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The Viet Cong Proselyting Program in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone (U)
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The Viet Cong Proselyting Program in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone (U)

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FOREWORD

(U) This paper is an outgrowth of an urban insurgency study conducted by RAC as Institutional Research. A companion technical paper reports on the other aspects of the Viet Cong (VC) control apparatus in the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone. Meanwhile, because of the unusual emphasis that the VC place on the subject of proselyting, it was deemed useful to publish this fragment of the report as a separate paper.

(U) In addition to any substantive value this paper may have, it is considered to be a modest example of what can be synthesized from raw intelligence already in the files of the US Government.

George A. Martinez
Head, Unconventional Warfare Department
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Problem

(U) To describe Viet Cong (VC) proselyting activities in the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone and incidentally to assess the adequacy of the data for further research using similar methods.

Facts

(C) This paper constitutes a report on one aspect of a broader research project relating to the VC control apparatus in the Special Zone. It is published separately to reflect the importance that the VC attribute to proselyting. The data used in the study were derived largely from prisoner and defector interrogation reports and from translations of captured VC documents. The Saigon–Gia Dinh area was selected as a focal point because of RAC’s interest in examining some of the activities peculiar to urban insurgency.

Discussion

(C) In the course of collecting and analyzing data to be used in studying the VC control apparatus in the area known to them as the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone, it became apparent that the VC gave proselyting activities a level of importance equivalent to that of military operations or political machinations. In order to direct and control proselyting, which VC doctrine declares to be the duty of every loyal adherent, the Special Zone control apparatus organized its activities into three principal areas identified with the target groups where proselyting was to be effected. These target groups were the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), employees of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN), and the private citizens of the RVN. In order to tailor its approach to the private citizens or masses, whose support is essential to a successful subversive insurgency, the Special Zone control apparatus keyed its proselyting campaign to make specific appeals to various discrete audience groupings of a social, professional, and cultural nature.

(U) Proselyting and propaganda activities were closely allied, though controlled by separate elements of the Special Zone headquarters; both elements exploited the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) in their appeals to the population of the RVN.
SUMMARY

(C) It was found that ample data in the form of raw intelligence reports exist for use in a study of this nature and that they can be identified in three categories—in the hands of American intelligence agencies, in the hands of Vietnamese agencies, and in the hands of third countries. Data in the first category are easily retrieved but limited in time frame. Retrieval of data in the second and third categories presents several problems that require further effort.

Conclusions

(U) 1. The VC consider their proselyting program to be as important to success as either military operations or political manipulations.
(U) 2. In the Special Zone the proselyting campaign is directed at three major target groups: the military, civil servants, and private citizens.
(U) 3. Data adequate for the preparation of a detailed analysis of the VC proselyting campaign have already been recorded; retrieval of the records will require a high level of effort.
The Viet Cong Proselyting Program
in the Saigon-Gia Dinh
Special Zone
### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>NFLSVN</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>SVN</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
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<td>VC</td>
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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF THE PAPER

(U) This report is an outgrowth of a broader research project that seeks to examine the VC control apparatus in the area surrounding the Vietnamese urban center of Gia Dinh Province and the municipality of Saigon. As analysis of the raw data collected for the broader study progressed, it became apparent to the authors that the VC, at least in theory, attribute as much importance to their proselyting activities as they do to either their military operations or their political machinations. It was therefore decided to publish a separate report on the proselyting program in the area under study before publication of a final report on the entire VC control apparatus. For reasons that will become apparent in the discussion of the data that follow, the time frame within which the paper deals is confined almost entirely to the period 1960–1966.

THE DATA

(C) To a very large extent the raw data used in the preparation of this paper were derived from English-language reports on the interrogation of VC prisoners and defectors and from English translations of captured documents. In recent years the American intelligence community has been concerned primarily with the collection of current intelligence that would be of immediate operational value to the battlefield commander. Therefore it is difficult for the researcher to retrieve information in English that goes much farther back than 1960. The files of the Vietnamese, French, and British governments are reported to contain much that would contribute to an understanding of the origins of the VC apparatus. Unfortunately in the course of this study events precluded a search of the French and British records. The Vietnamese files are kept in such a fashion as to require physical perusal of tons of paper to extract data pertinent to the problem.

(C) As noted, most of the raw data for this study are derived from VC sources. All this material has been translated into English by human beings, who often interpret and embellish, and therein lies a basic impurity in the data, for humans are not consistent in their choice of words to express the same idea. One man's battalion may be another man's company, especially when no exact English word exists to express the Vietnamese term. In addition to having been translated, the interrogations of VC prisoners and defectors were conducted by men of varying skills. A successful interrogator must ask the right
questions and must have the knack of drawing his subject out; otherwise the results are often superficial. In order to ask the right questions, the interrogator must have intimate knowledge of the topics with which his subject may be familiar; he must be able to catch his subject in a lie; and he must remember what other subjects have said on the topic. In short, a skillful interrogator is the product of long experience and hard work. A third and rather delicate weakness in these data arises from the fact that before 1965 they have in large measure been furnished to American authorities by the Vietnamese. It is a very human practice to withhold, even from one's friends, that which is derogatory to oneself. It is fairly safe to assume that some of the data on which this study is based have been filtered by Vietnamese authorities.

(C) Despite these three flaws in the data—translation, expertness of the interrogator, and political filtering—there remains a vast amount of authentic detail on how the VC worked and how their proselyting organization evolved in the Special Zone. After months of examining the data, the researcher becomes quite sensitive to discrepancies among sources; he becomes almost an expert at sorting out fact from guess, recognizing similarities despite inconsistent translation, and using translated documents to check the testimony of a defector for general accuracy. The information is, moreover, derived either from persons who participated in the events narrated or from documents written by those who controlled VC policy. Even if the data have suffered in the initial processing, much that is authentic still remains.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

(U) Although it is not the purpose of this paper to present an exercise in the semantics of a language with which the authors have barely a nodding acquaintance, the reader should be offered an explanation of the VC proselyting terms that have been translated and mistranslated in various fashions. Several versions of the information that follows can be found elsewhere, but this paper would be incomplete without it.

(U) Douglas Pike states that proselyting efforts were “...originally referred to...as...binh (military) and chinh (civilian), or B and C program[s]; later binh vân came to be used more loosely, to describe all proselyting activities, both military and civilian.”1 The accuracy of this statement is borne out in some of the documents used as sources for this paper.

(C) A study produced by an unidentified member of the Translation Section in the Intelligence Office of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, contains this statement about the Vietnamese word “vân,” which the author translates as “to proselyte,” despite the variance in diacritical marks.

“Vân” is originally the first morpheme of the verb “vân động” which in English literally means to exercise, move, campaign...use of “vân” in the sense of propagandizing, persuading, converting, and proselyting was first noticed about 1948 in the VC term “dịch văn” (enemy proselyting).2

(U) The nuances of Vietnamese diacritical and tonal marks are admittedly not entirely within the authors' ken; however, the Vietnamese–English Dictionary...
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prepared by Nguyen Dinh Hoa of the Universities of Saigon and Washington defines the term "văn động" in identical words, i.e., "to exercise, move, campaign." It appears safe to assume that the dictionary's tonal and diacritical marks are correct.* In any event the Vietnamese word implies definite action.

(C) The Vietnamese expression for "propaganda," as distinguished from proselyting, "huyễn-truyễn," is made up of two words, "proclaim" and "spread," or perhaps in the English vernacular "to spread the word." This expression connotes a much more passive act than does the aggressive "to campaign." During most of the period of time covered in this paper the VC kept the implementation of the proselyting program and the propaganda program clearly separated. In November 1966, however, an informant reported that a new VC organization called a "Propaganda-Culture and Proselyting Unit" had been formed. This change may by now have been confirmed by other reports. In any event the interrelation in the VC mind between proselyting and propaganda is expressed in the translation of an undated draft of a VC booklet on youth proselyting that was captured during a military operation in July 1965. This booklet discusses the importance of propaganda to the revolution (insurgency) expressing the idea that success depends on the active awareness of the people—awareness of what desirable results VC success will have for them (Ref 6, pp 12, 13). The discussion emphasizes that the people will not acquire this awareness without a vigorous VC propaganda program to enlighten them and to condition them for sympathy to the insurgents and indignation against the incumbent government. The translation continues:

Through the period of covert activity of the Party, nine years of resistance and seven years of political struggle in South Vietnam, propaganda has always played an important role in the awakening and motivation of the people...to support the Viet Cong movement and thwart the enemy. During many years of political struggle in South Vietnam...propaganda was almost the only...powerful weapon [which the Party had]...to defeat the enemy and to...develop the revolutionary movement...among the population.

Today, in the decisive...three front attack: Military, political, and...proselyting, propaganda constitutes a very important weapon....

(C) In the main, the data examined in the course of this study indicate that since early 1960 the VC proselyting campaign has been specifically directed at three general target groups in the RVN: the armed forces, the civil service, and the masses. There is evidence that implementation of the program was organized into three principal arms for this purpose, not one or two as suggested elsewhere. For these reasons the authors of this paper have chosen to discuss proselyting in the Special Zone under three headings: Military (bình dân), Civil Servant (chính [government, not civilian] dân), and Civilian (dân citizen) dân.

*To add to the confusion, Garry D. Brewer said that the word is "van," with no marks and means "to implore, entreat, beseech." Brewer and Nguyen Dinh Hoa agree on the meaning of "van" but the Intelligence Study should be more authoritative in presenting the origins of the correct word.

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ORIGINS OF THE SPECIAL ZONE PROSELYTING CAMPAIGN

BACKGROUND

(C) The VC campaign to recruit adherents and to subvert the incumbent government in the Special Zone is accorded emphasis equal to that given either the military effort or the political effort in South Vietnam (SVN). The testimony of participants, the content of captured documents, and VC performance all show that insurgent philosophy as translated into policy for the VC can be described as follows after the partition of Vietnam by the Geneva Accords in 1954.

(C) Open aggression using North Vietnamese troops against SVN to bring about a unified and independent Communist government was dangerous. Such overt action would be a clear violation of the Geneva Agreements and would be an invitation to the anti-Communist powers to intervene. Intervention would result in an all-out war with sophisticated weapons that would bring devastation to SVN, thus alienating the people and ravaging North Vietnam just at the time when she should be strengthening her independence. Therefore the Communist Party’s objectives would have to be achieved more subtly.

(C) The policy makers then considered the feasibility of motivating the entire South Vietnamese population, including as much of the government sector as possible, to press for reunification under some sort of coalition government acceptable to Ho Chi Minh. This course of action was discarded because it would involve North Vietnam in a long debilitating support effort. VC strength alone, both in numbers and influence, was inadequate for the task.

(C) Elimination of these courses of action led to the conclusion that Communist objectives could be attained best by the low-key instigation of piecemeal insurrection, first concentrating in those South Vietnamese localities most amenable to the idea, then spreading the insurgency to other areas.

CAMPAIGN ON THREE FRONTS

(C) Having determined the level at which the insurgent campaign was to be conducted in SVN, the planners proceeded to outline the strategy to be used in implementation. Obviously VC military action in the localities selected for insurrection could not alone prevail against the superior numbers and equipment of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Military action must then be supplemented with campaigns on two additional fronts. First the will of the South Vietnamese to resist must be weakened, their faith in the incumbent leadership must be shaken, and the conviction that their future lies in joining with
the VC must be established. Second the willing support of the South Vietnamese people in each locality selected for action must be ensured; they must be made politically aware of the advantages that would be theirs under the unified regime provided by VC political leadership. This was the strategy of ba mạt giáp công for three-faceted coordinated attack. The facets were military action, proselyting action, and political action; one could not succeed without the other two.

THE SPECIAL ZONE

(C) As was the case throughout SVN, the Viet Minh left a stay-behind organization in Gia Dinh Province and in the city of Saigon when they withdrew north of the 17th parallel after the Geneva Agreements in July 1954. Apparently what was then the Viet Minh Gia Dinh Provincial Committee was to be held responsible for low-key propaganda operations and proselyting activities in the rural districts surrounding Saigon. The Viet Minh Saigon–Cholon Committee was to control activities in the city itself, which was to be treated as a separate entity on an equal footing with the province. The cadres that remained in rural areas were instructed to blend with the villagers and to conduct their party activities in secret, using the jungle and underground passageways for the storage of their typewriters and printing equipment as well as for hideouts should the need arise. In the city, where police control was tighter and a legitimate facade was essential to the Communist Party's existence, the stay-behind cadre allied itself with the intellectual leaders (particularly journalists, playwrights, and authors) to form an effective propaganda-producing machine for the Communists. This city control group was able to maintain its own publishing house until 1958 or 1959, when a series of government raids revealed its true purpose. The cadre members caught in the government net were arrested and imprisoned.

(C) By 1960 it must have become apparent to the party leaders in Hanoi that the span of control was too great for efficient operations in Gia Dinh Province and in the Saigon–Cholon area, for the two groups were merged and their personnel and equipment pooled to form the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee. For simplicity's sake this paper uses the term "Special Zone" to refer to the entire area that by 1961 included the Saigon–Cholon municipality and the surrounding districts depicted in Fig. 1, which shows districts and provinces according to boundaries and names used by the GVN. As far as the writers can determine, the Special Zone boundaries have continued to include the areas shown in Fig. 1; however, the VC use different terminology for the districts, as shown in Fig. 2. In February 1964 an overlay was captured, which if accurate would indicate the minor changes shown in Fig. 2. The area has been accorded very special attention by the insurgents ever since the Viet Minh stay-behind net became the VC. The justification for this special attention is self-evident from both qualitative and quantitative points of view. The Special Zone, which comprised 1 percent of the land area of SVN, sheltered almost all its high-level military and civil service targets as well as 16 percent of the total civilian population of the RVN.
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Fig. 2—Special Zone Area in VC Terminology

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ORGANIZATION FOR PROSELYTING

(C) Organization of the proselyting program in the Special Zone was undertaken initially by teams from the Central Office for SVN, headquarters for the VC insurgency. These teams consisted largely of South Vietnamese who had gone to North Vietnam in 1954, had been trained in their field by professional agitprop organizers, and had been infiltrated back into SVN to staff the Central Office. When the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee was created in late 1960, it assumed the responsibility for the program.

(U) Reports of the manner in which the proselyting program was organized by the Special Zone Committee indicate that, as the program evolved, the organization was varied, presumably to adjust to the lessons learned as the VC implemented the program.

(C) It is quite clear that by 1963 one of the major subordinate elements of the Special Zone Committee was called the Proselyting Section. No formal distinction appears to have been made initially among military, civil service, and civilian proselyting. Whether this situation was due to a shortage of trained personnel and a desire on the part of the VC to avoid specialization, or whether the impression results simply from inadequate data to reach a research conclusion, it is impossible to say. In any event, by February 1964 the organization charts of the Special Zone Committee began to show two equal and directly subordinated proselyting sections, as indicated in Fig. 3.

*Some of these charts were reconstructed by intelligence agencies from the results of interrogation reports and some were pieced together by the authors from captured documents.

†Only one of the sources used in reconstructing Fig. 3 shows a Civil Servant Proselyting Section, although there is evidence that the function was carried out separately in the city.

Fig. 3—Organization for Special Zone Proselyting in 1964
Fig. 4—Possible Organization for Special Zone Proselytizing in Mid-1966
were called, depending on the source or the translator, the “Troop” or “Military” Proselyting Section and the “Front” or “Civilian” Proselyting Section.

(C) About June 1965 the subsections of the Civilian Proselyting Section began to be referred to in a fashion that would indicate their status was raised to the same level as the Military Proselyting Section and the Civilian Proselyting Section. Some time before August 1966 a Civil Servant Proselyting Section began to appear, resulting in an organization that might be depicted as shown in Fig. 4.

(C) As was the case throughout the source material used in this study, terminology seems to depend largely on the translator, but certain assumptions can safely be made on the basis of common sense and the identity of missions. For example, there is little doubt that what some sources call the “Property Owners Proselyting Section” is identical to the “Bourgeoisie Proselyting Section” described by other sources. “Writers and Artisans” is probably no different from “Writers and Artists” or “Poets and Artists,” as the title is sometimes. On the other hand, there appears to be a very clear distinction between “Youth” and “Students,” which certainly makes sense when one considers the target audience in rural areas as opposed to that in the city.

(U) Succeeding sections deal in as much detail as possible with each of the three major proselyting programs. It is hardly reasonable to believe that proselyting programs aimed at target groups such as “farmers,” “market women,” and “intellectuals,” are in fact accorded emphasis equal to programs designed to proselytize the military and the civil service. For this reason, Fig. 4 to the contrary notwithstanding, these programs are discussed in the next to the last section, “Civilian Proselyting.”

PROSELYTING PATTERN

(C) When interrogated by Vietnamese Military Intelligence a certain Tran Van Bay told of the operations of VC proselyting cells of which he had been both a member and a leader. The cell that he joined in February 1962 had been organized as an offshoot of the activity begun in early 1960. The establishment of proselyting cells was typical of Communist organizational activity anywhere. In the early 1960’s both military and civilian proselyting were included in the cells’ missions. Figure 5 depicts the typical cellular organization consisting of a leader and three cell members; only the cell leader knew all three of his subordinate members, thus minimizing the risk of betrayal. The cell leader was required to secure three military proselytes. Each of his three subordinates was charged with proselyting a maximum of three persons from the armed forces and three from the civilian population of the area. When the quotas were filled a new cell would be established with the best-qualified cell member as leader, and the process would begin again. To exercise control and direction, the cell leader would theoretically hold monthly meetings with each of his three subordinates when he would issue instructions for operations during the succeeding month and direct such shifts in policy as were dictated from higher echelons.

(C) The cell leader received his guidance at prearranged rendezvous with his superiors (usually at one of the big markets in the area). The time
and place for the next rendezvous would be set before parting. Written mate-
rial and money would be passed (concealed in a pair of sandals, a straw hat, a

Cell leader

Three military men

Cell Member

Cell member

Cell member

Military men (1-3 persons)  Mosses (1-3 persons)  Military men (1-3 persons)  Mosses (1-3 persons)  Military men (1-3 persons)  Mosses (1-3 persons)

Fig. 5—Typical VC Proselyting Cell

betel-nut pack, a jack fruit, or the like) to the cell leader. Recognition signs
in the tried-and-true tradition of the covert operative included carrying a cer-
tain newspaper and a package of rice cakes in the left hand and a package of a
certain brand of cigarettes in the right. Other evidence indicates that the cell
pattern described by Bay remained in use as the proselyting organization grew.

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(U) An early example of military proselyting can be found in Chinese history. During the third century the Han Dynasty was engaged in war against the rival So army. At one point in the war, Han troops had besieged a So unit for many days without success. The So clung doggedly to their position. A prominent scholar, Truong Luong, who had offered his services in the Han cause, suggested that a new weapon be employed against the So; that weapon, he said, was demoralization.

On a clear calm evening during a lull in the battle Luong took out his flute and played nostalgic airs that wafted into the enemy camp, stirring a wave of homesickness among the beleaguered So. Later that night the Han began to receive a stream of defectors from the So ranks; their will to resist had crumbled and they were ready to lay down their arms.

It seems likely that the Viet Minh borrowed from this Chinese success story in setting up their proselyting program during the war against the French. It is interesting to note that the Viet Minh term for the program was “Enemy Proselyting” whereas the VC term is “Military Proselyting.” The change in terminology can be attributed to the fact that the term “enemy” was used while fighting the French, who were foreigners. Now that the VC are fighting their own countrymen, who can be called neither friend nor foe, the term “military” is used to describe the target more specifically.

VC POLICIES

Viet Cong policy guidance for the military proselyting program in the Special Zone originates, as do most other policies, with the Central Office for SVN. This office is directly controlled by the Communist government in the north. The Central Office’s Military Proselyting Section is organized as shown in Fig. 6; this organization is reflected to varying degrees in the Special Zone and its subordinate elements. Military proselyting in the Special Zone is not a function of the Military Affairs Committee or Section; rather the program is conducted under the control of the Special Zone Committee itself. Military proselyting subsections appear at various levels below the Zone headquarters, such as district and even village level, depending on the size of the target. The municipality of Saigon receives special attention because of the size of the military population in the capital city.
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(C) Policy guidance to military proselyting sections at all levels sets forth the following objectives with respect to personnel of the armed forces of the RVN; particular effort is of course directed at officers and noncommissioned officers:

(a) Secure the desertion of personnel and encourage the deserters to bring their friends with them.
(b) Persuade proselytes to remain in place within the armed forces where they can serve as VC undercover agents—a fifth column.

(c) Devote special effort to securing intelligence and supplies from proselytes, whether they defect in place or not.
(d) If achievement of the foregoing objectives fails, encourage military men to leave the armed forces at the first opportunity and discourage their rejoining.

(U) It is VC policy to conduct military proselyting programs through pressure on the families, friends, and servants of the target and to make use
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of attractive and persuasive female proselyting agents. Terrorism and coercion applied to the target himself is generally a last resort.

(C) As is the case with the Military Proselyting Section of the Central Office, the Special Zone's Military Proselyting Section is charged with the staff supervision of the program within the operating elements subordinate to the Special Zone. The actual approaches to members of the armed forces are made by cell members, but policy dictates that every member of the VC apparatus is duty bound to encourage the defection of military personnel from the armed forces of the RVN.

THE SPECIAL ZONE'S MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION

(U) As indicated earlier in this paper, military proselyting activities, as well as efforts to subvert and exploit civil servants and the masses in the Special Zone, were conducted and supervised initially by the Central Office for SVN. Consistent references to a Special Zone Military Proselyting Section begin to crop up in 1962, although it is logical to assume that an agency for the purpose was in existence earlier when the Special Zone Committee was organized.

(C) One prolific source reports that this section had about 70 persons assigned by 1964, although some of these were assigned additional duties not directly concerned with military proselyting. This source states that the chief of the section was Nam Thu Chin (also known as "Nam Thu"), who has been identified elsewhere as the member of the 1962 Special Zone Committee responsible for military proselyting. In 1964 Nam Thu had additional duty as political officer for the Special Zone's Military Affairs Committee. His wife was active in Saigon as a member of the civil servant proselyting program.

(C) The Military Proselyting Section was located (in 1964) near Ho Bo Hamlet about 30 miles northwest of Saigon in the VC district of Cu Chi where several other sections of the Special Zone Committee were situated. The mission assigned it was "to develop military proselyting agents among the RVN's regular, regional, and popular forces" in the Special Zone. In order to accomplish this mission the section operated through two subordinate elements, the Rural Military Proselyting Subsection located at nearby Xom Chua, and the Urban or City Military Proselyting Subsection which was based at Ho Bo Hamlet, and conducted operations in the Saigon-Cholon area using proselyting cells whose members had legal identity papers to satisfy the city police. The rural subsection was headed by a man whose pseudonym was "Ba Tu"; he was subsequently transferred out of the Military Proselyting Section. The urban subsection, which was regarded as much the more important of the two, was headed by a man using the pseudonym "Tam Trieu." He had been trained in the north and infiltrated back into SVN in 1956 or 1957.

(C) Support for the Military Proselyting Section appears to have been provided by four cells, which may have serviced other elements of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee as well, although one source stated that the four cells were in direct support of the Military Proselyting Section early in 1964. These support cells consisted in the traditional fashion of three persons each and were assigned the missions shown in Fig. 7. By virtue of the
cellular structure and the strictly limited function of each cell, the knowledge of each member about the organization as a whole was of course minimized. It can also be seen from Fig. 7 that the armament for this support element was all but nonexistent. Storage facilities at each location consisted of a single 12- by 12-ft thatched hut.

![Flowchart of Special Zone Military Proselyting Section]

(C) Fig. 7—Support Structure for the Special Zone Military Proselyting Section in 1964

(U) Thus military proselyting in the Special Zone was carried out at a major staff level and was monitored directly by the governing body in the area. In effect every VC was charged with proselyting members of the armed forces as part of his obligation to the movement. The fact that the success of the program was minimal insofar as proselyting senior personnel were concerned can probably be attributed more to the Vietnamese military man's desire for a comfortable life than to weaknesses in the VC effort.
VC POLICY

(U) As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the civil servant proselyting program in the Special Zone was organized to subvert the government employees of the RVN and to secure their active participation in the VC insurgency. Actually the program went somewhat beyond this in that local administrative personnel at village levels were included in the target group to highlight their importance as compared with the masses in general. Obviously a village headman was a more valuable proselyte and could influence more followers than could a single farmer or “cycle” operator.

(C) VC policy guidance on procedures for proselyting among the civil service sets the following objectives to be pursued by whatever staff section might be held responsible:

(a) Secure the active support, overt or covert, of officials in the GVN.
(b) Require proselytes to furnish intelligence, both tactical and strategic, on all facets of governmental operations.
(c) Require proselytes to assist in providing VC covert operatives with the papers (identity cards, passes, licenses) necessary to the operatives’ successful deceit of the police.
(d) Secure financial support in the form of contributions to the VC movement.

(U) The approach to a prospective proselyte apparently conformed to that outlined for the military target. Families and friends were coerced or persuaded into influencing the civil servant in question. Increased effort was expended on proselyting employees of the government who had been active in the Viet Minh campaign against the French or who were known to be discontent with the incumbent government.

OPERATIONS IN THE CITY

(C) Obviously the City of Saigon contained the principal target group for civil servant proselyting. A VC\(^3\) who was a keyman in the city apparatus and later in the Special Zone’s headquarters, until his defection in 1964, furnished an interesting fragment of information on this score. The following information probably refers to the 1961–1962 period.

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(C) The eight boroughs of Saigon–Cholon, which coincided with the police precincts,* were organized by the VC into four “interdistricts” of two boroughs each. The proselyting program within these interdistricts was implemented by five “technical teams” that hid behind the skirts of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN). One of these technical teams was charged with proselyting civil servants. Supervision of this Civil Servant Proselyting Team (or Capital Civil Servant Proselyting Element, as the same source refers to it in the same interrogation report) was entrusted to a “Chin K” of the Standing Committee of the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone. Chin K was assisted in the civil servant proselyting organization by a certain “Tu Nam,” also of the Standing Committee, and by a person known as “Tam Thiet,” who is billed elsewhere as a member of the Standing Committee and responsible for another of the technical teams that was charged with proselyting artists and writers. Chin K and Tu Nam were later in charge of proselyting city workers, who could include civil servants, for a few pages farther on in the same interrogation report under the heading, “Social Classes and Capital Interdistrict (Party) Committee,” this entry appears: “Civil Servant Proselyting (i.e., Saigon–Gia Dinh Liberation Labor Association)” and goes on to list Chin K, Tu Nam, and Tam Thiet as cadre. The Liberation Labor Association was an arm of the National Liberation Front so one is tempted to conclude that the source was taken in by his own propaganda.

ORGANIZATION AT ZONE LEVEL

(C) There are almost no data from which the organization of a Civil Servant Proselyting Section in the Special Zone can be reconstructed. In fact an analysis of the code designations or cover numbers used by the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee in communicating with its staff sections indicates that there never was a separate Civil Servant Proselyting Section within the Special Zone’s structure. Despite this indication many sources refer to such a section, and in 1966 the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam officially published a political order of battle that shows a Civil Servant Proselyting Section as one of the Special Zone Committee’s staff elements.12

(U) The authors are inclined to subscribe to the hypothesis that proselyting of government employees was accomplished under the aegis of the Military and Civilian Proselyting Sections operating in the Special Zone. Logic, if not evidence, supports this theory. The detailed breakdown of the civilian-proselyting program, e.g., the categories “Bourgeoisie,” “Intellectual,” “Writers and Artists,” and “Chinese” (each was clearly an existing program and each was assigned a cover number) suggests that civil servants in those categories might be included in their proselyting efforts. Moreover, because a large number of leaders in the governmental hierarchy located in the Special Zone were members of the armed forces of the RVN, it certainly follows that the Military Proselyting Section could reasonably include them as part of the military target group.

*Recently a ninth precinct has been added.
VC POLICIES

(C) It is clear from the data examined that the VC are much less concerned with securing active participation in the insurgency from the masses than they are in the case of the civil service and the armed forces of the RVN. Directives from the Central Office for SVN and policy emanating from Hanoi indicate that the sympathy of the masses is vital to the success of the VC insurgency, a basic tenet preached by Mao Tse-tung and all the prophets of communism. One source sets forth the policy this way: "Accordingly, it is possible to say that the main objective of the [VC civilian proselyting] program is to obtain political rather than physical support from the masses." 2

(C) Early in the evolution of the movement the Central Office directed that all VC personnel, whether in a proselyting element or not, adhere to the following guidelines:

(a) Achieve a thorough understanding of VC political objectives, the land-reform program, the rural-administration program, and the physical-assistance program in order to spread these ideas intelligently among the masses.

(b) Treat all civilians as though they were members of one's own family. Whenever possible help the people with their chores, such as planting or harvesting the rice.

(c) When operating in areas controlled by the RVN be quick to point out the shortcomings of the incumbent government and the virtues of VC plans and programs.

(d) When operating in areas controlled by the VC seek to demonstrate good faith by implementing such programs as land reform. Take the land owned by adherents to the government and divide it among those who most actively support the VC cause.

(C) The civilian proselyting elements were instructed to systematize their efforts by classifying the people in each operational area according to the following scale of sympathy with the insurgents:

(a) Negative civilian: one whose attitude may range from indifferent to hostile.

(b) Receptive civilian: one who is willing to listen to, and occasionally accept, VC ideas.

(c) Sympathetic civilian: one who tends to identify himself with the insurgent cause.
(d) Committed civilian: one who preaches the party line and occasionally helps to implement it.

(e) Zealous civilian: one who takes the initiative in attaining VC objectives.

(C) As was the case in the military and civil servant proselyting programs, civilians were to be exploited wherever possible to expand the VC movement. In particular the policy guidance urged that the masses be pressed to demonstrate against the incumbent government, furnish intelligence on the enemy, assist VC agents with their tasks, and give financial support.

(C) The implementation of VC policy along the foregoing lines apparently left something to be desired on occasion. One source puts it this way:

... it is the people living in the [VC] controlled areas who are most mercilessly exploited... they have to... act and think in [the] manner set forth by the VC cadre [and] attend tedious political sessions which normally last until very late at night. Besides the heavy taxes to be paid annually they are forced to share their income with the VC under various forms of fund drive including the so-called "Anti-American or Resistance Rice Pot." ... they are frequently used as laborers to move military supplies, construct roads and other labor projects without pay and sometimes [at] the risk of their life. Last but not least, they are forced to join VC military units whenever their enlistment does not [interfere with] local economic production.

THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) A great deal has been written in the press and elsewhere about the National Liberation Front and will not be repeated here. The authors of this paper are convinced that this organization is exactly what its name implies. It is a front, or cover organization, for the Vietnamese Communist Party. Its mission is to sell the party line to the masses by appeal to social, professional, religious, and ethnic groups in the RVN and to present to the outside world a facsimile of a popularly supported rival nationalistic group that opposes the GVN. The National Liberation Front is designed to provide the public face for the Communist regime, which seeks to oust the incumbent government. When one deals with the Central Committee of the NFSLVN, one is dealing with an organ of the Communist Party, whether it is labeled "Workers' Party" as in North Vietnam or "People's Revolutionary Party" as it is in the south. Unfortunately many members of the National Liberation Front did not appear to recognize the fact that their organization was a creature of the Communist apparatus, although recently the association has become more overt.

(U) The most prominent elements of the National Liberation Front since its creation in late 1960 have had as their target audiences the farmers, women, and youths of the RVN. In addition to these so-called "liberation associations," represented in the Special Zone, there are many others. A listing of the principal associations follows:

The Association of Farmers for the Liberation of South Vietnam
The Women's Liberation Association
The Youth Liberation Association
The South Vietnam Liberation Students' Union
The Writers' and Artists' Liberation Association

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The Liberation Journalists' Association
The Veterans of the Indochina War
The Liberation Press Agency
The Liberation Broadcasting Net
The Liberation Federation of Trade Unions
The Liberation Workers' Association
The National Front for the Liberation of Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh
The Bourgeoisie Intellectual Front

As is always the case, translators differ in their selection of the correct English word; consequently the authors have taken a few liberties with the terminology which, it is hoped, will identify the target audience most clearly. There is some likelihood that in an effort to be thorough, the authors have shown the same association more than once by different names; however, a careful check of leaders' names has been made where possible to preclude error. It is interesting to note that few references are found to religious or ethnic associations in the Special Zone.

(U) The roles of the liberation associations seem to have duplicated those of the proselyting and propaganda elements of the Special Zone Committee, particularly in areas such as Cu Chi District where the VC held a degree of control. Most evidence indicates that the Committee's Civilian Proselyting Section maintained close coordination with the National Liberation Front.

ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PROSELYTING IN THE SPECIAL ZONE

(C) There is adequate evidence that the VC have been seeking proselytes among the people of the Special Zone area since July 1954. There is, however, little solid information on the detailed organization and operation of the Special Zone's Civilian Proselyting Section as it is represented in Fig. 3. Clues to the existence of a civilian proselyting staff element in the Special Zone Committee structure are furnished by an analysis of the personalities involved and the code designations or cover numbers, which turned up during the period 1960-1966.

(C) It is clear that a certain "Sau Khiem" was in charge of civilian proselyting for the Special Zone in 1961, 1962, and 1964. One of his subordinates was Nguyen Van Tron, who went by many names—the most common of which seems to have been "Ba Minh." Nguyen Van Tron was involved in civilian proselyting from 1960 until he was captured in November 1964 when he furnished this information, which is quoted from an interrogation report:

In general, the rural (village and hamlet) organizations, such as the farmers', youths' and women's organizations, had their own executive committees and cadre sections, which were under the direct supervision of the Village Party Chapter Committee [i.e., in the Special Zone's chain of command, not the National Liberation Front's]. . . . The executive Committees of the Farmers', Youths', or Women's Liberation Associations [i.e., National Liberation Front elements] were staffed by cadre from the Farmers', Youths', or Women's Proselyting Sections of the Village Party Chapter Committee. Consequently, the chain of command for these [National Liberation Front] Associations at the hamlets [level] extended to the respective organizations at the village [level], then to the Farmers', Youths', or Women's Proselyting Sections of the Village Party Chapter Committee, and in turn to the respective [proselyting] sections at the District Party Committee [and Special Zone Committee].

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(U) This paragraph makes good sense out of the relation between the professional proselyters and the cover organization known as the NFLSVN. If the information is accurate, and there appears to be no reason to think otherwise, the civilian proselyting program in the Special Zone was implemented through an organizational setup such as that shown in Fig. 8.

![Diagram](image)

(C) As time went on the VC found an increasing need for specialization in proselyting among the masses. If the evolution of the civilian proselyting organization is traced through the years on which sufficient data are available, in the early 1960's there appear to have been three subdivisions of the Special Zone's Civilian Proselyting Section. The organization probably looked something like that shown in Fig. 9. As previously noted, evidence indicates that during this early period in the evolution of the Special Zone Committee the Central Office for SVN furnished a cadre to help the proselyting program get started. As infiltration groups arrived in SVN, trained proselyters were assigned to the staffs of the various regions, and thus the Special Zone staff was gradually filled out. Apparently special attention was devoted to civilian

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proselyting activities in Saigon. Figure 10 shows an analysis of personalities, cover numbers, and other evidence that existed in the capital city in 1962. Part of the cadre operated in the city itself, but each team appears to have maintained headquarters in a safe area in Cu Chi District where the Special Zone Committee maintained its headquarters.

![Diagram of Civilian Proselyting Organization](image)

Fig. 9—The Special Zone Committee’s Civilian Proselyting Section circa 1960

![Diagram of Civilian Proselyting Organization](image)

Fig. 10—Organization for Civilian Proselyting in the City of Saigon in 1962

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The data support the thesis that the Civilian Proselyting Section maintained the organization outlined in the preceding paragraphs through 1964. The rural areas of the Special Zone were worked by the three branches: youths, farmers, and women. Proselyting of civilians in the city was conducted by the five technical teams, which concentrated their efforts on property owners and intellectuals, Chinese residents, city workers, youth and students, and writers and artists. Each of these aspects of proselyting is considered separately later in this paper.

In January 1966 the US 173d Bde captured a VC document in the form of a personal notebook. The notebook contained a list of the staff sections of the Special Zone Committee along with their previous cover numbers and a complete set of new cover numbers noted “effective 1 June 1965” (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff section</th>
<th>Previous cover numbers</th>
<th>1 June 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Proselyting</td>
<td>D.305, N.410</td>
<td>Y.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Proselyting</td>
<td>D.309, N.414</td>
<td>Y.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer Proselyting</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Y.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Proselyting</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Y.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Proselyting</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Y.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Y.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie Proselyting</td>
<td>A.532, Q.802</td>
<td>Y.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Resident Proselyting</td>
<td>A.534, Q.804, PH.108</td>
<td>Y.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Proselyting</td>
<td>A.531, Q.801</td>
<td>Y.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker Proselyting</td>
<td>A.530, Q.800, PH.103</td>
<td>Y.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers and Artists Proselyting</td>
<td>A.533, Q.802</td>
<td>Y.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Women Proselyting</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conspicuous by its absence was a new cover number for the Civilian Proselyting Section; however, an entry appeared in the list labeled only “Front,” which showed no previous cover numbers. Although the notebook suggests no subordination, other evidence indicates that this Front was a new name for the Civilian Proselyting Section. As stated earlier, it is not particularly logical to conclude that each of the 11 nonmilitary proselyting sections shown in Table 1 reported directly to the Special Zone Committee; there must have been an intermediate echelon, at least for those elements concerned with proselyting among the masses. The authors are inclined to accept the hypothesis that the Front was such an echelon. The addresses appearing on captured correspondence tend to support such a conclusion as does at least one source. As of 1 Jun 65 the organization chart for civilian proselyting in the Special Zone must have looked something like Fig. 11. There is little evidence to indicate that this structure has undergone significant change since that time.
PROSELYTING WORKERS

(C) As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, worker proselyting activities were concentrated from the outset in Saigon. Rural workers were, in effect, mostly the concern of the Farmer Proselyting Section. City workers employed in such installations as the Navy Yard, the Nha Be Shell Oil Company, and the Khanh Hoi Commercial Port were obviously profitable targets for the VC proselyters. Converts who could be persuaded to remain in place would be able to provide valuable intelligence and to perform covert sabotage and terrorist missions from their vantage points within these key installations.

(C) The translation of a document seized on a VC courier in May 1964 set the tone for worker proselyting:

The workers are the strong foundation of the National Front for the liberation [of SVN] in the cities and are the strongest backing of our Party.

The way the struggle is going at present is along the lines of . . . urban revolution . . . cities are the centers of the political campaigns. . . .

The same document emphasizes the value of worker proselytes who are employed "... everyday in the key economic installations of the enemy, in communication and transportation enterprises, . . ." The author of this document then singles out the workers of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area as being particularly aware of the class struggle and consequently especially vulnerable to the proselyter.

(C) Worker proselyting agencies were assigned missions as follows:

(a) Educate and propagandize the working masses in their rights to employment, good wages, and labor unions. Encourage them to resist relocation, taxes, and the draft.

(b) Proselyte and organize the workers so that when the time is ripe they can be used to isolate the enemy by controlling the key industries and public utilities.
(c) Recruit Communist Party members and build up the Liberation Labor Association.

(C) The city workers proselyting agency, or Technical Team A.530, was organized for operations in Saigon in 1961. The Special Zone Committee, heading the guidance on the subject relative to the importance of securing the support of city workers, assigned two members of its own standing committee to head the team. As noted earlier in the discussion of civil servant proselyting, these two were known by the pseudonyms Chin K and Tu Nam. Their names have appeared consistently in connection with worker proselyting activities in Saigon through 1964.

(C) As was the case with most of the staff sections of the Special Zone Committee, the headquarters of the Worker Proselyting Section was maintained well outside the city and probably moved about from time to time as enemy search operations dictated. For quite some time the base of operations was at Phu Hoa Hamlet in Phu My Hung Village of the VC Cu Chi District about 30 miles northwest of Saigon. Chin K and Tu Nam apparently were in the habit of spending a month or so in the city working with their cadre and then returning to Phu Hoa or making liaison visits to the Central Office in Tay Ninh Province. The cadre, most of whom enjoyed identification papers acceptable to the city police, remained in Saigon.

PROSLEYTING YOUTHS AND STUDENTS

(C) The data suggest that the Special Zone Committee placed more emphasis on youth proselyting in the city than it did in rural areas. Various sources refer to the staff agency concerned with working in Saigon as the "Youth, College and High School Students Proselyting Section," and it follows that the situation in the Special Zone was such that Saigon would certainly have offered a larger target audience of students than would the villages. The sources available for this study give no clear picture of the organizational demarkation between urban- and rural-youth proselyting though there is adequate information concerning operations in Saigon and on youth proselyting in general. One must conclude that youth proselyting in the villages was conducted separately from that in the city and that the two branches reported to the Youth Proselyting Section of the Special Zone staff. Before the establishment of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, youth proselyting was the responsibility of a subsection of the Gia Dinh Provincial Committee's Civilian Proselyting Section.

(C) One primary source of information on VC policy with respect to youth proselyting is a document captured in July 1965. The document, a 45-page draft instruction booklet, "Method of Youth Proselyting," bears no date but the author is attempting to sum up Communist and VC experience in the field over a number of years. A second potentially valuable source of information relating to the Special Zone's youth proselyting is the testimony of the same Nguyen Van Tron who was mentioned earlier. Tron was chief of the Youth Proselyting Section in 1963 and 1964 but was captured in November 1964.

(C) The booklet "Method of Youth Proselyting" appears to be worth drawing on rather extensively, but like all Communist literature, requires considerable editing if quoted for capitalist consumption. The preface to the booklet
indicates that it was prepared as a guide for use in the training of village and district party youth group cadres. The contents are in the form of lessons to be instilled in the student during his indoctrination and are rife with long-winded Communist philosophy and primerlike detailed instructions. The policy message that emerges from the 45 pages is summarized in the following paragraphs.

(C) The proselyter must recognize straightaway that youths do not constitute a class; they are a group of young persons with widely divergent social backgrounds and are held together only by their common interests as youths. Youthful character and ideology are highly malleable, but he who seeks to mold the youth and make him a proselyte has a complicated and demanding task that calls for considerable investigation and study of the youth’s motivation. Always keep in mind that youths seek change and self-improvement; they are the first to initiate new ideas. If these ideas are to be channeled in support of the VC, the proselyter must have a more thorough and realistic understanding of the cause than is needed for any other activity.

(C) Youth proselyting is to be conducted in five phases:

(1) Seek out and study the target.
(2) Propagandize the target.
(3) Organize the converts.
(4) Train the group thus organized.
(5) Lead the group into the struggle.

Each of these phases is to be implemented according to the following plan:

(C) First the proselyter must understand the motivation of his target intimately, be it a lone youth, a youth organization, an occurrence involving young people such as an antidraft demonstration, or youth in a specific locale. He must assess the people’s attitude toward the target or activity and seek to bend it toward support of the VC or to arrest it if it tends toward support of the GVN. In all cases the proselyter must go slowly and exercise extreme patience. He must be thorough, knowledgeable, and specific in order that he might be convincing and sincere. Complete familiarity with the target is achieved best by serious effort and hard work rather than through clever methods and techniques.

(C) In discussing the second phase, propaganda activity in relation to proselyting among youthful audiences, it is noted that the youth group is a discrete element of the masses. The nature of youth is characterized as “...enthusiastic, effervescent, and fond of new things.” It is pointed out that “...to initiate a youth movement is to create many favorable conditions for the...” whole civilian proselyting program. Many platitudes, loaded words, and instructions follow on how to make up slogans and establish propaganda networks among the youth. Of particular interest is a set of instructions on how the youth proselyter is to go about his job:

Propagandize by word-of-mouth and keep it brief.
Gather five to seven youths of common background (geographical, ethnic, religious) together for discussion that you guide by appropriate questions. Allow free expression of opinion and provide an opportunity for music, singing, and newspaper reading.
Occasionally organize a rally with entertainment and sports that will entice large crowds, predominantly youthful, to gather where you can
propagandize them. Do not do this during the harvest when the young people should be working.

Select likely youths to organize "assault propaganda teams" to carry on work for you in the hamlets.

Seize the opportunity afforded by holidays and memorial occasions to cause gatherings where youth can discuss political and social problems, sports, and music under your guidance. Make them feel interested in and part of the VC movement.

Highlight the "...crimes of the Americans and their lackeys committed against youth." Heroic examples of VC youth activity should be written up in stories for brochures that can be circulated regularly among the youth.

After detailing these instructions the author of the booklet proceeds to discuss the third phase of the youth proselyting program—that of organization. He notes many obvious virtues of organized action and cites several points pertaining specifically to youth:

- Youths are enthusiastic activists; they are fond of group activity on a modern basis in their daily lives.
- By organization we can mold youthful opinion in support of the VC and provide support for the activities of the National Liberation Front.
- We can better influence youths to resist the GVN if they are organized.

Be sure that no youth is forced into joining the organization; each must be sold on the idea and the leaders must be earmarked for use where best suited. Remain flexible in your method of appeal to various groupings of young people.

Starting at hamlet level, seek to organize groups of 5 to 20 youths. Create internal regulations and leadership with work assignments to be passed out to everyone. Encourage these youth groups at every level to donate a day's pay periodically to the party.

Encourage the most enthusiastic youths to be active in the Liberation Youth Association.

The discussion of the organization phase of youth proselyting ends with a word to the proselyter concerning his dual roles, one overt, the other covert. In his overt role the proselyter must conceal his party affiliation and play up his interest in the welfare of youth; he must exercise caution lest the police identify him as a VC agent thus destroying his freedom of movement.

The proselyter’s covert role is to select and organize secretly the most outstanding youths to form a trusted inner core that will be qualified to lead the various youth groups.

As for the fourth phase, training of youth organizations, it is pointed out that in addition to improving the youths’ level of education, training must popularize VC policy. The object of the training phase is to produce a number of key youth cadres to swell the ranks of the party. In general, training should be conducted in classes of short duration but with continuity. The more promising youths should be grouped for more intensive training; outstanding performance should be rewarded. Subject matter should include the following:

- The ideology and ethics of the VC and Communism.
- The mission and policies of the VC with respect to land reform, proselyting activity, and the National Liberation Front.
The mission of youth proselyters to include the five-stage approach (as set forth previously).

Basic familiarization with military operations and the use of simple weapons.

Finally, in the section that deals with the fifth phase, leading the youth groups into the struggle against the incumbent government, the author pulls out all the stops and plays the classical Communist tune. Unfortunately factual instructions for leading youth into the fight are pretty well obscured by the verbiage, but a few points emerge. "Our object [in the struggle] is to overthrow the imperialists and the feudalists [in order] to build socialism and communism." This seems a straightforward statement of purpose in which no attempt is made to hide behind nationalism. The proselyter is encouraged to lead his youth groups slowly and systematically into the struggle. Dashing exploits are not encouraged. Steady pressure on the government and willingness to accept hardship and delays are suggested as eventually bringing the revolution to a successful conclusion.

Following the establishment of the Special Zone it appears that the Youth Proselyting Section was organized as shown in Fig. 12. As pointed out earlier, the authors are unable to confirm the separation of urban and rural activity, but the evidence available does support this hypothesis.

![Organization Chart](image)

PROSELYTING WOMEN

Little detail is available on the Special Zone's organization for proselyting women. It can be stated with assurance that in the period of time between the creation of the Special Zone and about June 1965 there was a women's proselyting element in the Civilian Proselyting Section. This element, unlike the youth proselyting element, was responsible for recruiting in both urban and rural areas of the Special Zone.
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(C) It will be noted from Table 1 that when new cover numbers were assigned to various Special Zone staff sections effective 1 Jun 65, “Women's Proselyting” and an hitherto unlisted agency, “Market Women’s Proselyting,” appeared in the listing. It is again hard to convince oneself that the VC would not subordinate the operations of this new agency to the long-established Women’s Proselyting Section, which by 1965 must have trained a cadre that was as well versed in proselyting market women as it was in proselyting other groups. It is understandable that market women might be of special interest because the large markets of Saigon were favorite rendezvous for VC agents. The more support that could be elicited from the women who sold their produce, the safer would be the agents who came to exchange messages or to lead their colleagues to safe and secret areas in the countryside. It is also conceivable that the market women themselves, who had built-in excuses for traveling between the city and rural areas where their produce grew, would be used as couriers.

(U) As for policies and procedures pertaining to the proselyting of women, little can be added to those outlined at the beginning of this section.

PROSELYTING THE BOURGEOISIE AND INTELLECTUALS

(C) The function of proselyting among the bourgeoisie is ascribed at various periods in the evolution of the Special Zone apparatus by various translators to a staff subsection called “Property Owners and Intellectuals Proselyting Section” or “Bourgeoisie Proselyting Branch.” It appears that initially, in or before 1961, there existed an element called the “Bourgeoisie Intellectual Front,” which was a label used by the National Liberation Front, or “Front Bourgeoisie Branch.” The obvious mission of this element was to attract the bourgeoisie and intellectuals to the VC cause. One source states that the chairman of the National Liberation Front in the Saigon area headed up the Bourgeoisie Intellectual Front in the city until he returned to the Central Office in late 1962. The agency was then integrated into the organizational structure of the Special Zone Committee and was referred to as the “Front Bourgeoisie Branch” with headquarters at An Phu Village in Cu Chi District about 30 miles northwest of the capital.

(U) Some time before 1963, bourgeoisie-proselyting activities became the responsibility of one of the five technical teams charged with proselyting activities in Saigon (see Fig. 10). Insofar as the Special Zone was concerned, the city undoubtedly furnished by far the largest target audience for this particular activity.

PROSELYTING WRITERS AND ARTISTS

(C) One knowledgeable source states that the Writers and Artists Branch of the Special Zone’s Civilian Proselyting Section, or Technical Team A.533 as it was known some time in 1962, recruited for the VC only among actors and playwrights. The source claims that the Special Zone’s propaganda section, of which he was a longtime member, was specially charged with proselyting
novelists, journalists, poets, and painters. This statement is borne out by the fact that the cadre of Technical Team A.533 and that of the Poets and Artists Branch of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section of the Special Zone Committee are identical according to the names given by several sources.

PROSELYTING CHINESE RESIDENTS

(U) As has long been the case in all Southeast Asia, the Chinese population of Vietnam dominated business activity. It became apparent to the VC early in their operations that the resident Chinese concentrated in Cholon and Saigon provided a large and profitable target for proselyting activities. Not only were there a great number of Chinese but most of them were wealthier than the average resident of the capital, and moreover they had many exploit- able grievances against the GVN.

(C) Organization for Chinese proselyting in SVN was virtually nonexistent except in the Special Zone as late as 1964, and the data examined suggest little change in this situation as late as 1966. Here, as was the case with the proselyting of workers, youth, bourgeoisie, and writers and artists, the Chinese residents in the city were the responsibility of a technical team. This team maintained its secure headquarters near Nhuu Duc Village in Cu Chi District about 25 miles northwest of Saigon.

(C) The Central Office for SVN provided guidance and training for proselyters of the Chinese residents of the capital. This policy played up the idea that the Chinese, as money-earners, were victimized by governmental tax policies and forced out of business by American imports. Training for the proselyters was furnished by the Central Office in a 5-month course conducted near the villages of Lo Go and Cha Ruot about 15 miles northwest of the city of Tay Ninh. One such class was composed of some 30 Saigonese of Chinese origin who were placed in the charge of a former native of Canton who had a staff consisting largely of ex-convicts, also of Chinese antecedents. Lesson plans were written in Chinese and covered such matters as inspiring hate for the Americans and the evils and exploitations of capitalism, and extolling the virtues of communism.

(C) As noted earlier, organization and training in the Special Zone in 1962 was the responsibility of the Committee's Chinese Proselyting Branch or Technical Team A.534. According to a 1963 VC report on the subject the team had organized five party chapters with total membership of 56 resident Chinese by 1962. In addition some 43 Chinese-worker cells totaling 147 persons had been organized under the cloak of the National Liberation Front. The report states that there were, in addition to the cell members, "...489 sympathizers. They are [as] enthusiastic as the members in all activities." Apparently the VC were successful in enlisting support or sympathy among the labor unions with Chinese membership because the same report states that "Four out of the 22 Labor Unions are under our total control, and 10 others with more than 5000 members are under our influence." The 1962 Chinese workers in Saigon and Cholon contributed nearly $2000 to the Communist Party in the Special Zone and during Tet alone in 1963 they contributed more than $1000.
(C) The cadre of the Chinese Proselyting Branch, like other cadres, managed to operate undetected in the city by using the cover afforded them by legal employment. In 1962, 12 small training courses of about a week each were conducted in the city using the standard Communist lesson plan.

PROSELYTING FARMERS

(C) The Farmer Proselyting Branch of the Special Zone (and its predecessor) seems to have been in continuous existence from at least 1959 to 1966. Judging from the experience in proselyting operations of the men who were known to head the farmers branch, the Special Zone Committee must have considered the farmer target audience to be an important one. Some feel for policy can be derived from the following extracts:

The [SVN] Revolution is a Farmer's Revolution directed by the working class.22 Although urban areas are vital to victory, rural areas are important to the long range policy.23 At present, most of the rural population consists of...farmers and peasants therefore we should unite [with them] to attract other classes in the rural area.22 To speak of peasants is to speak of the land...any solution of land problems in the rural area...[should be designed to]...safeguard the [farmer's] will to fight.22

Apparently the "solution of land problems" was to be guided by the standing VC land-reform policies which might be summarized as follows:

- Give the landless farmers ownership of land from which the landlord is absent or which belongs to the government.
- Protect the new owner's possession of the land.
- Recognize resident landowners but prevent them from exploiting the farmers by charging high rents.23

(C) All farmers 25 years of age or over were required to join the Liberation Front's farmers' associations in areas under VC control. This enabled the VC cadre of the village executive committees that controlled the farmers' associations to sell the party line and to proselyte the farmers as food suppliers and cargo handlers without revealing their party affiliations until they were assured of the farmers' loyalty to the cause.16,18 A cadre member of two such executive committees during the period 1960–1965 reports that seven landless farmers were given about 4300 sq ft apiece to cultivate, that two extra crops were produced, and that in 3 years the farmers' association members contributed $750 that found its way into the local Communist Party coffers.19

COORDINATION OF THE PROGRAMS

(U) Despite the wealth of material available on the subject of insurgent programs to acquire proselytes among the masses, it is very difficult to avoid great areas of fuzziness in attempting to reconstruct the evolution of the overall civilian proselyting apparatus. In the first place, the distinction between propaganda and proselyting seems almost to disappear when one studies the
VC sources on the subjects. Second, the roles of the various associations spawned by the NLFSVN appear almost to merge in certain areas with the missions of the multiple arms of the Civilian Proselyting Section in the Saigon–Gia Dinh Special Zone. Third, as pointed out earlier, there seems to be some confusion among the sources as to the subordination of the various civilian proselyting elements and the echelon at which they operated. As previously stated, the authors are convinced that there is a staff section, whether it be called military, civilian, or whatnot, that supervises and coordinates the implementation of VC policy with respect to proselyting among the masses.
CONCLUSIONS

(U) The conclusions that grow out of this study can be grouped under two headings: those relating to the VC proselyting program in the Special Zone and those bearing on the data and its manipulation.

THE PROSELYTING PROGRAM

(U) 1. VC strategy dictated initially that the Vietnamese government could be ousted by an equally weighted three-pronged attack utilizing military force, political persuasion, and subversion of the several strata of South Vietnamese society.

(U) 2. In order to mount the third prong of the attack in the Special Zone programs were devised to proselyte among the Vietnamese military, government, and private sectors. Within the private sector, proselyting was tailored to appeal specifically to people in various social, professional, and cultural subgroupings.

(U) 3. The role of the NFLSVN in relation to that of the Communist proselyting apparatus is subordinate. The Front is used as a mask by the Communists for the benefit of the South Vietnamese and foreign countries.

DATA AND ITS MANIPULATION

(C) 4. Ample data for detailed study of the VC proselyting apparatus have been collected; no new requirements for collection need be levied to complete such a study.

(C) 5. Retrieval of data in the hands of US agencies poses no particular problems.

(C) 6. Retrieval of data in Vietnamese hands requires a major effort involving lengthy library searches, cataloging, and translation.
Appendix A

SOME VIET CONG PERSONALITIES IDENTIFIED WITH PROSELYTING IN THE SPECIAL ZONE
Anh.* Teachers’ proselyting cadre from 1965-1966; he had been arrested at the end of 1960 and in 1966 was again confined in Thu Duc jail.

Ba. Born in Phu Nhuan, Saigon, in 1942, he was a typist and guard for the Y.72 Front Civilian Proselyting Committee in late 1964. He attended fourth-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: height 165 cm; light build; round face; light complexion. Single.

Ba Hoang. He was a member of the Civilian Proselyting Section of Cu Chi District in 1966.

Ba Hung. He was assistant secretary and section chief of the Front Civilian Proselyting Section 32A, Lai Thieu District Party Committee.

Ba Huon. Born in Hoc Mon District of Gia Dinh Province in 1922, he was a cadre and security agent of the Y.64 Military Proselyting Section in 1964. Physical characteristics: height 165 cm; medium build; long gray hair; dark complexion.

Ba Pho. He was the person in charge of military proselyting in the Thu Duc District Party Committee of the Special Zone.

Ba Tam. He was Executive Committee cadre of the Students Association in the Front Civilian Proselyting Section 32A, Lai Thieu District Party Committee.

Ba Thanh. In 1965 he was the leader of the Civilian Proselyting element and a cadre in the Youth Proselyting Department of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee.

Ba Thong. In late 1964 he was acting chief of the “Nam Truong” Military Proselyting Unit.

Ba Tu. Chief of the Rural Branch, Military Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee, he was transferred to the position of cadre of T4 Organization Section Y.64 from 1964 until December 1965.

Sau Keo Banh. Possibly known also as Nguyen Thi Phan or Nguyen Thi Sau, she was born in An Nhon Tay Village in the early 1930’s. In 1964 she was identified as chief of the Y.71 Women’s Proselyting Committee and former chief of the North Province Civilian Proselyting Section of the Special Zone.

*Real names, when given, are in parentheses. All others are pseudonyms.
1. RAC-TP-299, "The Viet Cong Proselyting Program in the Saigon-GIA Dinh Special Zone (U)," was prepared by the Research Analysis Corporation as a part of an Institutional Research Project.

2. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position. The data and conclusions contained in this study are somewhat outdated and in error. This was not the fault of the analysis performed, but rather was somewhat unavoidable in view of the limited material made available and the difficulty of this kind of analysis. In particular, the final three conclusions must be taken with great care.

3. However, the process discussed is an essential and underrated part of the enemy's program in South Vietnam and is also characteristic of communist activity elsewhere in the world. For this reason, the study has been forwarded to your office.

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Chief, Studies and Analyses Division
Bay Dong. Born in Phu Hoa District of Binh Duong Province in the late 1910's or 1920's, he was leader and cadre of a hamlet guerrilla unit for Civilian Proselyting in Phu Hoa District. Physical characteristics: height 155 cm; medium build; black hair; dark complexion. Married with one child.

Bay Hien. Born in Tan Phu Village, Hau Nghia Province, in 1914, he was a cadre of the Y.69 Farmers Proselyting Committee in 1964. Educated in a second-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: height 165 cm; heavy build; long hair; dark complexion.

Bay Hoa. He was deputy chief of the Military Proselyting Section, Military Staff, Military Affairs Committee, Special Zone Committee.

Bay Nhing. A member of the Anh Sau Troop Proselyting Cell, Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in the capital, he was captured in September 1963.

Bay Quan. He was a cadre in the Executive Committee of the Youth Association, Civilian Proselyting Section 32A, Lai Thieu District Party Committee.

Chin. In 1966 she was a member of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Cu Chi District.

Chin Meo. In 1962 he was a member of the Anh Sau Troop Proselyting Cell, Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in Saigon.

Chin Thay. He was a member of the Lai Thieu District Party Committee’s Military Proselyting Section.

Di Nam. An urban liaison agent operating in Saigon for the Anh Nam Troop Proselyting Cell, Civilian Proselyting Section D.105, Special Zone Committee, he was captured 24 Aug 63.

(Doan Thi Thao) Thiet. In mid-1962 she was a cadre for the Women Proselyting Section of An Nhon Tay Village, Cu Chi District, Gia Dinh Province.

(Doan Van Xe). A cadre of the VC Labor Union Proselyting Organization, in civilian life he was a worker of the Thanh Danh Tile Factory at 242 Cong Quynh Street, Saigon.

Dung. Born in Tan Hiep Village, Go Mon District of Gia Dinh, in 1944, he was an agent for the Civilian Proselyting Section Y.72 in late 1964. He attended third-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: height 160 cm; light weight; dark complexion.

Hai Coc. A member of the Anh Sau Troop Proselyting Cell, VC Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, he had been transferred from Nam Chau Cell and in late 1963 was captured.

Hai Gia, Can. Transferred from the Cu Chi District Military Proselyting Section, in late 1965 he was the cadre in charge of VC prison deserters for the Y.64 Military Proselyting Committee of the Special Zone.

Hai Ly. In 1964 he was deputy chief of Technical Team A.534 dealing with Chinese proselyting.

Hai Tao. In December 1965 he was an official of the Y.64 Military Proselyting Section’s Armed Squad operating in Saigon.

Hai Tro. In 1965 he was an escort of the civilian proselyting element of the Special Zone.
Hai Yen. A member of the Troop Proselyting Section and Military Intelligence Staff in Go Mon District, he was a Mobile Training cadre with Sau Vien.

(Ho Nguyen Van) Nam Ho. Chief of the An Thanh Village Workers Proselyting Section Y.76, Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province, in January 1967, he was born in the mid-1910’s, was married before 1954 in NVN, and from 1954 to 1963 was a member of the Saigon-Cholon Party Committee and the General Workers Union.

(Ho Van Lieng) Ut, Ron. In 1964 he was a cadre for the Military Proselyting Section of Nhon Duc Village, Hoc Mon District, Gia Dinh Province.

Hung. Born in Tan Hiep Village, Hoc Mon District of Gia Dinh Province, in 1944, he was an agent for the Front Civilian Proselyting Committee Y.72 of the Special Zone. He attended fourth-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: height 160 cm; medium build; round face; dark complexion.

Huynh Mai. A cadre of the Y.64 Military Proselyting Section, he was assigned to go on temporary duty to Cu Chi, Ben Cat, Trang Bang, and Go Mon from 4 Jul 65 to 4 Jan 66.

(Huynh Van Gom) Tru Huynh Minh. In late 1964 he was a member of the Youth Proselyting Section of Nhon Duc Village, Cu Chi District, Binh Duong Province.

(Huynh Van Manh) Quyet, Can. He was a member of the Youth Proselyting Party Chapter of Nhu Duc Village, Cu Chi District, Binh Duong Province in late 1964.

(Huynh Van Rua). A cadre of a VC Labor Union Proselyting Organization in Binh Hung Hoa Village, Tan Binh District, in civilian life he was foreman of the Thanh Danh Tile Factory in Saigon.

Khung. He was an agent for the VC Civilian Proselyting Section D.105, operating in Saigon.

(Kim Tuyen) Ba Kanh. Born in Phu An Hamlet, Phu Hoa Dong Village, Binh Duong Province in the 1920’s, she was a cadre of the Women’s Proselyting Committee Y.71 in 1964. She resided in Ho Bo Hamlet and attended second-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: medium build; dark complexion; black hair.

(Lam Van Tam) Ba Tam, Lenh. Born in Phu Hoa District of Binh Duong Province in 1932. He was a cadre in the Youth Proselyting Committee in 1964, and a former member of the Phu My Village party chapter. He attended third-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: height 165 cm; medium build; round face; light complexion.

(Lam Van Tam) Ba Tam. A cadre in the Youth Proselyting Section in 1964, he was supervised by Ba Minh.


Luu. He was an agent of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in the capital city.

(Ly Duy Kim) Minh Nguyen. A cadre for Buddhist proselyting in 1965, he had been arrested in April 1960 and currently is on Con Dao Island.

Ma Sau. She was an urban agent in the Anh Sau Troop Proselyting cell of the D.105 Civilian Proselyting Section operating in the capital city.

(Mai Tan Lay) Phuong Son. In January 1966 he was a Workers Proselyting Section cadre operating in Saigon.

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Muoi Hanh. From January–May 1962 she was a clerk and cadre for the Executive Committee of the Women's Association of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Ben Cat District Party Committee, Special Zone Committee, and at one time was also a cadre for the Lai Thieu District Party Committee's Training and Education Cell.

Muoi Hong, Thi Chua. Born in Thoi Hoa Village, she became section chief of the Executive Committee for the Women's Association of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Ben Cat District Party Committee, Special Zone Committee.

Muoi Ta. From 1964 until reported in early 1966, he was a cadre of the Gia Dinh Province Civilian Proselyting Section.

Nam Cham, Anh Nam, Nam Chau, Nam Chan. Leader of the Anh Nam Troop Proselyting Cell of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in Saigon, he was discharged in early 1963 by Tu Viet for infractions of discipline and in September of that year was captured.

Nam Thuc. Chief of Technical Team A.531 in charge of Youth Proselyting in Saigon in 1964, he was under the direction of Special Zone Committee deputy chairman Bay Binh.

Nam Truong. An official of the Special Zone Committee's Military Proselyting Section in January 1965.

Nam Vinh. A member of the Anh Sau Troop Proselyting Cell, Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in the capital city, he was captured on 3 Sep 63.

Nam Xe, Nam 'C'. In 1964 he was chief of the Farmers Proselyting Department, Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee. In 1963 he had remained with Ba Minh after an 8-month proselyting training course for an additional month's conference on population proselyting conducted by the Central Office.

(Nguyen Huu Thuan). A cadre of the Labor Union Proselyting Organization, in civilian life he was a worker at the Thanh Danh Tile Factory in Saigon.

Nguyen Thanh. A cadre in the Labor Union Proselyting Organization, he lived at 36 Thu Khoa Huan Street in Saigon and was a weaver by trade.

Hai Nhung (Nguyen Thi Nhung). In late 1966 she was a proselyting cell member in the Cu Chi District Civilian Proselyting Section of the Special Zone.

Sau, Sau Keo, Chi Sau Keo (Nguyen Thi Phan). Born in An Nhon Tay Village, Cu Chi District, in 1964 she was chief of the Women's Proselyting Department (Young Women Branch), Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee. In 1966 she was a member of the D.303 Organization Section using the name Nguyen Thi Phan, although still a proselyter and provincial party committee member of the Civilian Proselyting Section D.309.


(Nguyen Van Chi). In 1965 a cadre for intellectual proselyting and a professor, he was arrested in April 1960.

(Nguyen Van Cung) Nam Xe. Born in Xuan Thoi Thuong, Hoc Mon District, Gia Dinh Province, in 1914, he joined the VC in 1945 and in 1966 was chief of the Farmer's Proselyting Section Y.69. He resided in the Nhuan Duc Area of Ho Bo Hamlet and had attended second-form elementary school. His usual occupation was farmer.
(Nguyen Van Gat). A member of the Cu Chi District Military Proselyting Section of the Special Zone Committee.

(Nguyen Van Hai) Bay Chanh, Dia Ban. Born in Tan Son Hoa Village of Binh Tan District, in early 1966 he was chief of the Binh Tan District Military Proselyting Section.

(Nguyen Van Nha). He was the assistant chief of the Cu Chi District Civilian Proselyting Section for the Special Zone Committee.

(Nguyen Van Nham). Chief of the Cu Chi District Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee.

(Nguyen Van Nhut) Sau Nhut. He was a cadre in the Youth Proselyting Section in 1964 and was supervised by Ba Minh.

(Nguyen Van Tan) Ba Tan. A cadre of the T.4 Youth Proselyting Section in 1964, he was also supervised by Ba Minh.

(Nguyen Van Tanh) Ba Tanh. Born in Hoc Mon District, Gia Dinh Province, in 1929, in late 1964 he was a cadre of the Youth Proselyting Committee Y.70.

Physical characteristics: dark complexion; heavy build; round face.

(Nguyen Van Thu) Nam Thu. Born in Hadong/HaNam, North Vietnam, in 1924, in late 1965 he was a member of the Current Affairs Committee Y.700, political officer of the Military Affairs Committee Y.60, and chief of the Military Proselyting Committee Y.64 for the Special Zone Committee.

(Nguyen Van Tron) Nguyen Minh, Nguyen Thai, Ba Minh. Born in Nhon Duc Village, Hoc Mon District, Gia Dinh Province, in 1929, he joined the VC in 1960 and was sent to the Saigon–Gia Dinh Province Committee for a 6-month training course given by the Central Office in Youth Proselyting Activities, after which he remained with Nam Xe for a conference on population proselyting. In late 1963 he replaced Sau Tham in the Youth Proselyting Department of the Special Zone Committee’s Civilian Proselyting Section and in 1964 was its chief, in charge of the Young Man Branch in Saigon. He is also listed by one source as a village youth proselyting cadre and commander of the C.3 Operations Training Section in 1966. He was captured in late October 1964, and again in January 1966.

(Nguyen Xuan Nha) Huynh Trung Don, Nam. Cadre of the VC labor union proselyting organization, he was also foreman of Thanh Danh Tile Factory of 242 Cong Quynh Street in Saigon, and a Tuy Hoa District Communist Party member in Phu Yen Province.

(Pham Thi Yen). In 1965 she was cited as a cadre of the Intellectual Proselyting Section and a pharmacist. The wife of (Tran Buu Kiem), she joined the Communist Party in 1949 and was active in subversion in Saigon. One source, however, states that she was arrested in 1960 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

(Pham Van Luu) Ba Hoa Hung. A cadre in the VC Labor Union Proselyting Organization in Tan Son Hoa Village, Binh Tan District, he was also a labor worker of the Internal Services Section of the Prime Ministers Office.

(Pham Van Tan) Thanh Tan. In April 1962 he was a cadre in the Binh Chanh District Military Proselyting Section.

(Phan Van Sam). He was a member of the Cu Chi Military Proselyting Section in the Special Zone Committee.

Sanh. He was a member of the Cu Chi Civilian Proselyting Section of the Special Zone Committee.
Sau Ai, Sau Anh, Thi Anh. A cadre of the Military Proselyting Section; Tran Van Sau was possibly her husband.

Sau Gia, Sau Thom. Born in 1917, he was a military proselyter for the Central Office in 1964. In mid-1966 he became chief of the Military Proselyting Section Y.64 in the Special Zone and resided in Ho Bo Hamlet.

Sau Nut. Born in Trung Lap Village, Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province, in 1932, in late 1964 he was a cadre of the Youth Proselyting Committee Y.70 of the Special Zone Committee. In early 1966 he was cited as political officer of a village military unit and the Saigon-Cholon Youth Proselyting Committee’s Party chapter secretary.

Sau Tuyet. In 1964 he was a cadre in Technical Team A.531 for youth proselyting in the Special Zone and was in charge of information and press. Sau Vinh. In 1964 a cadre in Technical Team A.533 for writers and artists proselyting in the Special Zone, he was also in charge of leading city activities for the Poets and Artists Section D.302/5 of the Propaganda and Training Section.

Tam Tan. He was assistant chief of the Military Proselyting Section, Lai Thieu District Party Committee 34A.

Tam Trieu. A member of the T.A Military Proselyting Section, in 1964–1965 he was chief of the capital Military Proselyting Section.

Thanh Tam. She was a cadre of the Executive Committee, Women’s Association Civilian Proselyting Section 32A, in the Lai Thieu District Party Committee.

Thi Cuc. Born in Thanh Truyen Village, she was an assistant in the Executive Committee of the Women’s Association, Civilian Proselyting Section, Ben Cat District Party Committee.

Thi Loan, Loan. Previously a female cadre during the resistance in Chau Thanh District, Rach Gia Province, she was a VC proselyting cadre operating in the Saigon area in late 1960, sent by Dac in 1961 to proselyte Dinh Cong Det. She urged (Det) to go with her to My Hung area to attend a training course conducted by Sau Tri.

Thi Ly, Thi My, Thi Xe. A member of the Military Proselyting Section in March 1966, she resided in Tan Phu Trung Village, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province.

(To Van Khoi) Khoi Tran Van, Nam Phong. He was chief of the Military Proselyting Section in Trung Lap Village, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province.

(Tran Thi Tam). In late 1966 she was a cadre for the Cu Chi Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee.

(Tran Van Bay) Hai Nguyen, Anh Sau. Joined the VC with Nam Cham in February 1962 for training in troop proselyting; he worked in Saigon in the Anh Nam Troop Proselyting Cell of the Central Office Civilian Proselyting Section. In September 1962 he was ordered by Tu Viet to divorce himself from Nam Cham and become the leader of a cell called “Anh Sau Troop Proselyting Cell.” He resided in Saigon and was taken prisoner 14 Oct 64.

(Tran Van Nam) Tran Van The, Nam Lien. A cadre of the Civilian Proselyting Section, Binh Chanh Village, Trung District of Cholon in 1962.

Tu Bay. He was a member of the Cu Chi Civilian Proselyting Section, Special Zone Committee.
Tu Cuong, Bay An. Born in Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province, in the late 1920's she was a cadre in the Women's Proselyting Committee Y.71 in late 1964. She resided in the Xom Bung and Ho Bo area and had attended second-form elementary school.

Tu Duong. Born in 1931, he resided in the Ho Bo and Xom Bung area and in 1966 was a cadre in the Civilian Proselyting Committee of the Special Zone Committee.

Tu Hoa. He was a cadre of the Executive Committee, Public Association, Civilian Proselyting Section 32A of the Lai Thieu District Party Committee.

Tu Hong. Born in My Tho Village, Dinh Tuong Province, in 1914, she was a cadre of the Women Proselyting Committee Y.71 in late 1964. She attended third-form elementary school. Physical characteristics: medium build; long face; dark complexion.

Tu Mao. In March 1966 he was chief of the Military Proselyting Section in Tan Phu Trung Village, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province.

Tu Ngoan. A member of the Anh Nam Troop Proselyting Cell, VC Civilian Proselyting Section, Central Office, operating in the capital city, he was captured 3 Sep 63.


(Tuyet Huynh Thi) Hong Tam, Nhi Tam. Born in Phu My Hung Village, Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Province, she was a cadre of the Women's Proselyting Committee Y.71 and a member of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Liberation Women's Committee.

Ut Hoi. In late 1966 he was the political officer in charge of military proselyting for the Duc Hiep Village Party Committee, Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Province.

(Vo Hung Phuc) Thanh. A cadre in the Go Vap District's Worker's Proselyting Section, Gia Dinh Province, in January 1966.

Vu. He was the commanding officer of the Military Proselyting Section Y.64 in the Special Zone Committee.
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**Abstract**

The Viet Cong, at least in theory, attribute as much significance to proselyting activities among the South Vietnamese as they do to military activity or to political manipulation. To this end they organized their proselyting apparatus to deal with three population categories: the military, the civil service, and the masses. Ample data on the subject are already collected; much of it is translated and in American hands.
attack on three fronts
civil servant proselyting
military proselyting
National Liberation Front
NFLSVN
proselyting
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Region
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone
Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone
Special Zone
three-pronged attack
Viet Cong