court-martial charges.

a. OBSERVATION: Two cases reversed by the US Court of Military Appeals on 1 March 1968 reemphasize the Government's responsibility to avoid unreasonable delays in processing court-martial charges and to prove compliance with the standards established in Articles 10 and 33, UCMJ. In one case, the unit commander insisted on waiting for the completed CID report and had sufficient information upon which to prefer charges. There has been several instances of this occurring within this command in recent months.

b. EVALUATION: In order to minimize the problem of denial of a speedy trial to an accused, court-martial charges, especially when either arrest, restriction, or confinement has been imposed, should be transmitted expeditiously. Under no circumstances should commanders wait until they receive the final CID report before forwarding the charges when they have on hand sufficient information to draft the charges.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (SJA)

8. (U) Imposition of Summary Court-Martial.

a. OBSERVATION: Any court-martial conviction is a federal offense and may prejudice an individual for further schooling and employment. More severe punishment may be administered under the provisions of Article 15 than can be imposed by a summary court. Consequently, a Summary Court-Martial should not be ordered when the imposition of Article 15 will accomplish the goals of justice and discipline.

b. EVALUATION: Commanders should resort to trial by Summary Court-Martial only for those who, having been offered an Article 15, demand trial by court-martial or only when a convening authority, after consultation with a Judge Advocate, has determined that there are exceptional circumstances.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (SJA)

9. (U) Claim for loss of small items of substantial value.

a. OBSERVATION: Paragraph 6h (1), AR 27-29, precludes recovery for small items of substantial value (i.e., over $50), such as cameras, watches, jewelry, etc., which are shipped by ordinary means (e.g., with household goods or hold baggage).

b. EVALUATION: A claimant may protect his small items of substantial value during shipment by requesting shipment by "expedited means" or by carrying the items on his person. If they are then lost or damaged, recovery will not be barred by paragraph 6h (1).

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (SJA)
AVHGC-DST (14 May '68) 1st Ind (U) CPT Arnold/brs/BN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM APO San Francisco 96375 11 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning block storage of ships, page 18, paragraph B(6): Concur. USARV has on a number of occasions, requested through joint channels that ships be loaded in the following manner.

   (1) Block Stow by lot number.
   (2) Consolidate by service and hatch.
   (3) Load small quantities in upper hatch levels.
   (4) Use hatch squares to load common-use ammo.

If the foregoing conditions are adhered to by outloading CONUS ports, the savings in time, manpower and critical equipment usage in RVN will out weigh the additional effort expended by the CONUS outloading ports. Recommend this topic be considered by DA and coordination be effected where required.

b. Reference item concerning support to airborne and airmobile divisions, page 19, paragraph 7: Concur. The deficiencies in the support command's capabilities for supporting combat operations and the division base camp on a continuous basis are well recognized. Support for division or brigade operations by FSA or augmentation to the FSE should be continued. However, a study to NYDE the airborne and airmobile support commands should not be initiated until final action has been taken on the plans for base camp NYDE/TDA augmentation to the division and separate brigades.

c. Reference item concerning support to airmobile and airborne division, page 19, paragraph b(7). The support command of the airmobile division is larger than either the infantry or airborne division. Since the
remaining airborne division will soon be converted to an airmobile division, the problem of a small division support command should not exist. The support battalion for the separate infantry brigades are included in Phase II Standardization. It is felt that the standardized support battalion provides an adequate organic support capability for the brigade. The 173d Abn Bde has submitted a request for additional personnel in the maintenance company of the support battalion. This request is being evaluated, on site, by the G4 and if the request is valid, appropriate MTOE action will be submitted to establish the requirement for additional personnel.

d. Reference item concerning security of Binh Loi-Tan Son Nhut pipeline and Binh Loi River Terminal, page 20, paragraph 11: Nonconcur. This command agrees with the evaluation that greater protection is required, particularly for the river terminal and for repair crews. No special plan is necessary, however, USARV Regulation 10-4 requires area coordinators to effect the necessary coordination for unit, area, and installation security.

e. Reference item concerning ammunition record clerks - MOS 76M, page 23, paragraph C(1): Concur. Personnel performing the duties of Ammunition Records Clerk, MOS 76M20, must know the techniques and capabilities of automatic data processing with regard to input, filing, processing, and output. Additional stress should be placed on automatic data processing in existing CONUS ammunition records MOS courses.

f. Reference item concerning ammunition supervisors, Section II, page 23, paragraph C(2): Concur. This could be accomplished through TDY enroute to Vietnam. Nonconcur with the recommendation that a special prefix be awarded to an officer's MOS and that a specific MOS be awarded to enlisted personnel to readily identify personnel who have received the training. An entry in personnel records indicating attendance of surveillance instruction at Savannah, Illinois is considered sufficient and proper for showing qualifications in this narrow field.

g. Reference item concerning chaplain supply briefing, page 26, paragraph 51: Concur. Action has already been taken to include the suggested supply briefings in the agenda of the Monthly Chaplain Training Conferences held at major commands.

h. Reference item concerning repair parts for end items procured under Project ENSURE, page 29, paragraph E(7). Concur. Recommend that, in addition, USAMC assume project managership for repair parts support of all ENSURE
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFC-5) (U)

items which are being provided to meet operational requirements. This headquarters has previously recommended to DA that the marine craft (and motors) which are being provided under ENSURE be standardized so that support of the items may be accomplished through the existing logistic system.

i. Reference item concerning Tug Support, page 30, paragraph E9: Concur. USARV has action pending at USARPAC requesting that 1st and 2d Logistical Commands be given the authority to control and schedule their assigned tugs for ocean tows without prior approval by USARJ or MSTS.

j. Reference item concerning Marine Maintenance Facilities, page 31, paragraph 10: Concur. The 1st Logistical Command request for construction of marine railways at Qui Nhon and Vung Tau has been approved; however, it is pending funding approval at COMUSMACV. This in-country capability for underwater hull repair at Qui Nhon and Vung Tau is essential to USARV's logistical support mission.

k. Reference item concerning use of returning special airlift assignment mission (SAAM) aircraft for retrograde cargo, page 34, paragraph K5: Non-concur. Communications on the availability of SAAM aircraft for return loads is not timely enough to permit usage in most cases. When loads are planned on a round trip basis, as is done with Army aircraft replacement, there is no problem. It is doubtful that a single agency in RVN to coordinate the use of SAAM aircraft would improve the communication problem. MAC will not permit use of available aircraft without prior approval being obtained through DA. This matter will be discussed at PACOM JTB 3-6 Jun 68.

l. Reference item concerning standardization of TOE's, page 36, paragraph F2. DA Circular 310-44, dated 5 November 1967, Appendix P, paragraph 2c specifically states: "Like TOE units at the same authorization level will be organized alike." With this statement as a guide, Department of the Army directed that Phase III Standardization include COSTAR units in the 1st Logistical Command. The difficulties involved in standardizing 1st Logistical Command units were presented to the Department of the Army Standardization Team by representatives of the 1st Logistical Command 3P60 office. These problems were evaluated by that team and at the exit briefing, EG Camp, Chief OTR, ASCFOR, and DG USARV stated there would be a Phase III Standardization and that COSTAR units would make up the majority of the organization to be standardized.
m. Reference item concerning accuracy of channel markings, page 40, paragraph 5: Concur. The placing and maintaining of deep water navigational buoys is a Navy responsibility. Some assistance may be available in the Cam Ranh Bay area from the 497th Engineer Company (Port Construction). This is especially true for the construction of the range marker.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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GPOP-DT (14 May 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Log Comd, for Period Ending 30 Apr 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed, with the following pertinent comments:

a. Paragraph 2a, 1st indorsement, Block Stowage of Ships. This subject has been under discussion for several months and was reviewed in detail at June meetings of PACOM JTB. Currently, CINCPAC is querying all component commands, MTMTS, APSA, OOMA for comments on ship loading procedures substantially as recommended herein. This headquarters has requested all subordinate commands to load in accordance with these procedures. It is anticipated that action will be taken by MTMTS, CONUS Port Operators, to load as recommended, insofar as possible.

b. Paragraph 2i, 1st indorsement, Tug Support. Recommendation is being evaluated within this headquarters. Effective utilization of available government owned ocean towing vessels plus safety-at-sea responsibilities indicates necessity for central assignment, routing and control. A decision should be forthcoming within 30 days.

c. Paragraph E-14, page 34, basic document, Property Disposal Scrap Yards. Defense Scrap Yard Handbook, TM 755-200, lists amounts and types of equipment recommended for each of the categories of scrap yards and is intended to be a general guide. Using this guidance, actual equipment requirements should be developed by the installation to fit individual situations. It is considered difficult, if not impossible, to develop more specific guidelines at DOD level which would apply across the board to any property disposal yard in any location under any circumstances. DA, Office of Chief of Support Services, Property Disposal Assistance Report Team Visit - Vietnam, August 1967, in Tab's J and K provides a detailed breakdown of minimum manpower and equipment requirements for each property disposal activity including staff.
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sections and the FESO. Any more specific guidelines
can only be developed at the operating level based on
actual day to day operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORR
CPT, AGC
Assn AG

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ANNEX A (C) ACOFS, CONTROLLER

1. (U) Budget and Fiscal Operations.

   a. The Fiscal Year 1969 Operations and Maintenance Army (O&M) Command Operating Budget ($279.8 million) was submitted to USARV on 6 February 1968.

   b. USARV withdrew $55.2 million of O&M funds for contract dredging and port maintenance, repair of lines of communication, rental of ADP equipment, real estate rentals and leases. This was made effective on 1 April 1968, and these programs will now be funded and approved by USARV.

   c. The Calendar Year 1968 Assistance in Kind (AIK) Annual Funding Program (AFP) was reduced by $VN 20 million below the Calendar Year 1967 Annual Funding Program. As a result, a portion of annual rental contracts were required to be funded with O&M Funds. A reclama of $VN 18.1 million was submitted by 1st Logistical Command to MAGV on 31 March 1968.

   d. A total of 13,182 reimbursable documents were forwarded to USARPAL Materiel Management Agency during March 1968 by subordinate units of this command. This represented a one month high for the command.

2. (U) Finance and Internal Review.

   a. The US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) conducted an exit conference on their audit of Direct Support/General Support Maintenance in the Qui Nhon Support Command on 15 April 1968. The formal report has not yet been received.

   b. Information was received that the USAAA will conduct a follow-up audit to their examination of ammunition management and accounting which was performed during April–June 1967. It will be conducted between June and August 1968.

   c. The command reply to the USAAA audit of the 506th Field Depot was forwarded through command channels to the Department of the Army on 12 April 1968.

3. (C) Management Division.

   a. Cost Reduction Program: On 22 February 1968, the USAAA validated a cost reduction action (Meal, combat, individual) for $9,038,500. This was accomplished through a 10 day reduction of the in-country stocking objective for Meal, combat, individual. Further, on 13 March 1968, the USAAA validated a cost reduction action (Han Jin Contract) for $8,506,400. This savings was the result of the United States Army Procurement Agency,
Vietnam (USARPAC) initiating a modification to contract DAJB 11-66-C-1030 for new tonnage discount rates. The combined results of these actions represent 107% of the USARPAC Cost Reduction goal for FY 1968.

b. Management Studies: A management study of the Central Real Estate Office (CREO) was completed and provided to the Chief, CREO on 8 March 1968. The document flow within CREO and the relationships of that office to commands and units beyond the command jurisdiction of the 1st Logistical Command were the major areas of interest during the study. Innovations based on the study are underway. Thus far, simplification of two register keeping functions have been completed concerning active leases and utilities usage.

c. Organisation and Functions Manual: A major revision of the Organisation and Functions Manual was begun 12 February 1968, and is expected to be completed during the next reporting period.

d. Command Review and Analysis: The Command Review and Analysis publications for February, March and April 1968 were printed in Japan and distributed to all elements of the command.
ANNEX B  ACOS/C, PERSONNEL, Civil Affairs Division

1. (a) Civil Affairs activities centered around recovery efforts on behalf of the civilian population in areas devastated as a result of the VC/NVA Tet attacks. Commencing on 2 February 1966, daily Civil Affairs Reports were received from all major subordinate commands which provided current information on the governmental, economic and social conditions in population centers contiguous to major logistical base areas. These reports also included daily totals of support being rendered to the Government of Vietnam Civil Recovery Program. On 21 February, these reports were reduced to a weekly requirement and were finally terminated on 19 March 1966. During this period, the command provided 3,175,901 pounds of material in direct support of the government's Civil Recovery Program.

2. (b) As a result of the widespread devastation in civilian population centers the Tet Aggression Relief Project was initiated by General Westmoreland on 16 February 1966, designating the period 2 February to 2 April 1966, as the time frame for the conduct of the project. Implementing messages were dispatched by Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army and Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. The project was intended to assist in the immediate relief of the civilian population who suffered losses and hardship as a result of the VC/NVA Tet attacks and to serve as an expression of our concern for these unfortunate people. A program to assist the Vietnamese employees of this headquarters had already been directed by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 10 February 1966, and a proposal was submitted for his approval on 12 February. Upon approval, this proposal was adopted for the conduct of the Tet Aggression Relief Project within this headquarters. The project was handled at the organizational level throughout the remainder of the command as directed by the implementing messages from General Westmoreland and Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. Final command totals for contributions in support of the project were as follows:

a. USASC, Saigon  $5,214.37 and 74,548 $VN
b. USASC, Cam Ranh Bay  $6,216.98
c. USASC, Qui Nhon  $2,281.21 and 59,658 $VN
d. MDL, 1st LC  $788.15
e. 14th IDC  $470.00

TOTAL  $14,970.66 and 134,206 $VN

GRAND TOTAL  $16,108.00
3. (U) One significant refugee problem was generated as a result of the WC/WFA Tet attacks which had a direct impact on operations. As a result of fighting at Tan Son Mint Air Base and Camp Red Ball in Saigon, 53 refugees, primarily women and children, sought refuge within the perimeter of Camp Red Ball. They were given shelter in the Personal Effects Warehouses where their presence interfered to some extent with this operation and the defense of the camp. The Civil Affairs Division was advised of the problem on the afternoon of 3 February 1968. The refugees were extracted by an armed convoy early in the afternoon of 4 February and turned over to the Vietnamese Red Cross.

4. (C) The Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, which was implemented in September 1967, is progressing well. The areas of responsibility were modified in December 1967, and USASC, Saigon is now responsible for 48 hamlets with a population of 153,000 people in the Cong Thanh and Duc Tu Districts of Binh Hoa Province. The program involves weekly hamlet visits and the implementation of an intensive civic action program in the assigned area. One significant project currently underway is the re-location of an entire hamlet which was devastated during the Tet attacks. Land was acquired from the government adjacent to the Binh Hoa mental hospital and 43 new homes are being built, entirely on a self-help basis, with material and technical assistance being provided by the government of South Vietnam and USASC, Saigon.

5. (C) USAFRY OPINT 81-68 (Campaign Plan) tasked this command with the coordination of all military civic action conducted within and contiguous to logistical base areas. Annex Q (Civic Action) to the OPINT gives the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command the responsibility of coordinating the civic action programs of subordinate units and other units of USAFRY located within these areas. This includes support commands, sub-area commands and contiguous population centers within a minimum radius of 11,000 meters. This plan was implemented in Annex Q (Civic Action) to 1st Logistical Command OPORD 1-68 which was hand carried to subordinate commands during the period 13-17 April 1968. Initial progress reports are due on 5 May 1968.

6. (U) The Civic Action Distribution Point processed and shipped 771,221 pounds (396 short tons) of commodities to all four corps areas. Shipments consisted primarily of food for the Popular Force Food Supplement Program, clothing and medicine. On 9 April 1968, a Letter of Instruction was published by HQ, MACV to USARVAC which tasked that headquarters with the mission of operating the Civic Action Distribution Point. A letter from HQ, USAFRY deleting this mission from their Letter of Instruction to this headquarters is forthcoming. Personnel and equipment at the distribution point will be transferred to USARVAC effective 1 May 1968.
7. (D) Units of the command continued to conduct extensive civic action and community relations activities. Following are the command civil affairs statistics for the quarter:

a. Total number of man-days engaged in civic action activities: 5,461,2

b. Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 6,342,054 $VN

c. Voluntary contributions: 3,471,733 $VN

d. Percent of US Military Civic Action activities conducted jointly with:

(1) Other VMAP 26.4%
(2) HVNP 24.5%
(3) US Civilian voluntary agencies 16.2%

e. Average percent of self-help contributed by the people: 65.7%

f. Major civic action programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAJB-DATE</th>
<th>SVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Economic Development</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Education</td>
<td>203.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Social Welfare</td>
<td>1,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Transportation</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Refugee Assistance Support</td>
<td>563.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

(1) Schools 73
(2) Hospitals 28
(3) Orphanages 69
(4) Others 20
h. Expenditures from US/NWMAF Military Civic Action and
   NWMAF Fund:  
   247,428 $VN

i. MEDCAPS (Number of patients) 4,841

j. Educational efforts:
   (1) Classes:
      (a) English 90
      (b) Others 9
   (2) Training:
      (a) Machine Operators 21
      (b) Mechanics 112
      (c) Others 119

k. Summary of civic action projects:
   (1) Construction projects completed during reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>BUILT</th>
<th>EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Dwellings</td>
<td>15, 7J*</td>
<td>4, 16J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Roads (km)</td>
<td>1, 8J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Churches</td>
<td>1, 1J</td>
<td>1, 4J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Hospitals</td>
<td>1, 2J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Dispensaries</td>
<td>2, 3J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Schools</td>
<td>4, 3J</td>
<td>5, 3J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Latrines</td>
<td>3, 2J</td>
<td>2J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = "J" connotes a joint operation.
(2) Commodities Distributed:

| (a) Cement (lbs)          | 168,530 |
| (b) Tin Sheets (nr)       | 4,157   |
| (c) Lumber (bd ft)        | 2,511,712 |
| (d) Paint (gal)           | 373     |
| (e) Medical Kits          | 155     |
| (f) School Kits           | 1,028   |
| (g) Physical Education Kits | 6     |
| (h) Food (lbs)            | 197,076 |
| (i) Clothing (lbs)        | 8,216   |
| (j) Health Items (soap, toothpaste, etc.) | 1,220 |
| (k) Agricultural Tools    | 40      |
| (l) Shovels               | 12      |
| (m) Docks                 | 8       |
| (n) Halls (lbs)           | 25      |
| (o) Reinforcement bars (lbs) | 3,150 |
| (p) Chain Link Fencing (lbs) | 150   |
| (q) Edible Garbage (lbs)  | 11,000  |
| (r) Dry Garbage (lbs)     | 5,500   |
1. (C) Authorized military strength of the command decreased from 54,829 to 54,149 during the reporting period and the assigned strength fell from 53,488 to 51,196. Present level of assigned to authorized is 94.5%.

2. (U) The command is authorized 303 Department of the Army Civilians (DACs) with recruiting authority for an additional 40. Present DAC strength is 271 with 71 positions presently under recruitment. Recruitment for 110 Special Services spaces is under way with 41 persons hired to date.

3. (U) Based on justifications received from using units, USARV re-validated Local National direct hire authorizations. In many cases, this resulted in reduced authorizations for using units. Due to the increased Vietnamese draft it is anticipated that the command will be understrength in this area.

4. (U) Local National daily hire employees have been used at a command average rate of 2,733 personnel. The authorization for fourth quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 is 2,533. The increased workload emanating from the Tet attack and receipt of new units was not offset by any increase in muster allocations.

5. (U) The program to convert selected military spaces to civilians has been temporarily deferred as a result of the Tet attack. The program is presently under revision.

6. (U) The USARMAC Manpower Utilization Survey conducted at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command during the period 5-31 January 1968, resulted in the team recognizing 664 military, 51 DAC and 106 Local National spaces.

7. (U) Manpower Surveys were also conducted at USASUCOM, Cam Rahn Bay (CRB) Headquarters from 1-14 February 1968, and USASUCOM, Saigon Headquarters from 6-12 April 1968. Recommendations were 293 military, 13 DAC, and 19 Local Nationals for CRB, and 556 military, 156 DAC and 433 Local Nationals for Saigon.

8. (U) The survey for USASUCOM, Qui Nhon Headquarters has been deferred until the 1st Quarter FY 1969.

9. (U) TDA's for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and the support commands will be submitted as a single circuit closing package after all surveys have been completed. Expected submission date is the first quarter of FY 1969.

10. (U) An MTD and Manpower Requirements Change for the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam containing an increase of ten spaces was submitted to USARMAC on 30 March 1968.
11. (U) Section II of the TDA for CNEASUCOM, Da Nang, submitted to USAVE in February 1968, has been returned to this headquarters to await completion of Sections I, III, IV and V. Estimated time of submission will be during fourth quarter FY 1968.
ANNEX D (U) AGofS, PERSONNEL, Personnel Services Division

1. Clubs and Open Messes, and Other Sundry Funds.

a. Reports of status of officers and enlisted clubs and messes (RCS MACJ1-13) for March 1968 reveal the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAIN</th>
<th>ANNEX</th>
<th>TV:VAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer's Open Mess</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Open Mess</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO/EM Open Mess</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM Open Mess</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess Association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During the quarter the following new clubs and messes were opened or planned:

(1) USAFE approval has been received for the construction of a new Cam Ranh Bay Officer's Open Mess with 14,500 square feet of floor space. Plans for the original structure of 17,000 square feet are being modified and construction will begin with the completion of plans. Construction completion date cannot be estimated at this time.

(2) The new Cam Ranh Bay Officer's Annex 94 opened on 20 January 1968.

(3) DOD approval has been received for the construction of the new Cam Ranh Bay NCO Open Mess, EM Open Mess, and NCO System warehouse. Construction will commence in May, with a completion date of 60 days later.

(4) A new Officer's Club opened at Camp Schmidt on 1 April 1968.

(5) NCO Club (RV 2366) Qui Nhon annexed three clubs during the month of April.

c. Planned expansion of existing clubs and messes was limited to the Qui Nhon area, and included the Main NCO Club, Annex 15 and the warehouse.

2. Education Program:

a. The position of Education Director was vacant from 10 January to
10 March 1968. The cessation of this function caused some problems of administration that were resolved when the newly assigned director arrived.

b. A policy change saw experienced education officers shifting from smaller centers to larger ones where their experience can be put to better use. They will also fill vacancies created in Vietnam by departing officers.

c. Another policy change saw incoming personnel given a complete orientation and some GED training at established centers before being sent to operate centers on their own. This experience is designed to overcome some of the normal problems that would arise when a new officer faces the Vietnam situation. It also gives management the opportunity to evaluate the quality of recruited education officers and to advise Department of the Army of their effectiveness.

d. During this period the following educational activity was accomplished:

1. 70 EM completed preparatory high school courses.
2. 94 EM completed MDS-related courses.
3. 24 EM completed high school courses.
4. 217 military personnel completed college courses.
5. 152 EM completed preparatory instruction.
6. 539 military personnel completed HS GED test batteries.
7. 27 military personnel completed GE-CGT test batteries.
8. 222 military personnel enrolled in foreign language instruction.

e. A total of 109 military personnel were administered various undergraduate and graduate college entrance examinations.

f. A total of 57 college resident courses were offered with the cooperation of the University of Maryland. Two hundred and forty military personnel enrolled and 178 completed this course work. The Tet attack was the cause of the decrease in completions.

g. A schedule of staff assistance visits was initiated to effect coordination and compliance with the policies approved for the GED program. Several visits were completed and on-the-spot corrections were made. Plans for expanding the facilities and for maintaining correct procedures were activated.
The first educational conference for all education personnel in Vietnam was held in April 1968. During the conference, the educators were afforded an opportunity to meet each other, discuss mutual problems at length, hear specialists from other fields, and receive direction from Headquarters, USARV on the GED program for Vietnam. The Dean of the University College of the University of Maryland, and his deputy for Vietnam, attended a morning session and gave a presentation. Education officers with major problems gave presentations to the group and requested suggestions on solutions.

1. Findings. The rate of participation indicates that the military student does want an opportunity to continue his education while in Vietnam. Since this benefit has been promoted by recruiters and retention personnel, it is extremely vital that existing policies allow for his educational activity. Education activities currently have a low priority as regards facilities, supply, and personnel, but once hostilities cease, it is expected that this priority would be raised. The major items of concern at education centers during this period has been the expansion of facilities and the increase in enrollments for all courses and classes, especially those designed for completion of high school requirements.

2. Safety.

a. Army motor vehicle accident statistics for this reporting period reflect a 23.1% increase in the frequency rate over the previous reporting period. The predominant cause of Army motor vehicle accidents is driving too fast for conditions. Other significant causes, in descending order of prominence, were actions of the other driver or pedestrian involved, following too closely, mechanical failure, and misjudging clearances. The command, with a frequency rate of 1.12 accidents per 100,000 miles driven for the reporting period, was above the USARV-established expectancy rate of 1.0.

b. The military disabling injury rate for the command shows an increase of 50.3% over the previous reporting period. Leading causes, in descending order of prominence, were Army motor vehicle accidents, being struck by moving objects or striking against stationary objects, falls, weapons incidents, and being caught between two moving objects or a moving object and a stationary object. The reporting period frequency rate of 4.66 injuries per 100,000 man-days exposure was within the USARV-established expectancy rate of 5.0.

c. The first endorsement to USARV letter, Subject: Mid-Year Review of Safety Management FY 1968, was dispatched 15 February 1968. Commanders were directed to:
(1) Review their weapons control and motor vehicle safety programs to assure compliance with existing regulations.

(2) Establish a system to insure that their commands are reviewing all command safety practices and procedures on a continuing basis, and that such practices and procedures are commensurate with directives issued by this and higher headquarters.

(3) Require immediate on-the-spot corrective action by officers and noncommissioned officers when improper acts, that may result in injury to personnel or damage to property, are observed.

(4) Assure an adequate amount of safety training is conducted on a recurring basis.

4. Another letter, Subject: Prevention of Gunshot Wounds, was dispatched on 2 March 1968. Commanders were directed to establish effective and continuing controls over the issue, storage, handling and use of weapons and ammunition.

4. Graves Registration: The US Army Mortuaries processed 5,747 remains of which 3,131 were at Da Nang (55%), and 2,616 at Tan Son Nhut (45%). The casualties at Da Nang were received mostly from the I Corps Tactical Zone. The workload did not include 285 Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) military dead received directly by the ROKA crematory at North Nha Trang and Qui Nhon.
ANEX E (C) ACOFS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Security Division

1. (C) Enemy activity directly affecting logistical operations significantly increased, especially in February, and involved standoff mortar and rocket engagements, ground attacks against installations, ambush of convoys, sabotage of equipment and facilities and interdictions of Lines of Communication (LOC), particularly Highways 1, 19, 14 and Highway 316 between Long Binh and Saigon.

a. At 011735R February 1968, a 300 vehicle convoy from the 88th Supply and Services and 124th Transportation Battalions was ambushed on Highway 14 approximately 20 kilometers (km) south of Dak To in the Central Highlands. An unknown size enemy force employed command detonated mines destroying four trucks and wounding one U.S. soldier.

b. At 012330H February 1968, Newport received small arms fire and an unknown number of mortar rounds. Two U.S. military personnel were wounded and an LST was slightly damaged.

c. At 060345H February 1968, the 178th Maintenance Company at An Khe received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds. One U.S. soldier was killed and one wounded, and one 5 ton wrecker and a 3/4 ton truck were damaged.

d. At 071010H February 1968, a convoy from the 54th Transportation Battalion traveling from Qui Nhon to Pleiku on Highway 19 was ambushed approximately 10 kilometers (km) east of Pleiku by an estimated 50-70 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops. The enemy force employed small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rockets, slightly wounding four U.S. military personnel, destroying one 5 ton ammunition truck, and damaging three other vehicles. The enemy suffered six killed and one detained.

e. At 1800L5H February 1968, the Cat Lai ammunition off-loading site was engaged with automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from an unknown size enemy force. Two Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ships, the "U.S. Explorer" and the "Annaple West," received minor damage, and 19 merchant seamen were wounded.

f. At 180138H February 1968, the Ammunition Supply Depot at Long Binh Post, operated by the 3d Ordnance Battalion, received an unknown number of mortar and 122mm rocket rounds. At 0135H, an estimated company size enemy force attacked the southeast corner of the depot and penetrated two of the three defensive perimeter fences before being repelled. Four U.S. military personnel were injured, two as a result of fighting fires, seven pads of ammunition and one pad of packing material were destroyed. The enemy suffered three killed, one detained, and assorted weapons and munitions captured.
At 210105H February 1968, a convoy of Equipment Incorporated trucks, driven by U.S. military drivers was ambushed on Highway 316 near Thu Duc by an unknown size enemy force using B-40 rockets. Two drivers were killed and 5 wounded.

h. At 210954H February 1968, a convoy from the 27th Transportation Battalion was ambushed on Highway 19 approximately 12 kilometers (km) west of An Khe by an unknown size enemy force using small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. Friendly forces sustained one killed, three wounded, and three 2½ ton trucks moderately damaged.

i. At 221105H February 1968, a convoy of eight ammunition barges on the Dong Hai River from Cat Lai to Cogido were ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. The attack resulted in two Filipino crewmen killed, ten Filipinos and two U.S. MPs wounded, six barges (owned by Luen Stevedoring Corp., Manila) destroyed, two barges and two jeeps damaged.

j. At 260815H February 1968, the Phase 31st Forward Support Area (PSA) received an unknown number of mortar rounds. The countermortar plan was fired with unknown results. Friendly losses were five wounded (two U.S. military and three civilian employees of Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc.). A total of 60,000 gallons of MAGAS and 90,000 gallons of diesel fuel was destroyed and moderate damage to facilities occurred.

k. At 290036H February 1968, a convoy composed of 16 Filipino vehicles and four military police jeeps was ambushed on Highway 316 approximately one mile south of Thu Duc by an unknown size enemy force. Friendly losses were two killed (one U.S. military and one Local National), nine wounded (five U.S. military and four Local Nationals), five trucks destroyed, and two trucks and two jeeps damaged.

l. At 042150H March 1968, the Cam Ranh Bay Air Base received 15 rounds of mortar fire. The rounds landed in the FOX staging area destroying 60,000 gallons of product.

m. At 051400H March 1968, an LCU from the 5th Transportation Company received mortar and recoilless rifle fire approximately 10km west of Dong Tan, killing two U.S. military, wounding two, and damaging the LCU.

n. At 080830H March 1968, Task Force Sismon at Dong Ha received approximately 80 rounds of rocket fire killing 10 U.S. military and wounding 16.

o. At 080830H March 1968, a convoy from the 54th Transportation Battalion traveling west on Highway 19 was ambushed approximately 12km west of An Khe by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms and
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 RPG fire. Two friendly troops were killed, 11 were wounded, one JP-4 tank was destroyed, and three trucks were damaged.

p. At 100130H March 1968, the 88th Supply and Services Battalion at Camp Holloway received approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire wounding 15, destroying one orderly room, and causing minor damage to facilities.

q. At 140050H March 1968, a Philco-Ford convoy traveling from Newport to Long Binh was ambushed on Highway 316 approximately two kilometers north-northeast of Thu Duc by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms fire. One U.S. military was killed, two wounded, and two trucks were damaged. The enemy lost one killed.

r. At 290135H March 1968, Camp Holloway received an unknown number of mortar rounds wounding four and destroying three pads of ammunition.

s. At 071400H April 1968, the billeting area at 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh Post, received 5 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Two BOQs were destroyed killing four officers and wounding two.

t. At 041251H April 1968, Camp Holloway received approximately 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack by an estimated 30 Vietcong (VC) employing satchel charges. There were no friendly casualties, but the enemy lost 13 killed and one detained.

u. At 070230H April 1968, the 630th Ordnance Detachment located at the Quang Tri Combat Base received 7-10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire killing one and wounding five.

v. At 071350H April 1968, an Alaska, Barge and Transport tug, traveling from Can The to Dong Tan, received automatic weapons and rocket fire from an unknown number of enemy. Two U.S. civilians were killed and tug sustained moderate damage.

w. At 090230H April 1968, the 526th Collection, Classification & Salvage (CC&S) Company, located approximately two kilometers west of Quy Nhon, was attacked by an estimated ten VC who penetrated the compound, detonated satchel charges throughout the area, and fired on friendly troops exiting their billets. Results of the attack were seven friendly troops killed, 26 wounded, one billet destroyed and seven buildings damaged. The enemy suffered five killed.

x. At 091205H April 1968, an estimated enemy squad ambushed a 359th Transportation Company convoy traveling east on Highway 19 approximately 30 kilometers west of An Khe. The enemy employed small arms, 840 rockets, and grenades killing one U.S. military, wounding one, and moderately damaging one 5,000 gallon tanker.
y. At 230100H April 1968, Vung Tau received approximately 12 rounds of 122mm rocket and recoilless rifle fire. Several rounds impacted in the area of the 805th Transportation Company and the 148th Ordnance Company. Friendly casualties were one killed and 15 wounded.

2. (U) On 2 April 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-5 was published and provides guidance concerning the personnel security clearance program. Authority to grant interim TOP SECRET and interim SECRET clearances is retained by this headquarters. The authority to validate TOP SECRET and SECRET clearances, and grant Cryptographic access is subdelegated to the major subordinate commands. The authority to grant CONFIDENTIAL clearances is subdelegated down to battalion level.

3. (U) On 16 April 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 380-5 was published establishing procedures for the safeguarding of defense information within the command. The authority to classify SECRET information is subdelegated to major subordinate commands down to group level. The authority to classify CONFIDENTIAL is subdelegated to major subordinate commands down to battalion and separate company level.

4. (U) On 12 March 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-6 was published establishing policies and procedures governing access to special category information (COFRAM). Authority to grant access to special category information is authorized to this headquarters and subdelegated to the major subordinate commands. Procedures have been established to restrict access to special category information to the minimum essential number of personnel.

5. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security clearance actions completed during the period:

   a. Clearances Validated:
      (1) TOP SECRET - 156.
      (2) SECRET - 111.


   c. Request for Background Investigations: 11.

   d. Request for United States Army Investigative Records Repository Check: 322.

   e. Clearances Granted:
      (1) Interim TOP SECRET - 26.
f. At the end of the period, 560 clearance actions were pending.

6. (U) Activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment.

a. On 17 April 1968, Major James E. Parker was assigned as Commanding Officer of the Detachment. On 2 April 1968, MSG John Finch Jr. was assigned as Operations Sergeant and 1st Sergeant of the Detachment. On 15 April 1968, CWO Trammell Lindsey was assigned as Case Control Officer.

b. One special study of the population of the Thu Duc area was conducted during the reporting period.

c. The Detachment conducted 53 announced counterintelligence (CI) inspections and 26 unannounced after-duty CI checks.

d. There were 33 personnel security investigations completed, with a total of 180 Agent Reports covering these investigations.

e. There were 55 investigations concerning sabotage, espionage, labor strikes and work stoppages and enemy initiated incidents, with a total of 209 Agent Reports concerning these investigations.

f. A new field office was opened at Da Nang in support of 1st Logistical Command elements recently moved to that area.

g. At the close of the reporting period, assigned and authorized personnel were 85 and 72 respectively. The headquarters of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI) remains in Saigon with field offices in Saigon, Long Binh, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau, Troy Hoe, Pleiku, Da Nang and Nha Trang.

7. (U) Weather: During January and February 1968, the Republic of Vietnam continued to experience the effects of the Northeast Monsoon with most cloudiness and precipitation in the DMZ area and along the eastern coastline, while the Central Highlands and inland III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) experienced their best weather of the year. The principal effects on 1st Logistical Command were poor flying weather because of low ceilings and poor visibility, and poor sea conditions because of the northeast wind flow. In late March, the transition from the Northeast to the Southwest Monsoon season began; however, by the end of April, the change in seasons was not yet complete in III CTZ. A slight increase in precipitation in III CTZ and the Central Highlands, and a decrease along the northeast coast was noted during April, but not to the extent expected based on yearly averages.
ANNEX F (C) AGofS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Plans and Force Development Division

1. (U) The U. S. Army Vietnam (USARV) Ad Hoc Committee for Base Development continued evaluating U. S. Army installations base development programs. In addition to the 12 base camps reported in the last two CRIs, the committee completed surveys of the following areas:
   a. Dong Dac
   b. Long Giao (Black Horse)
   c. Chu Lai
   d. Greater Saigon Area
   e. Long Binh (To include II FFORGEV, 199th Inf Bde, Long Tanh North, Thu Duc, and Camp Red Ball)
   f. Phan Thiet
   g. Dan Me Thoet

   The committee’s findings indicated that several installations had programmed construction excessive to their needs. The expected date for the completion of all surveys is 1 June 1968.

2. (C) In February 1968 a conference was held with the MACV staff and representatives of other headquarters to review and discuss logistical requirements for contingency OPLAN 67-68 (Post Hostility Activities). Committees were formed to develop assumptions and answers for a series of questions pertaining to the logistics annex of the OPLAN which would serve as a basis for a programmed update of the annex. The results of the committees’ efforts will be presented at a conference scheduled at CINCPAC during May 1968.

3. (U) The Army Authorisation Documents System (TAADS) administrative update of Modification Tables of Organisation and Equipment (MTOE) was completed.

   MTOEs submitted in February and March 1967 during the acceleration of the New Army Authorisation Documents System (NAADS) reflected authorisations as of 31 December 1966. Since that time, many MOS codes have changed or have split, certain items of equipment have been replaced by newer equipment, some units have had additional equipment approved, and certain grade structures were altered. These changes made the Department of the Army data bank inaccurate. DA Circular 310-64 directed that all these changes be incorporated into an administrative update of MTOE.
This update involved 274 1st Logistical Command units. USARV received permission from USARPAC to exclude the following categories from the update:

a. Units involved in standardization.
b. Units slated for inactivation.
c. Units with MTOE pending at DA.
d. Units known to require a substantive MTOE action.
e. Units for which USARV has not received an approved authorisation document.

4. (U) New temporary loan policies have been instituted to curb the drain on depot stocks. Department of the Army controlled items are to be reserved to fill TOE shortages and combat losses. Requests to retain items on hand for temporary loan will normally be honored; requests for items pending MTOE/HTDA determination will normally be disapproved as this is not considered a loan action. The following temporary loan actions were accomplished between 1 February 1968 and 30 April 1968:

a. Total requests received by this headquarters: 110
b. Temporary loan requests approved by USARV: 44
c. Temporary loan requests disapproved by USARV: 19
d. Temporary loan requests outstanding at USARV: 9
e. Temporary loan requests returned by this headquarters to the requester without action (items not available, insufficient justification, incorrect statements, etc): 24
f. Temporary loan requests in process at this headquarters: 14

5. (U) Pursuant to USARV letter, subject: Standardization of COSTAR Units, dated 5 March 1968, standardization of nine MTOEs in the 29 Series and one MTOE in the 10 Series was accomplished and forwarded to USARV G-3, Force Developments Division, by 30 April 1968. This phase of standardization included 46 units. A feasibility study is being conducted to determine what constraints, if any, prohibit the standardization of other MTOEs in the 29 Series Table.

6. (C) Five significant combat service support force packages were developed during February and March 1968 to support proposed additive combat forces. These became logistics force tabs to varying size combat and combat support packages developed by USARV and submitted to
7. (U) The Department of Army approved TDAs for depots at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon for implementation in February 1968. Deferral of implementation was requested pending evaluation of the civilian-military personnel mix in the TDA structure, particularly in Saigon's 506th Field Depot, which contained 71% Local Nationals. Experience during the Tet attacks demonstrated the unreliability of the civilian workforce during periods of active hostilities. Certain depot functions, not absolutely essential during periods of increased tension, are susceptible to contract operation. A revised staffing plan, which will provide additional military spaces for the Saigon Depot through the infusion of contractor operations, was submitted in March 1968, with proposed implementation on 1 June 1968.
ANNEX G  (C) ACOPS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Operations Division

1. (U) Major Unit Arrivals. None.

2. (U) Training.
   a. To assist the new provisional support command at Da Nang, an operator's course was established within the U. S. Army Support Command, Saigon to qualify recently assigned personnel in the operation of materiel handling equipment.
   b. This program included three days of classroom instruction and practical exercises on the equipment.
   c. A total of fifty personnel were trained and, upon completion, were assigned to U. S. Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional).

3. (C) Airdrop Re-supply.
   a. During February 1968, 46 emergency airdrop missions were conducted in support of U. S. Army, U. S. Marine Corps and Free World Military Assistance Forces. Drops totaling 4229.13 short tons, involving all classes of supply, were executed, and this represented the largest single airdrop monthly tonnage in airborne history.
      (1) The recipients of air-dropped material were the U. S. Marines at Khe Sanh - 54%; followed by the U. S. Army - 36%; and Allied Forces - 10%.
      (2) The methods employed to accomplish these drops, in order of frequency of use and tonnage dropped were the Container Delivery System (CDS), Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES), and free drops.
      (3) Missions were flown in C-123 and C-130 aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and Bien Hoa Air Bases by the 834th Air Division. Both visual and instrument controlled drops were conducted.
   b. During March 1968, 39 emergency airdrop missions were executed in support of U. S. Army and U. S. Marine Corps units. The record of the previous month was broken when a total of 5,516,67 short tons of all classes of supplies were dropped.
      (1) As was true in February, the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh was the recipient of the greatest amount of air-dropped supplies, receiving 91% of the tonnage.
(2) Methods employed, in order of frequency of use and volume delivered were: CDS; LAPES; free drops and the Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES).

(3) The GPES, an experimental U. S. Air Force system, is similar in principal to the aircraft arresting system employed on aircraft carriers of the U. S. Navy. In execution, a C-130 aircraft, with wheels almost touching ground surface, trails a hook. This hook engages a cable stretched across the extraction zone on the ground. Upon contacting the cable, the hook, which is attached to a modular platform, extracts the load from the aircraft. Only one drop utilizing GPES was performed during March, and involved the aerial delivery of lumber to the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh.

(4) Loads for the March airdrop missions were rigged at Bien Hoa by the 383rd Quartermaster Company and at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang by the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery). The immense task of classifying and repairing the parachutes and related air items recovered was accomplished by the 623rd Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment Repair and Depot) stationed at Cam Ranh Bay.

a. During April 1968, emergency airdrop missions were executed in support of U. S. Army and U. S. Marine Corps units. A total of 3064.34 short tons of all classes of supply were dropped.

(1) Methods used included CDS, LAPES, GPES, standard heavy drop on modular platforms, high velocity drop and free fall.

(2) During April, a variation of LAPES was used. Known as "1528 LAPES," this system employed three platforms attached in tandem. The aircraft flies approximately five feet above the ground, with a 15 foot extraction parachute deployed during the approach. Upon reaching the target area, the extraction parachute is released which deploys three additional 28 foot extraction parachutes. These parachutes extract and retard the load as it moves along the extraction zone. This system was used for four days, delivering JP-4 in 500 gallon collapsible containers with two containers on each platform. Of a total of 84 containers delivered, only 64 were recovered intact. Eight were ruptured due to the extreme "G" force encountered in this system. Two complete loads of 12 containers burned as they slid along the extraction zone. The cause of the fire has not been determined and an investigation is being conducted by the U. S. Air Force. The possibility exists that gravel on the extraction zone caused sparks which ignited fuel from a ruptured drum.

(3) During a drop in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), one C-130 aircraft was destroyed by enemy action. There were no survivors and the ammunition...
cargo was completely destroyed. Several other aircraft sustained damage, but all were able to safely return to their bases.

(4) Rigger personnel continued to assist the supported units by stationing themselves on the drop zone in the areas of operations. Missions for April were rigged at Cam Ranh Bay, Bien Hoa and Da Nang by the 109th Quartermaster Company, the 383rd Quartermaster Company and attached elements from the 101st Airborne Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 549th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery) which is on Temporary Change of Station from United States Army, Japan. The rehabilitation, storage and issue of airdrop equipment for these operations was accomplished by the 623rd Quartermaster Company.

4. (c) Tactical Operations.

a. The following major operations were logistically supported by this command during the period 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>INITIATED</th>
<th>TERMINATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CTZ *Jeb Stuart</td>
<td>22 Jan 68</td>
<td>31 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler/Wallowa</td>
<td>11 Sep 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscatine</td>
<td>19 Dec 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Pegasus</td>
<td>1 Apr 68</td>
<td>15 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Carentan</td>
<td>1 Apr 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Victory</td>
<td>8 Apr 68</td>
<td>19 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington Trail</td>
<td>8 Apr 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland II</td>
<td>15 Apr 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Delaware</td>
<td>19 Apr 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ *Pershing II</td>
<td>20 Jan 68</td>
<td>29 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Patrick</td>
<td>29 Feb 68</td>
<td>30 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Cochise</td>
<td>30 Mar 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolling</td>
<td>19 Sep 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*McArthur</td>
<td>12 Oct 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
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</table>

21
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>INITIATED</th>
<th>TERMINATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*McLain</td>
<td>19 Jan 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker</td>
<td>17 Jan 67</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ Toan Thang Campaign</td>
<td>8 Apr 68</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniontown</td>
<td>18 Dec 67</td>
<td>8 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitty Hawk</td>
<td>14 Jan 67</td>
<td>21 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamson 68</td>
<td>1 Feb 68</td>
<td>10 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratoga</td>
<td>9 Dec 67</td>
<td>10 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*San Angelo</td>
<td>16 Jan 68</td>
<td>9 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Yellowstone</td>
<td>1 Dec 67</td>
<td>24 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>13 Feb 67</td>
<td>10 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coberg</td>
<td>24 Jan 68</td>
<td>1 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riley</td>
<td>22 Jul 67</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>18 Dec 67</td>
<td>17 Feb 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narasin</td>
<td>21 Oct 67</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valley Forge</td>
<td>8 Mar 68</td>
<td>17 Mar 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harrisburg</td>
<td>8 Mar 68</td>
<td>24 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quyet Thang</td>
<td>11 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pimmarco</td>
<td>6 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilderness</td>
<td>11 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxsprings</td>
<td>16 Mar 68</td>
<td>28 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcorn Cove</td>
<td>21 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Banos</td>
<td>24 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarksville</td>
<td>24 Mar 68</td>
<td>7 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1968, this command established three Forward Support Areas (FSA). They were located at Camp Evans (ID 530330), Calu (ID 000480) and Landing Zone Eagle (ID 887745). Four FSAs were closed and one was transferred, in part, to the Marine Force Logistcs Command. Those closed were located at Loc Minh (IV733084), Katum (IT 331901), Song Be (YU 141070) and Phu Bai (ID 887748). The majority of personnel and equipment from the Phu Bai FSA was deployed north and subsequently became the Camp Evans FSA. The Calu FSA, which was established at the end of March to support Operation Pegasus, was transferred to the U. S. Marines at the termination of the operation. The Calu FSA was initially a joint Army – Marine endeavor. Although the Army controlled the management of the stocks, the task force was augmented by 42 Marine Corps personnel. The other established FSAs at Quang Tri (ID 378432), Tuc Phu (BS 809384), English Airfield (BR 845945), Dak To (ZS 016216), and Phan Thiet (AN 801068) continued to support tactical operations. An unusual situation existed at the Quang Tri FSA in that the four bulk Class III products for this FSA were being managed by the 1st Air Cavalry Division at the Division Forward Support Element. Due to a real estate problem at Quang Tri, POL bladders were loaned to the division and "through put" stock procedures were utilised to the division FSE. The amounts of POL consumed, however, were reported to the FSA Commander so that experience data on consumption was still maintained. The Class I and V stocks remained under the control of the FSA Commander. By the end of the period, seven of the FSAs were in full operation, five of which were in support of major tactical operations and two of which were providing support to forces on an as needed basis.
CONFIDENTIAL

a. As a result of the enemy's extensive Tet Attacks in February, resupply of tactical operations greatly tested the ability of this command to move needed material. Continuous interdiction of land lines of communication (LOC) resulted in the extensive use of combat essential and emergency resupply air missions. In the I CTZ, heavy enemy activity along the Cua Viet River leading to Dong Ha, along the Perfume River to Hue and along the road from Da Nang to Phu Bai significantly reduced the command's resupply capability by surface means. In the II CTZ, convoys from Qui Nhon to Pleiku and English Airfield, and from Pleiku to Dak To, were frequently ambushed. Fortunately, only small losses of supplies and a low casualty rate were experienced. In the III CTZ, where the greatest part of the enemy's attacks were concentrated, difficulty was experienced in the resupply of the Tay Ninh and Phouo Vinh Supply Points. In almost all instances, the convoy to Tay Ninh was not able to achieve a one-day turnaround. The trucks would normally be locked-in overnight and in some instances, for two days. Convoys were not dispatched to Phouo Vinh during the month. This supply point was resupplied entirely by air LOC. A total of 913 short tons of Class III products were shipped to Phouo Vinh by combat essential (CE) and emergency resupply (ER) missions. In the IV CTZ, resupply of the command's supply points was accomplished by air and water. Overall, normal movement of supplies was hindered; however, tactical units were always provided with essential supplies.

d. During February, as a result of the build-up of Army units in the I CTZ, this command deployed a support force of approximately 3,000 personnel to augment the support force of 2,300 personnel of the Da Nang Sub-Area Command. On 25 February 1968, the entire support force was designated as the U. S. Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional) (USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV)). Personnel and equipment were furnished from 1st Logistical Command assets. The mission of USASUPCOM, DNG (PROV) is: (1) provide command and control of Army combat service support troops in I Corps; (2) provide Army - peculiar II and IV and all Class V support to Army units; (3) provide terminal service and line haul transportation; (4) reinforce the Naval Support Activity in Class I, III and II and IV common supply. Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA) are currently being developed with the U. S. Navy.

e. To provide support for the headquarters of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and a two-battalion task force deployed to Ben Me Thout during February, U. S. Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay (USASUPCOM, CMB) provided a support force to augment 1st Logistical Command personnel that were operating the Class III Supply Point. The support force provided laundry and bath, graves registration, water purification and Class I supply services.

f. During March, a significant amount of work was accomplished by tactical and engineer units to open a number of LOC in the Republic of
Vietnam. In the I CTZ, three essential roads were opened. Route 1 from Da Nang to Quang Tri was opened, and upgrading is continuing at a rapid pace. Concurrently, Route 9 from Dong Ha to Ca Lu is open and is also being upgraded. The work on these two roads is to continue throughout the summer with the objective being a Class 60, 24 foot wide road with five foot shoulders. A third important LOC is the road from Wunder Beach to Hai Lang. Most of the work on this road was completed during March and by 15 April, the condition of the road was Class 30 and open to two-way traffic. In the II CTZ, convoys moving between Qui Nhon and Pleiku were occasionally ambushed, but the road continued to remain open. Route 21 to Ben Me Thout was opened for a period of five days. The operation to secure the road was conducted by a joint ARVN-ROK task force. During the five day period, sufficient amounts of supplies were line hauled to restore all supplies to stockage objective levels. After the road was closed, Ben Me Thout reverted to air LOC status. The next planned opening of the road is scheduled for early May. In the III CTZ, all land LOC remained open with the exception of Route 1A to the Phouc Vinh Supply Point. This road was opened for a period of four days, during which two convoys were dispatched. All stockage objective levels were restored. After ten days however, the majority of the Class III stocks had been issued, and, although some products did move by priority 01 air to the supply point, it was necessary to use GE airlift to move the required supplies in order to maintain a one-day stockage level. In the IV CTZ, the primary LOC, Route 4, was constantly interdicted and this command continued to resupply the Delta area by sea and air LOC.

The number of GE airlifts was drastically reduced in March as the backlog of priority 01 air shipments decreased. During that month, only 51 combat essential and emergency resupply missions were flown as compared to 138 such missions in February.

During April, the enemy's interdiction of the primary LOC was noticeably reduced. In the I CTZ, Route 1 from Da Nang to Quang Tri was kept open and the up-grading continued. Route 9 was opened from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh and its up-grading is continuing. In the II CTZ, convoys moving along Route 19 were ambushed on only one occasion, with negligible damage reported. In the III CTZ, all land LOC remained open with the exception of Route 1A to the Phouc Vinh Supply Point. This road was opened for a period of four days, during which two convoys were dispatched. All of the stockage objective levels were restored. For the remainder of the month, the installation was supplied by priority 01 air. In the IV CTZ, Route 4 was opened on a number of occasions; however, only the tactical units operated supply convoys. This command continued to resupply its supply points by sea and air LOC.

During April availability of priority 01 air increased considerably for the second consecutive month and only 24 air GE were used. Also dur-
ing April the Logistical Operations Control Center of this command became
the point of contact for GE air mission requests for U. S. aviation units
supporting ARVN troops in the IV CTD. Prior to this change, GE missions
were called direct to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Traffic Manage-
ment Agency by the IV Corps senior advisor.
ANNEX II  DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

1. (U) Surveillance activities:

a. Instructions were furnished ammunition supply points and depots on the proper procedure for airdrop preparation of 4.2 inch mortar ammunition Models M29A1, M32A1 and M35A2. These models may not be airdropped without removal of the firing pin.

b. In response to questions posed by the Project Manager for mortar ammunition, this headquarters furnished comments on the various type packs for this commodity. The jungle pack in wooden boxes is considered a substantial improvement over the plastic containers in wire bound crates previously utilized; however, a final evaluation will be rendered after the pack has been exposed to local conditions for an extended period.

c. The Chief of Surveillance attended a test firing of the Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW). Rounds from lots produced in 1966 through August 1967 were fired. A total of 51 rounds were fired at an old M48 tank hull. Good penetration was achieved when solid impact occurred. Practically no damage resulted when the rounds functioned by grase action or did not attain proper standoff. Two duds were experi- enced with Lots LS-7-3B (old lot). Rounds of recent manufacture do not leak readily when the tube is extended and prepared for firing. This headquarters and USAW are assisting Picatinny Arsenal with an investi- gation of this problem.

d. With the concurrence of USAARV, all lots of 1325-C246, Car- tridge, 81mm, HE, M374 with fuse, were suspended on 10 March 1968. The number of malfunctions experienced with 81mm mortar ammunition packaged in the M513 plastic containers became unacceptable. Sufficient quantities of other 81mm lots were locally available to meet minimum require- ments.

2. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities:

a. EOD personnel responded to 4,388 incidents throughout Vietnam, presented 163 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance courses, training a total of 1,880 personnel, and made 1,211 liaison visits to supported units.

b. EOD units were involved in major clean-up operations at the Long Biên Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD), Qui Nhơn ASD, Pleiku Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) and Phu Bai ASP due to damage caused by enemy action.
The Saigon based detachments (533d EOD Control and 170th Ordnance Detachment EOD) were heavily engaged in EOD operations throughout Saigon during the Tet attack, as were most of the other detachments in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. The arrival of the 99th Ordnance Detachment EOD at Da Nang in March (from CONUS) has enabled more effective coverage of the ICTZ.

3. (c) Supply activities.

a. Class V losses due to enemy attack were sustained at the following locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SHORT TONS</th>
<th>$VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Binh ASP</td>
<td>31 Jan 68</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>1,059,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku ASP</td>
<td>1-2 Feb 68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quy Nhon ASP</td>
<td>31 Jan 68</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>905,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai ASP</td>
<td>1-2 Feb 68</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>2,355,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Binh ASP</td>
<td>16 Feb 68</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>122,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Binh ASP</td>
<td>22 Feb 68</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>2,744,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku ASP</td>
<td>29 Mar 68</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>9,543,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Wholesale Class V activity for the theater included 289,005 short tons (S/T) of ammunition received and 300,627 S/T issued. A total of 213,986 S/T were stored in 1st Logistical Command supply points and depots as of 24 April 1968.

c. Due to the heavy demand during and immediately after the Tet attack, certain illuminants and small arms ammunition were supplied by channel air from CONUS.

d. An analysis of anti-tank Class V indicated that few supply actions were generated as a result of enemy introduction of armor. Action had already been taken to improve the 66mm Light Anti-Tank Weapon (B555) posture. The retrograde of excess anti-tank munitions will continue as programmed due to the deteriorated condition of many items.

e. A technical assistance team from Army Material Command was requested to assist in establishing a standardized Class V stock control system throughout 1st Logistical Command. It is estimated that the team will be required for approximately 180 days. The majority of this time will be spent working with the three ammunition battalions and the stock control element in the Da Nang Support Command.
f. Action to retrograde suspended 81mm mortar ammunition (C246) by air and sea was taken in April. A total of 44,000 rounds from Long Binh ABD were flown from Tan Son Nhat Air Base and 57,000 rounds from Cam Ranh Bay ABD were shipped by sea. The remaining 80,000 rounds at Long Binh ABD will be retrograded by sea mode. The 76,000 rounds of C246 at Qui Nhon and the remaining 12,000 rounds at Cam Ranh Bay will be shipped by sea on the first available retrograde vessel.

g. A conference was held at USARPAC Munitions Management Agency 15-17 April 1968 to plan for expansion of automatic data processing (ADP) in the Class V supply system in lst Logistical Command. A two man team from USARPAC is scheduled to arrive in May to perform a systems analysis of the overall ammunition system to include use of ADP at the battalion/depot level.

h. Between 25 January and 5 March 1968, the ratio of M501A1 fuse issues to its appropriate 155mm projectile (RC & Colored smoke) was 2.7:1. Support commands are now required to explain, in detail, each issue of fuses M501A1 that is not accompanied by a like issue for projectiles. USARV has also advised subordinate commands that ratio of fuses to projectile issues will not exceed the required supply rate (ASR), except that VT fuses are authorized on the same basis/rate as PB fuses, so long as a one to one fuse/projectile ratio is not exceeded.

i. Preliminary work has been accomplished to effectively utilize ADP equipment to reconcile unserviceable Class V assets in lst Logistical Command. The final goal is to provide a comprehensive monthly status of all unserviceable assets to improve the maintenance and retrograde programs as well as refine the stockage on hand.

j. A Department of the Army civilian ammunition maintenance specialist was assigned this headquarters in March 1968. His primary function is to implement and monitor the ammunition maintenance program.

k. Flares, Surface Trip M49, was removed from the intensive management items placed on Available Supply Rate (ASR). Those new items added are annotated with an asterisk. As of 30 April 1968, there were 26 items on ASR.

*Cartridge 7.62mm Minigun
*Cartridge 40mm HE M406
*Cartridge 60mm Tilt
*Cartridge 60mm HE
Cartridge 81mm HE
Cartridge 81mm Tilt
Cartridge 105mm HE
CONFIDENTIAL

- Cartridge 105mm Illum
- Cartridge 105mm Smokey WP
- Cartridge 4.2 Inch Illum
- Projectile 175mm HE
- Cluster Can Tact (CS)
- Grenade HD Frag M26A1
- Grenade HD Offset
- Grenade HD Oak Vio
- Rocket 66mm HEAT (LAW)
- Mine APERS M18A1 (claymore)
- Chem Agent CS1
- Signal Illum OD White Star Clus
- Signal Illum OD White Star Para
- Charge Demo HX C-1
- Flare ACFT Para MK24
- Charge Prop 8 Inch Green Beg
- Rocket 2.75 Inch HE w/motor
- Fuses FD M572

1. By direction of the Secretary of Defense, all lots of 5.56 Ball ammunition manufactured with Improved Military Rifle (IMR) Propellant were suspended (except for training use) in February 1968. The suspension affected approximately 10 million rounds of 1st Logistical Command Stocks or 11% of the total balance on hand. The system was imposed because tests conducted in Panama showed that rounds loaded with the IMR propellant experienced a higher than acceptable malfunction rate.

2. (U) Ammunition Operations:

   a. Twelve of 21 pads constructed at Cam Ranh Bay ASP Area "Q" have been accepted for storage of Class V. Construction continues on the remaining pads and barricades.

   b. Construction of the ASP at Dong Tam is progressing and should be completed by the end of May.

   c. The new ASP at Plaino is completed insofar as pad and barricade construction is concerned. Work is currently progressing on completing perimeter fencing, guard towers and other ancillary facilities. The ASP should be operational by the end of May provided that external security responsibilities are resolved by the I Field Force Commander.
d. Expansion into I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) by USARY units necessitated establishment of additional ASPs. Ammunition is now stored at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Camp Evans, Phu Bai, Da Nang, Chu Lai and Doc Pho. With the exception of Camp Evans and Doc Pho, Army ASPs are collocated with U.S. Marine Corps ASPs.

e. A beach holding area was established at Than My Thuy in ICTZ. Deep draft vessels may be off-loaded in the stream and Class V brought ashore on litterage. Class V is temporarily stored at this site and then moved by convoy to Camp Evans and Quang Tri. Back up support is provided to Phu Bai and Dong Ha in the event their ports are closed.

f. Plans are currently being made to establish an additional ASP in the Delta at Can Tho. This will be a small (2000 s/t) facility similar to the ASP being constructed at Dong Tam.

g. Class V operations in ICTZ have not met desired standards since the rapid buildup in that area. Upon arrival of the ammunition supply units (two) from CONUS in June, personnel and equipment will be more available to properly accomplish the Class V supply mission, although a shortfall will still exist in command, control and stock control. Although receipts and issue activity continues to meet combat requirements, many other activities must be postponed such as maintenance, rewarehousing and inventory.
1. (C) Intensified enemy action during the recent Tet attack resulted in extensive damage to a number of storage pads and loss of ammunition stocks worth approximately $4 million in the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD). Subsequently, piecemeal attempts were made to make this complex a complete and usable facility; however, only limited progress was made toward satisfying the total requirements of the ASD. The ammunition losses demonstrated a need for additional berms, for repair of damaged pads, upgrading of certain pads, and additional provisions for security measures to protect the ASD against further enemy infiltration and sabotage. Inspection of the ASD by members of the Ammunition and Engineering Directorates disclosed that an immediate requirement existed to repair 29 ammunition pads as priority 01 work; repair of 26 other pads as priority 02 work; and upgrading 83 pads and construction of perimeter roads, interior roads, shed storage, and supplemental security lighting and fence as priority 03. Crushed laterite will be used on each pad to form a compacted wearing surface to support a 10,000 lb. wheel load. Earth or sand, free of stones or other similar objects which may form dangerous fragments, will be used to construct all berms. Dimensions of berms will be 12 feet high, 3 feet wide at the top, and sloped at the normal angle of repose. Berms will be pan-primed or seeded to provide for control of erosion. Security fence and lighting requirements will consist of relocation of existing light poles and security lights, conversion of the entire overhead electrical cable system to an underground system, and relocation of sizeable segments of tactical fence to more advantageous terrain. Approval of the foregoing requirements has been obtained and the appropriate construction directives have been issued.

2. (U) In February 1967, the ammunition renovation building located at the Long Binh ASD was severely damaged by an ammunition explosion. A project to dismantle the building and to replace it with a tropical wood frame structure was approved on 26 January 1968. A beneficial occupancy date (BOD) of 1 April 1968 was established by the construction directive issued for this facility. As a result of diversion of the engineer troop effort to higher priority work, however, the project is presently only 10% complete with only the site preparation and limited work on footings accomplished. US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (P) (USAECAV(P)) has been asked to increase the effort on this project and to provide a new BOD.

3. (U) Eleven buildings have been completed and turned over to the 506th Field Depot at Long Binh. Following the DOD Advisory Group's recommendation to revise the layout of the planned depot complex, this headquarters requested that construction be initiated as soon as possible and that sufficient effort be applied to complete the remaining facilities in accordance with newly established priorities. A combination of engineer troop and
contractor effort has been assigned to expedite the construction. Approximately 70 percent of the operational and open storage areas are to be completed by 15 June 1968; the balance will be completed by 30 September 1968. Tentative completion dates for most of the remaining vertical construction have been received from USAECAV(P) and furnished to the 506th Field Depot so that movement to the new facilities can be planned.

4. (U) The construction progress of the Pleiku Logistical Complex has continued to be a matter of concern. Recent on-site observations revealed that the construction has not been proceeding as rapidly as expected. Past experience at Pleiku has shown that in order to maintain usable hardstand area during sustained wet weather conditions, the subgrade must be kept dry and sealed with a suitable wearing surface. USAECAV(P) has announced that the construction effort programmed by the 937th Engineer Group would result in about 104,000 square yards of hardstand area. This headquarters has held that 185,000 square yards of hardstand is the minimum requirement during this construction season. Although the reduced amount is expected to be completed by 1 July 1968, this will leave the logistical complex with two principal operational problem areas. These are hardstands for the engineer equipment repair (6,000 sq. yds) and the wheeled vehicle yard (6,000 sq. yds) areas.

5. (U) The Dong Hai POL jetty at Long Binh has sustained major damage to four dolphins and to the jetty itself. This damage has reduced the discharge capacity of MOGAS product into the pipeline to the Long Binh Tank Farm. Higher priority port construction and the non-availability of port construction effort have delayed repairs of the POL facility. Repairs cannot be made by troop construction effort until after 1 June 1968; however, redesign of a priority port construction project, and administrative and funding delays of a second port construction priority project, have resulted in available contractor assets. Therefore, this headquarters has requested US Army Vietnam, Engineer to task the contractor, BAM BRJ, through the Officer-In-Charge of Construction, to perform the repairs. It is estimated that the contractor can initiate repairs to the four dolphins and the jetty on or before 6 May 1968. The repairs can be accomplished by 20 May 1968.

6. (U) The Tet attack reinforced the need for a hardened underground command post for the 1st Logistical Command. On 24 February 1968 a DD Form 1392 (Military Construction Line Item Data) for construction approval of such a facility was submitted to USARP. The hardened command post will provide work space for 56 people. Space will be provided for the Command Group, a communications center, an emergency logistical operations control center, and selected key staff members. Installation of the communications equipment in Building 5008 has been suspended pending approval of the command post. A temporary underground facility has been constructed to provide protection against short duration attacks and
7. (U) In order to provide adequate housing facilities for Korean Nationals employed by the Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay, 13 two-story tropical wood barracks have been completed or are under construction. Construction began on 5 February 1968 and is being accomplished using Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds. As the barracks are completed the Korean employees are immediately occupying the buildings, thereby relieving the crowded living conditions at Cam Ranh Bay. As of 31 March, the project was 95% complete. The estimated date of completion was 30 April 1968.

8. (U) In February 1968, deep draft vessels coming into Cam Ranh Bay through the main channel were running aground as they neared the pier area. Because of this problem, it became necessary to unload ammunition from deep draft vessels in the stream. In order to resolve the problem and hasten unloading operations, immediate maintenance dredging was requested. The Officer-In-Charge of Construction directed a technical hydrographic survey of Cam Ranh Bay be conducted prior to scheduling a dredge. On 18 March 1968 the technical hydrographic survey was completed, and revealed that there was sufficient depth in the bay to facilitate movement of deep draft vessels. The grounding of incoming vessels was due to the channel marker buoys being moved outside the channel limits which was caused by wind, tide, current and wave action. In April 1968, a U.S. Coast Guard buoy tender arrived at Cam Ranh Bay and relocated the buoys to the original locations. This action eliminated costly dredging work and improved ammunition unloading procedures.

9. (U) Through heavy use, the wearing surface of DeLong Pier #2 at Cam Ranh Bay has badly deteriorated. On 3 April 1968 this headquarters requested that 27,000 square feet of salvaged AM-2 aluminum matting be released from U.S. Air Force stocks for resurfacing Pier #2. A 480 square foot test section of matting was placed on Pier #2 in February 1968. After two months of heavy use the condition of the matting was excellent, and proved that AM-2 matting can be used as an acceptable surfacing material. Use of salvaged material will result in a monetary savings to the U.S. Government of approximately $61,400.00. In addition to providing a suitable wearing surface, the AM-2 matting can be installed without curtailing unloading operations at the pier.

10. (U) In order to provide complete computer facilities throughout Vietnam, the 1st Logistical Command is installing updated Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS) facilities at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. Plans for renovating the U.S. Army Depot computer building at Cam Ranh Bay were completed in March 1968. On 11 April 1968, modification of the existing ADPS building began. When completed the building will house an IBM 1660/7010 computer, an Autodin room containing a UNIVAC 1106 computer, a crypto
facility and a signal transceiver, a tape library, an Engineer shop and an air conditioner room. The beneficial occupancy date for the facility is 15 May 1968. On 14 March 1968 construction of an ADP facility was begun at the U. S. Army Depot, Qui Nhon. When completed the facility will consist of 11,570 square feet building area and will house a 7010/1460 computer. The estimated date of completion for the facility is 1 June 1968.

11. (U) The semi-annual updated base development plans from ten installations, including all of the major logistical complexes, were received, reviewed and modified as necessary through coordination with the installation coordinators. A substantial improvement in the quality of the plans submitted has been noted. This is due, in large part, to the emphasis placed on the employment and effective utilization of the base development planning boards. USARV has informally announced that the base development plans are to be converted to an automatic data processing format with line item updating as required. Therefore, there will be no June submittal of new base development plans. Implementing instructions will be published by USARV in the near future.

12. (U) USARV Regulation 10-4, Organisation and Functions-Area Coordination, dated 10 January 1968, assigned responsibility for master planning to zone and subzone coordinators on a geographical basis. It established channels for submission of base development plans through the zone coordinators. To facilitate logistical planning, and to insure that base development is responsive to the 1st Logistical Command's mission, it is essential that this responsibility be retained by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command for those installations where logistical activities are dominant. A request was made to USARV on 12 April 1968 for an exception to this regulation wherein this command would be responsible for base development of the following installations:

Newport
Cam Ranh Bay
Nha Trang
Tuy Hoa
Qui Nhon
Pleiku
Da Nang (US Army occupied areas)

The request is being staffed by USARV.

13. (U) A study group chaired by the Directorate of Engineering conducted a study to determine the feasibility of establishing a depot at Vung Tau. The study addressed the proposed mission of the logistical complex to include stockage levels and population to be supported for each class of supply; the scope of facilities required; availability of real estate; the
construction costs to include the cost of real estate, the construction time, and the capacity of the port. The Commanding General approved the recommendation to establish a depot at Vung Tan at a decision briefing presented on 13 February 1968. The Deputy Commanding General, USARV, attended the briefing. The pertinent construction requests (DD Form 1391) were submitted to USARV in two phases. Phase I included facilities for Class I, Class III package products and Class IV construction materials. Phase II was for Class II and IV supplies. These requests were being staffed through USARV.

14. (U) A study was conducted to determine whether to relocate the two Pacific Architect and Engineers Inc. supply activities in Saigon — the Class IV construction materials yard and the non-standard repair parts activity to Long Binh as part of the MOOSE program, and to vacate the leased facilities. On 30 March 1968, the Commanding General approved the recommendation to move the Class IV construction materials from Area 205 to Long Binh; however, he disapproved the move of the non-standard repair parts activity from the Rice Mill to Long Binh at this time and decided instead to move it to the Fishmarket area because:

1. A large number of civilians would require housing on Long Binh Post.

2. The Naval Support Activity in Saigon would then have to come to Long Binh to pick up common service supplies. The move will be made as facilities become available in the Fishmarket area.

15. (U) To meet the growing requirements for Army peculiar supply items in the I Corps Area, a new depot is being established at Da Nang. As a result of a lst Logistical Command study, 120,000 square feet of covered storage and 57,000 square yards of open storage have been requested as an NCA construction requirement. USARV has approved six (120' x 200') warehouses and 27,000 square yards of open storage for the depot. If MACV approves the concept, a contract for the storage facilities should be let in June of 1968.

16. (U) USARV recently levied the lst Logistical Command for 32 two-bedroom house trailers to provide living accommodations for general officers and senior personnel of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. The two-bedroom trailers at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon were inspected by members of this headquarters, USARV, and MACV. As a result of the inspection, it was determined that nine trailers would be transferred from Qui Nhon and 23 from Cam Ranh Bay. The trailers have been offered for shipment and minor interior repairs are being made at each support command, prior to shipment. The trailers are scheduled to arrive at Tan Son Nhut by 15 May 1968.
17. (U) In May 1967, USARV directed the 1st Logistical Command to develop requirements and select a site for a depot parachute maintenance facility at Cam Ranh Bay. The requirements were submitted in late May, and in July 1967 USARV issued a directive for design. Numerous difficulties in the design criteria were further complicated by the fact that the USARV Ad Hoc Base Development Committee did not agree with the stated scope. The Ad Hoc Committee has now approved the total scope, however, and the design for the operations and rigging building is completed. The contract to build these two buildings should be let in early May 1968. The remainder of the facility is under design.

18. (U) Because of a reduction in funds for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1969 HCA Construction Program, USARV has requested a complete review and resubmission of previous requests for construction (DD Form 1391) by 15 May 1968. A listing of FY 1970 requirements is also to be submitted. Indications are that the FY 1970 program will be as austere as the FY 1969 program. To assist the support commands in reevaluating the HCA program requirements, members of the Engineer Directorate will help each support command screen requests, establish priorities, and categorize requests into the FY 1969, 1970, 1971 and later programs at separate support command screening board meetings. The priorities will be grouped by function category and by overall priority within the support command. This will ensure that the major requirements will remain in the FY 1969 program.
ANNEX : (U) DIRECTORATE OF ENGINEERING, Troop Operations Division

1. The Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) for the Army to provide BMU support to Navy facilities in II, III, and IV CTZ was received. The ISSA for Naval support to the Army in I CTZ has been received and is scheduled to be fully implemented by 1 September 1968. These actions resulted from MACV guidance which stated that common support would be provided by the predominant service component in each CTZ.

2. USAFR directed the Engineer Agency to provide necessary troop effort to local commanders in restoring battle damaged facilities to an operational condition. A letter was sent to the support commands giving them the authorization to coordinate directly with local elements of the Engineer Agency to obtain this assistance. This method will reduce the considerable time lag that would otherwise be experienced using existing BMU channels.

3. Letters were sent to each support command giving the maximum dollar limitation to be spent on minor new construction during the 3rd and 4th quarters of FY 1968. This limitation will be revised quarterly to comply with Change 3, USAFR Regulation 420-4 which establishes 25% as the USAFR-wide objective ratio of expenditures for minor new construction when compared to the expenditures for maintenance and repair.

4. A total of 14 staff visits were made to support commands and subarea command installations by the staff of the Troop Operations Division. BMU activities and engineer detachments were visited for purposes of inspection and/or providing technical assistance.

5. This division processed 35 Job Order Requests (DA Form 2701) during this period. Project requests above the approval authority of subordinate commands for Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) Minor Construction ($10,000) were thoroughly evaluated by the division to assure technical adequacy, adherence to prescribed standards, and compliance with regulations. Of the projects received, five were forwarded to Headquarters, USAFR since they required a waiver of the authorized standards of construction, or approval to expend Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funds, or approval to expend funds of more than $250 in-country.

6. There were 67 separate actions concerning air conditioning processed during the reporting period. Of these, 25 were forwarded to Headquarters, USAFR, for approval. The other actions either forwarded approved requests or returned the initial requests for detailed technical analysis of the air conditioning requirements after they had been evaluated by this office and found to be insufficiently justified or technically inadequate. USAFR Regulation 420-54, Air-Conditioning, has been revised and distributed to the field. The revised regulation includes the requirement for this headquarters to program air conditioning needs two fiscal years in advance to establish a sound basis for planning procurement actions.
-7. Logistics Support to MACV Advisory Teams:

a. Based on a request from Military Assistance Command, Director of Construction (MACDC), a letter was sent to MACV through USARV requesting this headquarters be furnished with base data and annual work plans for all MACV sites. This information, updated semi-annually, will enable this command to properly plan B&U support for advisor facilities at the same time other requests for these services are programmed.

b. Construction required for MACV advisors for Program 5 is to be accomplished by engineer battalions using MCA materials.

8. A quarterly Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) has been issued to the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, for reimbursement of funds spent for minor new construction projects costing between $500.00 and $10,000.00. The sum of this MIPR is $300,000.00. It was issued to complement the ISSA for the Navy to support the Army in I CTZ, and will be reissued each quarter based on the amount spent the previous quarter.

9. Due to recent events, it has been necessary to re-examine the advisability of planned deactivation and civilisation of engineer detachments. All support commands have been instructed to re-examine their requirements and develop contingency plans for military operation of critical B&U services in case of default or failure by B&U contractor forces.

10. During the February to April reporting period, a total of four Midal laundry units arrived in RVN and were issued to service units. Two went to the 625th S&S Company in Quang Tri, one to the 228th S&S Company in Tay Ninh, and one to the 259th QM Detachment in Vung Tau. At the present time, there are 131 of the authorized 158 units on hand for an 86% fill of standard equipment. The remaining 27 units are due in the near future. Total field production rose from 11.8 million pounds to 11.9 million pounds.

11. During the reporting period two MIPRs were processed for the total amount of $307,170.00. One MIPR, Number 68-Compt-128, was for $92,250.00 to provide additional funds for laundry support to Army personnel in Da Nang. The other MIPR, Number 68-Compt-145, was for $214,920.00 to provide contract laundry service to Army personnel in Phu Bai. Presently, all contract laundry service in I CTZ is on a reimbursable basis to the Navy. Contract Laundry service to Navy personnel in II, III, and IV CTZ is on a non-reimbursable basis under ISSA Number 50-XP0165-4132-6. A formal request has been made to negotiate an ISSA in I CTZ but has not yet been accepted by the Navy.

12. Two new contracts for commercial laundry service were awarded during the reporting period. Contract Number 1168-D-0105 was awarded to Cam Phung Laundry in Dan Tieng and Contract Number 1168-D-0117 to Boe Huy Saa-Modern Service Company in Qui Nhon. There are 23 contracts and six blanket
Purchase Agreements presently in force providing service to Army personnel in RZ.

13. Field bath support continued to be consistent with field and tactical requirements with a total of 430,000 hot showers given during the period.
1. Comprehensive inspections of the Repair and Utilities (R&U) Contractor's activities were conducted at the following locations: Saigon Port, Long Binh, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku, Camp Enari, An Khe, Di An, and Lai Khe. Inspections covered the full scope of R&U services performed. Deficiencies were brought to the attention of the contracting officer, contractor, and the support area commanders for corrective action.

2. R&U Contractor Performance Reports received in January and March 1968, using the new format discussed in the last ORLL, have proved to be of greater value for supervision of the R&U contract than was the rather general check list form previously used. The most notable improvement has been the provision for narrative comment by the rater (the Contracting Officer's Representative on site) and an endorsement by the appropriate Support Command Engineer. This has led to more direct and immediate actions taken at the installation and support command levels and has increased the effectiveness of actions taken by lst Logistical Command.

3. The special and technical provisions for the FY 1969 R&U contracts for the Qui Nhon Support Command, and the Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands were prepared. Both contracts are to be a cost-plus-fixed-fee type contract. The Qui Nhon Support Command R&U contract was advertised for award on a competitive basis. The Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands' R&U contract is being renegotiated with Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., the present R&U contractor. The U. S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) is now in the final stages of evaluation and negotiation of these contracts.

4. Schedules B, Government-Furnished Property for the FY 1969 R&U contracts for the Qui Nhon, and the Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands were developed. Property authorized the contractor by Schedule B are vehicles and equipment required for normal operations of the contractor's R&U activity at each installation. Schedule B of the contract constitutes the contractor's basic authority to requisition property. Vehicles and equipment requirements at each installation were considered in determining the total authorization and were developed in coordination with contractor representatives and support command engineers.

5. Inspections of water production facilities at Nha Trang, Dong Ba Thin, Cam Ranh Bay, Po-Ling (Dalat) and Long Binh Mountain (Dalat), were made to resolve problems in water supply at these locations. Water conservation and utilization management were common problems in need of improvement at each location. Results of these inspections and appropriate recommendations were given to the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command Engineer.

6. Excess equipment in the hands of the R&U contractor or due in was
identified. Equipment valued at $1.0 million was eliminated by cancellation of procurement action and/or diverted to other users. An additional $0.5 million worth of equipment, which is still due in, will be diverted upon receipt.

7. As a result of restrictions and limitations placed by Headquarters MACV on use of herbicides and soil sterilants, the 1st Logistical Command Repairs and Utilities contractor was ordered to suspend use of these agents. MACV subsequently determined that the chemical control of weeds and grasses in engineer grounds-maintenance programs is a normal non-tactical Repair and Utilities function and not subject to the restrictions and guidelines placed by that command on aerial defoliation missions over tactical zones. Accordingly, the use of herbicides and plant growth retardants was reinstated at R&U contractor-supported installations and sites. Selected standard-issue agents are authorized for use on a routine basis, and all applications are made with hand-type or power-operated ground equipment.

8. Production difficulties at CONUS contractor plants has resulted in shipment delays and a temporary shortage of rodenticide bait blocks within RVN. These blocks are used in the "flagging" of containerized and bulk retrograde cargo destined for CONUS ports, and signify the accomplishment of certain insect and rodent control processing procedures directed by United States quarantine regulations. The Armed Forces Pest Control Board, Washington, D. C., was advised of the critical shortage of this item and guidance was requested for alternate methods of identifying treated cargo which will be acceptable to CONUS port-of-entry authorities. Recent information from Defense General Supply Center indicates that production schedules of rodenticide blocks will be increased and early airlift of this item made to overcome current shortages and to meet future demands created by increased volume and shipments of retrograde materials.
1. (U) A total of 85,000 short tons of subsistence supplies was received and issued by the Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon depots during this period. Refrigerated reefer ships from CONUS on an eight day cyclic schedule provided approximately 50% of the incoming perishable subsistence. Contractual Sea-land vans, Western Pacific Procurement (Westpac) and local procurement provided for the balance of perishable subsistence. Non-perishable subsistence was received on general cargo ships from CONUS in accordance with the required delivery dates established by this directorate.

2. (U) To provide a more desirable ration to the troops in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), arrangements were made to fly locally procured fresh fruits and vegetables from Dalat to Da Nang Support Command. The first shipment arrived in Quang Tri on 30 April 1968 and was accepted with considerable enthusiasm. Since that time a daily shipment has been made.

3. (U) During March 1968 when Army troops were shifted to I CTZ, 1st Logistical Command was asked to assist the Navy with Class I support until their stocks could be built up to support the additional personnel strength. A total of 12,596 short tons of subsistence was transferred from Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon to the Navy stocks at Da Nang.

4. (U) In response to requests from tactical units for a beverage drink to supplement the combat ration, this headquarters established requirements and forwarded them to CONUS. In early February 1968 the first shipment of the Ration Supplement Beverage Pack was received in the command. The pack includes five different flavors of presweetened soft drinks, plus individual packets of tea and coffee. Sweetening of the soft drink is accomplished by a sugar-based concentrate giving the field soldier an additional source of energy in addition to a highly acceptable drink.

5. (C) In January 1968, a request was forwarded to CINCUSARPAC to reconsider the theatre stockage of combat rations and increase the level from 10 days to 15 days. A past history of erratic shipments and uncertainty of back-up stocks being available in Japan justified this request. In April a reply was received indicating the back-up stocks were available and the theatre stockage of combat rations would remain at 10 days. Depot stocks will be maintained at a seven day level and Class I supply points will maintain a three day level. The Tet attack revealed the importance of having adequate stocks of combat rations on hand.

6. (U) During the April requisitioning cycle, special items were requisitioned for the Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday meals. The Thanksgiving items are expected to arrive in country on 15 October 1968, with the Christmas items arriving 15 November. The leadtime noted insures that
these items are adequately distributed prior to the holiday in question.

7. (U) On 15 February, the commercially contracted Meadow Gold Dairy Plant at Qui Nhon became operational. This plant provides a highly acceptable filled milk product plus ice cream and cottage cheese. At the present time, efforts are still being made to obtain additional reefer vans, either commercial or military, to assist in the distribution of the products.
1. (U) Results of Red Ball Conference, 5-7 February 1968: Department of the Army has approved a 90-day test, utilizing multiple aerial ports of debarkation to receive Red Ball cargo directly from Travis Air Force Base. The test began 15 April and direct Red Ball shipments have been arriving at Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat and Da Nang. The Air Force at the four aerial ports is cooperating with local Red Ball representatives; only minor problems have been encountered and most have been resolved. Effective 1 April, the Red Ball Document Number assigned by the Direct Support Unit (DSU) is being perpetuated throughout the supply system. Red Ball cargo arriving in Vietnam is being shipped under this number and the previous problem of customer identification has been eliminated. In addition, as of 4 April, all Red Ball requisitions passed to 2nd Logistical Command and Logistics Control Office, Pacific (LOOP) are transceived in the V1-V2 Format instead of the R1-R2 Format. The Red Ball Request form (AVCA Form 12SR) has been revised and is being used by all units. Red Ball requests are being transceived from the depots (less the 506th Field Depot) to the 14th ICC, reducing the number of copies required and reducing the in-country processing time. The documentation package which previously accompanied Red Ball cargo has been greatly reduced. The supply manifest, "J" cards, and "S" card printouts have been eliminated. Verification of receipt of Red Ball cargo is accomplished through use of "ZDC0" cards furnished by the LOOP and Military Airlift Command (MAC) manifest which accompanies all Red Ball cargo. Department of the Army has cancelled the requirement for USARV to furnish the Weekly Red Ball Report. This report was prepared by the 14th ICC and was included in the weekly USARV Not Operationally Ready, Reason Supply Report (NORS).

2. (U) 14th ICC: Planning and program modification requirements for the Standard Supply System 14th Inventory Control Center (3S14) were completed on 16 February 1968. The USARPAC Standard Supply System (3S) is designed for centralized inventory accountability processing in which the stock control activity processes transactions and directs depots to make shipments, locator adjustments, federal stock number (FSN) changes, and inventories. Limitations of the in-country logistical communications network require inventory management to operate on a centralized/decentralized basis. The 3S14 requirements were developed following the general concepts outlined below:

   a. Accountability for all items which the 14th ICC manages is at depot level.

   b. The supply management function and issue control will be at the 14th ICC for line items designated as 14th ICC centralized control.

   c. Dues-in data for both replenishment and passing action out of country will be maintained at the 14th ICC.
4. Upon request from the depot, the 14th ICC will furnish the depot a tape of direct delivery passed actions for inclusion in the customer backorders reconciliation. Four new programs were developed for the 14th ICC functions of redistribution, referrals, asset status reporting, and the introduction of new local document identifier codes. Only two required functional programs, now basic in 3S, will require no change for the conversion. Maximum program development and testing on the new system commenced on 19 February 1968. Target date for implementation of 3S14 remains 15 June 1968. This date is contingent upon the timely acquisition and installation of additional disk storage and micromation equipment required by the conversion to 3S14.

3. (U) 506th Field Depot: The 506th Field Depot conversion to the International Business Machine (IBM) 7010/1460 computer configuration and the 3SVN was completed on 5 February 1968. The number of daily and hi-priority cycles completed during the reporting period are shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTHS</th>
<th>DAILY CYCLES</th>
<th>HI-PRIORITY CYCLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 506th Field Depot is in the process of converting from 3SVN Version 18 to Version 21 with an expected completion date of 15 May 1968. Version 21 will allow the 506th Field Depot to process requisitions in Federal Item Identification Number (FIIN) sequence and provide an interchangeability and substitution capability.

4. (U) Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon: The installation of the IBM 7010/1460 computer configurations and 3SVN was subject to delay at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) and Qui Nhon (QNH) depots because of the non-availability of facilities and air-conditioning. The facility at QNH is approximately 25% completed with a site completion date of 6 June 1968. The 3SVN renovation project is progressing as scheduled; however, the site completion date has been delayed until 8 June 1968 due to late arrival of the air-conditioning. CRB and QNH have established conversion task force teams to ensure that the depots are prepared for the conversion to 3SVN. The responsibilities of the force teams are:

a. Prepare or rewrite internal operating procedures to insure proper interface with 3SVN.

b. Prepare and present introductory training courses for depot personnel on procedures to be implemented.
c. Monitor and review all plans and programs prepared by Computer Sciences Corporation concerning the conversion of the Depot 3SVN.

d. Coordinate with the appropriate directorates on all procedures affecting their operations.

e. Furnish periodic progress reports to the 1st Logistical Command concerning the implementation of 3SVN.

QNH is now scheduled to convert to 3SVN during June and CRB in July 1968.

5. (U) Da Nang: The rapidly changing tactical situation in the I Corps area established a requirement for a provisional depot at Da Nang. To support the depot, plans were made to provide ADP equipment. Since February, an ADP staff of 34 personnel, two UNIVAC 1005's with supporting punch card machines, and a system modified from the Cam Ranh Bay Depot system have been provided. The ADP facility is expected to be operational by 10 May 1968. Because of the limited capability of the UNIVAC 1005 and the increasing logistical requirements, plans are underway to procure and install third generation ADPE. An estimated target date for implementation is 1 July 1968.

6. (U) 4th Transportation Command: The 4th Transportation Command has completed preliminary specifications on 35 computer programs required to automate the Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedure (MILSTAMP) at Saigon Port. Arrangements have been made for program assembly, testing, and debugging of these programs prior to the arrival of the computer configuration. International Business Machine (IBM) 1460 computer has been approved by Department of the Army (DA) and is tentatively scheduled for installation in mid June 1968. This target date is based on the assumption that an administrative building located at USA Terminal Newport can be renovated and air conditioning installed by the scheduled date.

7. (U) Vung Tau: In late January 1968, plans were made to establish a depot at Vung Tau. As a result, a system study was conducted with the following conclusions reached:

The Vung Tau Area Command DSU and depot operations require separate facilities, staffs and procedures; Vung Tau Area Command P lane customers should be satellited upon designated DSUs/GSUs; UNIVAC 1005 and auxiliary equipment would satisfy minimum requirements for Phase I operations; the ADP programs at USAD, Cam Ranh Bay can be employed at Vung Tau with minor modifications; minimum ADP personnel requirements to support the Vung Tau Depot are five operators, two programmers and one repairman; there is a need for transceiver communications between the Vung Tau Depot and the Can Tho and Dong Tan DSUs; interchangeable/substitute data is not available to Vung Tau Sub Area Command; and a further systems study should
be made to determine Phase II ADP personnel and equipment requirements.
In February, USARPAC authorized diversion of a UNIVAC 1005 to Vung Tau; however, the UNIVAC 1005 was diverted to the Da Nang Support Command (Provisional). The next available UNIVAC 1005 is scheduled for release in middle or late June and scheduled for Vung Tau.

8. (U) Micromation: The USARPAC Micromation Project is scheduled for implementation within 1st Logistic Command during the next three months. The concept is to provide a theater-wide microfilming system compatible with existing ADP equipment, the object being to replace voluminous computer listings with microfilm. The primary purpose is to relieve computer bound printers of lengthy processing time which is possible because of the high speed at which microfilm printers operate relative to the low speed of hard copy impact printers. Additional advantages that should accrue are:

a. Faster access time in retrieving information.

b. Less space required to store data.

c. Less cost involved in transportation of data.

d. Cost savings through reduction of paper use.

e. Greater integrity maintained in reports.

Current status of the project is that USARPAC has submitted a letter of intent to Stromberg Carlson Corporation to lease their SC 4360 Micromation System pending DA approval of the project. Proposed installation dates are as follows: 14th ICC, 15 May 1968; 506th Field Depot, 15 July 1968; 58th Field Depot, 15 August 1968; and 504th Field Depot, 15 September 1968. Examples of reports within the Standard Supply System which have been identified as candidates for modification to microfilm include: Daily Input listing; Daily Transaction register; Master I&S File; Master AEP File; and Army Master Data File.

9. (U) Training:

a. The 14th ICC, charged with the responsibility of the operation of the Supply Data Systems School, presented its first course during the period 22-26 January. A second course was conducted 29 January through 6 February and a third course is presently in progress. The courses have been supported by instructors from the IBM Corporation and have included such topics as autocoder programming, COBOL programming, 7010/1450 console operation, and basic computer operations. A total of 39 students have attended, representing USAD Qui Nhon, USAD Cam Ranh Bay, 4th Transportation Command, and the 14th ICC. Further, a training directive entitled "ADP Training Program - Local National Interns In Supply Data Systems", has been published.
and five Local Nationals are in attendance at the data systems course currently being held by the 14th ICC. Pending successful completion of the course, they are scheduled for employment at the 506th Field Depot.

b. In late March 1968, coordination was established with the USAEV Comptroller to obtain replacement personnel from CONUS for the 14th ICC and the depots and ports. The concept of the plan is: identify AF personnel through the use of an aptitude test; train individuals in ADF MOSs; send them TDY to 2d Logistical Command for 3SVN/3314 training; provide the 90th and 22d Replacement Battalions with rosters of names so individuals can be reported to USAEV Comptroller who will, in turn, assign them to 1st Logistical Command depots and ports and the 14th ICC.

c. 2d Logistical Command is still being used to train U.S. military personnel from Vietnam at facilities in Okinawa, who will ultimately work with 3S. Classes have been held during the periods of 1-14 February, 1-8 March and 1-6 April, hosting a total of 35 students. Another is scheduled for 13-27 May; however, in order to decrease out-of-country TDY, efforts are being made, in conjunction with USARPAC and 2d Logistical Command, to establish a training team that would teach on site in RVN. Two instructors from USARPAC are scheduled to arrive during 16-27 May to provide training at USAD Cam Ranh Bay, USAD Qui Nhon and the 14th ICC. In addition, efforts are being made to assign the 3S military instructors at Okinawa to 1st Logistical Command when they commence their Vietnam tour.

10. (U) Personnel: The advent of the more complex tape and disk oriented IBM 7010/1460 computer configuration has imposed a requirement for more experienced and qualified ADF personnel, i.e., computer operators, tape librarians, programmers and system analysts. TDA's for the 1st Logistical Command depots were approved by Department of the Army in February 1968. The Long Binh Depot TDA was designed to support a medium scale computer operation. TDA's for the other depots (CSV, QNH) were developed and forwarded prior to the decision that these depots would support a similar operation; however, the approved TDA's are being held in abeyance by USARPAC pending a reevaluation. Vinh Tau and Da Nang personnel are being provided from available assets in 1st Logistical Command until NTOE's can be prepared. In addition, the Data Automation Requirement (DAR) for Da Nang has been submitted for the employment of a small scale, third generation computer which will require additional highly skilled personnel. It should be recognized that even after revision and approval of the TDA/NTOE's, time will be required to fill the personnel spaces. In the interim, in order to meet scheduled target dates, the immediate availability of a variety of qualified computer personnel is required. Until the CONUS base can provide the required level of input, it is necessary to use outside assistance. In order to satisfy this requirement, it is envisioned that contractual personnel could be utilized as an operating and training nucleus on which to build a foundation of qualified military and DMC personnel. It is believed that they
would have the capability under military direction to operate ADP facilities. Overall, the objective of the lst Logistical Command is to bring the level of military skills in ADP operations up to that point where contractor assistance would not be required.

11a (c) Combat Vehicle Closed Loop Conference, 6-9 March 1968:

a. As a result of the conference held at Headquarters, US Army Tank Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan, revised programs for support of armored personnel carriers (APC) and tanks and new programs for support of M88 Recovery Vehicles and M42A1 Dusters were developed. Approval and implementation of these programs, to include assignment of project codes for the M88 and Duster programs, rests with DA.

b. Introduction of the M42A2C Tank into the USAEW inventory on an interim basis allows USAEW to get well quantitatively by the end of April. Over-5000 mile tanks will be purged from TO&E units by the end of June 1968. M42A2C tanks will remain in the system until introduction of the Sheridan Vehicle and the generation of sufficient M42A3 assets to allow complete replacement by TO&E unit.

c. Increased mileage anticipated for the M42A1 Duster and the present age of the fleet indicate a need for control of this item. Present assets are below authorization (196 of 212 authorized are on hand). Inclusion in Closed Loop Support (CLS) provides for a quantitative "get well" time of May 1968, with none of the fleet exceeding 5000 miles.

d. The M88, which had been previously considered for CLS, was recommended for inclusion at this conference. Present authorization of 105 will increase to 122 by August 1968, due to unit deployments to RVN. Closed Loop action will reduce the present shortfall of 16 vehicles to four by the end of June 1968, and eliminate all shortfall by the end of September 1968. Over-5000 mile vehicles will be purged from the system by the end of December 1968.

e. The present CLS program, as adjusted at the conference, accepts a continuous shortage of APC, which vary downward from 137 at the end of March 1968, to 56 by the end of August 1968. This shortfall is acceptable, since the conference recognized the requirement for 30 days of depot stocks and complete maintenance floats for a total of 353 vehicles. The average shortfall is 15% of the authorized depot stock and maintenance float.

f. Important highlights of the conference were:

(1) Recognition of the need to maintain depot stocks at a 60 day level.

(2) Recognition of increased attrition rates.
(a) 4% to 6% for APC.
(b) 3% to 5% for tanks.
(c) Establishment of 4% rate for Duster.
(3) Conclusion that all systems in the Loop can be supported with critical assemblies.

g. The synopses of the proposed programs as compared to existing programs are as follows:

(1) M113/M113A1 (APC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIOR PROGRAM</th>
<th>REVISED PROGRAM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARCH</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAINT FLOAT</td>
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<td>1800</td>
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<td>ON HAND</td>
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<tr>
<td>-143</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: * Increase due to minor TOE changes.
** Increase due to deployment of units.

(a) Major Changes:

1. Increased washout rate from 4% to 6% based on increased battle losses.
2. Increased depot stock from 8% to 12%.

(b) Although full authorization will not be realized, full TOE and 85% of maintenance float and depot stocks should be on hand by August 1968.
(2) M88 Tank Recovery Vehicle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>NEW PROGRAM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ON HAND</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-16</td>
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</table>

The increase in June 1966 is due to deployment of an additional tank battalion. This is a new program being looped for the first time.

(3) M2A1 Duster

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<tr>
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<th>NEW PROGRAM</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAINT FLOAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPOT STOCK</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
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<tr>
<td>ON HAND</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This is a new program being looped for the first time.
(a) M48A3 Tank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRIOR PROGRAM</th>
<th>REVISED PROGRAM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>MAINT FLOAT</td>
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<td>ON HAND</td>
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<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Changes:
(a) Increased depot stock level from 30 days to 60 days.
(b) Increased washout rate from 3% to 5% due to increased battle losses.
(c) June authorisations increase by 77 due to deployment of units.

12. (U) A Closed Loop Conference was held at U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMCECOM), 25 March–3 April 1968 for the purpose of reprogramming Closed Loop Support (CLS) for material handling equipment, electrical power generating equipment, engineer construction equipment and military standard engines (CLS Project Codes: NPY, NPK, MTP and NPB), lack of accurate equipment authorisation data continues to cause difficulties in supporting projects NPY, NPK and MTP. Major Item Data Agency (MIDA) authorization did not include all TOE/MTOEs and TDA/MTDA. Contractor operated–Government furnished equipment was not provided for. Efforts are now being made to have USABE provide the necessary data to MIDA to improve the accuracy of the authorisation base used in CLS programming. The NFB program has been approved by DA. DA approval is pending for the new NPY, MTP and NPK programs.

13. (U) FWMAF Liaison Office: A Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) Liaison Office has been established in the Plans and Projects Division, Directorate of General Supply. The functions of this office are:

a. Review all FWMAF TOEs and TAs for impact on supply operations and coordinate implementation within the headquarters.
b. Act as a clearing house for all FMAF logistical problems. This is accomplished through the use of contact officers in each directorate who insures that correspondence and individuals are referred to the appropriate directorate.

c. If necessary, interpret 1st Logistical Command directives that affect FMAF. Arrange for briefings or classes on those directives which have the greatest impact on the logistical system.

d. Conduct periodic liaison visits to FMAF.

14. (U) Identification and disposition of excess: Concerted efforts for identification and disposition of excess were initiated in April 1967. During the succeeding months, several programs were involved, including the Fringe Excess Program, Bulk Items Management (BIM) and the Five Phase Excess Program. The BIM ran from April through November 1967, when it was merged with the Command Five Phase Excess Program. During this period, $33,544,356 of excess was identified and shipped. Excess worth $11,609,084 was identified and shipped under the BIM portion of the combined program in February 1968. The first three phases of the Five Phase Excess Program, accomplished from December 1967 through 15 April 1968, tentatively identified $54,580,000 in excess. Phase four excess is currently being identified by the 14th ICG, based on the latest requisitioning objectives. Other manual excess actions, conducted from January through March 1968, resulted in $3,601,094 of excess shipped. The total value of excess identified from April 1967 through April 1968 for all programs is $120,326,792.

15. (U) Material Readiness: The Deputy Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command has been designated the Material Readiness Officer with staff responsibility for coordination and supervision of material readiness functions of the command. Further, the Deputy Chief of Staff has been designated the Assistant Material Readiness Officer. To assist and advise the Material Readiness Officer and Commanding General in maintaining a high state of material readiness throughout the command which will ensure that all facets of logistics are responsive to the operational requirements of supported combat elements, a Material Readiness Council has been appointed, comprised of staff members whose responsibilities affect material readiness. This council will convene monthly to review and advise on the adequacy and effectiveness of command implementation of the Material Readiness Program, including the adequacy of actions taken to correct problems and deficiencies reported in Unit Readiness Reports, and to determine that proper emphasis is being placed upon the program at all echelons of command. Consideration will be given to the following objectives: indoctrination of all personnel of the command in the principles of material readiness; establishment of equal emphasis on material readiness, personnel readiness, and unit training for the achievement of unit readiness; determination of the actual condition of equipment and equipment records; identification of deficiencies in supply
areas, including repair parts and equipment shortages; elimination of supply excesses by emphasizing their turn-in to supply channels; and determination of the adequacy of maintenance and supply personnel, facilities, funds, material, and related resources. A new 1st Logistical Command Regulation has been prepared establishing a comprehensive Material Readiness Program for the command.

16. (U) Care and Preservation Program and Facilities: Two care and preservation specialists from Tobyhanna Army Depot and one from Letterkenny Depot arrived on 13 March 1968 to advise and assist in the establishment and implementation of a viable care and preservation program. The team objectives are:

a. To determine the condition of stored material and identify any material that requires processing to meet serviceability standards.

b. To determine the current and anticipated requirements for material identified as requiring care and preservation action.

c. To develop workload forecasts for the functions of surveillance, care and preservation.

d. To develop a schedule for performing care and preservation processing on a timely basis, to insure that the material will be ready for issue prior to the receipt of shipping demands.

The team will establish a centralized record of inspection results to permit an analysis of packing and packaging deficiencies, undesirable storage methods, and other factors which would assist CONUS supply activities, storage managers, packaging engineers, transportation activities, and procurement agencies in improving and maintaining a quality surveillance system.

17. (U) Item Substitution:

a. The 14th Inventory Control Center has initiated an Item Substitution Program to accomplish three basic purposes:

(1) To reduce the number of separate types of items stocked through the selection of certain items as standard to be stocked and issued in lieu of requested items.

(2) To reduce the total dollar value of stocked items by selection of the more economical models as standard items for stockage and issue.

(3) To reduce back orders by issuing available substitutes in lieu of the requested items.
b. Specific actions taken in implementing the Item Substitution Program are:

(1) In one week, more than $2,140,200 in backorders for various models of typewriters were satisfied when a survey revealed that sufficient on hand assets of substitute items were available to satisfy all requirements.

(2) Another survey of typewriters revealed that of 22 different models in stock in Vietnam, five standard models could be identified and used to satisfy all normal customer requirements.

a. Similar actions were taken to identify and stock only standard types of office furniture and wall lockers. The standard items have been tentatively identified and the depots will soon be informed of the necessary procedures for reduction of stocks.

d. Other instances of item substitution practices include issuing the next higher assembly, or issuing separate components which together will constitute the required item. In addition to the items mentioned above for which substitutes were more easily identifiable, actions have been taken to expand this type of review in a systematic manner for other classes of supply.

18. (U) Goals established by the 1st Logistical Command in improving the clothing and textile supply and distribution within Vietnam, as recommended by Mr. Murakwa, USARPAC Material Management Agency (MMA), are:

a. Establishment of Central Issue Facilities (CIF) and Direct Exchange (DX) at locations designated by support commands.

b. Recovery, repair and return to stock of all repairable clothing and textiles.

c. Conversion of all soft material to rags.

Coordination is being made with USAVY, USARPAC, and DA for necessary changes in procedures and regulations as pertains to clothing and textiles.
1. Reorganization of Marine Maintenance.
   
a. During the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1968, the Marine Maintenance Division of this directorate engaged in the planning for a reorganization of marine maintenance in Vietnam. This reorganization consists primarily of the establishment of detachments of the U. S. Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (USAMMAV) at Da Nang, Dong Tam, and expansion of the detachment at Saigon. In addition, the contract operation at Cam Ranh Bay will substantially expand as the result of this reorganization.

b. The nonavailability rate for U. S. Army vessels has continued to fluctuate between 20% and 30%, as indicated below:

   1. Scheduled overhaul, 10-13%
   2. Support maintenance, 4-8%
   3. Organizational maintenance, 6-9%

c. Although the commonly accepted Department of the Army (DA) availability rate of floating craft is 75%, this norm is considered unacceptable in this command in view of the increasing demands of waterborne operations without a commensurate increase in boat units. Accordingly, a goal of 90% availability has been established. To facilitate attainment of this goal, additional facilities and authority to requisition maintenance float vessels have been requested.

2. Study of Maintenance Capabilities vs Requirements.

a. In February 1968, the Directorate of Maintenance, in conjunction with G4, U. S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) completed a study of capabilities versus requirements of maintenance units of the 1st Logistical Command under "Program 5." This study was in two parts:

   1. The first part determined specific requirements for maintenance support and attendant capabilities to meet those requirements, as of January 1968.

   2. The second part projected requirements through 30 June 1968 and compared the projected capabilities to meet those requirements, considering all units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam under "Program 5."

b. As a result of this study, imbalances between the capabilities
and requirements in commodity areas were identified. As an example, in the area of direct support capabilities, it was determined the command was short 1,103 repairmen based on Combat Developments Command established end item equivalents, found in their planning paper of 20 July 1966.

c. Based on information contained in the study, certain maintenance units programmed for deployment were recommended for diversion within 1st Logistical Command and other units were relocated within the command.


a. Radio Set AN/GRC-106 series is a medium power, voice and CW, vehicular radio set which is compatible to radio-teletypewriter operations.

b. There is a large density of these sets presently in-country, but only a few qualified military personnel are available to provide adequate direct support for this set(s); consequently, the deadline rate for these items is high.

c. Since a limited number of U. S. Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) technical assistance personnel are currently in RVN to assist in reducing the maintenance problems, only a temporary solution is being realized.

d. It is imperative that adequate direct support maintenance be provided using units in order to reduce the problems associated with Radio Set AN/GRC-106 Series. To this end, six 3-week courses for direct support personnel will be conducted in-country this calendar year. The first session began on 22 April 1968.

4. Deadline Rates of Selected Items.

The following deadline rates apply to selected equipment USARV-wide.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>ON HAND AS OF 30 APRIL 1968</th>
<th>% DEADLINED</th>
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<td>M578 Recovery Vehicle</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EQUIPMENT | ON HAND AS OF 30 APRIL 1968 | % DEADLINED
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
M102, 105MM How Towed | 163 | 0.2 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
M109, 155MM How SP | 108 | 7.5 | 4.7 | 4.6 |
M114/123, 155MM How SP | 118 | 1.2 | 1 | 0.6 |
M107, 175MM How SP | 82 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 3.2 |
M110, 8" How SP | 66 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 5.6 |
Reefer Vans | 209 | 7 | 5 | 4 |
5-Ton Trucks | 7172 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
Generators (ALL) | 15518 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
MHE (ALL) | 2118 | 12 | 10 | 10 |
Tracked Tractors | 665 | 14 | 13 | 15 |
AN/MPQ-4A Radar Set | 37 | 4 | 6 | 9 |
AN/GEC-106 Radio Set | 459 | 17 | 16 | 16 |
AN/PPS-4 Radar Set | 249 | 14 | 18 | 14 |
AN/GEC-26 Radio Set | 220 | 16 | 16 | 17 |

5. Participation in CLS Program Conference in CONUS.

Representatives of the General Equipment Division of the Directorate of Maintenance attended the U. S. Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMCECOM) Closed Loop Support (CLS) Conference, at USAMCECOM Headquarters, from 25-29 March 1968. The new proposed programs should be available for distribution on or before 27 May 1968. Each program was developed with particular emphasis on establishing realistic retrograde quantities. The importance of retrograding the scheduled quantity during the month scheduled must be stressed at all levels of command. Two additional categories of power generating equipment were added to the CLS Program for generators. These are the 60CMW and 100CMW generators.

The capability to repair collapsible fuel drums is located at facilities operated by the 140th Light Equipment Maintenance (LEM) Company at Qui Nhon. Due to the increasing number of units and usage of collapsible fuel drums, especially the 500-gallon drums, there has never been an overstockage of these items. During the enemy's Tet attack, it was realized that the requirement for the use of collapsible bags increases drastically when supply lines are interdicted. Thus, in addition to raising the monthly inputs of new containers, the repair facilities are currently increasing their production capability. This depends primarily on the number of vulcanizers available. These will be augmented to increase the repair capability by approximately 230%.


a. Prior to January 1968, M48A3 90MM gun tank losses were higher than programmed. Consequently, TOE quantities were reduced to a dangerously low level without benefit of maintenance floats or depot stocks.

b. In order to raise combat potential, DA directed that 61 M48A2C 90MM gun tanks be sent to RVN for issue to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). These tanks arrived in March and April 1968. The issue to the 11th ACR, with subsequent turn-in for repair of 44 M48A3 tanks, was begun 6 April and completed 13 April. The 11th ACR now has the number of tanks authorized by TOE (54) and six tanks in maintenance float and depot stock as a back-up contingency.

c. The 44 M48A3 90MM gun tanks from the 11th ACR were turned in to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. This unit is determining, through technical inspection, which tanks will be prepared in country for reissue and which must be retrograded to CONUS or Saigon depots for rebuild.

8. Artillery.

A product improvement program had been implemented for the M109 Howitzer. Colonel Hoey, Project Manager for the M109, visited 1st Logistical Command in January 1968 and as a result of his visit it was determined that the weapons should be exchanged rather than continue with the product improvement program. As a result of this decision, there have been 54 weapons exchanged through 30 April 1968. The balance of the weapons are scheduled for exchange during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1969.


An 18-man team from COMUS, provided by U. S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (USATACOM), retrofitted 158 M123A1C 10-Ton tractor transmissions.
The team installed a quantity of high fifth wheel kits for these tractors to provide the capability of hauling the 25 ton and 50 ton trailers utilized in transporting tanks and heavy equipment.

10. Small Arms.

During March and April 1968, chrome chambered barrels for the M16A1 rifle were received and distributed to the maintenance units at Qui Nhơn, Saigon, and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands that are involved in the M16A1 Repair/Retrofit Program. Of the 4,861 rifles repaired during the month of April, 3,711 were retrofitted with the chrome chambered barrel. Inclusion of the barrel exchange is envisioned for all M16A1 rifles processed by the maintenance activities in the future.
1. Purchase Request and Commitment Forms (PR&Cs) processed during the period 1 February through 26 April 1968 totaled 470 valued at $15.7 million. A detailed breakdown of these figures reveals that 220 PR&Cs were assigned to contracting divisions of the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) totaling $13.6 million; 219 PR&Cs were forwarded to CONUS totaling $1.9 million; 31 PR&Cs were forwarded to Western Pacific agencies totaling $.12 million. Total PR&Cs thus far processed during Fiscal Year 1968 amount to 2241 valued at $320.8 million.

2. Contracts under administration by the Agency, as of 26 April 1968, totaled 187 valued at $430 million. These figures exclude Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA).

3. The Command’s effort to reduce off-shore procurement and thereby reduce gold flow has met with success. As of 26 April 1968, off-shore procurement has been limited to $.7 million as compared to $6.8 million in the Third Quarter, FY 1967.

4. Preparation of a 200-page book entitled “Procurement Support in Vietnam,” was completed. On 17 April 1968, the book was taken to Japan for final printing and subsequent publication. It presents a comprehensive picture and analysis of procurement activities in a combat zone and covers many of the Agency’s efforts and contributions in the development of the industrial and agricultural bases of Vietnam. Initial distribution of the publication will commence in late May 1968.

5. The Advance Procurement Plan implemented as a management improvement in August 1967 has been highly successful. During November 1967, the first Fiscal Year (FY) 1969 Purchase Request and Commitment Form (PR&C) was received at the Agency. Since that date, additional PR&Cs have been received from various 1st Logistical Command Directorates. The overall success is evidenced by the fact that as of 17 April 1968 71 FY 1969 PR&Cs having a value of $245.4 million had been received at the Agency. This compares to the receipt of the first FY 1968 PR&Cs, valued at $31 million, during April 1967. The Advance Procurement Plan has also permitted nine FY 1968 sole source contracts, totaling $42,552,936, to be replaced by contracts solicited through competitive procurement. A 1st Logistical Command Regulation 715-20, “Advance Procurement Planning,” was published to formally implement and coordinate actions required for the Advance Procurement Plan.

6. The FY 1969 Management Improvement Program was prepared and includes programs totaling $56,579,996 in savings to the US Government. These savings will be realized through use of the Buy United States Here (BUSH) Program items, reduction of present contractor manning levels, consolidation of requirements and lower rates to be negotiated through competitive
The FY 1969 Management Improvement Program estimated savings of $56,579,996 plus the FY 1968 estimated savings of $24,864,335 with an additional sum of $24,351,029 in decommitted or deobligated funds, comes to a two year total of $105,795,380.

7. Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PA&E) has assumed the additional Repairs and Utilities (R&U) responsibility of servicing the United Services Organization (USO) and United States Naval Activities in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. These additional duties are expected to result in minimal increases in estimated costs and manning under the present R&U contract.

8. PA&E's procurement function was eliminated, effective 15 March 1968. All PA&E procurement requests in excess of $250 will now be handled through normal supply channels and through the Agency. This action is expected to result in substantially lower procurement costs.

9. As of 29 February 1968, PA&E's training program had resulted in 353 Local Nationals taking over positions formerly held by Third Country Nationals. This number exceeds the Government goal of 300 established for FY 1968.

10. The Agency Source List has been expanded by 79 (from 1091 to 1170), an increase of 7%. Increases in sources for the various principal categories are as follows:

   a. Rock from 315 to 328 (4% increase).
   b. Sand from 333 to 347 (4% increase).
   c. Construction from 256 to 262 (3% increase).
   d. Stevedoring from 132 to 145 (10% increase).
   e. Laundry from 151 to 161 (7% increase).
   f. Fresh fruits and vegetables from 107 to 112 (5% increase).
   g. Potable ice from 59 to 71 (17% increase).

Thirty two different Requests for Quotation or Requests for Proposals were released for competitive bidding, resulting in the mailing and distribution of a total of 1292 copies (includes Amendments).

11. The Procurement Pricing Division participated in the negotiation, analysis, and award of over $4 million of new contracts and modifications. In addition to these actions, pricing personnel began the evaluation and negotiation of approximately $128 million of proposals for FY 1969 perfor-
12. The Procurement Pricing Division revised the format of the M=CNOMY Reports and submitted one cost reduction savings under the Army Court Reduction Program. Also, a standard operating procedure for monthly reporting of management improvements was drafted and approved.

13. A training program was instituted as a regular weekly occurrence. Contracts are reviewed from a pricing aspect, problem areas are discussed, and future trends are examined. As a result of these training sessions, the pricing personnel are gaining a comprehensive overview of the Agency and its operations.

14. The Supplies Division's experience with Blanket Purchase Agreements has revealed the need for a reassessment of the utility value of this contract type. Specifically, in situations of high ordering activity, fragmentation of purchase and disregard of money limitation imposed upon this form have occurred. An analysis of the causes of this has suggested that other forms, such as priced and unpriced indeterminate quantity contracts, would serve better in this environment.

15. The Directorate of Property Administration conducted seven inspections of contractor activities as compared to 37 during the previous three-month period. This decrease was due to restricted travel conditions imposed during the February Tet attack. Additionally, it became necessary to suspend inspection schedules until such time as contractors were able to recover from operational setbacks and Government loss inflicted by enemy action. Loss and damage to Government-furnished property during this period was estimated at $945,446.00.

16. Property Administration has developed an improved, more effective inspection procedure which reduces inspection reporting time to a minimum, yet provides a comprehensive listing of discrepancies. The inspection provided uniformity of reporting, standard criteria for measuring the efficiency of contractor established property control and maintenance systems, and an accurate method of comparing the standards of each system. In addition, the scope of inspection has been expanded to include usage analysis of consumables and materials, and more extensive examination is being made in the maintenance management area. Most important, the improved procedure provides a better means of determining where the strongest administration effort should be applied which, in turn, will increase the effectiveness of the Management Improvement Program.

17. The program of identification of excess R&U supplies in the hands of P&U and the return of these excesses to the Government, reached its goal of $3 million redistributed, on 29 February 1968, one month ahead of time. Further refinements of the contractor's supply control procedures have permitted the upward revision of this goal to $4 million by 31 May 1968.
This redistribution action represents a positive savings of not only the value of supplies returned for Government utilization but also an additional 17% savings (based on GSA standards) in eliminated procurement, transportation, storage and other allied administrative costs.

18. An informal inspection in January 1968 by the Property Administrator of the Vinnell Corporation's supply account at Cam Ranh Bay disclosed that the contractor had used an incorrect order/ship time factor in computing his requisitioning objectives (ROs). This had the effect of permitting the maintenance of stock balances in excess of stock levels authorized to be maintained by non-depot activities.

   a. In a letter dated 22 January 1968, the Contracting Officer directed the contractor to recompute the ROs using the correct order/ship time factor prescribed by the 1st Logistical Command. This task was completed in March 1968 and the contractor immediately began a complete inventory preparatory to disposing of stock rendered excess as a result of the reduction of authorized stock levels. Upon completion of the inventory, action will be taken to turn in all excess property to Army depots.

   b. It is estimated that this action will permit the turn-in to Army depots of approximately 5000 line items of stock. The contractor will benefit by this disposal by being relieved of the responsibility for storing, inventorying, protecting, accounting for and reporting on these 5000 line items of property. The Army will benefit by the action by restoring or returning the property to the Army supply system for use by other activities. The dollar value of the property in question cannot be determined at this time, but it can be assumed to be substantial.

19. In order to insure efficient and economical management of Government furnished property (GFP), all Agency contractors possessing GFP were directed to report, on a monthly basis, idle or excess Government-furnished equipment (as opposed to materials) having an original acquisition cost of $500 or more. These reports, once received, will be circulated among Agency contracting officers and their contractors for possible utilization. In the event the idle/excess plant equipment is not required within the Agency, the Directorate of General Supply, 1st Logistical Command or the Officer in Charge of Construction, will be furnished the report, in turn, for their possible action.

20. A series of Commander's Policies are now being published which provide policy statements to clarify the aims, purpose and goals of the commander on a broad scope of subjects dealing with both procurement and nonprocurement matters. Seventeen have been published and eight are being staffed. Input and guidance from the Commanding Officer and the directors within the Agency is received, analyzed and used.
21. A study was conducted on the effects of the Tet attack on the Agency. It was divided into two areas:

a. Effects on the internal Agency operations. During the initial stages, the majority of Agency personnel were not available for work during the period 31 January - 4 February 1968. Military personnel billeted in the immediate vicinity permitted minimum staffing. Local National (LN) personnel were not available from 31 January - 10 February 1968. Communications with Agency personnel were impeded by failure of equipment and circuits; however, most were contacted. From 31 January to 4 February 1968, most personnel in Saigon received instructions via the Armed Forces Network (AFN). Lack of bus service necessitated the use of organic transportation, which although limited, did permit personnel to reach their work areas. Loss of power affected water supply for plumbing, and restricted the use of reproduction facilities. It also affected security lighting which could have developed into a major problem to the north of the building. Reduced working hours did not materially affect the accomplishment of the Agency mission; however, lack of LN personnel and typists did delay routine actions. Lack of weapons and the absence of an Agency defense plan have been corrected, although some items of equipment are still unavailable.

b. Effects on Contractor operations. Only one firm in the Saigon area did not experience a major disruption from VC activities. US Invited Contractors ran low on generator fuel, experienced power failures and general absence of LN personnel. Contractor facilities and equipment were damaged or destroyed, pilferage was extensive and personnel were killed or wounded. The general absence of LN employees seriously disrupted operations and forced emergency measures to be taken, using US military drivers and supervisory personnel. Some work was discontinued from 31 January to 4 February 1968. Information on LN contractors was spotty with revival of normal operations being much slower than that of US Invited Contractors. Imposition of GVN curfews seriously reduced the work day. US security forces refused entry to LN employees of contractor firms, which resulted in delays of R&AU work, port clearance and delivery of supplies. Restriction of types of cargo which may be hauled by VN drivers limited contractor flexibility. All outstanding solicitations were amended to extend the closing dates, and during the attack sole source procurements were affected to respond to combat support requirements.
1. (C) The Tet attack accounted for intensified enemy action against petroleum facilities and operations. The Qui Nhon-An Khe and Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipelines were damaged by satchel charges on ten occasions, and bullet hole damage frequently interrupted pumping operations. Timely repairs, however, allowed pumping operations to continue with a minimum of downtime. Other significant enemy action is shown below:

a. 2 February: Two 3,000 barrel and one 1,000 barrel tanks were damaged by mortar fire at Vinh Long.

b. 3 February: A rocket round hit a 50,000 barrel tank at Qui Nhon above the product line. The tank remained operational.

c. 6 February: A rocket and mortar attack at Pleiku destroyed two 10,000 gallon and one 50,000 gallon collapsible tanks. One 50,000 gallon collapsible tank was damaged.

d. 8 February: One 5,000 gallon tanker detonated a pressure mine on Highway 19 and was damaged.

e. 10 February: A convoy travelling between An Khe and Pleiku was ambushed. One 5,000 gallon tanker detonated a pressure mine and was destroyed.

f. 13 February: A rocket hit a 10,000 barrel tank at Qui Nhon, resulting in one 8-inch and several smaller holes. There was no fire.

g. 18 February: A 10,000 barrel tank at An Khe was hit by a mortar round, resulting in an 8-inch hole in its top. There was no fire or product loss.

h. 18 February: The Binh Loi-Tan Son Nhut pipeline was hit by friendly artillery fire near Go Vap. Repair crews were unable to enter the area for two days due to enemy action. The line was operational on 20 February. As a result, JP-4 stocks at Tan Son Nhut reached a critically low level.

i. 26 February: Two 50,000 gallon and five 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks at Phan Thiet were damaged by shrapnel when the ARVN ammunition facility exploded.

j. 5 March: Mortar and rocket fire at Cam Ranh Bay destroyed 159 500 gallon collapsible drums filled with JP-4.
k. 30 March: The Esso tanker "Crustacea" was hit by three rocket rounds and automatic weapons fire while located approximately 1,000 meters from the jetty at Can Tho. The chief engineer was killed and three crew members were wounded. There was only superficial damage to the vessel.

2. (C) The construction effort showed notable results. The Long Binh Tank Farm, with a storage capacity of 86,000 barrels, was completed on 2 February, while at Pleiku, 10,000 barrels of petroleum tankage was completed on 22 March with an additional 40,000 barrels still under construction. Qui Nhon Tank Farm #3, with a 192,000 barrel storage capacity, became operational on 10 April. At Cam Ranh Bay, 200,000 barrels of new Army tankage is currently being water tested, and construction of 200,000 barrels of new Air Force tankage continues. At Vung Tau, construction of an additional 150,000 barrels was begun at the existing tank farm. Approximately 30 miles of additional pipeline has been laid at Cam Ranh Bay. A new, 1600 foot T-5 tanker jetty is nearing completion at Cam Ranh Bay. The "Tiny Tim", a two stage, 12-inch pump capable of moving 8,000 barrels per hour has been installed near the jetty and is undergoing final adjustments and testing. The new jetty and pump will make it possible to unload a T-5 tanker in 30 hours rather than 4 days, which is the current requirement. Final construction effort continues on the An Khe-Pleiku pipelines.

3. (C) Distribution of bulk petroleum by commercial companies to U.S. military units in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones amounted to approximately 100,000 gallons per day before the Tet attack. This service was completely lost because of insecure roadways and the RVN Government-imposed curfew. Military line haul capability was barely adequate to make up for this loss of service. Only the relatively short duration of the attack prevented a complete drawdown of bulk petroleum at many key installations. In the Delta and on the waterways around Saigon, distribution of bulk petroleum by Y-tankers and barges, which normally accounts for 60% of the total deliveries, was also severely curtailed due to insecure waterway conditions and the curfew. In addition, the Central Navigation Company, which operates 3 self-propelled barges under contract, refused to return to work. Consequently, the vital air bases of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa reached a critical position on JP-4 on several occasions during this period.

4. (U) Three military Y-tankers, the Y-66, Y-100 and Y-487, are out-of-country for repairs. This loss was offset, to some extent, by the emergency contract of two commercial tug and barge combinations.

5. (U) New airlift procedures for bulk and packaged petroleum products were initiated. These procedures establish a single contact point and centralised control in the Directorate of Petroleum, 1st Logistical
Command for airlift of Class III to its supply points. The Petroleum Directors of the four support commands submit their O1 priority special mission airlift requests (SMAR) to their respective Traffic Management Agency Regions through the Class III supply points at the origin airfield. The specific daily requirement is transmitted telephonically to the Directorate of Petroleum, 1st Logistical Command, two days prior to the desired delivery date. Priorities are then assigned and the 834th Air Division Airlift Control Center responds accordingly.

6. (U) The Dracone, a neoprene floating collapsible petroleum container, 225 feet long and holding 86,000 gallons of product, arrived at Cam Ranh Bay from England and was placed in operation on 21 February. A second Dracone arrived 21 April. Dracones are in JP-4 service and are currently being used to resupply Phan Thiet from Cam Ranh Bay.

7. (C) In April, the Da Nang Support Command (Provisional) assumed responsibility for operating and maintaining the pipeline from Tan My to Phu Bai (approximately 18 miles) and operating and maintaining a pump station at Hue. Responsibility was also assumed for operating and maintaining the pipeline from Wunder Beach to Dong Ha (approximately 23 miles) and a 3,000 barrel tank and pump station at Dong Ha. Long line haul bulk petroleum deliveries are being made to Ca Lu, Camp Evans, Phu Bai, Hue, and Dong Ha.

8. (U) Monthly bulk fuel consumption by U.S. Forces in II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones was as follows (figures in thousands of barrels):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>578.5</td>
<td>509.6</td>
<td>574.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>142.9</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>117.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>286.0</td>
<td>212.1</td>
<td>252.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>595.3</td>
<td>602.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>101.2</td>
<td>133.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>212.9</td>
<td>238.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>142.7</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>111.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* April 1968 data not available at time of publication.
1. Retrograde Operations

a. Retrograde via Sea-Land: In early February 1968, Sea-Land service was first authorized on an emergency basis by MACV-TMA for the movement of retrograde material from Saigon and Qui Nhon. Further efforts to obtain the use of Sea-Land service on a more permanent basis resulted in authorization, in late April 1968, to move the following categories of material:

(1) From all RVN ports served by Sea-Land:

(a) Multifuel engines

(b) Reusable brass and propellant charge containers (when conexes are not readily available).

(c) 2.75" rocket packing boxes.

(d) Container, Ammunition M468

(2) From Saigon only: All container compatible dry cargo.

b. Study of collection, classification and salvage (CC&S) requirements: In mid-February 1968, a study was completed which, based on current workloads and man hour availability, indicated the requirement for additional personnel to achieve satisfactory performance of the CC&S mission in 1st Logistical Command. As a result, action was initiated to obtain additional personnel on a temporary basis pending implementation of depot TDAs. Later consideration indicate that CC&S activities are suitable for contract operation.

c. Implementation of In-Country Washout (CRC-H) Program: Following a planning conference on 30 January 1968, a program for in-country disposal of material previously listed as "mandatory retrograde" was started in mid-February, as a joint effort of the Directorates of Maintenance and Retrograde and Disposal. This program has reduced the amount of unserviceable, uneconomically reparable materiel leaving RVN, thus creating a substantial savings in transportation and handling costs. Equally beneficial is the expedited removal of CRC-H material from the national inventory through reports submitted directly to USARPAC from the NCP-appointed in-country inspectors.

d. Improvements in heavy-lift capability: Because of the high turnover of combat vehicles necessitated by Closed Loop Support programs, adequate heavy-lift transportation is mandatory. Shortages of TONE authorizations which existed previously have been filled, resulting in the command's ability to respond rapidly to meet retrograde objectives and ship-loading schedules.
e. Removal of ammunition from combat vehicles and artillery pieces:
In early February, action was taken to establish definitive requirements
and procedures to insure the removal of high explosives from combat vehicles
(including self-propelled artillery) being retrograded for rebuild. This
program is essential to eliminate hazardous conditions in out-of-country
rebuild depots. Action now includes the receipt of performance reports
from Anniston Army Depot to indicate the adequacy of in-country procedures.

f. Reduction of damage to retrograde material: Action was initiated
in March 1968 to reduce needless damage to material being retrograded
with the goal of conserving otherwise reparable equipment. Noticeable
improvements have been observed, including the use of tow bars for moving
disabled vehicles, and proper operation of cranes and forklifts.

g. Improvements in retrograde processing:

(1) Earlier action to secure steam boilers for conversion to
stationary steam cleaning facilities was accomplished, with each command
being provided a 100 horsepower boiler. The installation of one boiler
is complete and is in use at Qui Nhon.

(2) Additional steam cleaning capability is forthcoming through
procurement action for six heavy duty industrial capacity cleaners from
CONUS. Procurement action began in April 1968.

h. Improvements in retrograde cargo documentation: Although earlier
action was to correct documentation errors and omissions, serious efforts
have resulted in some improvements. Complete documentation is required to
insure retrograde credit for Closed Loop items shipped out-of-country, and
to assist ports of destination in making valid plans for the disposition
of material upon arrival. The correct marking of air shipments has been
emphasised to avoid confusion resulting from numerous export symbols and
addresses remaining on shipping containers.

i. Establishment of retrograde operations at Da Nang: With the
activation of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional),
retrograde planning called for the initiation of out-of-country shipments
from Da Nang at the earliest date possible. Regular reporting of retro-
grade operations began in April 1968, but the late implementation of
CC&S operations necessitated the continuance of inter-coastal movement
of retrograde material to Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay for export processing.
Export shipments from Da Nang are expected to begin in May 1968.

j. Retrograde statistics:

(1) Reparables shipped - 45,850 short tons (including in-
country disposal).

(2) Total retrograde tonnage - 94,987 short tons.
2. Property Disposal

a. During February 1968, the Foreign Excess Sales Office was at a virtual standstill due to the Tet attack. Department of the Army Civilian personnel were confined to their residences for approximately ten days. Those buyers who had been awarded property prior to commencement of the attacks found it impossible to remove their merchandise because of the complete lack of commercial transportation. Stringent curfew regulations also prevented buyers from employing laborers needed for outloading property. Several active contracts, therefore, had to be administratively modified to grant buyers additional time for removal of property. Several bid openings originally scheduled for February and March had to be postponed until April 1968, and the sales phase of the Property Disposal Program has suffered delays of as much as 90 days.

b. One sale was conducted during March 1968. A total of 98 line items of usable property were offered, representing 1,799 short tons of material. Proceeds from the 86 line items ultimately awarded amounted to $58,555.40. Only 48 short tons of property, however, were actually removed from property disposal yards during the month.
1. PORTS:

a. During the period 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968, a total of 2,378,673 Short Tons (S/T) was handled through the 1st Logistical Command ports. The monthly tonnages were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>S/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>652,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>865,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>892,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,378,673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Newport set a record in March by handling 141,740 S/T of cargo.

c. Vung Tau set records in both March and April by handling 88,247 and 96,132 S/T of cargo respectively.

d. During the period a requirement was placed on this command to establish a Logistical Over-The-Shore (LOTS) operation at Wunder Beach in northern I CTZ to relieve pressure on the U.S. Marines near the demilitarised zone. The available port facilities at Cua Viet/Dong Ha and Tan Ky/Hue proved inadequate, and the former was vulnerable to artillery attacks from the DMZ. The Navy was asked to find the best location for the establishment of a LOTS site. After studying the problem, the Navy concluded that it was impractical to establish such an operation and that the results would be minimal (250 S/T per day). In spite of this conclusion, the Army, faced with the need to support two divisions, proceeded to establish Wunder Beach at Thon My Thuy. By 13 March the site was fully operational and has proven highly successful. Daily performance averages over 1,000 S/T. As a result of this successful logistical operation, the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division were able to maintain the offensive and successfully relieve the Marines in northern I CTZ.

2. SEA-LAND:

a. Sea-Land continues to operate two CONUS to Cam Ranh Bay C&J vessel sailings per month. An average of 619 containers is delivered per sailing. C2 shuttle ships continue to operate between Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon and Qui Nhon within close proximity of published schedules, thereby providing rapid delivery of military interest containers to consignees. During the period 1 February thru 30 April 1968, a total of eight Sea-Land vessels arrived with 4,953 containers, of which 850 were reefers. The breakout of containers by vessel and area is as follows:
b. Emergency authorization to use Sea-Land for retrograde cargo from Qui Nhon to CONUS was terminated by M&CV-TMA on 15 April 1968. A study conducted by that agency revealed that Qui Nhon to CONUS service was not rate-favorable. Additional consideration is now being given to this study to provide a more comprehensive analysis, i.e., complete container versus breakbulk cost from loading in RVN to unloading at final inland destination in CONUS.

c. Several verbal requests have been received from local consignees for use of Sea-Land service to provide second destination delivery of containers. The contract currently authorizes such delivery at a cost of $20.00 per tractor hour. Problems unique to this mode of delivery are currently being discussed with Sea-Land and MSTS.

d. On 18 April 1968, the Long Binh Base Development Planning Board approved a request for a four acre plot of land for a Sea-Land container marshalling area on Long Binh Post. The area approved for use is centrally located to the 506th Field Depot, 3d Ordnance Battalion and the PX Depot which are the largest users of Sea-Land service in this area. A definite time saving in service to the customer and reduced chances of container demurrage are two significant advantages expected to be derived from this addition.

3. RAIL:

a. The Tet attack brought all operation and restoration of the Vietnam Railway System (VNRS) to a halt. The system was not restored to pre-Tet operational status until 8 April 1968.

b. Tonnage handled during February in support of U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) was 44 S/T which reflects the limited operational status of the system during that month. March tonnage, as the system was reopened, totaled 7,516 S/T.

c. Ten Plymouth locomotives presently in Thailand were designated for transfer to RVN for use at U.S. logistics installations.

4. HIGHWAY:

a. An average of 326,153 S/T of cargo a month was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units. Commercial contract vehicles
averaged $373,379 S/T of cargo per month. Military vehicles hauled an average of 67,200 PAX and 22,622,373 gallons of POL each month. Of the military cargo hauled, 28% was in port and beach clearance, 34% in local haul operations and 38% in line haul operations. Of the cargo hauled by commercial contract vehicles, 72% was in port and beach clearance, 26% in local haul operations and 2% in line haul operations.

b. The Tet attack made a definite impact on motor transport activities throughout the command:

(1) In Saigon, commercial drivers did not report for duty with Philco-Ford or Equipment, Inc. from 31 January through 4 February. On 31 January and 1 February, all roads were red; no vehicles moved. Beginning on 2 February, military drivers were used to augment the commercial contractors' driver assets. Cogido operations were interrupted periodically and were limited, during certain periods, to daylight hours. Line haul commitments were delayed because of enemy activity; consequently, logistical support for the divisions was hampered. Large numbers of trucks were under load and not available for other commitments due to roads being closed. On 6 March 1968, Operation Clear Port was started in order to move cargo inland that was backlogged at the port. Cumulative figures to date reflect that military 12 ton S&Ps and the Degill Company's S&Ps have averaged 870 S/T per day in port clearance. This is an average load of 11.34 S/T per vehicle with 4.01 turnarounds per tractor per day.

(2) At Cam Ranh Bay, highway QL1 was closed for 3 days, and approximately 1,100 S/T of cargo was delayed. Port and beach clearance and local haul operations on the peninsula were not affected. Line haul commitments and local haul operations off the peninsula were either curtailed or operated with maximum security precautions.

(3) In Qui Nhon, port and beach clearance by the commercial contractor was limited to daylight hours during certain periods. The spotting of trucks at night required armed security vehicles and shotgunners on each vehicle. Line haul operations continued but required maximum security personnel. A provisional unit was formed to assist in clearing the backlog of cargo at the port. The unit consisted of 30 2½ ton and 5 ton cargo vehicles with trailers and four 40 foot Air Force flatbeds.

5. TROOP MOVEMENTS:

a. Three troop ships arrived at 1st Logistical Command ports, discharging 50 units with a total strength of 4,829 personnel. The following is a passenger break down by port: DNG-1,055; QNH-483; CRB-162; VTU-3,129.
b. An additional 7,729 troops arrived by air as part of unit advance parties, main bodies, and rear detachments.
1. Three Army postal units assigned to 1st Logistical Command were relocated within Vietnam due to increased postal support requirements in I Corps Tactical Zone.

2. Technical inspections of eight postal units were completed to determine whether operations were being conducted in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and directives. Data concerning these inspections are at inclosure one.

3. All Army post offices operated by the command are making electronic inspections of parcels accepted for mailing. The purpose of these inspections is to reduce the mailing of prohibited items and eliminate possible personal injury, damage to mail handling facilities, and misappropriation of Government property.

4. The Personnel Assistance Advisory Team continued to conduct management assistance visits to support commands down to, and including, composite team level. Results have been of assistance in the improvement of management procedures.

5. Rotational losses from the command surpassed replacements during April 1968. This trend is expected to level off by the end of May and gains should exceed losses during June. Inclosure two further amplifies this area. The command strength report is attached at inclosure three.

6. The command enlisted promotion statistics are attached at inclosure four.

7. The reenlistment program has continued to show improvement. Reenlistment data is attached at inclosure number five.

8. Command casualty figures are attached at inclosure number six.

9. Command awards and decorations figures are attached at inclosure number seven.
1. Personnel

a. The 1st Logistical Command currently has 72 authorized chaplain spaces. This figure includes 71 TOE/TO spaces and one VOCG space. There are 65 chaplains present for duty of which one is Jewish, 54 are Protestant and 10 are Catholic. The Staff Chaplain and Deputy Staff Chaplain continued to make visits throughout the command to insure that all units receive the best possible religious coverage.

b. As of 30 April 1968, 1st Logistical Command had 80 chaplain assistants present for duty. Almost all replacements were school trained.

2. Religious Coverage

a. The average number of services per chaplain per week and the weekly attendance at these services decreased. The decrease is attributed, in part, to:

   (1) Several Catholic chaplains departed the command and because of a shortage of Catholic chaplains, two were replaced by Protestant chaplains. This resulted in Catholic chaplain coverage being provided, and reported, by Catholic chaplains outside the 1st Logistical Command, and caused a decrease in number of services and attendance figures reported by the command.

   (2) The added surveillance following the Tet attack caused personnel to have longer work hours and fewer personnel were able to attend worship services.

b. The U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) goal is four services per chaplain per week. This goal was exceeded in March and equaled in April 1968 by 1st Logistical Command. In February 1968, the 1st Logistical Command fell 2 below the goal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
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<th>APR</th>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Da Nang</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Training of Chaplains

a. Monthly training conferences for all chaplains were conducted by each support command staff chaplain. Character Guidance briefings were
presented during these periods, and items of interest to chaplains were discussed. A representative from the Office of the Staff Chaplain, 1st Logistical Command, regularly attended each of these training conferences. The conferences also served as the one-half day retreat which each chaplain must attend every month by direction of the Chief of Chaplains.

b. The Staff Chaplain and Deputy Staff Chaplain conducted supply briefings on ecclesiastical supplies and chaplain supply procedures for chaplains of three support commands, three combat divisions and for the USARV Supervisory Chaplains' Conference.

c. The Staff Chaplain, 1st Logistical Command hosted the USARV Supervisory Chaplains Training Conference which met at the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command chapel facility on 16 and 17 April 1968.

4. Civic Action. A consolidation of chapel offerings donated to community relations projects shows that $VN 719, 378 were donated in February 1968, $VN 949, 324 in March 1968, and $VN 1,251, 923 in April 1968 for a total of $VN 2, 920, 625 for the entire period. To more closely coordinate chapel community relations donations to the work of the Civil Affairs Officer, the Staff Chaplain provided the Civil Affairs Officer with a report of the amount of donations for each month.

5. Chaplain Supply

a. Requisitions for 31 electronic organs were filled.

b. A total of 433 requisitions for chaplain supply items were filled by the depots.

c. Approximately 1,900 Jewish personnel were furnished Passover meals.
ANNEX U (C) SIGNAL OFFICE

1. (C) The 1st Logistical Command's requirement for Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) was submitted to US Army Vietnam (USARV) in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1967. Due to the greater need for secure voice communications to Da Nang Support Command as compared to Saigon Support Command, and the fact that the AUTOSEVOCOM Phase I plan called for equipment at Saigon and not Da Nang, a request was made to divert the equipment to Da Nang. Subsequent to the submission of this request, a revised AUTOSEVOCOM Phase I plan, dated 30 March 1968, was published by USARV and assigned secure voice equipment to both Da Nang and Saigon Support Commands thus making the diversion of equipment unnecessary. The time frame for completion of AUTOSEVOCOM Phase I is mid August 1968. The activation of this secure voice equipment will allow the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, and his staff to more expeditiously and effectively exercise command and control of the subordinate commands. This will be especially apparent during periods when time and strict security are of utmost importance by providing a means of discussing classified information over the secure telephone.

2. (U) The expansion of the Command Group key telephone system to all directorates and staff sections is scheduled for completion in August 1968. This will add 25 new stations to the present system at a cost of less than $400,000.00. The engineering for the planned expansion, to include the complete Bill of Materials (BOM), was accomplished by the 1st Signal Brigade. Action has been taken to fund and procure the materials from CONUS. Upon arrival of the materials, the actual installation will be accomplished utilizing troop labor.

3. (U) A single side band (SSB) radio net was put into operation by the Signal Office in March 1968. This net includes stations at the Signal Office and the support commands at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. There is no station at the Saigon Support Command due to the proximity of that unit to the headquarters. Phone patch capability of the radio equipment allows speedy, nonsecure, radio-telephone service between the commands, supplementing the common user Army area voice communications system.

4. (C) The final phase of the code compartmentalization project went into effect during April 1968. The scope of this project is to segregate the distribution of National Security Agency (NSA) produced codes into four small systems at support command level, as opposed to the previous one large system that was distributed throughout the command by the Signal Office. In the future, each support command will draw and distribute the codes in amounts necessary to meet the needs of their own subordinate elements. This procedure precludes the possibility of a command wide compromise of an individual code series, and is more in
CONFDENTIAL

keeping with good communications security practices.

5. (U) The recent troop buildup in the I Corps Tactical Zone, and establishment of the Da Nang Support Command necessitated this Office's formulation of a communications concept for the new command. Information was acquired through numerous liaison trips and formal requests from Da Nang Support Command and their subordinate units for services and equipment. The concept provided for sole-user and common-user voice, teletype and radio teletype service. Through close coordination with staff elements of this and higher headquarters, equipment, radio frequencies, and circuitry were obtained to satisfy the majority of the requirements, vastly increasing the command and control communications capabilities in the new command's area of responsibility. Additional requirements will be filled as additional communication systems are installed in the area of operation.

6. (U) The 506th Field Depot is scheduled to relocate from Saigon to Long Binh during Fiscal Year 1969. Uninterrupted communications support during relocation is required; consequently, a study was initiated on 3 March 1968 by the Signal Office, and in conjunction with the depot planning group, a communications requirement plan was developed. The plan was forwarded to USARV for approval on 16 April 1968 and consists of three major communications systems:

a. Administrative Telephones: The administrative telephones are located at all operational and storage locations. These telephones will be connected to a separate depot telephone exchange, which in turn will be connected by direct trunking to the Long Binh Central telephone exchange. This arrangement reduces the total number of lines required from the Long Binh telephone exchange, thereby improving telephone service and reducing the load on the primary exchange.

b. Telephone Intercommunications: The telephone intercommunications system will connect the Commanding Officer to all major staff heads and directors.

c. Radio Nets: There will be two radio nets: one for area security and the other for administration. The security net will be used for internal security of the depot. The administrative net will be used for administrative matters and will also provide instantaneous communications with key personnel within the depot storage area.
1. The First Logistical Command continues to lead United States Army units throughout the world in hometown news releases. A total of 10,638 releases were sent to the Hometown News Center, or were released directly to newspapers in the United States. The total included 661 photo releases. A more thorough system of review is being utilized to provide subordinate information offices complete data and assistance necessary to lower their technical "kill" rate.

2. A total of 309 news stories and 240 captioned photos were released to more than 50 news media (significant general news releases are listed in paragraph 11). All releases and photographs received from subordinate information offices are reviewed to insure their quality and completeness. Emphasis is placed on subordinate information offices for initiative in seeking out and reporting in-depth their areas of responsibility.

3. This command offers every help possible to the communications media. More than 150 press queries were received from media representatives. Over half of these queries resulted in personal contact with news media representatives. Close liaison is maintained with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in order to keep media representatives aware of current newsworthy events within the command. Two such events were the opening of the Da Nang Support Command (Provisional) and initiation by that command of the unique supply operation, Logistics over the Shore (LOTS).

4. As a result of increased emphasis on the Army Daily Summary the number of 1st Logistical Command items published has steadily increased. The Summary is published by USARV for distribution to news media in Saigon and hometowns of individuals named in the summary. Items are received from each support command information office, compiled, edited and submitted to USARV. A total of 99 1st Logistical Command articles have been published, as compared with 89 during the last reporting period.

5. The Command Information Section published three fact sheets for distribution to the troops of the command (subjects of the fact sheets are listed in paragraph 12).

6. Four mimeograph newspapers are being published either weekly or bi-weekly by subordinate information offices. Six issues of the command newspaper, "The Vietnam Review" have been published and distributed. The printing of 17,000 copies gives a distribution ratio of one "Review" for every 3.4 personnel. In addition, nearly 200 copies are mailed to military information offices, military logistics organizations and VIPs, including media executives.
7. A Command Information Guidance letter for the fourth quarter, Fiscal Year 1968, has been prepared along the guidelines provided by DA and USARV and distributed to subordinate commands. The material is designed to help the U.S. serviceman better understand Vietnamese history and traditions.

8. Publication has been completed on an updated informational brochure concerning the command. Distribution of 100,000 copies will begin the latter part of May.

9. The number of hometown radio tapes continued to increase with 595 being dispatched. Three feature tapes were released to Armed Forces Radio, Saigon and Army Hometown News Center. Playbacks can be excepted on affiliates of MBS, NBC (especially Monitor) CBS and ABC.

10. The Information Office is directly involved in command briefings. The color slide library of logistical activities has been updated for use with special projects, command briefings, and orientation of newly arrived personnel.
### Significant General News Releases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SYNOPSIS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeding the Delta</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Feature on the 490th Gen Spt Co's methods of providing Class I Supplies to units serving in the Delta region of South Vietnam.</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly RAT5 Invade</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Feature on unique new approach to maintenance called Readiness Assistance Team (RAT).</td>
<td>QNH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Device Being Tested</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>Story on an inexpensive device—a mirror—that can be inserted into the chamber of a rifle to determine the serviceability of the chamber walls.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Merritt</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Feature on support provided by the task force to the 25th Infantry Division's &quot;Operation Yellowstone&quot;.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF Aided</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Civic action story on aid provided to the Regular Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) in Qui Nhon area.</td>
<td>QNH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, We Make Service Calls</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Feature on repairmen along the DMZ who keep counter-mortar radars operational.</td>
<td>QNH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st SP5 Completes Language School</td>
<td>Story w/photos</td>
<td>The 1st American to complete the Korean Language School in Vietnam.</td>
<td>QNH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Truck Company</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>Story on arrival of the 352 Trans Company in RVN.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st LOG Convoy Supplies</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Feature on support provided to &quot;Operation Yellowstone&quot; by the 6th Trans Bn.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics to I Corps Tactical Zone</td>
<td>Story w/photos</td>
<td>Story on the buildup of Da Nang Spt Cmd.</td>
<td>DN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Over the Shore</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Feature on new supply operation at Utah Beach that eliminates the need for truck convoys.</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The LARCs are Coming</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Story of the 60-ton sea-lend cargo transport used to unload sea-going vessels anchored off Utah Beach.</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jelly Bean Man</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Story of WO1 Robert F. Fescher and the assistance he and the men of the 147th give the children of Vinh Thi.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fueling the Delta</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Story on the supplying of the vital fuel and petroleum products of Army units in the Mekong Delta.</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta Workhorses Become I Corps Workhorses</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Story on the move of 329th Heavy Boat Company's LCUs from the Delta to the I Corps.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Stopped at Newport Bridge</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>Story of how soldiers of the U.S. Army Terminal, Newport, stopped the VC at Newport Bridge during the Tet Attack.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment saves Money and Supplies Ammo</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>Story of how the 174th Ord Detachment saved the government over one and a half million dollars and at the same time furnished combat soldiers with much needed ammunition.</td>
<td>CRB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Story of the monumental job of acquiring sufficient land and property for U.S. military installations in the Mekong Delta</td>
<td>HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
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<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Scholarships Given</td>
<td>Story w/photos</td>
<td>Men of the 506th Field Depot sponsor scholarships to students at the University of Saigon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>Feature w/photos</td>
<td>Vietnam Railway System, protected by ARVN, carries cargo throughout the III and IV Corps area.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Project</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>Opening day ceremonies for animal husbandry-Park project for citizens of Qui Nhon</td>
<td>QNN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lays an Egg</td>
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<tr>
<td>War on Rats</td>
<td>Story</td>
<td>PA&amp;E declares war on rodents in the Saigon Port area</td>
<td>SSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Fact Sheets published and distributed:
   a. Medical Benefits for Dependents
   b. How to fly military stand-by
   c. A note to commanders concerning Command Information
1. Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 191st Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Ordnance Company</td>
<td>6 - 8 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>611th Ordnance Company</td>
<td>6 - 8 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>533d Ordnance Detachment (EDC)</td>
<td>22 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 54th General Support Group</td>
<td>5 - 9 March 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Support Company (63d Maintenance Battalion)</td>
<td>5 - 9 March 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>148th Supply and Service Company</td>
<td>5 - 9 March 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Main Support Company, 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)</td>
<td>19 - 20 March 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>551st Transportation Company</td>
<td>12 April 1968</td>
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<td>4th Transportation Command (Tul C)</td>
<td>23 - 25 April 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>553d Heavy Equipment Company (GS)</td>
<td>13 February 1968</td>
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<td>151st Transportation Company (Lt Trk)</td>
<td>16 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, US Army Transportation</td>
<td>20 - 21 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion, Vung Tau/Delta (Prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Heavy Boat Company</td>
<td>22 - 23 February 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>228th Supply and Service Company (DS) (Reinspection)</td>
<td>23 February 1968</td>
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<td>329th Heavy Boat Company</td>
<td>24 February 1968</td>
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<td>567th Transportation Company (TS)</td>
<td>1 - 2 March 1968</td>
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<td>94th Maintenance Company (DIV) (DS)</td>
<td>5 March 1968</td>
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<td>124th Transportation Company</td>
<td>6 March 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>91st Finance Section (Disbursing)</td>
<td>8 - 9 March 1968</td>
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<td>402d Transportation Company</td>
<td>10 March 1968</td>
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<td>Personnel Services Center</td>
<td>19 - 22 March 1968</td>
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<td>218th Collection, Classification and Salvage Company</td>
<td>26 - 27 March 1968</td>
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<td>266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)</td>
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<td>54th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS)</td>
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<td>624th Supply and Service Company (DS)</td>
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<td>47th Transportation Company (POL)</td>
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<td>556th Transportation Company (POL)</td>
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<td>538th Transportation Company (POL)</td>
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<td>463d Field Service Company</td>
<td>23 - 24 April 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, and Headquarters 64th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Operating)</td>
<td>26 - 27 April 1968</td>
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<td>IG, USASC, QUI NWWM</td>
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<td>8th Transportation Group</td>
<td>2 February 1968</td>
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<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 27th Transportation Battalion</td>
<td>6 February 1968</td>
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<td>359th Transportation Company (MTrk)</td>
<td>13 February 1968</td>
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<td>647th Quartermaster Company</td>
<td>14 February 1968</td>
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63d Transportation Company 21 February 1968 150
29th Civil Affairs Company 23 February 1968
248th Supply Company (Repair Parts) 1 March 1968
854th Transportation Company (TS) 5 March 1968
560th Maintenance Company (Lt Equip) 8 March 1968
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 86th Maintenance Battalion 12 March 1968
514th Quartermaster Company (Reinspection) 15 March 1968
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 563d Supply and Service Battalion 18 March 1968
540th Heavy Material Supply Company 21 March 1968
669th Transportation Company 2 April 1968
264th Transportation Company 5 April 1968
512th Transportation Company 15 April 1968
523d Transportation Company 25 April 1968

IG, USASC, CAM RANH BAY

525th Quartermaster Company 23 February 1968
524th Quartermaster Company 24 February 1968
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 36th Transportation Battalion 12 - 13 March 1968
442d Transportation Company 14 March 1968
670th Transportation Company 15 March 1968
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, US Army Transportation Command (Prov) 9 - 11 April 1968

IG, USASC, Da Nang conducted no Annual General Inspections during the quarter.
2. The following Special Inspections were conducted during this quarter:

a. 458th Transportation Company, 1 April 1968.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 39th Transportation Battalion, 23 April 1968.

3. Complaints and Requests for Assistance.

The following is a summary of complaints and requests for assistance received by the Inspector General Office, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, computed on a basis of the rate per 5000 troops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMPLAINTS</th>
<th>REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JUSTIFIABLE</td>
<td>UNJUSTIFIABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Logistical Command</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
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<td>.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
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<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Da Nang</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. There were no reportable investigations or inquiries during the quarter.
1. (C) Port and inland waterways security.

   a. The 1st Logistical Command has been tasked with the responsibility of providing security to U.S. flag vessels traveling the inland waterways and ports operated by this command in II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

   b. The 18th Military Police Brigade provides direct support for the physical security of critical installations and facilities operated by the 1st Logistical Command. Port security is included in this mission. Support consists of, but is not limited to, security boat patrols, visual inspections of docks, wharfs, piers and discharge sites for mines, and identification, search and seizure, where justified, of small craft and swimmers in patrol areas of responsibility.

   c. To provide the 18th Military Police Brigade the resources to accomplish this security mission, the 458th Transportation Light Amphibious Company (PBR) has been organized in accordance with MTOE 55-130E. Equipment includes 39 Mark II Patrol Boats River. The Mark II Patrol Boat River (PBR) is 31 feet long and carries, as standard armament, one twin 50 caliber machine gun (MG) mounted forward, one 50 caliber M2 and one MK 18, 40 MM grenade launcher mounted aft. Concussion grenades are carried for use against swimmers. Other major items of equipment include one AN/VRC 49 radio and one 1900 N Radar. An M60 MG and M79 Grenade Launcher will be carried aboard to provide greater fire power. The crew of the PBR will be composed of an engineer, coxswain, two military policemen and a Vietnamese National policeman. With the aforementioned personnel and equipment, the Mark II PBR will perform the following functions:

   (1) Escort and protect vessels and barges while transiting channels, rivers and ports against waterside sabotage attempts and direct assault.

   (2) Protect vessels and barges anchored or moored in anchorages, against waterside sabotage attempts and direct assault.

   (3) Protect waterfront facilities in ports against waterside sabotage attempts and direct assault.

   (4) Board and search civilian watercraft, i.e., fishing boats, sampans and junkas.

   (5) Serve as a reaction force against potentially well organized hostile forces having automatic and medium caliber weapons, either from waterborne or shore attack.
2. (C) Physical Security

a. During February 1968 a committee was formed to review the security program for the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) and Area 208 at Long Binh. The committee included representatives from Hq USARV, Hq 1st Logistical Command, Hq U.S. Army Garrison, Long Binh Post, Vietnam (Provisional) (USAGLBPV (P)), Hq U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional) (USAECV (P)), Hq SSI, Hq 29th GS Gp, 3rd Ord Bn (Amme) and the 277 S&S Bn. Meetings were presided over by the Provost Marshal, 1st Logistical Command.

b. During the course of the deliberations, the committee considered the factors and guidance contained in a letter, subject, Security Program for Long Binh ASD and Area 208, Hq, 1st Logistical Command, dated 13 February 1968.

c. As a result of these meetings, on 29 February 1968 the committee made a comprehensive report with recommendations by which to improve the security posture of both the ASD and Area 208. A few of the recommendations for the improvement of physical security were to:

   (1) Improve the firefighting capability of LBASD by positioning two fire trucks with high pressure pumps at the depot, with crews trained in fighting ammunition fires. If such equipment had been available on 18 February, ammunition losses would have been greatly reduced.

   (2) Construct interior fences within LBASD to compartmentalize the depot and restrict movement in case of a breakthrough.

   (3) Move portion of present east and south perimeter fences of the LBASD (approximately 1400 meters of the perimeter) 40-50 meters further out to take advantage of higher terrain features and better observation.

   (4) Construct a new and better perimeter road. Present dirt road is inadequate, especially during the monsoon season.

   (5) Obtain 4 APC's (2 per sector) to improve the mobility and afford protection to the reaction force within the ASD.

The minutes of the meetings were approved by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, and by Hq, USARV with certain exceptions. Periodic follow-up reports are being made to insure that the improvements are accomplished.

3. (U) Discipline, law and order.

a. Crimes against Persons and Property continued to remain at a low rate of 4.5 per 1,000 troops during the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1968.
The total number of offenses recorded in this category was 237, of which 75 were assaults and 104 were larcenies.

b. The Miscellaneous Offense rate showed a slight decrease of .2 per 1,000 troops for a command rate of 4.6 per 1,000 troops. The number of disorderly conduct and narcotics (marihuana) offenses remained comparatively high during the quarter. Total Miscellaneous Offenses recorded during the period were 245.

c. The Military Offense rate decreased sharply from 56.3 per 1,000 troops in the second quarter of FY 1968, to 36.7 per 1,000 troops in the third quarter. The continuation of extended curfew and command emphasis on reduction of uniform violations accounted for the decrease. The total violations recorded in this category were 2,052.

d. The Traffic Offense rate increased slightly to 15.2 per 100,000 miles in the third quarter. The increase is attributed to mileage driven in connection with unit moves, and continued strict enforcement of traffic regulations by Military Police, particularly in the Saigon Support Command area. Speeding continues to account for approximately one half of all traffic violations. The total traffic offenses were 1,507.

e. Confinement. As of 12 April 1968, there were 499 persons in the Long Binh Stockade. Of these 121 were 1st Logistical Command personnel, 80 from Saigon Support Command, 20 from Qui Nhon Support Command, 14 from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and 7 from Da Nang Support Command. Proportionally, the largest number of offenses for personnel confined are for AWOL and offenses under the General Article (Article 134) i.e., use of marihuana and breaking restriction.

4. (C) US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Detachment #3.

The third US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Detachment (ELD 3) arrived in country and was stationed at Qui Nhon. ELD 3 became operational on 12 April 1968, and is providing technical supervision, advice, and inspections concerning loading and discharging of ammunition at Qui Nhon Port.
ANNEX Y (U) SPECIAL SERVICES

1. Strength: As of 30 April 1968, there were six officers, six enlisted men, 75 Department of the Army Civilians and 117 Local Nationals on duty with 1st Logistical Command Special Services.

2. Recreation and Plans Branch: Due to the availability of TV transmission in Vietnam, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Los Angeles, is phasing out the direct projection of 16MM TV films. Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) requested the section develop a program to phase out direct TV film projection and recover prints from the circuits by 30 June 1968.

3. Library Branch: a. There were 20 cataloged libraries and 39 field libraries open as of 30 April 1968. The total attendance for the period was 219,984.

b. The following libraries were officially opened or closed on the dates indicated:

   (1) The Dong Tam library was opened on 23 February.

   (2) The Phan Rang library was closed on 20 March. This library was operated by one battalion of the 101st Airborne Division and when the unit departed the books and equipment were sent to Cam Ranh Bay where they will be used to open a library for the 18th Engineer Battalion.

c. Two new librarians (one area and one assistant area librarian) arrived in country on 3 March 1968. One assistant area librarian completed her contract and departed for CONUS on 21 April. Two assistant area librarian positions are vacant and resignations are being processed for one area and two assistant area librarians.

d. Libraries are projected to be opened during the next quarter at Long Binh, Chu Lai, Pleiku, Long Giar, Can Tho and Cam Ranh Bay.

4. Arts and Crafts: a. Twelve multiple type crafts (MTC) facilities and 16 photo labs are currently operational. The Nha Trang MTC opened 27 April 1968.

b. Two multiple crafts ships and four photo labs are awaiting delivery of equipment. Equipment has been issued for one photo lab which is 75% completed. Construction was begun on 15 March on a 3,380 square feet MTC facility at Long Giao as part of an activity center which will also house a service club.
c. The MTC facility at Dong Tam was damaged by mortar attack during Tet hostilities. It was closed briefly for cleanup and repair.

d. Man-hour participation figures for this period total 98,000.

e. The Staff Crafts Director returned to CONUS on 30 March 1968 after completing a 14 month tour. The III Corps Area Crafts Supervisor was detailed to the position for 90 days. The I and II Corps Area Crafts Supervisor returned from home leave in February to an appropriated fund position. One NAF-9 crafts director arrived in country in February and was assigned to Cam Ranh Bay as assistant to the I and II Corps Supervisor. Another NAF-9 crafts director arrived in March and was assigned to the Americal Division, Chu Lai, and also as assistant to the I and II Corps Supervisor.

5. Entertainment Branch:  
a. The Professional Entertainment Section had 13 shows touring in Vietnam, giving 43 performances before a total combined audience of 53,993 (3 mounted shows' reports are not available yet, as they still are touring the country). In addition, there were nine handshake tours. Celebrities included Arthur O'Connell, Bob Denver, Sebastian Cabot, Mr. Daniel, Ed Begley, Robert Bray, Don Kingston, Cal Tjinney and Peas Parker.

b. Three Command Touring shows entertained U.S. and Free World Forces during the report period and two shows began rehearsals. The "Downbeats" played two performances to a total audience of 875. "Something Special II" and "Something Special III" played two performances to a combined audience of 350. "The Mersey-Rock Sound" and "The Hard Types" began preparing for their Vietnam tours. A 30 minute television variety show was prepared by this office but was cancelled by AFVN-TV after 50% of the show had been taped. Cancellation was caused by the unavailability of television personnel qualified to produce a show of this scope. The Command Military Touring Show Program was drastically curtailed due to loss of rehearsal facilities. New facilities have been promised for May after which time this part of the program is expected to grow beyond its former level.

c. Commercial Entertainment. During the period there were between 65 and 70 shows playing the club and mess circuit each month with an average of 650 entertainers performing in this activity. No figures are available as to number of performances or attendance since, after approval of each show, bookings are made with the individual clubs and messes.

d. One new entertainment director, Mr. Frank Ceci, arrived and was assigned on 28 February 1968 to Qui Nhon Support Command.
The entire entertainment program decreased during the period due to the Tet attack and other enemy action. It is anticipated, however, that it will gradually return to its former level.

6. Service Club: a. One service club was opened during this period, the Dragon Mountain Service Club at the 4th Infantry Division, Camp Enari, Pleiku. This is a 12,000 square foot tropical building. Other construction activities were delayed following the Tet attack.

b. The following facilities are available or under construction:

1. Sandpiper Service Club, 723d Maintenance Battalion, Americal Division, Chu Lai. The staff was assigned 1 March 1968. The anticipated opening is 25 May 1968. The building is an H-shaped Quonset, approximately 6,000 square feet.

2. Vung Tau, 53rd Support Group. A club director has been assigned. Other personnel will be assigned prior to the completion of the club. The anticipated opening date is 9 June 1968. The club will be 13,900 square feet.

3. II Field Forces, Long Binh. Activation of this facility is under way. It will be an 8,000 square foot building. Estimated opening is June 1968.

4. Ist Infantry Division, Lai Khe. Activation of this has been delayed pending renovation of the available building (formerly used by The American Red Cross). This will be an interim facility, pending permanent construction. The building is 3,500 square feet. If a web-top building can be procured for use as a Game Room, this will add an additional 500 square feet.

5. Quan Loi. A request has been received for a 4,000 square foot service club. Approval has been granted pending the arrival of additional service club personnel from CONUS.

6. Long Giao. A 10,000 square foot service club is under construction.

7. A new service club is being constructed at Cu Chi to replace the present club. The new building is 8,000 square feet. The scheduled opening date is 15 June 1968.

c. Personnel. Seven Recreation Specialists arrived in the command during this period:
Departures during the period were:

Miss Velma R. Baker, Staff Service Club Director, GS-12, following 15 months in Vietnam.

1 - NAF-9 resigned while on reemployment leave.
1 - NAF-9 resigned upon completion of employment agreement.
2 - NAF-7s resigned upon completion of employment agreement.
1 - NAF-5 resigned while on R&R in Hawaii.

d. Troop attendance for the period was 492,841.

7. R & R Branch: a. The out-of-country R&R utilization rate rose during the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 to 87%. The increase resulted from a more realistic allocation average of 3,000 per month.

b. This command received 407 allocations to the Vung Tau Enlisted Men's Center and 12 allocations to the Vung Tau Officer's facility during the third quarter FY 1968. The utilization rate for the Vung Tau Enlisted Men's Center was 90% and the utilization rate for the Vung Tau Officer's facility was 100%. Allocations for the fourth quarter will be approximately the same as the third quarter.
1. The amount paid for claims within this command during the past quarter showed an increase over the previous quarter. A total of $17,656.55 was paid for personal property claims of U.S. military personnel and civilians during this period. In addition, Judge Advocates throughout the command handled nearly 3,400 legal assistance cases since the beginning of February. The expeditious and efficient resolution of these problems contributed materially to the welfare and morale of the personnel of this command.

2. The incidence of courts-martial within the command increased slightly during the past quarter but still remained below the Army-wide rate. Emphasis continues to be placed on the use of non-judicial punishment at all levels. The policy of maintaining strict control over the use of confinement facilities during the pre-trial stage of court-martial proceedings was continued. In addition, new efforts have been initiated in order to better monitor the Special and Summary Court-Martial activities of subordinate units.

3. Non-judicial Punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by this command during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq, Ist Logistical Command</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Can Kanh Bay</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Da Nang (Provisional)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2916</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Supervisory review of Inferior Courts-Martial: In the past quarter, this office reviewed the following number of inferior courts-martial cases received from subordinate commands for correctness in law and fact:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Courts-Martial</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Courts-Martial</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td>93</td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
<td><strong>294</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown of cases tried by court-martial during the past quarter:
6. Courts-Martial rates per 1,000 military personnel are furnished for the fiscal year quarters indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Logistical Command</th>
<th>USARV</th>
<th>ARMY WIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3rd Qtr FY 1968)</td>
<td>(3rd Qtr FY 1968)</td>
<td>(2nd Qtr FY 1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed or damaged incident to service under provisions of AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB 1968</th>
<th>MAR 1968</th>
<th>APR 1968</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Claims Paid</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Claimed</td>
<td>2,502.42</td>
<td>8,950.16</td>
<td>11,736.73</td>
<td>$23,189.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Paid</td>
<td>2,100.12</td>
<td>6,863.85</td>
<td>8,692.58</td>
<td>$17,656.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled during the period 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Assistance</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Instruments Prepared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption and Change of Name</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, Immigration and Passport</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations and Paternity</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Non-support</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Notarizations</td>
<td>379</td>
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<td>Personal Finances, Debts</td>
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<td>178</td>
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<td>Personal Property, Autos</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Powers of Attorney</td>
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<td>721</td>
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<td>Real Property, Sales</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>Taxation</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Wills and Estates</td>
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<td>Deposits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
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<td>1621</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Date of Inspection</td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st APU</td>
<td>3-7 April 1968</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th APU</td>
<td>28-29 March 1968</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st APU</td>
<td>21-22 March 1968</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th APU</td>
<td>7 April 1968</td>
<td>Outstanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>566th APU</td>
<td>12-16 February 1968</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>570th APU</td>
<td>14-19 April 1968</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>575th APU</td>
<td>10-14 March 1968</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 1968</th>
<th>March 1968</th>
<th>April 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAINS</td>
<td>LOSSES</td>
<td>GAINS</td>
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<td>HQ, 1st Logistical Command</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned Units to HQ, 1st Log Comd</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>2626</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Can Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>1825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>2847</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Da Nang</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Totals</td>
<td>7584</td>
<td>4865</td>
<td>6400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Da Nang Support Command not organized until the end of February.
## CONFIDENTIAL
### (C) 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
#### QUARTERLY STRENGTH REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY 1968</th>
<th></th>
<th>MARCH 1968</th>
<th></th>
<th>APRIL 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/Auth</td>
<td>/ ASG</td>
<td>/%</td>
<td>/Auth</td>
<td>/ ASG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Logistical Command:</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>109.6</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached Units:</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>1123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Command Saigon:</td>
<td>20632</td>
<td>21178</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>19999</td>
<td>19612</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Command Cam Ranh Bay:</td>
<td>13464</td>
<td>11840</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>12780</td>
<td>11282</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Command Qui Nhon:</td>
<td>14968</td>
<td>14860</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>14532</td>
<td>14064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Command Da Nang:</td>
<td>4021</td>
<td>3817</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>6205</td>
<td>6321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Command Totals and Overall Percentage:**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54,829</td>
<td>53,488</td>
<td>97.6</td>
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### 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
Promotion Allocations and Appointment by Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>February 1968</th>
<th>March 1968</th>
<th>April 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alloc Apt Unused</td>
<td>Alloc Apt Unused</td>
<td>Alloc Apt Unused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HHD, 1st Logistical Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>2 2 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>2 2 0</td>
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<td>2 2 0</td>
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<td>36 36 0</td>
<td>30 30 0</td>
<td>35 35 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>38 38 8</td>
<td>29 29 0</td>
<td>30 30 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81 73 8</td>
<td>69 69 3</td>
<td>72 72 0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USASUPCOM, Saigon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>4 4 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
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<td>19 19 0</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
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<td>25 25 0</td>
<td>5 5 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>21 21 0</td>
<td>31 31 14</td>
<td>14 14 0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>373 369 4</td>
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<td>1043 1043 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1208 1110 98</td>
<td>1683 1679 4</td>
<td>1850 1759 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>2 2 0</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 12 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
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<td>3 3 0</td>
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<td>2 2 0</td>
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<td>E5</td>
<td>375 297 78</td>
<td>194 185 9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>632 631 1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0 0 0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0 0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>19 19 0</td>
<td>17 17 0</td>
<td>6 6 0</td>
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<td>418 418 0</td>
<td>443 443 0</td>
<td>397 397 0</td>
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<td>1270 977 293</td>
<td>1273 957 316</td>
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<td>1747 1431 316</td>
<td>1086 1086 0</td>
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<td><strong>USASUPCOM, Da Nang</strong></td>
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<td>E8</td>
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<td>1 1 0</td>
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<td>E7</td>
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<td>0 0 0</td>
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<td>E6</td>
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<td>7 7 0</td>
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<td>E5</td>
<td>44 44 0</td>
<td>195 195 0</td>
<td>160 160 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>76 76 0</td>
<td>220 220 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120 120 0</td>
<td>441 441 0</td>
<td>463 463 0</td>
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Inclosure 4
### (U) 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND REENLISTMENT STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DA OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>RA 1ST TERMERS OBJECTIVES 33.3%</th>
<th>RA CAREERISTS OBJECTIVE 80.0%</th>
<th>INDUCTEES OBJECTIVE 6.7%</th>
<th>RES COMPONENT OBJECTIVE 25.0%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ELIG</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>% ENL</td>
<td>ELIG</td>
<td>ENL</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY 1968</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARCH 1968</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRIL 1968</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>122</td>
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(U) REPORT OF CASUALTIES BY AREA AND TYPE

The following is a complete report of casualties by area and type rendered during the months of February, March and April 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Death/Injuries by Area</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>DEATH N-H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEBRUARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARCH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

For the month ending April 1968, there were seven PUNCH (missing). Three were reported from Saigon, three from Da Nang and one from Qui Nhon.

Description of reports:
- **EITHER**: Death as a result of hostile action.
- **PRIAR**: Lightly wounded or injured as a result of hostile action.
- **SMITE**: Seriously wounded or injured as a result of hostile action.
- **CROWN**: Death by other causes not of hostile action.
- **LOYAL**: Seriously injured or ill not as a result of hostile action.
- **REACH**: Died as a result of wounds or injuries resulting from hostile action after reaching medical facilities.
- **PUNCH**: Missing (hostile or non-hostile).

Injured non-hostile are no longer reported to this headquarters or Headquarters, USARV.

Inclosure 6
(U) AWARDS APPROVED BY 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
DURING THE PERIOD 1 FEBRUARY - 30 APRIL 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND</th>
<th>USASC SAIGON</th>
<th>USASC CAM RANH BAY</th>
<th>USASC QUI NHON</th>
<th>USASC DA NANG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRONZE STAR W/&quot;V&quot; DEVICE</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>396</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR MEDAL W/&quot;V&quot; DEVICE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR MEDAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM W/&quot;V&quot; DEVICE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>779</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1364</td>
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</table>

Inclosure 7
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
900 96384

Logistical Critique 1-68 Operation F.JT0(U)

1. (C) Operation F.JT0 was a three phase operation conducted by the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Kuan Loi/Loc Minh/Bu Dop areas
to destroy main force units, open LOC, and prevent enemy infiltration
from Cambodia. The operation began on 22 December 1967 and terminated
on 1 February 1968.

2. (U) Tactical contact was light throughout the operation.

3. (C) Support Operations.

   a. 1st Logistical Command performed its support mission through
      the US Army Support Command, Saigon, by the establishment of a For-
      ward Support Area (FSA).

   b. The concept of logistical support was supply point distribution
      of Class I, II, IV, 2ngr IV and Class V from the FSA located initially
      at an Loc and then permanently at Loc Minh. Maneuver elements
      supported were the three organic cavalry squadrons of the 11th ACR
      and its organic aviation company. The FSA provided only Class V sup-
      port to the aviation unit. Class III support to the aviation unit was
      provided by the 1st Infantry Division from their Base Camp at Kuan
      Loi. The tactical unit's train elements co-located with the FSA during
      the operation and supply point distribution was easily accomplished.

   c. The FSA departed Long Binh at 0630 hours, 22 Dec 67, and moved
      into its initial position at An Loc, RVN, at 1400 hours same day. The
      first supply convoy arrived in An Loc at 1400 hours, 23 December. As
      a result of a decision to relocate the FSA from An Loc to Loc Minh on
      24 December, no supplies were issued by the FSA from An Loc. The FSA's
      move to Loc Minh was completed at 1700 hours, 24 Dec 67.

   d. In addition to the Class I and Class V support provided, laundry
      and bath service, maintenance, and limited graves registration
      services were also provided. Resupply was by land LOC from Long Binh
      Supply Point with road security provided by the 1st Infantry Division.
      The FSA personnel and equipment were provided by the 29th General
      Support Group. Breakdown of FSA force provided is as follows:

      | Officers | Enlisted Men |
      |----------|--------------|
      | Command and Control | 2 | 12 |
      | Class I | 1 | 14 |
      | Class II & IV | - | 3 |

CONSIDERED
V. GO-CE 9 tipril

1568

Subject: Logistical Critique 1-68 Operation 3-REG (U)

Cificors

Class II

Class V

Services:

Law., ry. & Buth

Graves Registrar

Maintenance

Totals

- 8

1 12

- 20

- 2

2 49

6 120

e. Although no major problems were encountered which had an adverse effect on the support of tactical operations, additional engineer equipment would have expedited the preparation of 1000 and 90L storage areas. The successful operation of the FS. was attributed to:

(1) Land convoys experiencing no difficulties from enemy ambushes over the 150 kilometer distance from the supply point to the FS.

(2) The initial build-up of supplies was pushed forward in sufficient quantities to provide stockage for unexpected demands.

(3) The relatively stable demands from the tactical unit.

(4) The ability to obtain expeditious logistical air support as required on two occasions.

(5) Back up supply support being available at the 1st Infantry Division location at Quon Loi, a distance of approximately 25 kilometers.

4. (U) Lesson Learned. "When the tactical situation permits, a reconnaissance of the FS. site should be conducted to establish types and quantity of equipment necessary to expeditiously prepare storage areas.

Annex A: Logistical Support Data (Loc Minh)
SUBJECT: Logistical Critique

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3 - CG, II FFGACV
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3 - CG, 1st Inf Div
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1 - Dir/Gen
1 - Dir/Gen Sup
Annex A - Logistical supported data (Loc Minh)

**Operation PARCO**
**Parent Unit:** 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
**Period Covered:** 26 Dec 67 to 1 Feb 68

**Task Organization:** Bg of GP, 3 armored Cav Sqns, 1 Ar Cav Troop, Engr Co (-), 18 en
155mm Howitzers, 27 en 4.2 inch mortars

**Reference:** Map Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014 and L7016, sheet numbers, 6322, 6322, 633, 6332, 6333, and 6333

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>EST Day of Supply</th>
<th>Stockage Objective</th>
<th>Supply G/H End of FD</th>
<th>Supply G/H End of FD</th>
<th>Total Resupply</th>
<th>Total Consumption</th>
<th>Average Daily Resupply</th>
<th>Average Daily Consumption</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>13,500</td>
<td>2,340</td>
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<td>168,242</td>
<td>4,483</td>
<td>4,547</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gas (Gallons)</strong></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64,800</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diesel (Gallons)</strong></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>5,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class V (S/I)</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>2,889.0</td>
<td>2,880.0</td>
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<td>750.7</td>
<td>218.6</td>
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<td>4,564.9</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Logistical Command (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, 1st Logistical Command

REPORT DATE 14 May 1968

TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 165

S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 682276

PROJECT NO. N/A

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