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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (5 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682112 21 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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IFFORCEV
OPERATIONAL REPORT

ON LESSONS LEARNED

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1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED; COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORC-V for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

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1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During February, March and April 1968 United States and Free World Military forces (USFW) with 37 maneuver battalions (19 US and 18 ROV) supported by 21 artillery battalions and Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with 28 maneuver battalions supported by six artillery battalions continued operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ); in the west along the Cambodian/Lao/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Dakao, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, and along the east coast in Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, Phu Yen, Khanh Co, Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces. As the quarter started, planned offensive operations within the II CTZ were altered by the enemy's attacks, in violation of the Tet truce, on nine key population centers throughout the zone. Reaction forces in the II CTZ rapidly engaged the attacking VC/PAVN forces and subjected them to one of the most decisive military defeats in the history of the war. By mid-February after reducing the city blockades, combat operations had become primarily offensive in nature and oriented toward the location and destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast, cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolutionary development were emphasized.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 1,464 KIA and 2,974 WIA. Enemy losses were 11,602 KIA, 1,376 captured and 271 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 315 Ho Chi Minh trails.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) General: During the past quarter the organization and staff activities were changed in consonance with the IFFORC-V Intensified Reconnaissance Program, in that the G2 Air monitors all reconnaissance and surveillance activity, ground and air and an Asst G2 has been assigned responsibility for monitoring ground reconnaissance alone.

(2) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(a) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.

(b) The shortage of linguists continued to detract from the overall intelligence effort of this headquarters.

(c) G2 Air:
The Intensified Reconnaissance Program has necessitated a change in mission planning and surveillance target selection. Prior to the new program, infrared and photo targets were selected daily by the 225th SAC. Targets were selected from requests received from tactical units through G2 Air and from the monthly reconnaissance plan. Seldom was emphasis attached to a target area for reasons other than those related to priorities and dates no longer of value (DLV). In order to better accomplish the new program, since 1 April 1968 selection of targets for daily flights is directed from the G2 Air Section at 1200 hours for the next 24 hour period. Additionally, this concept of tasking is more responsive to the needs of the units in the field.

The following is a summary of relative surveillance tasks accomplished during the quarter:

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<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
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(a) 55th MI Detachment (Corps):

1. For the period 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68, the 55th MI Det received 471 missions and processed 364. In addition, 27 Dorsal Fin missions were received and processed. Twenty-six Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted which included 12 area studies, three traffic-ability studies, eight area studies in southeastern Laos and five mosaics. In addition to reports submitted, the 64th Engr Det (T) and Arty FSCM were furnished with master plates covering areas of G2 interest.

2. During the period 1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68, 215 individual weapons, 170 crew-served weapons, 8830 lbs of miscellaneous ammunition and 1150 lbs of uniforms, equipment and medical supplies were evacuated to MACJ2 for technical intelligence examination. During the period, IPW teams screened and classified 291 detainees and, as a result of these interrogations, a total of 195 FBIs and 185s were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 50,05 feet of documents were forwarded to CDEG for further exploitation. IPW teams also translated 37 Korean language documents, nine courtesy translations and 165 Vietnamese language translations, for a total of 261 Allied translations.

(b) Detachment D, 1st MI BN (ARS):

1. The Detachment has continued its assigned mission of interpretation, reproduction, and delivery of tactical imagery to field units. In support of these units, 295, 295 feet of photography were processed, resulting in 196,705 prints interpreted and 889 Imagery Interpretation reports prepared.

2. Two Tactical Exploitation Teams were dispatched in support of Long Range Patrol (LRP) operations during the reporting period. The first team consisted of one hand-held photographer who provided support in the An Khe area to Co L (LRP), 25th Inf for a period of nine days. No reproduction personnel were used for the operation because there was
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Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS D5-FFOR-63 (R1)

No location available to establish an adequate photographic lab. Reproduction was accomplished at the detachment photo lab in Nha Trang. Exposed film was picked up at An Hoa by Liet. fl Sm (ARS) delivery aircraft and taken to to Nha Trang for developing and printing. Finished prints were delivered back to the team member the same day. Hand-held photographers were rotated during the period to gain maximum use of the valuable experience gained on an operation of this type. The second team consisted of one hand-held photographer and one reproduction specialist and provided support to IAP operations in the Ban Me Thuot area. Support for this was planned for a 14 day period but actually lasted only two days because the operation ended early. Processing and printing was done in the National Police headquarters in Ban Me Thuot utilizing their reproduction equipment.

2. Hand-held photography missions remained an important part of the detachment's overall operations. In addition to daily hand-held photography flights, two special projects were undertaken. The first of these projects was for the 64th Engr-Det (T) and consisted of photographing highway bridges. The photographs are used as part of an engineer data file for each bridge and for bypass construction planning. During the project, unit hand-held photographers flew six missions totaling 25.52 hours and produced 1412 prints. The second special project comprised hand-held photography from artillery OP's throughout II CTZ to provide a 360 degree panorama from each outpost. The panoramic photographs will be used as aids by observers in directing fire at night and to help familiarize new personnel with the position. A total of four missions totaling 25.66 hours and production of 2108 prints were completed during this project.

(f) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company:

1. Training:

a. All platoons were completely trained in the previous quarter so that the only training conducted for unit members was that for 17 individuals who attended the MACV Recon School. The company did provide 12 personnel to train selected 4th Inf Div combat engineers in the techniques of rappelling from helicopters in order to construct L2's.

b. A training program for ARVN LRP's has been started within IFFORCEV with the objective of improving the capabilities of ARVN units to conduct IAP operations. The ARVN LRP training course at Duc My, Khanh Hoa Province, has been suspended due to the greatly increased trainee load and US LRP units are temporarily assuming this training mission. On 22 Apr the 4th Inf Div commenced training 30 ARVN LRP students from the 24th Special Tactical Zone. Co E (LRP), 20th Inf is providing six man Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to the 22d and 23d Divisions to train selected personnel for LRP operations. The 23d Division is providing 30 LRP students for training at Ban Me Thuot and the 22d Division is training 40 ARVN LRP students at De Duc near LZ English.

2. Operations:

b. During the quarter Co E (LRP), 20th Inf inserted 153 LRP's which resulted in 138 enemy sightings and 72 enemy KIA (KIA) and 21 wounded. The largest contact of this time was 20 enemy which were part of a larger force, after which the LRP was successfully extracted with only two minor casualties.

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b. Integrated ARVN-US LRF operations were begun in early April with excellent results. The 22d ARVN Div produced eleven Duc My LRF School graduates to work with the 273d Abn Bde (Sep) in the CONUS AO. The 22d ARVN Div on 27 Apr provided 154 ARVN LRF personnel, three of which were Duc My graduates, to the Co E (LRF), 20th Inf platoon in support of the 5/503d Abn Inf at Phu Kiep. The 23d ARVN Div is scheduled to provide by 30 Apr, 18 Duc My LRF School graduates to the Co E (LRF), 20th Inf platoon operating in the 23d ARVN Div's area of interest. Upon termination of the LRF training being conducted by the 4th Inf Div for the 24th Special Tactical Zone LRF trainees, those trainees who successfully complete the course of instruction will be integrated into the LRF detachment of the three brigades of the 4th Div.

(g) The 64th Engineer Detachment (Fierce) processed and distributed 106,665 copies of Tactical Date Overprints of 105 map sheets, scale 1/50,000 and 40,500 copies of Terrain Analysis Overprints of 105 map sheets, scale 1/50,000. Of the 105 sheets, 36 were in the 1 CTZ and 69 were reprints in the II CTZ.

3. Deviation from current intelligence doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

4. Significant changes from previous report: None.

5. Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in OB holdings during the period:

1. Units accepted:

- K50 Trans Bn, NT5 Probable 500
- 209th NVA Rgt, NT1 Confirmed 600
- 36th Sapper Bn, Binh Confirmed 125
- 20th Sapper Bn, Binh Front 50
- 401st LF Bn, Darlac Probable 110
- 406th Sapper Bn, Kontum Probable 75
- 610th LF Bn, Minh Probable 280
- Truc

2. Units dropped:

- K13 Arty Bn, 40th Arty Rgt - Moved to III CTZ
- 10th NVA Division - Initially disbanded
- Bien Hoa DKZ Bn - Lack of information

3. Changes in subordination:

- K101 Bn from 958 NVA Rgt to B3 Front
- 17th Trans Bn from NT10 to NT1
15 May 1968

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X200 Arty fire from B3 Front to 40th Arty Regt

91B NVA Bn. from MT10 to B3 Front

(c) Enemy Loses During the Period: (DCM is 35% of KIA based on MACV criteria)

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(d) Enemy strength in II CTZ as of 30 Apr 68:

- NVA: 20,640
- VC (HQ and LF) Regulars: 7,836
- Adm Services: 4,875
- Guerrillas: 15,979
- Infrastructure: 19,000
- Total: 68,330

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(6) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy Capabilities:

1. In the Western Highlands, the B3 Front continues its replacement and refitting activities, but nevertheless retains the capability to conduct coordinated attacks on relatively short notice against US/GVN forces and installations, employing multi-regimental forces supported by mortar, rocket artillery and AA artillery fire.

2. In Kontum Province, the enemy can attack the FSBs of the 4th Inf Div west of Polec Klang CIDG Camp in up to regimental strength at any time, supported by the fires of probably two mixed artillery (82mm/122mm mortar, 122mm rocket) battalions and two AA (12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm) artillery battalions. Major attacks can be expected within the next ten days against Polec Klang in multi-regimental strength with a secondary effort against Phu Wett/Gkk To installations in no more than two-battalion strength, supported by mortar, rocket and AA fires. Standoff attacks by fire can be expected, as well as enemy efforts at interdiction of friendly LOCs, disruption of US and GVN pacification activities and small unit/sapper activities.

3. In Pleiku Province, the enemy can attack Pleiku City, Camp Enari, Camp Holloway, Ploc Krong CIDG Camp or Plei Djereng CIDG Camp with elements of up to three NVA, MP and VC battalions. By deploying the forces of the 1st NVA-Div currently positioned in southwest Kontum Province, the enemy could launch an attack against Plei Djereng with regimental sized forces.

4. In the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa, the enemy can attack the populated areas of these provinces in multi-battalion strength in conjunction with harassing and interdiction attacks by sapper and ELF units; in Ptn Ten Province, the enemy has lost much of his combat effectiveness and therefore can attack urban areas in Tay Hoa and Tay An Districts only in multi-company strength.

5. In Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces, attack in up to two battalion strength if augmented by district and guerrilla forces; in Tuyen Duc and Ninh Thuan Provinces, attack in battalion strength.

6. Continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort.

7. Employ any combination of the above capabilities, carried out separately or in conjunction with each other.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1. Enemy LOCs are extended and insecure with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters, where some degree of security exists.

2. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities.

3. The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior Allied firepower in any large-scale offensive.

4. Newly recruited and impress; VC personnel are relatively untrained and inexperienced. Some NVA units are short experienced leaders; additionally, some replacements have not had extensive training.

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5. As a result of harassment and terrorist activities, and the Tet Offensive, the populace fears the enemy and probably will provide the enemy support only under duress.

6. Low morale in some units is caused by one or more causes, e.g., Allied firepower, sickness and lack of food.

7. Weather:

(c) Interior: The Northwest Monsoon was very weak during this quarter as the transition period began to affect the interior with occasional mild surges of the approaching Southwest Monsoon. Skies were generally fair during the morning and nighttime hours with ground fog forming in the high mountain valleys near sunrise. Occasional heavy fog in the Western highlands hampered some aerial operations during the early morning hours. Skies generally became partly cloudy during the afternoon hours. Afternoon and early evening rain showers and isolated thunderstorm activity became frequent each week as the upper level southwest monsoonal flow intensified and began to gradually affect the interior sections of II Corps.

(b) Coastal: The Northeast Monsoon and the transition period remained unusually dry this quarter except for the later half of April when frequent heavy rains, rainshowers, and thundershowers fell throughout the entire coastal area as a series of rain bands during the early morning hours with ceilings 1500-2500 feet, but clouds broke up and skies generally became fair by 1100 hours. The coastal ridges were frequently obscured with low clouds between the hours of 0100 and 0600. Isolated rain showers frequently occurred over the coastal ridges during the afternoon and early evening hours with some isolated thunderstorm activity in late March and April. Occasional early morning rainshowers affected the coastal stations, with most of the shower activity occurring north of Minh Hoa.

(c) Effects on operations: There were 164 TAC sorties and 16 trail dust missions cancelled due to weather. No other effects on operations are known.

(d) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting IFFORCEV and USARV tactical units in II CTZ plus the Americal Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne) and Provisional Corps Vietnam in 1 CTZ. Support is being provided in the following manner:

1. Staff Weather Officer (SWO)
2. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ
3. Climatological Support
4. 4th Infantry Division:
   a. SWO and forecaster support at base camp
   b. Observations at base camp
   c. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs
   d. Climatological Support

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 ROCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

2. Dalat/Cam Ly Air Field:
   a. Observations
   b. Forecasts on an as requested basis.

4. An Khe:
   a. Observations
   b. Forecasts on an as requested basis

5. LZ English:
   a. Observations
   b. Forecasts on an as requested basis.

6. Americal Division:
   a. Forecaster support at Chu Lai
   b. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs
   c. Climatological Support

7. 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne):
   a. SWO and forecast support at base camp
   b. SWO and forecast support at Division Forward when operational
   c. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs and Division Forward CP when operational.
   d. Climatological Support

8. Provisional Corps Vietnam:
   a. SWO support
   b. Climatological Support
   c. Forecast Support Center for I CFTZ

9. 3d Bn (abn) 506th Inf:
   a. Observations
   b. Forecasts on an as requested basis
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SLAM.21: Operational Report of the General Staff, 1st CAV for Quarter 1, period ending 30 April 1968 (C.1)

C. Operations and training activities.

(1) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence and overall strategy, the III Corps Division formulated and published 2 operations orders, one contingency plan and six fragmentary orders during the reporting period. In addition, the combined Quarterly Review was conducted and the monthly combined Commanders' Conference and weekly Special Operations Briefings were instituted. A major study addressing desires of IFFORCIV force dispositions during the forthcoming SW monsoon season was conducted. It included 14 separate component studies.

(2) Operations Orders:

1. OPLAN 201-68 (VALKH) was published on 5 February 1968. OPLAN VAHH tasked a battalion task force of the 173d Abn RCT (Sep) for tactical security of An Hoa and Long Xuyen. In addition it tasked the battalion task force to conduct reconnaissance in Force Operations to support revolutionary development within the AO.

2. OPLAN 202-68 (OPLAN XUUK) was published on 21 March 1968. This order deployed the 3d Bui, 6th Inf Div (+) from Binh Dinh to AD 64-65 and the 173d Abn Ide (Sep) to Binh Dinh Province from Ninh. The order directed the 173d Abn Ide (Sep) to conduct operations within the prescriptive OPLAN XUUK AO.

(b) Contingency Plans. OPLAN 102-68 (OPLAN II) was published on 17 February 1968. The sensitivity of this particular plan exceeds the classification of this document and precludes further discussion.

(c) Frag Orders: The following Frag Orders show the increased reliance on special type operations in I CTZ. The combined Long Range Patrol (LRP)/Mobile Strike Force (MSF) hunter-killer team concept is a tactical innovation that is producing encouraging results. A brief synopsis of the orders follows:

1. Frag Order 7-68 was published on 9 March 1968. This order directed a LRP/MSF hunter-killer team to seek out and destroy elements of the 959 NVA Regiment south of An Khe. The operation ended on 2 April.

2. Frag Order 12-68 published on 31 March 1968 employed one MSF company on a reconnaissance mission SW of Poai Lang.

3. Frag Order 13-68 was published 2 April 1968. This operation employed 3 MSF companies in an AO south of Chao Reo. The operation was a reconnaissance in force based out of Poai Lang and concluded on 23 April 1968.

4. Frag Order 14-68 published on 14 April 1968 employed two MSF companies in a reconnaissance in force operation north of Dak Pek. The operation is still in process.

5. Frag Order 15-68 published on 21 April 1968 is a reconnaissance in force operation currently being conducted in Lam Dong and Chan Thuan Provinces. The operation oriented against NVA elements of 156 elements of 173d Abn Inf reinforced by a platoon of a Co, 20th LRP and one MSF company.

(d) IFFORCIV Force Disposition Study. This study was conducted during March and examines the influence of the SW monsoon on the disposition of forces in I CTZ. In addition to the basic study are 14 component studies which examine the following subjects:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFF0-LEV for Quarterly
        Period ending 30 April 1968

1. Enemy Situation.
2. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
3. Weather.
4. Intensified Reconnaissance Program.
5. Artillery Considerations.
6. PSTDP.
7. Logistics Considerations.
8. Engineer Operations.
11. CDCG Camp Deployment.
12. Aviation Considerations.
13. USSF Camp Assessment.

Many of the study findings have already been implemented and others are
scheduled to be put into effect. The study will be distributed to the
field in early May 1968.

(a) Other.

1. Combined Commanders' Meetings. A series of monthly meetings be-
tween CC, II Corps, CG, ROYV-FC and CG, IFF0-LEV was initiated during the
period. This recent innovation in I FF0-LEV has the salient advantage of en-
hancing the personal relationships of the commanders and their mutual under-
standing of each other's problems. The meetings first review the intelli-
gence situation to focus on the enemy, secondly review the current friendly
situation and future operational plans and finally agenda items selected by
the commanders are discussed and resolved. During the reported period two
of these meetings were conducted.

11. Weekly Special Operations Briefings. Another innovation in I FF0-LEV
instituted during the period is the Special Operations Briefings. These
briefings are given to the CC weekly to provide a total program review
on special operations. The briefing reviews:

(a) Past week operations and results of mobile strike force companies,
camp strike force and OMEGA activities.
(b) Current dispositions and planned operations;
(c) Future priority areas for offensive operations.
(d) Integration of special operations with the intensified recon-
    naisance program.
AVFA-GC-OT
15 May 1968

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS IN PAVN/CVN FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968 - CO GSPO. 65 (A1)

(2) OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

(a) City Battles During the Tet Offensives.

1. In the early morning hours of 30 January, in violation of the declared Tet truce, the enemy attacked key population centers throughout II CTZ. The purpose of this offensive against key urban areas and US, Free World and ARVN installations was to disrupt the solidarity between GVN and US/Free World Forces; to destroy allied units; to incite the civil population to demonstrate against the present government of the Republic of Vietnam in the form of a "General Uprising"; and to induce a universal clanor for a coalition government.

2. Qui Nhon City, Binh Dinh Province: Within II Corps, as the countywide offensive began, elements of the 3d NVA Division attacked a major landing zone in Binh Dinh Province while local force elements and a napper company attacked Qui Nhon, the Province Capital. The fighting in and around Qui Nhon lasted from 30 January to 3 February. During this period elements of the 90th Local Force Battalion and three sapper companies attacked allied installations and GVN offices in and around the city. Key targets were the Military Security Service (MSS) Headquarters, the 2d Railway Security Compound, radio station and Bach Dang Village. The enemy occupied all target areas despite their defense by RP/FF elements. The first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four FF platoons stationed in the Bach Dang area. The 405th Scout Company and 1st Battalion, 41st ARVN Regiment were also committed into the Bach Dang area. An RP/FF, National Police Force and Province headquarters Task Force surrounded the enemy in the radio station and were reinforced by three companies of the 6th Regiment, Capital ROK Division. Two ARVN companies were committed against enemy forces controlling the railroad station. By 31 January all areas were secured. Results: enemy casualties were 276 killed and 56 WIA’s, 162 small arms and 11 crew-served weapons captured. Additionally, 12 members of the infrastructure were killed and 31 captured.

3. Tuy Hoa City, Phu Yen Province: On (30-31 Jan) and (1-2 Feb) elements of the 5th BN 95th NVA Regiment engaged in and near Tuy Hoa. Key targets appear to have been C Battery of the 6th BN 52d Artillery, Binh Tin Hamlet, the Tuy Hoa North Airfield, and the Province Prison. By 0600 hours on the 30th, Co D, 4th BN, 503d ABN Inf and two companies of the 2d BN, 58th ROK Regt attacked the enemy force that had been attacking C Battery, 6th BN, 32d Artillery, Tuy Hoa North Airfield and the prison. By 0730 hours 31 January, the enemy force was surrounded and destroyed in Binh Tin Hamlet. Two ARVN battalions of the 47th Regt and two RP companies attacked an enemy strong point in the center of Tuy Hoa on 5 February and reduced the strong point by 6 February. Results: enemy casualties were 316 killed and 104 WIA’s, 104 small arms and 30 crew-served weapons captured. Infrastructure losses are unknown.

4. Phu Yen City, Khanh Hoa Province: Elements of the 188 NVA regiment emerged in an aggressive role for the first time since their limited offensive attacks around Khanh Hoa and Nha Trang in October and November. Elements of the 11th Co, 7th BN, 188 NVA Regt and the H-71 LF Co attacked facilities in Khanh Hoa on 30 January. The main objective was the FF Training Center, enemy forces attacking the FF Training Center were fought between the cross fires of the NVA Compound and the Khanh Hoa Police Station. At 1200 hours on the 30th, seven companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th ROK Regt moved to blocking positions around the city and on the night closed their encirclement and had reestablished control. Though there were reports of sporadic contacts through 4 February, the heavier fighting terminated on 31 January. Results: enemy casualties were 45 killed and four WIA’s, 32 small arms and one crew-served weapon. Though no infrastructure elements were killed, five members were captured.

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5. Ninh Phong, Khanh Hoa Province: As the enemy extended his systematically coordinated city offensive, the Long An in Ninh Phong, was attacked on 30 January by elements of the 7th BN 188th Inf, the T-5 Recon Co, T59 Tank Co and the K90 and K91 Sapper Companies. These forces launched their attacks against the sector and province headquarters, the military and civil jails, the radio station, railroad station, and the Roberts Compound area. The enemy suffered heavy losses in their abortive attempt to take key objectives in the city. From 30 to 31 January, 15 45CF, CIDO and Ranger Companies of the 5th SFC, the 272d FZ Company; the 1st Co, 30th INF, and US ARVN and F5 Headquarters personnel attacked enemy strong points, and by 1 February eliminated all but scattered pockets of resistance. Results: Enemy casualties were 29 killed while 76 strong-points were captured; 21 crew-served weapons were captured. Eight infrastructure were killed and 101 suspects detained.

6. Phan Thiet City, Binh Thuan Province: For the first time in several months the 452d LF BN and the 150th HN BN launched a major attack in Binh Thuan Province. At 0315 on the 31st of January elements of the 452d and 150th launched an attack against Phan Thiet. Key targets included the IVN Compound and water point, Binh Thuan Sector headquarters, and the Army Plateau, LZ Betty, the Province Prison, and points along the perimeter of the city. Though the heavier contacts terminated on the 4th, sporadic firing continued into the 10th of February. In many instances the enemy units reportedly concentrated in schools in the northern part of the city as well as in a large pagoda in the western part of Phan Thiet. The enemy felt certain that these structures would not be fired on. As the fighting in the city died out, it appeared the enemy was withdrawing back to his base areas. At 0630 on the 1st the first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four PP platoons; an IF platoon and a Province Reconnaissance Platoon of the twon at Xuan Phong. From that time, the 3d BN, 506th Inf and the 4th BN, 44th ARVN Inf reinforced by the 3d BN, 44th ARVN Inf; two 2P Companies; three 1P companies and 15 PP platoons drove the enemy out of most of the city and had secured the area by 9 February. On 18 February the enemy again attacked Phan Thiet and overran the prison, releasing 500 prisoners. By 23 February the enemy attack had been defeated and the city was under-friendly control. Results: Enemy casualties were 1,256 killed, 48 PWs captured, 253 small arms and 21 crew-served weapons were captured. The infrastructure suffered 60 killed or captured.

7. Bien Hoa Thoict, Darlac Province: The attack on Bien Hoa Thoict which began on 30 January and terminated 6 February, involved the three battalions of the 134th WA Legt, the 150th LF BN, and up to five provincial PP companies. The apparent key targets included the 23d Division headquarters, the MACV Compound, both airfields, the Province chief’s house and the ARVN Military Compound, the IVF/FF training Center, and the Province Bank. Additionally two churches, missionary buildings and a leprosarium were destroyed. The initial attacks were met by the IF and PP companies and platoons performing their normal security operations. By noon of the 30th, the 23d Recon Company; the 13th ARVN Cav; and the three battalions of the 134th WA Legt were in contact. In the early hours of 1 February the 134th WA Legt battalion was deployed to the city and on 2 February the 1st Battalion, 503d Arty Inf, had reinforced the contact from Pleiku. Final search and clear operations were completed by these forces on 6 February. Results: Enemy casualties were 919 killed, 186 PWs, 161 small arms and 15 crew-served weapons captured. Infrastructure losses were 22 captured.

8. Pleiku City, Gia Lai Province: The attack on Pleiku City which commenced early on 30 January and terminated on 4 February involved the 6-13 LF BN, the 10th Sapper BN and four district companies. Key targets were the Pleiku Sector headquarters, the MACV Compound, the 71st Evac
hospital, the P Camp, the N Pelexi and N Camp Holloway airfields, the province Chief’s quarters, and the Montagnard Training Center. As the enemy attacked, elements of the 22d Ranger BN and the 3d AVN CAV moved to alert positions throughout the city. Co A, 1st BN, 69th Armor deployed to the contact areas and reinforced ARVN forces as did two 11F companies and one KF and one PF company. Elements of the 5th Div and 3d Inf were airlifted in of the city and moved into the city conducting a coordinated attack with two NLF companies on enemy strong points. By 3 February the joint US, ARVN task force had secured the city and clean up actions were begun. Results: enemy casualties were 632 killed, 182 P’s, 179 small arms and 10 crew served weapons. Twenty-five infrastructure members were killed and 160 suspects detained.

2. Kontum City, Kontum Province: Kontum City was struck early on 30 January by three battalions of the 24th NVA Inf, the 304th IF BN and the 406th Sapper BN. Some of the heaviest fighting in the Tet Offensive occurred when the enemy forces attempted to take the NVA Compound, Post Office, Finance Office, Province Chief’s Headquarters, the airfield and the 24th STZ headquarters. The prisoner interrogation center and a church were destroyed. The initial enemy assault was met by two Montagnard Scout Companies (-); the 25 BN, LGD ARVN Inf (-); two CIDG companies; and NLF/PF forces. By noon it was apparent reinforcement was required and the 1st BN, 23rd Inf; D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th CAV; and C Company, 1st BN, 69th Armor were forced into TF 22 and moved into the city. ARVN reinforced with the 3d BN, LGD ARVN Inf and two scout companies. By 3-4 February friendly forces conducting search and clear operations were meeting light resistance and all action in the city ceased on the 4th. Results: enemy casualties were 1039 killed; 20 KIA, 206 small arms and 13 crew-served weapons were captured.

10. Though the city battles in the western highlands are over there are recurring indications in Kontum, Pleiku and Daklac provinces which suggest that enemy offensive action in these areas is again possible.

11. Dalat City, Tuyen Duc Province: The last major city to be struck was the major economic city of Dalat. Elements of the 186th IF BN reinforced by a part of the 14th IF BN infiltrated the city and attacked at 0100 on 1 February. The initial attack was met by an IF platoon, armored car platoon and sector headquarters personnel. Two NLF companies and the armored car platoon supported by gunships were the first reaction force to drive the enemy out of the center of the city on that day. On the 4th of February three CIDG companies reinforced the hard pressed regional forces and on 5 Feb the 23d Ranger BN moved into the city. On 8 Feb the Co, 23d AVN Div assumed control of all forces in Dalat and reinforced by the 11th ARVN Ranger BN on 10 Feb attacked the enemy force and secured Dalat on 11 Feb. Results: Enemy casualties were 208 KIA, 8 P’s, 40 small arms and three crew-served weapons captured in twelve days of fighting. Infrastructure losses were 17 killed and 15 captured.

12. By 1 February, the enemy had committed forces against major population centers in nine of the twelve provinces in the Zone.

13. Results of the Tet offensive in the II CZ were:

a. Enemy military losses: 5405 KIA, 704 P’s, 1327 small arms and 127 crew-served weapons captured.

b. Friendly military losses: 471 KIA, 1746 WIA, 71 vehicles damaged or destroyed, 49 aircraft damaged or destroyed.
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AVN-QG-07

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters AFRICOM for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

CASPER-63 (RL)

1. Casualty casualties: 35 friendly KIA, 2979 WIA.


3. WIA: 10,282.


5. Infrastructure: 53 KIA, 439 captured (however some were only suspects).

(b) Operation Toggle.

1. Operation WELM (Inclosure 2) which commenced on 20 January 1968 was continued during the quarter by the 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Brigade. Cordons and search operations and operations in support of Revolutionary Development in Binh Thuan Province were the principal missions assigned to the operations. During February 3d Bn 506th ABn Inf was the principal reaction force committed against VC/NVA forces in the AO west of Phan Thiet City. On 1 Feb elements of B Co 3d in 506th ABn Inf embarked an estimated ten VC NVA KIAs resulting in five VC KIA. Night Hunter teams and gunships were credited with 20 VC KIA during the day's operations. On 2 Feb A and B Co 3d in 506th Inf maintained contact with enemy forces throughout the day resulting in three friendly KIA, nine friendly WIA and 15 enemy KIA. At 2300 hours, 2 Feb, 3d Bn 506th ABn Inf Command Post area began receiving small arms fire and 10-12 rounds of 60mm mortar. The aid station was hit resulting in two friendly WIA. In addition a CH-47 aircraft was damaged. On 3 Feb Night Hunter teams and gunships accounted for 29 enemy KIA. On 4 Feb C Company found five VC bodies in the Phan Thiet area during a sweep operation. Night Hunter teams and gunships accounted for 17 friendly WIA. On 5 and 6 Feb there was heavy contact throughout the day in the vicinity of AO120112, between A and C Companies, and an unknown size enemy force. The enemy employed mortars and small arms fire until contact broke at approximately 2200 hours. The contact resulted in two friendly KIA, 31 friendly WIA and 13 enemy KIA. On 8 Feb B Company engaged an enemy force vicinity AE010011 resulting in five enemy KIA. Night Hunter teams and gunships continued alert missions resulting in five enemy KIA. On 9 Feb the 3d Bn, 506th ABn Inf in conjunction with elements of the 54th ARVN Legt continued offensive operations in the vicinity of AE0012, with artillery and FAC Air supporting. The day's operation resulted in 53 enemy KIA with no friendly losses. On 12 Feb 506th ABn Inf was airlifted to Bao Loc to conduct road clearing operations along QL 20 from Bao Loc to Dalat. On 13 Feb B Co engaged an enemy force vicinity NE120011 and NE092242, resulting in two friendly KIA. On 19 Feb an enemy force reported in the Phan Thiet area, C Company was airlifted from Phan Thiet to Plan Chuut upon termination of their road clearing operation. A Company and Noble Strike Force 26 made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity AE010093. B Company engaged another force at AH030977, in the vicinity of the Province Hospital. Enemy elements in both locations were well dug-in. Artillery and FAC Air were called in as friendly forces consolidated their positions during the evening. Casualties for the day were 10 friendly KIA and 53 LIA. On 20 Feb the 3d Bn, 506th ABn Inf continued their operations from Phan Thiet. Their attack was met with heavy resistance from well-entrenched enemy in vicinity of AE030994. During the day, SF 26 was replaced by SF 23 from Phu Hea. Contact continued throughout the day resulting in three friendly KIA, 22 WIA and 25 enemy KIA. During 21 Feb there was light contact in the vicinity of AO1208 and AE010260 with indications that the enemy had withdrawn from their positions leaving delaying forces behind.

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results for the day were 18 enemy KIA, three small arms and four crew-
served weapons captured. On 22 Feb, B and C Companies and MSF 23
continued sweep operations in vicinity of AN815105 and AN843062 along
QL resulting in one friendly WIA and 18 enemy KIA. On 23 Feb C Com-
pany and MSF 23 moved into previously VC held positions and destroyed
33 bunkers. A Company and the Currie Shock Force of the 3d Inf, 506th
Abn Inf conducted ambushes in vicinity of AN766120 and AN781075 result-
ing in two enemy KIA. Results for the day were six enemy KIA. On 25
Feb at 0200 hours, B and C Companies received sporadic attacks by an
estimated reinforced enemy company, vicinity AN809645. Contact contin-
ued until 0450 hours, resulting in 25 enemy KIA, one FOK and four
small arms captured. At 2100 hours, LZ Betty, the Command Post air-
field of the 3d Inf, 506th Abn Inf received 10 to 15 rounds of unknown
ammunition. The SFN ammunition dump was destroyed, six US were
wounded, four helicopters damaged, the airfield closed and all commu-
nications by telephone and radio-teletype disrupted. By 26 Feb, all
communications had been restored and the airfield was operational. At
0330 hours on 27 Feb, B Company received small arms, 1-40 rocket and
mortar fire in the vicinity of AN809415. Contact continued until approxi-
mately 0800 hours, a sweep of the area resulted in five friendly
WIA, four VC KIA and five small arms captured. No significant con-
tact was made during the remainder of the month.

On 1 March 1968, elements of C and D Companies, 3d Inf, 506th
Abn Inf, and B 27th Engineer Battalion opened CL 1 from the I Corps
border, to Luong Son (big26383). During the day, Night Hunter teams
and gunships accounted for four VC killed. On 2 Mar eight Hunter teams
accounted for eight VC killed in the vicinity of AN878055, on 3 ar-
ning 10 KIA. On 27 Mar from Lang To to Plan Thiet. On 4 Mar, a long Range Patrol (LRP) engaged
17 VC in vicinity AN792180. Artillery was employed resulting in three VC
killed. On 5 Mar in the vicinity of ZT229507, C Company located an
enemy base camp of approximately company size. The base camp area con-
tained 15 bunkers, overhead cover, one-half ton of rice and small ar.
ammunition. On 10 Mar elements of A Company ambushed an unknown size enemy force who had children moving in front
of them vicinity AI-851292. Friendly elements waited until the chil-
dren passed before engaging the enemy, resulting in one VC killed.

On 13 Mar vicinity of AN852457, one platoon from C Company found a
cache containing two tons of rice. On 16 Mar A Company located a rice
cache at AN855626, containing 10 tons of rice. The rice was destroyed
by CS gas. At 2000 hours, B Company engaged 20 VC at AN811413, re-
sulting in two friendly wounded and one VC killed. During the day,
gunships from the battalion supported a Camp Strike Force (CSF) con-
tact at AN871100, killing six VC. On 19 Mar vicinity ZT268082, B
Company engaged 20 VC driving, six mortars resulting in two VC killed
and four empty mortars destroyed. On 21 Mar at approximately 1440
hours, a LRP engaged an estimated 30 VC at AN270159. Artillery, naval
gunfire, tactical air, gunships and Spooky supported. The LRP has ex-
tacted four and enemy killed. On 21 Mar at approximately 1440
hours, A Company located and de-
stroyed eight bunkers vicinity of AI733142. At 1525 hours, B Company
engaged an unknown number of VC at AI780155, resulting in one US wounded
and three VC killed. At 1600 hours B Company engaged 10 VC at AI781515,
resulting in two VC killed and two small arms captured. A logistics
convoy departed from Phan Thiet to Phat Tang at 0750 hours; however,
due to numerous cuts in the road, CL 1 was closed into Song as at
1600 hours. On 23 March, B Company engaged an estimated enemy pla-
toon at AN770174. Artillery, gunships and tactical air were employed
on enemy positions until contact broke at 2000 hours, resulting in one
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SUNSMIT: OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968 WSM 56-68 (21)

friendly killed and enemy casualties unknown. No significant contact was made during the remainder of the month.

1. On 2 Apr as 3d in 506th Attn Inf continued search operations in vicinity 272247, Co found an 81mm mortar, two mortars, 13 claymore mines, and four rolls of communications wire. On 5 Apr, vicinity 284129, a two and one half ton truck from 6th Bn, 20th Eng struck a mine, resulting in three US WIA and total damage to the truck. On 6 April the 6th Inf Command Post, along with A and B Co, 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf conducted an assault NE of Phan Thiet, vicinity 1439305 (Le Long Phong) for the purpose of conducting operations in that location. Co joined the battalion on 9 Apr. On 10 Apr at 1420 hours vicinity ANH140, the 506th and 5th Ld Companies made contact with an estimated two VC companies. The 4th Troop of the 4th Abn WnV reinforced the contact. Friendly elements to blocking positions at 2100 hours. Results of the contacts were two Attn KIA, 13 Attn KIA, one US advisor WIA, 21 Attn WIA and six IP WIA, four Ld WIA and five small arms lost. Enemy casualties were two KIA and two small arms captured. On 11 Apr, vicinity ANH3247, B Co located an enemy bunker complex and cache containing 23 bunkers with overhead cover, 300 pounds of rice and uniforms. On 13 April at 0920 hours, vicinity ANH140, the 4th Bn, 506th Attn Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one Attn KIA, five detainees, one ton of salt and 500 kilograms of rice captured. On 17 Apr, vicinity ANH9315, during search operations, A Co located an enemy bunker complex with seven large bunkers with overhead cover, one of which contained many bloody bandages and thought to have been used as a hospital area. On 20 April, the 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf began a shift in operations from the Le Long Phong area NE of Phan Thiet to the NW. The battalion was augmented at 1800 hours by the arrival of one platoon of tanks from the 1st Bn, 5th Armor, 4th Attn Div. On 19 Apr, the 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf commenced operations north and NW of Phan Thiet while the 2d and 4th Bns, 506th Attn Inf augmented with a US tank platoon continued operations north and NE of Phan Thiet. On 20 Apr, vicinity 272746, while on a search operation, A Co found 19 VC bodies in graves, believed resulting from contacts during the Tet offensive in the Phan Thiet area. On 21 Apr, vicinity ANH1057, a recon team from the 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf engaged eight VC resulting in one US WIA and three VC KIA and two small arms captured. On 22 Apr, all elements of the 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf returned to Phan Thiet in preparation for operations against NW 6 on 25 Apr. On 23 Apr, one NSP company from Pleiku and one NSP platoon from Co B, 506th Inf arrived in Phan Thiet for operation. On 25 Apr, the 3d Bn, 506th Attn Inf moved from their base camp SW of Phan Thiet to an operational area approximately 10000 NW of Phan Thiet, vicinity ANH140. The battalion was reinforced by a NSP company from Pleiku and one NSP company from Long Son. On 26 Apr, vicinity ANH2747, an individual from the 4th Bn, 506th Attn Inf detonated a mine resulting in two Attn KIA and five WIA. At 1340 hours, same vicinity, another mine was blown resulting in 11 Attn WIA. On 27 Apr vicinity ANH3164, Company B found an enemy base camp area containing 35 bunkers with overhead cover. In addition to the bunker complex, a well-concealed cache was discovered in the vicinity containing two transistor radios, three electric switch boxes, eight field telephones, three head sets and other signal equipment. On 30 Apr, vicinity ANH7024, B Company found an enemy platoon size base camp containing three bodies killed by artillery.

The results for Operation MCALAI for the quarter were: Friendly - 24 KIA, 206 WIA; Enemy - 606 KIA, 117 Pkts, 70 small arms and 30 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 30 April 1968 are as follows: Friendly - 24 KIA, 212 WIA; Enemy - 952 KIA and 120 Pkts, 87 small arms and 12 crew-served weapons captured.

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AVFA-CC-07

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters 503d Inf for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968

(c) Operation BILLING.

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) began Operation BILLING (Enclosure 2) on 19 September 1967 employing the 1st and 4th battalions, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Squadron 9th Cavalry. The operation was designed to destroy enemy forces located in the high ground east of Той Loc basin and was oriented against the 95th NVA Regiment.

2. Cordons and search operations continued in the BILLING AO during the quarter meeting light suicidal contact. The 1/3d bn bus (Sep) (-), with one battalion (4th bn, 503d bn inf) in conjunction with Cling Son CSF, conducted operations in the eastern portion of the BILLING area of operations.

3. Effective 0323001 H February, 1968 the BILLING area of operations was changed to encompass an area generally bounded as follows: from 19659050, south to 16603050, east to 18660040, north to 18880040, west to 16509020, and 16909010 (the starting point). On 4 Feb, vicinity 000572, an aerial observer sighted 13 enemy and crewed ground fire. The helicopter returned the fire killing three enemy and causing two secondary explosions. On 4 February 08h elements observed five VC collecting rice vicinity B9278. The VC were engaged and all were killed. On 6 Feb at 0915 hours, Company A, 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf engaged four VC outside their perimeter vicinity 0153478, killing one VC in a short firefight. At 061147H Feb, while conducting a sweep outside the perimeter, Company A found one wounded VC. Company C, 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf killed one VC and captured one pistol during operations on 6 Feb. At 074810H Feb, H. 173d Abn bn bus (Sep) began deploy to the BILLING area of operations, closing at an hte by 1735 hours. At 2000 hours, the 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf became OCA. to 120841H, at 074840 Feb Co D, 16th Armr moved contact with 10 VC in a village vicinity 0274642. A short firefight ensued and the VC broke contact. Results of the engagement were one VC killed and one F. captured. Also, 7.5 tons of rice were found in the village and extricated to PDA for distribution. On 8 Feb at 0315 hours, vicinity 0226346, an AR team and a FF platoon were attacked by an unknown number of enemy. The five minute engagement resulted in two KIA and one FF KIA plus two FF WIA. One carbine and one M-1 rifle were lost, no casualties were reported. On 11 February the 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf established a new fire support base (LaDrain) vicinity 02705664. Battery C, 3d Howitzer Battalion, 319th Artillery and Company C, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry forward-deployed to the new fire support base. Fire support base 11 located vicinity 0123649 was closed at 111535 Feb. On 12 Feb, Co C, 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf conducted ambush operations resulting in two VC killed. No friendly casualties were reported. On 16 Feb at 2140 hours fire support base Nazerback received 25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in two US wounded. On 19 Feb Co B, 16th Armr found a large bunker and tunnel complex vicinity 0166464. Chemical personnel from the 51st Chemical Detachment flushed the tunnels with CS gas without results. On 19 Feb one soldier from Co B, 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf became separated from his unit. The individual reported he engaged and killed six NV, vicinity BP995305. As the men was attempting to rejoin his unit he was attacked by an estimated 20 NVA and wounded in the hand. He evaded the enemy and rejoined his unit. (Enemy bodies were found). On 22 February Co D, 16th Armr and an engineer conditions team destroy the tunnel and bunker complex found on 19 Feb, vicinity 0166464. On 27 Feb 1A and C Companies, 4th Bn, 503d Abn inf moved from fire support base Nazerback and established new fire support base "45 vicinity BP995398."

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5 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters FFIDCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CS/OG-65 (R1)

1. There were very few significant actions within the BOLLING AO during the month of March 1968. Elements of the 16th En, 503d Abn Inf did participate in a significant operation in conjunction with the 17th ARVN Rgt outside the AO. On 4 March, D Troop, 16th Armbr linked up with elements of the 17th ARVN Rgt and conducted a sweep of the battle area. Contact was moderate throughout the day, TAC Air, artillery, and gunships supported the operation. At 1400 hours, D Troop, 16th Armor broke contact and withdrew into Tuy Hoa for the night. A sweep of the battle area was made on 5 March, however, contact was not reestablished. US losses as a result of the action: 5 KIA, 16 WIA, 2 MIA. In AFO's 8 CO, Cal, machineguns, 11 M16 rifles, 3 79 mm grenade launchers, 2 506 machineguns and 5 radios destroyed. Enemy losses credited to AR forces were 177 KIA, 5 detainees, 60 small arms and 17 crew-served weapons captured. At 1215 09 Mar vicinity CQ0092G6, an APC from D Troop, 16th Armor, while on a routine convoy mission, was damaged by a command detonated mine, wounding four personnel.

Another APC in the column observed two VC trying to evade and engaged them with small arms fire, killing both VC before they could reach cover. On 16 Mar a soldier from A Co, 503d Abn Inf separated himself from the company. Attempts to stop him were unsuccessful. At 1702 04 Mar vicinity CQ0995L2, an element from the 17th ARVN Rgt found the soldier's body. At 1100 hours on 17 Mar, elements from 2 Co, CIB CDO captured a VC who was watching a trail vicinity BQ079785. The VC gave the location of other VC in the area. At 1620 04 Mar, the CIB CDO entered a village vicinity BQ995561 and attempted to capture a group of VC. The VC began a firefight that resulted in 12 W. KIA. The 4th identified one of the VC as the VC area chief and another as the VC area police chief. On 19 Mar, elements of Co A, 16th En 503d Abn Inf observed an estimated VC company vicinity CQ0646L6. Artillery, TAC Air Strikes, and gunships were employed on the enemy location. A sweep of the area resulted in finding four VC KIA. At 1011 05 Apr, a herbicide mission was flown over vast enemy rice crops by the 51st Chem Det. The areas covered by the herbicides are located within the following boundaries: BQ509640, BQ509640, BQ5095310 and BQ50953-0, BQ5097200, BQ5097200, BQ5097200. On 20 March the 51st Chem Det conducted a defoliation mission in the Suoi Ca Valley vicinity CQ099415-3. At 1215 03 Apr, an aerial observer sighted 10 armed VC herding approximately 125 cattle. Gunships were employed on the enemy location resulting in ten VC KIA and 58 cattle killed.

5. On the 22 of April, gunships supporting the 16th En, 503d Abn Inf observed and killed three VC vicinity CQ935697, Co A, 16th En. 503d Abn Inf engaged eight VC on 7 April, vicinity CQ093399, killing three VC and capturing two AK-47's and 13 magazines along with one wounded VC. No friendly casualties were sustained in the action. On the 11th of April 2 Co located an enemy training camp capable of holding four hundred personnel in the vicinity of BQ937175. Simulated Chicoms grenades, simulated barbed wire made of vines, and several documents were found in the area. The 9th Bn 11th Bn conducted a five day operation in the NE portion of the AO from 16 April to 20 April without significant contact. On 27 April, Co D, 16th En, 503d Abn Inf found three enemy bunkers, constructed with 12x12 timbers, large enough to hold 10 to 15 personnel each. The area around the bunkers was cultivated. The bunkers were destroyed and the cultivated area dug up.

6. Results for Operation BOLLING for the quarter were: Friendly - 15 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy - 255 KIA, 72 WIA, 4 small arms and 12 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 30 April are as follows: Friendly - 57 KIA, 215 WIA; Enemy - 665 KIA and 85 WIA, 202 small arms and 19 crew-served weapons captured.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters LPORGEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS GSOSN-65 (RL)

(c) Operation FERSHING II.

1. Operation FERSHING II (Inclosure 2) commenced on 20 January 1968 as a cordon and search operation in Binh Dinh Province by the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AVN). Panzerfaust battalions under the operational control of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div were the 2d Bn, 7th Cav; 2d Bn, 6th Cav and 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf. Early in the morning hours of 31 January 1968, LZ Crystal, vicinity BR894658 and the Phu My District Headquarters were attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Two companies of 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf along with elements of the 3d ARVN Regiment and 1st Sqdn 9th Air Cav responded. Fighting continued throughout the day and into the night. By 0300 hours 2 February the fighting had become sporadic and contact was broken at 1615 hours. Results: Friendly - 3 ARVN KIA, 9 ARVN WIA, 2 US WIA; Enemy - 50 KIA (26 ARVN, 28 US), 3 WIA (1 US, 2 ARVN), 35 small arms (26 US, 9 ARVN) and 2 crew served (1 US, 1 ARVN).

2. On 1 February, RD Team 47 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force vicinity BR898655. ARVN artillery supported and contact broke at 2130 hours. A sweep of the battles area at first light on 2 February resulted in the discovery of 22 enemy bodies and three small arms. There were no friendly casualties reported. On 3 February Co B, 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf made contact with an estimated enemy company five kilometers SE of Phu My. Contact broke at 1100 hours. Results: Friendly - 1 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy - 28 KIA, 16 WIA, 20 small arms and 3 crew served weapons captured. Interrogation of a PW revealed the enemy unit to be the 3d Company, 75th Battalion, 20th VC Regiment. At 0900 hours, 12 February, the 1st Bn, 41st ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated enemy company vicinity ER918655. ARVN artillery supported and contact broke at 1615 hours. Results: Friendly - 1 ARVN KIA, 9 ARVN WIA, 2 US WIA; Enemy - 50 KIA (62 ARVN, 28 US), 3 WIA (1 US, 2 ARVN), 35 small arms (26 US, 9 ARVN) and 2 crew served (1 US, 1 ARVN).

3. On 18 February, the 2d Bn, 5th Cav deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and the 1st Bn, 35th Inf deployed from I CTZ to the FERSHING AO. On 19 and 20 February, the 2d Bn, 7th Cav deployed to 1 CTZ. Beginning on 22 Feb, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div headquarters and 2d Bn, 8th Cav began deploying to I CTZ and closed their new location on 2 March. On 28 February, the 1st Bn, 11th Inf closed into the FERSHING AO and on 29 February the 3d Brigade, 1st Inf Div Headquarters closed at I Engish. At 1900 hours 21 February, Operation FERSHING II terminated and Operation PATRICK commenced under the control of the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div.

4. Results for Opération FERSHING II were: Friendly - 21 KIA, 56 WIA; Enemy - 61 ARVN and 57 WIA, 133 small arms and 21 crew served weapons captured.

(a) Operation PATRICK:

1. Operation PATRICK (Inclosure 2) commenced on 29 February as a cordon and search operation in Binh Dinh Province as the follow-on-operation to FERSHING II. The operation was conducted by the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div with the two organic battalions, the 1st Bn, 35th Inf and the 1st Bn, 50th Inf and the 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech). Supporting the brigade in the operation was Troop C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 4th Inf Div. During March, action in the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

AO was relatively light. Significant actions during the month took place on 2-3 March, 8-9 March and 23 March. Numerous smaller contacts took place throughout the AO on 26 March the 2d BN, 35th Inf moved from 3 Corps Tactical Zone and closed into the MACARTHUR AO under operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 3d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry closed into the PATRICK AO on 27 March OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. On 30 March the 1st BN, 50th Inf moved from the PATRICK AO in the MACARTHUR AO and the 2d BN, 503d Airborne Infantry moved to the PATRICK AO. This was the second phase of the move of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to the PATRICK AO from MACARTHUR. The move was completed on 30 Mar and the PATRICK AO remained COCHISE-GREEN. Results of Operation PATRICK were:

Friendly: 18 KIA, 62 WIA; Enemy: 235 KIA and 14 WIA, 42 small arms and 13 crew served weapons captured.

1. Operation COCHISE-GREEN commenced on 30 March 1968 in Binh Dinh Province as a follow-on to Operation PATRICK conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Div. Operation COCHISE-GREEN was initiated by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) by a relief in place with the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Initially the 173d commenced operations with the 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf; 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf; 1st BN, 50th Inf (Mech); 2d BN, 50th Inf Div; Troop C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 14th Inf Div.

2. On 31 March 1968 HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) assumed operational control (OPCON) of the 4th BN, 503d Abn Inf operating in the BOLLIG Area of Operation in Phu Yen Province and the 1st BN, 503d Inf conducting in place from 7th Corps Tactical Zone and closed into the MACARTHUR Province. Conducting operations in Binh Dinh Province in coordination with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) are the 40th and 41st ARVN Inf Regts. On 4 April the 1st BN, 41st ARVN Regt and elements of the 30th ARVN Armored Cav Sqdn moved to the MACARTHUR AO. On 6 April the 2d BN, 41st ARVN Regt made contact with two enemy platoons and killed 6 enemy personnel south of Phu My (BR686645). Results of the action were 6 ARVN wounded. Enemy losses were 34 KIA, 2 prisoners, 9 small arms, 1 machine gun and two 80mm rocket launchers captured. On 6 April the 4th BN, 41st ARVN Regt made contact with two enemy platoons and captured 6 enemy personnel north of Phu My (BR686646). Additional enemy forces were contacted and the 2d BN, 41st ARVN Regt reinforced the contact and both battalions assaulted the enemy position. Results of the action were 12 ARVN wounded, 19 ARVN wounded. Enemy losses were 60 killed, 14 small arms and 6 crew served weapons captured. On 6 April the 1st BN, 14th Inf moved to LZ English in preparation for its move to Kontum City in the MACARTHUR AO. The 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf assumed the responsibility for the 1st BN, 50th Inf Div; Troop C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav departed for the MACARTHUR AO on 4 April by way of An Khe from LZ English. On 8 April the 1st BN, 14th Inf departed the COICLSE AO. On 8 April LZ Larunde was closed out by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). Also on 6 April Co C (-) and 1 platoon from Co B, 1st BN, 69th Armor closed into LZ Uplift from the MACARTHUR AO. The headquarters of 1st BN, 69th Armor will remain in the WALKER TANQ at Camp Radcliffe. On 12 April the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) commenced a two US BN and one ARVN BN operation in the Soui Ca Valley with the 2d BN, 503d Abn Inf, the 1st BN, 50th Inf (Mech) and the 2d BN, 41st ARVN Inf Regt. Co B, 2d BN, 503d Abn Inf found a bunker complex on the first day vicinity BR686667. In the complex were 50 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition and 16 rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle ammunition. On 14 April the operation was terminated and the 1st BN, 503d Abn Inf, from TANQ Walker, OPCON to the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in COICLSE; the 2d BN, 503d Abn Inf, the 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf, and CIDG forces from Vinh Thanh and Ha Tay Camps commenced operation VELVET WAMMER in the southern portion of MACARTHUR.
of the Kon River Valley north of Vinh Than and the high ground to the east. The lst Bn, 50th Inf (Mech), secured the major LZ's and bridges in the COCHISE AO during this operation. On 20 April Co C, lst Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) uncovered a rice cache of 11 tons 50m's east of LZ Uplift. Co A, 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf located a cave containing a number of room vicinity Z1752651. In the cave was found a printing press, beds, tables and chairs, 50 pounds of documents, 300 pounds of clothes, and food supplies. The documents were historical records of the 14 NVA Division. On 20 April in conjunction with the Capitol Inf Div operation MACAO II north of Qui Nhon, Co A, lst Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) and Co C, lst Bn, 50th Armor moved to the IOK operational area to support the lst IOK Regt and the 26th IOK Regt. Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep), the lst AIVN hq. and MFP units commenced screening and blocking operations north of MACAO II in the southern Phu My Valley and Nui My Mieu mountains in coordination with the IOK operation. On 22 April Co C, lst Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) found 74 tons of rice. 25m's north of LZ Uplift. The rice was distributed to needy families through the GVN Phu My District Chief. On 24 April CIDG elements from the Vinh Tanh Camp made contact with an enemy plt 15 km's north of the camp. Three VC were KIA in the action. Captured were 10 rounds of 120mm mortar amm., 34 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar amm., 30 rounds of 81mm rocket amm. and amm., firing devices, body traps and small arm ammunition. On 27 April the northern boundary of the COCHISE AO was changed eliminating all areas north of the I/II Corps political boundary except the Duc Pho District area south of the BS east-west 22 grid line from the I/II Corps boundary east to the South China Sea. The screening operation in conjunction with the IOK operation MACAO II terminated on 27 April. On 28 April after experiencing only light contact operation VELVET PAMIR terminated. Contact during the month of April was generally light and scattered despite intensive search and reconnaissance in force operations conducted by US and NVA forces within the COCHISE AO.

2. Results for operation COCHISE-QUEEN are: Friendly - 16 KIA, 82 WIA; Enemy: 77 KIA and 10 WIA's, 37 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured.

(g) Operation MACARTHUR.

1. Operation MACARTHUR (Inclosure 2) began on 12 October 1967 as a cordon and search and border surveillance operation conducted by the 4th Infantry Division in Kontum, Pleiku and Dak To Provinces. During February significant ground contacts were made in the AO however the enemy for the most part continued in their tactics of conducting stand off mortar and rocket attacks on US and NVA installations and positions. In early February contacts were made with relatively large size enemy forces (company or battalion); however, contacts involving that size enemy force decreased in the latter part of the month. Fire support bases at Ben Het and Dak To continued to receive mortar attacks during the month. On 2 Feb D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, on sweep operations of the contact site of 30 Jan in the vicinity of Z1123245, located 64 enemy bodies and 15 small arms. The lst Bn, 503d Abn Inf deployed from TAD JULIAN in the MACARTHUR AO to an area SW of Ban Ne Thuot for operations in that location. The battalion was deployed in response to enemy activity and intelligence reports indicating that enemy elements were operating in that vicinity. Contact was made on 4 February by elements of the lst Bn, 503d Abn Inf with an unknown size enemy force resulting in three NVA killed and one captured.
On sweep operations following the contact 10 NVA bodies were found presumably killed by air strikes employed during the contact. In the northern portion of the AO, Co B, 3d Bn, 8th Inf located an extensive enemy base area which contained 10 bunkers dug into a hillside. One of the bunkers was approximately 6' x 6' and extended into another 6' x 6' room. The complex had steps out into the entrance and was reportedly located from XB970128 to YB973177 (approximately 3,000 meters in length). The area had been used for storage of ammunition and heavy equipment. On 5 Feb B Co, 24 Bn, 8th Inf conducted a search operation in the vicinity of ZC893989 and located 19 enemy bodies and captured one wounded NVA. Three AK7's, one RPG, one carbine, 57 pounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, and two rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition were also captured. On 4 Feb MSF Co 22 was deployed to Ban Me Thuot to join the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf and MSF Co 27 in cordon and search operations in that location. On 5 Feb, after four days of heavy fighting in Kontum City, the 1st Inf Div elements in Kontum City, Task Force 22, consisting of 1st Bn, 22d Inf, D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav, C Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor plus A and B Companies, 1st Bn, 12th Inf attacked key enemy withdrawal routes and strong points outside the city of Kontum. During the battle within Kontum City, 31 Jan to 4 Feb TF 22 handled the NVA/VC a stinging defeat by killing over 600 enemy while suffering only 2 KIA and 17 WIA in the Task Force. A strong contact was made in the vicinity of AR799797 NE of Kontum on 5 Feb when C Co, 1st Bn, 22d Inf engaged an estimated enemy battalion. Gunships supported friendly elements in the eight hours of action. A and B Troops, 7th Sqdn, 17th Car reinforced the friendly elements in the fight which broke at 2030 hours. Losses are unknown. To reinforce friendly elements in Kontum three CLC companies, one each from Dak To, Dan Seang, and Hap Buh, were deployed to Kontum on 5 Feb. Company A, 1st Bn, 22d Inf followed-up the actions of 5 Feb by making contact on 6 Feb at 1035 hours with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AR804233, the site of contact on 5 Feb. The enemy force was well dug in with strongly fortified positions and heavy contact continued throughout the afternoon hours. The contact broke at approximately 1615 hours with four US killed, 15 wounded, and one MIA. Enemy losses were unknown immediately following the action; however, in subsequent sweep operations 31 enemy bodies were located on the battlefield.

2. Southwest of Ban Me Thuot the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf again made contact with five NVA on 7 Feb at 1220 hours. Company D engaged the enemy force with small arms and automatic weapons killing two NVA and capturing one other along with one AK7, one machinegun, and one BLO rocket launcher. During a subsequent fire fight immediately following an additional three NVA were killed and two small arms weapons captured. Operation SULTAN, employing elements of the DELTA force from the 52nd Platoon from Nha Trang in the vicinity of the Plei Trap Valley in western MACARTHUR, officially terminated on 25 January 1968. Two LIP platoons from Co E, 20th Inf were placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div for employment in the area of the Plei Trap Valley and the Delta Force was officially released from the SULTAN mission. TF 22, employed NE of Kontum on search and destroy operations following the significant actions in the vicinity of Kontum City during the latter part of January, returned to Dak To on 11 Feb and was placed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

3. On 14 Feb, OMEGA elements were provided to IPFORCEN and were employed in the MACARTHUR AO in an area within the operational area of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). The 4th, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf from JULIAN in the MACARTHUR AO displaced to an area
4. After a successful combat assault in the area of ZAC26685, Troop A, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav, made contact with an unknown enemy force on 25 Feb. Cannons, artillery and air strikes were employed against the enemy and results of the six hour contact were 24 NVA killed and six NVA captured. US friendly losses were taken in the contact. On 23 Feb the 1st Bn, 503d ABN Inf moved into the vicinity of ZAC27021. E HQProv, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav located a firing position in the vicinity of ZAC26685 on 21 Feb which was oriented towards Pho ALIGN and which had been fired from within a two day period was found. On 28 Feb, 6th Inf located two 12.7mm rocket firing positions on 32 Feb which were oriented towards Duk To and Kontum.

5. During March, actions in the MACARNO AR increased in the number of both stand-off attacks by fire and smoke attacks by comparatively large size enemy forces at both US positions as well as US and A-10 aircraft installations. Significant contacts between NVA units and US combat elements in the western highlands indicated that the enemy appeared to be conducting large scale probe and test of tactical defense in the MACARNO area. On 1 Mar B Co, 334th Bn, 8th Inf located a large enemy bunker complex consisting of 10 bunkers and an extensive mine area. Each bunker was 15 feet deep with overhead cover; the mine area included one bunker with six stoves, 200 pounds of rice, and six friendly rice bags. Seven NVA bodies were located outside the complex which was believed killed by action in that area on 29 Feb. The complex was located in the vicinity of YB9290. In response to intelligence information pertaining to the suspected movement of elements of the 334th NVA Bn in the Ban Me Thuot area, a task force was formed by the 4th Inf Div with the 1st Bn, 12th Inf as the nucleus and moved to the vicinity of the Nungal Plantation (W466222) on 4 Mar. The TF included B Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor (-) and a LRP platoon for employment in the proposed operational area. Prior to the move of the battalion, however, contact was made by B Co, 1st Bn, 12th Inf with an unknown enemy force in the vicinity of YB92799. The enemy occupied fortified positions and put up strong resistance; air strikes and artillery were employed to defeat the enemy. No friendly losses were 12
Killed, one Sazonov semiautomatic carbine, rocket launcher and one Degtyarev Squad Light machine-gun were captured in the action. On 9 Mar 2nd Bn, 9th Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of ZAO72 (20 km SW of Kontum). The enemy force employed small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets against the friendly force. The contact site after the action had broken resulted in finding 15 enemy killed as a result of the contact. Two Sazonov semi-automatic carbines, five Kalashnikov assault rifles and one Soviet antitank grenade launcher (FNR-2) and some documents were captured. On the same date Co B, 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AP-14976 (19 km SE of the city of Kontum). The results of this action were six US killed and 11 wounded. Enemy losses in this action are unknown. Elements of 3d Bn, 15th ARVN Regt made contact on 4 Mar, in the HAGARTHUR AO (vicinity of AP-894,955, 5 km NW of the city of Ba Me Thuot). The contact with the enemy resulted in four ARVN killed, two ARVN wounded with enemy losses totalling 26 NVA killed, four captured, and one 60mm mortar, four light machine guns and 24 small arms captured.

6. The 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav located an enemy base area on 7 Mar while conducting search operations in the vicinity of ZAL0535 (22 km south of the city of Kontum). The bunker complex contained 30 bunkers and 1,000 pounds of rice; the rice was evacuated. On the same day, elements of Troop E, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of ZAL07535 (19 km south of Kontum City). Results of the contact were: 16 US killed and 18 US wounded. Sixteen NVA were killed and five Kalashnikov assault rifles along with miscellaneous small arms ammunition and individual enemy equipment was captured. The 3d Bn, 8th Inf was placed under the 60cuT of the 173d Abn Bde (Gp) on 7 Mar for operations in a new area of operations. An armament vehicle (a full truck M-48) organize to a fire, 3d Bn, 6th Arty, while moving in convoy to a location in the vicinity of ZLL5318 (19 km SW of Pleiku City) on 9 Mar, caught fire and burned with the ammunition on board exploding during the fire. The vehicle along with 80 rounds of 155mm high explosive ammunition, 63 rounds of 105mm white phosphorous ammunition, and other assorted rounds were destroyed. Four hundred point detonating fuses also were lost. No injuries were sustained by personnel of the company. On the same day a forward air controller, operating in the vicinity of YEN71459 (23 km SW of Duc To), observed an estimated five enemy vehicles. Air strikes were employed; three vehicles were destroyed and one was reportedly damaged. On 10 Mar, elements of the 1st Bn, 22d Inf located two tons of rice in the vicinity of ZAL1719 (7 km south of Kontum City). The rice was evacuated to IACV Headquarters in Kontum. Co C, 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf, while on search operations in the area of ZAL01988 (16km west of Kontum City) located one 60mm mortar and 35 dead NVA who had been killed by air strikes during previous contacts in that area. On the same date, the 4th Inf Div formed a special reconnaissance task force with the 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav and elements of the 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav. The force was deployed on an intensified reconnaissance and surveillance effort in the area immediately east and west of Pleiku City. On 18 March elements of the 2d Bn, 15th ARVN Regt made contact with enemy elements in the vicinity of ZAL219 (9 km NW of Ba Me Thuot). The battalion received approximately 200 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire; the action resulted in 20 friendly killed, 31 wounded, three missing and 23 weapons lost. Two portable radio communications sets (service ton) were also lost in the encounter. Enemy losses in the contact were 15 killed, one PW and three small arms captured.
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7. On 20 Mar, elements of the 1st Bn, 12th Inf made a significant contact with NVA elements in the vicinity of ZV 227187 (6 km NW of Ban Ho Thu). The four hour action resulted in seven US killed and 23 wounded. Eighteen NVA were killed and two were captured. On the following day in sweep operations near the area of contact, 11 additional enemy bodies were found and 10 small arms were located alone with one 60mm mortar. An ammunition cache consisting of twenty-four 120mm mortar rounds; fifty 122mm rocket rockets and twenty-six 122mm rocket rounds were located on 21 Mar in the vicinity of ZA 089016 (6 km NW of Ploi Klong). On 22 Mar LRP #14, operating in the vicinity of YA 926813, became surrounded by enemy forces and attempted to evade to no avail. Extraction was called and a brief fire fight occurred and five NVA killed. The 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf was moved from the MACARTHUR AO to the PATRIOT AO on 27 March. On the same day elements of the 2d Bn, 35th Inf deployed to the II CTZ from the I CTZ for operations in the MACARTHUR AO. At 1545 hours 28 Mar the recon platoon from the 1st Bn, 22d Inf and CSF elements from the Ploi Klong Camp made contact with an unknown size force in the vicinity of ZA 017177. Results of this action were one CSF wounded and one carbine lost. Enemy losses were seven NVA killed; three pistols, one AK-47 and 25 R-90 rocket rounds and eight mines captured. Elements of the CSF based at the Die Lap Camp made contact on 29 Mar with an estimated 100 NVA. The friendly force engaged the NVA column which resulted in one CSF killed, seven wounded. Twenty CSF personnel were killed; five AK-47's and one SNS captured. The action occurred in the vicinity of XV 931765. (28 km SW of Ban Ho Thu). The 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf airlifted from Kontum to Lai Kho on 29 Mar and prepared to assume the responsibility for the WALKER THOR. On 30 Mar the 60th Inf Bde (Sop) assumed the responsibility for the newly named MACPACSF GRP operation. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div took over the area within MACPACSF previously occupied by the 173d Abn Bde (Sop).

8. On 1 Apr the 4th Inf Div was deployed in the MACARTHUR AO as follows: The 1st Bde consisting of the 1st Bn, 8th Inf and the 3d Bn, 12th Inf vicinity of Dak To; the 2d Bde consisting of the 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav; 1st Bn, 69th Armor; and 1st Bn, 22d Inf in Plokiu Province; the 3d Bde consisting of the 2d Bn, 8th Inf; 3d Bn, 8th Inf; 1st Bn, 35th Inf; 2d Bn, 35th Inf and 1st Bn, 12th Inf in Dak To Province north of Ban Ho Thu. On 2 Apr, the 1st Bn, 22d Inf moved to Kontum and joined the 3d Bde and on 3 Apr, the 1st Bn, 8th Inf and 3d Bn, 8th Inf exchanged places with the 1st Bn moving to Ploi Klong joining the 3d Bde and the 3d Bn joining the 1st Bn at Dak To. Also on 3 Apr, the 2d Bn, 8th Inf moved to Ploi Klong joining the 2d Bde. On 3 Apr, the 1st Bn, 11th Inf arrived at Ploi Klong from Binh Dinh Province and joined the 3d Bde while on 9 Apr the 1st Bn, 69th Armor moved to Binh Dinh Province under the operational control of the 173d Abn Inf (Sop). On 22 Apr, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf moved to Ploi Klong and joined the 3d Bde and the 4th Inf Div terminated operations in Dak To Province returning that portion of the MACARTHUR AO below the IV, IV, 1st Inf east-west grid line to II Corps.

9. The fire support base at ZA 936913, approximately 10 km west of Ploi Klong was subjected to stand-off mortar attacks on thirteen different days during April resulting in 2 US KIA, 3 US WIA. On 5 Apr Co A, 1st Bn, 35th Inf made contact with an enemy force occupying defensive positions in bunkers 2 km NE of the fire support base. The contact which began during the early morning hours continued throughout the day with Companies C and D, 1st Bn, 35th Inf reinforcing Co A.
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at approximately 1200 hours. Contact broke at 1800 hours when all three companies withdrew to their fire support base for the night. Results were: Friendly - 7 KIA, 22 WIA; Enemy - 14 KIA. On 15 Apr, approximately 2 km north of the fire support base, Co C, 1st Bn, 35th Inf on a search operation came under a heavy volume of mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy battalion. TAC Air strikes and artillery support were called on both sides. As one platoon from Co E, 1st Bn, 35th Inf joined the action, contact continued until 1930 hours when all elements returned to their fire support base. Results were: Friendly - 5 KIA, 18 WIA; Enemy - unknown. While conducting sweep operations around the fire support base, elements of the 1st and 2d Bn, 35th Inf found 43 WIA bodies, 15 small arms, and 2 crew served weapons believed to be a result of these two contacts. During 25 to 26 Apr, elements of the 1st Bn, 22d Inf encountered almost continuous mortar, 8-40 rocket and recoilless rifle fire from NVA forces in the northern Plei Trap Valley while conducting reconnaissance in force operations vicinity V. Unknown, approximately 19 km west of Polci Klong, TAC Air and artillery, and one from the 7th Sqn, 17th Air Cav supported the contacts. Results of the four day action were: Friendly - 13 KIA, 117 WIA; Enemy - 10 KIA. On 29 Apr, Co B, 1st Bn, 11th Inf operating 10 km west of Polci Klong vicinity V. 35W6Oe, began receiving 8-40 rocket, mortar, and small arms fire during the early morning hours. At first light the enemy fire ceased and the company moved out on a sweep through the area. When the sweep was completed the company had found 16 WIA bodies, 7 small arms and 1 crew served weapon. Friendly losses were 2 KIA, 20 WIA.

10. Results for MACVTHOR for the quarter were: Friendly - 215 KIA, 2,289 WIA; Enemy 1,685 KIA; 69 MIA; 1,176 small arms and 39 crew served weapons recovered. Cumulative results for MACVTHOR were: Friendly - 1,956 KIA, 20,579 WIA; Enemy - 3,743 KIA; 7 KIA, 235 WIA; 117 KIA of 846 small arms and 151 crew served weapons recovered.

(h) Operations within the WALKER TACR

1. Security operations in the WALKER TACR continued during the quarter resulting in 11 WIA contacts being noted while traveling Highway 19. On 6 Feb 60 Cam Ranh Cliffs received approximately 100 rounds of 60 and 82mm enemy mortar rounds resulting in friendly losses of 1 KIA, 21 WIA, and 22 aircraft destroyed. During March the major friendly losses were from small arms and rocket attacks. On 10 April at 0730 hours an enemy patrol was wiped out by 200 rounds of mortar and 54 rocket fire resulting in the deaths of 1 WIA and 1 KIA. On 15 April at 0530 hours a VC patrol was attacked by small arms and 8-40 rockets resulting in 1 WIA and the death of 1 KIA. On 16 April a VC patrol was attacked by small arms and 8-40 rockets resulting in 1 WIA and 1 KIA. Friendly forces killed 17 enemy during the quarter.

2. Results for operations in the WALKER TACR for the quarter were: Friendly: 9 KIA, 100 WIA; Enemy: 66 KIA and 67 MIA and 23 small arms captured. Cumulative results for the WALKER TACR are: Friendly: 15 KIA, 112 WIA; Enemy: 75 KIA and 7 WIA and 27 small arms captured.

(3) Organization and Training Activities:

(a) All units that are assigned, attached or under operational control of this headquarters as of 30 April 1968 are listed in Incl 3.
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(b) The command relationship of major US, AVN and FWD units within II CTZ is at incl 4.

(c) The following units were assigned, attached or became OPCON to IFFO.CEVE during the period:

1. 13th Military History Det, assigned by USAIV GO 496, 2 Feb 68.
2. 5th Public Information Det, 11th Public Information Det and 167th Signal Co (Radio Relay), assigned by USAIV GO 600, 12 Feb 68.
3. 3rd Bn, 4th Inf Div, OPCON by MACV msg (3) XXXCOC 12 CSM-02, 171632Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U). The Brigade returned to 4th Inf Div control on 30 Mar.
4. 6th Bn (155mm) (1) 84th Arty, assigned by USAIV GO 1126, 15 Mar 68.

(d) The following units were reassigned from IFFO.CEVE during the period:

1. 3d Bn (Rtn) (3P) 18th Arty, assigned to 1st Cav Div by USAIV GO 490, 12 Feb 68.
2. 18th Chemical Plt, 26th Chemical Det and 191st Military Intelligence Det, assigned to 1st Cav Div (AHQ) by USAIV GO 1126, 13 Feb 68.

(e) Manpower Authorizations: Infantry battalions of airborne/air-mobile units and artillery 105mm howitzer units were reorganized under standardized MTOE effective 24 Feb and 1 Apr 68 respectively. These MTOE were recommended during USAIV Phase I Standardization Conference in Aug 67 and submitted to DA.

(f) Research and Development (R&D) activities: Requests for information on various R&D items from USAIV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. No R&D requests were received from OPCON units.

(g) Training

1. Commencing 1 January 1968, the frequency of training inspections for all assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, was changed from quarterly to semi-annually. Nine units were inspected during the quarter. All were rated satisfactory.

2. Functional training requirements for overseas commands have in the past been programmed based upon normal personnel requirements. During this quarter units were required to identify their specific school requirements for all of FY 69. The list was submitted to USAIV on 16 Mar 68, well in advance of the greatest majority of FY 69 personnel requirements. The consolidated listings are designed to enable CONUS service schools to better develop schedules of classes in consonance with the needs of the commands for trained replacement personnel. Individual units will follow-up their previously submitted requirements with specific course identification on personnel requirements. If in-country diversions are held to a minimum, this system should provide the units with a higher percentage of school trained replacements.
During the period 22-25 Apr 68 a five man CONUS Liaison Team
visited Headquarters IFFO.CEV and CONUS units. The purpose of the visit
was to determine, through conferences and interviews, the adequacy of
service school training in preparing personnel for assignment to SVN,
HQ, CONUS, USAAC, USAAC, USAAC, and USAAC were represented on the team.
Observations made during the visit should contribute positively to the
conduct of individual and unit replacement training in CONUS.

(a) Chemical

1. Herbicide operations during this reporting period have been
limited to defoliation missions due to the emphasis placed on increasing
observation in critical areas and road-opening operations.

2. Riot control agents (RCA) continues in short supply. As personnel
become more familiar with RCA munitions, more effective means
of employment are being utilized.

3. There is an increase in the use of personnel detectors as a
positive means of detecting enemy locations.

(b) Herbicide Operations:

1. The results of US Air Force, C-123 herbicide missions are as
follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NO. OF SORTIES</th>
<th>HECTARES DEPOLITATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banh Din</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakoc</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lai Chau</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The results of US Army, UH-1 and CH-47 herbicide missions are
as follows:

(a) HQ, IFFO.CEV: The Chemical Division flew eight, UH-1 and two
CH-47 helicopter sorties to defoliate areas along Highway 21 in Khanh
Hoa Province.

(b) The 4th Inf Div flew eleven CH-47 helicopter sorties to improve
observation in areas southwest of Dak to. One UH-1 helicopter sortie
was flown to defoliate the II Corps Headquarters perimeter. One
ground based spray mission was completed, using the Power Driven Decon-
staining Apparatus (PDA) to defoliate along Highway 19 west of the
Nang Yang Pass.
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3. The 173d Abn Bde flow two UH-1 helicopter sorties to destroy rice sacking beds in Phu Yen Province and seven UH-1 sorties to defoliate the Camp Radcliff perimeter.

d. II Corps flew thirty two UH-1 helicopter sorties in support of defoliation operations requested by ROK Forces.

e. ROKFV flew seven CH-47 defoliation spray missions against the Cu Mong Pass in Khanh Dinh Province.

(f) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations (Friendly):

1. The 4th Inf Div reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. Twenty three E-158 CS canister clusters were employed as LZ preparations. On one occasion, this method followed immediately by Mark 82 bombs and napalm resulted in three NVA forward observers KIA on the LZ. Four E-158 were employed against a suspected enemy location and followed by artillery and ground assault with negative results.

b. Bulk CS (20,200 lbs) was employed to contaminate the NVA road network in Kontum at two choke points; against an enemy rocket site from which ground fire had been received; to contaminate suspected enemy locations and to restrict the use of terrain and fording sites along the Dak Ayunh River.

c. Four E-8 tactical CS launchers were employed against a suspected ambush site with negative results. One E-8 was employed by A Co, 1st BN, 69th Armor prior to a ground assault by friendly infantry against a well fortified enemy position causing the enemy to leave the position and disperse. The E-8 is utilized primarily as a defensive weapon and is placed around perimeters and can be mounted on convoy vehicles.

d. CS projectiles for the h.2" mortar were evaluated by the 5th Inf Div. The concept of employment was to initially cover the entire target area with agent CS, then to allow time for the agent to take effect, prepare the target with maximum conventional fire available and conduct a ground combat assault. On one occasion, an enemy fortified position has resisted for four days, but was finally overrun in one day by ground force rapidly exploiting preparatory fires consisting of a mixture of CS, WP and HE munitions. There were no friendly casualties during the attack.

2. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. Four E158 CS canister clusters were employed against a cave complex and followed by artillery with unknown results.

b. Bulk CS (1110 lbs) was employed to contaminate a portion of a suspected base area, to restrict the use of bunkers and to contaminate tunnels prior to destruction.

c. Five E-8 tactical CS launchers were employed by D Co, 4th BN, 503d Abn Inf in a combat assault against a well emplaced enemy at Tay Hau during the Tet Offensive. A dense cloud of CS covered the target area for approximately 30 seconds during which time the friendly troops were able to advance to the outer edge of the objective with little

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enemy resistance. Approximately 30 enemy ran from the village into
an open field and were taken under fire by supporting gunships. No
alone were 30 enemy KIA.

2. The 3d Bn, 501st Abn Inf, 109th Abn Div employed 1600 lbs of
bail CS to restrict the use of terrain within a known enemy base area.
The results of the employment are unknown.

(d) Mort Control Agent (MCA) Operations (enemy): On 23 March
1968, via G. 021761 to G. 620770 an estimated NVA battalion size force
employed chemical agent "followed by CS" against 6 Co, 1st Bn 501st
Inf. On 20 March 1968, 23 kilometers northwest of Kontum City, an
enemy force, probably an element of the 24th NVA regiment, attacked an
of manned by an N. F. Company. A mortar attack was followed by a ground
assault. Among the 81m mortar rounds were some which contained "Per-
sistent riot control gas." Contact terminated after two hours with no friendly-casualties. Heavy losses were unknown. A document captured on 9 March 1968, 25 kilometers southwest of Kontum City, re-
vealed that chemical munitions had been issued to elements of the 24th
NVA regiment.

(e) Personnel Detectors:

2. The 4th Inf Div, operating in the RIO CHINH AO, flew 63 MCA
missions. On one occasion a NIE FO/SE Company was inserted based on
the heavy readings and made contact with an estimated enemy bn. All
other readings were given to the G-2 for evaluation.

2. The 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div, while operating in the PA NAM AO
flew two MCA missions. On 17 March 1968 an artillery FO in an OI-E
aircraft accompanied the mission and adjusted fire on the location of
the reported readings. Results were four secondary explosions.

3. The 173d Abn Bde, operating KOLLING, WALKER, COKHESE and
MAC-AITHAO AO during this reporting period, flew 56 MCA and 77 MIB missions. In
most instances, the results of the mission were used to plan R & L
fires. On three occasions, Combat Skypots were flown in response to
heavy readings. On two occasions the sensor aircraft received heavy
ground fire which was suppressed by the accompanying gunships. On 27
April 1968 the sensor aircraft was downed by unknown causes, resulting
in the 1st FO injured (non-seriously). The UH-1 was a total loss but
the ADF was extracted and operational after minor repairs.

4. The 3d Bn, 50th Abn Inf, 109th Abn Div flew seven MIB and six
MCA missions after receiving the detectors and trained operators in
April. In all instances, gunships and R & L fires were employed against
the locations of the heavy readings. Two ADF and two MIB missions
were flown in support of MACV Advisory Team 38 (Ke Dong Province)
at the request of the 5-2 Advisor.

5. Subsequent to the Tet Offensive in Hai Trang, the 5-2, 5th
SPM requested MCA support to assist in locating the enemy withdraw-
ing from the city. Two IFF/CEOY MIB were located to the 5th SPM and
an operator was obtained on T/D from the 4th Inf Div. Between 3 and
20 February 68, five significant heavy readings were reported, one of
which was of long duration. Sixty six 105mm artillery rounds were
expended and two gunships stared that area. No assessment was made
due to the heavy enemy.

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(f) Summary:

1. Herbicide Operations:

   a. There were 186 C-123 defoliation sorties flown resulting in an estimated 21,288 hectares of forested area defoliated.

   b. Units UPOCN to IFFOLCEV are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters to spray small areas not conducive to attack by C-123 aircraft.

2. Riot Control Agent Operations:

   a. Munitions containing CS are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations.

3. Personnel Detectors: The 472 and 972 operating within the II CTZ are a continuing source of reliable information concerning enemy locations.

(f) Psychological Operations:

   a. GVN, US and NVA forces conducted active PSYOP aimed at both friendly and enemy target audiences in II CTZ from 1 Feb to 30 Apr 68. In II CTZ operations 520 million leaflets were disseminated of which 11 million were printed locally by the 6th PSYOP In. In addition 1,524 hours of aerial loudspeaker time were directed against targets in the enemy areas.

   b. Early in February, as the failure of the enemy Tet attacks became clear, the 6th PSYOP Rd was directed by 15 IFFOLCEV to commence a special saturation PSYOP campaign to exploit new vulnerabilities. Leaflets stressed the enemy's desecration of Tet, the failure of popular support for a 'general uprising' and unfulfilled promises of enemy leadership. This effort was coordinated by a PSYOP Tactical Operation Center which was established at COMUS IFFOLCEV to channel media requests to the PSYOP In and expedite dissemination after printing. The Tet response also featured extensive use of UH-1D helicopters rigged with 1,000 watt loudspeakers by Minh Tranh and Phu Yen Provinces.

   c. Radio Hoc Mon continued to broadcast according to the Yellowbird plan on 1820 ke until it was severely damaged by a well planned enemy attack on 24 March. This station had also commenced broadcasting in Feb to the population in the Highlands on 1540 ke. Feedback on the distribution of the single frequency "mini-radio" indicates that many of them have been picked up by the potential target audience. Since the attack, a 40W Radio Set AN/GRC-260 from the 5th Sig Bn has been used to keep the broadcasts on the air pending the arrival of a replacement Radio Transmitting Set AN/TRA-22.

   d. Support:

      a. The major PSYOP support agencies in II CTZ were the 6th PSYOP In, the 9th Air Commando Bdn (ACE), the 2d Coastal Zone "Junk and Swift boat" fleet, the 472 KFV Co/571 Co, the 6th AD/PSYOP In and the 114th WAP Liaison Bdn.

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2. For examples of leaflets printed by the 8th PSYOP Bn during the period see:
   a. Incl 5 - A Ho Chanh's personal appeal.
   b. Incl 6 - A fire power leaflet.
   c. Incl 7 - A public health poster.

3. The 8th PSYOP Bn supported a number of requests for printing periodic newshots and newsletters. These requests range from a small tabloid of straight international and national news for drop on suspected enemy positions to newshots devoted to IN/FF and Chieu Hoi activities. At the same time requests for propaganda leaflets have declined. These developments stem from a number of factors: awareness of a news vacuum in the countryside; increased emphasis of face-to-face contact rather than the mass dissemination of impersonal media; the degree to which many suspected enemy areas have already been completely saturated by leafleting and the effectiveness of the newshots in building confidence in crucial OVN programs. This emphasis appeared to be the most effective propaganda approach during this period.

4. Multi-national coordination of PSYOP has been improved with the information of a working committee consisting of PSYOP and Chieu Hoi representatives of II Corps, LOKFV-FC and IPPOcGEV. This has led to better operations at the II Corps Propaganda Support Center manned by representatives of II Corps HQ and the 8th PSYOP Bn.

6. G3 Air Operations

(a) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 35 to 102 with a mean of 68.9 per day for the period 1 February through 30 April 1968. The most frequent missions were:

1. Direct support of friendly forces in contact.

2. Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.

3. Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.

4. Landing zone construction.

(b) During the period, approximately 7.3% of the missions flown for IPPOcGEV were combat Skyshots and 1.7% of sorties flown were in support of major operations during the reporting period as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>SORTIES PER DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACARTHUR</td>
<td>3072</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: 126 KBK (confirmed), 115 KBA (estimated), 145 secondary explosions, 38 secondary fires, 38 military structures destroyed, 17 military structures damaged, 93 bunkers destroyed, 114 bunkers damaged, 17 anti-aircraft positions destroyed, 5 anti-aircraft positions damaged, 6 automatic weapons destroyed, 15 foxholes destroyed, 3 caves destroyed, 2 tunnels destroyed.
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destroy ., 6

grass fires, 4 pack aninals Kba.

CAP ROK

722 7.9

26 Kba. (confirmed), 12 secondary explo-

sions, 60 secondary fires, 311

cnunilary structures destroyed, 317

military structures damaged, 71 bun-

kers destroyed, 42 bunkers damaged,

42 pack aninals Kba, 1 cve destroy-

ed, l bridge destroyd, 1 bridge

dam.

go., 4 anitals damaged, 3 sampons

destroyed, 6 grass fires, 150 meters

of trench uncovered.

MCLAIN

540 5.9

3 Kba. (confirmed), 11 Kba. (estimated),

19 secondary explosions, 39 secondary

fires, 201 military structures de-

stroyed, 188 military structures da-

maged, 37 bunkers destroyed, 4 bun-

kers damaged,

COCHISE

250 2.7

3 Kba. (confirmed), 2 secondary explo-

sions, 8 secondary explosions, 11

cnunilary structures destroyed, 3 mil-

itary structures damaged, 28 bunkers

destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 1 tun-

nel destroyed.

Walker

11/ 1.3

2 secondary explosions, 5 military

structures destroyed, 45 bunkers de-

stroyed, 2 bunkers damaged.

ROLLING

192 2.1

3 Kba. (confirmed), 29 Kba. (estimated),

13 secondary explosions, 15 secondary

fires, 23 military structures destroy-

ed, 3 military structures damaged,

23 bunkers destroyed.

DANIEL BOONE

12 .1

27 Kba. (estimated), 12 military

structures destroyed, 4 military

structures damaged, 1 secondary ex-

plosion.
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G-106 4.7 1 secondary explosion, 109 military structures destroyed, 91 military structures damaged, 12 bunkers destroyed, 1 bunker complex damaged, 32 secondary fires, 2 caves destroyed, 4 trenches destroyed, 1 rail complex destroyed, 2 sewers destroyed, 1 sampan damaged.

(d) B-52 Support: There were 672 B-52 Sorties flown during the quarter, compared to 651 Sorties last quarter, in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>SMTHS</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0210632Z Feb</td>
<td>N.2</td>
<td>22-1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97th MX</td>
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<td>0420632Z Feb</td>
<td>N.2</td>
<td>21-1</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>222</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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AVFA-60-OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II FORCEN for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RDS OPMR-65 (SL)

May 1968

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**SUBJECT:** Operational report of Headquarters, IFORIC Wavy for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968 CCS CFPIC-66 (UK)

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<td>101932Z Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>111237Z Apr</td>
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<td>F=03</td>
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<td>F=35</td>
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<td>120424Z Apr</td>
<td>HA 4-11</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Hrs</th>
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<td>F-20</td>
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<td>F-34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F-65</td>
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<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>21/02/63 Apr</td>
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<td></td>
<td>G-53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/03/63 Apr</td>
<td>4-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>L-53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/03/63 Apr</td>
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<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/05/62 Apr</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F-17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/06/62 Apr</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F-17</td>
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<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-15</td>
<td></td>
<td>F-17</td>
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<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/11/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-54</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>28/11/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-55</td>
<td></td>
<td>H-15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-56</td>
<td></td>
<td>H-30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>29/10/62 Apr</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F-65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>29/11/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-51</td>
<td></td>
<td>H-07</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/12/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-52</td>
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<td>H-09</td>
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<td>MAGATHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>30/12/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-55</td>
<td></td>
<td>H-44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/12/62 Apr</td>
<td>4-59</td>
<td></td>
<td>H-11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAGATHUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/12/62 Apr</td>
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<td>H-18</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>
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AVFA-OG-CT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, FFQGCELV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968: LGR 3FQO-25 (1.2)

(7) Army Aviation Operations.

(a) The major objectives in employing the tactical aviation assets available to FFQGCELV are:

1. Provide airability to combat elements of Free World Forces in II CTZ.

2. Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance program.

(b) Resources available from 17th Gm and Gps:

1. Assault Helicopter Assets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>KB</th>
<th>CAB SUPPORT/MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td>521Cab</td>
<td>GS Highland, Prairie Fire &amp; Omega, 4th Inf Div &amp; II VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th AHC</td>
<td>521GAD</td>
<td>GS Coastal, 3/5(4th, 5th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th AHC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>Special Forces, 173rd ABn Bde (Sup)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th AHC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal, WHID, OR ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal, WHID, OR ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135th AHC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal, WHID, OR ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th AHC(-)</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal, WHID, OR ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Assault Support Helicopter Assets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>KB</th>
<th>CAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129th AHSC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>DS 4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d AHSC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th AHSC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th AHSC</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS Coastal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Heavy Helicopter Assets (Crane):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>KB</th>
<th>CAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355th AHSC(-)</td>
<td>521CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The 133d, 135th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the V. Program, and provide GS support throughout II CTZ.

5. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.

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15 May 1967

(c) Major accomplishments:

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCALS</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde (Sep)</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCKS</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde (Sep)</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMNAM</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XELLIN</td>
<td>3/306th Abn Inf Bn</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMLOCK</td>
<td>3d Bde 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALKER</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde (Sep)</td>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The daily ROMO support was provided by the 46th and 129th A/B's and the 12th and 160th A/B's. Additional support was provided, on a mission basis, for the following major 100 operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAR JOE JU #2</td>
<td>GILD</td>
<td>3 Feb - 16 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XOG H #15</td>
<td>GILD</td>
<td>17 Feb - 27 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOK 300 JUN KU #2</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>17 Feb - 27 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOK KAN TOOK</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>5 Mar - 7 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU KU #3</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>14 Mar - 27 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAK GI #15</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>23 Mar - 3 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOK KU KUN LE #6</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>6 Apr - 7 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOK KU KUN LE #7</td>
<td>WHILD</td>
<td>16 Apr - 30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XOG H #11</td>
<td>GILD</td>
<td>20 Apr - 27 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a recurring basis:

- IFFG.CEVE arty
- Corps Corp (Quz Dinh & Pleiku)
- HQ 5th SFGA
- CO B 5th SFGA
- 16th Engr Bde

3. Airmobile assets were provided to the following special operations directed by IFFG.CEVE:

- BBLD
- CHUD
- PHALPHLE
- PHUCO
- USL II COPs

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5. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support, mission basis status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>1st Delat</td>
<td>2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>Tuyen Duc Province</td>
<td>6 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb</td>
<td>B/5th SPG (Ben Het)</td>
<td>10 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Feb</td>
<td>CID</td>
<td>1 slick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>71st arty</td>
<td>6 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb</td>
<td>CID</td>
<td>5 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>5th SPG</td>
<td>3 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb</td>
<td>5th SPG</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mar</td>
<td>4th Bn 543d Air Inf</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar</td>
<td>B/5th SPG</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar</td>
<td>1st Corps</td>
<td>5 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>26th MEP</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>1st Corps</td>
<td>1 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>1 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>10 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>LDC - Win Trans</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Airmobile assets were provided the following units on a tactical emergency basis (T.E.E.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>1st Delat</td>
<td>2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>Tuyen Duc Province</td>
<td>6 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb</td>
<td>B/5th SPG (Ben Het)</td>
<td>10 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Feb</td>
<td>CID</td>
<td>1 slick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>71st arty</td>
<td>6 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb</td>
<td>CID</td>
<td>5 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>5th SPG</td>
<td>3 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb</td>
<td>5th SPG</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mar</td>
<td>4th Bn 543d Air Inf</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar</td>
<td>B/5th SPG</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar</td>
<td>1st Corps</td>
<td>5 slicks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>26th MEP</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>1st Corps</td>
<td>1 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>1 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>10 crane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>WOBID</td>
<td>2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>LDC - Win Trans</td>
<td>5 slicks 2 guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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15 May 1963


On 26 Feb, the 295th Heavy Helicopter Company (-) became operational. It is attached to the 521 Cam, 5th Air, and provide crane support throughout II CTZ on a mission basis.

On 9 Apr, an idea to use UH-1 aircraft for "people carrier" (Hartner Duster) missions was evaluated. This idea took steps, in conjunction with IFF/FOGEX ARTY, to determine the feasibility. This method is discussed in Section II. It would greatly relieve requirements for helicopters to perform this mission.

Due to the Tet Offensive, 29 Jan - 6 Feb (-), a heavy fire-support mission was placed on gunships. This, combined with enemy attacks on airfields, caused a serious slump in gunship availability. This problem was accentuated by the fact that 17th CA has a requirement for 13 gunships over and above those normally available. The 17th CA was, on average, 13 gunships under strength during this period.

On 3 Feb (-), the normal commitment for an AHC was reduced to 12 mission ready aircraft and 3 mission ready guns daily. This adjustment was in line with the policy of an AHC maintaining 60% of its assigned aircraft mission ready.

A program to reduce helicopter flying time by 30% was initiated in April (-) because of the critical shortage of TF-13 turbo engines (UH-1H helicopter).

Logistical activities:

1. The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to Operations NOAH, BULLING, NAIR, NELMA and NOAH (subsequently renamed HONSBE).

2. The major logistical problem which developed during the period resulted from the Tet Offensive. This enemy offensive generated severe logistical problems in the SVN forces and was particularly devastating to the civilian populace. To alleviate these hardships Operation NOAHBEF, designed to put the country back on its feet, was initiated. In cooperation with CMAF, 7,901.6 short tons of supplies were provided. The supplies were distributed by class as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class II &amp; IV</th>
<th>Class V</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>222.7</td>
<td>4556.9</td>
<td>201.6</td>
<td>7011.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. On 25 February 1963, the SVN ammunition storage area at Than Thiet was destroyed by enemy action. 30 short tons of ammunition were lost. Intensified resupply of Class V with US aid prevented curtailment of combat operations.

4. USAF, AIC, continued to monitor the material and supply posture of units assigned, attached and under operational control (UOOC) to this headquarters. The stock status of scheduled resupply of the following was monitored daily:

(a) P3 English, in support of Operation NOAHBEF (subsequently renamed NOAHBEF).
(b) P3 Dak To, in support of Operation NOAHBEF.
(c) P3 Han Thiet, in support of Operation NOAHBEF.

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AVN-OG-7 15 may 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, IFF/AGY for Quarterly
Period 23 April to 22 May 1968

5. During the reporting period the 64 staff identified problems
and initiated remedial action intended to improve the logistical
support systems of Army of Vietnam (AVN), Regional Force/Popular
Force (RF/PF) and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces within II Corps Tactical
Zone. Examples of these actions include:

(a) Continued assistance to IRO Forces, Vietnam in their efforts
to obtain real estate in the Nha Trang area for base development. Construction
requested has been approved by USAVN and forwarded to IROV
for funding.

(b) Visits to provinces to discuss and assist in resolution of
administrative and logistical problems. Such as D & NSL GO within the II
Corps Tactical Zone was visited by representatives of II Corps, DSA,
II Corps, AO, and G4, IFF/AGY. These composite team visits have
provided a better understanding of problem areas and will allow more rapid
solution of problems.

(c) Close monitoring of RF/PF and AVN logistical posture and infusion
of US logistical assets where appropriate and critically needed.

(d) Monitor camp conversion from Civilian Irregular Defense Group
(CIDG) to RF units.

(e) Restore availability of combat materiel within II Corps Tactical
Zone to a more responsive level.

(f) Supply/There are no existing shortages of supplies and equipment
which significantly impair the operational capability of this command. However, shortages of water trailers, water pumps, medical supplies
(C101-Splitle), NF/3 tents, AVN-Air-25 radio, LFA evacuation equipment
and aircraft cargo slings cause concern and should be alleviated as soon as possible.

(g) Emphasis placed on turn-in of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment
resulted in the reporting of 74 items for supply action on 217
separate items ranging from field dock sets to 24 ton trucks.

(b) Due to heavy drawdowns of ammunition during the Tet Offensive
and continued heavy combat, several items were placed under available
Supply Stock (ASS) control during the reporting period. Of the items
under ASS, 24 were critical, 37 were II Corps minus 125 which require stringent monitoring. The ASS for this item dropped from 29,000 rds/whp/day to 21,000 rds/whp/day on
24 March, and a further reduction to 20,000 rds/whp/day was required,
effective 24 Apr 68. Presently there are 26 items under ASS control.
Two of the items, 60mm LAW and 60mm HE, are not authorized for
IFF/AGY units based on a recent determination by DOD that 60mm projectiles are no longer authorized within US Army units (exception to this
for Special Forces Group). The following items are under ASS control:

1. 1465 7.62mm: Ball, Linked, 5/3000 rounds
2. 2500 120mm HE, 5/600 rounds
3. 152mm LAW
4. 256 12.7mm: HE, 9/250 rounds
5. 6445 105mm HE

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4. C449 1.5in Illum
7. C454 15.1 in. Wi
8. C760 4.2 in. Illum
9. D372 175mm HE
10. D675 90mm FSPelling, Charge, G.
12. G469 Grenade, Hand, frag, H26
13. G918 Grenade, Hand, Offensive
14. G943 Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow
15. G955 Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Violet
16. H40 2.75" rocket, HE
17. H955 rocket, 60mm HE, AT (LW)
18. K143 Mine, AP, H38 (Claymore)
19. K104 Coll. Agent, CS-1 (pulk)
20. L307 Signal, Hand Held, White Star Cluster
21. L312 Signal, Hand Held, White Star Parachute
22. L607 Flare, Aircraft, Parachute, MX24
23. M023 Charge, Destruct, 0-4
24. N311 Fuze, ID, D572 (For 175mm HE)

(c) Close monitoring of equipment for MATS personnel is being
accomplished as these teams are being phased into the II Corps Tactical
Zone.

(7) Services: Nothing significant to report.

(8) Transportation

(a) Highway QL-21 was opened during February and March 1966,
for the resupply of Tan Ma Thoat by US Convoys from Cam Ranh Bay and
and La VN Convoys from Ninh Trang. A total of 8,539 short tons of mixed
classes of supplies were moved during these periods. Highway QL-1
from L2 English to Duc Hoa was upgraded from Siler to Green on 5 Apr
66. Highway QL-11 from Phan Rang to Da Lat was upgraded from Suler to
Green on 14 Apr 66. Both of these roads remain open and in a green
condition.

(b) The tempo of daily aircraft operations throughout II Corps
Tactical Zone has decreased from the record high of the previous quar-
ter. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period
ending 30 April 1966 compared with daily averages of the previous quar-
ter are as follows:

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(c) Increased use of I-1 south from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet occurred during the latter part of the quarter. Three convoys carrying 1977 short tons of supply were moved over this road in order to reduce dependence on the sea LOC. Increased use of this road is anticipated for the next quarter.

(c) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

(1) General

(a) The beginning of the reporting period, 1 Feb 1968, was the second day of widespread VC/NVA attacks against population centers throughout the II CTZ. Initial attacks were fought off by commanding officers and GVN forces, which in many instances included GVN pacification assets such as the National Police, the RF/PV, and 2D Cadre Groups. When the population failed to rally to the VC cause, and defense blunted the enemy's attacks, inflicting substantial casualties, subsequent enemy operations against the population centers seemed to founder and be considerably less effective.

(b) Heaviest attacks were launched initially at the highvalue population centers of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot. Attacks continued through mid-February against other cities such as Dalat and Phan Thiet. Concern for the safety of the cities resulted initially in a partial withdrawal of major pacification assets from the countryside to the population centers. The RDC Cadre Groups, TDN Teams, and Territorial Forces generally fared well and were for the most part untouched. Exceptions were noted in the provinces of Ninh Thuan and Binh Dinh. By mid-March most of these elements were back in their assigned hamlets.

(c) GVN Revolutionary Development and Pacification programs were initially thought to be set back one to two months in some provinces, and perhaps as much as six months in certain districts. The efforts of the GVN and the US/FV advisory and assistance agencies were largely preoccupied during the period mid-February through mid-March, with re-establishing security in the countryside and recovery in the cities. Though more recent assessments of the actual status of these GVN programs indicate that earlier estimates of set-back may have been overly pessimistic, emphasis of the US advisory and assistance activities has remained with the objectives of completing recovery operations, raising the countryside and re-establishing GVN authority there, stepping up the attack on the VC, and revitalizing the revolutionary and nation building effort. At the end of the reporting period, the GVN pacification activities and the economy in the II CTZ have for the most part achieved a pre-list level. Complete recovery and resumption of all phases of pacification can be expected in the next quarter.

(2) Planning, Programming and Reporting

(a) Initial CORDS planning action during the reporting period was the development of the II CTZ Action Program for CY 68, which implemented the Pacification Guidelines for 1968 issued by MACVDS in January. This document provided guidance and goals to be achieved by the advisory and assistance effort in support of the GVN revolutionary development and pacification programs in the II CTZ for the next quarter.
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1968. Planning and programming an execution of the II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan, developed in the previous reporting period, enjoyed only moderate emphasis as a result of the VC/NVA Tet attacks and the subsequent preoccupation with recovery. After Tet, emphasis was directed at programs and actions designed to assist II Corps in re-establishment of control over the countryside, and minimizing disruptions to the RVN and pacification process. Specific attention was given to GVN Project recovery, Show the Flag Operations and revision of the 1968 RD Program.

(b) The II CTZ Recovery Plan was designed to establish priorities for physical reconstruction of public buildings, private structures and public utilities either destroyed or damaged during VC/NVA Tet attacks, and to indicate what types of material, manpower and advisory resources were to be required from COORD, US military and/or other FWF to assist in reconstruction. The actual reconstruction was primarily a GVN directed and funded effort. The COORD, USAID, US military and FWF assistance was limited to providing commodity support required in the reconstruction process, primarily cement, tin roofing and rubber and providing the loan/use of heavy equipment, transportation and advisory personnel when these resources were requested by II CTZ province chiefs.

(c) The coordination of US and FWF assistance to II Corps and other GVN agencies during the period of emergency was effected through the COORD Operation Center (OCO), established at RC IFFOEIV on 1 February. This agency was formed within the assets available to the ACOs, COORD, Plans, Programs and Evaluation Division, and operated on a 24-hour basis. The primary function of the OCC was to provide one point of contact to handle emergency requests for logistical, medical and similar support required for recovery operations in the field (II CTZ province). An additional function of the OCC was to receive routine and spot reports on recovery and pacification status throughout the II CTZ. A situation board was maintained to reflect current data relative to civilians killed and wounded, homes destroyed, etc. Operations of the OCC were terminated 1 March.

(d) In regard to "Show the Flag" Operations, the US-FWF advisory and assistance efforts were designed to encourage GVN governmental agencies and armed forces to implement programs at the province and district levels to recover affected areas, gain the confidence of the populace, regain the initiative, re-establish security and resume revolutionary development and pacification programs outlined in the Combined Campaign Plan. GVN operations conducted in support of this effort ran the gamut of security operations by the ARVN, NPPF and RVN, destruction of the VC, conduct of psychological operations, revitalization of RD Corps operations and the re-establishment of government administrative organizations. The execution phase of this plan to regain the initiative began 1 April and is expected to run through 31 May.

(e) In April, the advisory staff at the provinces and at DEPOS/IFFOEIV (at the request of MACV, DEPOS/DEP) prepared a detailed province-by province review and evaluation of changes being proposed in the II Corps provincial RD plans for 1968. The coordination of the recommendations submitted in this report are the subject of presently continuing actions with the respective province chiefs and advisory staffs concerned.

(f) Urban area defense has become a matter of prime concern as the result of lessons learned during the Tet VC/NVA attacks and population centers. Joint reviews with appropriate GVN counterparts are being conducted which will emphasize the role of the National
FILED IN URBAN SECURITY AND ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT IT IS REQUIRED. COMUSMACV HAS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT EFFORTS IN THIS AREA BE CONTINGENCY ORIENTED.

(g) The MACORS's reporting system continued to operate throughout the quarter, provide the necessary data needed for the evaluation and management of CORAS advisory and assistance activities. However, extensive effort was expended at all advisory levels, district, through province and CORAS/IFFORCEV, to provide MACORS'S Saigon, with additional detailed assessments on the status of pacification and recovery in the II CTZ. These additional requirements included submissions of weekly situation reports and numerous one-time assessments on various aspects of pacification or recovery.

(3) RF/PF Organization: On 29 March 1968, the RF/PF advisory division displaced from Pleiku, where it was a section of the II Corps advisory staff, to join CORAS/IFFORCEV in Nha Trang. This move, as was expected, has resulted in the division being more responsive to the requirements of the Senior Advisor, II CTZ, and being able to coordinate more closely with the other CORAS divisions. However, the advisory function of the division has been impaired by the separation from VN counterparts on advisory staff sections at II Corps headquarters in Pleiku. RF/PF administrative, personnel and logistical matters which were previously handled by the GI and G4 advisors of I/4, II Corps, in coordination with the RF/PF section. An expansion of the division is being considered to provide locally the required advisory services. In conjunction with this expansion, it is also planned to station an RF/PF liaison officer at the II Corps headquarters in Pleiku, who will act in an advisory capacity as an alter ego of the Senior RF/PF Advisor located at Nha Trang.

(4) Refugees:

(a) For the first time in the history of the program, the refugee advisory team in II CTZ had to deal with large numbers of urban refugees. The need to cope with persons made homeless as a result of the Tet attacks created many new situations.

(b) The immediate problem was to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the victims. Obviously since such a situation has not been faced before, normal channels of supply and transportation were soon stretched to the limit. Under these circumstances it became necessary to call on the military for transport as well as supplies such as tentage, mosquito nets, 55 gallon drums, blankets, lumber, canned foods, etc. The experience gained in dealing with countless military units has proven invaluable for continuing refugee operations.

(c) The most valuable lesson learned was that the provinces must be prepared to deal on a contingency basis with large numbers of dispossessed people. Today the provinces have accumulated stocks of BL 480 footstuffs, tarpaulins, clothing and blankets, to better cope with any future influx of refugees.

(d) Subsequent processing of these refugees also provided a valuable lesson. After the immediate needs of the refugees had been met, it became necessary to extend to them aid needed to re-establish themselves. It quickly became evident that one of the main problems was to ensure timely distribution of funds to the provinces for relief payments. In many cases the recovery program was hampered by absence of funds and rarely were additional funds available on a timely basis.
(15) Liaison. During the period of this report a detailed evaluation of liaison officer employment was conducted. The nature of the missions of IFFORCEV Artillery units requires liaison be established with a large number of varied types of agencies to include US, ARVN and ROK maneuver and artillery forces; SF/CIDG camps; sector and subsector headquarters; and installation defense commands. Although only 17 liaison officers are TOE authorized within IFFORCEV Artillery it was necessary to establish liaison with 34 agencies in order to insure effective fire support. Duties of these liaison officers range from clearance of artillery fires to fire support coordination.

(16) Training for Newly Assigned Lieutenants. Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses conducted respectively by 41st Arty Gp at An Khe and 52d Arty Gp at Pleiku have been in operation since January 1968. Both courses have undergone several modifications during this ORLL period in efforts to improve the quality of instruction presented and to better accomplish the mission of orienting newly arrived lieutenants in II CTZ to insure safe transition into combat operations. During this reporting period there was 1.25 Forward Observer School graduates and 89 graduates from the Fire Direction Officer Training course.

(17) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) In order to assist units in II CTZ that do not possess an extensive targeting capability, FSCE increased targeting efforts beginning in February. Over one thousand targets were developed during the month including 301 Hangfire targets. Special analyses were completed for the Vinh Than Valley area, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 18th NVA Regt, the Pleiku area, 3d NVA Div and 95th NVA Regt. A greater use of CICV targeting information was begun and the first results of this effort were passed to units in the field during February.

(b) In February the FSCE assumed responsibility for targeting ARC Light strikes which had been handled previously by the IFFORCEV G2. All records, administration and follow up responsibility was also transferred to FSCE.

(c) The second in a series of fire support coordination meetings was held on 13 February in the FSCE. Representatives of FSCE, Army Aviation, DASC A and G3 Air attended. Results included a recommendation that staff visits to subordinate units be conducted to identify individual coordination problems.

(d) Although the number of Hangfire targets diminished, there were over one thousand targets developed and passed for firing during March.

(e) Staff visits were conducted at 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in AO PATRICK on 2 and 4 March 1968 for the purpose of explaining targeting procedures and assisting with coordination problems the unit encountered after assuming responsibility for the new AO.

(f) Special analyses were completed on the 5th NVA Div, 95 B Regt, 1st NVA Div, and 32d and 33d NVA Regts during March 1968.

(g) Artillery and ARC Light coordination and the rules of engagement against watercraft received emphasis during March 1968. An IFFORCEV regulation on rules of engagement against watercraft was published in April and an IFFORCEV regulation covering artillery and ARC Light coordination was drafted and initial staffing completed during April.
(2) Personal strengths of assigned, attached units, OPLAN units are at incl 9.

(3) Personnel Management:

(a) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached units have been satisfactory through out the reporting period. A problem still exists in obtaining qualified radar personnel for HNB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty. The problem has been reported to USMACV and that headquarters has given this command priority fill in MSG 172 (leadership). The 6th BN, 8th Arty arrived on 23 Apr 68 at full strength. The infusion plan of this battalion with other artillery battalions within IFFO-CEV is being coordinated with H1, IFFO-CEV Army. The infusion program of the 4th BN, 60th Arty is progressing smoothly with cooperation from the 108th Arty Opn. The 1111 FF0-CERV Army. Some unlisted NOS imbalances still exist as a result of the measures taken to alleviate previous artillery shortages. On-the-job training progression these imbalances are being overcome. The current imbalances exist in NOS's 126, 111, 111 BN, Development areas.

(b) IFFO-CERV was urged for 40 officers for in-country assignments during the period. Twenty four company grade officers were re- assigned to the TFP advisory program. The remaining officers, most of them field grade, were re-assigned to the army EDA, MCF, and the Prov Corps Vietnam.

(c) Lack of timely receipt of reassignment instructions for rotating personnel continues to be a problem. Many instructions are not received until just prior to departure. This has a detrimental effect on morale and presents a hold baggage shipping problem.

(b) Civilian personnel management:

(a) Coordination was maintained between area civilian personnel officers and all levels of command. During the period USMACV issued an IFFO-CERV TM authorizing 190 civilian spaces. Previously, 234 spaces were authorized by bulk allocation. The reduction in the civilian work force created a serious impact; therefore, requests for necessary changes to the IFFO-CERV TM issued by USMACV are being forwarded in Section II TM with complete justification.

(b) A new regulation for direct un daily hire and a new regulation on control of overtime payments are being prepared for publication in May 1968. These regulations consolidated several USMACV regulations and will assist in achieving improved reporting, procedures, and control for local national hire.

(e) The AIX allocation for 1st Qtr CY 68 was 2,005,000 $VN, or 69.2% of the amount requested. The AIX allocation for the 2nd Qtr CY 68 was 2,350,000 $VN or 69.3% of the amount requested.

(5) During this quarter the processing of awards and decorations for HOK and DAV personnel started an upward trend. Two HOK and five DAV recommendations were forwarded to USMACV during this period. Twenty one HOK awards were being processed as of 10 Apr 68. There also has been an increase in recommendations for unit awards. Three Presidential Unit Citations, (1st BN 7th Inf Div; 20 Bn, 4th Inf Div, 173rd Abn BN, 9th Inf Div), one valorous unit citation (106 BN, 15th Inf Div, 1st Cav Div), and four Meritorious Unit Citations (6th BN, 1st Inf Div; 8th BN, 30th Arty; 228th BN, 1st Cav Div) have been forwarded to USMACV. Two Valorous Unit Citations (TLP, 17th Cav Div; 1st BN, 12th Inf Div, 4th Inf Div) and three Meritorious
UNIT CITATIONS (11th PIR; 54th Bn; Btry E, 82d Arty; 1st Cav Div) were approved during the quarter. Awards and decorations during the quarter are at Incl 10.

(6) On 1 Feb 68 promotion authority for senior enlisted personnel was delegated as follows: To grade E7, CG IPPORCEV arty and CO's 41st and 52d Arty Grps; to grade E8, CG IPPORCEV arty. Promotion to grade E9 for all units assigned or attached to IPPORCEV, and to grades E7 and E8 for IPPORCEV units not assigned or attached to IPPORCEV was retained by CG, IPPORCEV. The delegation was announced in IPPORCEV log 600-200 which also outlines the standards to be followed by all promotion boards. The delegation of authority has reduced the time enlisted personnel are required to be away from their units for the purpose of appearing before a promotion board. Promotion allocations made are at Incl 11.

(7) The 43d Army Postal Unit initiated a program of inspection of all parcel post packages with a metal detector on 31 March 1968, all suspicious packages are opened. Prohibited items discovered are impounded and a letter sent to the CO of the individual attempting to mail the prohibited items advising him of the offense. As a result of this program the number of prohibited items discovered decreased from 37 during the first week to none during the fifth week.

(8) Chaplain Activities:

(a) The II CTZ has 130 US Military Chaplains: 116 US Army (90 Protestants, 25 Catholics, 1 Jewish) and 14 US Air Force (9 Protestants, 5 Catholics). This is a significant drop from last quarters report. This is due in part to a high casualty rate plus the movement of units and chaplains out of the II Corps area.

(b) Protestant services in IPPORCEV assigned, attached and OPCON units and in combat support and service support units were adequate. Services for advisory teams on a regular basis is difficult. Chaplains assigned to advisory teams depend on neighboring units to render services and counseling when necessary. Due to Holy Week an Easter Sunrise services there was an increase in attendance at religious services.

(c) Catholic services in assigned, attached and OPCON units have been adequate. Catholic Chaplains, although in short supply, increased their activity during Lenten and Easter season and saw a tremendous increase in attendance at mass and communion.

(d) Jewish services have been adequate. Services are conducted by the Jewish Chaplain in nine locations once a month and in Nha Trang every week on the Sabbath. Lay Leaders conduct weekly Jewish services at nine locations. Coordination is no problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters had responsibility in the II CTZ for all Jewish personnel during this period.

(e) The following services are scheduled in Nha Trang:

1. Sunday: 20 Protestant, 13 Catholic, 1 Lutheran, 2 Episcopal, 1 Pentecostal, 1 Christian Science and 1 Latter Day Saints.

2. Friday evening: Jewish Sabbath Service.

2. Daily: Two Catholic services.
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Services were rendered at the following locations:

- 17th Arm Gp
- 5th Special Forces Gp
- HQ NTSC
- US Air Force Base
- 8th Field Hospital
- Harbor Defense Site
- Beach Chapel
- 71st Artillery

(9) Security Services: Several isolated IFFO/CEV security units with expanded security assignments have been unable to maintain a consistent level of security due to limited personnel and resources. Additional personnel have been ordered to assist in maintaining a higher level of security.

(10) Exchange Services: Exchange services during the period continued to be adequate. A constant effort was made to assign, attach, and distribute personnel and supplies to units during the period. Full support of the exchange services continued during the period. Attention was given to ensure the availability of items on the exchange list. Stock levels of critical components and systems are inadequate.

(11) Welfare Services:

(a) The G1 staff continued to exercise staff supervision over the operation and administration of all welfare, sanitary, and morale activities within assigned and attached units. These activities include welfare fund management, sanitary fund operations, and open mess facilities.

(b) At the end of the reporting period, three officers' open messes and HQ/EM open messes were operational within the command.

(c) Approval was granted during the period for the establishment of an additional HQ/EM sanitary fund and the establishment of an additional sanitary fund for the 54th Sf. En.

(d) New unit fund accounting and procedures were implemented in IFFO/CEV units on 1 April. IFFO/CEV Regulation 230-21 was revised and several changes were made to establish and maintain policies and procedures in regard to unit funds. The regulation specifically established policy regarding the accounting and use of unit funds.

(12) Utilization of M.A. quotas for assigned and attached units as shown at Inc 12.

(13) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Combined Patrolling: Throughout II CTZ, combined US/SAV/VM patrolling continues with area support military police providing 52 patrols in major population areas and tactical unit military police providing 11 patrols near these areas. Restrictions placed upon the circulation of individuals in cities, towns, and hamlets during the period immediately after the Tet Offensive reduced the necessity for combined patrols and free police personnel for other duties. As the restrictions were eased and curfews lifted, the working hours of the patrols were adjusted to coincide with peak traffic hours; it is during this time that illegal goods are moved freely under the cover of crowds of people and vehicles. An increase in the quantity of black market goods confiscated was noted and attributed to the strict curfews and curfews.
(b) Effect of VN Presidential Decree upon US Forces Personnel:

President Nguyen Van Thieu, in a widely publicized speech given shortly after Tet, called upon the people of Vietnam to accept a "life of austerity" during the "critical period of our national history." In keeping with this spirit the president issued a decree permanently closing all bars, snack bars and dance halls within the republic. Enforcement of the decree by National Police was instantaneous. In an anticipatory move to prevent US forces personnel from being noticed in establishments opened in violation of the decree, this OP prepared a zone coordinator letter requesting II CTZ US unit commanders at all levels to circulate information of restrictions to members of their command. To date no significant problems of US personnel patronizing bars, dance halls or snack bars have been encountered.

(e) Prisoners of War: Visits by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): On 8 March 1968, the ICRC visited the Phu Tai PW Camp and inspected that facility for compliance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POW (GPW). The following recommendations were made by the committee:

(a) A new latrine should be built.

(b) Toilet paper should be available for use by POW.

(c) Human waste should be burned rather than burned.

(d) A copy of the GPW should be permanently posted inside the camp. At the urging of the US Military advisor, immediate corrective action of the above deficiencies was initiated by the RVNAF camp commander. On 26 March 1968, the ICRC visited the 4th Inf Div PW collecting point at Nam Linh on the RVNAF Phu Quoc PW Camp. There were no deficiencies noted at either of these locations; ICRC comments were favorable.

(f) Reorganization of the Phu Tai PW Camp: Future JGS plans call for the conversion of the Phu Tai PW Camp into an all female PW facility. When converted, the Phu Tai PW Camp will continue to receive a limited number of male PW from tactical unit collecting points on a pipeline basis. At present the camp has a population of 902 PW, 64% of whom are females. To attain the goal of an all female facility large scale movements of PW to the RVNAF central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island will be necessary and are programmed.

(g) PW Reduction: GS/USAADV has expressed desire to reduce the population of Phu Quoc PW Camps to a maximum of 600 PW each. To reduce the mainland camp population to an acceptable level, Phu Quoc Island PW Camp facilities must be expanded to accommodate 22,000 PW. Presently the Phu Quoc Island PW camp has a population of 8,763. Several problem areas which may hamper the timely completion of the facility are the lack of adequate water and the fact that enemy troops still operate on Phu Quoc, thereby creating a security hazard. In an effort to reduce 11 CTZ camp to the in-camp population level desired by GS/USAADV, 265 PW were transferred from Phu Quoc PW Camp (820 from Phu Tai, 185 from Pleiku).

(15) Serious Incident report Statistics:

(a) Self Inflicted Wounds: Serious Incident Reports received by PM, IFORCEV, during the reporting period revealed a high number (thirty-one) of self-inflicted injuries resulting from gunshot wounds. In many cases determination as to whether or not the injury was intentional could not be made from available information. A great many of
these injuries were clearly attributable to careless or gross neglect on the part of the individual soldier, i.e., carrying a round in the chamber, failure to clear a weapon after entering a secure area, or foolish handling with a firearm. Additionally, four suicides were reported in II CTZ. (Figures based upon available data).

(b) Indiscriminate, Malicious, or Careless Discharging of Firearms: During the period 26 Jan - 25 Apr 68, there were 41 reported incidents of indiscriminate, malicious or careless discharging of firearms (not including self-inflicted wounds) in II CTZ which resulted in the death of 5 US soldiers and 4 VN civilians, the injury of 23 US soldiers and 8 VN civilians, and several incidents of damage to VN property or livestock. Monthly totals from the 26th of the preceding month to the 25th of the reporting month of April (Feb: 16 incidents; Mar: 16 incidents; Apr: 9 incidents). Efforts to reduce the rate of occurrence of these incidents included: widespread dissemination of the causes and recommended actions to be taken by commanders at all levels, increased convoy discipline, annual police vigilance along II CTZ roadways, and in the reduction of damage to VN property, livestock or damages caused by weapons indiscriminately or maliciously fired from passing vehicles. Education and enforcement efforts continue to be directed towards this problem.

(16) Safety and Accident Prevention:

(a) Both the motor vehicle accident and military injury rates rose above the previous quarter rates, each was above the established expectancy ceiling. Statistical data, by unit, are shown at Inclosure 13.

(b) The primary problem areas continued to be accidents involving the operation of Army motor vehicles and the mishandling of firearms. Of the 73 accidents reported during the 3rd quarter, FY 68, 39 or 53% resulted from Army motor vehicle operation. Eleven injuries resulted from the mishandling of hand and shaker held weapons.

(c) During the quarter, two zone coordination letters were distributed to all PMFs within II CTZ. The letters forwarded combat information on character guidance bulletins and彩色 bilingual posters. A total of 2500 letters and 40,000 posters, directed towards the prevention of Army motor vehicle accidents involving Vietnamese, were distributed.

(d) IFFORCEV Safety Newsletter Number 2 was published in February. This quarterly publication provided realistic on-attached unit commanders and safety officers with information pertaining to safety program objectives, injury and motor vehicle accident rates, safety administration and problem areas. The newsletter provided example cases of accidents involving the mishandling of firearms and improper use of flammable liquids.

(17) Medical:

(a) The only significant change in medical coverage was the move of the 17th Field Hospital from Saigon to an area in March 68.

(b) The 43rd Medical Group has provided excellent coverage to TP 3d BN, 506th Abn Inf at Phan Thiet to Ben Hoa and units by providing medical platoons from the 506th Clearing Company.
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(c) The general health of the command was excellent during the quarter. There were no cases of venereal disease or malaria reported. The daily effectiveness rate was extremely low, with 100 and 180 per 1000 troop strength, in February and March.

(13) Personnel Orientation. The second bimonthly Orientation Briefing for Senior Personnel Residing in the Nha Trang area was conducted on 16 March. The briefing proved successful in providing a basic orientation on the missions and functions of the various US units located in the Nha Trang area.

2. (C) Artillery:

(1) During the period 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68 IPFORGEV Artillery continued to support US, ARVN, SF, RF, 1FF and C160 forces in II CTZ.

(2) IPFORGEV Artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, four separate batteries, and six detachments supported all major operations in II CTZ to include Operations BUCKING, MOLIA, MUGATT, and DEFENDII (the 9th and 10th and CMB areas of responsibility were supported during Operations MOLIA and DEFENDII). ARVN forces were supported in operations conducted by units of the 226th and 232d ARVN Division, 24th STZ and provincial defense units.

(3) Selected Missions. Selected missions were released for employment in Kontum, Dakloc and Gia Lai provinces by COMMANDS in mid February 1968. Training of artillery units was accomplished by a US Army Artillery and Missile School team headed by Col John J. Kenney, Assistant Commandant USASC. Since completion of the missions in II CTZ three missions have been fired. The 4th Inf Div Artillery fired on an active rocket location near Dong Ban, the 1st Bn, 92d Arty fired in defense of a 4th Inf Div fire base west of Plei Klang. All missions were conducted using unobserved fire techniques and the effectiveness of fire could not be judged. Lack of suitable targets accounts for the sparse use of selected missions in II CTZ to date.

(4) Artillery support for Task Force 1st Bn, 12th Inf. During the period 1 Mar - 29 Apr 68, Btry A, 4th Bn, 10th Arty, Btry C, 32d Arty, 6th Arty and Btry C, 7th Arty, 15th Arty, disposed to Ben Hoi Tinh to support operations of 1st Bn, 12th Inf in that area. Liaison was established with 232d ARVN Division fire support coordination was provided by 32d Arty, 6th Arty, Btry C, 7th Arty, 15th Arty subsequently converted two of its 8-inch Howitzers to 175mm Guns to provide greater range capability and to support concurrently Special Forces operations in the Ben Hoi Tinh area. Upon termination of the operation, heavy artillery coverage was maintained by the replacement of Btry A, 7th Arty by Btry A, 32d Arty, 22d Arty.

(5) Associate Battery Program.

(a) Established on 14 March 1968, the IPFORGEV/ARVN Associate Battery Program was developed to augment existing advisory programs, improve the effectiveness of ARVN forces and develop further the channels for better coordination of fire support and mutual understanding. US divisional and force artillery units sponsor ARVN artillery units in their vicinity. The program provides a responsive US headquarters from which the ARVN units can request technical assistance and aid in such areas as maintenance and training. Additionally, the personal relationships developed between associate units will provide a vehicle for the exchange of information and ideas.

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(a) With the problems of Vietnamese artillerymen in mind, the specific objectives of the Associate Battery Program are to:

1. Establish close liaison between associate units.
2. Integrate US, ROK and ARVN artillery fires whenever possible.
3. Establish communications between associate units.
5. Assist in training as requested.
6. Provide for maintenance and technical support within capabilities.

(c) Although in its infancy, progress made thus far has been truly encouraging. Initial coordination and liaison visits with appropriate MACV divisions and associate ARVN artillerymen have been completed. Detailed assistance programs have been assigned and implemented, and initial reports indicate proven goals will be attained.

(6) Arrival of Artillery Battalion. The 6th Bn., 86th Arty (155mm Towed) arrived in country on 21 March 1968 at the port of Qui Nhon. The battalion was set up at CCO, TFF-FCV and CO, TFF-FCV Arty. CO TFF-FCV delivered the welcoming address. The battalion motor marched to its base camp at Camp Radcliff where an intensive in-country orientation and training program was conducted 25 March through 7 April 1968. Attached to TFF-FCV Arty with further attachment to 1st Arty Op, the battalion was first employed tactically on 8 April 1968 in COCHIEN A0. See paragraph 1(c) below for details.

(7) Survey. During the GELL reporting period survey control was extended from the vicinity of Pleiku to approximately 20 km north of Ban Me Thuot. Change 2 to the II CTZ Artillery Trig List was published and distributed on 1 April 1968 adding 64 stations.

(8) Combined Artillery Conference. A Combined Artillery Conference was chaired by the artillery officer on 4 April at Camp Radcliff, An Khe. Attendees included senior US, ROK and ARVN artillery commanders and staff officers. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss artillery employment in II CTZ and to present for discussion and refinement a mobile artillery task force concept (see para 1(c) below). This artillery conference proved invaluable as a sounding board. It reinforced employment philosophies and did much to strengthen relationships among ARVN, ROK and US senior artillerymen.

(9) Mobile Artillery Task Force. Because of the great size of II CTZ and the wide dispersion of maneuver elements, force artillery battalions have had to be employed to cover large areas, often resulting in the firing batteries of a single battalion being dispersed over distances of 100 miles or more. With arrival of 6th Bn., 86th Arty (155mm towed) on 21 March 1968 the opportunity to employ and demonstrate the effectiveness of massed mobile artillery was apparent. Addressed at the Combined Artillery Conference of 4 April (para 1(c) above), this concept involves employment of the battalion intact, and augmented by additional artillery assets as available. The mobile artillery task force is then employed anywhere in the II CTZ in support of maneuver unit operations where needed. The battalion may be described as an artillery reaction force, able to move on short notice to support major contacts as well as planned operations. The battalion was employed initially on 8 April 1968 in support of Operation
VELVET HAMMER, a 173d Abn Bde (Sep) operation in the COULISSE AO. Subsequently, the battalion moved to the Qui Nhon area and supported the GRID operation MAENG HO 11 during the period 11-29 April 1968. Initial successes of this battalion are encouraging and verify the validity of the mobile artillery task force concept.

(10) Calibration Program. The USARV calibration team calibrated ROK and US artillery units in the 9th ROK and GRID areas of operations and in the MULAIN AO during the period 8-22 April 1968. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tube Size</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th ROK Div Arty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP ROK Div Arty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/F, 3/132th Arty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(11) Relocation of 5th BN, 27th Arty. In order to expand US artillery coverage in the four southern provinces of I I CTZ, the 5th BN, (105mm Towed) 27th Arty was deployed from the vicinity of Phu Hiep to Phan Thiet on 13 April 1968. Currently, the firing batteries are located in Binh Thuan, Tay Ninh and Khanh Hoa Province. Assigned a general support mission, the battalion has been tasked to establish liaison with and offer assistance to ARVN artillery and maneuver units, CIDG camps and TF 3d BN, 306th Inf. One firing battery is in direct support of the ARVN 2d Ranger Gp.

(12) Assistance to SF/CIDG Camps.

(a) Recent visits to Special Forces/CIDG camps in II CTZ have shown the need for improved coordination with supporting artillery. To correct the situation, CG, IFFORCEV established a program on 13 April 1968 designed to improved artillery support to SF/CIDG operations. Under this program artillery units maintain close liaison with assigned camps and provide advice and assistance in the following areas:

1. Defensive fire planning to include pre-firing defensive concentrations by organic and/or supporting artillery;
2. Artillery support for SF/CIDG operations within the T.O.ZR.
3. Maintenance for CIDG howitzers and training of crews;
4. Training for Special Forces personnel in observer and fire direction procedures;
5. Communications, ammunition, survey and expendable supply support within capabilities.

(b) Although too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this new program, it is expected to result in more responsive fire support for SF/CIDG operations and technical, maintenance and training assistance for CIDG howitzer crews and fire direction centers.
(a) The first IFF(ECEV Artillery Intelligence Workshop/Se minar was conducted on 16 April 1968 at the 6th Bn, 32c. Arty. The purpose of the conference was to provide guidance and recommendations for improvement of intelligence operations of all artillery units with IFF(ECEV, and to provide an open forum for discussion of problems encountered at various levels within artillery units. Attendees included intelligence representatives from all artillery units with IFF(ECEV. Guest panelists from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), UNSY, IFF(ECEV), II Corps, and 6th Inf Div conducted discussions and presented briefings in four workshops, each of which was attended on a rotating schedule by groups of intelligence representatives.

(b) Availability of aerial reconnaissance systems and application of results of aerial reconnaissance to targeting procedures at battalion level were addressed in one workshop by representatives of IFF(ECEV 02 Air and II Corps 02 Air. Techniques of collecting, recording, evaluating and applying targeting data at artillery group/battalion level were discussed in a second workshop by representatives of CICV, IFF(ECEV Arty, II Corps and 6th Inf Div Arty. A demonstration of targeting procedures employed by CICV also was presented to all groups in the second workshop. During the third workshop, surveillance representatives from UNSY, IFF(ECEV Arty and 6th Inf Div 02 Air discussed surveillance capabilities available to all artillery units, demonstrated recommended utilization of maps, overlays and aerial photographs in surveillance planning and execution and reemphasized the importance of productive surveillance efforts. In the fourth workshop, three representatives from CICV explained the mission and operations of the Intelligence Center and outlined in detail what support is available to all units and methods to be used in requesting CICV data. A briefing on enemy order of battle in II CTZ was also presented during this workshop.

(c) At the conclusion of the four workshops a general seminar session was held. Attended by all panelists and intelligence representatives, highlights of the day's discussion were reviewed, and final recommendations, based on ideas generated throughout the day, were presented.

(d) Due to the enthusiasm generated, ideas exchanged and difficulties resolved during the Workshop/Seminar, similar conferences will be conducted quarterly.

(II) Meteorological Compatibility Studies. Because of the wide dispersion of artillery in the II CTZ and limited meteorological assets, employment of metro sections at closer-than-optimum range. During the period meteorological compatibility studies were conducted in order to issue metro stations are employed efficiently and provide widest possible coverage. These studies revealed:

(a) Meteorological conditions between Tuy Hoa and Minh Hoa are compatible, thereby releasing one metro station for employment elsewhere.

(b) Compatibility in the Bong Son/Phu Cat area resulting in the employment of only one metro station at LZ English. Previously there were stations at both Tuy Son and Phu Cat.

(c) An improved metro coverage plan for the western portion of II CTZ employing metro sections at Oasis, Soul Doi, Kontum and Dak To. As a result, complete coverage is available throughout the Central Highlands and Highway 152 to include the Mang Yang Pass.
Liaison. During the period of this report a detailed evaluation of liaison officer employment was conducted. The nature of the missions of I FORCENE Artillery units requires liaison be established with a large number of various types of agencies to include US, ARVN and ROK maneuver and artillery forces; SF/CLDG camps; sector and subsector headquarters; and installation defense commands. Although only 17 liaison officers are TOE authorized within I FORCENE Artillery it was necessary to establish liaison with 34 agencies in order to insure effective fire support. Duties of these liaison officers range from clearance of artillery fires to fire support coordination.

Training for Newly Assigned Lieutenants. Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses conducted respectively by 41st Arty Group at An Khe and 52d Arty Group at Pleiku have been in operation since January 1968. Both courses have undergone several modifications during this ORLL period in efforts to improve the quality of instruction presented and to better accomplish the mission of orienting newly arrived lieutenants in I CTZ to insure safe transition into combat operations. During this reporting period there was 125 Forward Observer School graduates and 89 graduates from the Fire Direction Officer Training course.

Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) In order to assist units in I CTZ that do not possess an extensive targeting capability, FSCE increased targeting efforts beginning in February. Over one thousand targets were developed during the month including 301 Hangfire targets. Special analyses were completed for the Vinh Than Valley area, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 18th NVA Regt, the Pleiku area, 3d NVA Div and 92nd NVA Regt. A greater use of CICV targeting information was begun and the first results of this effort were passed to units in the field during February.

(b) In February the FSCE assumed responsibility for targeting ARC Light strikes which had previously been handled by the I FORCENE G2. All records, administration and follow up responsibility was transferred to FSCE.

(c) The second in a series of fire support coordination meetings was held on 13 February in the FSCE. Representatives of FSCE, Army Artillery, DASC A and G3 Air attended. Results included a recommendation that staff visits to subordinate units be conducted to identify individual coordination problems.

(d) Although the number of Hangfire targets diminished, there were over one thousand targets developed and passed for firing during March.

(e) Staff visits were conducted at 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in AO PATRICK on 2 and 4 March 1968 for the purpose of explaining targeting procedures and assisting with coordination problems the unit encountered after assuming responsibility for the new AO.

(f) Special analyses were completed on the 5th NVA Div, 95 B Regt, 1st NVA Div, and 32d and 33d NVA Regts during March 1968.

(g) Artillery and ARC Light coordination and the rules of engagement against watercraft received emphasis during March 1968. An I FORCENE regulation on rules of engagement against watercraft was published in April and an I FORCENE regulation covering artillery and ARC Light coordination was drafted and initial staffing completed during April.
h) A study group consisting of the AFSC, G3 air and a G2 representative, visited MACV for the purpose of discussing recent changes in Air Light procedures. As a result of increased emphasis in Air Light strikes and the requirement for follow up information, the AFSC and G3 air visited 3d Bn, 506th Inf., 4th Div. and 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in April 1968. These coordination visits centered on identifying programs and providing information on Air Light policies and procedures. Additional visits are planned with both ROK Divisions.

(i8) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis.

(a) Since the SITREP format was changed on 25 December 1967 to classify ammunition expenditures according to more meaningful categories, a large amount of useful data has been gathered. The system developed to record and analyze this data is:

1. Number of rounds and mission fired by each battery in each target category are extracted daily from the SITREP’s, recorded and added to previous expenditures.

2. The total number of percentages of rounds and missions fired in each target category are tabulated weekly by battalion, AO and caliber.

3. An analysis is made to the weekly cumulative data in which expenditures are compared with those of previous weeks and also with the level of activity in the area concerned.

(b) The weekly analysis have proven to be a useful management tool in many areas.

2. Command emphasis has been applied to improve the method of expenditures of particular units. As a result, a significant shift has been noticed in expenditure from the interdiction category to the more profitable target categories, such as confirmed and acquired.

3. Data obtained has been useful in determining the requirements for repositioning of artillery units.

4. The analysis provides information upon which recommendations on allocation of artillery ammunition is based.

(a) Artillery units down to battery level are being encouraged to make an analysis of their expenditures much the same as has been done at this headquarters. As a guide, a copy of one week’s ammunition analysis was reproduced and distributed to all major US artillery headquarters, battalions and batteries in III CTZ.

(i9) Artillery Strength. The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN and PWNAF Artillery units in III CTZ at the end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8-inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>FEBRUARY TOTALS/1000 ROUNDS</th>
<th>MARCH TOTALS/1000 ROUNDS</th>
<th>APRIL TOTALS/1000 ROUNDS/MILLION ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONNECTED</td>
<td>55,106/1,849</td>
<td>45,055/992</td>
<td>24,980/719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>89,249/5,142</td>
<td>29,814/4,425</td>
<td>37,427/4,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROLLED</td>
<td>11,076/765</td>
<td>8,083/314</td>
<td>6,572/253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P陕西省</td>
<td>29,572/876</td>
<td>28,664/1,034</td>
<td>64,940/15,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>206,623/30,700</td>
<td>60,269/26,373</td>
<td>64,911/30,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSES</td>
<td>27,148/2,061</td>
<td>31,575/4,033</td>
<td>25,072/3,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>19,090/1,023</td>
<td>6,333/672</td>
<td>3,772/314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>291,155/43,710</td>
<td>243,992/35,957</td>
<td>192,718/36,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Expenditure by Caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
<th>SUB-TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
<th>1000/1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>185.26</td>
<td>190.64</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>53.235</td>
<td>106.86</td>
<td>106.40</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>27.545</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>15.122</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>221.45</td>
<td>221.45</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>71*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>144.723</td>
<td>144.72</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>40.072</td>
<td>100.24</td>
<td>100.24</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>18.935</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>13.154</td>
<td>13.15</td>
<td>13.15</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>223.942</td>
<td>223.942</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>126.641</td>
<td>126.64</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>36.978</td>
<td>100.72</td>
<td>100.72</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>27.343</td>
<td>92.71</td>
<td>92.71</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>11.758</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>192.718</td>
<td>192.718</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>692,625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Projected Average
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AVFA-CC-07
15 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORFORV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968. LCG CSFOR-65 (K1)

(21). Organization US Artillery Units of I Field Force Vietnam at the End of the Reporting Period Were:

(a) Non-divisional.

IFFORFORV Artillery

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (WSP)
Battery B, 59th Artillery (Searchlight)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MD)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion,
26th Artillery

77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8 inch SP)
2a Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T Prov)
6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

(b) Divisional.

4th Infantry Division Artillery

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105m T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

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1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

Battery B (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th artillery (105mm T)

II. SIGNAL OPERATIONS: The maintenance of command control facilities for HQ IFFOCEV and support of combat communication requirements which are beyond the capabilities of subordinate commands continue to be the major activities of the Signal Section.

(1) The first few weeks of this quarter saw the Signal Section deeply involved in the detailed planning for movement of a Corps headquarters into a remote tactical location. A signal complex was designed and SOI and SSL were prepared. Traffic and terrain studies were conducted and plans were completed to provide command and control communications to four division size elements. Equipment was assembled and extensive training for signal personnel was conducted by the 54th Signal Battalion.

(2) The 54th Sig Bn provided communications support for Operations DOLLING, OCHRE GLARE, ELMTH WOODS, JUNIOR KING, PAVILION and PISING. In addition to the normal support provided for IFPGCEV operations, the 54th provided support for 10K and Special Forces operations. Additional equipment was committed to mission tasks with the installation of a AN/GRC-26 radio in support of 8th Pay Ops in at Pleiku when its radio station was destroyed by enemy action.

(3) While IFFOCEV suffered no major communications loss during the Tet offensive and no significant communications outages, minor incidents did occur. A SENAES Communications System structure was destroyed at Phan Thiet. Communications to the 3d Inf, 506th Airborne Division were disrupted but quickly restored. Additionally, a combat loss was sustained by the 54th Sig Bn at Phan Thiet when their AN/GRC-26 position was destroyed by secondary explosions. Administrative communications facilities that fell briefly under enemy control such as those within the Khanh Hoa Sector Headquarters, required detailed inspection to preclude clandestine exploitation or delayed sabotage. In the first few days following Tet, routine installation and restorations and police of wire and cable lines in the Nha Trang area was deferred and then performed under armed escort because of sporadic sniper fire.

(4) Another step in the Time Phased Implementation Plan (TPS) for Telephone Service in Southeast (II) was accomplished in March with the activation of the 2000 line Nha Trang Air Force Dial Central Office. Concurrently, a subscriber survey of the headquarters tactical switchboard was conducted with the view of discontinuing those local telephones installed to supplement the limited area telephone service in Nha Trang. Dial phones replaced many of these Typhoon numbers and a program of graded telephone service was also inaugurated. While dial service is not intended to replace the headquarters tactical switchboard, its availability greatly enhances the tactical integrity of the Typhoon switchboard in its primary role of providing direct and responsive communications between HQ IFPGCEV and subordinate units.

(5) During this reporting period extensive studies in the employment of new Army Area Communications System equipments were conducted in coordination with the 21st Sig Bn. A feasibility study of consolidated frequency allocation and control for the new AN/GRC-50 radio was...
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AVP-OIC-01

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters IP/00I5W for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 - LCS CP/05-45 (R1)

prepared. School visits were conducted to ensure these were conducted to ensure safety of the equipment upon arrival in the area. Section visits were conducted with Section visits were conducted with Section to determine the characteristics of the equipment. Engineering and maintenance was conducted to determine the characteristics of the equipment and to train personnel in its operation. The major sections were involved in the quarterly report, with the equipment being utilized to support the training and maintenance of the equipment. The equipment was used to train personnel in its operation and to determine the characteristics of the equipment.

1. (c) Engineer

(a) The majority of the effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, construction, and supervision of the engineer section support provided by the 25th Engineer units in support of IFFOICEV, 6th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units.

(b) The majority of the engineers effort was utilized in upgrading and maintenance of roads, repair of airfields, and general engineering support.

(c) The 35th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations.

(a) Operations DOLLING and FESHERING I & II. The 45th Engineer units provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units.

(b) Operations H.G.O.J.T. The 35th Engineer units provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units.

(c) Operations WL-EX and GCoHs-CHEDD. The 35th Engineer units provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units. The 25th Engineer units, 4th Engineer units, and the 173rd Engineer units, provided support to the 173rd Engineer units and the 4th Engineer units in support of the 173rd Engineer units.

(3) Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair.

(a) The 20th Engineer units completed upgrading this field from T-17 to T-301, on 18 Feb 68. The field is rated as Type 11 (C-130).

(b) The 20th Engineer units completed upgrading this field from T-17 to T-301 on 18 Feb 68. The field is rated as Type 11 (C-130).

(c) The 20th Engineer units completed construction of this field on 31 Jan 62. The field is rated as Type 11 (C-130).

(d) The 20th Engineer units completed construction of this field on 31 Jan 62. The field is rated as Type 11 (C-130).

(4) The 20th Engineer units completed construction of this field on 31 Jan 62. The field is rated as Type 11 (C-130).

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFOCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 ICS CPK-7-65 (All)

(c) Point Can Ly (LP L23041). The 07th Engr in (Cost) completed construction of a new 4500 ft, Type II C-130 runway on 29 Apr 68.

(f) Ton San (2V O32260). The 20th Engr in (C) began upgrading this airfield to Type II C-130 on 22 Feb 68 by extending the clear zones on construct a new five C-130 capable parking apron with two access taxiways. Current EDC is 15 May 68.

(g) Choc Ho (12 233701). The 7th Engr in (C) began repairing the old runway on 22 Apr 68 to carry limited all-weather, Type II C-123 traffic. This work was completed on 22 Apr 68. The 7th Engr in (C) moved a work party to Choc Ho and began repairing the failed sections of the new runway on 3 Apr 68. Upon completion of these repairs the new runway will be reopened to limited Type II C-130 traffic.

(b) Dak To II (25 032217). The 299th Engr in (C) began repairs to this airfield in Mar 68. During the period prior to 160 SW Monsan the unit will patch the failed sections of the runway, construct an all-weather taxiway from the runway to the middle of the parking apron and improve the existing drainage system. During the period 4-12 Feb 68, Dak To I was required to carry C-123 traffic during dry weather.

(k) Bien Hoa (Y-3654). The 22nd Engr in (C) repaired approximately 2500 sq ft. of runway that was showing signs of failure by removing the M19230 matting, filling, and compacting the subgrade and replacing the failed sections of matting.

5. Future Airfield Repair. The following fields are scheduled for repair or upgrading during the next three month period:

1. English (15 075013). The extremely heavy C-130 traffic at English airfield during the period Dec 67 to Feb 68 caused serious M19 matting and subgrade failures, which caused the field classification from Type II C-130 to Type I C-123. Work is being given to rehabilitating the field by replacing the M19 matting with an asphaltic concrete surface. A tentative EDS for this project is Jun 68.

2. Dong Sa Thin (GP 0329). The runway is closed to all fixed wing traffic due to failures of runup surfacing and subgrade. IFFOCEV has submitted a request to USAFAC for approval to rehabilitate this field by construction of a 3000 ft asphaltic concrete runway over the present site. Tentative EDS is 15 May 68.

(a) Land Clearing Operations. The 3rd Land Clearing Platoon continued under O-COR of IFFOCEV. During the past three months approximately 11,000 acres have been cleared by the Land Clearing Platoon, 237th Engr Op on the 4th Engr in along routes 19, 21, 24, 1,
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SECRET  Operational Report of Headquarters MACV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966

CONVOY-route and supply combat trails within the MACV area. The following routes were cleared during this period or are being cleared at present:

(a) QL-1. Cleared from Phu Vang to Phu Ngoc.
(b) QL-160. Cleared from junction with Lite 60 south to AG 0000.
(c) QL-21. One lane flow section is now clearing from Lam No to the Dak To area. At present the section of road from 1 to 3107 to 1 to 3117 has been completed.
(d) QL-19. Two lane flow sections are now widening the cleared areas on both sides of the road from 310 to 345 to 365 to 36 to 37
(e) Route 7B. Cleared from junction with QL-14 eastward to LR 0102.
(f) QL-20. Organic lane flows from 127th Engr Cp widened the cleared areas outward to 3060 from 24 1963 to 24 2066 to eliminate enemy ambush sites.
(g) Route 51L. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(h) Combat Trail. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(i) Route 60. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(j) Route 60. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(k) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(l) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(m) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(n) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(o) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(p) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(q) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(r) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(s) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(t) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(u) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(v) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(w) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(x) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(y) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.
(z) Route 134. Organic lane flows from the 4th 10th in cleared 1000 along both sides of the road from Pola Key to Konhe.

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portion of its assets to 1 C&G as the 45th Engr Gp (H), 14th Engr
En (C), 35th Engr En (C), one light equipment company, one Bailey
Bridge Co and one earth moving platoon from the 539th Engr En (Con-
struction now: northwali. The 35th Engr Gp. W1 relocated from Cam-
hanh to Qui Nhon and assumed the area responsibilities of the 45th
Engr Gp. in addition to the previous area.

( ) The deployment of these assets resulted in the following
reorganization of the 15th Engr Det:
45th Engr Gp (1 C&G)
  14th Engr En (C)
  35th Engr En (C)
  39th Engr En (C)
35th Engr Gp (Qui Nhon)
  19th Engr En (C)
  67th Engr En (C)
  61th Engr En (C)
  577th Engr En (C)
  593rd Engr En (C)
  614th Engr En (C)
937th Engr Gp (Fleiku) - No change

(C) Miscellaneous Projects.

(a) Kontum Airfield. During the 1st period, the existing
Aircraft area adjacent to the Kontum airfield was severely damaged.
Following a decision to relocate these facilities to a new location
at the airfield, the 299th Engr En (G) began construction of a parking
apron, taxiway and hardstands during Mar 62. Current EDC is 20 May
62.

(b) Heavy Artillery Fire Bases. Construction of heavy artillery
fire bases in the Central Highlands was completed in Apr 62 by units
of the 937th Engr Gp. During the period preceding the 62 SW Monsoon,
175mm/6 inch, all weather artillery bases will be constructed at Dak
Te, Kontum, Plei Djereng, Saihan, Son Doi, and Lang Son. The 20th
Engr En (C) completed the firebase at Plei Djereng on 29 Apr 62.

(c) Long Son Causeway. The 35th Engr Gp constructed a causeway
bridge across the Lai Giang River at Long Son in Apr 62 to provide
two way, CI-50 traffic employing the railroad bridge and the new
causeway.

J. Information Office.

(1) Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity
coverage for numerous award and promotion ceremonies as well as for
special events during this period, including:

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RCS CSFOR-6.5 (Rl)

(a) Change of command of I Field Force Vietnam on 1 March with Major General William R. Peers taking over from Lieutenant General William L. Rossen. (See Enclosure 14)

(b) Presentation of awards by MG W. R. Peers to individuals of the 272d Military Police Company, 10 March.

(c) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the Special Security Detachment, I Field Force Vietnam, by General William C. Westoverland, 19 March.

(d) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the 11th Public Information Detachment (Press) by MG W. R. Peers, 20 March.

(e) Presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General George S. Blanchard by General William C. Westoverland, 20 March.

(2) Photographic coverage was provided for the visits of numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(a) Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, Chief of Naval Advisory Group Vietnam, visiting the Harbor Defense, 31 March.

(b) LTG Ko Yuan Fen, Commander, Chinese Advisory Group, KVN; ambassador (GEN, Retired) to KVN, 11 April.

(c) Representative Donald J. Irwin (D-Conn.) and Representative Charles S. Guston (D-Cal.), 19 March.

(d) General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army, 20 April.

(3) The following media representatives were granted an interview with the CG and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(a) Mr. Robert Stokes, Newsweek Magazine, 7 February.

(b) Mr. Al Jessen, KOIN TV, G.S., Portland, Oregon, 8 February.

(c) Mr. Dot Kentley, Wall Street Journal, 13 February.

(d) Mr. Jim Wallace, US News and World Report, 20 February.

(e) Mr. Carson Prager, Time Magazine, 4 March.

(f) Mr. John Carroll, Baltimore Sun, 12 March.

(g) Mr. John Thompson, Senior Military Analyst, Chicago Tribune, 10 March.

(h) Mr. Dick Oliver, United Press International, 2 April.


(j) Mr. Joseph Alsep, Washington Post, 14 April.

(k) Mr. Robert Jordan, Senior Editorial Writer, National Geographic Magazine, 17 April.

(4) On 7 February LTG Rossen presented a briefing on the Tet offensive to the press in Saigon.

(c)
SUWECT: Report of the 1st Quarter

(5) On 3 April Ms. Peters was interviewed and photographed by a news team from the Strategic Air Command for a special presentation on the effectiveness of B-52 strikes in II CTZ.

(6) On 17 April a week up briefing on the Tet offensive in II CTZ was conducted in Saigon for media representatives.

(7) Command Information Initial Orientation briefings for personnel newly assigned to IFFACLV were conducted twice monthly.

(8) Information briefings were prepared in support of the corps-wide Zone Coordination program.

(9) The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the 10, IFFACLV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the February, March and April issues of the IFFACLV magazine, the "Typhoon." On 17 March Major Martin C. Frechel arrived in the command and assumed the duties of Commanding Officer of the 5th RID.

(10) The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 717 personnel during the period covered. Further improvements were made on the radio press corps enhancing the facilities available to media personnel.

k. (a) Inspector General Activities:

(1) A total of 73 complaints and 25 requests for assistance were received during the period. One half of the complaints were justified but there was no indication of significant problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the command.

(2) IFFACLV Regulation 20-1, Command Inspections, was published on 7 Mar 68. This regulation synthesized earlier directives and established the command program for inspection of all units assigned or attached to the headquarters. The regulation was changed, slightly on 10 April to accommodate certain recommendations submitted by USMC.

(3) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st 4th div, 25th arty</td>
<td>19 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co 2, 20th Inf (MC)</td>
<td>23 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7th SPC Co</td>
<td>23 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th In, 26th arty</td>
<td>11 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st C Co</td>
<td>22 Mar 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd A Co</td>
<td>22 Mar 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th In, 27th arty</td>
<td>25 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CI Det</td>
<td>27 Mar 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>29 Mar 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>64th Eng Det</td>
<td>29 Mar 68</td>
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SUUJrCT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II FFOQCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1960

15 May 1960

AVFA-GC-OT

HHD, I FFOQCEV Arty
6th in 36th Arty
272d 60" Co

5 Apr 60
8 Apr 63
19 Apr 62

All units inspected were rated satisfactory with the exception of HHD, 6th in 36th Arty and it was re-inspected on 25 March with satisfactory results.

(4) During the period two DA Special Subjects for Inspection (SSI) were received, analyzed and current guidance prepared and disseminated to all units. These subjects, Command Surveillance of User Communications Discipline and the M1611 Rifle were also included as special items for inquiry during Command Inspections.

(5) The Inspector General visited 5 provinces, 10 districts, Headquarters II Corps and the 22d and 23d A.VN Division Advisory Teams in conjunction with a program to develop ways and means of improving the U.S. Government organization and operational relationships obtaining in II CTZ.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate activities:

   (1) In the field of military justice, five general court-martial cases were tried during the quarter. Subordinate units under the general court-martial jurisdiction of CG, I FFOQCEV, held 79 trials by Special Court-Martial and 33 trials by Summary Court-Martial. Pursuant to paragraph 94, MCM, 1951, and Article (5 (c), UCMJ, the records of trial by Special and Summary Courts-Martial were reviewed in the office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency.

   (2) During the quarter 710 persons were punished under the provisions of Article 15.

   (3) US personnel presented 70 claims against the government for loss or damage to personal property. Ajudication of these claims was made by the Staff Judge Advocate, I FFOQCEV, and a total of $21,051.50 was paid to the claimants.

   (4) During the quarter legal assistance was given to 972 personnel.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, IFF1MCLV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 LCS CSPFR-63 (R1)

2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER’S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Reduced Static Census Grievance (SCG) Cadre Reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC Tot Offensive attacks on cities in II CTZ caused a decrease in the flow of information from hamlet cadres to the Study Centers located at provincial capitals. In practice, District cadres serve as liaison between hamlet cadres, District OUs and US officials, the study Center, and DIDOs. However, they are generally excluded from the hamlet to province information channel.

(b) EVALUATION: A one-week course of instruction, conducted in Saigon should lend necessary emphasis and explain the role of the District Cadre. In the event of future attacks against provincial capitals, SC information available at District level should be exploited.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That current and future cadre orientation courses emphasis the role of District Cadre in the information channel.

(2) Military Police Use of Small-unit Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Tot Offensive attacks against II CTZ major population areas, US Military Police provided immediate reaction forces which assisted in nullifying the initial enemy assault.

(b) EVALUATION: The performance of individuals and units, while noteworthy, was marked in some cases by prolonged contact through a failure to employ basic tactics of fire and movement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That military police units operating in population centers conduct thorough reviews of assault tactics at the small unit level for all assigned personnel.

(3) Use of M-79 Grenade Launcher in Urban Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M-79, 40mm grenade launcher was used extensively throughout the city of Nha Trang during the Tot Offensive. The weapon was employed with telling effect against point targets, e.g., windows and doors of enemy occupied masonry buildings.

(b) EVALUATION: The weapon was effective when armed rounds were aimed accurately and traveled the required distance to become armed. However, many rounds were fired from less than 15-25 meters, the minimum distance the round must travel before it is armed. As a result, these rounds struck buildings but failed to detonate. After the firing ceased an EOD police of the area revealed numerous unexploded, live 40mm rounds.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the scope of training on the M-79 grenade launcher emphasize the importance of observing the minimum arming distance when used in built-up areas.

(4) City Defense Facilities.

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(a) OBSERVATION: After action reports covering the Tet Offensive pointed out that the defense networks of cities experienced considerable confusion as to where to report information.

(b) EVALUATION: Provincial capitals need a Combined Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which has the equipment, facilities, and trained personnel to control and monitor the defense of the city, force deployments and air and artillery support. The TOC should be co-located with the Province Interrogation Center (PIC) so that current intelligence and operations can be easily integrated. It should be large enough to accommodate liaison personnel of additional units which may be required to augment local forces in the defense of the cities as well as representatives of all friendly forces permanently located in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a combined TOC be constructed in Provincial capitals for the efficient control of combat operations.

(5) MK18 Rapid-Fire Grenade Launcher.

(a) OBSERVATION: Installation of the MK18 rapid-Fire Grenade Launcher on UH-1D/H provides a capability for employment of helicopters in a suppressive fire role.

(b) EVALUATION: The Navy has a rapid-fire grenade launcher presently used on small boats and helicopters which appears to have great potential. This weapon has been mounted on a UH-1D helicopter on the Xx 23 door gun mount. The MK18 machine guns were moved forward to the door opening for additional firepower. The effectiveness of the MK18 system has not been fully evaluated; however, it has been used successfully during one infiltration and five extractions of small reconnaissance teams - a total of 1500 rounds have been fired without a malfunction. Utilization of this system would enable a quick change from troop carrier configuration to supplement gunship configuration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the MK18 system mounted on the UH-1D/H helicopter be tested by the USA Combat Developments Command.

(6) Use of Hangpack Personnel Detector in the O-1.

(a) OBSERVATION: Employment of the Hangpack Personnel Detector (HPD) in the O-1 aircraft is an operational promise.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the HPD in the O-1 aircraft is feasible and practicable. The HPD is small enough and light enough to install in the O-1 without modification of the aircraft. The O-1 mounted HPD is excellent for use by VR aviators or artillery observers to verify suspected areas or to check areas in which observation is limited. Targets of opportunity can be engaged by artillery or air upon verification by the HPD. In addition, UH-1 helicopter assets, the primary aircraft for employing the HPD, are released for other missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That tests be continued using the HPD in the O-1 aircraft.

(7) Heliborne Loudspeaker.

(a) OBSERVATION: By rigging 1500-watt loudspeakers to the UH-1B helicopter a desirable increase in range and audio...
AVFA-DC-CT

Perio District

1. (a) EVALUATION: The 1,000 watt loudspeaker, helicopter mounted gives tactical units a reliable airborne public address system. It is particularly valuable as a population control device. The equipment was found to operate best at altitudes of 800 to 1,200 feet. Below 800 feet, tests showed that the noise of the aircraft engine interfered with reception on the ground.

(b) EVALUATION: That the helicopter loudspeaker technique be encouraged.

2. (b) LENGTH OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA

(a) OBSERVATION: Lt. Col. Van Can rallied to the 14th Inf Div in Feb. This Ho Chi Minh maneuver is a long tradition of interdiction in military practice which was printed by the 350th PSYOP Gp. in Saigon. On 2 Mar Sgt CPT Vu Van Y, 12th BN, 66th Inf, 4th Div rallied in the Dak To area with a copy of Dr Cong's statement. In April, the senior NCO's from the 350th Inf also rallied indicating that allied propaganda is more than mere words of the Vietcong's return.

(b) EVALUATION: This experience demonstrates that the reading habits of literate Vietnamese are different from ours. Lengthy messages with full details and explanation are an acceptable form of communications with the Vietnamese. Short texts may be less effective than they would be with Western audiences.

(c) EVALUATION: That printed propaganda media should employ lengthy texts with full details to build credibility and appeal to Vietnamese reading habits.

3. (U) THREAT: None.

4. (G) INTELLIGENCE:

(a) OBSERVATION:

Civilian curfews, while in effect in some cities immediately before the Tet Offensive were suspended for the purpose of Tet celebrations and Church attendance. As a normal practice, civilian curfews have always been rigidly enforced in the II CTZ. The lack of an effective curfew has resulted in an attitude of detachment from the war among the people in the urban areas.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. There is a need for effective population control within heavily populated areas. Population control is enhanced by the enforcement of curfews for both military and civilian personnel.

2. There were too few national police patrols and check points available in most cities attacked. January. Numerous cities had national police patrols scheduled to be on duty during this period; however, few of these patrols were actually performing their mission, an examination of the routes of approach used by the enemy in entering the cities indicated that patrols were ineffective around the peripheries of the towns and in the back streets. In the cities where check points were used, they tended to remain in fixed locations and were easily by-passed by the enemy.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, IFFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

1. Efficient national police patrols and checkpoints, both stationary and roving, can monitor the passage of personnel entering and leaving populated areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That large population centers develop and enforce effective population control measures and an efficient system for police patrols and checkpoints.

e. (C) LOGISTICS:

(1) Prestocking barrier materials and ammunition.

(a) OBSERVATION: Insufficient barrier materials and ammunition are located in the provinces to permit AVN units adequate back-up in cases of emergency such as the Tet offensive.

(b) EVALUATION: The Tet offensive pointed up the shortage of barrier materials and certain types of ammunition in the provinces. As a result, these types of supplies became critically short overnight. Through combined AVN-US efforts, such supplies and ammunition were rushed into the provinces to alleviate both the military and civilian situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased reserve stocks of barrier materials and ammunition be maintained at province and lower level to insure sustained operational capability.

(2) Analysis of AVN Logistical System.

(a) OBSERVATION: AVN Logistical System (ALC) is not responsive to sudden demands of large magnitude such as occurred during the Tet offensive.

(b) EVALUATION: During the Tet offensive the AVN Logistical system was not as responsive as required due to several factors such as:
   1. Lack of trained personnel.
   2. Insufficient stocks on hand.
   3. Lack of transportation.

As a result of the above, the ALC was seriously handicapped in accomplishing its mission. Through use of US resources, many of the immediate problems were identified and resolved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a detailed analysis of the AVN Logistical system be accomplished to identify problem areas and insure improved responsiveness.

(3) Suitable Weapons for KD Cadre Groups.

(a) OBSERVATION: The recent attacks on major cities and the employment of KD groups in a security role proved the issued KD Cadre weapons a poor match for the VC and NVA individual automatic weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: The issued M-3 submachine gun should be replaced with a more accurate, lighter and longer range automatic weapon. The M-2 carbine would be a suitable substitute. The substitution of M-2 carbines for M-3 submachineguns in the KD Cadre standard issue kit is presently being considered at Saigon level.
AVPAC-60-47
15 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational report for Headquarters, IFFOMC for Quarterly Period Ending, 30 April 1968

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That AIM-C use the N-2 carbine for the N-3 submachine gun in N groups.

(4) Emergency Frequency Modulation (FM) Contact Frequency.

(a) OBSERVATION: An emergency FM contact frequency was needed which could be used by ground and aviation units for emergency aviation support requests.

(b) EVALUATION: There is a requirement for a method whereby aircraft flying in the vicinity of ground units or convoys who may need emergency aviation support can establish communications. There are numerous cases where aircraft on administrative or other missions have seen a ground unit in contact requiring casualty evacuation, artillery or gunship support but contact could not be established. With a common emergency frequency, a ground element requiring help could fire flares to attract the attention of passing aircraft, then initiate contact on the common FM frequency. IFFOMC has designated 38.9 MHz for this purpose which will meet with the new and old family of FM radios as well as AF FM airborne sets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the military specifications for future FM radios include a FM emergency frequency mode which can be monitored at all times in a manner similar to that of the VHF Emergency Channel.

(f) (C) ORGANIZATION:

(1) Requirements for Helicopter Gunships.

(a) OBSERVATION: Mission requirements for gunships continue to increase because of missions never envisioned at the time present TOE's were developed.

(b) EVALUATION: Gunships are presently used for convoy cover, installation defense, insertions and extractions of Long Range Patrols, Mobile Strike Forces, combat assaults, escort of CH-54 missions, protection of medical evacuation helicopters, airborne personal detachment helicopters plus myriad other tasks limited only by the imagination of the user. This imaginative use of gunships has resulted in a severe shortage of gunships which were allocated primarily for support of combat assaults and limited aerial fire support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE's be reviewed to provide gunship authorization to meet increased mission requirements.

(2) Medical Support Activity Coordination.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Tet offensive, there were many civilian war casualties in Ben Ho Tracht and Phan Thiet. Representatives from several medical activities were available and willing to assist; however, there was no central authority designated to coordinate the available medical personnel and assets. Consequently, resistance actually provided or available when the need was most urgent was not as effective as it should have been.

(b) EVALUATION: That medical assets were not utilized as efficiently as they could have been during the critical period, representatives of Public Health Service, the Surgeon Officer of the Field Force concerned, RNW Corps Med Advisor, 4th Med Det, and local tactical units should conduct on-the-spot surveys to develop needs and plans for a maximum coordinated effort.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, IPFC/CEV for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 ACS SP00-66 (c)(1)

(e) RECOMMENDATION: That post-attack plans include designating a single coordinator for all medical agencies in the areas where mass casualties or disasters may be expected. The Coordinator should be from Public Health Service CO/DS.

(1) OTHERS: None.

FOr. THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE S. BLAINE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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AVHCC-1ST (15 May 68) 1st Ind (C) CPT Arnold/hga/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96275
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: OP-DT,
APO 96278
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters,
IFFORCEV.

2. (C) a. Reference item concerning reduced static census grievance
cadre reporting page 71, paragraph 2b(1). Concur that cadre orientation
courses should emphasize the role of District Cadre in the information
channel.

   b. Reference item concerning Military Police use of small-unit tact-
cics, page 71, paragraph 2b(2). Concur. The USARV Provost Marshal re-
   commended to Colonel Lionel E. Scott, USAMPS, a member of the CONARC
   Liaison Team, that additional fire-movement training for military police-
   men be included in MP courses at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Additionally, MP
   unit commanders throughout Vietnam reported to Colonel Scott that unit
   training programs now emphasize small-unit tactics for military policemen.

   c. Reference item concerning MK-18, rapid fire grenade launcher, page
72, paragraph 2b(5). The MK-18 is not an approved armament system for the
UH-1. This system has not been flight tested nor certified for use on the
UH-1 aircraft. By separate action, this headquarters will gather all in-
formation presently available to conduct an initial evaluation. Further,
it is recommended that use of the MK-18 be suspended until such time as
proper testing is completed.

   d. Reference item concerning use of manpack personnel detector in the
0-1 aircraft, page 72, paragraph 2b(6). Concur. The manpack personnel
detector is smaller than the airborne personnel detector. Due to the
necessity for low level flights in order to derive maximum efficiency from
the personnel detector, extreme caution should be exercised when flying
the 0-1 aircraft at low altitudes. Significant findings as the result of
employment of the personnel detector in the O-1 should be forwarded to
this headquarters for dissemination.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSGSR-65 (R1) (U)

e. Reference item concerning population control, page 73, paragraph 2d(1): Concur. The USARV Provost Marshal has initiated a program to establish closer liaison with National Police throughout Vietnam. The program includes scheduled FM/NPF conferences and the placing of liaison officers from the National Police in the offices of Provost Marshals. A National Police major is a member of the staff of the Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade. The result of the closer contact will be the improvement of National Police methods and techniques. Combined MF/NP population check points and patrols are established within and outside the large population centers in Vietnam. These patrols will become more efficient as the bonds of friendship, mutual understanding and respect are strengthened through close and continuous combined police operations.

f. Reference item concerning prestocking barrier materials and ammunition, page 74, paragraph 2e(1). Barrier materials are presently being issued direct from the Army Logistical Center (ALC) to Province Admin Logistic (AL) companies bypassing the Division Tactical Areas (DTA). This fact coupled with country wide stock levels and the large volume of due-in level to satisfy emergency requirements such as experienced during the VC/NVA TET Offensive. Ammunition will continue to be stocked and distributed according to the need.

g. Reference item concerning analysis of ARVN logistical system, page 74, paragraph 2e(2): The Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) is designed to update this system and is presently being done on a semiannual basis.

h. Reference item concerning suitable weapons for RD Cadre groups, page 74, paragraph 2e(3). The modernization program conducted by the GVN is converting approximately 1600 M1 Carbines to the M2 Carbine each month. Also as tactical forces receive the M16 rifle, their M2 Carbines are turned immediately over to the RD groups.

i. Reference item concerning emergency Frequency Modulation (FM) contact frequency, page 75, paragraph 2e(4): Concur. The AN/ARC-11A Receiver-Transmitter which is designed for installation in the OH-6 aircraft initially and subsequently in other Army aircraft, will have a FM communications capability in the 3C-75,95MHz range on 920 channels, plus a guard frequency. This will provide the desired capability for a FM emergency mode on a designated frequency. The date of introduction of this radio in-country is not yet established. Current measures for use of emergency scene-of-action FM frequencies must remain in effect as specified in HQ USARV CEOI Item 67-1.
j. Reference item concerning requirements for helicopter gunships, page 75, paragraph 2f(1): Concur in that portion which states an increase in requirements for gunships. However, it appears that the comment advocates an increase in the number of gunships in nondivisional assault helicopter companies, and, if this is the TOE unit referred to by IFFORCEV this headquarters nonconurs with the increase being reflected in these units. The mix of gunships and slicks in the current Assault Helicopter Companies (MTOE 1-77G) is considered adequate, however, IFFORCEV has not been provided a pure gunship company in the past. The move of the 361st Aviation Company (Escort) TOE 1-157T to II CTZ to be employed under the OPCON of IFFORCEV has just been completed. This will provide a source of gunships for missions of the type indicated and alleviate the gunship shortage in II CTZ. The 361st Aviation Company is a small unit which was originally designed for the Aerial Weapons Companies in the Airmobile Division. This is the only unit of this type that is not organic to a division. It may prove to be a highly versatile organization and ideal for the type missions described in this ORLL. The operations of this company will be closely monitored and compared with the larger armed helicopter companies now employed in III and IV CTZs. If it proves effective, it may be advisable to review the troop structure with regards to optimum size of gunship companies, and the ratio of pure gunship units to those containing a mix of gunships and slicks.

k. Reference item concerning medical support activity coordination page 75, paragraph 2f(2): Concur that a central control should be established for medical activities. Nonconcur that coordinator be from the Public Health Service CORDS. A study is being requested to determine the proper agency for the coordination of these programs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKAMURA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished: HQ, IFFORCEV
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (15 May 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Fld Force Vietnam for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, USAArmy, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed with additional
comments:

a. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: IFFORCEV states a
requirement for additional gunships in the basic ORLL due to an
increase in requirements for gunship support, and recommends that TOE's
be reviewed with the objective of providing additional gunships. In
1st Indorsement, USARV interprets the review to mean an increase in
the number of gunships in non-divisional units. Concur in USARV
position that the TOE for non-divisional assault helicopter companies
should not be changed. Additional gunships to meet the increased
requirements should come from additional armed helicopter companies.
The solution presented in paragraph j, 1st Indorsement, will provide
a portion of the additional gunship support required. However, other
competitive requirements for the services of the 361st Aviation Company
are not acknowledged by the USARV indorsement. In fact, these competi-
tive requirements will probably require the total support capabilities
of the 361st.

b. The effectiveness of helicopter gunships has been demonstrated
over and over in operations in Vietnam. Because of this effectiveness,
ground commanders have steadily increased the demands for the services
of these aircraft. At the same time, the number of gunships on hand
has consistently remained below the number authorized. Hence, the
supply has been unable to meet the demand. Future gunship procurement
actions should consider the quantitative requirements for gunships as
superior or at least equal to qualitative requirements.
SUBJECT:  Operational Report of HQ, I Fld Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

c. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k: USARV rear area damage control should insure that coordination of medical support is included in each plan and the responsibility, therefore, clearly defined and fixed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CT. SHOOTT
CFT, AGC
AG

Cy furl:
CG USARV
II CTZ MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS
5 MARCH 1968

LEGEND
C-130 MINIMUM TYPE II
C-123 MINIMUM TYPE II
C-7A MINIMUM TYPE I
ABANDONED AIRFIELD - MEWAL (A)
MAJOR HELIPORT
MACY STANDARD ROAD...
(24 FT WIDE, CL 50 ONE WAY, CL 35 TWO WAY)
MINIMUM CLASS 31 ROAD
MINIMUM CLASS 18 ROAD
MINIMUM CLASS 12 ROAD
STATUS OF ROAD NOT
KNOWN OR CLOSED
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

Scale 1:750,000

Notes:
1. Road class shown may be for two way traffic.
2. Road may be of a greater one way capability.
3. For detailed information see 10th Engr. Div.
   Bridge and Route Data CTZ 24th Engr. Div. (T)
   Route Classification and Bridge Number Maps;
   Engr. Brct. II FF or local engr. unit.
   Limited by local authorities to C-123 or smaller.
   Limited by local authorities to multiengine aircraft.
6. Prior permission required for use by C-123 or C-130 aircraft.

COMPiled BY 1 FFORCEV ENGINEER SECTION
DRAFTED BY 680th ENGR CO (TOPGONCORPS)

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### HEADQUARTERS I FORCEN VASK ORGANIZATION

**AS OF 30 APRIL 1968**

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**NOTE:** *Unit is in support of 3d Bde, 6th Abn Div*

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OPORD: UNITS

4th Inf Div

173d Abn Bde

II Corps US Army Advisory Gp

17th Combat Aviation Gp

7th Armored Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div)

8th Payops Bn

Co B, 5th SPG

201st Avn Co

AUG

AUTHORITY

USARV OPLAN 78-66 (OP RORIN)

MACV msg (S) MACCONTL 05002, 171835Z Feb 68,

Unit Deployment (U)

MACV msg (S) MACCONTL 05002, 231133Z

May 67, Reinforcement of II CTZ (U)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(3)

US-KO msg (C) aVHOC-0 31527 110846Z Jan 68

Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and

7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

MACV msg (S) MACCONTL 01603, 151110Z Jan 68,

Byrd CO (U)

MACV ltr (FOUO) LCPD dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment

of the US Army 6th Payops Battalion (Tactical)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(4)

MACV msg (S) MACCONTL 02353, 211221Z Jan 67,

OPORD of USASF Team in II CTZ (U)

US-KO msg (C) aVHOC-0 31527, 110846Z Jan 68,

Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and

7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

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AVIATION SUPPORT

MACV LETTER MACCOOL, DATED 13 JUNE 1967, SUBJECT: ARMY AVIATION ALLOCATION (U) PLACES THE FOLLOWING ALLOCATIONS (CURRENTLY UNDER CONTROL OF THE 17TH AVIATION GROUP) IN SUPPORT OF HEADQUARTERS 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM.

10th Cav Avn Bn

61st Avn Co (AHL)
92d Avn Co (AHL)
192d Avn Co (AHL)
196th Avn Co (MED HEL)
213d Avn Co (MED HEL)
281st Avn Co (AHL)

52d Cav Avn Bn

57th Avn Co (AHL)
119th Avn Co (AHL)
155th Avn Co (AHL)
170th Avn Co (Hel)
179th Avn Co (MED HEL)
189th Avn Co (AHL)
355th Avn Co (HEV HEL) (-)

223d Cav Spt Avn Bn

13th Avn Co (U.C)
183d Avn Co (Rub)
185th Avn Co (Rub)
203d Avn Co (Rub)
219th Avn Co (Rub)
225th Avn Co (SAC)

268th Cav Avn Bn

48th Avn Co (AHL)
129th Avn Co (Rub)
134th Avn Co (-) (AHL)
180th Avn Co (-) (ED HEL)
335th Avn Co (AHL)
### CONFIDENTIAL

**1 Feb 1968 - 30 Apr 1965**

As of 30 Apr 1968

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(2) Includes HQ Btry IFFV Arty, 5th Bn, 27th Arty; 6th Bn, 92nd Arty; 7th Bn, 60th Arty; 9th Bn, 93rd Arty; 9th Bn, 60th Arty; 8th Bn, 93rd Arty; 21st Bn; 241st, 242nd, 243rd, 244th, and 77th and 237th RADAR Dets.

(3) Includes HQ Btry II Arty Op, 5th Arty, 12th Arty, 13th Arty, 15th Arty, 21st Arty, 16th Arty, 1st Bn, 2nd Arty, and 5th Bn, 221st Arty.

(4) Includes HQ Btry 52d Arty Op, 3d Arty, 6th Arty, 6th Arty, 11th Arty; 1st Arty, 92d Arty; 5th Arty, 22d Arty.

(5) Includes 5th Sig Bn, 167th Sig Co and 237th Det.
## Promotion Allocations

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**NOTE:** Above data is a compilation of accident reports and exposure data as reported to this HQ by units shown.
# MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES BY UNIT

For 3d Quarter FY 68

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| Total            | 475         | 380945     | 4.63 |

---

a Includes all injuries resulting in death, permanent impairment or disability necessitating hospitalization beyond midnight of the day following accident.

b Based on empirical data contained in Da Cir 385-16. Fatality: $42,000. Non-Fatal: $4284.

c Reflects disabling injury rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling (4.50).

NOTE: Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this HQ by the units shown.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68**

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

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