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AGAM-P (M) (13 Aug 68) FOR OT ED 682315

4 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Air Cavalry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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AVDG-GC

24 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

   a. OPERATIONS.

   (1) During the period February through April 1968, the 101st Airborne Division has conducted combat operations in three of the four Corps Tactical Zones in the Republic of Vietnam, as well as the Capital Military District around Saigon. Elements of the Division have fought Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Regulars and Local Force units from the marshy rice lands southeast of Saigon to the mountainous jungles west of Hue. During the period, the Division has served as a Reaction Force, ready to deploy on a moment's notice to any location in Vietnam. At 310300 January 1968, the VC/NVA launched their Tet Offensive. During the early hours of the battle, a VC Sapper platoon breached the court-yard wall, placing a significant threat on the American Embassy, Saigon. A Ready Reaction Force from C-1-502 Inf was directed to conduct an air mobile assault to the roof top of the Embassy building, and to clear and secure the Embassy and surrounding area. After two attempts, the assault force was able to land on the HOT LZ at 010834 February. In less than 1 hour, the Embassy and surrounding area had been secured. The action resulted in 9 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's credited to the 101st Abn Troopers. There was one US casualty, a door gunner on one of the assault helicopters was wounded by SA fire.

   (2) Another example of the type of rapid reaction operations conducted by the Division occurred on the morning of 22 January when the Division was alerted for future operations and directed to send one brigade immediately to ICTZ. At that time, the 1st Bde was conducting operation SAN ANGELO in Phuoc Long Province near the Cambodian border; and the 3d Bde was conducting Operation MANCHESTER north of Bien Hoa. The 2d Bde, at the time, had just begun an air assault into the Michelin plantation area near Minh Thanh (XT 6367) to begin a reconnaissance in force operation in that area prior to Tet. At 220910 January, 1-501 Inf received its warning order while in flight to the Brigade AO. The aircraft were diverted and returned to Cu Chi from where the battalion deployed to Hue/Phu Bai the following day. The 2d Bde (-) followed immediately. The 2d Bde remained OPCON to III MAF and further OPCON to 1st Air Cav Div until 10 March 68. The activities of 2d Bde during the period 22 Jan - 10 Mar are included in the after action report at Inclosure 1.
AVOG-OC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSP(65) (RI)

(3) On 1 February the day after the initiation of the VC/NVA TET offensive, organic combat units under the control of the Division Headquarters were deployed as shown below:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CONTROL HEADQUARTERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>Song Be</td>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327 Inf</td>
<td>Song Be</td>
<td>1/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327 Inf</td>
<td>Tien Sa Nhut</td>
<td>CMD *(effective 2 Feb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>Song Be</td>
<td>1/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-506 Inf</td>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>IFFV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-506 Inf</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>3/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506 Inf</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>3/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-187 Inf</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>3/101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17 Cav</td>
<td>Song Be</td>
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In addition to the above, on 2 Feb 68, the Division received OPCON of the 199th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep) and the 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR, and further assumed responsibility for OPERATION UNICOTOWN with the task of providing for the defense of the Bien Hoa - Long Bien Complex. The After Action Report for the TET offensive and OPERATION UNICOTOWN are included in Inclosure 2. Concurrent with the VC/NVA TET offensive and subsequent operations in the Long Bien - Bien Hoa Area, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div also conducted an air move from Song Be to the Phu Bai OPCON to the III Marine Amphibious Force upon arrival. Availability of aircraft, weather conditions in the northern Corps area and other contributing factors required the move be conducted piece meal. On 9 Feb 1968, the Bde terminated OPERATION SAN ANGELO and began movement to I CTZ OPCON to III MAF. On 10 Feb, 1-327 Inf initiated air move from Bien Hoa to Hue Phu Bai. 2-502 Inf departed by sea on 13 Feb and on 19 Feb landed at Da Nang. 2-327 Inf moved from Bien Hoa to Hue Phu Bai. The 1st Bde remained OPCON to III MAF until 18 Mar, when OPCON returned to Div control, and they joined OPERATION CARPETSPAN I, southwest of Hue. The activities of the 1st Bde in I CTZ during the period 22 Feb - 18 Mar are covered at Inclosures 3, 4, 5, 6. During the period 17 February - 5 March the operations conducted by the Div Headquarters, with the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div; the 199th Inf Bde 'SEP' and the 2/11 Cav in II CTZ are covered in the Quarterly Evaluation Report for the 1st Quarter FY 68, at Inclosure 2.
AVDG-QG

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, AGS CSPOR-65 (RI)

(4) On 5 May 1968, operational control of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div and 2/11 Cav passed to HQ's I P P V and the Div HQ moved by air to Hue Phu Bai. The Division Tactical Operations Center opened, via YD 832145 on 6 May, OPCON to I P P V and at 062400 May, the Division assumed operational control of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div (YD 817147) and began Operation CARENTAN I. On 10 May, the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div (YD 637273) returned to Division control, and OPCON of the Division passed to the newly created Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV). At 180800 May the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was released from participation in OPERATION JEB STEWART and returned to Division control. The activities of the 1st Bde during operation JEB STEWART are covered in the combat after action report at Inclosure 6. With the return of the 1st Bde, the Division Task organization for combat in I CTZ was as shown below:

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div:
- 1-327 Inf
- 2-327 Inf
- 2-502 Inf

2d Bde, 101st Abn Div:
- 1-501 Inf
- 2-501 Inf
- 1-502 Inf

2d Bde, 82d Abn Div (Task Force):
- 1-505 Inf
- 2-505 Inf
- 1-508 Inf

2-17 Cavalry

(5) The 101st Abn Div officially started OPERATION CARENTAN I at 062400 when the Div HQ assumed control of the 3/82 Abn Div. The operation continued as the 2/101 Abn and 1/101 Abn joined the Div on 10 and 18 May respectively. CARENTAN I was a Regional Reconnaissance In Force operation conducted in the area generally from the Perfume River south of Hue City northeast to Camp Evans and from Huy QL-I, northeast to the Gulf of Tonkin. When the 1st Bde returned to Div control on 18 May the AO was extended south of Hue to vic East-West Grid 05 to include the area in which
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AVDG-GC  24 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period
ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

they had been working while in OP JEB STEWART. During the reporting period,
the Division has participated in three major unit operations: CARENTAN I,
CARENTAN II and DELAWARE. These operations are discussed below.

(6) OPERATION CARENTAN I: Operation Carentan I was initiated
082400H Mar, when the Division assumed operational control of 3d Bde, 82d
Abn Div. The operation was conducted IAW 101st Abn Div OPCORD 5-68 (CARENTAN)
at Inclosure 7. The mission of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy
forces, base areas and logistical installations in the assigned AO with
emphasis on interdicting enemy infiltration routes along Hwy 547. Concurrent
with the above, the Division assumed the responsibility for the external
security for the Tan My - Cocoa Beach port facility (YD 8232). The concept
of the operation is discussed at Inclosure 7. Unit activities during
Carentan I consisted of preparation and occupation of fire support bases
(FSB), mine sweep and road clearing operations, convoy escort missions and
after it joined the Div on 18 Mar, be an a reconnaissance in force Op to
the southwest astride Hwy 547 to clear the road and to interdict enemy in-
filtration from the southwest into Hue.

(7) CARENTAN II: Operation Carentan II was initiated on 1 April
as an extension of Carentan I rather than as an entirely new operation. The
mission remained the same with the additional requirement to extend the
Division AO to the west to include the areas and responsibilities previously
held by the 2d and 3d Brigades of the 1st ACD. This mission was designed to
facilitate the 1st Cav drive to open Hwy 9 and the relief of the Marines
at Khe Sanh Combat Base. The AO extension generally included the area be-
tween Hwy QL-1 and the Gulf of Tonkin from Camp Evans northwest to Hai Lang.
The concept of the operation is included in the 101st Abn Div OPCORD 7-68
(CARENTAN II) at Inclosure 8. The activities of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
Task Force in OPERATIONS CARENTAN I and CARENTAN II will be covered in the
ORLL which the Bde submits as a preparing agency. The activities of the 2d
Bde, 101st Abn Div in operations CARENTAN I & II will be covered in the
Inclosure 9. A review of these separate actions at this point would be
superfluous. However, several will be described below to point out the
techniques and methods of combat which are representative of the philosophy
and approach to successful operations employed by the Division during the
period.

(8) During the month of March, Division activities centered closely
around Hue. Unit activities were generally devoted to the establishment of
base camp facilities and positioning forces as the Divisional units returned
to Division control. Minor internal AO adjustments were made to facilitate
fire-control and maneuver coordination. Generally the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
was deployed to the northwest of Hue; the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div to the south
and southeast of Hue and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to the southwest of the
Imperial City. The terrain over which operation Carentan I & II was conducted

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was low, coastal rice land. The geographical area was characterized by low rolling sand dunes approximately 1 - 5 meters high with a labyrinth of rice paddy dikes and hedgerows interconnected, throughout, by canals and streams leading eventually into the Gulf of Tonkin. The major LOC's in the area, were Huy CI-1, Ha Noi 555 and 551, the "Street without Joy", the many canals and the Perfume River. The paddy dikes, and villages were found to be elaborately fortified, substantiating the fact that the area had been an enemy stronghold for many years. It was in this environment that Operation Carentan met the enemy. As units became more familiar with the terrain, and operations continued to expand throughout the area, several techniques and methods of operations began to emerge as being more successful than others. Operations were then keyed to exploit these revelations. Within short time 8 principle items had been identified as the most successful methods of meeting and destroying the enemy in this area. These 8 items have been identified as follows:

(a) Multiple actions.
(b) Continuous attack.
(c) Night fighting.
(d) No reserve.
(e) Maximum fire support.
(f) Mass rapidly on lucrative targets.
(g) Close coordination with ARVN.
(h) Special equipment.

(9) The methods are very briefly described as follows:

(a) MULTIPLE ACTIONS. The Infantry rifle company is the basic force conducting combat operations within the AO. Normally this has meant an average of approximately 25 company size operations in the field simultaneously. This provided maximum exposure of friendly troops and kept the enemy off balance by appearing to be everywhere at once.

(b) CONTINUOUS ATTACK. Very simply stated this means "relentless pursuit". Once contact has been established all available resources are used to maintain the pressure until the enemy is either captured or destroyed.

(c) NIGHT FIGHTING. It has been said that the night belongs to the enemy. This has proven to be true only if allowed to be. Night operations within the Division have taken two courses. One, all units throughout the AO, nightly establish extensive ambush positions astride enemy LOC's and suspected supply areas. The second common which Division night operations
have taken is the use of artificial illumination to take the advantage of darkness away from the enemy.

(d) NO RESERVE. A reserve in the classical sense has not been maintained. However, coupled with the concept of multiple company actions, is the principle that these companies operate in close proximity to each other and within range of rapid reinforcement. In effect, any company not in contact is thereby "in reserve".

(e) MASS RAPIDLY ON LUCRATIVE TARGETS. As soon as a unit has established contact with the enemy, all available modes of transportation are used to rapidly seal the enemy and prevent his exfiltration from the area. This includes movement by truck, by tracked vehicles and by foot, as well as by helicopter.

(f) MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT. Once contact has been made, all supporting fires are brought to bear upon the enemy to fix his position while reaction forces maneuver to cordon the area. These fires continue to pound the enemy and soften his defenses prior to assaulting the objective succinctly stated it means sacrifice rounds not bodies.

(g) CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ARVN. Close coordination with the 1st ARVN Division in Hue, and the RF/PF and National Force Police has proven very fruitful. These agencies have provided an exceptionally valuable intelligence source as well as added combat power in numerous combined actions.

(h) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT. Several items of equipment and techniques have particularly enhanced the combat operations on the coastal plains. The use of riot control agents has had very favorable results particularly the ES (CS) dispenser. Tactical aircraft have also uniquely supported pay-war operations. Airlifting 106cm recoilless rifles to support combat troops after contact has been established, and utilizing constant artificial illumination during darkness has been used to effectively prevent enemy forces from escaping under the concealment of darkness from an established cordon.

(10) The individual actions from which the analysis and identification of these methods was made are contained in the After Action Reports and Feeder Reports included in the inclosures to this report. No attempt will be made to re-address these separate actions here. Described below are examples which illustrate typical types of actions conducted during the Carentan Operation.

(11) **Typical Actions During CARENTAN I & II, 9 April**
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AVOG-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, 1GS CSFOR-0 (R1)

(a) Early in the afternoon on 9 April the 2d Bde Forward Air Controller observed what appeared to be 8-10 122mm rocket positions vic TD 5721. Arty and two tactical air strikes were employed against the suspected locations. A platoon from C-1-502 Inf was air-lifted into the area. As soon as the artillery was lifted the platoon was inserted at 1408 hrs to raid the area. The quick reaction resulted in 9x122mm rockets captured. The rockets had been positioned on bamboo rails and were aimed at Camp Evans.

(b) During the lst week in April the 2-501 Inf was securing Wunder Beach (TD 4935) and Fire Support Base HARDCOE vic TD 450510. Recon operations were conducted throughout the area to obtain information on enemy strengths and dispositions. On 10 April, hard intelligence indicated an enemy build up vic Thanh Phuoc Dien (YD 4748). In response to the intelligence information A-2-501 began a RIF from FSB HARDCOE to an attack position vic TD 471490 while D-2-501 conducted an air assault to an LZ vic YD 479481. Both companies began a coordinated attack on the village after artillery and TAC Air prepped the objective. At 1317, both companies established contact vic YD 472489 and YD 473482. TAC Air and artillery were employed, and, as ground contact continued it became obvious that the two companies were engaged with a sizable enemy force. At 1844, the battalion was relieved of its responsibility to secure the beach and firebase and immediately air-lifted B Co into the objective area to help establish a cordon around the enemy force prior to darkness. After the cordon was established, 81mm mortars were inserted to bolster the cordon. The three companies maintained 100% alert during the night and employed continuous illumination and artillery. Throughout the night the enemy employed SA/AW RPG and mortar fire in numerous unsuccessful attempts to escape the cordon. The following morning, helicopter gunships, artillery and seven 88 (CS) launchers were employed against the enemy position followed by TAC Air. At 1230 hrs, Co D and Co B (-) attacked the village from the southeast to northwest into the blocking positions of Co A and the remainder of Co B. The objective was swept by midafternoon meeting only scattered resistance. The entire operation resulted in 66 NVA KIA, 13 NVA WIA, 21 individual weapons and 5 crew served weapons captured, plus numerous munitions and miscellaneous equipment. The operation had dealt a significant blow to the 6th Bn, 812th NVA Regt. Friendly casualties were 7 KIA and 35 WIA.

(c) On the morning of 20 April the 2-17 Cav was deployed with Trp A conducting a dismounted reconnaissance in force vic TD 6029, South West of An Lo Bridge (TD 624302). 2d Platoon, A-3-5 Cav (attached to 2-17 Cav) was located at Le Bridge (TD6230), and Trp B, 2-17 Cav with one Platoon of M13 armored personnel carriers was conducting a reconnaissance in force operation northwest of An Lo Bridge. At 1045 hours, B Trp observed and engaged an NVA platoon vic TD 613326. B Troop continued to develop the contact determining that the enemy force was an NVA company. It was also discovered
that the stream between the enemy and Trp B was not fordable. (See figure 1, below). It was readily apparent that the enemy's position was bounded on the north and south by natural obstacles. Immediately Trp A was heli-lifted from its position southwest of An Lo bridge into an LZ via YD 612338 and then moved overland into a blocking position via YD 609332, thereby preventing any escape from the west. While A Trp was being lifted to position artillery and TAC Air placed withering fire on the enemy position. Simultaneously, B Trp moved around the marshy area on the south to attack the village from the east. As B Trp was moving into its attack position via YD 629335, the attached Cav Plt (2-3-5 Cav) moved from An Lo Bridge to join the attack, B Trp assaulted with the two mechanised platoons abreast and the infantry platoon following closely behind. By 1615, the entire village had been swept. The action resulted in 33 NVA KIA, 6 NVA WIA, 18 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. The entire operation resulted in only 5 US WIA (3 evacs).

(d) On 21 April, C & D 2-501 were conducting a reconnaissance in force operation via YD 7350 in response to intelligence build up in the area. At 1445 hrs Co C observed 2 VC via YD 734311. The company engaged the enemy killing one and capturing one AE-47. The company pursued the enemy into the village of Thon Kim Doi (YD 7331) where they established contact with an enemy platoon. Co C deployed along the southeast corner of the village employing heavy artillery and 4 tactical airstrikes against the enemy position. As the contact developed, the enemy employed AW, 84mm RPG and 82mm mortar fire against the friendly forces. Co D working adjacent to Co C moved in around the northeast side of the village. The enemy forces was further evaluated to be a company and just prior to darkness Companies A & B 2-501 Inf were heli-lifted into the northwest and southwest sides of the village, respectively. The cordon was completed at 1910. Artillery and continuous artificial flareship illumination were employed throughout the night. During the night, the enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to escape the cordon. The enemy's persistent attempts to escape, however, further reinforced the fact that a sizeable force had been trapped in the cordon. At first light, as the friendly forces began closing into the village they again received heavy AW/RPG and mortar fire. Heavy artillery and 6 TAC Air strikes were employed throughout the day. Captured documents indicated that the enemy force was the 4th Company (heavy weapons) of the 812th NVA Regt. The attacking forces continued to meet stiff resistance as the action continued into the late afternoon. At 1716 hours the 1st ARVN Division Recon Company (The Black Panther Forces) was heli-lifted in to join the southern portion of the cordon, and the 222 RP Company moved overland from Quang Dien via YD 6833 to join the cordon in the north. 47 NVA were killed during the day as the contact continued into the night. The cordon was continued as artillery/sustained continuous illumination and bombarded the enemy positions throughout the second night of contact. A reduction in enemy resistance was noted and at first light the village was powerd with artillery and TAC Air, then companies A & D attacked from the north.
through the village towards the blocking positions on the south. The
operation resulted in 74 NVA KIA, 1 NVA/WIA and 13 weapons captured or
destroyed. Friendly casualties for the entire 3 day operation were 12 US WIA.

(e) Approximately 1100 hrs, 28 April the 1st ARVN Div Recon
Company, while operating in close coordination with Div forces along the Song
Bo River vic TD 6929 reported a significant enemy force located vic TD 6928.
Reacting in response to this report, 1-501 Inf with 4 rifle companies and 3
platoons of popular force troops moved overland and by helicopter to estab-
lish a cordon around the area. (See figure 2, below). The rapid response
caught the enemy by surprise. During the remainder of the afternoon and
throughout the night, the enemy attempted to escape the cordon. Each attempt
was repulsed utilizing tremendous amounts of heavy artillery, helicopter gun-
ships and continuous artificial illumination during the night. The follow-
ing morning (29 April), the friendly forces in the northern "neck" of the
cordon began to push into the village. Immediately they met stiff resistance
from enemy forces with SA/AW/RPG in fortified bunkers. The battle raged
throughout the entire day with allied forces making little progress. D-1-501 Inf
was inserted into the cordon to bolster the northern position. M206 recoil-
less rifles and 81mm mortars were air lifted in to add additional fire power
as TAC Air and artillery continued to pound the fortified enemy. ES (CS)
dispersers were also inserted and integrated into the cordon as plans were
made to attack the following morning. The actions on 29 April accounted for
64 enemy dead. Throughout the night, the enemy continued his violent, yet
unsuccessful attempts to escape. The enemy estimated at battalion size
massed AW/RPG and mortar fire while trying to rush a platoon size force
through the cordon vic TD 69428. Recoilless rifles and claymore mines were
an effective deterrent to the would-be escapees. The artificial illumination
and heavy artillery continued throughout the night. The enemy resistance
was beginning to fade although savage fighting continued all day 30 April.
Contact continued during the night of 30 April - 1 May. Twice during the night,
enemy forces tried to escape the cordon but were driven back. A Hoi Chanh
who rallied during the contact and several PW's identified the enemy unit as
the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt. Early in the morning, a psywar appeal was made
by a loudspeaker to the trapped enemy. The psywar operation was made
in conjunction with the TAC Air Strikes on the village. After several air strikes
had been made, the Hoi Chanh made an appeal to the trapped enemy to surrender.
After a pause, the forward air controller would direct a long, low, screaming
pass over the village, then the loudspeaker made another appeal for
surrender telling the trapped soldiers that the next pass would be for real.
Sufficient time was given for believers to react then the aircraft were directed
in "live" to further convince any doubters. This technique directly influenced
the 95 NVA/PW's who surrendered during the day. The psyops mission was
followed by a CS drop and more tactical air strikes. The enemy had weakened
considerably as substantial advances were made into the village and the
cordon was further consolidated. The day's action resulted in an additional
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111 NVA KIA, and 75 weapons captured. Continuous pressure was maintained throughout the night of 1-2 May. Enemy attempts to escape decreased and his fire power was considerably reduced as artillery and TAC Air had eliminated his indirect weapons. PF's indicated heavy casualties had been sustained and the remainder had been without food for several days. On 2 May the sweep of the village was completed. For several more days friendly elements remained in the area to search the area for weapons and other items of intelligence value. The total results of this highly successful operation netted 314 NVA KIA, 107 NVA/PoW's and 103 weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA, 21 WIA (17 NVA). Investigation after the action confirmed that the enemy unit was the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt and that during the action the Bn Commander, Executive Officer and 3 Company Commanders had been killed. The five day operation had rendered the enemy battalion virtually ineffective for a considerable period of time.

12 The actions cited above are by no means the only actions conducted during the period. These actions account for a small portion of the 1882 enemy killed during the operation. They do, however, point out the methods which have been successfully employed by the Division in the coastal plains around Hue. These methods are significant in that they are simple, comprehensive, interrelated and, most significantly, that they were successful. There is one additional principle that has also greatly enhanced these operations; that is, the extension of "night operations" to include a network of ambush sites established nightly throughout the AO. The Division has averaged 50 squad/platoon size ambush positions each night. In operation CARENTAN I & II, these night operations have accounted for approximately 60% of the total fighting for the period. A more detailed account of enemy casualty and equipment losses during the period is included at paragraph c (Intelligence) below, Operation CARENTAN II continues through the end of the reporting period.

13 OPERATION DELAWARE: Operation DELAWARE began 190000H April 1968 as a one brigade operation into the mountainous jungle astride Hwy 547, southwest of Hue. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div conducted the operation IAW Division CPGRD 11-68 (DELAWARE) at Inclosure 10. The operation was designed to compliment the 1st ACR assault into the Ashau Valley. The mission of the 1st Bde was to conduct ground and airmobile assaults southwest from FSB Bastogne to interdict enemy routes of withdrawal/infiltration via junction Hwy's 547 and 547A (TD 5401); establish FSB Veghel vic hill 333 (TD 5401); block Hwy's 547 and 547A in zone and provide security for FSB Bastogne and Rome Plow operations in the area. Upon completion of the above, be prepared to continue attack to the south into the Rao Tai (River) Valley or to re-orient north along the axis of the Song Bo River towards VC/NVA Base Area 11A.
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The original concept of the operation is discussed at Inclosure 10.

(a) The initial concept of operation was changed on 17 April 1968 at which time the brigade received a FRAG O directing that the 3d ARVN Abt Task Force would assume responsibility for the clearing of Hwy 54/7A. The ARVN Abt Task Force would also air assault into a LZ secured by elements of the 1-327 Inf and provide one battalion to assist in securing LZ VEGHEL. The mission of the 2-502 Inf was changed to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the Rao Nai Valley. The date for the air assault remained unchanged.

(b) The LZ for the air assault of the 1-327 Inf into the Delta Junction Area was changed from Hill (YD 546049) to vic YD 556030. This was due to the inability of the Hill to be satisfactorily cleared with tactical air including 2000lb daisy cutters. As this location was the prime consideration for establishment of LZ VEGHEL doubt was now cast as to the practicality of this as it would undoubtedly require a major engineer effort. In view of this the decision as to where LZ VEGHEL would be located was withheld until after the air assault.

(c) Excluding (a) & (b) above, the operation was initiated on 19 April 1968 as planned. Early in the morning of 19 April the 2-502 Inf and 2-327 Inf launched attacks to fix and destroy enemy forces operating west of Fire Base BASTOGNE. The air assault of the 1-327 Inf commenced at 1100H with Company C making the initial assault. An aircraft in the first wave at 1103H developed mechanical problems and crashed on the LZ resulting in 6 casualties (5 from C-1-327, 1 crew member) none serious. C-1-327 closed on the LZ at 1130H and secured the location for the displacement of the remainder of the battalion. The air assault was completed at 1230H. On the following day the 6th ARVN Abn BN air assaulted into the same LZ which was still secured by C-1-327. The relief of the 2-502 Inf by the 1-502 Inf at BASTOGNE was effected on 20 April. This was followed by the air assaulting of the 2-502 Inf into an LZ vic YD 556028 on 21 April. The remaining two battalions (3d and 6th) of the 3d ARVN Abt Task Force air assaulted into the same LZ on 22 and 23 April respectively. During this period 19-21 April elements of the 1-327 Inf were involved in heavy fighting to seize objectives 1 and 2 vic YD 550036 and YD 543028 respectively. On the evening of 21 April the 2-502 Inf was given the mission to relieve the 1-327 of mission to seize objective 2 (YD 53028). On 22 April after four days of heavy fighting the 1-327 Inf seized objective 1 (YD 550036) and C-2-502 Inf seized objective 2 (YD 543028). Elements of the 3d ARVN Abt Task Force were engaged in heavy fighting vicinity YD 546049 and Hill 333 (YD 546049). On 28 April the 3d ARVN Abt Task Force crossed the Song Bo River vic YD 528035 and moved west into the Pac Wha Valley, the 2-502 Inf oriented west into the Rao Nai Valley.
VALLEY leaving the 1-327 Inf in the Delta Junction Area. The 2-327 Inf was operating west of Fire Base BASTogne and north of Hwy 547. All elements are in this general posture at the close of the reporting period. The dense triple canopy jungle and the steep rugged mountains presented a formidable obstacle to operations in the area. Weather conditions severely hampered air operations. Enemy ground contacts in the area were scattered and generally the enemy force was squad size or smaller. Enemy initiated activities were predominately rocket and mortar stand off attacks. Some anti-aircraft fire was experienced in the area. Several large munitions caches were also discovered.

(d) Results of 30 April 1968 (does not include ARVN):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly losses</th>
<th>Enemy losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40 KHA</td>
<td>221 NVA KIA (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206 WHA</td>
<td>1 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 MHA</td>
<td>58 SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 NBC</td>
<td>19 C/S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS. During the period February through April 1968, chemical activities of the Division included aerial and ground employment of RCA CS, aerial and ground based defoliation operations, aerial smoke operations and personnel detector operations.

(1) RCA Operations:

(a) Non-persistent RCA CS has been used extensively in conjunction with preparatory fires on fortified hamlets north and northwest of Hue during Operation CAIENTAN. The CS delivery systems used include E158 CS Grenade Clusters, E8 Tactical CS Launchers, locally fabricated CS grenade dispensers and 4.2 CS mortar rounds. Use of CS in preparations is in consonance with the 101st Airborne Division's policy of wide ranging reconnaissance and rapid concentration of units to fix and destroy the enemy once located. The CS is integrated into supporting fires, primarily in a target softening role.

(b) Five examples of these operations are described below:

1. Action 7-8 April 1968 via YD 6729 (See figure 3, below)

a. At 0610 hours on 7 April, an ambush element of B-1-501 was returning from their night ambush position to the company base area when it was fired upon from the western edge of the village, by what was later...
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estimated to be a company sized VC/NVA force. Another ambush element linked up with the platoon (-) and engaged the enemy with organic weapons. At 0915, contact was broken and the platoon (+) moved on to the company base. The company then set up blocking positions on the west side of the village. "C" Company, 1-501 moved into the area north of the village and established blocking positions. B-1-505, conducting RIF operations to the east, was lifted across the river by helicopters and proceeded to sweep to the west. Lead elements came under heavy SA/AM fire from the small village to the east of the initial contact. They pulled back and called for artillery and air strikes and included 20 rounds CS from their organic 4.2 mortar. It was soon determined that this complex was heavily bunkered and well defended. By this time it was late afternoon and plans were made to continue the attack the following day.

b The next morning C-1-501 began at first light to move SW around B-1-501 toward the river. At 0930 a CS preparation was placed on the village and followed by artillery and air strikes. The initial CS pass was at 1500 feet and delivered four E158 Clamshell Clusters which impacted on the western edge of the village, covering about 70% of it with agent. The wind at this time was westerly at 7 to 10 knots, with a neutral temperature gradient. Light and medium artillery and four air strikes followed the CS. By late morning, C-1-501 moved into attack positions west of the village.

g Upon completion of the final air strike at 1150 hours, additional CS was placed on the village. Two E158's were dropped, again from 1500 feet on the target line, in order to suppress expected ground fire. Next, using the rocket pod grenade drop system, 192 grenades were dropped in the village. The CS pass was closely followed by 192 HE grenades. A final pass was made at 1500 feet to drop the remaining two E158's on a tree line along the NE corner of the village from which fire was coming. The wind direction was now almost northerly, and the village was completely covered with agent. Artillery was again employed and the two companies on the north and west began sweeping through this village, and later the one to the east. During the sweep of the villages and the surrounding area, the company killed or found the bodies of 57 enemy.

d The ground commanders praised the effects of the CS and felt that it had significantly increased the effectiveness of the artillery strikes, and had assisted them in their assaults across the open rice land surrounding the villages.

Action 9 April 1968 vic YD 6828 (See figure 4, below)
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a. On 8 April, the 1st Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry made heavy contact with a suspected company size NVA force in the village of Phuoc Yen, via TD 680220. Bravo and Charlie of the 1-505 reinforced by Alpha of the 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry cordoned the village while TAC Air and artillery were called in. The cordon was maintained through the night and, on 9 April, Bravo and Charlie prepared to sweep from the south and west respectively while Alpha moved to its positions to the north.

b. As the sweep began, CS grenades were dropped on a generally east-west line to aid Alpha and Charlie in entering the village. Winds were ENE at 8 to 10 knots and the temperature gradient was lapsed. Bravo company, which did not have protective masks waited until the agent cloud cleared the village before advancing. At 1155, coincident with the CS drop, Alpha moved toward the village, across 150 meters of open ground receiving light sniper fire, but suffering no casualties. Alpha completed the sweep into the village east of the river, taking several detainees.

c. Charlie company also moved toward the village as the CS was dropped. They encountered the CS agent just as they reached the edge of the village. At that time, the agent concentration was weak but protective masks were required. The company made no contact while the CS was in the area, but contact was made with an estimated platoon size force after the agent cleared.

d. Wind and temperature gradient contributed to rapid dissipation of the agent cloud, but the CS did provide sufficient fire suppression to allow the companies to reach the village without casualties.

e. Alpha company's sweep netted four NVA bodies prior to making contact.

f. In each case, protective masks were found on or near the bodies. The CS agent had provided sufficient suppression to allow the companies to cross open ground and enter the village even though at least a portion of the enemy force was equipped with protective masks.

Action 10 April 1968 via TD 4748 (See figure 5, below)

On 10 April 1968, the 2d Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry employed RCA CS in conjunction with a sweep operation on the village of Phuoc Dien via TD 475485. The village was believed to contain an NVA company.

h. Alpha company, having made initial contact near the village, was reinforced by Delta company shortly after noon when Delta completed a combat assault on a LZ west of the village. After line-up with Alpha
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the two companies prepared to sweep from NW to SE through the village. Prior to the sweep, five E8 Tactical CS Launchers were to be fired into the village, closely followed by airdrop of 192 M13 CS grenades on the SE side of the village.

Immediately after the E8's were fired, both companies moved toward the village through the CS cloud. As they moved forward, they killed three NVA who were moving about in the village. At 1317, as they reached the edge of the village, both companies began receiving SA/AW fire and occasional RPG rounds. By this time, the CS cloud, driven by the relatively stiff winds, had passed through the village. It had, however, allowed the companies to cross approximately 200 meters of open terrain without taking any casualties.

Stiff resistance was encountered from bunker complexes within the village, and at 1630, contact was broken and TAC Air and artillery were called on the village. A sweep of the village on 11 April yielded 19 NVA KIA, 1 PW and 20 detainees. Of the 20 NVA found in the village, two had protective masks. Total friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 10 WIA.

The commanders involved felt that the CS could have contributed more to the operation if it had lingered in the village a longer period of time. The 15 to 20 knot winds coupled with the strong mid-day lapse conditions greatly accelerated the dissipation of the agent cloud. Reinforcement of the agent cloud with additional grenade passes or with additional E8 launchers would have been appropriate when the companies began receiving fire inside the village. At the time such reinforcement was not possible, due to non-availability of helicopters and additional CS munitions.

Action 18 April 1968 vic YD 7230 (See figure 6, below)

On 18 April 1968, three companies of the 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Inf trapped an estimated company size NVA force (later identified as 4th Co, 1st Bn, 803 NVA Regt) in the fortified hamlet of Dong Xuyen, vic YD 7230. With C Company blocking to the north, B Company on the west and A Company to the southwest, D Company moved into position from the east. D Company received AW fire and RPG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 11 WIA. D Company withdrew and waited while airstrikes were called on the village. After the final airstrikes, CS gas was placed on the village and followed immediately by an artillery TOT.

The CS mission consisted of three passes, one at 1000 feet using one E158 Cluster, and two low level each delivering 192 CS grenades using locally fabricated grenade drop racks. The initial E158 pass was intended to suppress enemy fire for the low level passes by placing an initial...
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concentration of agent in the area. Fighter aircraft had received AW and RPG fire during the preliminary airstrikes.

g. The E158 landed on target and effectively covered the northern portion of the village. Immediately following the E158, a low level pass from NW to SE was made and 192 grenades were dropped along the NE side of the village. On the third pass, NVA were observed moving around in the village. As soon as the CS ship cleared the area, the artillery TOT was fired on the village.

The CS drops were made at 1800, 1805, and 1815 respectively. Winds were from the NE at approximately 10 knots. The temperature gradient was neutral. The target coverage was 100% of the village, and 100% of the munitions functioned.

h. A sweep of the village on 29 April 1968 discovered 54 NVA bodies. Four AK-47's and two SKS were captured along with numerous SA ammunition, miscellaneous LEE, a large medical kit and 4500 lbs of rice and documents. Total friendly losses for the engagement were 1 US KIA and 12 WIA.

Again, ground commanders considered the CS munitions which were incorporated in the softening fires contributed extensively to the impressive body count and helped to reduce friendly casualties.

Action 28 April - 1 May 1968 vic YD 6027 (figure 7, below)

a. The cordon operation around Phuoc Yen village (vic YD 6027) began on 28 April when four rifle companies from 24 Bde 101st Abn Div (A-1-502, A-1-501 and B and D-2-501) responded to intelligence information and encircled the hamlet where an NVA battalion later identified as the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt, was reportedly entrenched. During the night and early morning hours of the 29th, the enemy made three concerted efforts to break the encirclement which were successfully beaten back. On 29 April, heavy artillery, TAC Air, gunships and recoilless rifle fire together with intensive machine gun and rifle fire from the paratroopers continued to batter the enemy. Gunships from the 308th Avn Bn and 101st Avn Bn killed 31 enemy. An additional 13 NVA were killed by the paratroopers and 4 weapons were captured. On 30 April, the enemy continued to deliver heavy volumes of SA/AW/RPG fire from the village. Friendly artillery and 15 TAC airstrikes continued throughout the day to soften up the objective area, as another paratroop company (B-1-501) was heli-lifted into augment the seal. Thirteen NVA were killed during the day's
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action by TAC air and ground forces. Between 0400 and 0500 on 1 May, the trapped NVA attempted twice to break through the ring of paratroopers but were driven back by savage fighting. At 1345 on 1 May a CS drop was conducted using fabricated grenade racks. This followed by an artillery and 4.2 mortar preparation. In the course of 20 minutes, 150 rounds of 4.2 CS were intermingled with the artillery HE, VT Fuse. This maintained the agent cloud and suppressed enemy fires while the paratroopers made their assault on the position. The results for 1 May were 111 NVA KIA, 95 NVA WIA, 63 NVA and 12 CS, Division total for the first 4 days in this operation was 216 NVA killed, 95 NWS and 79 weapons. The 101st Abn Div combat methods of maintaining contact, rapid reinforcement, maximum use of fire support to include the use of CS produced results that leave little doubt about their effectiveness in this type of ground operations.

Both battalion commanders concurred in the opinion that the preparation with CS significantly reduced the number of casualties, and contributed greatly to the overall success of this Screaming Eagle operation.

NOTE: Persistent RCA CS-1 has been used to harass the enemy use of LOC, base camps and rocket launch sites. CS-1 was included in the effort to restrict the enemy movement along highway 547 in southern Thua Thien Province. In this operation, the CS was employed where the highway passed close to a stream in an effort to harass both road traffic and possible dock operations. Terrain in the area makes bypass extremely difficult.

(2) Defoliation Operations: Defoliation operations in support of division operations have included large scale defoliation of highway 547 and 547A from the Song Ta Trach southwest toward the A Shau Valley and area defoliation of base area 101 in northeastern Thua Thien Province. These operations, conducted by Air Force Ranch Hand Aircraft, began on 5 April 1968 and evidence of their effect is currently seen in both areas. In addition to these large scale operations, ground based hand sprayers were used by personnel of the 3d Bn, 52d Abn Div in the vicinity of the pontoon bridge (ID 757740) where highway 547 crosses the Song Ta Trach. This ground based operation was designed to clear the bridge approaches of foliage and enhance the defensive positions of the unit securing the bridge.

(3) Smoke Operations: The mountainous terrain and the high incidence of large caliber anti-aircraft weapons in the southern portion of Thua Thien Province make smoke screening of landing zones especially desirable. Non-availability of helicopter integral smoke generator systems has led the 101st Airborne Division Chemical Section to experiment with new delivery techniques.
One successful means involves the serial employment of A5/MA2 floating smoke pots from CH-47 aircraft. The large volume of smoke produced and the 10 to 15 minute burning time makes this munition especially adaptable to operations in densely vegetated, mountainous terrain. This system was first used on the initial combat assault of Operation DELAWARE. Ninety MA2 floating pots were dropped from 3200 feet above the ground along the southern, western and northern sides of the LZ via TD 558G28 as the 1st Battalion (Airm), 327th Infantry air assaulted from the east. The pots provided an excellent screen, and the load capacity of the CH47 aircraft coupled with the high employment altitude allowed numerous passes and extended maintenance of the smoke screen.

(4) Personnel Detector Operations: The 101st Airborne Division used the modified Manpack Personnel Detector extensively in southern Thua Thien Province. The rugged terrain requires that flight procedures be altered somewhat. Straight, evenly spaced course-legs are not acceptable, due both to the terrain and to the heavy concentration of anti-aircraft positions in the area. Generally, the procedure used is to fly about midway up the side of the mountain while maintaining a crosswind heading (as much as possible) in the valleys. The use of four aircraft, two slicks and a LPH, is desirable to insure a lift-out capability in the event the "sniffer" ship is downed. The MPD has been used extensively in the surveillance program as a means of locating enemy lines of communication, to confirm suspected enemy base camp locations and to locate enemy concentrations ahead of friendly units.

c. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) G2 Section and MID

(a) G2 Operations:

1. During the period, the G2 Operations concerns itself with the tactical situation in III CTZ and the subsequent deployment of the Division (-I to I CTZ. Because of the far-reaching effect of the MACV TET offensive, the Division's intelligence collection effort was concentrated on the enemy situation in I, II and III Corps areas. The Division rapidly deployed battalions to GIA DDIIN and KHEU HCMC provinces and to II CTZ to reinforce areas under attack and continued combat operations in PHUOC LONG and KHEU BOCG provinces. This situation necessitated a more thorough coverage than normal by Division-level intelligence agencies of the entire Corps area. Every scrap of information became critical; an incident in TET KHEU could have been the key to the initiation of the so-called "Second Offensive". To cope with this situation, increased liaison was established with US divisions and brigades and MACV intelligence organizations at KHEU HCMC AB. An extensive liaison effort was conducted with Special Forces and MACV advisory
team and 1st ATC air and ground reconnaissance were increased. This intelligence watch paid dividends: on several occasions, attacks by fire were accurately predicted, and, once launched, pre-positioned reaction forces were immediately brought to bear.

2 At the same time, in addition to increasing its activities in III CTZ, the 101st Abn Div (minus its 3d Bde) was alerted for deployment to I CTZ. Personnel from every section under the Office of the AGOs, G2, displaced to I CTZ to establish liaison with existing intelligence organizations, US and ARVN units, and Marines, and build an intelligence data base.

3 The Division (--) deployed to I CTZ, joining its 2d Bde, which had been conducting combat operations under OCON 1st ACR since 24 January. The Division became operational on 8 March with the initiation of Operation CARENTAN I. Initially situated at GIA LE until Camp Eagle construction could be completed, the G2 Section reported direct to II MAF. Liaison and coordination had been established with Provisional Corps, Vietnam, and on 10 March, PCT was activated as the controlling US Corps Hq for the two northern provinces in I CTZ.

On 27 March, the G2 Section displaced to Camp Eagle. Having perfected its liaison techniques in III CTZ, the Division established continuing personal contact with PCV, TF XRAY, 1st ARVN Div, THUA THIEN Sector, Project Delta (USSF), FOB PH (USSF), and other intelligence agencies to insure complete exchange of current intelligence.

(b) G2 Air and II, MID:

1. 1 February to 9 March 1968 (Bien Hoa) - during this period, G2 Air section conducted routine aerial surveillance and reconnaissance functions in the III Corps Tactical Zone and prepared to move to I Corps Tactical Zone. The 101st Airborne Division Imagery Interpretation Section was fully operational and under OCON of the G2 Air Section. The Imagery Interpretation (II) Section conducted aerial observation supplemented by hand-held photography. Primary efforts of the II Section were directed toward Imagery Interpretation and targeting. A system for recording and storing data base information was developed during this period. Of particular significance during this period was the coordinated surveillance and reconnaissance of the Bien Hoa mortar/rocket belt during the Tet offensive. This was accomplished by using O-1E aircraft, armed helicopters and AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar. Also during this period, one G2 Air/II officer was sent to the forward CP in I Corps to establish liaison and obtain the standard operating procedure for utilization of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance assets in I Corps.

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2 7 March to 24 March - on 7 March the G2 Air section moved by air from Bien Hoa to Gia Le. The G2 Air section became operational in I Corps at 1200 hours on 8 March when telephone and radio communications were established. In this same period, the II section moved, by echelon, to I Corps. Initial coordination was established with III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV) when the 101st Airborne Division came under the OPCON of the latter. Assets for visual reconnaissance were obtained from Northern VASAC Coordinator utilizing the 220th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company (RAC). Up to 30 hours of O-1E flying time were made available to the Division daily. In addition coordination was affected to obtain one (1) AH/TK-2 Ground Data Link Station from III MAF for direct read-out of SIAR imagery in support of 101st Airborne Division operations. In the latter portion of this period the AH/TK-2 Ground Data Link Station became operational at Camp Eagle and greatly aided in reducing the time between sensing and engagement of enemy moving targets.

3 24 March to 30 April 1968 - on 24 March the G2 Air section deployed to its present location at Camp Eagle. All elements of the II section had completed their move and the section was operational. During this period, the G2 Air section in conjunction with the II section prepared terrain analysis and conducted extensive reconnaissance for Operations Carentan I, Carentan II and Delaware. Also during this period, as part of an intensified training program, several personnel were sent to 1st Military Intelligence BN (MIBARS) in-country schools for G2 Air and Imagery Interpretation Training. An II aircraft observer course was conducted at Camp Eagle for Division aerial observers. Numerous liaison trips were made to III MAF, 220th RAC, 245th SAC, Detachment B, 1st MIBARS, and PCV to improve the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance effort in the PCV area.

(c) Enemy Order of Battle, MID:

1 The period of 1 February - 30 April was marked by movement of the OB Section from Bien Hoa (I CTZ) to Camp Eagle (I CTZ).

2 The Order of Battle Section consisted of six men at the time of its deployment to ICTZ. Five men preceded the Division Headquarters to ICTZ while one man remained at Bien Hoa to support remnants of Division Headquarters and the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div. The five men sent ahead to ICTZ were stationed with the 3d Marine Division, 1st Air Cav Division, and III MAF. While stationed with these units in the capacity of liaison for the 101st Abn Div, each man learned the enemy situation and obtained complete sets of Order of Battle files from each of the units. The culmination of their efforts was the production of a 212 page Order of Battle handbook that organized in a meaningful fashion all information collected by each man.
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2 Since arriving at Camp Eagle, the Order of Battle section has been expanded to 12 men with one man at each brigade supporting the S2. The Order of battle section also has included within its duties target nomination for C3 Air/PSE.

4 The section has since been reorganized internally to meet its additional commitments. The OIC and NGOIC are primarily responsible for target nomination and supervision of all Order of Battle functions. Two Order of Battle teams have been created on an area coverage basis and are responsible for all enemy actions within their respective areas.

5 Since arriving in ICTZ the Order of Battle Section has produced numerous studies concerning the enemy situation, enemy tactics, enemy organisation and projected enemy actions. The Order of Battle Section has also been responsible for a large amount of input to the Daily Intelligence Summary. The target nomination section of OB has nominated in the neighborhood of 150 targets from the period 21 March to 30 April. On 21 April the Order of Battle Section published a complete update to the Order of Battle Handbook previously published.

(d) CI and IFW, MID:

1 During the period covered, the MID planned and accomplished a major unit movement into Camp Eagle. This was executed in such a manner that the MID remained operational at all times.

2 Coordination and control personnel were sent forward from each section to make initial contact with operational counterparts in the area. These personnel were followed by the Advance Party consisting of personnel from each section. Coordinating personnel and Advance Party personnel formed the nucleus for operations in the forward area for approximately three weeks. These personnel were followed by the main body which was sent forward with other Division elements as operational requirements dictated. Until the main body arrived at Camp Eagle, an MID Officer acted as the OIC of the forward element. He organized the MID base camp and directed operations as instructed by the 101st ID CO, who was kept abreast of the needs of forward and rear elements by continuous visits and through communications facilities. At present, there are four personnel at Bien Hoa Base Camp, responsible for rear operations. All other personnel are operating at Division Headquarters, Camp Eagle and at the Brigade Headquarters. During the same period, the 181st MID was amalgamated into the 101st MID. It was formerly in support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The 101st MID also acquired the 9th ARVN MID.

2 Initially upon arriving at Camp Eagle, the IFW Section, in conjunction with the Office of the Provost Marshal, coordinated for the use of the 3/82d Abn BN PAVN Command in the vicinity of Camp Eagle.
This gave the section immediate facilities for POW interrogation. The IPW Section made immediate coordination with the Collection Branch of PCV. They also coordinated with III MAF to insure proper reporting procedures and formats. In addition, the IPW Section arranged for the exchange of IPW reports with the 1st ARVN Division. MID personnel can interrogate their PW's at any time it may become necessary. The IPW Section has had much assistance from the attached 9th ARVN MID which has been deployed down to Brigade level. The personnel are especially helpful in providing efficient document readouts and also assisting in IPW interrogation.

Immediately upon arrival at Camp Eagle, Counterintelligence personnel made coordination with CI PCV, 525th I Group Office at Hue, CI MACV Hue, CI MACV Phu Bai, and other intelligence agencies. Arrangements were made for mutual exchange of intelligence reports during liaison visits. Liaison was initiated with District, village, and hamlet chiefs in order to acquire information. Counterintelligence personnel conducted a thorough survey of civilian employees in Camp Eagle for the purpose of recommending proper security measures and for establishing an informant net within these workers. Significant strides have been made in the recruitment of sources from these employees.

Prior to the Division's movement to Camp Eagle, Counterintelligence personnel made periodic visits to all Division units to insure that excess classified material was being properly destroyed by burning. Post evacuation checks of all Division base camps were conducted to insure the above.

NOTE: As a result of diligent work prior to movement, the 101st MID was able to establish an excellent living and working area. Prior planning consisted, among other things, of insuring that proper amounts of tentage, defensive material and working supplies were at hand prior to movement. Rear elements constantly monitored the needs of the forward party to insure adequate resupply.

(2) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company.

(a) At the beginning of this reporting period Co F, 58th Inf (IRP) was being utilized as a security force for the Division Headquarters in Bien Hoa RVN (III Corps Tz). On 12 February 1968, a 12 man security detachment was sent to the I Corps Tactical Zone for security of the advance planning group of the Division. On 27 February 1968, the remainder of the company, which was operating at approximately 60% strength, deployed to Gia Ia, ICTZ.
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(b) On March 1968, the Company received the mission of security for the opening of the new camp, Camp Eagle, retaining the mission for the month of March. With the security mission of Camp Eagle, the Company conducted short range reconnaissance patrols and local ambush patrols. In addition to the security of Camp Eagle, during the month of April the Company also was designated as the Division reaction force. The Company was called upon to provide security for three downed helicopters during the month. All training conducted during the period was OJT. Due to the lack of equipment and the non-availability of aircraft during this reporting period, Co F, 58th Inf (IAF), did not operate as a Long Range Patrol Company.

(3) 265th RR Company: Due to the nature of the classification of this unit's mission, their report was forwarded thru Radio Research channels to Co, 509th Radio Research Group.

(4) Enemy Situation.

(a) 1 Feb 68 - 8 Mar 68:

1 During this period the 101st Abn Division was located in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Contacts with enemy units during this period were a result of the VC TET Offensive, as the enemy remained within striking distance of the populated centers. The enemy disposition in III CTZ prior to the TET Offensive was believed to have been as follows for VC and NVA regular units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Division</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
<td>NE Bin Long Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st VC Regiment</td>
<td>vic &quot;Fish Hook&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272nd VC Regiment</td>
<td>vic &quot;Fish Hook&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd VC Regiment</td>
<td>Du No area, vic YT 0296, with one Brn possibly SW of Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
<td>NE War Zone &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>W of Highway 13, vic XT 6887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Security for CSVN Hq, central War Zone &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>vic Michelin Rubber Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
<td>unlocated in Phuoc Long Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC Regiment</td>
<td>Hat Dinh area, Phuoc Chuy Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regiment</td>
<td>Unlocated in Phuoc Long Province, last contact immediately south of Song Be with 31st ARVN Rangers on 25 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Northern Phuoc Long Province, with possibly one battalion in the vic of the &quot;Fish Hook&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Units subordinate to the 5-1, 6-2, 6-3, 8-4, and 8-5
Sub-regions took part in the attacks against key targets in the Saigon area. These units included elements of the C-10 Carper Battalion, 267th IF Battalion, 269th IF Battalion, 566th IF Battalion, 4th and 6th IF Battalions; elements of the 11th and 16th IF Battalions conducted attacks in the Tan Son Nhat area. The enemy's primary objective was to seize and hold key areas in the Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhat area. PW interrogations revealed that enemy forces in Saigon were to hold their initial objectives until they were relieved (which was to take place in 48 hours). In most cases PW's revealed that they were to remain in their positions and also that no withdrawal routes out of the immediate area were given, a practice which is unusual in VC tactics.

3 Interrogation of PW's and a captured operations order for the attack on the Bien Hoa Airbase indicated that it was the enemy's intention to attack continuously until all objectives had been secured in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area. The 274th VC Regiment conducted the attack against Bien Hoa Airbase, and the 275th VC Regiment attacked II Field Force Headquarters. The 238th Local Force Company acted as guides for the Main Force regiments taking part in the attacks. The 274th VC Regiment had moved across Highway 9/1 from its normal area of operations up into War Zone "D", skirting the eastern limits of AO Manchester. There, it linked up with the 275th VC Regiment which had moved down from Phuoc Long Province a month before, entirely undetected. Two weeks prior to the attack, the two reinforced and resupplied regiments moved south to assemble in the vicinity of Trang Bom. On 22 Jan., three agent reports were received which located the Headquarters of the U-1 Sub-region Headquarters immediately north of Trang Bom; unfortunately, no action was taken on these reports, and though it is unconfirmed, since the U-1 KI's controlled the Bien Hoa area it is probable that the two regiments received their guides and assembled in the Trang Bom area under the control of the U-1 KI's. The day prior to the attack on Bien Hoa, the enemy moved west to their attack positions. After the initial attack, the enemy was to reassemble at prearranged positions for further attacks. The 274th Regiment was to move to the east and then south. The 275th was to move to the east and then north. PW's indicated that the enemy was to be reinforced and to continue attacking until all objectives had been secured. Indications existed that the 5th VC Division Headquarters was in position south of the Song Dong Nai to control attacks in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area. There were two reasons that the enemy did not re-attack as was planned. First, the enemy in its initial attack had suffered too many casualties to remount offensive operations. Secondly, a MlI captured by the 199th Light Inf Bde indicated that
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A new heavy weapon (possibly 240mm rocket) was not brought to bear against friendly forces due to logistical difficulties.

Elements of the 9th VC Division and the 7th NVA Division did not participate in the attacks in the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Lon: Binh areas. The TET Offensive in these areas was conducted by Local Force elements, except for the 274th and 275th VC Regiments. It is conceivable that the VC plan of attack was as stated by VNM: Local Forces to gain hold in the populated areas with the aid of civilians, and then the entry of main force units into Saigon to add support and firepower to the Local Forces in order to seize the cities. The 1st US Inf Div made heavy contact with the 273 VC Regiment north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province near Phu Cuong City, killing over 200 and thereby preventing the 273rd from entering Saigon. The 25th US Div contacted both the 271st VC Regiment and the 272nd VC Regiment, inflicting heavy casualties upon both of these units and preventing them from gaining access to the city. Elements of the 165th NVA Regiment and the 101st NVA Regiment later moved south towards Tai Khe-Ben Cat with the obvious objective of containing the 1st US Inf Div to that area in order to enable elements of the 9th VC Division to gain entrance to Saigon. They were too late since elements of the 9th VC Division had been severely harassed from initiating offensive operations in Saigon. Eventually, the 11lst NVA Regiment and the 25th NVA Regiment joined the other enemy forces in the area in order to maintain pressure on Saigon, and thereby force concentration of friendly forces. The K-1 and K-2 Battalions of the Dong Nai Regiment attacked Tan Uyen District IV as anticipated, but the K-3 Battalion detached itself from its sister battalions and engaged friendly forces south of Saigon in Long An Province.

It can be surmised that if the 1st US Inf Div and the 25th Inf Div had not interdicted the move of the 9th VC Division towards Saigon, the VC TET Offensive would have come much closer to accomplishing its goals.

During the month of February the 101st Abn Division engaged the enemy in several small contacts. The most significant of these contacts occurred immediately north of Bien Hoa as elements of the 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div contacted elements of the 275th VC Regiment along the south banks of the Song, Dong Nai. During the latter part of February elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div deployed to Phu Bai, Thu Thien Province in the I Corps Tactical Zone to join the 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div. The 101st Abn Div Hqs became operational in ICTZ on 8 May 68.

(b) 8 March - 30 April: On 8 March 68, upon the initiation of Operation Carentan, the enemy disposition was as follows: Within the
area of operations the Tri Thien Military Region Headquarters operated as the highest Level control authority. This headquarters was located in eastern Base Area 114 (vic YD 5520). The 324B NVA Division Headquarters was located out of Phuoc Tri City (YD 3353) in the coastal lowlands. Subordinate to this division and operating south along Highway 1 (vic YD 6132) was the 812th NVA Regiment and subordinate battalions 4, 5 and 6. The 90th NVA Regiment of the 324B NVA Division and 2 battalions of the 803d NVA Regiment were reported east of Hue City area (vic YD 7532). The 29th NVA Regiment of the 325C NVA Division was also reported in the vicinity of Hue. Four regiments not subordinate to division level headquarters operated within the area of operations. The 5th NVA Regiment, though unlocated, had elements dispersed in northern portions of Base Area 101 (vic YD 3343). The 416th NVA Battalion, subordinate to the 5th NVA Regiment was identified in Hue during T.T. The 5th NVA Regiment was located along Highway 1 (YD 6440). Battalions of this regiment, the 2d, 4th, and 7th were dispersed east of this location in the coastal lowlands. The 6th NVA Regiment and subordinate battalions, the 800th, 802d and 806th were dispersed immediately to the north of Hue. Elements of the 4th NVA Regiment were dispersed east of Hue (vic YD 8820). Sapper Battalions operating within the area included the 10th Sapper Battalion unlocated in the area surrounding Hue, and the Hue City Sapper Battalion also unlocated. The 5th LF Battalion was located SW of Hue vic 6316. The 804th LF Battalion was located SW of Hue vic YD 907. There are seven local force companies that operate within the area. The H-97 and C-113 LF Companies operate SW of Huong Tri City in the coastal lowlands. The C-114 and C-115 LF Companies operate SW of Hue in the lowlands. The C-116 and C-117 and C-118 LF Companies operate SW of Hue in the coastal lowlands.

(5) Significant Changes in enemy disposition (Thua Thien Province):

It is presently believed that the 324B NVA Division Headquarters has been disbanded and the regiments of this division are now subordinate to the Tri Thien Military Region. This has been reported by F,Is. The alternatives remain that the 324B NVA Division Headquarters elements have either been absorbed by the Tri Thien Military Region or remained in NVN to train troops.

The 9th NVA Regiment is presently believed to be located in Base Area 101 along with its subordinate battalions.

The 4th NVA Regiment is presently believed to be located in the vicinity of Phu Loc District Headquarters with one battalion possibly in Phu Vang District SE of Hue.

The Hue City Sapper Battalion is believed to be co-located with the VC Thua Thien Political Headquarters in the area known as the Hue City rear supply area.
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Area, vic YD 7505.

At the beginning of Operation Carentan, the 2d Bn/803d NVA Regiment was located north of Kong Ha in Quang Tri Province being utilized in a transportation and supply role for the 1st and 3d Bn/803d NVA Regiment located north of Hue in Quang Dien District. Agent reports indicated in late March that the 2d Bn/803d Regiment had deployed into Thua Thien Province. In contacts with the 3d Bn/803d NVA Regiment, documents were captured which indicated that the 2d Bn had moved into the area. Although never positively confirmed, the 2d Bn/803d NVA Regiment is carried as possibly within the 101st Abn Div AO.

The 812th NVA Regt is still believed to be operating in southern Hue Lang District; however, a recent contact may indicate a southern move by the Regt. On 21 April 68 the 4th Bn, 812th NVA Regt was contacted at Thin Kim Doi vic YD 7531.

The 90th NVA Regt has been confirmed in the area west of Hue. On 7 April an agent stated that a battalion was located at YD 723305. The names that the agent gave as commanding this battalion identified the 7th Bn, 90th NVA Regiment. On 20 April 68, a Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 9th Bn, 90th NVA Regiment. He stated that his battalion was located vic YD6619. On 30 April the 1/501st started a cordon operation around Phuoc Yen Village (vic YD 6828). They believed that they were facing a battalion-size element. This battalion was later identified as the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt.

On 26 March 68, as elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div deployed down Rt 547, they engaged enemy forces fighting from well-fortified positions. Captured documents revealed the LBN of the 7th Bn/29th NVA Regt. On 30 Mar 68, supporting reconnaissance elements captured a PW in the vicinity of Delta Junction (vic YD 545049) who stated that he was a member of the 9th Bn/29th NVA Regt; he reported that his unit's mission was to secure Rt 547. A PW captured on 16 April 68 (vic YD686096) he stated that he was from the 8th Bn, 29th NVA Regt. He also reported that his unit's mission was to interdict Highway to Allied use.

On 21 March 68, at 0400 hrs, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div at LZ Pinky while supporting another FSB were attacked by SA, AW, rocket and RPG
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fire. Under the cover of 23 B-40 rounds enemy sappers breached the defensive wire with bangalore torpedoes and penetrated the perimeter. Documents taken off of dead NVA soldiers at first light revealed LBN's of the 7th and 9th BN's/90th NVA Regt. Except for harassing attacks by fire, this was the only enemy offensive move during the period 18 Mar 68.

Prior to the initiation of Operation Carentan 11 elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div moved south in an attempt to penetrate into New Base Area 114. The enemy platoon and company size contacts were believed to have been with elements of the 90th NVA Regiment.

At the same time, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div continued to contact elements of the 2d BN/803d NVA Regt in the vicinity of the "W" in the Song Bo, vic YD 6928. All during the period 18 Mar to 18 Apr 68, elements of the 101st Abn Div continued to engage elements of the 1st and 3d BN's/803d NVA Regt from the vicinity of the "W" in the Song Bo, east along the banks of the Song Bo and along the banks of the Perfume River to the vicinity of YD 763313.

On 10 and 11 April 68, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div contacted elements of the 6th BN/812th NVA Regt in a village SE of FSB Hardcore. Preliminary interrogation of PW's captured during this contact revealed numerous ASA's; the most frequent being 7th BN/812th Regt. Further interrogation disclosed that all the PW's were from the 812th NVA Regt, however, PW's continued to use the designation 7th BN. It was concluded that since most of the PW's were new recruits from NVN that they had been replacements to the 6th BN/812th NVA Regt. It is significant to note that the 6th BN/812th NVA Regt had not been heavily engaged during the TET fighting as had the 4th and 5th Battalions who had also received replacements.

On 22 Apr 68, the 2/502 came into heavy contact vic YD 5602. A PW captured in this action identified his unit as the 10th Co, 3d BN, 308th Engineers. This unit is nicknamed Cutthroats. It is possible that this large an engineer unit has been responsible for the recent upgrading of 547A and the depot complex in A Shau - A Loui Valley.

On 19 Apr Rallier Pham Van Nghia stated that he was a member of the 22d Regt. He reported that the CP was located vic YD 761032. He also stated that the K-4, K-10 and K-18 BN's were subordinate to the 22d Regt. This location falls within the general vicinity known as the Hue Rear Supply Area. Nui Ke Mtn vic YD 761055 is reported to be the location of the VC Thua Thien Province Political Headquarters. The Hue City Municipal Unit is also believed to be located in this area. Also, K-10 is an AKA* for the 804th LF BN. It is possible that the 22d Regt is a newly formed command and

* Also Known AS

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control HQs for the units operating south of Hue.

(7) Enemy Tactics:

Indications existed that the enemy intended to introduce more conventional weaponry into the Quang Tri-Thua Thien battlefield. 23mm ammunition found by supporting reconnaissance elements indicated the possible presence of the ZU-23 Anti-Aircraft Gun. Numerous incidents of aircraft receiving AA fire and air bursts at 800 feet also substantiated the reported presence of 37mm AA Guns. Agent reports, EW's and a cache which contained 76mm tank ammunition all indicated the possibility of enemy tanks along Route 547; aerial photography also reported possible tank sightings as well as tank tracks in the A Shau Valley and in the vicinity of Route 547.

Agent reports, EW's and captured documents all pointed towards a second offensive directed against Quang Tri City and Hue. A further indication of the enemy's intention to re-attack Hue is the refusal of the 803d NVA Regt to withdraw from the coastal lowlands north of Hue to safer haven in the foothills or mountain to the west of Hue. Even in the face of heavy losses and devastating airstrikes the enemy only attempted to disengage itself from friendly forces and move to another fortified village or hamlet in the coastal lowlands. It is believed that the 803d NVA Regt is attempting to maintain a position within striking distance of Hue. It appears that the enemy is willing to accept heavy casualties since he is in an area where once detected he becomes highly vulnerable to friendly forces. Also, the 90th NVA Regt was given the mission of strengthening the infrastructure in the area west of Hue. This was the mission the 8th Battalion, 90th NVA Regt when it was caught and decimated at Phuoc Yen Village.

(8) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses for Quarterly Period:

During the period, enemy losses were as follows (including 3/82d OPCON to 101st Abn Div):

| VC/NVA KIA | 2683 |
| VC/NVA EW | 84 |
| Hoi Chanh | 9 |
| Capt Wns | 700 |
| Grn (Capt/Dsc) | 48 tons |
| Doc (Capt) | 87.5 lbs |

(9) Recapitulation of losses for OPCENTAN I & II

| Friendly | 193 KIA |
| Enemy | 29 1892 KIA |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RG 338, CSCP: (RI)

24 MAY 1968

Friendly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1190 WIA (1007 Evac)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 MIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy

| 69 FW                |
| 1 Hoi Chan          |
| 389 IWC             |
| 60 CSWC             |

(10) Recapitulation of losses for OP DELAWARE:

Friendly

| 40 KIA               |
| 206 WHA             |
| 1 MIA               |
| 2 NBC               |

Enemy

| 221 KIA             |
| 1 NVA/PFW           |
| 56 IWC             |
| 11 CSWC            |

d. LOGISTICS.

(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period, the division G-4, and the division Support Cmnd provided logistical planning, direction and support for the following operations:

1. Tacoma 15 Feb - 30 Mar
2. Carentan I & II 11 Mar - Present
3. Delaware 19 Apr - Present
4. Division move to I CTZ

(b) The move of the division's administrative and support elements to I CTZ presented several problems, due to the limited use of Phu Bai Air Field, and the congested condition of Route 1 from Da Nang to the Phu Bai area, and North. Close coordination with Marine Forces provided for the movement of over 1300 troops, 600 vehicles, and over 9,000 tons of organisational equipment by sea and air to Da Nang, and North to Phu Bai by sea and overland.

in this move:

1. Elements of the following division units were involved

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Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1966, RCS, CS/R (AI)

a. HHC Division and attachments
b. Division Artillery
c. 101st Aviation Bn
d. 2/17th Cavalry
e. 801st Maint Bn
f. 326th Engineer Bn
g. 101st Military Police Company
h. HHB 2/11th Arty
i. Support Command

Unit personnel and vehicles convoyed from Da Nang to Phu Bai and Camp Marble, with security being provided by 2/17th Cav, and B/1/17th Cav. Marine Support agencies in the Da Nang area provided billeting and staging areas for these convoys.

Unit equipment, not able to be carried on the troop convoys was staged at pier/dock sites and then moved North in the following ways:

a. LST or LCU to Rue Ramps, or Tan Ky ramps.
b. Convoyed North by 2½ ton truck assets levied from division units.

(2) Logistics Operations

(a) General: During the reporting period covered the 101st Airborne Division participated in 4 major operations in which the 101st Airborne Division Support Command provided the necessary combat service support to insure the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The basic concept for the supporting of the Division remained the same throughout the whole time frame. The concept included the disposition of Forward Support Elements consisting of a Maintenance Platoon, a Medical Company and a Supply Detachment which accompanied their respective Brigades to their bases of operations. The size of the Medical Company remained the same on all occasions, however the size of the Maintenance Platoons and the Supply Detachments...
Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RG5, CGFOR (RI)

varied in accordance with the distance of the Brigade Base Camps from the Bien Hoa Base Camp and whether or not the 1st Logistics Command placed an FSA at or near the Brigade Base of Operations. In cases where a Division Tactical Command Post was used a Logistical Operation Coordination Center was established at the location.

(b) Dispositions:

1. During Operation Tacona: (movement to I CTZ)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Supporting Agency</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde FSE</td>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>FLCC-A</td>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde FSE</td>
<td>LZ Jane</td>
<td>TF Mamos</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde FSE</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>Log Cda LSA</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NOT: Class II & IV TOE items from Bien Hoa then Camp Eagle or Maintenance Bn Closed Camp Bales)

2. During Operation Caretan I & II & Operation Delaware:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Supporting Agency</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde FSE</td>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>TF Lane</td>
<td>Camp Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde FSE</td>
<td>LZ Sally</td>
<td>TF M Donald</td>
<td>Camp Evans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde FSE</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>Log Cda LSA</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde 82d Abn FSE</td>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>TF Lane</td>
<td>Camp Eagle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DLOC was initially set up at Camp Eagle during the latter stages of Operation Tacona and it gradually expanded into a Support Command forward as the desired elements of the Support Command closed at Camp Eagle, during the initial stages of Operation Careton. Included in the Support Command forward were elements of the DSO, DSCC, and DTO.

3. Maintenance:

(a) The 801st Maintenance Bn supported the Division operations by utilizing the Forward Support Maintenance Platoons placed in direct support of the organic Brigades. The Ground Maintenance Company (GM), the Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company and the Bn Headquarters remained at Bien Hoa until the latter portion of Operation Tacona whence they displaced forward to Camp Eagle.
(b) The following maintenance jobs were accomplished during the reporting period:

- AUTO: 1361
- SIGNAL: 3284
- A/C & AV: 2941
- ENG: 121
- QUARTERMASTER: 255

(c) During the reporting period 16271 lines of repair parts were issued from the BN's ASL.

(d) Salvage collection points were set up at each of the Forward Support Platoons locations and at the BN Main's location.

(4) Supply:

(a) The 426th CSS BN supported the Division operations utilizing Forward Supply Detachments varying in size depending on whether or not 1st Logistical Command provided an FSA on location. These detachments provided support in the classes of supply not covered by the LOG Comd Agencies present. All Class II & IV TOPS requests were processed through Bien Hoa.

(b) Listed below are the quantities issued by the DSO and its agencies:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>105,242 rat</td>
<td>88,885 rat</td>
<td>358,503 rat</td>
<td>553,630 rat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II&amp;IV</td>
<td>159 S/T</td>
<td>166 S/T</td>
<td>679 S/T</td>
<td>1,004 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>933,640 gal</td>
<td>555,886 gal</td>
<td>525,346 gal</td>
<td>2,075,181 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>1,479 S/T</td>
<td>1,026 S/T</td>
<td>5,088 S/T</td>
<td>7,538 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

(NOTE: This does not reflect the total usage factors for any class of supply in view of the fact that when a Log Comd agency is present it provides direct supply point distribution for any and all customers.)

(c) Below are listed the items currently in short supply:

1. Class I - 3d BN is not receiving full issues of fresh fruits and vegetables.

2. Class II & IV - Radio, AN/GRC-125
   Telephone, Ti-1
   Antenna, RC/292
   Kit. installation, radio, AN/VRC-47
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Suspensers, field pack, small & regular coat, tropical, XSS and XLR Armor, boot, and knife, fork and spoon, field mess

Class III - None

Class V - Pyrotechnics, illuminating

5) Transportation:

(a) Convoy Movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th># VEHICLES</th>
<th>TONNAGE (s/t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Mar</td>
<td>BH - FV</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar</td>
<td>FV - HG Back Haul</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>BH - FV</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mar</td>
<td>FV - BH Back Haul</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 Mar</td>
<td>BH - New Fort</td>
<td>2 convoys</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 Mar</td>
<td>BH - SGN Fort</td>
<td>7 convoys</td>
<td>2266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 22 Mar</td>
<td>BH - SGN Port</td>
<td>11 convoys</td>
<td>2641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MARCH Totals -- 8,914

(NOTE: Movement to New Port & Saigon Fort were for cargo to be shipped via sea. Tonnage represents both vehicles and cargo shipped north inasmuch as the vehicles were in fact "cargo".)

11 Apr | BH - FV | 313 | 1958
12 Apr | FV - BH Back Haul | 251 | 400  |
13 Apr | BH - FV | 278 | 1720 |
14 Apr | FV - BH Back Haul | 260 | 500  |

APRIL Totals | 4,668
Total | 13,582

(b) Sea Shipments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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**Total**

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(c) Air Movement (includes fixed-wing special Air Mission, Courier Aircraft and Dedicated Aircraft).

**MONTH**

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<th>Cargo (S/T)</th>
<th>Pax</th>
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<td>Totals</td>
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(d) Total for all movement for the 101st Airborne Division:

**MONTH**

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<th>Cargo (S/T)</th>
<th>Pax</th>
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</thead>
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<td>MAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>8564</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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</table>

(e) Medical:
The 326th Medical Bn supported Division operations by utilizing its Direct Support Medical Companies with each Brigade. To date the medical facilities have processed and treated 4,026 patients with varying degrees of injury and illness.

The Division Medical Supply Office during the reporting period processed and shipped 10 tons of medical supplies to divisional units.

Below are listed items currently in short supply:

- a) Tetanus Vaccine
- b) Small Pox Vaccine
- c) Yellow Fever Vaccine

(7) Other Activities

(a) The amalgamation of the 1st Bde Support Bn continued through the reporting period with the movement of 6 LST loads of personal equipment from Phan Rang to Newport and Tampa, leaving only one ship load remaining. At the present time it is expected that the move will be completed during the second week in May.

(b) On 23 April 1968 the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School became attached to Division Headquarters Rear.

e. CIVIC ACTIONS

(1) The Division has continued its civic action efforts in both I and III CTZ's. All Civic Action projects were coordinated through appropriate ROV Advisors. This coordination precluded any duplication of efforts by other units operating in the same areas and reinforced cordial relationships with advisory personnel. Civic Actions implemented to assist the CSVN Revolutionary Development effort during the period are summarized below:

SCHOOLS

- Repaired  5
- Supplied  (5) 1,680 School Kits
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DISPENSARIES/HOSPITALS

- Repaired: 21

MEDCAP VII -

- Visits: 30
- Patients: 4,509

COMMODORES DISTRIBUTED

- Food: 120,589 lbs
- Lumber: 66,377 bd ft
- Clothing: 6,615 lbs
- Health Supplies: 1,305 lbs

DWELLINGS

- Repaired: 12
- Built: 110

ROADS

- Repaired: 3½ KM

BRIDGES

- Repaired: 3

MARKET PLACE

- Built: 1

(2) In order to help new personnel understand the purpose of the Civic Affairs activities and foster the acceptance of US and PVN/HAF by the Vietnamese populace, all incoming personnel receive instructions on the customs and courtesies of the Vietnamese culture as a part of their in-country processing.

(3) Status of CSVN Revolutionary Development Program.

(a) The assistance provided in rebuilding the village of Cay Da (VT 003182) has nurtured a new spirit of cooperation between the populace, CSVN authorities and American troops. This major undertaking to rebuild or repair 297 homes saw 122 completed in the first 40 days.
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(b) The Medical Civic Action Program II (MEDCAP) is continuing to be the greatest single factor in winning the people to the GVN and the American Forces. This media reaches thousands of persons in dire need who otherwise might be forgotten. The misery and suffering thus relieved has brought new hope for these people. The vast and efficient medical personnel from American units working jointly with available Vietnamese staffs is one of the most effective means possible to gain the support and respect of the people.

(c) The first major Civ Action project in the I Corps area was the reconstruction of the An Cuu Marketplace. This project is significant since it was a joint effort involving a platoon of engineers from the 326th Engineer BN and a platoon of engineers from the 101st ARVN Eng GP. This project did much to insure Vietnamese acceptance of the US Forces.

(4) No monthly Community Relations Council meetings have been held in the Divisions AO in I Corps. Present pacification status of population does not at present appear conducive to the establishment of a Community Relations Council.

(5) A summary of psychological warfare support.

(a) During this reporting period the 101st Airborne Division moved from Bien Hoa to Hue Phu Bai. Prior to the move, PSYOP campaigns by this Headquarters were oriented toward the exploitation of general themes as directed by II Field Forces. These themes included Chieu Hoi, Rewards, Pro GVN, TET, Allied GVN Power, Anti VC, and Anti NVA.

(b) Upon relocating in the Hue Phu Bai area the same themes prevailed, however, the directions provided for PSYOP activities came from III Marine Amphibious Forces Headquarters in Da Nang thru Provisional Corps Vietnam located at Phu Bai.

(c) Statistical data for this quarter is as follows:

1. Leaflets disseminated 35,625,550
2. Number of Loudspeaker Broadcasts 201
3. Number of movies shown 18

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2. SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. PERSONNEL

(1) Replacements:

(a) Observation: Unprogrammed losses in key slots (both officer and enlisted) have not been filled in a timely manner.

(b) Evaluation: It has been our experience that, when a Commander, an aviator, or an NCO in a critical MOS slot is lost to the Division, no provision for his replacement seems to have been made.

(c) Recommendation: That the unit reporting an unprogrammed loss be given notification of receipt of that report, and be given as much information as is available pertaining to when a replacement will become available. In addition, when the replacement is finally assigned to the unit, his orders should note that he is being assigned against the unprogrammed loss.

(2) Casualty Reporting:

(a) Observation: Reporting casualties of all categories when operating at distant locations from where personnel records are maintained requires a communications capability not organic to an airborne division.

(b) Evaluation: This division, when it first moved to I Corps Tactical Zone, had no communication with the Division main at Bien Hoa. Since then two lines have been allocated the Division for the passage of administrative traffic. In addition to these, we have a single channel RHI capability. With the constant flow of administrative traffic inherent in a Division Headquarters, it is impossible to assign a single capability to the AG Casualty Branch as a solo-user circuit. Consequently, casualty reporting is done on an opportunistic basis, and as a result is often delayed.

(c) Recommendations: That consideration be given to augmenting AG casualty sections with their own long range communications capability. This capability should be one by which a two-way conversation can be easily achieved. An alternative to this augmentation would be the granting of a solo-user circuit for casualty reporting when units are operating beyond normal communications capabilities.

(3) Levies:

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(a) Observation: During the reporting period, this Division has been levied for key personnel by higher headquarters as shown:

<table>
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<th>Number</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade Officers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior NCO's</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 and L4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Evaluation: This Division, has a critical shortage of Captains and Senior NCO's. These are the two areas that have been hit the hardest by levies. If these levies continue at their present rate, the combat effectiveness of the 101st Airborne Division will have to suffer accordingly.

(a) Recommendation: That added consideration be given to minimizing levies against the 101st Airborne Division. This consideration will become increasingly important when this division begins to reorganize under an airmobile TOE.

(4) Aircraft Mechanics

(a) Observation: The TOE of the Light Airmobile Company, Aviation Battalion, Airborne Division (TOE 1-578) does not provide enough mechanics in the aircraft maintenance section to support the number of flying hours required to support a division.

(b) Evaluation: The TOE provides for three (3) sections of twelve (12) helicopter mechanics of which one is a supervisor. The normal availability after KP, perimeter guard, details and R&R will leave enough men to provide approximately 4500 man hours maintenance per month. The normal flying time in the company is 2200-2400 hours per month. This provides a ratio of 2 maintenance man hours per flying hour; which is insufficient.

(c) Recommendation: That a serious detailed study of the TOE be made with a realistic view towards normal support of a division in combat.

(5) Aircraft Door Gunners

(a) Observation: There are no aircraft door gunners authorized in the TOE (1-586) for the aviation General Support Company, Aviation Battalion, Airborne Division.
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(b) Evaluation: Door gunners for the armed helicopters and the two UH-1 command and control aircraft are required in the helicopter to provide suppressive and protective fire. The door gunners currently have to be provided from within the company or from infantry units in the division.

(c) Recommendation: That door gunners (11B) be added to the TOE (1-586).

(6) Officer Personnel for AAE:

(a) Observation: The TOE provides one (1) major (Asst Division Aviation Officer) to man the Army Aviation Element (AAE) in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC).

(b) The AAE at DTOC is a 24 hour a day operation. The necessary personnel to operate the AAE on a sustained basis have to be drawn from the Aviation Battalion.

(c) Recommendation: That the Aviation Battalion Headquarters Company TOE be increased by two (2) Captains (0251B) to provide minimum personnel to operate the AAE in DTOC.

(7) Ammunition Handlers

(a) Observation: There is only one Ammunition Storage Specialist authorized in the Aviation General Support Company, Aviation Battalion, Airborne Division TOE 1-586.

(b) Evaluation: This TOE authorizes six (6) armed helicopters with the XM1 armament sub system. With only one ammo man authorized it is impossible to keep up with the ammunition requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That a minimum of five (5) more ammo handlers be authorized on this TOE.
OPERATIONS

(1) Night Operations:

(a) Observation. Night movements and ambushes were conducted extensively with great success.

(b) Evaluation. As units gained experience and confidence in their ability to operate at night, the enemy was denied night freedom of movement. During Operation JEB STUART alone, night ambushes accounted for 90 enemy KIA (KIA) while friendly casualties were 2 KIA and 3 WIA.

(c) Recommendation. All infantry units must continue to emphasize the value of night movement and ambushes. Training in these subjects must be realistic and comprehensive.

(2) Sapper Tactics:

(a) Observation. During the reporting period the Brigade base and night positions of subordinate units were subjected to sapper attacks.

(b) Evaluation. These attacks were initiated with mortar attacks. Sappers, advancing under the initial mortar barrages, employed RPG fire to create the effect of a continuing mortar attack. Bangalore torpedoes were used to breach defensive wire and enemy troops rushed into the perimeter hurling satchel charges and 7-pound blocks of TNT, primed with pull type fuses, into the perimeter bunkers.

(c) Recommendation. Night defense positions must be tightly configured, fields of fire cleared, sectors of responsibility clearly designated, and likely avenues of approach well defended and covered by fire.
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Personnel must continue to improve positions after dark if necessary. Personnel must be alert and awake in every bunker (use the buddy system in 3-man positions). Surveillance must be maintained during mortar attacks. Upon the first indication or detection of enemy infiltration, all means of organic and supporting firepower must be employed. All types of warning devices must be employed and expedient warning devices and systems improvised to meet the particular situation.

(4) Joint US/ARVN Forces Operations:

(a) Observation. Throughout the reporting period, provincial and ARVN Division forces operated in close coordination and in conjunction with the 2d Bde, thus providing valuable assistance in accomplishing the Bde mission.

(b) Evaluation. The provincial RF/PF units, although reluctant to conduct independent operations at the outset, became effective fighting forces when backed by the fire support and mobility resources of the US units. Participation by these units enabled the Bde to saturate the AO with maneuver units. These forces also provided an invaluable asset when fighting in populated areas.

(c) Recommendation. Close coordination and cooperation between ARVN and US military forces is a necessity when conducting operations in populated areas. Support provided to such units pays handsome dividends in the form of effective combat units that may be employed in the area of operation.

(5) Operations in the Coastal Plains:

(a) Observation. In the coastal plains, operations are characterized by frequent attacks of fortified villages and hedgerows.

(b) Evaluation. As a general rule, every village encountered in the lowlands between the coastal beaches and the foothills of the mountains to the west contain a series of mutually supporting and inter-connecting bunkers and trench systems.

(c) Recommendation. The fundamentals of attacking a fortified position must be stressed. Fire and maneuver at the squad and platoon level are essential and must be second nature to platoon and squad leaders.

(e) Cordon Operations:

(a) Observation. Cordon operations have been very successful in this area of operations.

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(b) Evaluation. These operations can only be productive if the commander can rapidly deploy sufficient blocking forces to contain the enemy. An immediately responsive transportation capability, such as an airmobile company, is essential to successful initiation of the operation. Of equal importance is the ability to fix the enemy once contact has been established and prior to the completion of the cordon. Intensive artillery fires and air strikes have been found to be particularly valuable in this regard. Once the enemy has been sealed in the cordon, all available means must be brought to bear to destroy him. The cordon must be impregnable. Continuous illumination must be provided at night. Constant pressure must be maintained until the enemy has been destroyed.

(c) Recommendation. Potentially, cordon operations can be most successful. To be successful, the requirements for rapid encirclement, adequate encircling forces, application of intensive fires and the capability to maintain a constant pressure must be satisfied. When properly executed, this type of operation can inflict heavy losses upon the enemy with a minimum of friendly casualties.

(7) Command and Control:

(a) Observation. Operations designed to saturate a given area of operations vastly increase the span of control of battalion and higher level commanders.

(b) Evaluation. In this type of environment, commanders often have units operating in widely divergent areas. Commanders must be able to obtain first hand information in order to make rapid and timely adjustments to the tactical dispositions to best meet the ever changing situation.

(c) Recommendation. It is recommended that battalion and higher level commanders be provided a utility helicopter equipped with a two channel radio console on a daily basis.

c. INTELLIGENCE

(1) Need for Liaison in Moving to New Areas

(a) Observation. Prior to moving into a new area of operations, the Division should have at hand all available intelligence on the enemy, terrain, and weather in the area.

(b) Evaluation: Several weeks are required for the gathering of intelligence of a new area sufficient to support Division operations, and it must be done in advance of the Division's arrival in the area. The only satisfactory means for obtaining the needed intelligence is through...
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personnel, which should be dispatched to every headquarters, US and Allied, possessing a collection capability that lies within or near the new Division AO.

(c) Recommendation. That all planned moves by the Division to new areas of operations provide for advance liaison visits to all major headquarters in the area for the specific purpose of gathering intelligence, all visits to extend over as many days as necessary to acquire all available intelligence.

(C) (2) Employment of AN/TPS-25 Radar in Base Camp Defense Plan

(a) Observation. Special technical equipment should be employed whenever possible to replace or augment troops in the security of a static base camp defense perimeter.

(b) Evaluation. This Division has found that the AN/TPS-25 Radar is ideally suited, where terrain permits, for employment in the base camp perimeter surveillance role. At night and under limited visibility conditions, this radar can detect movement of company size elements at 12,000m and individuals at 4,500m, obtaining accurate and reliable fixes on the enemy for their engagement by friendly weapons of the base camp defenses. These sets are mechanically reliable as well, as this Division's experience shows a total of 1600 hours of operation by its one set with only 43 minutes of "down time" for repairs. When employed from a highly elevated position inside a base camp, the TPS-25 can relieve a significant number of troops from the task of manning bunkers at night thru its reliable and accurate early warning capability.

(c) Recommendation. That the AN/TPS-25 Radar be acquired in sufficient quantity to issue down to the DS Arty Btry level (i.e., support of each Bde) and that static defense of base camps doctrine be amended to include the employment of these radars wherever possible for perimeter surveillance.

d. LOGISTICS

(1) Observation. Lack of organic transportation capability within the framework of the present TO&E.

(a) Evaluation. It was apparent upon arrival in country that the 101st Airborne Division lacked the necessary assets to effectively re-supply itself with the trucks on hand and that even if the trucks were available there was no existing organization to effectively maintain and control these assets. There were two courses of action open to the Division and
they were to obtain a currently existing transportation organization on a permanently attached basis or to form a provisional truck company out of the assets from the 1st Bde Support Bn and the 180 day loan vehicles.

(b) Recommendation. Form a provisional truck company as stated above.

(2) Observation. TO&E structure of the Airborne Maintenance Bn.

(a) Evaluation. At present the Airborne Maintenance Bn is organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, a Ground Maintenance Company and a Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company. In comparison to other divisions, which are performing the same basic mission for approximately the same number of troops and equipment, this organization is considered too light. It is felt that the Maintenance Bn should be re-organized to include at least three Forward Support Maintenance Detachments. This problem particularly comes to light in the areas of armament and electronics maintenance where the Forward Support Maintenance Platoon only has a total of 7 personnel covering these widely diversified fields.

(b) Recommendation. Approval of the MTOE which has been submitted covering this problem.

(3) Observation. Consideration should be given to allocating higher movement priorities for repair parts resupply.

(a) Evaluation. In a situation where Division Maintenance Bn is dependent upon long lines of communication, as is the case during counter-insurgency operations, it is necessary to reconsider normal allocations of available transportation assets, especially for repair parts resupply. Repair parts must receive a higher priority than that normally allocated. This is especially important for depot shipments against deadline requisitions.

(b) Recommendation. That repair parts resupply be accorded higher movement priority during periods of reduced transportation availability.

(4) Observation: The present communication system between forward and rear Support Command logistical elements does not provide for adequate alternate or back-up communication links.

(a) Evaluation. Communications in the counterinsurgency situation is a critical must. The need for transmission of reports and requests between the forward and rear areas is a continuing problem over the long
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Distances involved. The Support Command has by virtue of its attached SCOP a radio teletype capability which is adequate in most cases; however, there is no back-up method of rapid communications and if maintenance difficulties occur, both areas are hard pressed to obtain all the information necessary to maintain the flow of supplies vital to the accomplishment of the mission.

(b) Recommendation. That additional telephone and teletype circuits be provided for a communications link between the direct lines of communication forward (DLOC FWD) and the DLOC Rear.

(5) Observation. The use of geographic versus tactical boundaries for area support, Class I, caused unnecessary problems.

(a) Evaluation. The Marine Force Logistics Command, which was responsible for division Class I support, imposed geographic boundaries for Class I support, with the Marine Force Logistics Group - Alpha supporting all units south of Hue, and 1st Logistical Command supporting all units north of Hue to Quang Tri. This caused several problems for the division as our support was split between the two agencies due to unit dispositions. Liaison parties had to be maintained with both agencies, and two sets of records had to be maintained because of differences in means and procedures between Marines and Army.

(b) Recommendation. That inter-service support agreements be fully coordinated prior to large scale unit deployments.

(6) Observation. The lack of coordination of Inter-Service support agreements caused exclusion of Army Troop support in some instances.

(a) Evaluation. Because of a lack of coordination, fresh fruits and vegetables were not available to the division during the period 1 March - 28 April except for a two day supply of potatoes, cabbages and oranges. A local purchase contract had been made for fresh fruit and vegetables but it excluded Army troops.

(b) Recommendation. That inter-service support agreements are fully coordinated prior to large scale unit deployments.

(7) Observation. Complete pre-stockage of support elements prior to a large unit move is essential.

(a) Evaluation. Stockage objectives of support units were not adjusted prior to the division's move to I CTZ. The TET Offensive then hampered resupply so severely that some of these objectives were not met until well after the division had closed, and the need for supplies in general had
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become critical. Some of these objectives (Class V) have not been met yet.

(b) Recommendation. That stockage objectives of support units be adjusted and pre-stock completed before deployment of a division.

(8) Observation: Neither divisional nor non-divisional maintenance support elements were moved to I CTZ in time to adequately support combat elements during and immediately after the division move.

(a) Evaluation: Sufficient transportation assets were not made available to move ground maintenance elements, both division and non-divisional support elements, until 3 weeks after combat elements had closed I CTZ. Area maintenance elements were not able to adequately support the division during this three weeks, as the Marines did not have repair parts for Army peculiar items. This situation caused an excessive and extended deadline situation.

(b) Recommendation. Adequate area type maintenance be pre-positioned prior to a division move, and organic maintenance units be allocated higher movement priority.

(9) Lessons Learned

(a) Prompt high quality telephone and teletype service between logistical activities is a must.

(b) When moving tactical units consideration must be given to logistical activities, organic and area support, so that upon closing the new area adequate supply and services may be rendered.

(c) Adequate transportation must be afforded the logistical activities to insure that normal resupply can take place on a timely basis.

(d) Greater care must be taken to insure that the transportation assets available are utilized to the maximum in the role of resupply and movement of combat units.

(10) Fire Fighting Equipment

(a) Observation. The fire fighting equipment in the aviation battalion TOE is totally inadequate.

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(b) Evaluation. The fire fighting equipment for all the division's eighty-eight (88) aircraft consists of one (1) 3/4 ton truck with chemical fire extinguishers and foam fire extinguishers. The capability of this system to extinguish an aircraft fire and save lives is highly questionable.

(c) Recommendation. That a fire truck with suitable fire extinguishing capability be added to the Aviation Battalion TOE.

(11) Maintenance Tents (Tent, Maintenance, Frame Type)

(a) Observation. Lack of maintenance tents in units.

(b) Evaluation. The extreme weather conditions existing in the current operational area reduces the efficiency of the aircraft mechanics for a good six (6) hours during the middle part of the day. During the rainy season it reduces the maintenance man hours available and efficiency even more.

(c) Recommendation. That more maintenance tents be made available to aviation units operating in SEA to increase efficiency of maintenance personnel. These should be added to the TOE.

(12) Armed Helicopters

(a) Observation. There are not enough armed helicopters authorized in the TOE to provide sufficient support to divisional units.

(b) Evaluation. The TOE provides six (6) armed helicopters for the entire division. The armed helicopters are used to provide armed escort, night mortar watch, chemical detector missions, close support to ground troops, convoy coverage and numerous other missions. It overtaxes the available maintenance facilities to keep more than four of the six aircraft flyable at one time.

(c) Recommendation. That at least six (6) more armed helicopters be added to the TOE with a corresponding increase in aviators and maintenance personnel.

g. ORGANIZATION

(1) Transportation Aircraft Maintenance

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(a) Observation. The transportation aircraft maintenance company is insufficiently manned to provide direct support maintenance to the division's aircraft.

(b) Evaluation. The division's aircraft will fly an average of 6160 hours per month requiring approximately 42,000 man hours of maintenance. The TOE of the Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company provides for only 29,400 man hours per month and does not include necessary details, KP, guard and shortage of authorized personnel. This is totally unsatisfactory to maintain aircraft in a proper condition to support the division.

(c) Recommendation. That a re-evaluation of the TOE for the Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company, Maint Bn, Airborne Division be conducted.

(2) Post Exchange Supplies

(a) Observation. For the first month of the Division's tenure in I CTZ, PX supplies were non-existent. This situation was aggravated by the non-availability of sundry packs.

(b) Evaluation. PX supplies of essential items (toilet articles, etc) do not create a bulk storage or transportation problem of any significant magnitude, and are the bare minimums that a unit must have to maintain an acceptable degree of hygiene and morale.

(c) Recommendation. That upon deployment of a unit to an area of known austerity, some provision be made to provide day to day expendables. This could be accomplished through one of the mobile PX facilities that are known to be already operational.

(3) TOE Insufficiency

(a) Observation. TOE of the AG Section is insufficient to perform its functions during combat in RVN.

(b) Evaluation. It has been found that TOE 12-157G does not authorize a casualty unit nor an awards and decorations unit, both essential for combat operations. Additionally, authorized personnel are insufficient in the Postal Division, (two officers and twenty-four EM).

(c) Recommendation. A complete review of TOE 12-157G is required with a view toward establishment of a casualty reporting unit.
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an awards unit and increased spaces for the Division Postal Section. The following spaces are recommended:

1. Awards unit: Two officers and 30 EM.
2. Casualty reporting unit: One officer and 10 EM.
3. Postal Division: Three officers and 50 EM.

d. SIGNAL

(1) Radio Relay Terminal AN/MRC-68

(a) Observation. The four channel system, radio relay terminal set AN/MRC-68 does not possess the capacity to provide the required multi-channel service within the division for passing voice (Sole User & Common User), and teletypewriter service to the Brigade CP's and provide adequate communications from the Division Main CP. Although the AN/MRC-68 possesses the capability of employing two AN/TCC-3 terminals, to actually do so negates the required facility for "back up" communication in the event one system is rendered inoperative. Although employing two AN/TCC-3 provides eight circuits, this still does not meet the minimum division to brigade communications requirements.

(b) Evaluation. The twelve channel system AN/MRC-69, or equivalent, possesses the facilities to provide multi-channel service between the division elements for the G2, G3, G3 Air, LNO, FSCC, RRU, SSD, Weather, G4, and trunking switching facilities.

(c) Recommendation. That the signal brigade provide internal signal communications in support of divisional requirements utilizing radio relay terminal set AN/MRC-69 providing 12-channel service in use, and 12-channel capability for "back-up" or alternate routing.

(2) Switchboard AN/MTC-1 and SB-86/P

(e) Observation. Manual switchboard SB-86/P, 60 local telephone capacity switchboard, whether configured as AN/MTC-7, AN/MTC-10 or SB-86/P does not provide adequate or satisfactory telephone switching service to divisional size headquarters. At Camp Eagle, in I Corps Tactical Zone, telephone and switching requirements exceeded a total of sixty (60) trunking circuits between Division Main CP, higher headquarters, and major subordinate headquarters. In addition to this (114) local telephones were
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installed off the Camp Eagle switchboard with (36) extension telephones utilising the AN/HIC-1. An average of 6000 telephone calls are completed daily for the switchboard subscribers.

(c) Evaluation. Switchboard AN/HIC-1, 200 local telephone capacity switchboard with three (3) switchboard operator positions, automatic ringdown signaling and dial telephone facilities is required to support the switchboard communications requirements at Division Main CP. The AN/HIC-1 presently is on 180 day loan to the Division Signal Battalion which will expire in June 1968. The employment of this switchboard has proven invaluable in supporting the Division.

(d) Recommendation. That either the switchboard AN/HIC-1 be made available on extended loan to support divisional size units in RVN, or that the 1st Signal Brigade provide switchboard AN/HIC-1 to meet the Division Main CP switching requirements.

(3) Radio Set AN/GRC-163

(a) Observation. In supporting the brigade within the Division area of operation telephone service from the various fire support bases; one of the major problems was in non-availability of CH-47's in conjunction with the mission priority as established. Based on the priorities established, delay has frequently been experienced in getting telephone service into the FSB. By employing the radio set AN/GRC-163, a four (4) channel telephone and two (2) channel teletypewriter service is provided, which is very compact and lightweight when detached from its prime mover, 4 ton truck. It consists of R-524, R-442, Multiplexer TD-856 (R)/TCC, and a 1.5 KW generator. It is considered an internal load for a helicopter UH-1D. The transportability plus the rapid installation time of approximately 30 minutes is in itself a valuable factor of installation of a multi-channel system.

(b) Evaluation. The AN/GRC-163 consisting of the components mentioned above plus the log periodic antenna once positioned, dug in, utilizes an area of ground space less than 4'x4'. Presently the AN/GRC-163 is undergoing operational test to measure its reliability in RVN.

(c) Recommendation. That radio set AN/GRC-163 be adopted for employment at divisional control level to facilitate the rapid deployment of the communications system within the division.

(4) Cable System.

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(a) Observation. Communication paths provided over 50 pair
cable between Provisional Corps Vietnam area communications network, through
Gia Le to Camp Eagle area. There were some ramifications. First, the multi-
pairs of the cable were not tested between Phu Bai and Gia Le in order to
determine the exact quality of the cable. Second, the cable was extended from
Gia Le to Camp Eagle and was buried at a depth of 3 feet. Distortion and
sporadic tone was observed on various pairs of the cable and testing was
conducted to isolate the source of the distortion. Contributing to this
problem was the frequent over-riding distortion between Phu Bai and Eagle
switchboards. The resistance on the cable at various points measured over
950 OHMs when the test was conducted, also resistance at the Camp Eagle
switchboard read as high as 2,150 OHMs before the problem was solved through
"com-grounding" of the switchboard and patch panel. Additionally, the cable
was cut by bulldozers building revetments.

(b) Evaluation. The quality of circuitry over cable provides
adequate service, provided the cable system is properly tested upon install-
ation and resistance is determined as opposed to the requested services
required. If the cable had been buried a depth of 6-7 feet initially,
properly posted along the cable route with signs reading "buried cable" the
service would not have been interrupted.

(c) Recommendation. That cable systems installed be properly
tested upon the completion of installation and the network be turned over
for acceptance to the requesting signal unit for systems engineering, and a
cable platoon be "on call" to facilitate the rapid restoration of the system
if an outage occurs. Also there is a definite requirement for a VHF system,
pre-phased for the immediate "switch-over" of the circuits from cable to VHF
until the cable can be restored.

(5) Cable CG 1042/U (T-Splice)

(a) Observation. Upon effecting the 4 channel system, AN/
H:C-68, normally 60 minutes in time is consumed in erecting the ground plane
antenna's for engineering purposes, consisting of one for the transmitter
and one for the receiver. Systems engineering is a necessity and is normally
executed utilizing the spare radio set AN/GRC-10. The "T-Splice" is not a
component of the AN/H:C-68 but it is provided with radio set AN/GRC-2L.

(b) Evaluation. The signal battalion in order to enhance
effecting VHF systems, fabricated "T-Spliced" cables for use with the AN/
H:C-68 which provides internal connections to the transmitter and receiver and
therefore requires the erection of only one ground plane antenna thereby
reducing antenna erection time by fifty percent.

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(a) Recommendation. That the cable CG 1024/U, T-Splice", be issued as a component of radio relay terminal AN/MRC-68.

(6) 45 KW Generator

(a) Observation. The VOC of the Airborne Signal Battalion does not include a central power source for the communications equipment. Available power consist of FU-322 and 3 KW generators to individually power the AN/MRC-68, AN/MGC-17, and AN/GRC-142.

(b) Evaluation. Under continuous operation of the FU-322 generator and 3 KW generator a high deadline rate has resulted, due to the non-availability of required repair parts. Prior to deployment to RVN two (2) 45 KW generators were procured for use as a central power source. This has provided uninterrupted power for all the communications equipment at Division Main and Division Forward CP.

(c) Recommendation. That 45 KW generators be made available to signal battalions in support of divisional size communications complex as a control power source.

(7) Power for Radio Set AN/GRC-142

(a) Observation. The 3 KW, DC generator designed to provide power for the radio set AN/GRC-46, is being used as the primary power source for the AN/GRC-142.

(b) Evaluation. The 3 KW (DC) generator is inadequate to provide power for the AN/GRC-142 under continuous operation. The AN/GRC-142 is provided with an air conditioner to cool the signal equipment during operation. Since a DC generator is providing power, the air conditioner does not have a power source.

(c) Recommendation: That generator set FU-332A, 10 KW (AC) be provided as primary power source for radio set AN/GRC-142.

(8) Terminal Telegraph AN/HSC-29 VS AN/HSC-17

(a) Observation. The AN/HSC-17 central office teletypewriter has the capacity to terminate either one full-duplex or two half-duplex circuits with security equipment. The division has been supported with an AN/HSC-29 from the area signal battalion in order to terminate circuit requirements.

(b) Evaluation. The AN/HSC-17 is inadequate to terminate the secure circuits (received "Irregular. HQ. DA". Secure circuits terminated
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in the Division Communications Center consist of, one full-duplex from Provisional Corps Vietnam, one half-duplex from division Rear CP, one half-duplex from Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC), one half-duplex from Corps Weather Station, and one half-duplex circuit to each of the three Brigade's CPs. The breakdown of the teletypewriter TT-44/TC due to maintenance problems results in a shortage of equipment vital to the operation of the communication center.

(c) Recommendation. That the telegraph terminal AN/PRC-29 with the capacity to terminate 8 full-duplex or 12 half-duplex non-secure circuits, or 2 full-duplex and 4 half-duplex, secure circuits be provided to divisional size Airborne Signal Battalions.

(9) Radio Set AN/PRT-4 & AN/PRR-9

(a) Observation. Crystals for "combat loss" squad radio set AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 are not being shipped with replacement radios and are not available through normal supply action.

(b) Evaluation. Without proper operating crystals the radios cannot function with other unit radios.

(c) Recommendation. Spare crystals for squad radios should be made available for "combat loss" replacements. Crystals should be sent with the radios when request for replacement radios are received at the depot.

(10) Keying Device KYK-28

(a) Observation. Insufficient KYK-28 keying devices, were issued with initial issue of T/SEC KY-28 speech security devices to meet the division requirement.

(b) Evaluation. The basis of initial issue (one KYK-28 per four KY-28) is adequate when units are operating in one locale, however, when divisional units are dispersed and operate in various areas as the division does, then additional keying devices are required.

(c) Recommendation. Keying devices for T/SEC KY-28 and KT-38 should be supplied on an "as required" basis to units where deployment of equipment is in a widely separated area.

(11) FM Frequencies
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(a) Observation: FM Frequency problems are much greater in I CTZ than III CTZ.

(b) Evaluation: Apparently much fewer frequencies are available for assignment in I CTZ than were available in II CTZ and III CTZ areas. However, terrain "compartment" in I CTZ should provide good frequency separation if frequencies are divided and assigned by "geographical areas." This seems an ideal solution on paper, but in practice, units are not bound to certain fixed areas and interference results. Certain frequencies are assigned as "shared" frequencies, but due to the wattage output of various radios sharing the frequencies, the results are unsatisfactory, for the strongest signal generated will dominate the "shared" frequency.

(c) Recommendation. Assign available frequencies on the basis of firm geographical areas, except that some frequencies should be used only by one unit within the Corps area. All "shared" frequencies should be limited to low power or AN/PRC-25 used so that sharing is possible.

(12) Turn in of KL-7's and HL-1's:

(a) Observation. Due to the preponderance of other secure means of transmission, there is great reluctance, world-wide, to utilize "off-line" encryption. The system is relatively complex, laborious, and time consuming. This in turn has adversely affected the availability of accomplished operators, consequently few 72B's can be considered skilled "off-line" cryptographers.

(b) Evaluation. It is considered a poor security practice (particularly below Division level) to stock crypto devices and associated material which are never used. In addition, the secure voice and teletype capability coupled with the availability of KAC Codes, one-time pads, air-courier, ARFCOS facilities, etc, negate the need for any internal "off line" back-up within the Division. A staff study recommended the retention of 2 each KL-7's, HL-1's and a Theater System at Divisional level only, in the event "off-line" traffic is introduced into the Division Communication complex from an outside source. Correspondence was initiated and USARV subsequently authorized the turn-in of 11 each Cipher Machines KL-7's, 6 each Tape Readers HL-1's, and associated equipment.

(c) Recommendation. Prior to deployment, amend TOE or obtain authorization to turn in all but 2 KL-7's and associated equipment. If, after arrival, requirement exists for additional "off-line" equipment, machines can be obtained from the COMSEC Logistic Support Unit, Vietnam

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(13) Preparation and Distribution of Key-list Extracts and KAC Codes.

(a) Observation. AG classified facilities for reproducing Keylist Extracts are somewhat limited and severely taxed initially. Units must arrive in country with adequate keying material, KAC Codes, etc. and be prepared to establish immediate secure communications. Resupply is difficult due to wide dispersion of Division Units and limited transportation facilities.

(b) Evaluation. The Division Crypto Office effected a 90 day issue of KAC Codes and Keylist Extracts to all subordinate accounts prior to departure from CONUS. This eliminated the need for any immediate publication, reproduction and distribution of keying material during the hectic period covering preparation for deployment, deployment and establishment of base camp.

(c) Recommendation. That all subordinate crypto accounts deploy with a 60-90 day supply of KAC Codes and keying material. In this request, research the possibility of obtaining pre-printed Keylist Extracts from CRIOLEX (COMSEC Regional Issuing Office List Extracts) prior to departure. It will completely eliminate the tedious task of reproducing extracts from a Master Keylist.

(14) Secure Voice Equipment Augmentation

(a) Observation. KY-8 assets in country are extremely limited. Additional Secure Voice Equipment can be requested from CLSU-V only after establishment of TOE, MTOE, or special authorization. Even after proper documentation and authorization is established, prompt delivery cannot be guaranteed due to the critical shortage of this device.

(b) Evaluation. It is imperative that a unit carefully evaluate and anticipate their secure voice requirements prior to departure. In attempting to determine your KY-8 requirements, include a 15% maintenance float, and a 5% operational float to cover additional secure voice circuits which may be levied after arrival in country. 101st Airborne Division initiated correspondence for KY-8 augmentation prior to deployment and obtained DA approval for 2 each KY-8's per Infantry Battalion and Support Command. Equipment was mounted and installed prior to deployment. Correspondence for additional KY-8's for Div Art (down to and including Battery level) is still pending.

(c) Recommendation: Initiate correspondence and obtain KY-8 augmentation prior to departure. Insure that 2 each KY-8's are obtained for Support Command, each Infantry Battalion, and Artillery Battery if not already reflected by TOE, MTOE, or special authorization. Include a 20% increase of
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Total authorization to cover a 15% maintenance float and a 5% operational float. It should be noted that the KY-8's authorized for CO, two ADC's, and 03 vehicles are rarely if ever used. This allows some latitude and flexibility in allocation of equipment.

(15) Availability of Repair Parts

(a) Observation. Several critically needed cryptographic repair parts are in extremely short supply in country. COMSEC equipment is deadlined at GISU-W for lack of parts. This, at times, adversely affects the DISRA's ability to DX bad equipment.

(b) Evaluation. 101st Airborne Division deployed with a 90-day supply of repair parts, which proved more than adequate. PLL was recalled from all subordinate accounts and stacked at Division level. "X-Mode" cables contribute to at least 50% of KY-8 difficulties. Capacitor C-1 and power switch CB-1 for KY-8 are virtually impossible to obtain. E-BAT(K-1,K-2) W-2, W-7, cables and dummy plugs for KX-7 are also difficult to obtain in-country.

(c) Recommendations: Deploy with at least a 60-day supply of COMSEC repair parts to include:

1. E-BAT (K-1, K-2) 25 spares for each 50 KN-2.
2. W-2, M-5, W-7 cables, 25 spares for each 50 KN-7's.
3. Dummy plugs, 25 spares for each 50 KN-7's.
4. "X-Mode" cable, 25 spares for each 50 KY-8's.
5. Power cable, 10 spares for each 50 KY-8's.
6. Capacitor C-1, 25 spares for each 50 KY-8's.
7. Power switch CB-1, 15 spares for each 60 KY-8's.

(16) Establishment of Crypto maintenance and Accounting Facilities and Augmentation of Maintenance Personnel.

(a) Observation. Airborne TOE makes little or no allowance for additional equipment for establishment of crypto facility under tactical conditions. No augmentation of maintenance personnel despite the tremendous projected increase in certain items of COMSEC equipment.
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(b) Evaluation. Attempts to amend TOE to reflect adequate equipment were unsuccessful in CONUS. Division must possess capability to operate maintenance facilities at both Division Forward, and Division Rear. Additional teletype, test equipment, etc is required. Several hundred KY-38's are projected for the Division in the near future with no anticipated increase in maintenance personnel.

(c) Recommendation. Analyze carefully your TOE, MTOE and special authorization of crypto assets. Initiate correspondence and attempt to obtain prior to departure, authorization for sufficient personnel and equipment to sustain both a Division Rear and Forward accounting and maintenance facility. This should include:

1. Sufficient teletype equipment to establish bench position for KW-7's at both locations.
2. Sufficient power supplies to establish bench position for KY-8's at both locations.
3. 2 each relay test sets and additional test equipment as required.
4. Adequate tentage and/or shelters, field desks, tables, lighting kits, etc to operate tactically in both locations.
5. A minimum of 2 each 4-drawer decure containers (note: this unit very successfully, employs conexes at both Rear and Forward areas for storage and maintenance facilities.)
6. Adequate accounting and maintenance personnel to handle vast increase in COMSEC equipment.

(17) Administrative:

(a) Observation. The need to establish a new account in country and transport existing account safely to overseas location requires considerable coordination.

(b) Evaluation. Signal Battalion liaison officer established contact with Field Army Issuing Office-Vietnam (FAIO-V) immediately upon arrival in-country. New account number and other vital information were immediately forwarded to the Division Crypto Office in CONUS. New orders and signature cards reflect: the new account number were prepared along with a letter of introduction from the Battalion Commander to FAIO-V. These items were hand-carried to FAIO-V by the Division Alternate Crypto Officer who accompanied the Advance Party. Effective use of the Alternate Custodian was instrumental in establishing the new account and accomplishing much of the liaison work relative to supply operations prior to the arrival of the main body.
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(c) Recommendation.

1 Recommend maximum use be made of the Alternate Custodian. His selection as part of the advance party will help facilitate establishment of the new account and permit immediate transaction of business by the Custodian upon his arrival in country. More specifically, the Alternate Custodian can effect liaison with FAIO-V, ascertain in country Keylist, KAC Codes, etc, requirements, prepare DA Form 2770 for new Crypto Facility, obtain RRU approval, and establish new account.

2 Recommend the Custodian accompany the account to the overseas location.

e. ENGINEER

(1) Observation. An additional line company is required to provide a general support capability.

(a) Evaluation. This observation has been made by every engineer battalion organized without a general support capability in every after action report submitted in Vietnam. . . . These three line companies are barely capable of providing the required combat support for the three Infantry Brigades. This leaves the division base with no organic engineer support capability. It must be remembered that the base includes such units as Division Headquarters, Aviation Battalion, Support Command and the Cavalry Squadron - all requiring a tremendous amount of engineer support. Non-divisional engineer elements have been reluctant to accept the types of missions most often required by these units.

(b) Recommendation. That an additional line company be authorized within battalion.

(2) Observation. Employment of the M450 bulldozer.

(a) Evaluation. The M450 dozer is a small, light dozer that can be lifted in one piece by a CH-54 or sectionalized by a CH-47. The one piece insertion into a heavily wooded LZ provides a rapid means of clearing the trees that have been cut or blown down. This is often the only practical means to expand an LZ in heavily wooded areas, so that heavier equipment can later be inserted.

(b) Recommendation. That early use of the M450 be considered for construction of new LZ's in heavily wooded terrain.
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(3) Sub-soil conditions in the piedmont in the northern I CTZ are excellent for construction of roads and helipads.

(a) Evaluation. The piedmont in northern I CTZ is sparsely foliated and consists of a gravel and laterite subsoil. Roads and helipads can be readily constructed by stripping and shaping. Little if any compactive effort is required, drainage is generally excellent, and dust suppression is relatively simple. For roads, an application of 50/50 mix of peneprime and diesel fuel, allowed to cure for 24 hours, followed by 100% application of peneprime gives good results. Helipads can be satisfactorily constructed by a single 100% application of peneprime.

(b) Recommendation: Observation be noted.

(4) Observation. The VC have recently employed several new types of mines and booby traps.

(a) Evaluation. The VC have recently employed several new mine devices which tend to reduce the incidence of detection with metallic mine detectors. The basic method is to emplace large non-metallic charges in the roadway initiated by small pressure type firing devices. Often the explosive, less the metallic firing device will be inserted in the road for a considerable period to allow the traffic to compact the disturbed surface and to mislead the daily mine clearing teams. Later, a small hole is made in the surface and a small, difficult to detect, detonator is inserted. Other methods to avoid detection include deep burial of all metallic working parts of the mine. See figures 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 below.

(b) Recommendation. Observation be noted.

(5) Observation. Cutting LZ's in the dense foliage requires special techniques.

(a) Evaluation. In the Hue area, the dense foliage requires a larger amount of explosives than on previous operations. To alleviate this problem each infantryman entering the forward area carries in with him 2-4 pounds of C4. This is consolidated at the battalion forward CP and issued to the engineer demolitions teams as required. The larger trees encountered have required the use of shaped charges so that an internal charge may be used to cut the tree. This has resulted in a savings in explosives.

(b) Recommendation. In dense foliated terrain engineer
demolitions supply should be augmented by requiring each infantryman to bring in 2-4 pounds of C4, to be centrally located for future use. Internal charges should be considered for larger trees to save on demolitions.

(6) Observation. Joint civic action projects offer many advantages.

(a) Evaluation. A joint US/ARVN Civic Action project was undertaken to restore the An Cu market place at Hue. This involved US and ARVN engineer troops and local citizens working jointly to construct the facility. Advantages of this system are (1) that a better understanding of ARVN is achieved by US troops that would otherwise have little opportunity for this contact, (2) the US input acts as a catalyst for greater and faster ARVN participation, (3) the psychological and propaganda value of the completed project is greater, (4) US engineer resources are always critical and the ARVN assistance increases their capability to complete meaningful projects.

(b) Recommendation. Continuation of such projects.

(7) Observation. Well-planned MEDCAPS are essential for maximum effectiveness.

(a) Evaluation. This unit conducted several MEDCAPS in the city of Hue. These were the first since the TET Offensive and attracted large numbers of people. As it became apparent that all the people might not receive treatment, they became anxious and tended to swamp the medical personnel, thus reducing the overall efficiency of the MEDCAP. Also it is an American tendency to treat children first, this is not always understood by the Vietnamese who have a greater respect for the aged. Therefore, the following single rules should be applied to all MEDCAPS:

1. Insure adequate personnel, VN civilian police if necessary, are available to maintain order.

2. Insure adequate time and medication will be available to treat all potential patients.

3. Treat all patients in order without regard to age.

(b) Recommendation. The rules enumerated in the Evaluation be observed on all MEDCAPS.
3. SECTION 3, HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION.

a. Confidential msg #42434 from AVHGC-DST, Subject: Tactical Cover and Deception, DTC 271113Z March 1968, requested data from preparing agencies on Cover and Deception operations conducted during the period.

b. Throughout the reporting period, the 101st Airborne Division has been actively engaged with enemy forces both in I and III CTZ's. There has been no requirement for overt deception operations at Division level other than normal security and counterintelligence measures taken consistent with the current operational missions. One such technique utilized by Division forces has been that of carrying 4-5 days rations at the beginning of an operation. The technique reduces the necessity for daily helicopter resupply. It allows the maneuver elements to operate more freely without telegraphing their direction and rate of progress by daily logistical sorties. It further reduces the necessity of relocating daily, night defensive positions, when resupply is accomplished late in the afternoon.

c. During the period 25 March through 28 March, the 101st Abn Div did participate in a Corps level deception plan IAW Annex H to Provisional Corps Vietnam OPORD 3-68, dated 16 March 1968. The plan was designed to convince the enemy that the main thrust of PCV attack would be in the Dong Hoa area and to the north, and further to deceive the enemy on the 1st ACD's plan to attack west along Hwy 9 to relieve the Khe Sanh combat base. The concept of operation as it applied to the 101st Abn Div was to move one rifle company and a Signal Detachment to vic Dong Ha. The Signal Detachment was to transmit radio messages simulating an Arrival Airfield Control Group such as would be conducted if the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div were moving to Dong Ha. The rifle company was to conduct operations in the villages and populated areas, so as to obtain maximum exposure of the Screaming Eagle Patch and give the impression that a much larger force was in the area. One airborne rifle company and 15 personnel (1 Off and 14 EM) from the B.501st Signal Bn moved by air from Hue/Phu Bai Airfield to Dong Ha on 25 March. Two AN/VRC-49 radios and one AN/ARC-121 radio group accompanied the signal personnel. Operational control of the Task Force passed to CG, 3d Marine Division upon arrival at Dong Ha.

d. The 15 personnel were located in two different locations approximately 10 Km apart. This was done so that all the radio signals would not emanate from the same location. The signal team was to simulate the following radio nets:

(1) 2d Bde Command Net
(2) 2d Bde Admin Net
(3) 2d Bde Intel Net
(4) 1/501 Bn Cmd Net
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(5) 1/501 Bn Log net
(6) 2/501 Bn Cmd Net
(7) 2/501 Log Net
(8) 1/502 Bn Cmd Net
(9) 1/502 Log net
(10) Arty Cmd Net
(11) Arty F-1 Net
(12) Company nets for A, B, and C Companies of each Bn.

e. This Headquarters is unable to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the deception operation, however, some observations were made concerning the internal functioning of the operation. These observations are discussed below.

(1) The scenario which accompanied the signal personnel included approximately 7 messages per net per day. Although ad lib messages were used to keep the nets active, it was recommended that the scenario be expanded.

(2) Some personnel with peculiar speech patterns were unable to disguise their voices, and thereby could only be used to represent the same call sign in a net. This limited personnel flexibility and it is recommended that radio operators be thoroughly screened to facilitate maximum personnel utilization.

(3) It was also discovered that inexperienced enlisted personnel had difficulty playing a convincing role as an officer or senior NCO. It is recommended that senior grade personnel conduct such an operation in order to add credence to the radio messages.

(4) When many nets are being simulated from one location, care must be taken to prevent background noises from other nets telegraphing the attempt to deceive.

(5) At the termination of the signal portion of the exercise, the 3/3 Marines were to actually assume the role of the units previously simulated. The transition passed smoothly except it was noted that only one call sign from the scenario corresponded with those of the new unit. Care should be taken in future operations of this nature to ensure that the simulated unit does not disappear abruptly as was the case cited above.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, HCS 65 (RI)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ALL INCLUSIONS WITHDRAWN, HQ, DA

W. P. TALLON, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

6 - Through Channels to ACofS for Force Development,
    DA (ACOF S, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310
2 - CINCPAC, ATTN: ODP-27, APO 96358
3 - HEAD, ATTN: AVDO-76T, APO 96375
15 - CO, 101st Abn Div, ATTN: AVDO-OG, APO 96343

65
AVII-GCT (10 May 68) 1st Ind
LTC Clark/jas/2157
SUBLEKT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division, for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, PCV, APO San Francisco 96308 25 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Enclosed ORL, 101st Airborne Division, is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (c) Comments on Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities, follow:

a. Items currently in short supply, page 33, para 1d(4)(c).

(1) Ration issues are now supplemented with issues of locally procured fresh fruits and vegetables for Army troops in NICTZ. There will be an increased availability of perishable ration components as soon as planned construction of refrigerated storage facilities is completed.


(3) Class V - pyrotechnics, illuminating, are in short supply in Vietnam. Continuing review of stockage objectives by 1st Logistical Command assures maximum issues subject to item availability.

b. Item: Shortage of vaccines, page 36, para 1d(5)(e). This matter was reviewed by the 4th Advance Platoon, 32d Medical Depot and the assistant medical officer, 101st Abn Div. They report that there was no shortage of vaccine in NICTZ during this period. Information is not available at this headquarters concerning the status in III CTZ.

3. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned, commander's observations and recommendations, are listed below.


b. Item: Casualty reporting, page 39, para 2(a)(2). Resolution of this problem is not within the capabilities of this headquarters. Recommend that USARV review the division's recommendations for feasibility.

c. Item: Levies, page 39, para 2a(3). Concur. Requirements for levies are recognized; however, recommend that special consideration be given to reducing their levy requirements during reorganization of the 101st Abn Div.

d. Item: Aircraft mechanics, page 40, para 2a(4). Concur. Reporting unit has been advised to submit MTDS with justification in detail for the additional mechanics required.

6/6

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e. Item: Aircraft door gunners, page 40, para 2a(5). Concur. Door gunners are authorized for all separate helicopter companies. The positions should be included into TDE 1-586 by the submission of an MTDE. Division has been advised of this requirement.

f. Item: Officer personnel for AAE, page 41, para 2a(6). Division has been advised to submit MTDE for addition; however, MOS for these officers should be 2518.

g. Item: Ammunition handlers, page 41, para 2a(7). Nonconcur. One ammunition storage specialist is adequate to supervise the amount of ammunition maintained in a company size unit. Normal operating procedures in Armed Helicopter units is for aircraft crews to perform all loading and handling of aircraft ordnance. Additional ammunition handlers are not considered necessary or warranted.

h. Item: Night operations, page 42, para 2b(1). Concur. BUSHMASTER and STINGRAY operations in PCV receive continual emphasis. A tactical seminar on night operations, chaired by the PCV DOG, will be held on 26 July 1968 to review all aspects of night operations.

i. Item: Sapper tactics, page 42, para 2b(3). Concur.


m. Item: Command and control, page 44, para 2b(7). Concur. Under present conditions commanders must utilize jury rigged radio and antenna systems or use the helicopter radio. When using the helicopter radio the commander has little flexibility to switch channels.

n. Item: Need for liaison in moving to new areas, page 44, para 2c(1). Concur.

o. Item: Employment of AN/TPS-25 radar in base camp defense, page 45, para 2c(2). Concur. A request has been submitted to USARV for additional radar sets.

p. Item: Lack of organic transportation within present TDE, page 45, para 2d(1). Concur that additional truck assets are needed to sustain a
division in ground combat. The first alternative, to obtain a currently existing transportation unit to support an airborne division, would be the better solution since maintenance elements would be already established.

q. Item: The structure of airborne maintenance battalion, page 46, para 2d(2). Concur. However, this may not be true after reorganization of the division. The 801st Maint Bn, 101st Abn Div, is presently making a study to determine the adequacy of the proposed maintenance and support configuration for the division after reorganization and will submit recommendations accordingly.

r. Item: Allocation of higher movement priorities for repair parts resupply, page 46, para 2d(3). Concur. Additionally it is recommended that concurrent planning for, and commitment of logistical units with combat units be accomplished in order to achieve continuity in logistical support.

s. Item: Alternate or back-up communication links between forward and rear support command logistical elements, page 46, 2d(4). Concur in principle. In a situation as described, the division should receive additional voice user telephone and teleprinter trunk to its rear area. These have been provided in the form of a tettotype circuit and a voice circuit to Bien Hoa, and a voice circuit to USAF. Nevertheless, even these dedicated circuits, which tend to degrade the common user system in favor of one division, appear insufficient to satisfy requirements. The real solution of the problem is to avoid separation, by long distances, of divisions rear and forward elements.

t. Item: Use of geographic versus tactical boundaries for area support, Class I, page 47, para 2d(5). Concur. Full coordination of inter-service support agreements prior to large scale unit deployments are essential to minimize problems caused by area support boundary considerations.


v. Item: Pre-stockage of support elements prior to a large unit move, page 47, para 2d(7). Concur. Pre-stocked supplies free transportation assets vitally needed for unit moves.

w. Item: Pre-positioning of area maintenance support units, page 48, para 2d(8). Concur. The concurrent planning for, and commitment of logistical units with combat units should be effected. This will provide more responsive combat service support, increased combat effectiveness and a balanced utilisation of transportation needs.
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AVIL-OCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division,
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)


z. Item: Armed helicopters, page 49, para 2d(12). No action contemplated by this headquarters in view of the planned reorganisation under the airmobile configuration.

aa. Item: Transportation aircraft maintenance, page 49, para 2e(1). No action by this headquarters in view of planned reorganisation under airmobile configuration.

ab. Item: Post Exchange supplies, page 50, para 2e(2). Concur in recommendation. A policy statement should be developed during the concurrent planning phase regarding the source of health and hygiene items to be pre-stocked and shipped concurrently with combat essential items.

ac. Item: TDE insufficiency, page 50, para 2e(3). Concur. However, it is further recommended that consideration be given to relocating the AG base functions closer to the forward elements of the division. This would reduce communication time and would provide for centralisation of some functions and reduce personnel requirements.


(1) An airborne division, when operating as an Infantry division should be afforded twelve channel systems between division main CP and the Bde CP's.

(2) It does not follow, however, that 1st Signal Brigade should provide this support. The 1st Sig Bde has commitments which far exceed its present resources. These commitments are area communications, base camp support, DCS communications and Advisor/ORDS communications support. Further, 1st Sig Bde does not have the mission for the internal support of divisions, nor does the Army doctrine call for it. In some instances, the 1st Sig Bde has provided the divisions with internal support.

(3) The solution is in MTOE action by the division. However, since the division will convert to an airmobile configuration, no further action is required at this time.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division,
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

ae. Item: Switchboard AN/MTQ-1 and SE-B6/P, page 51, para 2f(2). Concur. The 101st Abn Div has an AN/MTQ-1 switchboard on extended loan from II PAVN. If this were not the case, 1st Sig Bde would provide an area switchboard at Div HQ as it does at numerous division CP's in RVN.

af. Item: Radio set AN/GRC-163, page 52, para 2f(3). Concur. PCV had four AN/GRC-163 available from USAFR for testing. These sets were loaned to the 101st Abn Div for use as described. Testing of the AN/GRC-163 proved successful. The 101st Abn Div is authorized a number of AN/GRC-163 radios and has these on requisition. Delivery is promised in early FY 1969.


(1) Cable was installed hastily and could not be engineered by the Communications System Engineering Management Agency (CSWMA) of 1st Sig Bde. Further, the Gia Le - Camp Eagle cable run was installed on a temporary basis and was not planned as a permanent installation, but as a field installed project.

(2) The VHF back-up system was installed and pre-phased after the first cable break was experienced.

ah. Item: Cable GG-1042/U (T-splice), page 53, para 2f(5). Concur.

ai. Item: 45 KW generator, page 54, para 2f(6). Concur with following exception. 45 KW generators should be made available to the division signal battalion through local arrangements with engineer support elements. This equipment is too heavy to be placed on TDA of an airborne or airmobile division.


ak. Item: Terminal telegraph AN/MSC-29 vs AN/MSC-17, page 54, para 2f(8). Concur. It should be noted however, that the introduction of the AN/MSC-29 decreases air mobility and transportability of the airborne signal battalion. The AN/MSC-29 is mounted on a 2 1/2 ton truck; the AN/MSC-17 is mounted on a 3/4 ton truck.


am. Item: Keying device KTK-28, page 55, para 2f(10). Concur. It should be noted that these items are in short supply in RVN.

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AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division, for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG 35PFR-65 (R1) (U)


(1) There are presently some 540 FM frequencies available for use in I CTZ. These frequencies are the same as were issued to III CTZ. However, the PCV area is smaller; the resultant compression causes frequency congestion and interference. Frequencies are assigned on the basis of geographical separation; in addition, some frequencies are assigned on a single use basis. Frequency "bootlegging" is prevalent and control is difficult. Also, Vietnamese JGS will not issue additional frequencies.

(2) This headquarters has informed the 101st Abn Div of the above and will stress the optimum use of low power to all units in PCV area.

ao. Item: Turn in of KL-7 and HL-1, page 56, para 2f(12). Concur. This equipment is outdated, obsolete, and unable to meet "real time" encryption and decryption requirements of divisions and other units.

as. Item: Preparation and distribution of key-list extracts on KAC codes, page 57, para 2f(13). Concur.

sq. Item: Secure voice equipment, page 57, para 2f(14). Concur, except that there is a world wide shortage of this equipment. NSA is trying to overcome this, but production and budgetary conditions, plus programmed requirements, make it impossible to keep up with demand.

sr. Item: Availability of repair parts, page 58, para 2f(15). Recommend consideration of this paragraph by HQ, USARV.

as. Item: Crypto maintenance and accounting facilities and augmentation of maintenance personnel, page 58, para 2f(16). Recommend further study by HQ, USARV.

at. Item: Administration of crypto material and accounts, page 59, para 2f(17). Recommend further study by HQ, USARV.

as. Item: Additional company in engineer battalion, page 60, para 2g(1). Concur. Division has been notified to initiate HTOE action if desired. No further action by this headquarters.

av. Item: Page 60 - 62, para 2g(2) - (6). Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (18 Mar 68) 2d Ind (C)  CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 14685
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the
period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 21 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters,
101st Air Cavalry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning replacements, page 39, paragraph 2a(1);
      and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a: Nonconcur. Requisitions for replace-
      ment of unprogrammed personnel losses (UPL) are regularly submitted to
      Department of the Army; of necessity, the determination of quantity,
      grade, and MOS for each UPL requisition must be based on past experience.
      In summary, this headquarters sees no advantage in identifying UPL numer-
      ical replacements as long as this command lacks the capability of com-
      pletely replacing even programmed critical losses with required grade
      and MOS.

   b. Reference item concerning casualty reporting, page 39, paragraph
      2a(2), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3b. The recommendation to provide
      the Division AG its own long range communication capability is not con-
      sidered practical or economical. This would create a requirement for
      additional communications operating and maintenance personnel and equip-
      ment separate from the Division Signal Battalion. Augmentation required
      to meet additional communications requirements of the division should
      be requested and be provided by the Division Signal Battalion, which
      has the mission of providing communications support within the division.

   c. Reference item concerning levies, page 39, paragraph 2a(3); and
      1st Indorsement, paragraph 3c: Nonconcur. This command is required to
      provide large numbers of experienced company grade officers and senior
      noncommissioned officers to MACV to serve as RP/PF advisors. Levies
      are apportioned among USARV combat elements in accordance with ability
      to fill and USARV command guidance. Shortage of captains and senior
      NCO's described in 101st Air Cavalry Division ORLL item is reflected in
      all combat elements. Unusual circumstances which require special
      consideration should be presented by the unit to DOG, USARV, through
      command channels; Operational Reports-Lessons Learned does not con-
      stitute an adequate or appropriate device for requesting or recom-
      mending preferential treatment in regard to personnel levies.
AVHC-DST (18 Mar 68) 2d Ind (C) 21 JUL 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

d. Reference item concerning command and control, page 44, paragraph 2b(7); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3m. Command and control consoles (AN/ASC-10 and AN/ASC-11) are issued according to an established USARV Basis of Issue. The 101st Air Cavalry Division has been allocated and issued ten consoles. If more consoles are required, a letter of request and justification should be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: AVHAV-LOG.

e. Reference item concerning allocating higher movement priorities for repair parts resupply, page 46, paragraph 2d(3); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3r: Nonconcur. Based on information presented, it appears that the problem lies in movement of the items from the depot to the customer. USARV Regulation 700-8 contains detailed instructions on the use of Redball Support which is a program specifically designed to expedite delivery of repair parts. Priority air delivery systems prescribed in USARV Regulation 55-4 are available to expedite deliveries. Additionally the 384th Air Division operates daily flights through coordination with local THA office. Transportation priorities are predicated on MILSTRIP (DOD Instructions 4410.6) Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMIPS). This system allows the requisitioner to establish the supply priority in accordance with UMIPS which dictates the transportation priority that the material moves under. This priority cannot be changed by anyone except the requisitioner.

f. Reference item concerning area support, Class I, page 47, paragraph d(5) and item concerning Inter-Service agreements, page 47, paragraph 2d(6): Nonconcur. Interservice support agreements do not govern the methods of distribution of supplies in combat operations. An interservice support agreement is currently in existence and provides that Navy is responsible for all Class I supply in I CTZ. Location and operation of Class I Supply Points is determined by tactical commanders in conjunction with their logistical staff advisors. Although it is agreed that it is normally better to support all elements of one unit from the same supply point, the operational conditions dictate the final decision and not the ISSA.

g. Reference item concerning post exchange supplies, page 50, paragraph 2e(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3ab: Concur. Mobile exchange units are prepositioned with forward troops where possible based on available assets. The Vietnam Regional Exchange monitors troop movements both in-country moves and arrivals from CONUS in order to ensure that support is responsive to the needs of the commander. Exchange
subject to the 101st was provided initially by the Marines. When the division was sufficiently settled in its forward base camp, exchange support was provided directly from the Da Nang exchange depot. Since Sundries Packs were not a fast moving item in I CTZ prior to the Army buildup, the Navy did not stock sufficient quantities to meet Army requirements. Immediate action was taken to transfer stocks to the Navy from Army resources in II, III, & IV CTZ's.

h. Reference item concerning cable system, page 52, paragraph 2f(4).

(1) The allegation implied by the observation, evaluation, and recommendation on this item is that the two buried 25 pair cables installed between Camp Eagle and Gia Le and the 50 pair cables installed between Gia Le and Phu Bai were not properly installed and tested. However, the implication is incorrect.

(2) The 25 pair cables (unloaded) between Camp Eagle and Gia Le were installed on a crash basis to meet the requirements of the division. It was intended to provide service into the communications nodal point at Gia Le, a distance that precluded the need for loading coils at that time.

(3) The 50 pair (loaded) buried cable between Gia Le and Phu Bai were installed to permit the operation of dial trunks between Gia Le and Phu Bai.

(4) A mobile dial exchange was not available for commitment at Gia Le at the time the 101st Air Cavalry Division deployed to Camp Eagle. Therefore, a smaller switchboard was installed at Gia Le and an additional manual switchboard was installed at Camp Eagle to serve the 101st Air Cavalry Division.

(5) At the request of the 101st Air Cavalry Division, an attempt was made to provide direct dial trunks from the manual switchboard at Camp Eagle to Phu Bai. These trunks would not operate satisfactorily due to the distances involved and an attempt to utilize both unloaded and loaded cables.
JUL 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(6) The improper grounding of the manual switchboard of the 101st Air Cavalry Division at Camp Eagle would introduce noise and hum on all lines connected to the board regardless of quality of cable construction. As noted in the report, when the board was properly grounded, that problem was solved.

(7) The normal depth at which cable is buried is between 30 to 40 inches. 40 inches being the maximum depth a trencher will dig a cable trench. When the cable was originally installed, the area was not secure and the use of signs would have drawn unnecessary notice to the cable location. A cable construction platoon of the 40th Signal Battalion is available on call to maintain this cable. Coordination should be effected with the 40th Signal Battalion for routine and emergency service.

1. Reference item concerning radio sets AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9, page 55, paragraph 2(f(9)). HQ USAV letter, file AVHGD-MD, subj, CK-81 Crystal Replacement, 16 February 1968, informed all units of stock numbers of individual crystals comprising Kits A, B, and C to permit units to requisition replacement crystals as required.

2. Reference item concerning keying device KYK-28, page 55, paragraph 2(f(10) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3am. The KYK-28 is used to key both the KY-28 and KY-38. The BOI for the KYK-28 is one per four KY-28 and one per three KY-38, which results in a total of two KYK-28 per seven KY-38. Normally, the communications chief or his representative key all KY-28/38 in a given area. During the period of this report, the full authorization of KYK-28's and KY-38's was not available for issue to the division. When full authorization is issued, sufficient KYK-28 should be available to meet operational requirements. If experience shows otherwise, MTCE action should be initiated.

3. Reference item concerning availability of spare parts, page 58, paragraph 2(f(15) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3ar. Concur in recommendation that units deploy with 60 day supply of CONSEC spare parts. This will allow normal operations while accounts are established and changes to demand data are completed. Though not addressed in this report, the PLL, currently for 15 days, should not be increased unless programmed in advance to avoid severe drain on the supply system.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Reference item concerning crypto maintenance, accounting facilities, and augmentation of maintenance personnel, page 58, paragraph 2f(16): Nonconcur. A proposed Communications Security (COMSEC) Logistic Support Plan, approved by HQ, USAARV, has been forwarded for approval by USASTRATCOM and DA. This plan envisions the assignment of COMSEC Divisional Contact Detachments (CDCDS) to each division for direct support COMSEC maintenance to all units assigned and attached to the parent division. This concept will be employed until experience is gained with the new KY-8, KY-28, and KY-38 series of COMSEC equipment and Divisional Signal Battalion MTOE changes are defined and processed.

2. Reference item concerning administrative, page 59, paragraph 2f(17) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3at: Concur. Any action which will help facilitate the establishment of a new account and permit immediate transactions of business by the custodian upon arrival in-country will tend to ease or eliminate most problems attendant to an overseas deployment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSURASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 101st Air Cav Div
HQ, PCV
GPOP-DT (18 Mar 68) 3d Inj (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Abn Div for the Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. T. SHORTT
Capt, AGC
Asst AG
Figure 6

"A" and "D" ATTACK POSITION

"D" LZ

E-8

CS GRENADES EMPLOYED

WIND DIRECTION

ACTION 10 APRIL 1968
Figure 9

CONFIDENTIAL
The blue bombs dropped from aircraft. A number of them do not detonate on contact with the ground. They are pressure type firing devices and are used numerous times by the VC.

**Figure 10**

Confidential
CONFIDENTIAL

BOOBY TRAPPED KNIFE

Pull on Knife Releases Pin on Grenade

Hole Drilled in Table

Spring Visible on Side of Table

Figure 11
Check Shoulders & Holes in Road

Road

H-16 (US) Antipersonnel Mine

Aluminum & TNT

Soil

Top View

Figure 12

CONFIDENTIAL

Top View

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 101st Air Cavalry Division (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, 101st Air Cavalry Division
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.